Sierra Madre Trust v.

Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources

G.R. Nos. L-32370 & 32767
April 20, 1983
FACTS

The Sierra Madre Trust filed with the Bureau of Mines an Adverse Claim against LLA No. V-7872
and LLA No. V-9028 of the Jusan Trust Mining Company and J & S Partnership over six (6) lode mineral
claims, with the office of the Mining Recorder of Nueva Vizcaya. The adverse claim alleged that the
aforementioned six (6) lode mineral claims encroached and overlapped the eleven (11) lode mineral
claims of the respondent Sierra Madre and the adverse claim alleged that the aforementioned six (6) lode
mineral claims covered by LLA No. V-9028, encroached and overlapped the thirteen (13) lode mineral
claims of herein petitioner Sierra Madre Trust.

The adverse claim prayed for an order or decision declaring the above mentioned claims of
respondent J & S Partnership and Jusan Trust Mining Company, null, void, and illegal.

This adverse claim was docketed in the Bureau of Mines as Mines Administrative Case No. V-
404, and on appeal to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources as DANR Case No. 3502
and jointly heard.

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources ruled that the Director of Mines found that,
"By sheer force of evidence, this Office is constrained to believe that there exists no conflict or
overlapping between the protestant’s and respondents’ mining claims." And this finding was affirmed by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources thus: "Anent the first allegation, this Office finds that
the Director of Mines did not err when he found that the twelve (12) claims of respondents Jusan Trust
Mining Company and J & S Partnership did not encroach and overlap the eighteen (18) lode mineral
claims of the appellant Sierra Madre Trust. For this fact has been incontrovertibly proven by the records
appertaining to the case.

ISSUE

Whether or not may there be a valid location of mining claims after the lapse of thirty (30) days
from date of discovery, in contravention to the mandatory provision of Section 33 of the New Mining Law

HELD

The court see no reason why they have to answer the questions in this petition considering that
there is no justiciable issue between the parties. The officers of the Executive Department tasked with
administering the Mining Law have found that there is neither encroachment nor overlapping in respect of
the claims involved. Accordingly, whatever may be the answers to the questions will not materially serve
the interests of the petitioner.

In closing it is useful to remind litigation prone individuals that the interpretation by officers of laws
which are entrusted to their administration is entitled to great respect. In his decision, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources said: "This Office is in conformity with the findings of the Director of
Mines that the mining claims of the appellees were validly located, surveyed and registered."
 Asturias Sugar Central Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs
G.R. No. L-19337
September 30, 1969
FACTS

The Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. is engaged in the production and milling of centrifugal sugar for
exert, the sugar so produced being placed in containers known as jute bags. It made two importations of
jute bags. The first shipment consisting of 44,800 jute bags. The second shipment consisting of 75,200
jute bags.

Of the total number of imported jute bags only 33,647 bags were exported within one year after
their importation. The remaining 86,353 bags were exported after the expiration of the one-year period but
within three years from their importation.

The petitioner, thru its agent, requested the Commissioner of Customs for a week's extension of
Re-exportation and Special Import Tax Bond no. 6 which was to expire the following day, giving the
following as the reasons for its failure to export the remaining jute bags within the period of one year: (a)
typhoons and severe floods; (b) picketing of the Central railroad line by certain union elements in the
employ of the Philippine Railway Company, which hampered normal operations; and (c) delay in the
arrival of the vessel aboard which the petitioner was to ship its sugar which was then ready for loading.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Commissioner of Customs is vested, under the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909,
the then applicable law, with discretion to extend the period of one year.

HELD

Yes. It will be noted that section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 and the superseding sec.
105 of the Tariff and Customs Code, while fixing at one year the period within which the containers
therein mentioned must be exported, are silent as to whether the said period may be extended. It was
surely by reason of this silence that the Bureau of Customs issued Administrative Orders 389 and 66,
already adverted to, to eliminate confusion and provide a guide as to how it shall apply the law, and, more
specifically, to make officially known its policy to consider the one-year period mentioned in the law as
non-extendible.

The administrative orders in question appear to be in consonance with the intention of the
legislature to limit the period within which to export imported containers to one year, without extension,
from the date of importation.

In applying the doctrine or principle of respect for administrative or practical construction, the
courts often refer to several factors which may be regarded as bases of the principle, as factors leading
the courts to give the principle controlling weight in particular instances, or as independent rules in
themselves. These factors are the respect due the governmental agencies charged with administration,
their competence, expertness, experience, and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are
the drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on which the legislature must rely to
advise it as to the practical working out of the statute, and practical application of the statute presents the
agency with unique opportunity and experiences for discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or
improvements in the statute.

If it is further considered that exemptions from taxation are not favored, and that tax statutes are
to be construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority, then
we are hard put to sustain the petitioner's stand that it was entitled to an extension of time within which to
export the jute bags and, consequently, to a refund of the amount it had paid as customs duties.
 Antique Sawmiill, Inc. v. Zayco, et al.
G.R. No. L-20051
May 30, 1966
FACTS

A public bidding was conducted for the award of a 12,680-hectare forest area. Four parties
submitted bid applications with the Bureau of Forestry, namely: the petitioner-appellant, Antique Sawmills,
Inc., the respondent-appellee, Aquiles Zayco, Crisencio Milendez and Pedro T. Lo. The Director of
Forestry awarded the bid to the respondent-appellee, Aquiles R. Zayco. Thereafter, the losing bidders
appealed the above award to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who, affirmed the same.

All the losing bidders filed a motion for reconsideration with the Secretary of Agricultural and
Natural Resources and acting on this motion, the said Secretary issued an order modifying the original
exclusive award to Aquiles R. Zayco. Under this order, the forest area in question was awarded in equal
portions to Aquiles R. Zayco and the petitioner-appellant, Antique Sawmills, Inc.

The respondent-appellee appealed the above order of February 15, 1956, to the Office of the
President. The herein appellant interposed an opposition to the above-mentioned appeal on the main
ground that the order appealed from had already become final and executory.

However, the Executive Secretary rendered a decision sustaining the appeal and reversing the
order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated July 14, 1955. This order of the
Executive Secretary awarded the entire forest concession in question to the respondent-appellee, Aquiles
B. Zayco.

ISSUE

Whether the Office of the President still retains or possesses jurisdiction to review on appeal a
decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources which has become final.

HELD

The Supreme Court has ruled that compliance with the period provided by law for the perfection
of an appeal is not merely mandatory but also a jurisdictional requirement. Thus, in the case of  Miranda
vs. Guanzon, et al., 92 Phil. 168, this Court held:

Section 13 of Rule 41 provides that when the appeal is not perfected within the reglementary
period the appeal shall be dismissed. The requirement regarding the perfection of an appeal
within the reglementary period is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. Such failure has the effect
of rendering final the judgment of the court, and the certification of the record on appeal thereafter
cannot restore the jurisdiction which has been lost. The dismissal of the appeal can be effected
even after the case has been elevated to the Court of Appeals (Rule 52, Section 1[a]). Appellee's
failure to file a motion for dismissal of appeal in the court of origin before the transmittal of the
record to the appellate court, does not constitute a waiver on his part to interpose such objection.

That administrative rules and regulations have the force of law can no longer be questioned. Only
recently,

x x x it cannot be contended, as the court a quo intimated, that an administrative regulation

should not be given the same weight as to rule of court but should rather be given a more liberal
interpretation for, as is well known, a regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force and effect
of law. In fact, it is a wise policy that administrative regulations be given the same force as rules
of court in order to maintain the regularity of administrative proceedings.
 Tayug Rural Bank v. Central Bank
G.R. No. L-46158
November 28, 1986
FACTS

Tayug Rural Bank obtained thirteen (13) loans from Central Bank of the Philippines, by way of
rediscounting, at the rate of 1/2 of 1% per annum from and thereafter at the rate of 2-1/2% per anum. The
loans, amounting to P813,000.00, were all covered by corresponding promissory notes prescribing the
terms and conditions of the aforesaid loans.

Appellant, thru the Director of the Department of Loans and Credit, issued a Memorandum,
informing all rural banks that an additional penalty interest rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum would be
assessed on all past due loans beginning January 4, 1965.

Rural Bank sued Appellant in the Court of First Instance of Manila, to recover the 10% penalty
imposed by Appellant amounting to P16,874.97, and to restrain Appellant from continuing the imposition
of the penalty. Central Bank filed a counterclaim for the outstanding balance and overdue accounts of
Appellee in the total amount of P444,809.45 plus accrued interest and penalty at 10% per annum on the
outstanding balance until full payment. Central Bank justified the imposition of the penalty by way of
affirmative and special defenses, stating that it was legally imposed under the provisions of Section 147
and 148 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Rural Banks promulgated by the Monetary Board under
authority of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended.

ISSUE

Whether or not administrative rules and regulations may impose penalty not so provided by the
law promulgating it.

HELD

There are, however, limitations to the rule-making power of administrative agencies. A rule
shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress authorizes promulgation of administrative rules and
regulations to implement given legislation, all that is required is that the regulation be not in contradiction
with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes. In case of discrepancy between the basic law
and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or
regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.

When promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative
agency by law, the rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may
be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law.

Hence an administrative agency cannot impose a penalty not so provided in the law authorizing
the promulgation of the rules and regulations, much less one that is applied retroactively.

Such clause was not a part of the promissory notes executed by Appellee to secure its loans.
Appellant inserted the clause in the revised DLC Form No. 11 to make it a part of the contractual
obligation of rural banks securing loans from the Central Bank, after December 23, 1964. Thus, while
there is now a basis for the imposition of the 10% penalty rate on overdue accounts of rural banks, there
was none during the period that Appellee contracted its loans from Appellant, the last of which loan was
on July 30, 1963. Surely, the rule cannot be given retroactive effect.

 
 Boie- Takeda Chemicals, Inc. v. De La Serna
G.R. No. 92174
December 10, 1993
FACTS

President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Memorandum Order No. 28, which contained a single
provision modifying Presidential Decree No. 851 by removing the salary ceiling of P1,000.00 a month set
by the latter

Boie-Takeda wrote the Labor Department contesting the Notice of Inspection Results, and
expressing the view "that the commission paid to our medical representatives are not to be included in the
computation of the 13th month pay since the law and its implementing rules speak of REGULAR or
BASIC salary and therefore exclude all other remunerations which are not part of the REGULAR salary."
It pointed out that, "if no sales is made under the effort of a particular representative, there is no
commission during the period when no sale was transacted, so that commissions are not and cannot be
legally defined as regular in nature.

ISSUE

Whether or not that said provision constituted a usurpation of legislative power because not
justified by or within the authority of the law sought to be implemented besides being violative of the equal
protection of the law clause of the Constitution.

HELD

Quite obvious from the foregoing is that the term "basic salary" is to be understood in its common,
generally-accepted meaning, i.e., as a rate of pay for a standard work period exclusive of such additional
payments as bonuses and overtime.

In remunerative schemes consisting of a fixed or guaranteed wage plus commission, the fixed or
guaranteed wage is patently the "basic salary" for this is what the employee receives for a standard work
period. Commissions are given for extra efforts exerted in consummating sales or other related
transactions. They are, as such, additional pay, which this Court has made clear do not form part of the
"basic salary."

In including commissions in the computation of the 13th month pay, the second paragraph of
Section 5(a) of the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law unduly
expanded the concept of "basic salary" as defined in P.D. 851.

It is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add to or detract from the provisions of the
law it is designed to implement. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law they are intended to carry into
effect. They cannot widen its scope. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
 Araneta v. Gatmaitan
G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191
April 30, 1957
FACTS

San Miguel Bay is considered as the most important fishing area in the Pacific side of the Bicol
region. trawl operators from Malabon, Navotas and other places migrated to this region most of them
settling at Sabang, Calabanga, Camarines Sur, for the purpose of using this particular method of fishing
in said bay. On account of the belief of sustenance fishermen that the operation of this kind of gear
caused the depletion of the marine resources of that area, there arose a general clamor among the
majority of the inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay. Mayors'
League passed a resolution condemning the operation of trawls as the cause of the wanton destruction of
the shrimp specie and resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San
Miguel Bay by declaring it closed for trawl fishing at a certain period of the year. The same League of
Municipal Mayor, prayed the President to protect them and the fish resources of San Miguel Bay by
banning the operation of trawls therein.

In response to these pleas, the President issued Executive Order No. 22 prohibiting the use of
trawls in San Miguel Bay, but said executive order was amended by Executive Order No. 66, apparently
in answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of trawl
fishing during the typhoon season only. However, Executive Order No. 80 was issued reviving Executive
Order No. 22, to take effect after December 31, 1954.

ISSUE

Whether or not Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not
in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the President.

HELD

From the provisions of Act No. 4003 of the Legislature, as amended by Commonwealth Act No.
471, which have been aforequoted, We find that Congress (a) declared it unlawful "to take or catch fry or
fish eggs in the territorial waters of the Philippines; (b) towards this end, it authorized the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by the regulations such restrictions as may be deemed
necessary to be imposed on the use of any fishing net or fishing device for the protection of fish fry or fish
eggs (Sec. 13); (c) it authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to set aside and
establish fishery reservations or fish refuges and sanctuaries to be administered in the manner to be
prescribed by him and declared it unlawful for any person to take, destroy or kill in any of said places, or,
in any manner disturb or drive away or take therefrom, any fish fry or fish eggs (See. 75); and (d) it
penalizes the execution of such acts declared unlawful and in violation of this Act (No. 4003) or of any
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, making the offender subject to a fine of not more than
P200, or imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or both, in the discretion of the court (Sec. 83).

From the foregoing it may be seen that in so far as the protection of fish fry or fish egg is
concerned, the Fisheries Act is complete in itself, leaving to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources the promulgation of rules and regulations to carry into effect the legislative intent. It also
appears from the exhibits on record in these cases that fishing with trawls causes "a wanton destruction
of the mother shrimps laying their eggs and the millions of eggs laid and the inevitable extermination of
the shrimps specie" and that, "the trawls ram and destroy the fish corrals. The heavy trawl nets dig deep
into the ocean bed. They destroy the fish food which lies below the ocean floor. Their daytime catches net
millions of shrimps scooped up from the mud. In their nets they bring up the life of the sea" 
 Grego v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 125955
June 19, 1997

FACTS

Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by no less than this Court upon a finding
of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by a certain Nena Tordesillas.  Subsequently,
Basco ran as a candidate for Councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila during the January 18,
1988, local elections. He won and, accordingly, assumed office.

After his term, Basco sought re-election in the May 11, 1992 synchronized national elections.
Again, he succeeded in his bid and he was elected as one of the six (6) City Councilors. However, his
victory this time did not remain unchallenged. In the midst of his successful re-election, he found himself
besieged by lawsuits of his opponents in the polls who wanted to dislodge him from his position.

Basco remained undaunted and ran again for councilor in the May 8, 1995, local elections
seeking a third and final term. Once again, he beat the odds by emerging sixth in a battle for six councilor
seats. As in the past, however, his right to office was again contested. On May 13, 1995, petitioner Grego,
claiming to be a registered voter of Precinct No. 966, District II, City of Manila, filed with the COMELEC a
petition for disqualification, praying for Basco's disqualification, for the suspension of his proclamation,
and for the declaration of Romualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duly elected Councilor of Manila's Second
District.

ISSUE

Whether or not private respondent's proclamation as sixth winning candidate on May 17, 1995,
while the disqualification case was still pending consideration by COMELEC, is void ab initio

HELD

This provision, however, does not support petitioner's contention that the COMELEC, or more
properly speaking, the Manila City BOC, should have suspended the proclamation. The use of the word
"may" indicates that the suspension of a proclamation is merely directory and permissive in nature and
operates to confer discretion. What is merely made mandatory, according to the provision itself, is the
continuation of the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest. Thus, in view of this discretion
granted to the COMELEC, the question of whether or not evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant
suspension of proclamation must be left for its own determination and the Court cannot interfere therewith
and substitute its own judgment unless such discretion has been exercised whimsically and capriciously.

The COMELEC, as an administrative agency and a specialized constitutional body charged with
the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has more than enough expertise in its field that its findings or
conclusions are generally respected and even given finality. The COMELEC has not found any ground to
suspend the proclamation and the records likewise fail to show any so as to warrant a different conclusion
from this Court. Hence, there is no ample justification to hold that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion.

However, being merely an implementing rule, the same must not override, but instead remain
consistent with and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative rules and
regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law.
 Conte v. COA
G.R. No. 116422
November 4, 1996
FACTS

Petitioners Avelina B. Conte and Leticia Boiser-Palma were former employees of the Social
Security System (SSS) who retired from government service. They availed of compulsory retirement
benefits under R.A. No. 660. In addition to retirement benefits provided under R.A. 660, petitioners also
claimed SSS "financial assistance" benefits granted under SSS Resolution No. 56, series of 1971.

A brief historical backgrounder is in order. SSS Resolution No. 56, approved on January 21,
1971, provides financial incentive and inducement to SSS employees qualified to retire to avail of
retirement benefits under RA 660 as amended, rather than the retirement benefits under RA 1616 as
amended, by giving them "financial assistance" equivalent in amount to the difference between what a
retiree would have received under RA 1616, less what he was entitled to under RA 660.

ISSUE

SSS Resolution No. 56 then within the ambit of and thus proscribed by Sec. 28 (b) of CA 186 as
amended by RA 4968?

HELD

We answer in the affirmative. Said Sec. 28 (b) as amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain terms
bars the creation of any insurance or retirement plan — other than the GSIS — for government officers
and employees, in order to prevent the undue and inequitous proliferation of such plans. It is beyond cavil
that Res. 56 contravenes the said provision of law and is therefore invalid, void and of no effect. No
ignore this and rule otherwise would be tantamount to permitting every other government office or agency
to put up its own supplementary retirement benefit plan under the guise of such "financial assistance".

We are not unmindful of the laudable purposes for promulgating Res. 56, and the positive results
it must have had, not only in reducing costs and expenses on the part of the SSS in connection with the
pay-out of retirement benefits and gratuities, but also in improving the quality of life for scores of retirees.
But it is simply beyond dispute that the SSS had no authority to maintain and implement such retirement
plan, particularly in the face of the statutory prohibition. The SSS cannot, in the guise of rule-making,
legislate or amend laws or worse, render them nugatory.

It is doctrinal that in case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former
must prevail. A rule or regulation must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling
statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. The rule-making power of a public administrative
body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by the
Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and
statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by such a
body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and
regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the
statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a
statute.
 China Banking Corporation v. CA
G.R. No. 117604
March 26, 1997
FACTS

Calapatia obtained a loan of P20,000.00 from China Banking, payment of which was secured by
the pledge agreement still existing between Calapatia and China Banking.

Due to Calapatia's failure to pay his obligation, petitioner filed a petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure before Notary Public of Manila, requesting the latter to conduct a public auction sale of the
pledged stock.

China Banking informed VGCCI of the above-mentioned foreclosure proceedings and requested
that the pledged stock be transferred to its name and the same be recorded in the corporate books.
However, VGCCI wrote petitioner expressing its inability to accede to petitioner's request in view of
Calapatia's unsettled accounts with the club.

An important consideration, moreover, is the nature of the controversy between petitioner and
private respondent corporation. VGCCI claims a prior right over the subject share anchored mainly on
Sec. 3, Art VIII of its by-laws which provides that "after a member shall have been posted as delinquent,
the Board may order his/her/its share sold to satisfy the claims of the Club.” It is pursuant to this provision
that VGCCI also sold the subject share at public auction, of which it was the highest bidder. VGCCI caps
its argument by asserting that its corporate by-laws should prevail. The bone of contention, thus, is the
proper interpretation and application of VGCCI's by-laws, a subject which irrefutably calls for the special
competence of the SEC.

ISSUE

Whether or not the SEC took the proper cognizance of the case.

HELD

The Court taking cognizance of the move to vest jurisdiction in administrative commissions and
boards the power to resolve specialized disputes in the field of labor (as in corporations, public
transportation and public utilities) ruled that Congress in requiring the Industrial Court's intervention in the
resolution of labor-management controversies likely to cause strikes or lockouts meant such jurisdiction to
be exclusive, although it did not so expressly state in the law. The Court held that under the "sense-
making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction - the courts cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact,
and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered.

In this case, the need for the SEC's technical expertise cannot be over-emphasized involving as it
does the meticulous analysis and correct interpretation of a corporation's by-laws as well as the
applicable provisions of the Corporation Code in order to determine the validity of VGCCI's claims. The
SEC, therefore, took proper cognizance of the instant case.

We remind VGCCI that in the same proceedings before the RTC of Makati, it categorically stated
(in its motion to dismiss) that the case between itself and petitioner is intra-corporate and insisted that it is
the SEC and not the regular courts which has jurisdiction. This is precisely the reason why the said court
dismissed petitioner's complaint and led to petitioner's recourse to the SEC.
 People v. Maceren
G.R. No. L-32166
October 18, 1977
FACTS

Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario
were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having
violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.

It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to
electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by "using their own motor banca,
equipped with motor; with a generator colored green with attached dynamo colored gray or somewhat
white; and electrocuting device locally known as sensored with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the
tip or other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was attached to the dynamo direct
and with the use of these devices or equipments catches fish thru electric current, which destroy any
aquatic animals within its cuffed reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace"

The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an
obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section II of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a
substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court further
held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments
cannot consider it unlawful.

ISSUE

Whether or not the regulation penalizing electro fishing is in accordance with Fisheries Law.

HELD

No. In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with
the Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was issued, because the law itself does not expressly
punish electro fishing.

Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in
punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense fails within the category of "other
violations" because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the
penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the
same as the penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries
Law.

The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts
should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty
provided for in the law itself.
 Bautista v. Juinto
G.R. No. L-50908
January 31, 1984

FACTS

Alfredo L. Juinio, then Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications and Romeo
P. Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 39,
which imposed "the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of
the above-specified vehicles" found violating such Letter of Instruction. It was then alleged by petitioners
that "while the purpose for the issuance of the LOI 869 is laudable, to wit, energy conservation, the
provision banning the use of H and EH [vehicles] is unfair, discriminatory, [amounting to an] arbitrary
classification" and thus in contravention of the equal protection clause. 

Moreover, for them, such Letter of Instruction is a denial of due process, more specifically, "of
their right to use and enjoy their private property and of their freedom to travel and hold family gatherings,
reunions and outings on week-ends and holidays," inviting attention to the fact that others not included in
the ban enjoying "unrestricted freedom." It would follow, so they contend that Memorandum Circular No.
39 imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license is likewise
unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of "undue delegation of legislative power." It is to be
noted that such Memorandum Circular does not impose the penalty of confiscation but merely that of
impounding, fine, and for the third offense that of cancellation of certificate of registration and for the rest
of the year or for ninety days whichever is longer.

ISSUE

Whether or not there has been an undue delegation of power upon issuance of MC 39

HELD

No. Petitioners invoking the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. To that extent that a
Letter of Instruction may be viewed as an exercise of the decree-making power of the President, then
such an argument is futile. If, however, viewed as a compliance with the duty to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed, as a consequence of which subordinate executive officials may in turn issue
implementing rules and regulations, then the objection would properly be considered as an ultra
vires allegation. The regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general
provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as the
regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid. We reaffirmed such
a doctrine in a 1951 decision, where we again made clear that where an administrative order betrays
inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, 'the mandate of the Act must prevail and must
be followed.

It was alleged in the Answer of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza that Letter of Instruction 869
and Memorandum Circular No. 39 were adopted pursuant to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. It
contains a specific provision as to penalties. Thus: "For violation of any provisions of this Act or
regulations promulgated pursuant hereto, not hereinbefore specifically punished, a fine of not less than
ten nor more than fifty pesos shall be imposed." Memorandum Circular No. 39 cannot be held to be ultra
vires as long as the fine imposed is not less than ten nor more than fifty pesos. As to suspension of
registration, the Code, insofar as applicable, provides: "Whenever it shall appear from the records of the
Commission that during any twelve-month period more than three warnings for violations of this Act have
been given to the owner of a motor vehicle, or that the said owner has been convicted by a competent
court more than once for violation of such laws, the Commissioner may, in his discretion, suspend the
certificate of registration for a period not exceeding ninety days and, thereupon, shall require the
immediate surrender of the number plates. "It follows that while the imposition of a fine or the suspension
of registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid under the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, the impounding of a vehicle finds no statutory justification. To apply that portion of Memorandum
Circular No. 39 would be ultra vires. It must likewise be made clear that a penalty even if warranted can
only be imposed in accordance with the procedure required by law. 
 PBCOM v. CIR
G.R. No. 112024
January 28, 1999
FACTS

Petitioner filed a claim for refund of creditable taxes withheld by their lessees from property
rentals in 1985 for P282,795.50 and in 1986 for P234,077.69.

The CTA rendered a decision which, as stated on the outset, denied the request of petitioner for a
tax refund or credit in the sum amount of P5,299,749.95, on the ground that it was filed beyond the two-
year reglementary period provided for by law. The petitioner's claim for refund in 1986 amounting to
P234,077.69 was likewise denied on the assumption that it was automatically credited by PBCom against
its tax payment in the succeeding year.

ISSUE

Whether or not RMC 7-85 is in harmony with NIRC

HELD

No. When the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued RMC 7-85, changing the
prescriptive period of two years to ten years on claims of excess quarterly income tax payments, such
circular created a clear inconsistency with the provision of Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC. In so doing, the BIR
did not simply interpret the law; rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the statute passed by Congress.

It bears repeating that Revenue memorandum-circulars are considered administrative rulings (in
the sense of more specific and less general interpretations of tax laws) which are issued from time to time
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is widely accepted that the interpretation placed upon a
statute by the executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is entitled to great respect by the courts.
Nevertheless, such interpretation is not conclusive and will be ignored if judicially found to be erroneous.
Thus, courts will not countenance administrative issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent
and in harmony with the law they seek to apply and implement.

Art. 8 of the Civil Code recognizes judicial decisions, applying or interpreting statutes as part of
the legal system of the country. But administrative decisions do not enjoy that level of recognition. A
memorandum-circular of a bureau head could not operate to vest a taxpayer with shield against judicial
action. For there are no vested rights to speak of respecting a wrong construction of the law by the
administrative officials and such wrong interpretation could not place the Government in estoppel to
correct or overrule the same. Moreover, the non-retroactivity of rulings by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue is not applicable in this case because the nullity of RMC No. 7-85 was declared by respondent
courts and not by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Lastly, it must be noted that, as repeatedly held
by this Court, a claim for refund is in the nature of a claim for exemption and should be construed
in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer.
 Romulo Mabanta Beunaventura Sayoc and Delos Angeles v. Home Development Mutual Fund
G.R. No. 131082
June 19, 2000
FACTS

The HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7742, issued Board
Resolution No. 1011, amending and modifying the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742.
As amended, Section 1 of Rule VII provides that for a company to be entitled to a waiver or suspension of
Fund coverage, it must have a plan providing for both provident/retirement and housing benefits superior
to those provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund.

PETITIONER filed with the respondent an application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund
Coverage because of its superior retirement plan. In support of said application, PETITIONER submitted
to the HDMF a letter explaining that the 1995 Amendments to the Rules are invalid.

The President and Chief Executive Officer of HDMF disapproved PETITIONER's application on
the ground that the requirement that there should be both a provident retirement fund and a housing plan
is clear in the use of the phrase "and/or," and that the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 7742 did not amend
nor repeal Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 but merely implement the law. 

PETITIONER's appeal with the HDMF Board of Trustees was denied for having been rendered
moot and academic by Board Resolution No. 1208, Series of 1996, removing the availment of waiver of
the mandatory coverage of the Pag-IBIG Fund, except for distressed employers.

ISSUE

Whether or not Section 1, Rule VII of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations
Implementing R.A. No. 7742 is valid.

HELD

No. It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has rule-making power as provided in Section 51 of
R.A. No. 7742 and Section 13 of P.D. No. 1752. However, it is well-settled that rules and regulations,
which are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the
effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the
law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. 

In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in Section 1, Rule VII of
the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742 that employers should
have both provident/retirement and housing benefits for all its employees in order to qualify for exemption
from the Fund, it effectively amended Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. And when the Board subsequently
abolished that exemption through the 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. Such
amendment and subsequent repeal of Section 19 are both invalid, as they are not within the delegated
power of the Board. The HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation not
consistent with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, supplant or
modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. Only Congress can
repeal or amend the law.
 Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. v. Secretary of Education Culture and Sports
G.R. No. 78385
August 31, 1987
FACTS

The DECS took note of the report of the Task Force and on the basis of the same, the DECS,
through the respondent Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports (hereinafter referred to as the
respondent Secretary), issued an Order authorizing, the 15% to 20% increase in school fees as
recommended by the Task Force. The petitioner sought a reconsideration of the said Order, apparently
on the ground that the increases were too high.

Thereafter, the DECS issued Department Order No. 37 dated April 10, 1987 modifying its
previous Order and reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to 15%, accordingly.  Despite this
reduction, the petitioner still opposed the increases. The petitioner, through counsel, sent a telegram to
the President of the Philippines urging the suspension of the implementation of Department Order No.
37. No response appears to have been obtained from the Office of the President.

ISSUE

Whether or not Department Order No. 37, issued by the DECS, is in the exercise of its legislative
function?

HELD

Yes. The assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged
by all private schools in the country for schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing
are not essential to the validity of its issuance.

This observation notwithstanding, there is a failure on the part of the petitioner to show clear and
convincing evidence of such arbitrariness. As the record of the case discloses, the DECS is not without
any justification for the issuance of the questioned Department Order. It would be reasonable to assume
that the report of the Task Force created by the DECS, on which it based its decision to allow an increase
in school fees, was made judiciously. Moreover, upon the instance of the petitioner, as it so admits in its
Petition, the DECS had actually reduced the original rates of 15% to 20% down to 10% to 15%,
accordingly. Under the circumstances peculiar to this case, We cannot consider the assailed Department
Order arbitrary.

The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an

adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected
parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in
the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such
rates.

When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all
enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the
rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its
function is quasi-judicial in character.
 RCPI v. National Telecommunications Commission
G.R. No. L-68729
May 29, 1987
FACTS

Kayumanggi Radio Network Incorporated was authorized by the public respondent to operate
radio communications systems in Catarman, Samar and in San Jose, Mindoro.

The private respondent filed a complaint with the NTC alleging that the petitioner was operating in
Catarman, Samar and in San Jose, Mindoro without a certificate of public covenience and necessity. The
petitioner, on the other hand, counter-alleged that its telephone services in the places subject of the
complaint are covered by the legislative franchise recognized by both the public respondent and its
predecessor, the Public Service Commission. In its supplemental reply, the petitioner further stated that it
has been in operation in the questioned places long before private respondent Kayumanggi filed its
application to operate in the same places.

After conducting a hearing, NTC, in its decision dated August 22, 1984 ordered petitioner RCPI to
immediately cease or desist from the operation of its radio telephone services in Catarman Northern
Samar; San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; and Sorsogon, Sorsogon stating that under Executive Order No.
546, a certificate of public convenience and necessity is mandatory for the operation of communication
utilities and services including radio communications.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent should be denied of the certificate to operate its services in Samar
and Mindoro.

HELD

No. Thus, in the words of R.A. No. 2036 itself, approval of the then Secretary of Public Works and
Communications was a precondition before the petitioner could put up radio stations in areas where it
desires to operate. It has been repeated time and again that where the statutory norm speaks
unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the
scope of its operation, must be obeyed.

It was well within the powers of the public respondent to authorize the installation by the private
respondent network of radio communications systems in Catarman, Samar and San Jose, Mindoro.
Under the circumstances of this case, the mere fact that the petitioner possesses a franchise to put up
and operate a radio communications system in certain areas is not an insuperable obstacle to the public
respondent's issuing the proper certificate to an applicant desiring to extend the same services to those
areas. The Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot be exclusive in nature nor can a franchise be
granted except that it must be subject to amendment, alteration, or even repeal by the legislature when
the common good so requires.
 Lupangco v. CA
G.R. No. 77372
April 29, 1988
FACTS

Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional
Instructions to Examinees," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in
accountancy. The resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions:

No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall
receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any
review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every
examination day including examination day.

Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art.
III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission.

Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy schedule on
October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like
them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of
a writ of a preliminary injunction against PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned
resolution and to declare it unconstitutional.

ISSUE

Whether or not Resolution No. 105, issued by the Professional Regulation Commission, is valid?

HELD

No. The questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the
integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its
constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee
cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review
material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer,
lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions.

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees'
right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how
they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all
the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They
have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be
allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth.

Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the
schools concerned. PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers
believe would best enable their enrollees to meet the standards required before becoming a full-fledged
public accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient,
impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out
their students.