Limbona v.

Mangelin
G.R. No. 80391
28 February 1989
FACTS

Petitioner Limbona was appointed as a member of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional

Autonomous Government, Region XII, representing Lanao del Sur and was elected Speaker of
the Assembly.

Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of

the House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI,
Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII.

Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting Secretary Johnny
Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November
as "our presence in the house committee hearing of Congress take precedence over any
pending business in batasang pampook.

On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice.

After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside
in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in
attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair declared said seat of the Speaker vacant.

ISSUE

Whether or not the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now
constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts?

HELD

Yes. The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII
by Presidential Decree No. 1618. Among other things, the Decree established "internal
autonomy" in the two regions "within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution," with legislative and executive
machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities specified therein.

It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative

matters for the respective regions," except to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction
and competence of the National Government,"
 Garcia v Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 101273
July 3, 1992
FACTS

The President issued EO No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes
and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of
five percent (5%) ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all
imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. This
additional duty was subsequently increased from five percent (5%) ad valorem to nine percent
(9%) ad valorem by the promulgation of EO No. 443.

Meantime, Executive Order No. 475 was issued by the President, reducing the rate of
additional duty on all imported articles from nine percent (9%) to five percent (5%) ad valorem,
except in the cases of crude oil and other oil products which continued to be subject to the
additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem.

Upon completion of the public hearings, the Tariff Commission submitted to the
President a "Report on Special Duty on Crude Oil and Oil Products", for consideration and
appropriate action. Seven (7) days later, the President issued Executive Order No. 478, dated
23 August 1991, which levied (in addition to the aforementioned additional duty of nine percent
(9%) ad valorem and all other existing ad valorem duties) a special duty of P0.95 per liter or
P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.

In the present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, petitioner assails the
validity of Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. He argues that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and
478 are violative of Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution\

ISSUE

Whether or not EO Nos. 475 and 478 are in violation of the constitution.

HELD

No. under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation,
revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative
rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are
prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the
Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution.

There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President

subject to such limitations and restrictions may impose to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates
and other duties or imposts.
 Tatad v Secretary of the Department of Energy
G.R Nos. 124360-127867
5 November 1997
FACTS

Due to oil crisis in 1971, the government enacted the Oil Industry Commission Act. It
created the Oil Industry Commission (OIC) to regulate the business of importing, exporting, re-
exporting, shipping, transporting, processing, refining, storing, distributing, marketing and selling
crude oil, gasoline, kerosene, gas, and other refined petroleum products. The OIC was vested
with the power to fix the market prices of petroleum products, to regulate the capacities of
refineries, to license new refineries and to regulate the operations and trade practices of the
industry.

The downstream oil industry was controlled by multinational companies, the President
created the Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC) to break the control by foreigners of our
oil industry.

Petitioners assail section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 which fixes the time frame for the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

ISSUE

Whether or not section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of

legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy.

HELD

No. Given the groove of the Court's rulings, the attempt of petitioners to strike down
section 15 on the ground of undue delegation of legislative power cannot prosper. Section 15
can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that
Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of
March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March
1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason.
Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion
given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997.
Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President — he is to time it as
far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are
declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.

Petitioners contend that the words "as far as practicable," "declining" and "stable" should
have been defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set determinate or determinable standards.
The stubborn submission deserves scant consideration. The dictionary meanings of these
words are well settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence. Webster defines
"practicable" as meaning possible to practice or perform, "decline" as meaning to take a
downward direction, and "stable" as meaning firmly established.25 The fear of petitioners that
these words will result in the exercise of executive discretion that will run riot is thus groundle
 Solicitor General v Metropolitan Manila Authority
G.R. No. 102782
11 December 1991
FACTS

The Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing
itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor
vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."

There are numerous complaints filed before the court all with the same reason which is
traffic violation and the confiscation and removal of plate numbers.

Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the Court
in his own Comment that his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of
illegally parked vehicles and that he had in fact directed full compliance with the above-
mentioned decision in a memorandum, copy of which he attached, entitled Removal of Motor
Vehicle License Plates.

Pat. R.J. Tano-an, on the other hand, argued that the Gonong decision prohibited only
the removal of license plates and not the confiscation of driver's licenses.

ISSUE

Whether or not the delegated power has been exercised validly

HELD

No. The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as
agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and
conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now
before us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted
principles governing municipal corporations.

In fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan
Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators
only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree
itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least
allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides
that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions
are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions
comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong.

It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to
impose such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this
effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains
effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except
under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in
Metropolitan Manila.
 Employers Confideration v National Wages Productivity Board
201 SCRA 759
1991

FACTS

The Regional Board of the National Capital Region issued Wage Order No. NCR-01,
increasing the minimum wage by P17.00 daily in the National Capital Region. The Trade Union
Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) moved for reconsideration; so did the Personnel
Management Association of the Philippines (PMAP). ECOP opposed.

The Orders of the Commission (as well as Wage Order No. NCR-01-A) are the subject
of this petition, in which. ECOP assails the board's grant of an "across-the-board" wage
increase to workers already being paid more than existing minimum wage rates (up to P125. 00
a day) as an alleged excess of authority, and alleges that under the Republic Act No. 6727, the
boards may only prescribe "minimum wages," not determine "salary ceilings."

ISSUE

Whether or not the board has performed an unlawful act of legislation.

HELD

No. The Court is not convinced that the Regional Board of the National Capital Region,
in decreeing an across-the-board hike, performed an unlawful act of legislation. It is true that
wage-fixing, like rate constitutes an act Congress; it is also true, however, that Congress may
delegate the power to fix rates provided that, as in all delegations cases, Congress leaves
sufficient standards. As this Court has indicated, it is impressed that the above-quoted
standards are sufficient, and in the light of the floor-wage method's failure, the Court believes
that the Commission correctly upheld the Regional Board of the National Capital Region.
 Beja Sr. v. Court of Appeals
207 SCRA 689

FACTS

Petitioner Fidencio Y. Beja, Sr. was first employed by the PPA as arrastre supervisor in
1975. He became Assistant Port Operations Officer in 1976 and Port Operations Officer in
1977. In February 1988, as a result of the reorganization of the PPA, he was appointed
Terminal Supervisor.

PPA General Manager, Dayan, filed Administrative Case against petitioner Beja and
Hernando G. Villaluz for grave dishonesty, grave misconduct, willful violation of reasonable
office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Beja and
Villaluz allegedly erroneously assessed storage fees resulting in the loss of P38,150.77 on the
part of the PPA. Consequently, they were preventively suspended for the charges.

PPA general manager indorsed it to the AAB for "appropriate action." At the scheduled
hearing, Beja asked for continuance on the ground that he needed time to study the charges
against him. The AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja an opportunity to present
evidence. However, Beja filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental.

ISSUE

Whether or not the DOTC Secretary and/or the AAB may initiate and hear administrative
cases against PPA Personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager

HELD

Yes, but the court ruled that it is, therefore, clear that the transmittal of the complaint by
the PPA General Manager to the AAB was premature. The PPA General Manager should have
first conducted an investigation, made the proper recommendation for the imposable penalty
and sought its approval by the PPA Board of Directors. It was discretionary on the part of the
herein petitioner to elevate the case to the then DOTC Secretary Reyes. Only then could the
AAB take jurisdiction of the case.

An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to

which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control or
administrative supervision. This is borne out by the "lateral relationship" between the
Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for "policy and program
coordination." With respect to administrative matters, the independence of an attached agency
from Departmental control and supervision is further reinforced by the fact that even an agency
under a Department's administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference with
respect to appointments and other personnel actions "in accordance with the decentralization of
personnel functions" under the Administrative Code of 1987. Moreover, the Administrative Code
explicitly provides that Chapter 8 of Book IV on supervision and control shall not apply to
chartered institutions attached to a Department.
 Eugenio v. Civil Service Commission
243 SCRA 196

FACTS

Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She
applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO ranK, she was given a
CES eligibility. Thereafter, she was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the
Career Executive Service Board.

However, Civil Service Commission issued CSC Resolution No. 93-4359 which
abolished the Career Executive Service Board.

Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service
Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition
at bench to annul, among others, resolution No. 93-4359.

ISSUE

Whether or not the act of the Civil Service Commission to abolish the Career Executive
Service Board is constitutional

HELD

No. The court ruled that, the controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service Board
(CESB) was created in the Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 1974. It cannot be
disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the
legislature. In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the
abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to
1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB.

the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission's power to reorganize is

limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16. From its inception, the CESB
was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to respondent
Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee "the CESB shall be
autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up executive manpower in the
government with a broad and positive outlook."
 Leyson v. Office of the Ombudsman
331 SCRA 227
FACTS

ITTC entered into a one year contract with LEGASPI OIL, GRANEXPORT, AND UNITED
COCONUT comprising the CIIF companies, for transportation of coconut oil in bulk through MT
Transasia. Prior to the expiration of the contract, the CIIF companies with their new President, respondent
Oscar A. Torralba, terminated the contract without the requisite advance notice.

Petitioner charged Oscar A. Torralba, Tirso Antiporda, Chairman of UCPB and CIIF Oil Mills, and
Oscar A. Torralba with violation of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act also before the Ombudsman
anchored on the aforementioned alleged irregularities and corrupt practices.

Petitioner contends that CIIF is a government owned and controlled corporation.

ISSUE

Whether or not CIIF is considered as government-owned and -controlled corporations

HELD

No. The court ruled that these jurisprudential rules invoked by petitioner in support of his claim
that the CIIF companies are government owned and/or controlled corporations are incomplete without
resorting to the definition of "government owned or controlled corporation", any agency organized as a
stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or
proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly,
or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of
its capital stock.

The definition mentions three (3) requisites, namely, first, any agency organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation; second, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or
proprietary in nature; and, third, owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either
wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51)
percent of its capital stock.

In the present case, all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF companies were organized as
stock corporations.1âwphi1 The UCPB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the shares of LEGASPI OIL, 91.24% of the
shares of GRANEXPORT, and 92.85% of the shares of UNITED COCONUT. 15 Obviously, the below
51% shares of stock in LEGASPI OIL removes this firm from the definition of a government owned or
controlled corporation. Our concern has thus been limited to GRANEXPORT and UNITED COCONUT as
we go back to the second requisite. Unfortunately, it is in this regard that petitioner failed to substantiate
his contentions. There is no showing that GRANEXPORT and/or UNITED COCONUT was vested with
functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature unlike PETROPHIL in
Quimpo. The Court thus concludes that the CIIF companies are, as found by public respondent, private
corporations not within the scope of its jurisdiction.
 BCDA v. CIR
G.R. No. 205466
11 January 2021
FACTS

On February 16, 2011, BCDA filed via registered mail a Petition for Review with Request for
Exemption from Payment of Filing Fees (Petition for Review) with the CTA involving its claim for refund
against the CIR.

On March 1, 2011, the BCDA received a letter of even date from Atty. Elvessa P. Apolinario (Atty.
Apolinario), CTA's Executive Clerk of Court IV, acknowledging the receipt of the Petition for Review.
However, in the same letter, Atty. Apolinario informed the BCDA that she was returning the said Petition
for Review as it was not deemed filed without the payment of the correct legal fees.

Subsequent letters were exchanged between Atty. Apolinario, who insisted that the BCDA was
required to pay docket fees, and the BCDA, which maintained otherwise and insisted on its status as a
government instrumentality.12

On April 7, 2011, the BCDA paid the docket fees under protest.

ISSUE

Whether or not BCDA is government instrumentality and exempt from payment of taxes.

HELD

Yes. The BCDA is a government instrumentality because it falls under the definition of an
instrumentality under the Administrative Code of 1987, i.e., "any agency of the National Government, not
integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed
with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy,
usually through a charter." It is vested with corporate powers under Section 3 of RA No. 7227. Despite
having such powers, however, the BCDA is considered neither a stock corporation because its capital is
not divided into shares of stocks, nor a non-stock corporation because it is not organized for any of the
purposes mentioned under Section 88 of the Corporation Code. Instead, the BCDA is a government
instrumentality organized for the specific purpose of owning, holding and/or administering the military
reservations in the country and implementing their conversion to other productive uses.

Being a government instrumentality, the BCDA is exempt from payment of legal fees including
docket fees pursuant to Section 22, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.