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Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects

1964

The Military Career of William Booth Taliaferro, April

1861-February 1863
Robert Charles Bolander
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

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Recommended Citation
Bolander, Robert Charles, "The Military Career of William Booth Taliaferro, April 1861-February 1863"
(1964). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539624557.
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-nd2a-hc11

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THE MILITARY CAREER OF WILLIAM BOOTH TALIAFERRO
Vi

APRIL 1861 »*:FEBRUARY W U

A Thesis

P resen ted to

The F a c u lt y of the D epartm ent of H istory

The College of William and M ary In V irginia

In P a rtia l Fulfillm ent

Of the R equirem ents for the D egree of

M aster of A rts

By

Robert C h arles Bolander

August i% 4
 APPROVAL SHEET

This th esis is subm itted In p a rtia l fulftllm ent of

the requirements for the degree of

.Master of Arts

Approved, August, 1964:

I S w f f i B* Johoajm, Ph. -jj£— ™

William W. Abbot, Ph. 0 .

 ACKNOWLBDOEMENTS

The author wishes: to ex p ress ;h te :appreciation to P ro fesso r

Ludwell H* Johnson* under whose guidance this investigation was

c o n d u c te d , for his patient guidance and constructive criticism

throughout the Investigation. The many kindnesses of M iss Jeanne

English helped to m ake the re s e a rc h and w riting of this th esis

possible.

I ll
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. . . . . ... . . . . . . ., . . .

LIST OF MAPS . . . .. . :. . . . . ., . . ..

ABSTRACT . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter
I. GENERAL PROBLEMS OE CONFEDERATE COMMAND

: RESOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

a. FUTILE CAMPAIGN AND A TEDIOUS MARCH . . ‘

HI. AN INAUSPICIOUS BEGINNING UNDER JACKSON .

IV. SUCCESS FROM CEDAR MOUNTAIN TO

FREDERICKSBURG...........................................

V. A VIRGINIA ARISTOCRAT TO THE END . . . .

BIBLIOGRAPHY................. ....

VITA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 .JUST OF.MAPS

' 'Page

Theatre of O perations--A rm y of N orthern V irglnia ... .. . . .. IS

Rich Mountatn Campaign and R etreat, July, 1861. ,. , * 22

Cheat McmnlMn, Campaign, S e p t e m b e r * 1861* .. . . * 38

Battle of G reen b rier R iver, October 3 ,1 8 6 1 . * * 44

Battle of .Me Be well.! May 8, 1862 . . . . . . . * , 61

B attle around P o rt Republic, June 8 and 9, 1862,.* *■> ... . r 65

B attle of C4©dar Mountain, August 9, 1862... .* . . .* . . , 73

laekaen'e'RaM around Pope, August 24* 28, 1862"-.. . . . * 81

Battle of Fredericksburg, *Becember 13* 14, 1862* ** . . * 90

v
 ABSTRACT

The purpose of th is paper is to tra c e the m ilita ry c a re e r

in V irginia of Brigadier General William B. Taliaferro* C. S. A.
The available biographical sketches of T aliaferro a r e inadequate,
especially those concerning his .m ilitary career*. There is,die*
agreem en t over w hether or not T aliaferro w as ever prom oted to
Major*General*. And If he did rece iv e his commission* why w as
it not until the end of the w a r t Was it because he was incom petent?
If he was com petent, then why was hie prom otion so long in coming?
And why was he passed over for prom otion when he was the senior
officer In h is division? What w as it that m ade him tra n s fe r to
another th e a tre of w ar?

Each of th ese questions posed a problem* T aliaferro had

been a lead er in th e ante-bellum V irginia p o litics and society.
Following the w ar, he again played an influential ro le in V irginia.
Was it possible that such an Individual would prove incom petent
as a m ilita ry lead er? P erh ap s i R esearch would have to provide
the an sw ers. And it did.

This paper exam ines Virglnia*6 com mand re so u rc e s a t the

outbreak of h o stilities in o rd er to put in p ro p er p ersp ectiv e the
p rofessional opportunities a m an of T aliaferro 1® experience could
reasonably anticipate. Following this is a detailed n a rra tiv e of
Taliaferro*s action during his m onths of se rv ic e in V irginia. The
conclusion is favorable to T aliaferro . On the whole, he app ears
a s a com petent field com m ander. Only an e a rlie r conflict with
his commanding general caused T aliaferro to be p assed over for
prom otion in January, 1863. His prom otion finally com es, but it
is in the closing hours of the w ar.

The conclusion is that T aliaferro , although not b rillian t,

w as a s able a com m ander as m ost of those who held the rank of
m ajo r general.

vi
THE MILITARY CAREER OF WILLIAM BOOTH TALIAFERRO

APRIL 1861.- FEBRUARY 1863

 CHAPTER I

GENERAL PROBLEMS OF CONFEDERATE COMMAND RESOURCES

I *. . 1

When V irginia seceded from the Union A pril 17, 186 l»i she

p o ssessed a substantial volunteer m ilitary organization* Her ”paper

i - , * _

re s e rv e 1* totaled 143, 155 men, the la rg e s t re s e rv e In the South and

the seventh la rg e s t in the old Union, But thousands that w ere counted

as effectives', w ere u n fit'fo r‘m ilitary'Service'* V irginia11s arm ed units

, i

totaled 12, 150 m en with 118 infantry com panies, forty-tw o com panies

of riflem en, sixty-seven troops of cavalry and twelve com panies of

a rtille ry . Ready volunteers without weapons, about half a s num erous

as those arm ed , including twelve additional a rtille ry units which

i l'

awaited needed ordnance, brought Virginia*® total fighting force near

20, 000 at her s e c e s s io n .1

With am ple m anpower, the state le g isla tu re turned to the

question of potential le a d e rs. W here w ere the brigade, divisional,

and arm y com m anders to com e from ? How w ere com petent field

officers to be provided?

*Douglas Southall F reem an, Tee*® Jbleutenants (Hew York, 1942)J

I, 701-725. F reem an has done the only survey on the Southern R esources
of Command.
 2

There w ere seventy-five o fficers on the ro s te r of the reg u lar

United States arm y; nineteen w ere colonels, nineteen lieutenant

colonels, and th irty -sev en m ajo rs. The reg u lar arm y staff was

com pose# of ten colonels, ten lieutenant colonels an# fifty-one

m ajor s--m ak in g a gran# total of 146, officers plus the four g en erals.

The averag e a g e ,of the gen erals was sixty-eight, of the colonels

sixty-seven. D espite the static condition of the reg u lar arm y 1*

officers, it was assum ed by the ..Virginians that th e ir -sons w ere-

younger, m ore able, and vastly su p erio r to th eir co u n terp arts in

the H erth and that they would go with th eir state.

Winfield Scott, com m ander of the A rm y, was a V irginian,

as was Joseph E. Johnston, Q u a rte rm a ste r G eneral, with the staff

rank of b rig ad ier general. Six colonels of the line w ere V irginians:

John Garland, Thomas T* F auntleroy, Matthew M* Payne, Philip

S ^ ^ e o r g e ■Cooke, Washington Seawell, and E o b e rtE . Dee* Only

Cooke and Lee w ere g raduates of the Daited States M ilitary Academy.

Two lieutenant colonels, both W est P o in ters, w ere V irginians: John

Bankhead M agruder -and G eorge E.- Lay. Other V irginians holding

com m issions in the reg u lar arm y w ere: ten m a jo rs, staff and line,

seven of whom w ere West Point graduates, tw enty-three captains,

twenty being West P o in ters; of th irty -o n e lieutenants, tw enty-three

w ere West .point g rad u ates; and of the ten second lieutenants, all but

two had graduated from the M ilitary Academy. In all, th e re w ere

eighty-four reg u lar o fficers from V irginia, sixty*four of whom had

gone to West Point*

Virginians second source- of lead ersh ip m a te ria l w as the’

■graduates of West Point who'.-had serv ed in th e re g u la r A rm y and had

resigned their com m issions T rio r to- V irg in ia’s *sec ession;' In 'all,"

th e re w ere twenty-two such m en who w ere natives of Virginia; '■'■Some

of the m o re prom inent m en in this Category included Thomas B.

Randolph, age sixty-nine, residing In M issouri in 186 l t and W alter

Gwyim, an experienced engineer; specializing in ra ilro a d and bridge

construction. O thers who d eserv e attention w ere the Reverend W. N.

Pendleton, •William" B, M agruder, h ead of a Kentucky g ir ls ’ -school,

and P ro fesso r Thomas j . Jackson who: .had earned S' distinguished

re c o rd in the Mexican W ar.

Those o fficers who- had parfcicipatedin the Mexican' War

constituted Virginia*$ -th ird source' of officer; m aterial.-. The number

of th e se v eteran s, not- alread y included, in any other’ category, totaled

at le a st ninety-four. A rth u r C. Cummings, V irginia M ilitary Institute,

law yer, colonel In V irginia1e m ilitia, -and William B. 'T aliaferro ,

G loucester planter and law yer, two m en of distinction, had been

breveted a s m ajo rs during the Mexican War.

V irginia M ilitary Institute, operating in Lexington since 1839

under the-direction of its Superintendent F ra n c is H. S m ith --a m em her

of the G overnor’s A dvisory C ouncil--w as to provide an Invaluable

source of potential le a d e rs. Much of the discipline and a la rg e p a rt of

the professional train in g of the United States M ilitary Academy had been

copied by V. M* 1* In the w ords of one of its historians# it provided

Ma lib e ra l education, coupled with a m ilita ry training, in belief that

its graduates would prove valuable citizen s, all the m ore useful because

capable of bearing a rm s efficiently In the hour of th eir country’s need.

In 1861, V. M. t had 433 living graduates and 645 non-graduate s.

M ost of them resid e d In V irginia and constituted an im m ediate and

indispensable officer r e s e rv e co rp s;

V irginia could also hope to draw upon the r e s t of the South for

its officers. The r e s t of the South p o ssessed 184 living graduates of

West Point, only eighty m o re than V irginia h e rse lf; F u rth erm o re,

th irty -six officers from other sta tes, who w ere not West P o in ters,

w ere listed on the Arm y R e g iste r.- Among the m o re distinguished

w are B rig ad ier G eneral D. E. -Twiggs who- had ■surrendered the Texas

fo rts to the Confederacy, Colonel A. S. Johnston, a b rev et b rig ad ier

general, and B rigadier G eneral W. S. Harney of Louisiana, who had

alread y d eclared for the Union. Colonel Samuel Cooper, a native

New Y orker tied to the South through m a rria g e , was to become

adjutant and inspector general for the Confederacy. M ajor Braxton

Bragg, a breveted lieutenant colonel, Captain P. G. T. B eauregard,

2Ibid. , p. 708.
alread y a b rig ad ier general, for the Confederacy, W. W. Loring#.

form erly a United States colonel# and. Lieutenant- Colonel W, J. Hardee

a recognised, tactician# w ere all to-becom e fam iliar figures. M ajors

E arl Van. Dorn and E. Kirby Smith,, who- w ere ;io- have, im portant, ro les

in the coming w estern, campaigns#' and lam es. Long s tre e t, ..former .

A rm y paym aster destined to play. a. leading ro le with' the A rm y of

N orthern Virginia# a ll (resig n ed their.(co m m issio n s,to serv e the..

Confederacy. A few other majors# relativ ely unknown# and a con­

siderable num ber of captains#, old for th e ir grade because of th e

sm alln ess of the United States Army# also- resigned to se rv e the.

South*..

These, men w ere alread y busy training re c ru its in the deep

South* , V irginia could expect v ery few, _if any a t all#., to a s s is t in

organizing her. troops. N either could, she expect to g e t o fficers from

the existing or defunct m ilita ry schools in the other Southern .states*

The Citadel was to- ren d er se rv ic e to South C arolina sim ilar, to-

V. M. 1. Is contributions to V irginia. But Virginia, could co-unton

her, s is te r -tstates for support in battle, when the. invaders-.came...

From all sources# V irginia could count a m aximum of 625

m en with m ilita ry train in g or .experience*. . Exclusive- of V. M* I. *s

contribution, the total was not m o re than 208. The p ertin en t question

was., whether they all would support the C onfederate cause.

Scott w as unyielding,in his allegiance to- the Union*. .Lee,

 6

although deploring secession* remained firmly for V irginia. M ajor

G eorge H. Thomas of Idea's form er regim ent rem ained loyal to the

Union. Joseph E. Johnston# with staff rank of brigadier general#

resig n ed to join the Confederacy. Philip St. George Cooke d eclared

his firs t allegiance w as to the Union and not to Virginia* but his

son-in-law , J. E. B* Stuart, w as to tight for the Confederacy.

Colonel Thomas Fauntleroy, at the age of sixty-five, sided with the

C onfederacy. Of the other th irte en field officers* five w ere for

Virginia! John. Bankhead Magruder* R obert Hall Chilton* R obert S.

G arnett, Henry H ill and A lbert J. Smith. Hina of the- twenty active

g eneral and field officers born in V irginia w ere to defend h er.

Forty* seven of the sixty-four activ e company o fficers appointed to

the United S tates A rm y from V irginia w ere to fight for h er. And of

the seventeen officers who had resig n e d p rio r to 1861, th irte en sided

with the Confederacy. One activ e officer and th re e of those who had

resigned did not p articip ate on eith er side.

The resp o n se of the M exican War v eteran s was a bit d isap ­

pointing because of th e ir age. Out of ninety-four potential commanders*

tw enty-five w e re to en list In the se rv ic e of the South. Some excellent

o fficers w ere forthcoming—Jam es JU Kemper* William B. Taliaferro*

M ontgomery D. Corse* and David A. W eislger im m ediately volunteered

and receiv ed com m issions.

The resp o n se of the V* M. I. graduates w as excellent. Within

three'm o n th s of V irginia’s secession, one th ird of the field officers of

V irginia’s volunteer reg im en ts and iw o t b ird s of the ■'’provisional”

regim en ts Of the sta te w ere V .' M. I* men. By 1362 they w ere furnishing

one' third^of 'the regim ental le a d e rs. Eighty *two p er cent of'the'

school’s total 'graduates '(I,. 781 of 1, 902) from 1829 to 1865 w ere to

se rv e In the Confederate A rm y.

Other individuals**sons of V irginia by b irth And by choice,

h u t‘appointed to th e Academy "from other states**w ere to se rv e

V irginia. Captain G eorge E. Pickett, h o rn In Richmond' hut appointed

to West Point fro m ’Illinois, Joined the South. M ajor Daniel Buggies

of M assachusetts, W est Point Class of' '183-3, w as m a rried ' to' a

' v . {
Southerner' and chose to fight for the South, B revet M ajor John C.

Pem hSrton of P en asy iv an ia'reelg n ed a s a captain of a rtille ry in the'

reg u lar arm y because of Southern p rinciples. M ajor Benjam in Huger,

a brevet colonel in the South C arolina volunteers, Was to play a m ajor

ro le In 'th e 'e a rly V irginia Campaigns.

D espite the num erous resignations' from th e re g u la r arm y and

despite th e high calib er of the le a d e rs she was enlisting, V irginia felt

hum iliated. V irginia had the' highest p ercen tag e o f officers in the

United' States' A rm y w hich refu sed to- 'recognise secessio n . T hirty

p er cent of the West Point g rad u ates from' Virginia- d eclared for the"'

North com pared to a ten p er cent average throughout the r e s t of the

South. Only eighteen of twenty*nine reg u lar com m issioned officers

from V irginia d eclared for the South j 'twenty-: seven, of- th irty *foar

com m issloned'-officers from the r e s t of the South d eclared for the

Confederacy* .'There a r e two reaso n s for .this relatively^stronger

pro-U nion sentim ent in Virginia* A 'd eep er -cleavage o v er th e is s u e

of secessio n existed in Virginia* 1'■■Furthermore* a s o n e of the Union* s

oldest and m o st .populous states* she had' continually supplied a la rg e

quota of officers to the.Army*-, many of whom, growing .up within the

Union as*, a whole, had lo st touch, with V irginia h e rse lf. Most of those

who retain ed clo se tie s with, her; sided with her* :

On A pril. 18* 1861, before it was known what m o s t'o f th ese m en

would do* the V irginia Convention .authorized th e Governor to m u tte r

Into se rv ic e as many volunteer -troops at. n e c e ssa ry to re p e la n y

Invasion* .and to appoint Virginia*© general,: field* and staff-officers*

Under V irginia law* .the volu n teers elected th eir company o ffic e r Si

the G overnor and his council appointed the field o fficers* ' V irginia

law differed slightly from -the policy of the C onfederate government*

If the volunteers w ere offered'as. battalions or regiments-, they could,

elect th e ir' own,field officers' if th e ir state law ■permitted. fbretident-

Jefferso n p av is could appoint m ajors, lieutenant colonels* and

colonels -only to unattached units*. ■w hich;had;been form ed .into regim ents;

otherwise* a ll positions w ere to be filled by elections. The political

rationale, of this unwise system, was that th e volunteers constituted

state m ilitia m u ste re d .Into C onfederate,s erv ice. _ U n d er'the. perm anent
 9

Constitution, the appointm ent of m ilitia officers for battalion, regi*

, m ental, andcom pany commands w a s r e s e rv e d to the Individual states*-

A ll-com m issions In-the re g u la r arm y o fth e 'Confederacy, w ere by,

.presidential appointment# although In estab lish ed ,reg im en ts, all ,

vacancies<beiow .-the-rank of b rig ad ier general w e re to be “filled, by.,

prom otion according to,seniority..**,

The V irginia Convention on th e day -that it voted for secession,

also auth o rised the'.Cknrornor.'to.o^ghnise sufficient volunteers to stop

an enemy---Invasion, and- to appoint the nec es eary field com m ander s.

T a lia fe rro ,’now-a m ajo r general of the m ilitia » w a s given tem p o rary

com mand of hlor folk* Kenton H arper, another m ajor general in the

m ilitia , w as sen t to HarperVs F e rry . Philip St. George Cooke w as

Commissioned b rigadier g en eral and o rd ered to assum e d irectio n of

a ffa irs in A lexandria. .Major- Daniel Rugglea w as assigned- to

F re d erick sb u rg as b rig a d ie r,general .of.the- V olunteers. On A pril Z$$

Dee, w ith th e ran k 'o f m a jo r general#, took command of all V irginia

forces* 3*: F . . Jbbnstpn# a lso a m ajo r g en eral of She V olunteers,

.declined the nom m and of th e Richmond fo rces and its d e fen ses for

the reaso n that V irginians-m ilitary organisation was-known to-be.

tem porary* .d u t because swift o rg an isatio n was n ec essary for d efen se

of the'State#; other o fficers accepted, th e ir com m issions Im m ediately.

They were, willing to ris k losing th e ir state com m issions, receiving

a low er Confederate rank, or having to .serve under a- Confederate

officer whom they outranked'w hen Virginia* s V olunteer System 'w as'

in teg rated in to ’the' reg u lar C onfederateA rm y.

Soon regim ents from; other- .states began arriv in g . - Aim.oat

im m ediately ’.fic tio n arbS#-between V irginia and C onfederate

au th o rities, >To alleviate th is ^Secretary of W ar Derby P v Walker

|h form al order's gave Dee# as V irginia com m ander, tem p o rary

control' o f all Confederate forces w ith in th e state* But- even D eb's

b e e t‘efforts,-could not control’the riv a lrie s and am bitions of a ll die

o fficers. Im patience and bickering seem ed fb dom inate a ll con*#

eider'attons. Then on May 23* 'the-V irginia v o ters overw helm ingly

approved the ordinance o f secessio n . Virginia's- troops b ecam e p a rt

Of th e Confederate m ilita ry organization.

The Confederacy had fewer than 1500 train ed officers available

fo r.service*; W est1Pointers# graduates an d non*graduates alike, to taled

le ss .'than 300. G raduates and nbm gradoates of the various- state

m ilita ry schools totaled approxim ately TOO. V eteran officers of other

3
w ars num bered som e 300. But th a t w as-all. There-'-were only 1300

trained, offlee rs t o command som e ’650,000 volunteers, if V irginia

expected to u tilise h er en tire m anpow er, which included 250, 000 m o re

who b ad been tu rn ed away for lack of a rm s , she would have to- se cu re

3Robert R. ElliS, "The Confederate Infantry Officer,'' Infantry

Journal. LXIV-LXV <1949), 17.
additional officers* At le a st 25, 000 general officers of all a rm s and

se rv ic e s would foe needed.

P lan te rs, lawyers* bishops, and professional so ld iers a ll

volunteered tkefr services* T he.professionals em phasized the need

for m ilita ry ■experience'and,edueationr-the non-professionals..contended

that the ability to c a rry a rm s an d 'to command w ere as. readily, the

gift of gentlem en'as the acquired .knowledge of soldiers* 4 Yet only

Individuals with m ilita ry training and experience could evaluate-the-

com plex-factors of training, ta c tic s , -logistics and ad m in istratio n

a
•which, affected'-each of the many commands. ■Altogether,these'-factors

created a m ore complex situation in;which the ro le of staff planning

becam e m ore,and m o re vital* Both P re sid en t 'Davie and S ecretary of

War Walker, realize d this. As -f a r :as-p o ssib le Infantry brigade and;

division commands went to West Pointers* F u rth e rm o re , attem pts

w e re m a d e to, in su re that no-officers-from sta te-se rv ic e' accepted 'rank

L
above the grad e of colonel unless the above re q u lre m e n tsw e re m e t*

Politicians'fum ed* A s 'fa r as-they w ere concerned: Morth" C arolina

troops would foe commanded by a Korth C arolina general appointed by

^T. H. and C* G. Dupuy, The Com pact H istory of the Civil War
(New York* 1962), p. 118*
/ " tivc Confederate Jjhlwifry Off*
6 Ellis p. 17. 1
the North C arolina governor; the Confederate au th o rities in Richmond

would ju st 'have to accept. It. Jefferson Davis, who had his own definite

Ideas-about-arm y com mand, w as to w ork in thls atm o sp h ere of states*

rights.

A s'w artim e p resid en t .of a ■country''In rev o lt, Bavis faced many

problem#* The,blockade p ro b lem 'w ap 'larg ely 'th e re su lt of Union:

naval superiority* th e continual conflicts w ith the various state

governors w ere the product of states* rig h ts; the problem with his

m ilita ry com m anders was tdo often the re su lt of personality- clashes.

F rank Vandiver comm eats, that, .fiercely lo y a l to Ms friends, Dayje

8
would never forgive o r forget an e n e m y * P e r h a p s w ith le s s m ilita ry

experience D avisw ould have been m o re charitable' about the short**,

com ings of Inexperienced and- le s s a b le :subordinates; Rut he could

Q
not brfng h im self to tr u s t o th ers with m ilita ry trivia* He believed

-him self a com petent field com m ander, but his strateg ic .thinking was

often lim ited In scope. A fter a while he could not see much beyond
10
the confines of Richmond and JLee*s departm ent. Above all, he

7Ibid., p. 18.

®Frank Vandiver, Rebel Brass: The Confederate Command

System (Baton Rouge, 1956), p. 28.

9Ibld., p.' 25.

10lb id .. pp. 25-26.

 ’ ' 11
would to le ra te no m ediocrity In the A rm y of N orthern V irginia.

Davis b'elleved him self a m em ber of the m ilita ry profession#

and supported the professionals* d e s ire for a well organised#

professional fighting m achine. P erhaps the professionals w ere too

critical# as some of the civilians*»John B. Cordon# Nathan Bedford

F orrest# Joseph Kershaw# William M ahone*-proved to be fine

officers* 12 But Davis was ready to fight the state governors# who

supported political appointees# on this point.

Despite the continual conflicts and quarrels* by la te May it

appeared that th e Confederacy had sufficient m en and com m anders

available and enough m a te ria l re s o u rc e s (for a sh o rt w ar at least)

to a s su re victory. The only concern was making ce rta in the m en

and w ar m a te ria l w ere at the rig h t places 'a t the right tim es. The

efforts of the adm inistration took place in an atm osphere of confidence

and certain ty * -certain ty that once G eneral P. G. T. B eauregard*s

grand plan had brought the Yankees to battle, the w ar would soon be

over.'

Although the adm inistration in Richmond was painfully aw are

of the lim ited num ber of qualified le a d e rs for any long struggle# they

w ere confident in the ability of those available to perform the initial

u Jb id ., p. 31.
*0 11 7~fvi' (ubr\'fede{rc(fi, kvvfry O f f i c e r
l2 Ellis#Ap. 18. r r
 14

task s efficiently. Southerners w ere confident that they w ere a ra c e

born to lead# superior to their b ro th ers in the North. 13' As a result#

they took few pains to tra in the junior Infantry officers and the non­

com m issioned officers* This was to prove a fatal w eakness of the

14 ;
Confederate a rm ie s'." The C o n fe d e r a te a d m in is tr a tio n and the

South in general expected those men# qualified except for ex p erien ce

to develop their potential qualities in battle. The school of battle,

however, sim ply did not graduate enough suitable officers to m atch

the casualties. IS All too often, men with high reputations and

personal followings proved disappointing in the heat of battle. Boastful

m en who covered up failu res, those am bitious for su ccess for personal

gain, physical cow ards, and b lu n d erers with a love for battle often

em erged instead of another R ichard Stoddert Ewell# Thomas J*

Jackson# R ichard H. Anderson# or R obert E. Lee.

Lee personified the q ualities of command: A sense of duty, a

sense of honesty and justice# m o ral and physical courage, a sense

of humor, and a'high m o ral c h a ra c te r* -a ll strengthened'through

n ibid.

I4 Ib id .

I 5X b id ., p. 19.
 IS

su p erio r professional ability. i f P erhaps many of the Southern lead ers

did p o sse ss a ll'o f these q ualities except the professional ability; p e r­

haps with a m ilita ry education gained'through actual'experience* these

me n wpuld provide the n ecessary officer re se rv e . William Booth

T aliaferro was one of the Southern le a d e rs who lacked professional

m ilita ry training. He, too, would need battle experience to develop

into a qualified officer.

T aliaferro exem plified the "typical” Southern gentlem an of

the ante helium period. ^ B ern in 1822 of w ell-to -d o Tidewater

paren ts, he graduated from William and M ary in 1842 and then

attended H arvard Law School. At the outbreak of the Mexican War

he organized a company of re c ru its from G loucester County and left

for V era Cruz. T aliaferro was enchanted with his experiences and

rom anticized them in his d iary and le tte rs . Despite youth and its

*7The O f f ic e r G u id e (H arrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1943), p. 515.

^ B io g rap h ical sketches of T aliaferro; C. A. Evans, e d .,

Confederate M ilitary H istory (Atlanta, 1899), 111, 670. E zra J* W arner,
G enerals In Gray; Lives of the Confederate Com m anders (Baton Rouge,
1959), pp. 297-298. Alien Johnson, e d ., Dictionary of A m erican Biography
(New York, 1928), XV&I, 283-284.

^ D ia ry of William B. T aliaferro , U. S. A ., G loucester, V irginia,

1847, "On Voyage with Troops to Mexican W ar” and le tte rs from William
B. T aliaferro --M ex ican W ar, 1847-1848, W illiam Booth T aliaferro
P apers, College of W illiam and Mary L ib rary , W illiam sburg, V irginia.
All T aliaferro P ap ers a re from the m anuscript collection at the College
of William and M ary, unless otherw ise noted.
 16

sentim ents, he perform ed hid duties well and retu rn ed home with the

rank of b rev et major* In the ensuing y e a rs he continued his law

p ractice and engaged in politics, rep resen tin g his county in the

V irginia House of Delegates*

His next ta ste of m ilita ry life cam e In 1859 when the governor

ordered him to Charlestow n, V irginia, following John Brown*e raid

on H arper*s F erry .- T aliaferro , now a m ajo r general-of the m ilitia,

took advantage of the incident to revam p the s ta te 's volunteer m ilitia

system and d rill the troops In p rep aratio n for g re a te r events. He

sensed that arm ed conflict had become Inevitable, and in his m em o irs

sta tes that he

had been active before the w ar in p rep aratio n for the event which
I had expected, and had endeavored to excite a m ilita ry s p irit in
the people, and seised hold of the absurd and visionary but c ru e l
attem pt of John Brown at H a rp e r's F e rry as an opportunity to
organize our volunteer system . I was placed In command of the
troops sent by the Governor of V irginia, Governor Wise, to
Charlestow n to prevent a resc u e and m ade the m ost of my
opportunity***! never suffered anything so silly a s a resc u e or
an attem pt to lib e ra te that fanatic* but I organized, d rilled and
in stru cted the troops amounting from tim e to tim e to some
thousands which w ere placed under my command, and p rep ared
them to some extent for the g reat dram a in which they w ere so
soon to act. ^

A fter the election of Lincoln, T aliaferro becam e an open

advocate of secession*.

T a lia fe rro 's m an u scrip t recollections of the w ar, through

1861 only, T aliaferro P ap ers.
 17

I w as an ardent advocate lo r secession. 1 was a firm 'b e lie v er

In the Institution ol slav ery . 1 thought It w as of divine origin and
enjoined upon us for the m utual benefit of the w hite'and negro ra c e s.
I honestly believed to oppose the institution of slav ery w as Infidelity
to the C h ristian religion. I saw the bright side of the Institution*
the bright side for the slaves and the bright side for th e ir m a s te rs .
I lived In a society refined and elevated by its influences among
slaves whom I believed to be happy and contented, and I thought
it a c rim e to d estro y ; a crim e to lim it and not to extend a
political and social condition which produced so m uch happiness
to both ra c e s and so much independence of c h a ra cte r and re fin e ­
m ent and v irtu e to the dom inant race. I believed the rig h ts of
the-people of the Southern States u n d er’the C onstitution'w ere
invaded and violated by the efforts of N orthern politicians to
c irc u m scrib e the a re a of sla v ery --an d that the South could b etter
p rotect h e rse lf under an Independent governm ent and push the
institution into Mexico or beyond. 2i

Deeply devoted to the cause of the Confederacy, T aliaferro

p o ssessed the other n ecessary qualifications to help lead the Confederacy.

He was typical of the non-professional men on whom-"the Confederacy

had to rely to fill its positions of command. His perso n al background—

G loucester planter, lawyer* a n d ‘politician—and his m ilita ry experience

as b revet m ajo r in the M exican War and ranking M ajor-G eneral of the

sta te m ilitia, recom m ended him highly a s a p erson of ability. The

South expected of T aliaferro what she expected of others: that actual

m ilita ry experience would fully develop his capabilities.

2ilbid.
 18

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 /HIJ ATD'T’tT'D TT

ttn fflj® CAMPAIGNS' A K 0 A- TEOI00S MARCH:

Major G eneral W illiam B« T aliaferro was the highest ranking

officer of the V irginia m ilitia during that ten se month o£ April* 1861#
(
while his state pondered secession*- ' On A pril 18, 1861, 'when V irginia

■seceded, ’’T aliaferro was o rd ered to 'Norfolk to organise’and assum e

command of the forces which w ere to be concentrated a t that point.

When the V irginia convention adopted the volunteer system# he applied

for S’ com m ission. On May 3, he w a s appointed to .the rank-of Colonel

of V olunteers in the P ro v isio n al A rm y-of Virginia# and d irected to

take over the post and troops at G loucester Point# opposite Yorktown,

and pro tect the York R iver passage.

T aliaferro'accepted# on May 6, 1861, his com m ission "as'

colonel o f'th e''G lo u cester m ilitia. ’ Eee in stru cted him to push
2
forw ard the b attery on G loucester Point a© far as possible.

1R obert N. 'Scott (ed. under d irectio n of S e c re ta ry of War), The

War of the Rebellion: A -001001101100 o f the Official, R ecords of the Union
and Confederate A rm ies (Washington, lS80*l’W o|JSerles I, ll7^800,www~
(H ereafter re fe rre d to as Official R ecords. Unless otherw ise noted all
Official R ecords notations a re 'fro m S eries I. )

2Ibid., p. 831.

19
 w

T aliaferro com plied with the o rd e rs, and with the help of John Page of

the Navy, installed two nine-inch gun© at the w ater b attery . By May 11#

he had 185 infantry and ninety a r tille r is ts under h ie command. Two'

m o re nine-inch guns h a ttju s t arriv ed , and they, too*' w ere scheduled

: $
for rap id installation. ' T aliaferro , having m a d e th e n ecessary pro*'

lim ln ary 'arra n g em e n ts, began establishing M s p o sltio n o n a m ore

perm anent b asis by May 14. lie requested the n e c e ss a ry authority

to secure, houses; fo r needed hospital facilities and offic e r .q u arter a *■

Jbee, who disliked the idea of subjecting p riv ate houses to m ilita ry

needs, refused T a lia fe rro 's f irs t req u est. In addition, T aliaferro

requested additional tro o p s, perhaps from the m ilitia of neighboring

King and lueen County. This req u est was approved, and T aliaferro

was a lso given the use of the troops from neighboring Mathews

County*

There w as little excitem ent o r action d u rin g .T a lia fe rro 's

ten u re in May. He continued to se cu re his.position on the York R iver

but w as unable to obtain sufficient .forces-and equlpm entto co n stru c t

any suitable r e a r -defenses. The. Only Incident o ccu rred on May 14:

^ I b id ., p. 834*

4Ibid., pp. 843-844.

5 ib id .. p. 857.

6Ibid., p. 859.
when a F ed eral gunboat appeared at the m onth of the riv e r. But the

F ed eral a w ere m erely, sounding ''the m outh of the channel and m ad# no

attem pt to force th eir way up the riv e r.

‘ g
He was. rep laced at the end of M ay'and ord ered toR iehm ond.

T here he assumed command of the Twenty* Third Virginia Infantry,

and on Tune 7 left for .the-campaign In w estern V irginia. : T a lia fe rro

and hie regim ent took the ra ilro a d to Staunton and then m arched

120 m iles to B rigadier G eneral R obert $>■ Garnett*s camp a t L au rel

Hill* ^ T he‘campaign-was intended to: prevent the F ederal# under

M ajor G eneral George B. McClellan*# d ire c tio n from securing the

exposed link of the B altim ore and Ohio R ailroad between Washington

and P ark ersb u rg . The F ed erals ■could not bind together the F a st and

Midwest, unless they could freely operate th is ra ilro a d without th re a ts

of ra id s, -r It was the duty of the Confederate force under G arnett to

prevent the enemy from penetrating to Beverly, the junction of the

Staunton-Parkersburg stage road and the turnpike to Grafton. 10 By

holding; Beverly, the C onfederates would be able to continually h a ra ss

7Ibld.. p. 844.

8Xbtd., p. 876.

^Letter to Lt. Garnett Andrews from William B. Taliaferro,

G reen b rier R iver, August 29, 1861# T aliaferro Papers*

^ F re e m a n , Lee* a Lieutenants, 1, 23*24.

 22

51 k&

G e n e r a l s k e t c h of r e g i o n of R i c h Moun tain C a m p a i g n , July, 1861.

(S o u r c e s : O f f ic i a l R e c o r d s II, 274. L e e ’s L i e u t e n a n t s , I, 2 6 . )
%
 33

the B altim ore and Ohio Railroad*,

T aliaferro ’s regim ent w as with the fo rce which form ed the

advance guard at Buckhannon Gap som e eight m iles w est of B everly.

On July 7 pickets rep o rted a la rg e force of the enemy under the

d irectio n of McClellan* advancing tow ard th e ir position. It w as

M a|or G eneral W. S. R osecran s, McClellands ab lest subordinate,

with about 8,000 men# G arnett o rd ered Colonel Jam es N, R am say1s

F ir s t Georgia Infantry to hold the enemy. The C onfederates m et

them on the wooded hill to the right of the cam p and drove them back,

L ater th at day T aliaferro ’s Twenty ♦Third V irginia Regim ent reliev ed

the Georgia troops a t th e ir position on the hill. T aliaferro successfully

held the position until nightfall with m inor casualties* -one killed and

two wounded, **

That night h is regim ent w as reliev ed by Colonel Samuel V.

F ulkerson’s Thirty-Seventh V irginia who held until the next m orning.

Then, In the morning# the F ir s t G eorgia reliev ed the Thirty«Seventh.

About two o’clock that afternoon* July 8, the Thirty-Seventh relieved

the F ir s t G eorgia with Instructions to hold until nightfall when

the Tw enty-Third would relie v e them . As T aliaferro ’s m en

approached the hill# a party of the enemy m ade a dash for th eir

* ^Memoranda of events connected w ith G eneral G arnett’s

command from ?th to 9th of July inclusive (n. d . }. (H ereafter
r e f e r re d to a s July 1861 M emoranda, T aliaferro P ap ers. )
 3.4

position. ■ The r e s u it w as m a ss confusion,- F a rt of the Thirty-Seventh

had alread y begun re tirin g as som e pf the Tw enty-Third began m arching

up*. There w as.general, unorganised .firing from a l l ;sides downhill

tow ard th e .enemy. S cattered -as -It was#- the firin g .rep elled the .attack

with considerable lo ss to the enemy. ^

)¥hen G arnett learned, of the situation he sent Colonel William £«

Starke forw ard to try to rectify the. position, of the. troops* A fter a _

general consultation. Starke o rd ered that the hill be abandoned. With

only 4, 000 men, G arnett realize d he,could not hold fhe num erically

superior forces, of the 'enemy, for, any length of time*, T a lia fe rro ’s

Tw enty-Third withdrew* and by 10:3b that night was p osted on another

ii
hill some 300 to 400 y ards to the r e a r . Throughout the night the

enemy continued to shell the abandoned hill. The next m orning the

F ed erate continued shelling tow ard,the camp* but,w ith,little,success*

T aliaferro was able to hold his new position for the next th ree days

w ith the lo ss of but one m an. ^

pncthe .evening of July 11* G arnett sent for the colonels'Com ­

manding regim ents. They w ere inform ed that the F edeyaJt had
i . 'J ‘

succeeded In enveloping the Confederate left flank on Rich Mountain

l ^lbtd.

13Ibtd.

14lbid.
a n d h a d se iz e d the ro ad 'an d the gap. The F ed erals w ere squarely

a c ro s s the Confederate line of re tre a t,; forcing G arnett’s m en to go

over the c re s t of the m ountain and attem pt to reac h B everly. The

colonels-w ere'Instructed- to pack the baggage'of'their'1commands'-with

the utm ost quiet and without dem oralization. T aliaferro said nothing

of a ret|?eat,: but'told his m e n th e y w ere going to make-a; detour to

’
catch a -’’party iof Yankees11 near SL George. 16 ■

The heavy rain that had begun to fall m ade m arching conditions

m o st difficult. 1 It prevented the m eat from being cookedand the

m en survived on bread for the next two days. F u rth e rm o re the rain

drenched ail' th e ’tents-and-caused-the eyar-tead'ed- wagons to b o g down

quite frequently# The tra in w as a long tim e in starting because of the

rain and mud. "When the-m arch'finally d id 'g et under -way, the F i r s t

G eorgia Infantry Regim ent of Colonel Ram say was In front, followed

by T aliaferro ’s Tw enty-Third V irginia, the wagon train , Colonel H. R.

Jackson’s T h irty -F o u rth V irginia, the b attery , with F u lk erso n ’s

IT
Thirty-Seventh bringing up the r e a r.

About su n rise on July 12, afte r having successfully and

uneventfully cro ssed the mountain, the en tire command was within

^ F re e m a n , L ee’s L ieutenants, 1, 39-31,

^ J u ly 1861 M emoranda, T a lia fe rro P ap ers.

 26

four m iles of Beverly* The command h a lte d and after a few minutes*

r e s t each reg im en t turned to the rear# rev ersin g the o rd e r'o f m arch.

The en tire command then took the right hand road at Leedville and

m arched' forw ard on that turnpike'-toward 'St* George. ^NaUr- 'Beedville,

Bieutenant Colonel George W. Hansborough’s battalion and one company

.« . 13 , .. j ,

of cavalry joined the command. ■: It w as Garnett*© intention .£o:m a rc h

through the Cheat Mountain© tow ards Hardy County and m ake hie way

to B rigadier G eneral Edward Johnson*© command* A fter having gone

se v eral m iles on the road, the column halted about eleven o* clock. A

battalion of infantry with a company of cavalry was posted at this

point* ^ A fter restin g , the column moved on to Hew In terest w here

it turned off to the right-on an exceedingly had country road going

d irectly tow ard Cheat Mountain*! The ensuing m a r eh'was'-quite tedious*

At sunset the F ir s t G eorgia continued forw ard while T aliaferro ’s

Twenty* T hird V irginia with the b attery rem ained In the r e a r .

Several hours la te r the command cam e for them to advance.

T a lia fe rro ,re la te s "they led,us-'to believe-the. wagons had-succeeded

in crossin g the m ountains. But such was not the ease. And

• ^ B e tte r -to. B rig a d ie r G eneral H.- R*: Jackson from William B.

T aliaferro , M onterey, July 25, 1361* M em oranda of events connected
with G eneral G arnett’s re tre a t, T aliaferro P ap ers. ”

July 1861 M emoranda; T aliaferro P ap ers.

20Ibw .
 2?

the difficulties that had faced the w ag o n train m ultiplied a s they, struggled

to get the a rtille ry over the m ountains In pitch d ark n ess# ' ■rain,., and-

ankle*desp mud* - Only th ro u g h 'th e ’*extraordinary exertion** of se v e ra l

of his officers#; says. Taliaferro# w e r e ;they able to accom plish this.

i ’*11 * !* • :
difficult task,

-By su n rise the m orning of Ju ly 13#: the 'Twenty** Third had,

advanced to, within a m ile o f the wagon tra in s . • GarnettVs whole

com m andw as once again put Into motion, observing the m arching

o rd e r of the preceding day* This m eant, that Tails ferrous;. Twenty*..

Third V irginia regim ent and Ramsay*# F ir s t G eorgia regim ent would
22.
again be the .re a r guard* The command proceeded down the steep

side of -Cheat: Mountain and cro ssed S haver's (Main) Fork,of- the C heat

R iver ■at E a te r1s F ord. On th e ;opposite side of the river* ..the road

turned left and followed the riv e r bank* A meadow ra n along between

the'-r|ver and the road to w here the. road again c ro sse d the riv e r a t

G arrick 1s Ford.. ^

G arnett continued his re tr e a t over the muddy road., Nothing

■but ford after ford lay'ahead* And w o rse news: befo re a wagon, had

2 ^Letter, to. B rigadier .General H. R* Jackson from' W illiam B*

T aliaferro , Monterey# August 10, 1861* R eport of B attle of G arrick ’s
Ford# July 13* 1861# T aliaferro Papers*

^ J u ly 1861 -Memoranda# Taliaferro Papers,

^ F r e e m a n , .B ee’s L ieutenants, I, 34*

crossed'K aler*e F ord, c a v a lr y s coots rep o rted the enemy -closing- in

on the rear of the ■column. •' -Garnett’s adjutant selected a system.

of retiring" upon eligible defensive .positions, R am say’s F irs t'G e o rg ia

w as :‘to form, a c ro s s the-meadow, and'hold the' enemy until th e wagon'

tr a in ;had c ro sse d the r iv e r ; then it was to r e tir e behind T aliaferro ’s

Twenty- Third V irginia. Then R am say’s regim ent was to., form a line

behind Taliaferro*# so that the la tte r could r e tir e behind It and refo rm

behind the G eorgians. This system of holding position after position

for over th ree m iles to C ar ric k ’s F ord enabled the wagon tra in s to

escape without any serio u s attack on the fo rces and without lo s s of

m en or wagons* At' G arrick ’s F ord the crossing was difficult

because of the-sw iftness and'depth of the riv e r and'the.num erous

•*»£
, ■ ,

stalled wagons, causing sev eral wagons to be abandoned,

T aliaferro was ord ered to occupy the high bank on the rig h t

of the ford with-his regim ent and a section of artillery ., • At firs t

the uniform s of the F ed erals appeared identical to those of the

confederates, and the approaching columns w ere m istaken for

^ R e p o rt of B attle of Car ric k ’s : F ord, July 13, 1861,

T aliaferro P ap ers.

2Slbid.

2% uly 1861 M emoranda, T aliaferro Papers*

^ R e p o rt of B attle of G arrick ’s Ford,, July 13, 1861,

T aliaferro P ap ers.
R am say’s ■Georgians.- The m istake-W as soon discovered# and

T aliaferro ’S'men* 'alt-except-Company'A whose stren g th ’had been

. . . 28
depleted by sickness 'and .fatigue#4opened- up. with a fierce b arrag e. - •

■Together -with the. a r tille r y 1'# d estru ctiv e 'fire* T aliaferro ’s Infantry

w as able to keep the F ed eral s. from cro ss ing the r iv er. •. Finally

w hen-nearly every ca rtrid g e had'been expended* T aliaferro o rd ered

the regim ent to r e tir e .

-Although th e re w ere thirty' dead and:wounded#; the m en

r e tir e d down the hill in p erfect o rd e r. . A fter inarching alm o st-h alf

a m ile, the Tw enty-Third approached another ford. H ere they m et

Colonel Starke who d irected them to move on and overtake the m ain

body of-G arnett’s fo rc e . On -crossing*the ford# T aliaferro m et ’

G arnett who in stru cted T aliaferro to detail ten good riflem en to act

as s k irm is h e rs ,behind some .fallen tre e s . 30 T aliaferro -sent an

entire company* but since th e re was not adequate protection* all

but ten w ere o rd ered back. He posted th ree m o re com panies on the

high bluff overlooking the rlv e f, bub discovering the undergrowth to

be too thick, they soon cam e back to the regim ent. Starke* acting

^ J u i y 1861 M emoranda, T aliaferro Papers.-

^ R e p o rt of B attle of G arrick ’s Ford, July 13* 1861#

Taliaferro" P ap ers. ■

3 0 Ib id .
 30;

u n d e rG a rn e tt1e orders*' told T aliaferro 1© men to m arch off-and'over*

takethemainbody. ^*

As this p a rt of h i$ 'reg im en t m arched'off to the founds of.,

skirmishingtotheir;rear# Taliaferro;received'the;nowsthat Garnett

hadbeenkilled*, .The en tire ‘regim ent now;pushedonas rapidly;as

possible for another 'two m ites, cros'sed P arso n ’s Ford,, and ,©hort|y.

overtook the'm ain body of troops.- ; The other com mands w ere

drawn up in good order and anxious., to' r e s is t the enemy. ^

However» the question of command had to' be' settled firs t.

Colohel R am say of the F ir s t G eorgia was the ranking officer, but

he had gone ahead with Ms regiment* A m essen g er was sent to

overtake him ; the question was what to do In the m eantim e. G eneral

G arnett1© aides.suggested th eir p resen t position w as adequate to

make a stand. T aliaferro objected. F or one thing#, the enemy

a rtille ry had taken its toll on his re g im e n ts morale* F u rth erm o re,

the a r tille ry had gone ahead an d /T aliaferro advis ed ag ain st making a

stand without it. He w as certain th e re w ere'defensible positions ahead

34
and suggested the a rtille ry halt and the .infantry fall back. '

3itbld.

33July 1861 M emoranda, T aliaferro P ap ers.

34lbld.
 31

His suggestion was ■follow ed a n d th e com m an d s'began ■to m o v e -

forw ard. T aliaferro ■refo rm ed ’fbe ■Twenty* Third*-w hich w a s ■In ■

•

d is o rd e r' after the'long r e tr e a t—on th e ■m arch. Having no o rd e rs

from:' Cblonei Ramsay,- they continued to m a re h , resting: a t periodic

in te rv a ls. P resen tly the; m e ss e n g e r returned*- He h a d in s tr actions

from Colonel' Ramsay w hich again'pot T aliaferro In com m and o f the

rear. It w as T a lia fe rro 1© duty to continue to defend the tra in and to

chech the F ed eral e a t ev ery eligible position. To th is o rd e r T aliaferro

rem ark ed , "does Colonel R am say w ish to throw the whole responsibility

of the re tr e a t on m e t If so I would lik e to have m o re force In the

r e a r which Is to be attacked and is in g reat d a n g e r.v’^5 The m essen g er

however stated that th e re appeared to be g re a te r danger In front and

th e re fo re the la rg e st force w as req u ired th ere.

T aliaferro m ade do with what he had* he placed Jackson*©

T hirty*Fourth In the lead, then Hansborough*© battalion, then the

Twenty*Third, with Fulkerson*s Thirty-Seventh In the r e a r . His

req u est for a company of cav alry to blockade the ro ad In the r e a r

w as never g ra n te d .; The troops continued up Horseshoe- Run, m arching

without a halt through the gathering dusk* The r e a r was "g rea tly

e m b a rra sse d 15 by the p resen ce of ordnance wagons* M ost of the

ordnance wagons, lightened by dumping e x c e s s baggage, had m anaged

35Ibid.
 32

to keep up w ith the advance. T hree wagons rem ain ed with the rear*

and It was im possible to m ove th ese forw ard with any speed* a s

the team s had broken down. A req u est w as sen t to Colonel Ram say

to m ove'forw ard m o re slowly} h is rep ly w as that- the wagons should

36
he abandoned II they hindered T aiiaferro , e m ovem ents too much.

•After nightfall* T aliaferro 1®; m e sse n g e rs could no longer

'.keep contact w ith the advance* w hich'w as m iles ahead. The situation

w as quite p erilo u s »*lf th e enemy should s trik e the- r e a r , th e advance

w as too fa r to lend support? if the enemy w ere In front* the r e a r

could offer ho'Sid, fo r the sam e reaso n . T aliaferro 1® c o m m a s

continued.'to m a rc h through the night I n th is hazardous fashion.

Only by the u se of lig h ts w ere they ab le to d isc e rn which road the

By
advance had taken a t the num erous forks.

At daylight on Ju ly 14, the fo rc es under T aliaferro reached

the Red House In M aryland on the;N orthw est Turnpike n ear Altam ont.
<

H ere 'they finally caught up w ith th e advance. A fter halting a sh o rt

time* the reunited com mand continued th e ir w m t t h m the turnpike

t
w ith Taliaferro*# Twenty*Third leading th e way. A. la rg e force' of
38
Federal® w as nearby* but they did not attack the C onfederates. ■
'
i

Sfelbid. 37Ibtd,

3®Report of B attle of C a rric k 'a F ord. July 13, 1861,

T a lia fe rro P ap ers.
 33

The co m m an d then h a lte d o n :th e n o rth b ra n c h of th e P o to m ac b e fo re

■crossing back into V irg in ia . T hey continued th eir in a rc h on the road

to' A‘point called N e v ille w here they ■took' a b ran ch to. M oonfield. They

■advanced along th is' b ran ch 'to a point c a lle d G re en lan d , a 'U n io n 'se ttle *

m e n t v e ry h o s tile to 'th e Southern cause*- About e le v e n p . m . 'the

co lu m n finally h alted .', C olonel R a m sa y , sick, 'turned the com m and

Over to -Taliaferro. ^

Ignorant of the- a re a , T aliaferro quickly reconnoitered. ';He

d iscovered th at th e ro a d ran through1the m ountains for "m iles and w an

■commanded by'high ground on both- -sides. I b is m eant the enem y

could endanger the e n tire command If It wer e alre a d y 'in front of

T allaferro^s ■forces.' F u rth e rm o r e, his troops w ere only' thirteen-

m iles from -the B altim ore and Ohio R ailroad via-a good'turnpike from

New Creek."- This •caused. T aliaferro anxiety, -for he knew the F ed erals

occupied this point and', could easily and quickly In c re a se th e ir -num bers

If the o cca sio n n e c e s s ita te d .40

A t IMS' tim e T a lia fe rro fortunately overtook the cavalry, which

w as im m ediately o rd ered out a s pickets* A ll the roads leading to

the cam p w ere picketed' with an ex tra larg e, force p laced on the-'turnpike

tow ard New Creek* T aliaferro 1a- next.' endeavor -was to ’p ro c u re needed

3^July i8bt M emoranda, T a lia fe rro P ap ers.

40lbid.
 34.
41
food for the commend* ' A fter long# w eary m arch es the tatter ed and

exhausted troops finally reached. Monterey* 42

B rigadier 'G eneral C5arnettls ;death* th e hum llltaflon of TOO

casu alties (excluding T aliaferro ’s command) and th e abandonment of

th e ;w estern approaches to the Shenandoah V alley w ere .equally m ourned

by the S ou th .43 Even w o r s e wes the "panle terror", which se iz e d

much of theSoufch, The July I f edition of the. Richmond Exam iner

Insisted, that the effects of the d is a s te r would he lim ited .an d that it

w as the officers .of G eneral G arnett1s command, that w ere the re a l

su ffe re rs * -nth eir reputation is torn, to p ieces by the tongue of-rum or. ”

The Richmond. Q ispaieh on .the. sam e day a ttrib u ted the d is a s te r ” in

g reat p a rt to, fa td fy je n e ra ish lp ,i although believing the m a in reaso n

w as the .♦’tre a c h e ry on th e p a rt of. the natives who guided .the m arch

of the invader*

It w as ,in this atm o sp h ere th at T aliaferro, w as called upon t o ,

■explain the condition, of hie- command* This unfortunate Incident was

Sparked by'a le tte r fro m C ap ta in A ., V*. Scott of T aliaferro ’s brigade

deploring the d iso rg an ised condition of T aliaferro ’s command*.

4 lm d .

.^ F r e e m a n , L e e 's Lieutenants, I, 36.

4 3Ib id .. p. 36.,

44Ibid., note, p. 36.

Taliaf o rro w a s .not inform ed of ’th e 1le tte r •for a lm o st1a ;month*' R eferring

to Its'contents#: T aliaferro agreed that Scott’s contention'about the

condition of the reg im en t w a s 'c o rre c t h u t denied that the regim ent

had ever “become com pletely dlsorgahiaed*,1^ ^ D espite the trying

c irc u m sta n c e s’the reg im en t still m aintained discipline. T aliaferro

attached a note from Scott to his re p o rt saying that Scott had never

Intended to convey the: Im pression that the regim ent had lost' all

.sem blance ;of discipline* ^

■In.his ■report# ■Taliaferro then went into a lengthy-' d escrip tio n

of the'.condition of .the regiment* ■The agg reg ate to tal had been r educed

fr om 65 9 to 544* by A u g u st129, when 'T aliaferro 'wrote.' from- O reen b rler

River#*' w here:his command had been stationed awaiting fu rth er orders*

T here w ere sixteen deaths, twenty discharges,, one .transfer# ■sixteen

killed in, action* and a .total of sixty-tw o left either sick at'’l a u r e l Hill#

wounded# .taken p riso n e r on-the'm arch#( or missing* Of the 544, 'MZ

w ere p re se n t w ith 291- fit'fo r duty*, ‘The. other 222#: n early all of whom.

w e r e ;slck# had been le ft a t McDowell and M onterey. Leaves of

absence 'had:' been 'given "to. a few upon-, certificatio n of the m edical
47
d ire c to r that they would, d ie 'If they "Stayed in the field*' -

4 &L e tte r to h t. G arnett Andrews from W illiam B. Taliaferro#

G reen b rier River# August 29# .166.1# T aliaferro .Hapera*

46lbW. 47Ibid.
 He followed up with a lie t of the causes that had o p s ra te d to

p ro s tra te h is regiment* W hen'the regim ent had le ft Richmond in

Tune It had been .badly equipped and lacked su fficie n t -tents. Upon
1: ;
r eaching L aurel Hill# h is m e n had' been under- se v ere duty both day

and night#- co n stan tly ;creatin g a ^ p o stu re of defense*n The 'distance ■

■from , an adequate supply base w as great: and foraging par tie s w ar e

n ec essary ,d ally to 'p ro c u re "food h o rn the surrounding countryside.

A lso c o n tr ibuting to -thfl-r p ro stra te d condition -w as the continual

contact w lth;the Federate* num erous, night, p a tro ls were, sen t Out

to w aylay;the-enemy# th e guard and picket, d u tie s w e re se v ere due

to continual. F ed eral ...firing* and heavy skirm ishing o ccu rred day' and

night* ■Furtherm ore* ;,many of th e 'm en slep t in the tren c h es without

■protection from:the- r a in ,; On top of all. this, a m e asle s epidemic

had broken out.

-Therefore# by the--.time the o rd e rs to -m arch were; given-on

Tuiy ,11* -the m en w ere .already In poor, condition* That'night and

all the. next day th e y were, on the move with only a few hour s of re s t.

A fter Reaching th e m ain cam p -ju st outside of B everly th e re was.

a-b rief halt and then-the m a rc h g o t underway again w ith -the Twenty*

Third s till acting-as the r e a r guard# now with th e a s s is ta n c e of the.-

F irst-G eorgia; * .Upon c ro s sin g .Cheat Mountain# the column faced

ford after' ford*, it w as the-duty o f the re a r guard to r e s is t the enem y

long' enough.- to: allow the- wagon t r a i n to escape*- Then at C ar rick* s

Ford# the Twenty*Tfaird-alone _engaged' the enemy w hile 'the r e s t o f the

troops -were resting* 'They w e re -then o rd ered to o v ertak e th e 'main

: .1
body* - a task that called for -a m arch of four miles# the 'cresbfhg o f

another ford'and engaging the enemy fn the p ro c e ss. The Twenty*-

Third continued to .guard' the1rear-' oh th e m arch id Red House, And

m arched 'all rilghi again many .miles Into; Virginia*

;'By the tim e his command had" reached M onterey, the mdn "had

'finally succum bed to- the m ental and physical sufferings they had

endured. • 'T aliaferro was confident,' he said# that although h ie '

regim ent had seen -th e'h ard est 'Service of alT in ■ffcarhett:*s' Army# ■the

rem o v a l'to 'th e E ast would produce !fhe'needed# beneficial m o ra l ■

effect on his m e n ; ^ Aiready# two weeks before h e w as asked to

defend' its condition#" he had asked' th a t1he be given independent command

cn
of his regim ent*: • He had been relu c tan t to se rv e d irec tly -under

Colonel R am sa^f now# A u g u st'29# he-asked fo r a tr a n s f e r * ; His ■

tra n sfe r w u s to come#' but n o tb e fo re his regim ent had undergone

another Campaign.

•Oh Septem ber 9, B rig ad ier G eneral H. R. Tacks o n iu fo rm ed

4dibld.'

^°L ettor to B rigad ier G eneral H. R, 'Jackson from W illiam B.

T aliaferro , August 13# 1661# T aliaferro B apers.
 38

HWTTOj

^oviTeet?/

WM. 'pedtevu.VTv\£cu(\Vu ^
<^3 Cc^.^fev" ^ Tv£<mAv-^

R e g i o n of C h e a t M oun ta in C a m p a i g n , S e p t e m b e r 9 - 1 2 , 1861.
(S ource: R. E. L e e , I, 5 6 3 . ) G r e e n b r i e r C a m p of T a l i a f e r r o ' s
t r o o p s in v i c i n i t y of w h e r e S t a u n t o n - P a r k e r s b u r g P i k e c r o s s e d
Greenbrier River.
 39

Taliaferro, that the Twenty** Third and Fulkerson* s Thirty "-Seventh had.

Seen detailed, to accompany Colonel-Albert R ust’s T h ird A rk an sas to

B rigadier G eneral W. W. Boring’s h ead q u arters, .-They w ere-to co­

operate w ith Boring*s command ■under ^-Bee'*s •guidance... Bee h ad ■been

sent-out from' Richmond.- ■It w as hoped that h e c o u ld recoup the lo sses

the C onfederates -had■'suffered-in w estern Virginia*-.. The- objective was

to su rp rise -and a ssa u lt -the. F ed eral' position on' Cheat M ountain.'

Colonel Rust: had been assigned to com mand the- expedition* 'Although

It was n ecessary to waive rank, T aliaferro* knowing little of the

te rra in or enemy positions, d eclared he would happily en tru st him self

e1
to- R ust’s leadership.

R ust’had p ersonally reconnoitered the a re a .. \He ,had d is­

cover ed that a column could,m ake its way along the w estern ridges

of Cheat Mountain to a point two m iles w est of its c re s t and d irectly

on the road which supplied the F ed eral forces;on top of the mountain.

The F e d e ra l« had only som e tren ch es and a blockhouse at this point

which could be taken easily. F rom this lofty position an assa u lt

could, easily -foe m ade on. the .Federal flank which w as exposed.' By

$ ^William B. Taliaferro*,'Memorandum- of o ccu rren ces and

a .march of two- fo rces under Colonel Rust, Third A rkansas, to-
Cheat Mountain* 9* 10, 11* 12. September# 1861* w ritten from camp
a t C t ^ n b r i m R iver, T aliaferro P ap ers. (H ereafter re fe rre d to
as Greenbrier- Memorandum, T a lia fe rro ;Papers*!
 40
c*
th e tim e T aliaferro a rriv e d , the offensive plan w as worked out.- ■

T aliaferro rem ark ed that he w as concerned -that the enemy w o u ld .<

have strong entrenchm ents guarding'the- F ed eral rear-, h o t Was, •

' ’ • •a# ‘
re a s su re d by Rust that this was notithe case.. -

. T aliaferro rs •regiment awaited' day1b reak' on -.the ten th with

■the r e s t of the force a t Havener*s on:the Greenbank Road. ' The .<

colum n went. into', the woods at/thApoinl#; ascended uthe backA Heghany, n

forded the 'G reen b rier’R iver and mounted the f irs t top of Cheat ,

Mountain ab o u t'dark, •Dawn of the eleventh came* and ■the force' began

its' descent down th e mountain along a creek- which led Into'G hent R iver.

A t-the point-Where the- creek in te rse c te d the river* Rust assem bled

his field'‘Officers- and explained/the p!an of attack . The column w as

to assau lt the enemy cam p through the woods which p ro tected it. To

get Into position to do so, they would f irs t have to m arch to the Staunton

turnpike.. At this point, Hansborough with th is command of 100 ‘m en w as

to a s sa u lt the 'sm all F e d e ra l fo rc e up the turnpike on the left. T aliaferro

w as.to take his men* go up th e 'ro a d 'a sh o rt distance.*' tu rn 'rig h t and

■get between-the woods and th e .F e d eral position* Rust, with his m en

and the rem ain d er of Tacksonfs' command* was to -move up-'the- road

to White* s ' houses Thus*' with sim ultaneous attacks.*. the .forces would

5 2 F r e e m a n , IL JS. L e e , . I, S 6 0 -5 6 2 .

^ G r e e n b r i e r M em o ra n d u m . T a lia f e r r o P a p e r s .
a s s a il the. F ed eral encampment, in the. r e a r and on the left flank, -By

nightfall the fo rces w e re ;w ithin a m ile and ,a h alf of th e enem y’s-, camp.

There they halted for the, night. .

Meanwhile the '.other .C onfederate;fo rces, operating under

Lorlng*a -command, "had carried -o u t ,■

their- p a rts In. Dee’s p la n .; :

ia m a e l Read A nderson w as w here he could reach th e , Staunton*,

P ark ersb u rg turnpike In a ru s h in o rder to prevent any reinforcem ents •

being dispatched to Cheat Mountain.' D onelson's m en occupied, a

position w h ere they ■could support eith er A nderson o r Loving, ■Lor|ng*s

troops had m arched down- the" valley, clo se to the enemy* --if. all. worked

w ell the enemy would be driven down Tygart’s Valley; with A nderson’s

fo rces p o ised to. s trik e andD onelson’s ready to pursue, -v icto ry could

yet be.achieved-In th is rugged-w estern'V irginia a re a . '.‘T he-key was

R ust on the. eastern, side of the mountain. Would he be successful?

R ust’s m en, exhausted, by ,-the rain* cold and rugged te rra in

of the previous day* w ere read y to move by-two o’clock on the

m o rn in g .of, the. te n th .. D ark n ess -and dense underbrush prevented

them' from; moving until su n rise. Then* leaving behind.their blankets*

o v ercoats, and h av ersack s, they m arched to- the turnpike w here they

s u rp rise d and captured the enemy- picket guard. Exam ination o f the

$4th|d,

SSpreem an, R> E* Lee, 1* A&2»$66»

p r is o n e r s ' showed that: Rush*® plan was w orthless. T here w e re F ed eral

d e f e n s e s In t h e ■ rear, A m u s k e tp r o o f b lo c k h o u se a t th e bend of th e .'ro a d

and four p ieces -of artillery ' clearly commanded the road*. These w ere

supported by. two- regim ents* one on bach side, of th e road# 'w hich'w ere

protected by log w orks. H ow ever,-'there w ere n o -works for a sh o rt

space on th e south side of the encampment,- ^

A new plan was devised. The command would move in two

lin e s to- the south side. From that point-they would attem pt an-attack

by penetrating within the enemy encampm ent. The forces moved back

to the turnpike with th eir captured wagons and p riso n e rs and began

th eir attem pt to approach the enemy from the south. Although g reatly

ham pered by dense brush the troops pushed to within a sh o rt distance

of the F e d e r a ls ,, A p arty was sent- forw ard to reconhoiter. They

rep o rted ..that -any assa u lt would h e sheer m adness as the F ed erals

w ere also strongly protected by earthw orks at this point. ST The

officers dehided* without a dissenting vote, to re tu rn to camp. They

did not venture, to m eet A nderson who had p en etrated to Staunton Road

below. .-Instead the troops retu rn ed 'o v er the sam e tra il as far. as

Cheat E lv er, The next m orning they resum ed th eir m arch back to
Cft
camp* arriv in g early that afte r noon*

^ G re e n b r ie r Memorandum# T aliaferro P ap ers.

57lbi<i. svm
 In the m eanwhile Lee w aited for w ord from Rust. , Nothing In

the way. of m usket volleys had been'-heard from. Rust who-was--Supposed

to have opened the offensive On the m orning of Septem ber 12. By noon

a ll -'expectations of the m orning had vanished. L ee’ s plan could not

-be executed.- in 'any essential. . sphere was- still, no -word 'from .Rust -on

the m orning of Septem ber 13. Lee s till hoped, to hold his position In

T ygart’s Valley, and f|n d another route to the Federal*s r e a r . L ater

in the day he was inform ed of what had happened east of Cheat

Mountain, It was now apparent that nothing could be accom plished On

the w est side eith er and the r e s t of the troops w ere also o rd ered to

fall back to th eir original positions, ^

T aliaferro ’s m en proceeded to camp again at G reenbrier

R iver afte r the abortive attem pt on Cheat Mountain* On October 3,

a la rg e force of enemy Infantry approached their encampm ent.

Dispositions, of the, C onfederate'forces w ere im m ediately undertaken,

T aliaferro was now acting b rigadier ro r the Tw enty-Third and F o rty -

F ourth V irginia Infantry and a battalion of the Twenty* F ifth ..Virginia*.

He o rd ered h is troops to occupy the trenches defending the. front,

approach. He o rd ered the a r tille r y to a position commanding the

turnpike and m eadow to the front and left of the C onfederate position*

The pickets gallantly re s is te d the oncoming F ed erals, but slowly

S k e t c h of B a t t l e f i e l d of G r e e n b r i e r R i v e r ,
O c to b e r 3, 1861. (Source: O f f i c i a l R e c o r d s ,
 m

r e tire d against overw helm ing adds. P a r t o f the F ed erate cam e off the

turnpike and began m arching a c r o s s the r iv e r Hat* the r e s t occupied

the h ills to the eigh t of the road. 60 A heavy a r tille r y exchange follow ed

Immediately* Most of th e F ed era l fire w as concentrated on the m o re

exp osed positions held by T aliaferro. ^ 1

The Intense C onfederate b a rra g e forced the enemy* to fail back

■out of range. The F ederal# then tried' to tu rn the C onfederate le ft

flack. P a r t of th eir force# advanced to a point opposite the cen ter of

T aliaferro 1# position under fire from th e C onfederate troop# on the

right. Once In position* they began m arching downhill to the meadow

w ith the Intention of assau ltin g T aliaferro 1s w orks. P re p a ra to ry to

th e ir assault* they opened fire on the Confederate# with th e ir long*

range m uskets. But the effective C onfederate a r tille r y and coolness

and gallan try of T aliaferro 1# troop# soon threw the F ed eral# Into

confusion and re tre a t. A fter som e tim e Still under heavy fire, they

m anaged to refo rm , reg ain the turnpike*' and with th e ir b a tte rie s

withdrew. The C onfederate lo ss w a s quite sm all com pared to the

heavy lo s s e s of the F ed era l s. Taliaferro®# command suffered only

#|m c a su a ltie s, two killed and four wounded. Taliaferro* himself*

fe°Q « |c la l R ecord s. V, 231.

6 *ib td .. V, 226.

6 2ib id .. V . 231-232.
was p raise d by H. R. Jackson, th e commanding general* to r the cool

skill and energy displayed under fire . ' -

F o r four, m onths T aliaferro, had effectively- perform ed, his

limited-duties in a s e rie s of fu tile Confederate cam paigns In w estern

Virginia* Under b attle conditions h e w as proving h im self a capable

le a d e r*• 'He. felt that his services, m erited, a tran sfer' to.; an a re a w here

he- could develop his potential m ore, fully. ' Finally his req u est for a

tra n sfe r w as granted* T a lia fe rro would, soon -fee- seeing se rv ic e -In

n o rth er n V irginia -'under ■Thomas J. -Jackson.

 CHAPTER m

AM INAUSPICIOUS BEGINNING UNDER JACKSON

\ By D ecem ber 9, 1861, T aliaferro had a rriv e d w ith'hie-brigade

at' Thomas J* ■,^fStonewaiT, Jack s o n ^ e a m p at W inchester, V irginia.

In October, Jackson had been' assigned to com m andthe Shenandoah

Valley D istric t' In th e D epartm ent' of N orthern V irginia. -...On'' '

November S, Jackson h ad 'estab lish ed his h ead q u arters at W inchester

w here he began im proving the condition of his scan ty fo rees* By

th e m iddle of November he had form ulated a plan for an advance on

Romney. * For"-this venture he needed .additional troops*. Luring1s

troops w ere sent to supplement" the fo rc es'o f Jackson* But th e

■command o f these new troops w as to ’rem ain s e p a ra te ,' under the

continued d irectio n of Loring, a s the A rm y of the Northwest* ^

Jackson wanted his fo rces fco move ag ain st'th e F ed eral com-*

m unicatlons along the Potom ac. His purpose w as to d estro y th e

C hesapeake.and Ohio Canal by blowing up sev eral d am saro u n d

Hancock, M aryland, and to d isru p t th e 'easlow est B altim ore and-

*Official R ecords, V, 389, 913, 937, 96$,. 988-989^

^F reem an, Lee*s L ieutenants, 1, 122-123.

47
 48

Ohio R ailroad se rv ic e by damaging -several'S ection s of track .

T aliafer r o 's br igade was to play an ';tep o rtan i ro le in Jackson® s

1% -
campaign. ' Under cover o f se v eral dem onstrations "made ag ain st

v ario u s F e d e ra l positions along the Potomac ea st of th e ir objective,

advanced troops concentrated n ea r Dam" F iv e 'on Decem ber 17.

'Four days la te r they bad successfully breached i t , ' disrupting' the

c a n a l.' !On January I, th e m ain fo rce moved northw ard from 'W inchester.

'The'two colum ns united and. bn January 4, drove the F ed eral fo rces

from Bath*' •Jackson®s m en proceeded to c ro s s t h e 'Potomac, 'bom­

barded Hancock, 'and then, receiving no support, w ithdrew 'tow ard

Romney oh t h e 7th.

Snow and sle e t had been falling for 'se v e ra l days'and' the read#

w ere next to Im passable for’ the a rtille ry and Cavalry. Not until

January 14 did Jack so n 's advance guard, T aliaferro's, b rig a d e ,' re a c h

Its destination. The m ain force a rriv e d a t Romney the n ex td ay .

i
F ortunately fo r the m en, who w e re 'a lre a d y beginning to suffer from

the num erous hard sh ip s in cu rred through two w eeks of Continued

exposure to the h a rs h elem ents of w inter, the F ad er alb once again

Taliaferro® s brigade consisted of the Tw enty-Third and

'Thirty-Seventh Virginia,' the Third A rkansas, and th e F ir s t Georgia..

^R obert Underwood Johnson and C laren ce Clough Buel, e d s . ,

B attles and'L e a d e rs (New to r k , '1084-1887), II, Official R ecords,
V, 389.....
offered no re sistan c e.

Jackson could not re si at the tem ptation to p u r s u e h ls enemy.

lie w ould take Me ’'Stonewall Brigade*1 under G arnett and' T a lia fe rro 's

brigade and p re ss the F ed erals back a c ro s s the Potom ac. .If this

could be achieved, he could d isru p t the F ed eral com m unications over

a w ider a re a by destroying se v e ra l B altim ore and Ohio, b ridges

5
a c ro s s the Potom ac and Pattersou*s. •'Creek* But Taliaferro's-:

brigade w as'dim inished in size and all but d em o ralized because of

fatigue, sickness and casu alties. It w as in no., condition for. 'active

operations.

In a le tte r dated January 20, to d * P. Benjam in, S ecretary

of War, Jackson adm itted that a ll of B o rin g 's brigades-w ere in poor

condition, 'but that.'he was. .confident, th eir condition would be .greatly

Im proved in,a few days* Jackson was confident th e y w o u ld b e able

to. hold-this-: im portant position, provided the troop© w ere given

b
adequate w inter, quarters* B eterm iaed to hold Romney, he'proceeded

to statio n -T aliaferro 'an d the r e s t o f Boring*© com m and th e re and

retu rn ed Garnett*'© troops, to Winchester* This- arran g em en t was

m ade because Jackson believed that ’’G arn ett's experienced and fast

5 Frank E. V andiver. M ighty Stonew all {New York, 1957}.

pp. 188-189.

6 O fficial R ecord s, V, 395, 1039.

m arching regim ents could * * . move m o re quickly than Boring’s,

troops to .any'threatened part: of the; d fstrleti I’7 The logic of this

assum ption o€ Jackson was strengthened by the fa e tth a t eome of

B oring’s troops w ere relatively'Inexperienced;and slow In m arching

whfch had prevented Jackson from moving a s swiftly a s h e had ;

g
d e sire d during, the cam paign.'^

R egardless, of Jackson’s reasoning,., the m e n o fB o rln g ’s com*

mand w er © dissatisfied* When Jackson took his ’’Stonewall Brigade**

back to the co m fo rts of W inchester, they viewed this l a s t move m erely

a s another a c t of favoritism shown tow ard h is ,rpet lambs* Perhaps

It was this act that 'finally b roke'that p ro v erb ial ’’cam el’s b a c k .M IBs

troops had nearly exhausted them selves In th e ir stru g g le against the

F ed erals and the unrelenting, h a rsh elem ents, of nature. .T aliaferro

d e sc rib e s the conditions under w hich h is men. existed;.during, the

campaign*

*., . . .th ere w as neither tent n o r cam p equipage*, Ho. house was.
there,', hardly a tre e , t h e w eather w as Intense* an d 'a hard*
-crisp snow sh eeted the landscape*. It Is a fact th at'th e enemy
lite ra lly snowballed us, for the m is sile s from, th eir guns scat*
te re d the-hard snow .and hurled the, fragm ents upon u s, alm o st as
uncom fortable to us a s the sp lin ters from th e ir shells* 0aya
and nights w e w ere without shelter-.of any kind. -One officer

^Freeman# B e e ’s lie u te n a n ts, I,- l&$*

^Vandiver, Mighty Stonewall, p. 188*

^B etter to Holmes Conrad from W illiam B. T aliaferro ,

July U , 187?# T aliaferro Papers*
 SI

sent his servant back for b is campbed, and Ike next m orning,
covered with enow, It w as an antique tomb, w ith the effigy' of
an ancient knight carved upon it. i Fortunately for us, the
fences of that country w e re not all of stone and knew how to
burn. ^

tinder such'Condition# It i s understandable that, Jackson6s m en and

officers grew m o re and m o re discontented w ith th e ir se rv ic e under ■

him. Jackson him self w as apparently unconscious of -either cold o r

suffering*. His attitude is clearly revealed In his official re p o rt when,

adm itting the tack of tents and other' essen tials, he sta te s that the

m en, except for p a rt of L oring’s command, **kore up under -these

hardship#.., w ith the- fortitude becoming p atrio tic so ld iers. **

.Jackson*# o fficers lacked his zeal. N either the campaign nor

the logic behind, it had im p re sse d them* To them# the- e n tire .m arch

had been nothing sh o rt of m ad n ess,,, How they w e re iso lated in

Romney. •■They w ere bound, and determ ined to have;their troop©

rem oved .from th eir desolate outpost to the com forts of W inchester.-

B lsconteot soon m anifested It self In, the form o f'le tte rs to s e v e r a l

politicians In Richmond complaining of th e conditions prevailing at-

Romney*
& MARY

P erso n al R em iniscences of-Stonewall Jackson11 by W illiam B.

T aliaferro , (unpublished m anuscript) T aliaferro P ap ers. This is
OF WILLIAM

T a lia fe rro 's -description of the conditions o f th e m a rc h -itself,' but'

things w ere'n o b etter at their camp at Romney.
COLLEGE

11Official R ecords, V, $95*396,

 BZ

Colonel' F u lk erso n of T aliaferro*'#brigade Initiated'the :-

cen trev ersy 'w ith his re p o rt of the conditions a t Romney. He sent

hi# letter* with Boring’s approval, to-W alter R. Staples*., a prominent.

V irginia p o litician 'in the Confederate''Congress* ' who w as d ire c te d

12
to see that it was delivered to the a d d r e s s e e ^ P r e s id e n t Davis. *■'

Oh. January ‘23* T a lia fe rro 'a lso wrote-' to 'Staples* a longtime, friend

of-the- T aliaferro family*.' In re fe re n c e to F u lk erso n ’s le tte r. T aliaferro

observed -that it was tru ly unfortunate that the strength of the best

arm y he had ever seen had been destroyed-by **bad m arch es and bad

m anagem ent*n At th is tim e, -he, also recom m ended .the 'im m ediate

w ithdraw al of'the troops o r ”we w ill not C bave_7 a', m an of this arm y

for the spring cam paign.**^ Two days la te r a petition deploring the

condition of the arm y at Romney w as form ally p resen ted to Boring*

It w as signed foy eleven officer© of his command*- Colonel T aliaferro ’s

nam e headed'the list* The "petition complained of the se v ere degree

of Mhardship, toil, exposure, and suffering t h a t £ found/? no p a ra lle l

In the* prosecution of the p re se n t war*f undergone by th e ir m en during

the previous eight m onths. By the firs t of D ecem ber the troops w ere

already exhausted*, the re p o rt continues# but instead of camping for

the w itte r, they w ere o rd ered id V /inchesier w here they subsequently

l 2n>id,, pp. 1040-1041.

I3Ibld., p. 1042.
participated i n the Romney campaign*. ; On th is expedition'the m en

laced ''numerous ’’toilsom e 'm arches’* and'©pent night, a lte r night L

without tent a, blankets or even ax es to cut wood# in the ’’coldest

period of a cold clim ate. ” Their p rese n t en cam p m en t'w as'o n ’’wet*

sp o u ty la nd" which was' nothing m o re 1than a sheet ol w ater when It

rained.' F u rth e rm o re th eir location w as p recariously near the :

F ed eral position on the B. & G. Railroad.' T h e'rep o rt concludes

that-” *. '> v your arm y 'could he ■maintained m uch m o re com fortably

and a t m uch le s s expense and 'With-every m ilita ry advantage at

1 j|
alm o st any other p lace*11

Boring, agreeing th a t'M s re p o rt reflected th e true-condition

df his troops*, forw arded the' petition "to Richmond. ’ D esiring that

the case'fee clearly presented, he asked Taliaferro* who was ju st ;"

going on leave* to take a copy of the petition to Richmond and

p ersonally hand If to the P resid en t. .Irregular as the procedure was*

Taliaferro'com piled* - and worse'yet*- 'P resid en t .Davis accepted the copy

from 'him . D avis proceeded to pull out a map-and had T aliaferro

explain, the e n tire situation* As- T aliaferro la te r recalled* Davis

sa id 'th at Jackson had com mitted'a: m istak e and Im m ediately o rd ered

reconcentratio n of the forces- at W inchester* ^ ■

14|bid. , p. 1046.

15Letter to Holmes Conrad from William B. T aliaferro,

July 1 i* 1877, T aliaferro P ap ers.
 Jackson im m ediately, though reluctantly, c a rrie d out the o rd er.

He also wanted to re sig n his command And. tra n sfe r' hack to. V* M. I. ^

Such a resignation would he detrim ental to the G onfederat e command

system s th erefo re, Im m ediate-action, was delayed as-' Governor Betcher

of V irginia attem pted to p ersu ad e Jackson to reconsider* As Jackson

w aited, he attem pted to have Boring sent hack to Romney. When this

failed, Jackson p re fe rre d charges against Boring for neglect of duty

and conduct subver sive to good m ilita ry discipline. 17

■F o rtunately cooler -heads p rev ailed .’ Jackson yielded to the

arg um ent'th at his resignation would have a discouraging: effect:on-the

m orale' of the young Confederacy; His'-letter of ■resignation was

retu rn ed to him . Boring was tra n s fe rre d to another th e a tre of

operations, but was not fu rth er rebuked* On the contrary,; he was

prom oted to Major G eneral; fu rth erm o re, the charges against him

w ere dropped.

.The favorable treatm en t accorded Boring did- not p lease ‘

Jackson. •Also' disconcerting w as B o rin g ’s "request for- the" prom otion

to
of T aliaferro to B rig ad ier G eneral. Jackson had be eh thoroughly

^ Official R ecords, V, 1653..

17lb jd ., pp. 1055-1656. *

l^Freem am , -Bee* s Bleutenant s, ■I, 129*

^ B e tte r t o ’J. F. Benjam in, ■S ecretary o f ‘War,-';from: W«. W.

B oring, F ebru& ryl3, 1861, T aliaferro Papers-.
 ss

disgusted with all of the political maneuvering behind the scenes

during the rounderobin a ffa ir, fie w as net likely to forget that

T aliaferro had been one of the m ain ag itato rs in the controversy*

Jackson w as to re ta in b itte r m em o ries of this affairi his anim osity

tow ard T aliaferro would never com pletely subside. He w as ju stified

In his contem pt for the m anner In which the affair had been handled*

The procedure its e lf w as not In acco rd with, m ilita ry discipline and

good order* T aliaferro ’s attitude was the epitom e of the insubordination

c h a ra c te ristic of Jackson’s officers*

That th is w as an e ra in which politicians and other non*

p ro fessio n als played an important* though often blundering* ro le

In m ilita ry a ffa irs does not a lte r the fact that such a condition was

sim ply poor m ilita ry discipline and ham pered m ilita ry efficiency*

Examining the logic of Jackson’s cam paign itself* Vandiver

concludes that Jackson’s reasoning w as sound*

He £ JacksonJ7 hoped to attack Bath* to c le a r the enemy

from that vicinity and from Hancock* Maryland*, not far north
of Bath* to d estro y com m unications between F ed eral G e n e ra ls.
Banks and Kelley* and to th reaten K elley’s r e a r . Cut off, without
news of what w as happening around him* K elley m ight be driven
to evacuate Romney without fighting, o r he m ight be .goaded into
fighting alone. If he fought alone, Jackson would outnumber him**
a tactic which Jackson alw ays sought to employ. 20

Jackson’s hopes had been fulfilled. He had driven the F ederal#

2^Vandiver, Mighty Stonewall* p. 18$.

 56

from Romney. F rom th is position the Confederates could strik e

effectively a t the ea st-w est com m unications of the B. & O. Railroad}

this w as something the South had been trying unsuccessfully to

accom plish through many w eary cam paigns and. m onths of failu re In

w estern V irginia. Only one black m a rk appeared on Jackson1s

^records' the condition .of h ie ‘troops* B efore the co n tro v ersy had ev er

begun*. ■Jackson had admitted, th a t th e ir m o ra le was low , but ex p ressed

his confidence that th e ir condition' couM be im proved. .Improvement

m eant adequate w lnter housing; adequate housing' req u ired the

se rv ic e s of a com petent engineer# and-a good engineer w as sim ply

2i
not available* ■ =: D espite th is. Ja c k so n stubbornly-refused to

relinquish h is'g ain s until o rd ered to do: so. Jackson can be re p ri*

m anded for th is obstinacy which b lu rre d h is vision to 'th e hardships''

endured by his -men. Perhaps*' a s T aliaferro notes in his Reminiscences*

the ends accom plished b y the Romney cam paign do not Justify the

S acrifices w hich w ere m ade. 22 ■The conditions -existing w ithin the

arm y-w ere inexcusable! p ro p er caution, should have been used to

a s s u re that th ese conditions did'not occur.' But Jackson-cannot be

sev erely c ritic is e d for the logic of 'his cam paign itself. The fact

^ Official Records* V, 103$.

22,rP erso n al R em in iscen ces.of 'Stonewall Jackson'* by W illiam

B. T aliaferro , T aliaferro P ap ers.
that the'cam paign took p la c e in the m iddle of w in ter m erely em phasizes

Jackson* s ability to-"achieve s u rp ris e by using the unexpected.

•The Im portant th in g 'w as-that■Jackson rem ained. He was

soon busy molding h is fo rc e Into-a trim fighting unit. --Mot that he

forgot the 'incident en tirely . It- w as Just th a t■-there weire m ore p ressin g

problems-. The F ederalS had planned. afchree-prOnged th ru st tow ards

Richmond for -the sum m er of 1862. M cClellan would bring 100, 000

F e d e r a ls to the Henlnsulat opposing him would be J . E . Johnston-'

w ith som e 55,000- tro o p s. B rig ad ier1G eneral Irv in McDowell would

m a rc h south to ■Fredericksburg with -some 40,800'} opposite Mm- would

be Brigadier. G eneral C h arles W. Field-w ith only, a s m a ll‘force of

about 2,500.'- I t was ■th eir duty" to perform- reco n n aissan ce serv ice,

continually checking' McDowell’s m ovem ents. The -third' F ed eral force

w as to move by way of. the Shenandoah Yalley. M ajor G eneral Nathaniel

Banks was to-move h is 15#000 men-down the Y alley-and unit# near

Staunton with-the 15, 000 of M ajor -General' John €#-: F rem ont. If he

-could d r iv e .Jackson up-the Valley* ‘he. was to move to F re d erick sb u rg

and unite with McDowell. ■ -The C onfederates under' Jackson could

expect‘to-have-no mo r e :than IT* 5 88 m en to stop him ’. '

If the th re e F ed eral-fp re es -could'successfully converge o n ■

Richmond*.-they could'Succeed, m e re ly on-the stren g th of th e ir over*

whelming number s , It w’a s Dee* s duty to prevent this} ■Jaeksonw & s ,

to play the key role* While the cautious M cC lellan was- delayed in
 58

front of Richmond, Jackson was to dispose of the commands of F rem ont

and Banks separately, and sim ultaneously to fo rce M c D o w ellto

rem ain n ea r F red er ic k sb u rg b y threatening to cut off'his com m unications.

If Jackson could accom plish this, 'Lee was confident th at M cClellan

could he driven away from R ichm ond's gates, thus thw arting the

F e d e ra l's grand plan* 23

To do th is, Jackson needed reinforcem ents;- • He a lso needed

to fill in several vacancies in command* Johnston sent him a new

b rig ad ier general! his name w as W illiam B. Taliaferro* 24 Jackson

said nothing of his d isp leasu re to his staff, but to the Adjutant G eneral

he vehem ently ex p ressed his sentim ents.

Through God's blessing my command, though sm all, Is efficient,

and I resp ectfu lly req u est its efficiency may not be injured by
assigning to It inefficient O fficers, h a s t w inter Gen. T aliaferro
had charge of a B rigade and he p erm itted it to become so
dem oralized that 1 had to abandon an im portant e n te rp ris e In eon*
sequence of the inefficient condition in which he rep o rted his
Brigade. Notwithstanding the dem oralization condition of his
B rigade he left and v isited Richmond, thus making a second v isit
th e re within two months* His brigade Since he left it, has, under
o ther hands, become efficient, and it, as well as the o th ers bids
fair to r ender good se rv ic e if not placed under incom petent O fficers.
I attach so much Im portance to this m a tte r as to induce m e to send
this communication d irect. The sam e statem ent will be forw arded
through Gen. Johnston* 2^

23Freeroan, R. E. L ee, 11. 8 -2 4 .

24O fficial R ecord s, XH. P art ill, 844.

25Vandlver, M ighty Stonew all, p. 212. L atter from Stonewall

Jackson dated A pril 14, 1852**H otchkiss p ap ers, L ib rary of C ongress.
T aliaferro was no m ore pleased with the p ro sp e c t of once again serving

under Jackson. He undoubtedly Celt the chilly atm osphere that m ust

have prevailed at headquarter si, Anger got the b e s t of him. He was

determ ined, • he la te r noted,

. * * to do my duty the best way I could and satisfy

C m y m ltJ by my conduct of any perso n al feelings against
him , and try to le t him Judge of m e by my subsequent
actions.

Another unfortunate asp ect of the situation was that he was to command

F u tk e rso n 's ' brigade, which w as alread y in capable-hands,; T a lia fe rro •

could'have'been m o r e effective commanding B u rk s's brigade,, as-

B urks w as on indefinite sick leave* But-his o r d e r s 1were-to'Command

F u lk erso n 's, and he-complied.- A nd'Jackson, after-having ex p ressed

h is'd issatisfactio n ,, gave Taliaferro^ a chance to-prove him self.

T aliaferro 's-b rig ad e would-be erganized-tnto M ajor-G eneral' I- R.

T rim b le 's division.

Jackson decided- to elim inate Fremont, first.- Ewell moved M s

8,000 m en to C o n rad 's S to re In the Valley, w here he- would' be on

B u rk s's Bank should the la tte r advance on Stauntoni Jackson with

7, 000 m en moved to join Edward Johnson's 3, 000 a t McDowell. The

leading elem en ts of F re m o n t's fo rce cam e-in contact with Johnson

e a rly the m orning of May 8* T a lia fe rro 's brigade, in advance of the

^ L e t t e r to Holmes Conrad from William B. T aliaferro ,

July 11, 1877, T aliaferro P ap ers,
A rm y of the Valley, was ord ered to Johnson's aid* T aliaferro moved

his brigade up to the r e a r of Johnson's force. Soon o rd e rs cam e to

proceed rapidly to the front* TJnder heavy fire, the men p ressed

forward,'- Stumbling up the rocky tra il in.the gathering d ark n ess, they

finally reached' the sum m it of Bull Run' Pasture* :

Upon reaching the-, battlefield, T aliaferro discovered the

F ed erate engaging the Confederate troops to the left and front of

his position* T aliaferro quickly o rd ered the Tw enty-Third V irginia

Infantry to rein fo rce and support the position im m ediately to their

front. The ■Twenty-Third pushed forw ard, opening up a heavy .fire

on the enemy to the front and on a sp u r of a hill just'to- the-right*

Meanwhile, Colonel F ulkerson moved his T hirty-Seventh V irginia

Infantry toward a wooded hill on the right. It was T a lia fe rro 's

intention that the T hirty-Seventh prevent the F ed erals from turning

* V

the C onfederate rig h t and d riv e th e enemy from his-position on th e

hill. The tro o p s, eager -to do. battle,- quickly achieved their' objective*

By now, T aliaferro had called forw ard' the Tenth V irginia Infantry,

which had been held in reserve* Four of its com panies w ere ord ered

to support Johnson's advance on the left* the r e s t w ere sent forw ard
!

to aid the Tw enty-Third on Its right. The Tenth was subsequently

moved fa rth e r to the rig h t to prevent any fu rth er attem pts by the
 FeA*ra\
0 >
3

1 1 ^ ouN ta ih

' ;" ' < -■

'^'p'ke -fe
^ ^ S S rv u ^

G e n e r a l s k e t c h of B a t t l e of M c D o w e l l . (Source: O f f ic i a l
R e c o r d s , XII, 474. ) T a l i a f e r r o ’s r e g i m e n t s are: T a l i a f e r r o ' s
T w e n t y - T h i r d , F u l k e r s o n ' s T h i r t y - S e v e n t h , and the Tenth
V i r g i n i a R e g i m e n t . P o s i t i o n s of C o n f e d e r a t e f o r c e s a r e
r e l a t i v e to final d i s p o s i t i o n s o c c u p i e d at t i m e F e d e r a l s b e g a n
retiring.
 62

F ed erals to advance up the valley between the two hilts* 27

The battle lasted from 4? 30 to 8:30 P* M. Every movement

of the F ed erals w as prom ptly m et and defeated* In the waning

m inutes of the conflict Johnson w as wounded and T aliaferro took

over command* Under instructions from Jackson to hold the hill

2g
a t a ll costs* T aliaferro proceeded to m ake the n ecessary dispositions.

T aliaferro stationed sev eral regim ents In advance of the m ain force

under cover of the rav in es and crev ices and advanced h is skirm ishers*

But the conflict was overt the F ed erals had retreated;- ••By H P * M*

Jackson o rd ered T aliaferro to move his m en back for relaxation*

Johnson personally commended T aliaferro for hie gallantry*

T aliaferro ’s efforts to stop the F ed eral attem pt to turn the Confederate

rig h t flank* and the discipline and sp irit of his m en w ere lauded in

Johnson’s rep o rt.

T actically the engagement had not been Im portant. And the

498 Confederate casu alties (181 In T aliaferro ’s command} to only

30
256 F ed eral casu alties did not reflec t any tactical m asterp iece.

But Jackson had successfully stopped one of the two forces converging

27 O fficial R ecord s, XU, P a r t i , 480-481.

28 Evans, e d ., C onfederate M ilitary H istory, TO, 231.

29Official R ecords, XII, P a rt i. 483.

Ib id .» pp. 476, 481-482$ Freeman* Lee’s 'Lieutenants* I# 384.

 63

ton Staunton* Now he turned- n o rth w ard ;to face the other threat*

ilachson l e f t ,lohneon*s forces to protect the southern approach

to the Valley,, m arched up to New M arket to join up with Ewell# and

cro ssed over the M assanutten Mountains to Luray. It w as;the

beginning of his famous and b rillian t Valley Campaign. From JUiray,

ja c k s on m arched down the Valley to F ront Royal. At F ro n t Royal,

on May 23, a sm all F ed eral outpost w as taken by s u rp ris e and driven

back. On May 25, Jackson pushed on to Winchester# driving the

F ed erals before him. Occupying that town, he m ade dem onstrations

ag ain st H arp er’s Ferry# threatening a possible attack on Washington.

Gathering together his captured supplies and ordnances# Jackson

h u rried ly m oved back up the V alley to -avoid being sn ared in a. F ed eral ■

convergence -which was rapidly closing1,upon the Valley Imhfs 're a r.

This campaign stopped Banks and forced McDowell to postpone his

m arch on Richmond. T aliaferro m issed the May action after the

battle at McDowell because of a sh o rt illn ess. %1 He did not re p o rt

for duty until. Jackson had begun m arching southward from W inchester,

slipping down the w estern side of the M assanattens between* the Union

forces, Jackson positioned his forces between C ro ss Keys and P o rt

3 ^ P e r s o n a l R em iniscences of Stonewall Jackson** foy W illiam B.

T aliaferro , Taliaferro-. P ap ers. This-’is the only source which, sheds
any light on T aliaferro ’s w hereabouts d u rin g Jackson’s Valley Campaign.
In his R em iniscences, T aliaferro m erely m entions that he m issed p a rt
of the campaign 11because of illn e s s. 11
Republic. Once again he hoped to he ablo to m eet the enemy forces

individually; thus# outnum bering them# Jackson could again Inflict

■defeat upon them.

Contact was established w ith the F ed erals-o n June 8 around

P o rt Republic* Taliaferro# hearing the gunfire# ordered'HIS

regim ents form ed and moved tow ard the bridge a c ro s s the North

R iver leading into town. The Thirty-Seventh V irginia under Colonel

F ulkerson w as in the advance* H alf way to the bridge# T aliaferro

m et Jackson m inus Ms h at and p a rt of his staff# sp u rrin g up th e ‘road.

S urp rised by som e F ed e ra l'c a v a lry and a r tille r y which had p enetrated

the town# Jackson and his staff had. b arely escaped* While Jackson

pushed on to forw ard reinforcem ents# T aliaferro o rd ered his brigade

forw ard.

The' Thirty-Seventh charged the bridge# captured the a r tille r y

piece commanding it# and drove -the- F ed erals from the village. The

F e d e ra ls escaped by cro ssin g an unprotected upper ford.- Taliaferro#

believing that th e low er ford and the bridge w ere the- only' ways, into

town# did not disco v er M s e r r o r until it was too late* In his report#

T aliaferro sta te s that ,#had I known the topography we could have

captured m oat of the e n e m y . T a l i a f e r r o proceeded to occupy the

32ibid.

2 3 O fficial R eco rd s, XH, P a r t i , 773-774

 to

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G e n e r a l s k e t c h of r e g i o n ar o u n d P o r t R e p u b li c . B a t t l e s of C r o s s K e y s ,
J u n e ;8, 1862, and P o r t R e p u b l i c , June 9, 1862. (Source: L e e ’s
L i e u t e n a n t s , I, 453. ) T a l i a f e r r o ’s B r i g a d e o c c u p i e d the v i l l a g e of
P o r t R e p u b l i c du ri n g m o s t of the two d a y s ’ fighting. C a l l e d upon to
r e i n f o r c e J a c k s o n in hi s fight a g a i n s t Shields^, T a l i a f e r r o f o l l o w e d
a p p r o x i m a t e l y s a m e r o u t e a s T a y l o r . He a r r i v e d j u s t a s the F e d e r a l s
b e g a n to f al l back.
 66

town as ordered. The Tenth V irginia was posted In the town; the

Twenty.** Third was dispatched to p ro tect the fords n ear the town; and

the a rtille ry was placed on a hill to the north of P o rt Republic 'w here

It could-command the upper fords*'-' These dispositions, gave T aliaferro

c
a good defensive position and, at the sam e tim e, prevented him from

being cut off from the m ain body of the arm y. The next day, Tune 9,
i _ .. f

Jackson left Ewell to withdraw slowly and continue to block any further

ag gressio n by F rem ont, who had been beaten by Ewell the previous

day |n the Battle of C ro ss Keys,, while he stru ck out-at M ajor* General

Tames Shields ju st n o rth east of P o rt Republic. T aliaferro , whose

brigade was now a p art of Major* General 1. K. T rim ble’s division,

rem ained with his troops at P o rt Republic as o rd ered . Finding the

re sis ta n c e of Shield’s F e d e ra ls m o re obstinate than expected,

.Jackson called for rein fo rcem en ts from Ewell, and o rd ered Trim ble

to evacuate P o rt Republic* burning the bridges to prevent F rem ont

from joining Shields. This was done by T rim ble, who sent T aliaferro ’s

brigade ahead. By the tim e Taliaferro*s men reached the battlefield,

Tackspn had been reinforced sufficiently to enable him to tu rn Shield’s

left flank. The enemy had begun to retreat* T aliaferro ’s troops d is­

charged f*an effective volley Into the ran k s of the wavering and retrea tin g

enemy1*; but this w as th e ir only opportunity to take p a rt in the narrow

but l,glorious,, victory.

34lb ld .. pp. 715, 774.

 T aliaferro had m issed 'th e m a jo rity o f th e'b attle a d u rin g ;fhe

campaign, participating in the opening and closing convicts* At

McDowell he had skillfully moved his troops up to rein fo rce Johnson

and had prevented the F ed erals from turning the Confederate rig h t

flank* A fter Johnson was wounded, T aliaferro had assum edcom m and,

and had continued to thw art the F e d e ra l attem pts to advance. He

had handled his troops com petently and continued to do so at F o rt

Republic# although his action for the m ost p a rt was lim ited to

holding that town. In both conflicts^ T aliaferro displayed his

com petence and gallantry.

Tackson wanted to push back up the Valley after the d iso rd ered

F ed erals and th reaten the r e a r of Washington# but t e e could not

sp a re sufficient; troops to m ake it a profitable venture* Lee was

facing McClellan# who had driven alm o st to the o u tsk irts of

Richmond. Jackson and his now famous A rm y of the Valley w ere

called to the environ© of Richmond. L ee had m ade his decision.

The re s u lt was the Seven Days* Battle# which effectively bottled

up M cClellan a t Harrison*© L anding., T aliaferro, once again absent

because, of illness,- was, to m iss this;-entire battle-* ^ He-rejoined

^ L e t t e r from Mrs* W illiam Booth Taliaferro# -dated June 2?*

1862* L etter to W illiam B. T aliaferro from Jam es Lyons# dated
June 25, 1862# T a lia fe rro Rapers* T aliaferro was In sickbed a t the
home of one of his relatives? the cause of his Illness is not m entioned.
Jackson* s com m and in' July, •Ju st in /time' to participate;, in Lee* e next,

offensive thrust^ wMcii was designed to cleat* V irginia o f the-F ederal

trodps.':
 CHAPTER IV

SUCCESS FROM CEDAR MOUNTAIN TO FREDERICKSBURG

Deeds'-offensive th ru st to the north*.' a fte r driving M cClellan

away from Richmond in the Seven Days* Battle, b e g a n in e a rly

August* 1862. Jackson’s corps was to lead th is push*, His firs t

objective was to step B rigadier G eneral John Pope, who was

moving toward the im portant ra ilro a d center at GerdonSviile^-.where'

the Orange and A lexandria joined the V irginia Central* The hope

was that Jackson could strik e Pope*® advance corps under Banks

at Culpeper before the la tte r could get rein fo rcem en ts. Upon his

approach Jackson discovered that.-H ope.had'ordered Banks forw ard

to C edar Mountain, about eight m iles south of Culpeper, By noon

of August *?, the F ed erals had two divisions of about 8,,000 m en a t

Cedar Mountain with another division coming up in support. *

Still believing that only the advance units of Pope had reached

C ulpeper, Jackson p re sse d forw ard eagerly. Ewell* a divisionTed

the m arch with E arly ’s brigade at the head of the column., B rigadier

G eneral C h arles S* W inder*s division (form erly Jackson’S)--followed -

on the heels of Ewell. Winder,, pale and sick,, had ju st been form ally

*Johnson & Buel, e d s ., B attles and L ea d ers,,/H,. 4, 5, 9.

69
 70

given the command that m orning. T aliaferro was his senior brigadier*

A. P. MiR’s division was se v e ra l m iles back, within easy supporting

distance. In all, som e 24,006 Confederate troops cro ssed R obertson

R iver the m orning of August 9* The th ree brigades under Winder

began th eir m arch that m orning from th eir cam p a t'B a rn e tt’s F ord

on the Rapldan R iver bn the turnpike leading to Culpeper. Three

m iles pais t the R obertson R iver, they cam e upon Sw ell’s division

which had already confronted the enemy near the h ills of Cedar Run.

D ispositions had alread y been made, and Ewell’s a rtille ry had begun

firing. The brigades of Ewell’s division had form ed on the right.

. 3
W inder’s troops w ere to form on the left. Winder quickly ord ered

his division up the turnpike to a point at which the woods on the right

of the road terminated* Beyond this lay a b a rre n field to the right

and a cornfield to the front. E arly ’s brigade, protected by sev eral

h ills, occupied the right of this b a re field. The C onfederates form ed

th eir lin e of battle* supposedly opposite the F ed eral lines, which

w ere on the other side of a cornfield.

Winder now o rd ered his Second Brigade, under J . M* ^Garnett,

to move forw ard to the left under cover of the woods to, the wheat i

field. H ere the brigade was to extend itself back to the edge of the
! ! ,

2F reem an, L ee’s L ieut enantSj H, 22-23*

^Johnson & Buel, e d s ., B attles and L ead ers, II, 4, 5, 9*

 71

woods, Winder ordered Ms b atteries to move up to w here the b are

field began ahd to begin firing. T aliaferro was o rd ered to m arch

p a ra lle l to the road in the r e a r of the b atte rie s and under cover of

the woods to a point within supporting distance of the Second Brigade.

AH of these dispositions w ere'm ad e under heavy F e d e ra l■a rtille ry *

fire# thrown at random Into the woods. .Once the" Confederate'guns

began th eir effective shelling# the F ed eral guns slackened their*

fir e. *

Upon reaching his designated position, T aliaferro halted the

men and awaited further o rd ers. He soon received news that

Winder had been shot, and that he was now in command of the 'F irs t

D iv isio n . Although second in command, T aliaferro had not been

inform ed of the division operations’much beyond the .d isp o sitio n of

his own brigade. In his official re p o rt of the battle, he Stated th at

<f £ l was_7 Ignorant of the plans dn general, e x c e p te d fan as I Could

form an opinion from my observations of the dispositions made, u

He im m ediately rode to the front to acquaint him self with the position

of Garnett*@ ‘b rig a d e and to reconnoiter the enem y1s position which was

obscured by the w heat field in front of the F irs t V irginia Battalion of

that brigade* There was no sign of the F ed erals in front of the wheat

^ O fficial R e c o rd s , XII, p a r t it, 198,

5I b i d ., p. 189,
 7Z

field, 'but Taliaferro ^dtsc over ed; them-.t** the right of this -positiorrih

the cornfield, p artia lly concealed by the rolling countryside. ■'

T aliaferro had retu rn ed to the position of his b atte rie s when

■he-was /informed that the F ed erals w e re beglnning to show them selves

In Trent-of the F irs t V ir ginia# which/he had ju st left.. - He. q u ick ly

o rd ered the. Tenth V irginia Infantry regim ent' o f Ms -Third B rigade;

forw ard t o 'r e in f o r c e the F ir s t V irginia battalion and told Colonel J.

Roland to rapidly move his F ir s t B rigade to support G arnett.

At the same tim e the F ed erals began moving through the

cornfield. Noticing th e ir advance# T a lia fe rro o rd ered G arnett'to

throw the-right wing of? Ms Second B rigade forw ard to d riv e them'

back. He a lso 'o rd e re d the Third B rigade, now under Colonel

A lexander G. T aliaferro ’s command, - to move into the open Held

on the right and d riv e back the F ed erals in th e ir front. G eneral

T aliaferro commented upon the gallantry of the Tw enty*First

V irginia Infantry Regiment of. the Second' B rigade as-they-poured

d estru ctiv e f ir e upon the enemy* T aliaferro 1 b rig ad e 'a lso advanced

in Superb -fashion-causing the enemy to give way before a.' se v e re fire.

But while the b attle went well on the right* d is a s te r was:

impending on the left. Roland’s brigade was not n ear enough to

^ W illia m B. T aliaferro ’s Third brigade was now placed under

the command of Colonel A lexander G. T aliaferro , a relativ e. A. G.
Taliaferro-wa.S'.senior colonel in the brigade.
 73

lE&BtlCk . ;: i.
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Sk et ch of B a t t l e f i e l d of Gedar Mountain. (Source: L e e ' s

L i e u t e n a n t s , II, 31. Taken fr o m H o t c h k i s s ' m a p in O ff ic ia l
R e c o r d s A t l a s , P l a t e L X X X V - 4 . ) This is b e s t m a p a v a i l a b l e ,
but i s not e n t i r e l y s a t i s f a c t o r y . It s h o w s p o s i t i o n s of the
C o n f e d e r a t e B r i g a d e s a f t e r th ey had b e e n tu rn ed by the
Federal assault. The F e d e r a l f o r c e s , h o w e v e r , a r e sh ow n
in the p o s i t i o n s h e ld b e f o r e th ey c h a r g e d .
Garnett* 8 Second Brigades this allowed the F ederal# to turn the left

wing of Garnett* The Second began falling back, slightly d iso rd ered ,

which exposed the left flank of T aliaferro 1# brigade and caused it,,

also , to fall back m om entarily before regaining its original position*

At this c ritic a l m om ent Boland*# brigade moved up; alm ost

sim ultaneously Branch*s brigade of Hill*# division moved up to

engage the F ederal#. These fre sh troops w ere sufficient to d riv e

back the F ed eral# whose ran k s w ere becoming confused because of

the se v e re conflict with the Second Brigade* ^

A# Taliaferro*# brigade advanced to the edge of the hill over*

looking the cornfield and Garnett*# brigade to the edge o f the woods,
g
Ewell threw forw ard his brigade# on the rig h t. ' The F ederal# w ere

driven back from th eir positions in confusion. To cover th eir re tre a t,

the enemy cav alry charged against Taliaferro*# brigade*. But th e ir

valor brought no su ccessi caught in a devastating c ro ss fire , they

w ere d isp e rsed with heavy lo sse s. This was the la s t offensive effo rt

of the F ed erals, and they -began retreating* Taliaferro*# division

c ro sse d the cornfield diagonally tow ard the woods on the other side*

m eanwhile Ewell*# troops advanced en echelon* The C onfederates

continued to d riv e the F ed erals back for som e th re e m iles until,

T aliaferro w r ite s, "tiarfcttess m ade further pursuit im p o ssib le . *»9

Even with d ark n ess Jackson was. determ ined to m ake the

m ost of the advantage he had barely- won.- H ill's fre sh troops, w ere

o rd ered to lead -th e column and d riv e the F e d erals hack-to Culpeper.

Although meeting, resistance,'- they continued to p re s s forw ard. Only

the news .that a second F ed eral-co rp s had a rriv e d caused-Jackson

to o rd er his troops to bivouac. At the end of the day., the F ed eral

lo sse s totaled 2, 381, -which Included som e 480 p riso n e rs. In

com parison, -the Medical Birector- of the Confederate A rm y rep o rted

a total, of.1,278**229 dead, 1$47 wounded, T a lia fe rro 's and G arn ett's

brigades suffered alm o st half (Oil) of th e casu alties. **

Viewed tactically , ra th e r -than la te rm s of casu alties, ■the

battle at Cedar Mountain w as not really 'm u ch of a su ccess for

Jackson. Jackson.should have been-able to- use his su p erio r

num bers to take fuller advantage of Banks* g ro ss re c k le ssn e ss.

The in itial F ed eral a s s a u lt on the Confederate left -had.been -ill

p rep ared and should have been crushed Immediately.- But this, was

not the result,. Instead*1two C onfederate brigades' had been thrown.

9lb ld ., pp. 189-190.

F reem an , B ee's L ieutenants, H, 4 0 -4 3 .

u O fflctal R eco rd s. XII, part li, 179-180,

^ F r e e m a n , L e e 's L ieutenants, H, 44.

into confusion. The re a s o n ,--of -course,' lie s In the fa c t that' th e :'

C onfederate left flank had been In •the a i r . F reem an ex p re sse s

the belief-that no Initial reco n n aissan ce had been m ade to th e left,

although 'the woods w ere so- thick th a t .su rp rise m ight have been

expected*, He believes that Jackson should have ..acquainted him self

personally w ith, the conditions o n an ■exposed .flank 'that w as threatened*

As for- T a lia fe rro 's sh a re o f'resp o n sib ility , F re e m a n sta te s that

i .. ... the. change m ade by'that officer, in G arn ett's line w as '
o rd ered h u rried ly under m arked disadvantage. When a
senior B rig ad ier is'k e p t in Ignorance of the p a rt the Division,
is to play in action* how can he be blam ed H, on sudden call,
■he does not follow a .plan Be does.,not know. .Jack so n 's reticence****
not to say seeretlveness^*w as responsible in p a rt for the rout
of h is left 'Wing* ‘ ;.

The facts connected w ith this ro u t seem to reliev e T aliaferro

of any m ajo r re sp o n sib ility .; F irs t, he was Ignorant not only of the

gen eral plan of attack, but also of-the disposition of: the brigades

them selves. A fter making, a p re lim in a ry reco n n aissan ce, he o rd ered

Roland's .brigade Up In support of G arn ett's brigade.- In his.'report

follow ing'the b attle , Taliaferro-notes- th at when he discovered that:

the le ft wing of the-brlgade had-been turned#- he w ondered.lf perhaps

R oland had not -received his order.. ** But obviously, the .order had

been received a s Roland, w as s u rp rise d when G a rn e tt's brigade began.

1:3Ib id ., pp. 44*45*

14O fflcial R eco rd s, XU. P art li. 189.

to foil backf he had been under the im p ressio n that the rig h t of hie

b rig ad e;had.r e s te d ,on the; le ft.of Garnett* s . **

.It seem # then th at, T aliaferro , .(assum ing.com m and o f the.

division, with little.foreknowledge,;)', correctly/evaluated the.situation

and .o rd ered the n ecessary dispositions. , Roland's brigade, m arching

up,, was also h a m p e re d by the lack of. knowledge oTthe terrain.;. Its

com m ander, moving his troops as ordered, lacked tim e to place

Ms rig h t on the left: o f G a rn e tt^ b rlg a d e .

The B attle of C edar Mountain decided nothing. Jackson was

forced to .withdraw; because the r e s t o fP o p e 's fo rc e# were, coming up.

to support Banks. As soon a s Long s tre e t’s corps could be sent from

Richmond, Lee wanted to m ake another offensive th ru st at Pope before

McClellan, could rein fo rce h im .. The p la n was to tra p Pope between

the Rappahannock and Rapidan River,#.

On the m orning of August 20, T a lia fe rro 's d iv isio n began

its m aneuvering, cro ssin g the- Rapidan R iver a t S om erville F ord,

and bivouacking.,at Stevensburg in .Culpeper County. The next morning#

T a lia fe rro 's d iv isio n moved to the front (leading E w ell's and A. P.

H ill's), near Brandy Station on the Orange and A lexandria Rail*

road and pushed forw ard to Cunningham F ord on the Rappahannock

 78

R iver. 16

-.As T aliaferro 1© leading brigade approached the ford, ltd is »

covered Federal©, on the o th er -side* '• 'The F ed eral infantry held'the

edge of a" eornfield and a skirt, of the woods which approached the"

riv e r bank and the h ills overlooking the ford. T aliaferro halted his

troops under cover of som e woods and moved his a rtille ry to the

front. A fter a sh o rt resistance# the Confederates w ere able to 1

©lienee the F ed eral guns* In the struggle one of th e e n e m y caissons

was blown up and their infantry d lsp ersed■in confusion. 17 tinder the

directio n of M ajo rrO en eral Stuart* the cavalry reconnoitered. They

i

rem ained for se v e ra l hours rounding up p riso n e rs and a rm s. Upon

returning* they told T aliaferro they had d iscovered the enemy re**

grouping- and; moving up larg e, m a sse s along the- riv e r. T aliaferro'

im m ediately detailed a fo rce of sh arp sh o o ters .from 'the Third''Brigade

to hold the riv e r bank.

S kirm ishing1continued,- for the - tm t of'the d ay .' Toward' night

the-F ederal sk irm ish e rs'w e re reinforced by a brigade o f infantry.

The C onfederates answ ered-this move by'opening up-with th eir

a rtille ry until d ark n ess fell.

'On- the following morning*. August Z% T aliaferro -was o rd ered

^ Jo h n so n and Buel, e d s ., B attles and h e a d e rs, H, 501-511.

17O fficial R ecord s. XII, P a rt ii, 654.

 79

to hold his position a s Ewell’s and H ill’s troops passed on h is left

tow ard F a rle y F ord on the Hazel R iver. T aliaferro,w as to follow.

That .morning,he engaged in what he d escrib ed as a " w a rm a rtille ry

duel” w ith the F e d e ra ls which, according to published reports*

resu lted in a- considerable slaughter: tofche enemy*', The Federals'.

suffered lo ss e s about M to 1 com pared to th e C onfederates. ’ H e:;.

then moved on to F arley Ford* passing the other divisions who

m ade way for him. .By the tim e-he reached the ford*, T rim ble and:'

john B. Hood’s brig ad es had a lre a d y engaged the F ed erals and had

d riven them'back* L ee ordered.. T aliaferro to rem ain at, the; ford

until m orning and* together w ith Hood, re p r e s s any further enemy

dem onstrations.; No fu rth er ad v an ces‘.were m ade by th e F e d e ra ls on

the,23rd*; and T aliaferro ’s m eivproceeded to S e o tt’e f a r m near White

Sulphur Springs. 18

Meanwhile* back at L ee’s headquarters* m ore im portant

events -had occurred.., S tuart had raided: Pope’s h ead q u arters and

■had seized.a m iscellaneous m ass, of Popa’s m ilita ry p ap ers, including

a dispatch book. Lee examined the p ap ers carefully. Theyconfirmed

his suspicions that Pope was the stro n g er. M cClellan’s reinforcem ents

would m ake the odds hopeless. Pope had alread y m anaged to avoid

being .trapped between the riv e rs . Lee still had'to find som e way to

18lb id .. p. 655
 30

attack 'Pope before F ed eral reln f or cem ents arriv ed , b u th e was unable

to croea the Rappahannock because 'of P o p e 's defensive actions* Bee

d esire d to avoid a n y general engagem ents If .possible'. 5A w ar of

m aneuver was the;o^y;Way.rhe- Qonfederuiee could succeed*.-; A fter

an unsuccessful attem pt to sweep P ope's left flank. JLee decided to

Send J'ackson's corps, of about 23, 000, around P ope's right. ^

/Following, lues's o rd e rs, T aliaferro 1s .m e n m oved out on

A ugust E4. They pushed forw ard to within one m ile of J Offersonton.

The next day,; s t i l l in the r e a r ,' they., cro sse d the ford,above W aterloo,

m arched 26 m iles, and bivouacked near Salem* Only Jackson knew

th at th e ir objective was to cut p o p e's communications* The o rd ers to

the division'chiefs w e re sim ply, ■!"m a rc h to a c ro s s « r6a d ; a sta ff officer

th e re w ill inform you which fork to takej and so on to the next fork,

w here you-will find a co u rie r with a. sealed d irectio n .pointing'out the

road*#f^ • T aliaferro-notes that th is ex trem e reticen ce was •very

uncom fortable and often annoyed Jack so n 's subordinates as It was

som etim es c a rrie d too far* B ut it: w as, he concedes, the re a l se c re t

of Jack so n 's reputation* ^

They resum ed th eir m arch the next day, August 2b, ; this tim e

l9 F reem an , IL L ee, U, 289*303.

Johnson & B uel, c d s ., B attles and L ea d ers, XI, 501.

21Ib ld ., p. 502.
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 82

a t fig h t angle e t o the d irectio n o f the preceding day tow ard B ull Bun

Mountains. By the tim e ,the 'three divisions reac h ed G ainesville,

se v e ra l cavalry brigades under. S tu a rtV d ir action had caught up with •

them* All of Jackson1s subsequent m ovem ents-w ere greatly aid ed by

the skillful employment of the cavalry. Pouring through Thorough*

fa re Gap onto.- the'plains extending to M anassas Junction,- they m arched

to within a m ile of B risto e Station on the Orange and A lexandria

K allroad. The adjacent cornfields supplemented th eir Scanty rations*

At B risto e Station they stopped two F ed eral train s, although

another managed to avoid capture. Jackson now moved north along

the ra ilro a d to M anassas Junction, w here th e re was a v ast depot of

q u a rte rm a s te r1® com m issary and ordnance sto re s. T aliaferro 1®

F ir s t Brigade, under Colonel William B aylor, w as o rd ered to lead

via a country road to M anassas Junction. * Baylor encountered a force

of enemy cavalry about a m ile from the Junction, but easily d isp e rsed
23
them* Be then pushed beyond, Into the Junction. T he-Federals

w ere not taken by surprise# but th eir force was too sm all'an d they

w ere quickly defeated# F o r the p ric e of fifteen wounded, the Con­

federates captured Im m ense sto re s, eight pieces of a rtille ry and 300

prisoners* A counter attack was beaten back; 200 m ore p riso n e rs and

zzI b id .. p. 502.

^ O ffic ia l R eco rd s, XII, Part li, 655-656.

the-"train. 'which had tra n sp o rte d them ■from A lexandria w ere taken ':

during the fight.

:T aliaferro assum ed bommandU&t M anassas Junction,-: He had

the ra ilro a d bridge -over'Bull 'Run R iv e t; This co m plefcedthe!

severing of' all communications' w ith A lexandria. F u rth erm o re,' he

established th e :n ec essary p ick ets'•tdf prevent any 's u rp ris e ‘-attack,

m ade prep aratio n s to tra n sp o rt the captured supplies, distributed

som e of the food to the troops, and then m ade p rep aratio n s to fire
24
the rem aining sto re s.

Thus far Jackson*® actions w ere nothing m o re than those of

a raiding party. His purpose of attacking Pope and holding him until

L ongsireetfs corps could come up from behind and cru sh him had

not yet been accom plished. .S ev eral’problems* as T aliaferro recall®

in h is-a rtic ie , 'confronted Jackson: ■{!> i t was' n ecessary -to place his

forces on one of. Pope* s flanks to p ro tect him self If X*ongstreet, s m en

w ere-late In a rriv in g ;: (2) at: the1,sam e-tim e, Jackson-had to be able

to strik e effectively a t Pope; (3) he had to--remain n ear Trongsfreet in

case quick reconcentration becam e n ecessary ; (4) if L ongstreet w ere

unable to reach him , Jackson would have to be in a position either to

rem ove the obstacles in B ongstreet1® path or to withdraw his troops

safely. ^ The point that seem ed to heat satisfy th ese re q u ire m e n ts

w as w.egt of Bull, Run R iver-and n o rth of th e W arreaion. turnpike*:

-That night, .August 27* , Jackson, began making, the n e c e s s a ry

dispositions. ■He had allowed. the m en le isu re ; tim e .that' day. :C ertain

that his flanks had been so well.-guarded, that the enemy was. under tain*

If not unaw are, of his position, Jackson could afford to r e st his men.

A*. P . .Hill’s division was. in stru cted 1-to m arch to C e n te rv ille ; Ewell’s

division was to c ro ss Bull Run-River at B lackburn’s Ford,and m ove

upstream to the stone bridge. ^ T a l i a f e r r o ’s division was to'm ove

down to the W arrenton and A lexandria Turnpike via an old country

road to Sudley Mill. At daybreak on August 28, T aliaferro ’ s division

had reached the battlefield of Fir®! M anassas. T aliaferro-threw fo r­

w ard his Second Brigade,- under Colonel B radley T. Johnson, 1to

Oroveton. . The Third B rigade, u n d er.Colonel T aliaferro , was

poc|tf,oned at Sudley Mill, while the F irs t and F ourth B rigades w ere

stationed about a half m ile beyond the Turnpike and Aldie Road.

As.usual,. -Jackson’s.m arch in g o rd ers revealed v ery little

of.his plans#.,.F reem an statesr,

Nobody knew w here they had m arched or when or why. .

^ J o h n so n and Buel, e d s ., !B attles and L ea d ers, ..|l, 505.

26Ib id ., p. 505.

27O fficial R ecord s. XU, P art ii, 656.

 85

;'There-wa£, '’In Short* wor se confusion than had prevailed'oh-

any of Jackson’s m arch es save that of August 8, m route to
■me e t ;Hope .at C edar ’Mountain* ^ L " i;v

B efore the sc atte re d divisions could he regrouped, the F ed erals m ade

contact-W ith'some o f' T aliaferro ’s'tro o p s; • M istaking H ill’s.'m arch to

C enterville for that of Jackaon’s e n tire corps* the F ed erals had been

O rdered'to concentrate "at M anassas to p u rsu e. ^9 T h e'in itial'F ed e ra l

dem onstrations; w'd’r e checked by'the ..Second'’B rigade who w e re picketing

the W arrenton road toward G ainesville. A captured m essen g er inform ed

Colonel Johnson that the F e d erals w ere planning to c ro s s Bull Run

a t the stone bridge and at Sudley* s F ord. When the news reached

Jackson, he o rd ered T aliaferro 16 ’’move your division and attack the

enemy. ” -Bwell-was to follow a n d s u p p o r t the attack* * if the available

forces could r e s is t the opening F ed eral onslaught, Jackson would fee

able to -reu n ite his ecatfcered forces and strik e a 'decisive blow a t Pope*

T aliaferro ’s troops m arched through the woods to attack the

F e d e ra l left flank as it advanced tow ard Sudley from the d irectio n of

Gainesville# Pushing; forw ard with the- F irs t, Third and F ourth

B rigades, T aliaferro discovered the F ed erals had abandoned their

^ .F re em a n , T ee’s Lieutenants, U, 104.

^ Jo h n so n and Buel, e d s .». B attles and*L ead ers, 11, -507.

Official R ecords, 5C11, P a rt ii, 656.

^ ^Johnson and Buel," e d s ., B attles and L ead ers, 11, 508.

 86

original intentions of concentrating at .Manassas* Instead he found the

enemy' moving off to the right of the W arrenton turnpike. The F ed erals

had run into Johnson's pickets, and m istaking them for a reeonnoltertag

party,, had 'turned westward., T aliaferro Im m ediately threw- forw ard

his troops, followed by Swell, In the d irectio n of the turnpike. B attle

lines form ed, p arallel to the road.

In short o rd er, the F ed eral sk irm is h e rs advanced and w ere

alm ost im m ediately supported by a la rg e force which cro sse d the

turnpike and advanced tow ard the C onfederate lines* T aliaferro

deployed B ay lo r's brigade on the extrem e right with, the F ourth B rigade

next to It. Johnson's brigade was still some distance to the left* at

the outbreak of the fighting, having recently been withdrawn from its

position at Oroveton. T a lia fe rro 's brigade did not a rriv e until afte r

the action had commenced* it wa& im m ediately moved to support the

32
b a tte rie s on the right and subsequently moved to the rig h t of B aylor.

H ie 'b a tte rie s w ere placed in .position' In'front of the F ourth Brigade

ju st above the village of Oroveton. From th eir vantage point they

poured a d estru ctiv e fire upon the advancing F ed eral forces. Then,

under heavy fife, they moved to the right of the F ir s t B rigade w here

they w er e able to Infiltrate the F ed eral a rtille ry and d riv e the guns

from the field.,

O fficial R ecord s, XII, Fart' 11, 656.

 87

■ By this- time both lin es 'stood in the open fields. The Con*

federate troops, re la te s 'T aliaferro 1, m oved‘forw ard a c ro s s the

field With splendid gallantry and In p erfect o rd er. Twice they

advanced to the farm' house and orchard on th eir rig h t w hile the

F ed erate held p a rt of th e o rch ard and’turnpike with--superior forces.

F o r two and a half hours, both lin es stood solidly, unflinching at

the deadly exchange of m in is balls, bayonets, and fists* It was a

bitterly contested stand up fight..: Finally, about nine o 'clo ck that

night, the F ed erals slowly and reluctantly fell back and yielded the
13
field.

As F reem an sta tes, the struggle taught nothing; tactically,

' •' : • ; 34
It m erely dem onstrated the obstinacy of both forces* The

gallantry and heroism displayed by the Confederate' troops w as,

In T aliaferro 's w ords, "beyond p ra ise * 11 In h is re p o rt h e 'lis ts th e ’

actions’ of His"own troops:-' Baylor's" brigade, the m o st exposed,.

sustained the reputation of the "Stonewall B rigade" it had gained

som e'tw elve months previously*' ‘io h n so n 's brigade, having had

picket duty the night befor e and having been involved in the early

sk irm ish es, was kept in -re serv e; T a lia fe rro 's brigade-advanced under

se v ere fire and succeeded in driving the F ed erals from th e ir position

33Ib id ., p. 657.

^F reem an, Lee's Lieutenants; 11, 109.

 88

In the o rch ard and on the turnpike; the F ourth also perform ed

splendidly. ^5 T aliaferro, hims elf, received p ra ise from Tackson

for hie individual perform ance in a fight which w as ''fierce- and

sanguinary. 1,38

The lo ss w as heavy on both sides; T a lia fe rro 's division had

alm o st one th ird of Its m an killed o r wounded. Its fighting force

had trim m ed to a little over 400 m en—barely the sice of a m oderately

strong brigade. 37 Furtherm ore* Its command w as greatly weakened* 38

One of the m o re se rio u s casu alties w as T aliaferro . Shot in the neck*

In the arm , and In the foot* he m aintained h is command until the

battle ended, but was forced to- re tu rn to Richmond* w here he was

to rem ain convalescing until D ecem ber.

40
By D ecem ber I t, T aliaferro had retu rn ed to his command. ‘

In the m eantim e L ee had moved into M aryland after defeating Pope

35 O fficial R ecord s, XU , P art 14, 657.

3h b i d ., p. 645.

37H>ld. * pp. 661*664.

-^ F reem an , L eefs L ieutenants, II* 109.

39O fficial R eco rd s, XU, P art II, 658.

* The exact date is uncertain. On November 28, Lee reports

W. B. Taliaferro to be s till absent. As late a s D ecem ber 9, M rs.
W. B* T aliaferro re c o rd s In her d iary of visiting W. B. T aliaferro
In Richmond.
a t Second'Manass&e. "Escaping a "close c a ll at the B attle of Sharpsburg

in Sept em ber, the tattered Confederate troop© w lthdrew baek 'into

Virginia* :The cam paign of the p a s t few months had b een d iffiealt.

C rossing back over the P otom ac Into V irginia, Eee* s fo rc e w a s not

the sam e'trim * w e ll-o ile d fighting' machine that ‘h ad left- Richmond. 1

Supplies- w e re sc a rc e If not nonexistent. The m en them selves' w ere

suffering from fatigue-. F ortunately the F ed erals did not p re s s their'

advantage-. By- the tim e they did* m o st of the deficiencies In Bee’s

a r m y had been co rrected . The ''Federate w ere' th reaten in g '1once again

by the tim e T aliaferro had recovered- from h is wounds and'had retu rn ed

to Bee. The F ederal'plan-w as’ for A m brose E. B urnside to attack '

F red erick sb u rg * 'w h ere the "Confederates had begun regrouping th e ir

fo rces and supplies. Outnumbered' eight to five (125, 000 under Burnside;

78,000 under- Bee), the C onfederates still had am ple re s e rv e s due to

th e ir strong defensive position. On Decem ber 11# B urnside began

laying bridges o v er the Rappahannock. 1

The following m orning, Taliaferro* again acting a s a division

commander*; received o rd e rs to m arch his troops north from Gainey*s

Station to Hamilton.1s Crossing* -At. this point* they Joined A. P. mil*©

41
division which was alread y in b attle order* T aliaferro form ed his

4 i L o n g street's co rp s com m anded the C onfederate le ft fla n k .'

Hood’s division {Bongstreet’s corps) protecting the cen ter of the line,
-acted a s liaiso n with la c k s on* s. corps. Jackson placed A. P. H ill’s
division on the line, holding T aliaferro , £>. H. Hill, and E arly In
reserve*
 Ji '<? Vis\^=^'^Q>e

'm w vs\
tutt t \ ""WA
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S* ' ,t . v Vv, fV
I «>*tWh- ji*-'{'\ ('U&frphZf0T.fc\ S \

X (L i-CAjkMiy
I S^

li

^ k -:\

v^v^vv. ;?;■/
M «
✓O wrk> „ „ . ..,.
>6 JtLttfsfe# vV^A,„v-v% •/' ^
fUr ' - V ^ V
/*!» «XvHi\e.y^
i tn i h

S k e tc h of B a t t le f ie ld of F r e d e r i c k s b u r g ,
D e c. 13-14, 1862. (Source: L e e 1s
L ie u t e n a n t s , II, 331.) S h o w s ‘o r ig in a l d i s p o s i t i o n s of
C o n fe d e r a te f o r c e s . F e d e r a l s p e n e tr a te d a r e a la b e le d
" T h e Gap" b e t w e e n vb r ig a d e s of A r c h e r ‘and L a n e .
 n

troop# ,eo th e ra ilro a d to Hill*# right. ' Subsequently* ho was or dared

to-m ove1his. com m and to the r e a r and left of H ill1© line. f The m e re

fact that Taliaferro* s’division (Jackson’s old division)' which had had

Its rank thinned by continual se v ere front line service* w as placed

in the rear# dem o n strates that' L ee had. sufficient re s e rv e s for a

change. Me then proceeded •to- a tat ion E. •F ran k P axton's and' William E.

■Starke's brigades in H ill’s rear# holding his other two brigades In

42
re s e rv e . His a r tille r y w as placed to the left of the division. When

a ll arran g em en ts .had been Completed# '-Taliaferro notified Mill of the

v arious positions. Much to A. P. H ill’s satisfaction# a ll of l^ li a f e r r o ’s

brigade and b attery ■commanders' had been o rd ered to reco g n ise a n y

dem ands fo r support without the need’of o rd e rs from th e ir im m ediate

su p e rio rs.

E arly the next morning* DecemberT3« T aliaferro posted two

o f‘h is b a tte rie s In 'th e field a c ro s s the ra ilro a d to the right of

B ern ard ’s q u a rte rs. One b attery ■and. two pieces of another' battery

w ere placed' on the h ill Just left of- the railro ad . 1The other pieces

protected the extrem e rig h t flank of the C onfederate forces* About

f A. M. # th e F ed erals began advancing tow ard Jacks on* s position

on the-right of'the C onfederate line.' The C onfederate b a tte rie s

im m ediately opened with such a d estru c tiv e fire that the F ed eral lines

4 ^O fficial R ecord s, XXI, 675.

 n

w aver e d a n d broke. The F ed eral a rtille ry now b eg an can cen tratin g

each a heavy- fire on the Confederate batteries, that they forced the

C onfederate a rtille ry to r e tir e to the r e a r , behind-the railro ad , afte r

;two-' hoars .of action. tinder, c o v e r.of this support* -the enemy infantry

’again began to advance: tow ard A. F . iBill's-; l|ne*; T a lia fe rro o rd ered

ihle Infantry' to advance io fch em llitary roadf- although exposed to: the,

h e a v y F e d e ra l shelling they would be within easy supporting distance

of. .Mill1# line* : His troops moved#' T aliaferro relates*: in com pliance

w ith 'th eir o rd e rs w ith ^ p erfect ste ad in e ss and- en th u siasm .’*

Paxton, commanding the F ir s t -Brigade of TaHaferroVs -■

division* discovered that som e of Che C onfederate troops.,w ere falling

back to. the rig h t of.-Marcy G regg's brigade. -The enemy-was- advancing

with-two reg im en ts beyond the front line through a gap which fronted- a

boggy w ood--supposedly ■inaccessible to- them . Paxton Im m ediately

moved h is brigade to the rig h t to engage the penetrating F ed eral'

forces., By-the tim e they reached that area# the F e d e ra ls w e re

already re tirin g -under'the fordQus counterattack of Brigadier- G eneral

Tubal A . Early* s m e n . ': Baxton.continued' to push forw ard to the

front and for the r e s t Of the day his m en occupied that p la c e In the

front line. The m ain effo rt of the enemy that day had been on the

Confederate left. ''F o u rteen tim es -the F e d e ra ls attem pted to take

Marye*e Hill. ■ F ourteen tim es 'their unsuccessful charges m et w ith

disaster.: -Finally* b y?:-P .M .* the assau lt* stopped.

 93

The other brigades of Taliaferro* s division w ere held in re se rv e

until the m orning of December 14* At that tim e, they relieved A* P.

/■

H ill's troops a t the front. Starke was placed to the left of the

railro ad ! Jones* Taliaferro* and Paxton occupying the ra ilro a d

and connecting with Early*s troops on the right. At daybreak the

F ed erais m ade a slight dem onstration on Taliaferro*s left; th eir

sk irm ish e rs advanced alm ost to the r a ilr o a d ,, but w ere easily driven

back. By m id-day the skirm ishing, which at tim es had been b risk ,

ceased.

D. H. HiU*s division, reliev ed T aliaferro the next m orning.

T a lia fe r r o 's men moved back to Mine road w here once again they

could r elax. 44 L ater that day B urnside began withdrawing from

F red erick sb u rg . He had s u ffe re d 12, 600 casualties* L e e 's forces

had sustained 5, 600 casu alties, but m ost w ere only slightly wounded*

The withdrawal of B urnside m arked the end of the I86£‘Vlrgiat&

cam paigns--cam paigns which on the whole could be re g iste re d as

C onfederate successes* But the p ric e of success cam e high. Many

m en had been lost, m en who could no longer be readily replaced.

C asualties had a lso caused a' general depletion in the ranks 'of the

officers. Between Cedar Mountain and Sharpsburg, Winder and

4% bld., p. 676.

44I b id . . p. 676.
G arland’had. died* Ewell* Taliaferro*. T rim ble rand F ield had, ell b;e en

wounded. At Sharpsburg the casu alties had been num erous. Three .

gen erals (O, B, Anderson* W* B. Starke* and L* O 'B rien Branch)

had been; killed! •.•five, g e n e ra ls .{Richard H. Anderson*: R o b e rt, Toombs,

A m brose R. Wright* R. S. Ripley* and A lexander Lawton) had been

wounded..: Below'-the. brigade.■level, -the. ca su a ltie s had been'even

g re a te r. The nine divisions w ere headed by four m a jo r-g en e ra ls,

four brigadier generals, and one colonel! the fo rty -th re e brigades w ere

led by seventeen b rig ad ier g en erals and: twenty*six m en w ith the rank

of colonel or low er.

Lee could sc arcely afford to allow his arm y to o p erate under

conditions of tem p o rary command. , lie had attem pted to alleviate

th is condition by subm itting a lis t of new prom otions in October, but

had not been en tirely su ccessfu l in achieving his req u ests because

of P resid en t D avis's s tr ic t in terp retatio n of the m ilita ry law. . Davie

would hot prom ote officers who w e re physically disabled. This meant*

for one thing, deferrin g the prom otion of B rig ad ier G eneral 1. R.
46
Trim ble. L e e avoided th is ru le by having him appointed to command

an unspecified., division .under Jackson. . T here was no. recorded,

opposition to either the device used by Lee or to the prom otions

^ F r e e m a n , ’L ed 4® Lieutenants, 12, 250-254,

ihom selves♦- none 'except by B rigadier G eneral W illiam S.- T aliaferro.

A & senior b rig ad ier in Jackson1^ division, he believed that he -should

have the divisional command. The early months of 1863 saw T aliaferro

attem pting':to secu re th is prom otion.' /-For T aliaferro it. was eith er

the prom otion or a tra n sfe r to another th eatre.

 CHAPTER V

A VIRGINIA ARp.TOC.RAT TO 'THE END

1T a lia fe rro 'w as: quite d istu rb e d when T rim ble w as officially
i
given com m ando! Jackson*s division. • A s a lre a d y noted, T aliaferro

w as determ ined to se c u re a tra n sfe r If lie w as'not nam ed to-command

the division. He was' the ranking b rigadier ■of the'division and had

been in command of i t since'W inder* s. deaths ex cep t fo r th e two months-

he spent recuperating from his wounds. By all-rig h ts h e should not

have been p assed over for pram otion~*the coveted rank of M ajor*

G eneral should have been his; T rim ble1s prom otion confirm ed

Taliaferro* s laten t suspicions that Jackson had never com pletely

forgiven him for h is p a rt in the Romney episode.

In' review ing Taliaferro* s; c a re e r for the twenty months*, the -

Romney incident shows up a s the only black m a rk ag ain st h is

profession al reputation. Prom an exam ination of the evidence sur**

rounding the protest#' it ap p ears that T aliaferro and the other, officers

w ere..justified in.’their-dem and for-'better, conditions for th e ir men*.

B ut'the m a n n e r which they em ployed'to achieve th ese a im s ■Was.

*O fficial -Records, XXI, 1009. The form al appointm ents w er e

not m ade until A pril 23# 1863 when C ongress convened# but the com*
m issio n s w ere'd ated from. January •17#- 1863* Trimble* e was announced
January 19# 1863.
certain ly not ju s tifie d .' The' petition to E aring w as in accordance with'

p roper m ilita ry procedure* although the wording was' a hit 'strong.

But by th is tim e the dam age had been done.' A lready the-politicians

In Richmond had w ord of the demoraliz;ed conditions existing within

the ra n k s / ■ T aliaferro a n d th e o th e r o fficers had' gone over Jackson’s

■authority without Jackson’s knowledge* T aliaferro ’s action cannot

he eondoned in this case*

Other than this episode, T aliaferro ’s c a re e r''s ta n d s’up well

under critical'ev alu atio n . He was- certain ly no physical coward.

Wounded serio u sly a t th e B attle of Groveton (August 28, 18621, he

remained- on the field commanding his m en until the'fighting subsided.

The previous year,, -at the B attle of G reen b rier River'-‘(October 3,

1861},- he 'had' been com m ended'for h is g allan try and th e'in sp iratio n

he- provided his m en.

T aliaferro displayed' considerable tactical skill*-' Only at

Cedar Mountain (August % 1862) had h is troops suffered from faulty

deployment. On1that occasion -the left flank-of the F ir s t Brigade' w as

turned because of a gap between If and th e Second Brigade.' But in

2
exam ining'the circu m stan ces Surrounding this tem p o rary setback,

T aliaferro can not be held resp o n sib le fo r'th e d evelopm ent'ofthe

conditions, which m om entarily-placed his- tro o p s in th at precarious-

%ee supra. Chapter |H.'

 98

«situation*' Oh th e :whole he -'handled■his men well* Several ’of the

-engagements 'he' p articip ated in were, o f-little tactical im portance;

they w e re m erely-knock-down, -drag*-©Ot fights* Under th ese conditions

o f close'-,combat and -heavy f ire , T aliaferro always’managed fed r etain

-order am ongst his troops, who perform ed w ell under fehese difficult

conditions.

.■-Much: of the C onfederate ’strateg y Involved m arching, continually

attem pting to flank* the m o re numerous-’foe. M ore often than hot On

th ese m ar ches, If w as T aliafer r o’ s com m and-^fir et his r egim ent,

then his-brigade and finally h is division**that' w as -the'vanguard of

-the -Confederate Army.-- And if h e w as not leading, T aliaferro seem ed

to be guarding the r e a r —contirmally lighting holding and delaying

re a rg u a rd actions. -Only 'twice during' h is twenty month# id V irginia

w as h is command rep o rted In unsatisfactory condition. -Both tim e s ,

organisation had broken dow n’under ad v erse circum stances* The

f irs t incident-occurred following, the two week tre k afte r G arnett’s

defeat-at R ich M ountain. The relativ ely inexperienced tro o p s ’had

undergone a grueling experience; th e ir com mander had been killed

e a rly fh th e -re tre a t and the new Commanding -officer w a# in cap acitated

by illness* Finally T a lia fe rro w as-given command* He successfully

brought the -tattered-forces-to safety. This sam e force,-- s till not

' u im '>■■* * » m>^.. WK «'i-,............................................................................................................... .. .................................................................................... .

^Although T a lia fe rro ’s m en escaped, Lfe* Colonel John Fegranfs

com m and.of 853 w as captured* The other units m u st have had som e 100
com pletely recovered, then underwent the tortuous Rom ney,campaign

w here disorganisation .and d em o ralisatio n again se t in.; 'In both

instances the troops had faced adverse’ conditions. Hiking many long,

tedious mUes without p ro p er cam p equipment or adequate food, and

w ith n ature n o t at h er'k in d est, it Is eusy to understand why discipline

becam e lax. T aliaferro had little control over these outside forces.

In both c a s e s / 'as- soon as the adverse; conditions w ere a lle v ia te d ,.

Taliaferro-quickly re sto re d his command to-Its-peak .efficiency.

On the whole, T aliaferro displayed the ability to command.

He ,success fully, managed Jackson’s. division for se v eral m o n th s ..

D espite his ability, it appeared that Jackson had p assed him over

for promotion*. The reason m ust lie with the attitude T aliaferro

displayed dur|ng the e n tire Romney affair.

In January, 1863, while awaiting official w ord of the new

prom otions, T aliaferro becam e involved In another controversy,

this time-.with 'B rigadier-G eneral F ra n k Paxton. H ostilities between

the two began over a m inor question of m ilita ry etiquette--w hether

or not c o u rt-m a rtia l proceedings should be forw arded through

channels and whether the division com m ander had the right to

open a sealed packet of court docum ents. T em pers flared* The

or m ore wounded and stragglers* T aliaferro ’s T w en ty Third only

lo st 32. (See F reem an, L ee’s Lieutenants, I, 23-27, note 36.)
 4
alleged charges soon reached Arm y Headquarters* Lee examined
' fe rro 's position. 5
the case; his findings supported T a lia

The controversy had been decided in T a lia fe rro 's favor, but

the denial of His prom otion annoyed him. When he learned that

T rim b le 's prom otion was official, he decided to apply for a ,tra n s fe r.

His m otives seem clear: ‘‘the continual denial of a M ajor G en eral's

com m ission w as an affront to his station as a landed a ris to c ra t and

a gentlem an politician. h7 Oh January 30 he w rote to his commanding

general asking to be relieved of His command. In urging his tra n sfe r

T aliaferro said:

1 sincerely tru s t that the Comdg Genl will recognise

and app reciate the delicacy of sentim ent which influences m e
to urge that he w ill not in sist that afte r occupying the position
of a Division Commander for so long a tim e I w ill be req u ired
to assu m e a subordinate position in the sam e division. ®

^Vandiver, Mighty Stonewall, pp. 443*444; F reem an , L e e 's

L ieutenants, II, 504*505, citing Paxton, E lisha F ranklin Paxton M emoir
and M em orial, pp. 83*84.

^ L etter to Lt, G eneral Jackson from G eneral Lee, January 12,

1862, T aliaferro P ap ers.

^F reem an, L e e 's L ieutenants, Hi 417.

7fb ld ., 505.

^ L etter to B rigadier G eneral R. H. Chilton, H eadquarters,

Jack so n 's Division, from W illiam B. T aliaferro , January 30, 1863,
T aliaferro P ap ers.
T a lia fe rro 's req u est was approved; he was tra n s fe rre d to duty in the

southeastern sta tes. Jackson made no com m ent about T a lia fe rro 's

tra n s fe r—but'his opinion can be in ferred by his failure to recom m end

T aliaferro for prom otion. So-ended T a lia fe rro 's serv ice for the

Confederacy in V irginia.

In F ebruary 1863, T aliaferro rep o rted to P. G. T. B eauregard

who assigned him to command the defenses of Savannah and the adjoining

coast. He was recalled in July to command B attery Wagner (on M o rris

Island, protecting C harleston, South Carolina). A fter being bombarded

heavily for a n 'e n tire d ay --Ju ly 18-*T aliaferro , with le s s than 1200 men,

was able to repulse the attack of some 6000 F ed erals. ? A fterw ards he

was in command of Jam es Island, another defense of C harleston. For

a b rie f tim e in 1864 he had a quasi-independent command In F lorida,

but by A pril he was again in command at Jam es Island. By D ecember

1864, the F ed erals under S herm an's guidance had pushed through

Georgia to the coast. During the siege of Savannah* T aliaferro com*

manded the troops covering its evacuation. T aliaferro commanded a

division of H ard ee's corps In Johnston's arm y during M arch and

A pril, 1865. In th eir engagem ents against the F ed erals in M arch,

? Official R ecords, XXVHI, P a rt i, 415-421. W illiam s, Beau-

regard: Napoleon In G ray, has an excellent descrip tio n of the e n tire
F ed eral assau lt on the Confederate defenses, pp. 209*244.
the Confederates w ere continually pushed northw ard through North

Carolina. Finally, oh A pril 25* the day before Johnston's su rren d er,
*A
T aliaferro was prom oted to M ajor General,

A year e a rlie r, Jam es A. Seddon, then S ecretary of War, had

stated, "of, his ZTTaliaferro's J gallantry and trie d determ ination on

the field th ere can foe no doubt, and his general capacity is, in my

judgment, fully equal to m oat of Our m ajor generals whom I have

mot,-” H T a lia fe rro 's prom otion had been delayed at that tim e for

sev eral reasons; F irs t, openings w ere oh the whole sc arce in the

southeastern a re a w here m ilita ry activity was much m ore lim ited

than in the b a ttle -sc a rre d V irginia th eatre. And when vacancies

occurred, p referen ce was given to the officers from the im m ediate

vicinity; this w as ju st another example of the strong sectionalism

existing in the South. Another reaso n involved Seddon him self. He

was a relativ e and good friend of T aliaferro 's. This m eant using

extrem e delicacy in p ressin g T aliaferro 's prom otion le s t charges of

favoritism cloud Seddon*£ reco rd .

A fter the w ar, T aliaferro returned home w h ere he continued

L etter to W illiam B. T aliaferro from John C. B reckinridge,

S ecretary of War, A pril 25, 1865, T aliaferro P ap ers, V irginia
H istorical Society, Richmond, V irginia.

^ O ffic ial R ecords, XXXV, F a rt I, 622-623.

to help lead V irginia In her hew life, He realized that the outcome of

the w ar had changed the Southern way of life . His ideals, though

never su rren d ered , becam e pliable, adapting to the new life.

A s a m em ber of the state le g isla tu re {1874*4879), T aliaferro opposed

the repudiation of V irginia’s state debt. He believed that V irginia,

and the r e s t of the South, should accept defeat gracefully, and become

an integral p a rt of the new Union. . In 1880 he ran unsuccessfully for

governor of V irginia. The rem ain d er of his life centered around h |s

la v /p ra c tic e , although he continued to be active In public life. He

was Grand M aster of Masons of V irginia from 18?6*to 187?.; He was

a m em ber of the board of v isito r s of sev eral state institutions*

including William and M ary (1870-1897) and V. M. 1. , and also

served as Judge of G loucester County Court from 1891 to 189?. Until

his death, the many distinguished v isito rs to his an c estra l home

Dunham M&ssie saw an old Confederate battleflag draped in the m ain

hallway, a tribute to a. lo st cause. 14

^ T a lia f e r r o ’s recollections of the w ar, T aliaferro P ap ers.

14
Dictionary of A m erican Biography, XVIII, 884.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

The William Booth T aliaferro Paper $ at the College of William and

Mary, W illiam sburg, V irginia w ere a m ajo r source for this
paper. Catalogued in tw e n ty four boxes, the collection covers
T aliaferro ’s c a re e r from the early 1840’s until his death In
1098. Boxes 1, 15, and 21 w ere of p rim ary im portance in
tracin g his se rv ic e to the Confederacy. They give p articu larly
good coverage to his early c a re e r in 1861 and also his serv ice
under B eauregard In 186$ and 1864. T here Is little m a te ria l
covering his serv ice -with Jackson; the m ajor item here Is
T a lia fe rro 's "R em iniscences of Jackson'1 which is too vague
on the activ ities of T aliaferro him self. Supplementing the
hereto fo re mentioned m an u scrip ts a r e (1) T a lia fe rro 's
recollections of the Avar, which unfortunately is finished
only through 1861; (2) M rs. William B. (Sally Lyons)
1T a lia fe rro 's d iary and sev eral of her le tte rs which pinpoint
T a lia fe rro 's location during his frequent illn esse s; (3) a
good coverage of T aliaferro ’s activ ities at H a rp e r's F e rry
im m ediately following the John Brown incident.

The T aliaferro P ap ers in the V irginia H isto rical Society, Richmond,

V irginia is only a sm all collection. Their m ain em phasis is
upon his c a re e r during the 1850's; they w ere of little help in
tracing his m ilita ry c a re e r.

Books, Pam phlets, and A rticles

I. P rim ary Sources

Evans, Clement A ., ed. Confederate .M m ja n rH isto ry , Atlanta:

Confederate Publishing Company* 1899. I t Vets. Vol. lit
gives a general account of the m ilitary activ ities in V irginia,
tt contains the m ilita ry ac tiv ities of the Romney campaign In
som e detail. It has the b est synopsis of T a lia fe rro 's m ilitary
c a re e r (HI, 670).

104
 105

Johnson, Robert U. , and Buel, C larence C ., eds. B attles and L eaders

of the Civil W ar. New York: The Century Company, 1887*1888*
4 Vole. Another general account of the m ilitary activities* It
is of in te re st and im portance because of T aliaferro 1s a rtic le
” Jackson’s Raid Around Pope1* in II, 501-511.

Scott, Robert N ., chief com piler. The War of the Rebellion; A

Compilation of the Official R ecords of the Union and Confederate
A rm ies. Washington, D. C .; Government Printing Office,
1880- 1901. 70 volum es in 128. This is the other m ajor
source consulted in research in g T aliaferro ’s m ilita ry c a re e r.
His rep o rts following each of his battles w ere extrem ely helpful.
S eries 1, Volumes II, V, Xii, p art ii, and XXI w ere of the m ost
help. Volume V threw considerable light upon the Romney
affair. No account of the war can be w ritten adequately without
consulting this m assiv e work. Official R ecords A tlas in two
volumes provides sketches of the num erous battle te rra in s .

H. Secondary Sources

Dupuy, T. N ., and C. G. The Compact H istory of the Civil W ar.

New York; C ollier Books, 1962.

E llis, R obert R. HThe Confederate Infantry O ffic er,” Infantry Journal.

LXIV-LXV, November 1949* 17- 19.

F reem an, Douglas S. Dee’s Lieutenants; A Study in Command.

New York: C harles S cribner’s Sons, 1942-1944. 3 Vols.
This is without a doubt the best work in its field. The
descriptions of the actual battle conditions, troop dispositions,
and tactical movem ents of the com m anders a re excellent.
T aliaferro ’s movem ents can easily be blended into the whole
p ictu re with the aid of F reem an ’s w orks. His appendix H
in volume one is m ost valuable for its d escription of the
Southern command re so u rc e s.

. R. E. Lee: A Biography. New York: C harles S crib n er’s

Sons, 1934-35. 4 Vols. It is extrem ely helpful in portraying
the conditions under which the Confederacy and Lee w ere forced
to operate.
 106

Henry, R obert $» The Story of the Confederacy. New York: Garden

City PuMlshing Company, Inc. , 1931.

Johnson, Alien, ed; Q lctlonary of A m erican Biography. New York:

'C harles S crib n er’s 'Sons* 1918. ■Used t o r 'biographical sketches
of Taliaferro# Staples# Seddon, and Breckinridge# This gives
'the-beet- account1of hie1ao » * m ll|tsry c a re e r (XVIli, 283-284).

Vandiver, F rank E. Mighty Stonewall. New York; M cGraw-Hill

Book Company, I n c ., I9S7. This Is extrem ely good in
establishing1Taliaferro* s relationship with Jackson. It
provides a clear understanding of th e ‘en tire Romney episode.
Vandiver him self'need the T alia fe rro /F a p e rs a t William And
’M ary. ’ *

■>. Rebel Brass* The -Confederate -Command System.* Baton

Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State U niversity P re s s , 19S6.

W arner, E sra J. G enerals In Gray: Lives of the Confederate

C om m anders. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U niversity
P re s s , "1959#
 vim

• R o b e rt C harles Bolander

B orn la Burlington# Iowa,. .‘May* 8, 1940'.= Graduated' from

E ast S en io r,High School*- Rockford,; Illinois# lu n e 1958. Received

A; B; in Economics from College of William and Mary# 1962.

Spent 1963 as p o st .graduate in history a t W illiam and -Mary.

In September* 1963* the author becam e a graduate' student

In the D epartm ent of History# College of William and Mary*

107