On the facts, the plainti is seeking to set aside the order for sale granted in his absence.

As per
s256(3) national land code 1956, the court has the authority to order sale of land unless the court
is convinced that there is cause to contrary. As such, in order to set aside the order for sale, the
plainti must prove to the satisfaction of the court that there is a cause to the contrary. Following
Malayan building society bhd v univein sdn bhd, the burden of proving cause to the contrary is on
the plainti .

Following low lee lian v ban hin lee bank bhd, cause to the contrary arises when the conditions
precedent for making an application of an order for sale are not satis ed, the exceptions to
indefeasibility doctrine under s340(2) national land code 1956 applies or the grant of order for sale
is contrary to rule of law or equity.

On the facts, ringgit bank sent a simple notice of demand to the plainti and subsequently sent a
statutory notice in Form 16E demanding the entire outstanding sum. The plainti is advised that
the fact that a notice of demand was sent to the plainti is not a ground to vitiate the order as
there is no provision in the national land code prohibiting the issuance of notice of demand before
a statutory notice under s254 is issued (Multipurpose bank bhd v mammon abdul razak). Further,
following Jacob v overseas Chinese banking corporation, a wrong form of statutory notice that is
sent to the charger is not a cause to the contrary so long that the content of the form is clear. As
such, although a notice in form 16D should have been issued to the plainti as per s254, the form
16E is not a factor to vitiate the order for sale.

However, the statutory notice only gives the plainti seven days to pay the outstanding sum. This
is in contradiction of s254 which requires chargee to give a minimum time period of one month to
make payment of the outstanding sum. Hence, this is a breach of the condition precedent for
making an application of an order of sale.

Besides, the outstanding sum demanded in the statuary notice is based on an additional penalty
interest rate which is not stipulated in the loan agreement. This may amount to a cause to the
contrary as the position of law on this issue is far from clear. Pursuant to alliance nance bhd v
kemas perkakas sdn bhd, the court may hold the additional penalty interest is void but the court
may nd the order valid as the court can invoke its discretion under s256 to grant an order for sale
not for the amount as claimed by the bank but for a lesser amount arrived after dedeycting the
amount of the additional penalty interest. However, following multi purpose bank v mammon
abdul razak, as the chargee based its calculation of outstanding sum on a factor that is not
stituplated in the agreement, the court may treat this issue as a cause to the contrary and declare
the order void.

On the facts, the originating summons was served after the hearing of the order for sale
application. This is a breach of Order 83 rules of court whereby the originating summons shall be
served on the plainti at least 4 clear days before the date xed for hearing. Hence, the condition
precedent for making an application of order for sale is not satis ed and amounts to a cause to
the contrary.

In conclusion, suji is advised that he can successfully challenge the order for sale as there are
multiple causes to the contrary rendering the order defective and invalid.

Pursuant to s259(2)(c) national land code, the bank has the right to x a date for subsequent
auctions when the auctions are not successful. Further, there is no limitation period to hold an
action because it is not a cause of action but merely enforcement of the order for sale, as per Rob
v dato Mohamad Hamzah. Hence, sati is advised that the bank cannot be restricted from xing
further action date.

fi
ff
ff
ff
ff
ff
ff
fi
fi
fi
fi
ff
ff
ff
fi
fi
On the facts, rajin alleges that she is not bound by any law pertaining to housing development as
she is not a developer. According to s3 of the Housing Developer, a developer is de ned to
include any individual who carries on a housing development. As such, rajin is a housing
developer within the de nition of Housing developer under the housing development (control and
licensing) act 1966 (HDA 1966) and so she is bound by the laws pertaining to housing
development.

Since Rajin is a housing developer, she is bound by the laws pertaining to housing development.

This would include Regulation 11(1) of the Housing Development (control and licensing) regulation
which requires that every sale and purchase agreement to be in the prescribed form namely,
schedule G in the case of landed property and schedule H in the case of high-rise property.

On the facts, the purchasers signed a di erent format of sale and purchase agreement. Following
low Tina v kemuning Setia, the

fi
ff
fi
 Q6

The question is whether a caveat could be entered on Mary’s property based on sally, sibs and
Lucy’s suggestion.

On the facts, sally suggested that Mary should enter a private caveat on her house. Following Eu
nance v Siland sdn bhd, Mary , a registered properties of her house, cannot enter a private
caveat on her own land as she is not claiming title unless she is claiming other interest.

On the facts, sibok suggested that Mary should ask Sally to enter a caveat on her house.
According to s323(1), only persons with caveatable interest in the land is permitted to lodge a
private caveat on the land; to be caveatable, the interest must be an interest in land or interest
which is capable of registration (Luggage distributors v tan for Teng). The facts are silent whether
sally has an interest in Mary’s land. Nevertheless following, sally can still lodge a private caveat at
the registry because the duty of the registrar is merely administrative in that the registrar does not
have the authority to refuse application of entry of private caveat nt he grounds that the applicant
does not have the requisite caveutabe interest. In any event that sally has lodged a private caveat,
Besar bank could apply to remove it under s327 as his rights as a chargee is adversely a ected
by the entry of private caveat. Further, the application to remove the private caveat would
succeed as the entry would fail on the rst limb of the 3 stage test laid down in luggage
distributors v tan for teng, in which sally who is the caveator does not have caveatable interest
under s323(1). Therefore, sally can enter a private caveat but it is liable to be set aside by Besar
bank.

On the facts, Lucy suggested that she apply

Q7

On the facts, slow contended that he is not bound by the HDA as he is not a developing
company, that only 5units commercial building are constructed on the land. According to s3 HDA
1966, a housing developer is de ned to include any person who intends to carries on a housing
development; a housing development is de ned to construct more than four units of housing
accommodation which are building for wholly residential purposes or partly for business
premisses and partly for human habitation. Since, slow intends to construct

Q5

As per s257(1)(g) and (h), the balance of the purchase price shall be paid within 120 days form the
date of the acution and no extension of time is allowed and the deposit shall be forfeited if the
balance of the purchase price is not paid within the 120 days. Prima facie, aplying s257(1)(g) and
(h), the bank could not grant belie an extension of time to settle the balance purchase price

However, in Chi Liung Holding sdn bhd v L&T realty sdn bhd, the court held that extension of time
to pay the balance purchase price can be granted provided it is agreed between both parties even
if the proclamation of sale does provide for an extension of time. Since the bank manager is belie
good friend, it is likely that the bank would not object to belie’s request of extension of time. In
such event, the bank could grant an extension of time

According to s266, it provides that the charger has the right to redeem the property subject to a
public auction by paying all the outstanding sum stated in the order for sale before conclusion of
the sale, notwithstanding that an order for sale is granted. In M&J Frozen food sdn bhd v Siland
sdn bhd, the court interpreted the phrase ‘before conclusion of sale’ to mean before the the
purchase price of the sale is paid in full. As such, following M&J frozen food sdn bhd, Atok has
the right to redeem the property and pay o the sum owed so long that belie has not paid the
balance of the purchase price in full.

On the facts, the banks want to sell the land by way of private treaty to muda, the bank has 2
options. Firstly, he is advised to apply to court for a declaratory order.

Since the bank intends to see the property by way of private treaty to muda, the bank is advised
to apply to court for a declaratory order to secure the private treaty sale of land to muda to avoid
fi
fi
fi
ff
fi
ff
any challenge from Atok. According to umbra v chong bun sun, the court he’d that a declaratory
order for private treaty can only be granted if the order for sale has not be granted otherwise the
court would be functors o cio. As such, since an order for sale has already been granted, fast
bank cannot sell the property by way of private treaty through a declaration.

Alternatively, the bank could proceed to sell the land by private treaty without a court order, but
the legality of such sale is far from clear. Given that the proceedings for application of order for
sale has already commenced (Chartered bank v packer maiden) and an order for sale has also
been granted (mui bank v Cheah Kim you), the private treaty sale may be invalid. However,
following umbra v chong bun son reading together with mj frown food v Siland sdn bhd, the
private treaty sale may still be valid so long that it is completed before belie paid the balance
purchase price in full.

As such, the bank may sell the property by way of private treaty without giving any grounds of
challenged provided it is done before payment is made in full by Celia
ffi