[G.R. No.
 206077. July 15, 2020.] DECISION
HELEN P. DENILA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, CITY GOVERNMENT OF
DAVAO, BRGY. 74-A MATINA CROSSING
FEDERATION, INC., represented by its
President, LOLITA P. TANO, MATINA BALUSONG
NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC.,
represented by its President, FE I. BETIOS, ST.
PAUL NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC.,
represented by its President, ESTRELLA E.
NAMATA, ST. BENEDICT XVI NEIGHBORHOOD
ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its
President, MELCHOR LECIONAN, SHALOM
NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC.,
represented by its President, ROMEO PACHO,
ALEJANDRO ALONZO, JR., MARITES ALONZO-
LILOC, ARACELI ALONZO-DIOLASO, ROBERTO
ALONZO, EULALIA ANGELITUD, EVANGELINE
BAUTISTA, SALVADOR BAUTISTA, FELIMON
BILIRAN, JR., LOURDES BILIRAN, REYNALDO
BILIRAN, ARSENIO BRIONES, NORMA CAL,
MARILYN CAÑETE, EDGARDO COSTANTE, JOY
BILL DELA CRUZ, MARJORIE DELA CRUZ, JOHN
JAMES ESPINOSA, ROMAR CAÑETE, TIMOTEO 1 C.
FLORES, JEMUEL GAUDICOS, LILY LISONDRA,
ERWIN PACADA, ALMA PAGALAN, LEONARDO
PELOÑO, REYNALDO POLIQUIT, VIRGILIO
REUYAN, JESUS REUYAN, SR., ROGELIO REUYAN,
ARLAN SILVA, CARMELITA SILVA, ROMMEL
SILVA, GRACE TEMONERA, ERLINDA VALENCIA,
and DEL CARMEN MATINA APLAYA
NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, respondents.
GESMUNDO,  J  :p
Compliance with jurisdictional requirements is strictly
mandatory in a special proceedings case as it is the operative
fact which vests a court with the power and authority to validly
take cognizance and decide a case. CAIHTE
Preview
The case involves a Petition 2 for Review filed by Helen
Perez Denila seeking to: (a) reverse and set aside the July 25,
2012 Decision 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) — Special Former
Twenty-Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 03270-MIN which
granted the Republic of the Philippines' (Republic) petition for
relief from judgment; and (b) reinstate the March 4, 2008
Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch
14 (RTC) in SP PROC. No. 7527-2004 which ordered the
reconstitution of the owner's duplicate Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) Nos. 164, 219, 220, 301, 337, 514 and 67 originally
registered in the name of Constancio S. Guzman (Constancio).
Antecedents
Historical Background
The dispute traces its roots back to the time when
Constancio and his common-law wife Isabel Luna (Isabel) had
several parcels of land in Davao City registered under their
collective names in which they were issued the
aforementioned OCTs sometime in November 1925. 5 When
both Constancio and Isabel passed away intestate during the
Second World War, they left no direct heirs and were survived
by Heirs of Constancio Guzman, Inc. (HCGI) — a corporation
whose stakeholders were children and grandchildren of
Constancio's only sibling, Manuel Guzman. 6
 On June 8, 2001, HCGI filed four (4) separate Petitions
for Reconstitution of Title of Lost and/or Destroyed OCT Nos.
219, 337, 67 and 164 before the RTC; and, during the initial
hearing, the same court required Davao City's Register of
Deeds (RD) to submit a report on the status of the
aforementioned Certificates of Title. 7
On July 25, 2002, Davao City's Acting Register of Deeds,
Atty. Florenda Patriarca, submitted a report showing that: (a)
OCT No. 337 in the name of both spouses Constancio and
Isabel had already been cancelled and had been the subject of
several transfers, the latest being to the Republic of the
Philippines; (b) OCT No. 219 in the name of both spouses
Constancio and Isabel had likewise been cancelled and had
been the subject of several transfers, the latest being in favor
of a certain Antonio L. Arroyo (Arroyo); (c) OCT No. 164 in the
name of both spouses Constancio and Isabel had been the
subject of several transfers and is currently registered in the
name of Arroyo; (d) OCT No. 67 in the name of Constancio
himself had also been cancelled and transferred several times,
the latest being in the name of Madeline Marfori. 8
On May 12, 2003, the RTC dismissed all the petitions for
reconstitution as it was clear from the report of the RD that
OCT Nos. 337, 219, 164 and 67 were neither mutilated,
destroyed, nor lost, but were in fact cancelled as a result of
both voluntary and involuntary subsequent transfers. 9
Aggrieved, HCGI directly elevated the case to this
Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari.
On November 24, 2003, this Court's Third Division
issued a Resolution in Heirs of Don Constancio Guzman, Inc. v.
Judge Carpio (Heirs of Guzman, Inc.) 10 denying HCGI's Petition
for Review ratiocinating that: (a) there was a blatant disregard
of the hierarchy of courts and that no exceptional or
compelling circumstance had been cited; (b) there was no
proof that the Certificates of Title intended to be reconstituted
were in fact lost or destroyed; and (c) that the evidence on
record reveals that OCT Nos. 337, 219, 164 and 67 were
actually cancelled on account of various conveyances.
Present Reconstitution Case
On June 22, 2004, petitioner filed an "Amended Petition
for Reconstitution of Original Certificates of Titles" 11 before the
RTC seeking to direct Davao City's RD to reconstitute OCT Nos.
164, 219, 220, 301, 337, 514 and 67 alleging, among others,
that:
1) The subject OCTs were originally registered in the
name of Constancio and Isabel; 12
2) A certain Bellie S. Artigas (Artigas) had been entitled to
a 40% share in Constancio's estate and was
authorized to recover, administer and dispose of
all properties in the said estate pursuant to her
agreement with Constancio; 13
3) The parcels of land covered under the subject titles
were sold to her by Artigas, as Constancio's
attorney-in-fact, by way of a Deed of Absolute
Sale; 14
4) She is currently in possession of the lands covered by
the subject OCTs; 15
5) She had caused a re-survey of the parcels of land
covered under the subject OCTs; 16
6) The original copies of the subject OCTs were kept
inside the repositories of Davao City's RD; 17
7) Davao City's RD issued a Certification which stated
that the subject OCTs were "not available among
[its] files[,] the same maybe (sic) mutilated or
destroyed"; 18
8) The parcels of land covered under the subject OCTs
had "no co-owners, mortgagees and/or lessees"
 and had no corresponding certificates of title
issued to other persons which had been lost or
destroyed; 19
9) The parcels of land covered under the subject OCTs
had "no buildings or other structures of strong
materials" which "[did] not belong to
[petitioner]"; 20
10) The fruit-bearing trees and other seasonal crops
existing on the parcels of land covered under the
subject OCTs had also been
"sold/ceded/transferred" to her; 21
11) The parcels of land covered under the subject OCTs
were free from all liens and encumbrances; 22
12) There exists no deed or instrument affecting the
parcels of land covered under the subject
OCTs; 23 and
13) She is willing to pay the real estate taxes on the
parcels of land covered under the subject
OCTs. 24
On September 6, 2005, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed an Entry of Appearance and deputized
Davao City's Office of the City Prosecutor to handle the
reconstitution case before the RTC. 25
Before the presentation of witnesses, the RTC issued
a Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum directing the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) and Davao City's RD to
produce in court the certificates of title in the custody of their
respective offices. 26
During the course of the trial, petitioner presented the
testimony of Myrna Fernandez (Fernandez), Chief of the
Document and Docket Division of the LRA. Fernandez testified
that petitioner's respective copies of OCT Nos. 164, 219, 301,
337 and 67 and of Decree No. 195448 pertaining to OCT No.
514 are "faithful reproduction[s]" of the "original" copies
"existing in [the LRA's] records and/or volt (sic) section." 27 She
further attested that, as record custodian, her office only keeps
a record regarding the existence of the subject OCTs and that
the Register of Deeds makes the cancellation of these
certificates of title though they are not required to notify or
communicate such fact of cancellation to the LRA. 28 Finally, she
also clarified that all matters pertaining reconstitution are
forwarded to the LRA's Reconstitution Division whose duty is to
prepare technical reports 29 after plotting and examining the
plan appearing on the technical description of the lots covered
by the certificates of title sought to be reconstituted. 30
For its part, the Republic presented the testimony of
Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra (Atty. Cruzabra), Davao City's then
Deputy and Acting Register of Deeds who: (a) brought
typewritten representations of OCT Nos. 164, 219, 2980, 220,
301 and T-514 as well as Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos.
356 and 1363; and (b) testified that the actual copies of the
same certificates in her office's custody which were subjects of
the Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum are mutilated
and beyond recognition. 31 She elaborated that, due to the
subject OCTs' present condition, she issued the Certification to
the effect that the same certificates are "mutilated and/or
destroyed." 32 Moreover, she explained that: (a) the typewritten
representations of all the OCTs that she brought in open court
had already been cancelled; (b) OCT No. 2980 and TCT No. 356
were derived from OCT No. 219; (c) TCT No. 1363 was derived
from OCT No. 301; and (d) OCT No. T-514 brought in open
court is a typewritten original document. 33 Finally, Atty.
Cruzabra stated that the typewritten entries in the certificates
of title she presented in open court show that the same
documents had been cancelled and each had been replaced
with a corresponding TCT. 34
 Reacting to the Republic's evidence, petitioner objected
to the admissibility and probative value of Atty. Cruzabra's
documents because the copies of the purported titles are "not
in their normal forms issued by the [RD] but were merely lifted
and copied [from] a local [news]paper, the stroke and style of
the signature of the then [RD], Patrocinio Quitain, varies from
one document to another." 35 She stressed that "[t]he
discrepancies are so apparent that no less than [Atty.
Cruzabra] admitted that the strokes of Patrocinio Quitain are
different." 36 Finally, she pointed out that "the alleged copies of
OCT[s] and CTC[s] were typewritten on cheap onion skin bonds
and that they were [so] typewritten in 1972 when
[photocopying] machines [were] already abundant." 37
Regional Trial Court's
Reconstitution Ruling
On March 4, 2008, the RTC-Branch 14 in SP PROC. No.
7527-2004 through then Presiding Judge George E.
Omelio (Judge Omelio) rendered a Decision in favor of
petitioner essentially holding that: (a) the entries of
cancellation at the back of the OCTs are not conclusive proof of
the truth of such entries as they were not the authenticated
copies of the originals; 38 (b) the testimonies of Fernandez had
convinced him that the subject OCTs did exist in the LRA's
office and that the same were all registered in the name of
Guzman and Luna; 39 and (c) the Republic presented no proof
(document or decree) as to the circumstances of the subject
OCTs' cancellation. 40 The dispositive portion of such Decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition well
founded, the same is hereby granted.
The Registrar [sic] of Deeds of Davao City is
hereby ordered to reconstitute the owner[']s Original
Duplicate Copy of Original Certificate of Titles No. OCT
No. 164, OCT No. 219, OCT No. 220, OCT No. 301,
OCT No. 337, OCT No. 514 and OCT No. 67 with the
approved Technical Description of said parcels of land
attached with [sic] this petition be respectively
inscribed thereto and that the titles to the said
mentioned parcels of land be duly registered in the
name of the original owner Constancio Guzman, and
considering that the latter[,] through his attorney-in-
fact Bellie S. Artigas[,] sold the same to herein
petitioner (Exhs. "G" to "M"), the Register of Deeds,
Davao City is further ordered to correspondingly issue
Transfer Certificate of Titles over the subject parcels
of land in the name of herein petitioner.
Cost against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED. 41
Post-Regional Trial Court Proceedings
On March 27, 2008, the OSG received Judge Omelio's
March 4, 2008 Decision. 42
On March 28, 2008, Clerk of Court V Atty. Ray Uson
Velasco (Atty. Velasco) of RTC, Branch 14 issued a
Certification 43 stating that: (a) copies of Judge Omelio's March
4, 2008 Decision were received by petitioner's counsel and
Davao City's RD (as well as the Office of the City
Prosecutor) 44 on March 5, 2008 and March 10, 2008,
respectively; and (b) the same Decision had become final and
executory.
On March 31, 2008, an Entry of Judgment 45 was issued
by Atty. Velasco pursuant to the March 28, 2008 Certification.
On April 15, 2008, Atty. Cruzabra sent a letter to LRA
Administrator Benedicto B. Ulep (LRA Administrator
Ulep) elevating Judge Omelio's March 4, 2008 Decision by way
of en consulta. 46
On April 18, 2008, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for
Execution claiming that, since no Motion for Reconsideration
was filed by the adverse parties within the reglementary
period, her motion must be granted. 47
On April 23, 2008, Judge Omelio granted petitioner's
move for urgent execution and issued a corresponding Writ of
Execution. 48
Petition for Relief from Judgment
Proceedings
On May 26, 2008, the Republic through the OSG filed a
Petition for Relief from Judgment with the RTC seeking to set
aside the March 4, 2008 Decision. 49
On September 3, 2008, Judge Omelio issued an
Order 50 with the pertinent portions as follows:
That is why, it would appear that the
undersigned Presiding Judge seemingly rendered the
subject decision with lightning speed which is not in
reality.
As there is already a doubt cast by these
concerned sectors against the sense of impartiality
and independence of the undersigned Presiding
Judge he is therefore, voluntarily INHIBITING himself
from further sitting in this case.
Let the record of this case be transmitted to
the Office of the Executive Judge of this Court for re-
raffling with the exception of Branch 14.
SO ORDERED.
Here, Judge Omelio directed the transmittal of the case
records to the Office of the Executive Judge for re-raffle. 51 The
case was eventually re-raffled to Judge Ridgway M.
Tanjili (Judge Tanjili). 52
On September 15, 2008, Judge Tanjili issued an Order
re-setting the date and time of the hearing previously set by
Judge Omelio. 53
On June 29, 2009, LRA Administrator Ulep issued a
Resolution in Consulta No. 4581 holding that, based on his
office's records, the subject OCTs sought by petitioner to be
reconstituted are all previously cancelled titles making
rendering Judge Omelio's March 4, 2008 Decision
unregistrable. 54
On August 12, 2009, Judge Tanjili unexpectedly inhibited
himself from handling the reconstitution case. 55 DETACa
Petition for Relief Ruling
On September 3, 2009, Judge Omelio, despite the
absence of any raffle and without conducting a hearing, 56 re-
assumed jurisdiction over the case and issued an
Order 57 denying the Republic's Petition for Relief from
Judgment for having been filed sixteen (16) days beyond the
reglementary period based on the observation that the
Prosecutor of Davao City received a copy of the March 4, 2008
Decision on March 10, 2008 and that the OSG belatedly filed
the same petition for relief only on May 9, 2008. 58 Moreover, it
also pointed out that Atty. Cruzabra, being Davao City's RD,
"did nothing," "made a wrong interpretation of the Rules," and
elevated the March 4, 2008 Decision via consulta to the LRA
Commissioner instead of filing an appeal with the regular
courts. 59 The dispositive portion 60 reads as follows:
Accordingly, the Petition for Relief from
Judgment is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved by the Order, the Public Prosecutor of Davao
City filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the Order of the
Honorable Court Denying the Petition for Relief filed by the
Solicitor General and Inhibition of the Honorable Presiding
Judge. 61
On October 1, 2009, Judge Omelio issued an Order
denying the Public Prosecutor's Motion for Reconsideration. 62
Petition for Certiorari Proceedings
in the Court of Appeals
On October 22, 2009, the Republic filed a Petition
for Certiorari [Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court] with Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order with the CA pointing out that
Judge Omelio committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the September 3, 2009 and October 1, 2009 Orders for: (a)
being contrary to jurisprudence; and (b) denial of due process
by exhibiting bias and partiality towards petitioner as he
unilaterally re-assumed jurisdiction over the petition for relief
case despite his previous inhibition. 63
On March 17, 2010, the CA issued a Temporary
Restraining Order via Resolution enjoining Judge Omelio from
enforcing the RTC's March 4, 2008 Decision as well as the
September 3, 2009, the October 1, 2009 and the March 4, 2010
Orders. 64
On May 18, 2010, the CA issued a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction to prevent any grave and irreparable injury to the
rights of the Republic and Atty. Cruzabra pending the
resolution of the Petition for Certiorari. 65
Fencing Permit, Writ of Demolition,
and Intervention of herein Private
Respondents
On May 25, 2010, despite the pendency of
the certiorari proceedings before the CA, Judge Omelio issued
an Order (upon motion of petitioner) directing the Davao City
Engineer's Office to issue a Fencing Permit over the properties
covered by OCT Nos. 164, 219, 220, 301, 337, 514 and 67. 66
On June 30, 2010, Atty. Cruzabra filed a Manifestation
with the CA informing the latter of Judge Omelio's highly
contumacious May 25, 2010 Order which directly violated the
May 18, 2010 Writ of Preliminary Injunction. 67
In response to Atty. Cruzabra's June 30, 2010
Manifestation, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion for
Clarification pointing out that: (a) the parcels of land subject in
the instant reconstitution case are being unlawfully occupied
by informal settlers; (b) the "request" for Fencing Permit is to
enclose the same properties in order to prevent intrusion by
unscrupulous informal settlers; (c) Judge Omelio's May 25,
2010 is not a direct violation of the injunctive writ issued by the
CA because it cannot be considered an enforcement of the
final and executory March 4, 2008 Decision of the RTC granting
the petition for reconstitution. 68
On October 5, 2010, the CA, in a Resolution and in view
of petitioner's move for clarification, assented to Judge
Omelio's May 25, 2010 Order for the issuance of a fencing
permit as well as a Writ of Demolition. 69 Here, it opined that
the issuance of a Fencing Permit would not violate or injure the
rights of all parties for it is a necessary measure for
preservation which would, instead, tend to "preserve and
protect" the area in question from trespass and depredation
by third persons. 70
On October 8, 2010, Judge Omelio issued an Order
reiterating its directive to the City Engineer's Office to issue a
Fencing Permit in petitioner's favor. 71 In the same Order, he
also issued a Writ of Demolition for the clearing of structures
erected on the properties covered by the OCTs sought to be
reconstituted. 72
On November 11, 2010, Brgy. 74-A Matina Crossing
Federation, Inc. (represented by its President, Lolita P. Tano),
Matina Balusong Neighborhood Association, Inc. (represented
by its President, Fe I. Betios), St. Paul Neighborhood
Association, Inc. (represented by its President, Estrella E.
Namata), St. Benedict XVI Neighborhood Association, Inc.
(represented by its President, Melchor Lecionan), and Shalom
Neighborhood Association, Inc. (represented by its President,
Romeo Pacho) filed a Joint Motion to Intervene with Leave of
Court with Prayer for Reconsideration (with attached Joint
Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention) with the CA claiming that
they have a legal interest in the matter in controversy because:
(a) they are the actual occupants and possessors of the
properties covered by the subject OCTs; (b) they were not
notified of the reconstitution proceedings in the court below;
(c) their intervention will not unduly delay the resolution of the
case or prejudice the rights of the original parties; (d) their
rights will not be fully protected in a separate proceeding; and
(e) the issuance of a Fencing Permit will authorize the petition
to enter the several parcels of land including those possessed
by them. 73
On November 17, 2010, Judge Omelio recalled the
"special" Writ of Demolition in an Order 74 with the relevant
portions reproduced as follows:
THE Order of the Court dated OCTOBER 8,
2010 is hereby amended to the effect that the City
Engineer's Office or its Building Officials, Davao City,
pursuant to the Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated October 5, 2010 in SP Proc. No. 75-2004 is
directed to issue a Fencing Permit to Applicant Helen
Denila after which the latter has to perform the act of
fencing the metes and bounds of her area subject of
the instant case.
As to the special writ of demolition issued by
the Court dated October 8, 2010, the same is
hereby SET ASIDE or RECALLED. Petitioner may
instead file a separate ordinary action to this effect if
she so desire(s), but not under the instant special
proceeding.
On November 26, 2010, Alejandro Alonzo, Jr., Marites
Alonzo-Liloc, Araceli Alonzo-Diolaso, Roberto Alonzo, Eulalia
Angelitud, Evangeline Bautista, Salvador Bautista, Felimon
Biliran, Jr., Lourdes Biliran, Reynaldo Biliran, Arsenio Briones,
Norma Cal, Marilyn Cañete, Edgardo Costante, Joy Bill
Dela Cruz, Marjorie Dela Cruz, John James Espinosa, Romar
Cañete, Timoteo C. Flores, Jemuel Gaudicos, Lily Lisondra,
Erwin Pacada, Alma Pagalan, Leonardo Peloño, Reynaldo
Poliquit, Virgilio Reuyan, Jesus Reuyan, Sr., Rogeleo Reuyan,
Arlan Silva, Carmelita Silva, Rommel Silva, Grace Temonera,
Erlinda Valencia and Del Carmen Matina Aplaya Neighborhood
Association filed a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion for: (a) leave
of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Hereto Attached
Petition-in-Intervention; (b) Reconsideration of the Resolution
dated 05 October 2010; and (c) the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
in the alternative to direct the Honorable Public Respondent
Presiding Judge and Public Respondent City Government of
Davao through the City Engineer's Office to defer
implementation of the Order dated 08 October 2010 and
issuance of the Fencing Permit in favor of private respondent
Helen Denila with the CA claiming that: (a) they have a legal
interest in the matter subject of the litigation and that allowing
them to intervene will not unduly delay the resolution of the
case for it will prevent multiplicity of suits; (b) petitioner had
speciously asked for a Fencing Permit without disclosing that
they are actual occupants and possessors of the real
properties subject in the reconstitution case; and (c) the
construction of a fence would cause them irreparable injury
and injustice, especially if they were deprived of their day in
court. 75
On December 7, 2010, Davao City filed a Motion for
Leave of Court to Intervene with the RTC stating that: (a) the
Barangay Hall of Barangay 74-A, as well as the Talomo Police
Station which it funded, is within the lots covered by the OCTs
sought to be reconstituted and the demolition of those
structures would result in the damage of these improvements;
(b) one of the properties which will be affected by Judge
Omelio's October 8, 2010 Order is presently registered in
the Republic's name and is part of Maa Diversion Road which is
a major road/highway forming part of the road network of the
City; (c) the issue of fencing was never raised in the
reconstitution proceedings and it was never required to file
any Comment by the RTC through Judge Omelio in violation of
its right to due process; and (d) it intervened in the present
case for it was constrained to protect its rights and interest. 76
On the same day, Davao City also filed its Petition
for Certiorari-in-Intervention with Urgent Application for a
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction with the CA seeking to participate in
the certiorari proceedings already initiated by the Republic. 77
On April 11, 2011, the Republic through the OSG filed its
Manifestation (in lieu of Comment) with the CA stating that the
intervenors should be allowed to intervene considering that
they were not notified of the reconstitution proceedings a
quo. 78
On April 28, 2011, the CA promulgated a
Resolution 79 granting all the motions to intervene and recalling
its October 5, 2010 Resolution which, in turn, assented to Judge
Omelio's May 25, 2010 Order for the issuance of a fencing
permit. The relevant portion of the Resolution reads:
Acting on the pertinent pleadings on file, the
Court RESOLVES to: (1) NOTE the Rejoinder to
Intervenors-Petitioner's Reply to Respondents' Omnibus
Comment/Opposition filed by private respondent
Helen P. Denila; (2) NOTE that per verification report
by the Judicial Record's [sic] Division, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) has not filed its Comment to
the Joint Motion to Intervene with Leave of Court with
Prayer for Reconsideration (with attached Joint Petition
for Certiorari-in-Intervention) filed by Lolita P. Tano, et
al., and to the Omnibus Motion: (a) for Leave of Court to
Intervene and to Admit attached Petition-in-Intervention,
(b) for Reconsideration of the Court's Resolution dated 5
October 2010, and (c) for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction filed by Alejandro Alonzo, Jr., et al.; (3) NOTE
that no compliance has been made by the OSG to the
Court's 24 January 2011 directive to file a Comment to
the City of Davao's Motion for Leave to Intervene; (4)
GRANT the Joint Motion to Intervene with Leave of
Court filed by movants Lolita P. Tano, et al.; (5) GRANT
the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by movants
Alejandro Alonzo, Jr., et al.; (6) GRANT the Motion for
Leave of Court to Intervene filed by the movant City of
Davao; (7) ADMIT the Petition-for-Certiorari-in-
Intervention with Urgent Application for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
filed by the City of Davao as it has already paid the
docket and other lawful fees; (8) DIRECT the
prospective intervenors, Lolita P. Tano, et al., and
Alejandro Alonzo, Jr., et al., to pay the required docket
and other lawful fees within five (5) days from notice;
(9) HOLD IN ABEYANCE the admission of the Joint
Petition-for-Certiorari-in-Intervention filed by Lolita P.
Tano, et al., and the Petition-for-Intervention filed by
Alejandro Alonzo, Jr., et al., pending compliance with
the preceding directive; (10) RECALL the Resolution of
July 13, 2010 insofar as it declared this case submitted
for decision; and, (11) RECALL Our October 5, 2010
Resolution, only in so far as We assented to the
issuance of the fencing permit.
SO ORDERED. 80
Court of Appeals' Certiorari Ruling
On July 25, 2012, the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 03270-MIN
rendered a Decision 81 against petitioner ratiocinating that: (a)
the Republic had seasonably filed the petition for relief since
the reglementary period should be counted from the date of
receipt of the OSG — not the Davao City's Office of the City
Prosecutor; 82 (b) the present reconstitution case as regards
OCT Nos. 219, 337, 67 and 164 cannot prosper for it is barred
by res judicata pursuant to this Court's ruling in the case
of Heirs of Guzman, Inc. which Judge Omelio should have taken
judicial notice of; 83 (c) Judge Omelio acted with grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the Republic's petition for relief
without any hearing; 84 and (d) petitioner failed to comply with
the requirements of Republic Act No. 26 85 (R.A. No. 26) because
she failed to notify the intervenors-private respondents of the
present reconstitution proceedings before the RTC and her
petition is not based on an existing owner's, co-owner's,
mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate OCT. 86 The decretal
portion 87 of the same Decision reads as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, We GRANT the petition. The
assailed 4 March 2008 Decision and 3 September
2009 and 1 October 2009 Orders of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 14, in Special Proceeding Case No.
7527-2004 are VOIDED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved by the CA's judgment in granting the Writ
of Certiorari in favor of the Republic, petitioner moved for
reconsideration.
On March 1, 2013, the CA issued a Resolution 88 denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration on the finding that the
arguments raised "are merely reiterative of the same
arguments or grounds already discussed and passed upon in
[its] decision." 89
Post-Court of Appeals Proceedings
On April 22, 2013, petitioner assailed the CA's July 25,
2012 Decision and March 1, 2013 Resolution through an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 primarily seeking for the
reinstatement of the RTC's March 4, 2008 Decision which
ordered the reconstitution of OCT Nos. 164, 219, 220, 301, 337,
514 and 67 under the former's name. 90
On October 10, 2013, Atty. Maria Theresa D. Biongan-
Pescadera (Atty. Biongan-Pescadera), Davao City's new Register
of Deeds (RD), caused the reconstitution of OCT Nos. 301 91 and
219 92 while the case was still pending with this Court and
despite the existence of the CA's July 25, 2012 Decision.
Parties' Arguments
Petition
Petitioner faults the CA for granting the Republic's
Petition for Certiorari and nullifying Judge Omelio's March 4,
2008 Decision as well as his September 3, 2009 and October 1,
2009 Resolutions because: (a) the certified photocopies,
reconstitution reports, certifications (that all the subject OCTs
were not available among their files) purportedly issued by the
RD as well as testimonies of key employees of Davao City's RD
office pertaining to the subject certificates of title are valid and
statutorily-recognized sources of reconstitution; 93 (b) the Deed
of Absolute Sale between her and Artigas is enough to
establish her interest over the properties subject of the
reconstitution; 94 (c) she had complied with the jurisdictional
requirements of notice and publication for being able to post
her petition for reconstitution in the City Hall of Davao City as
well as 95 the Official Gazette which serves as notice to the
whole world; (d) the lack of notice to the private respondents
was cured when her petition for reconstitution was published
in the newspaper of general circulation; 96 (e) the intervenors-
private respondents do not have a legal and valid interest over
the certificates of title of the lands in question because they
are informal settlers who were not occupants at the time the
petition for reconstitution was filed; 97 (f) the Republic failed to
file a Motion for Reconsideration — a condition sine qua non in
the filing of a petition for certiorari — as the same was declared
as pro forma by Judge Omelio; 98 (g) the CA's findings are not
supported by the evidence found in the records of the case
because it "dwelt so much on the allegation[s] x x x raised by
the intervenors-private respondents; 99 (h) the March 4, 2008
Decision had already become immutable for having attained
finality; 100 (i) res judicata is inapplicable in the case at hand
because the court that took cognizance of the reconstitution
cases pertaining to OCT Nos. 219, 337, 67 and 164 did not
acquire jurisdiction over her person as a party to the case and
because this Court did not rule on the merits of that case; 101 (j)
Judge Omelio did not abuse his discretion when he revoked his
inhibition and denied the Republic's Petition for Relief from
Judgment because he was merely exercising the residual
powers of the court that rendered judgment on the petition for
reconstitution of title; 102 (k) Judge Omelio did not abuse his
discretion in summarily denying the Republic's Petition for
Relief from Judgment without hearing because the same
pleading was filed out of time; 103 and (l) the intervenors-
private respondents should have litigated their cause in a
separate proceeding because the instant reconstitution case is
not an adjudication of their ownership on the subject lands. 104
Comments
The Republic, in response to petitioner's claims,
contends that: (a) the Petition for Relief from Judgment was
seasonably filed because it received the RTC's March 4, 2008
Decision on March 27, 2008 — not March 10, 2008 which is the
date of receipt by the Public Prosecutor of Davao City; 105 (b)
this Court had already held in Republic  of the Philippines v.
Mendoza, 106 that the reglementary period "should be counted
from the date the Solicitor General received a copy of the
decision because the service of the decision upon the city fiscal
did not operate as a service upon the Solicitor General"; 107 (c)
Judge Omelio no longer had jurisdiction to rule on
the Republic's Petition for Relief from Judgment when he
voluntarily inhibited himself prom participating in the
case; 108 (d) Judge Omelio abused his discretion in failing to
conduct a hearing before dismissing the petition for
relief; 109 (e) Procedural Rules should "receive a liberal
interpretation in order to promote their object and to assist
the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action;" 110 (f) the CA did not err in
holding that petitioner is barred by res judicata from seeking
another reconstitution for OCT Nos. 219, 337, 67 and
164; 111 (g) Judge Omelio should have taken judicial notice of
this Court's Resolution in Heirs of Guzman, Inc.; 112 (h) the CA did
not err in holding that the RTC did not comply with the
requirements of Sections 12 and 13 of R.A. No. 26; 113 (i) the
doctrines of immutability of judgments and res judicata only
apply to final and executory decisions — not to Judge Omelio's
March 4, 2008 Decision which did not acquire jurisdiction to
proceed with the reconstitution case for failure to comply with
the requirements of Sections 12 and 13 of R.A. No. 26; 114 and
(j) a Motion for Reconsideration need not be required in a
Petition for Certiorari when the decision or order being
assailed, such as the RTC's March 4, 2008 Decision, is a patent
nullity. 115 
aDSIHc
Intervenors-private respondents Lolita P. Tano, Fe I.
Betios, Estrella E. Namata, Melchor Lecionan and Romeo Pacho
also filed their joint Comment 116 claiming that: (a) Sections 9
and 10 of R.A. No. 26 pertaining to the service of notices to
actual occupants or possessors of lands covered by certificates
of title subject in a petition for reconstitution of title were not
complied with; 117 (b) res judicata applies to petitioner (as far as
OCT Nos. 219, 337, 67 and 164 are concerned) even if she was
not a party in the case of Heirs of Guzman, Inc. because the
latter was in the same predicament as petitioner's in this
previously-settled case; 118 and (c) their belatedly-pursued
intervention in this case was warranted considering that they
have not been served with any notice of the instant petition for
reconstitution of title as required by R.A. No. 26. 119
Intervenors-private respondents Alejandro Alonzo, Jr.,
Marites Alonzo-Liloc, Araceli Alonzo-Diolaso, Roberto Alonzo,
Eulalia Angelitud, Evangeline Bautista, Salvador Bautista,
Felimon Biliran, Jr., Lourdes Biliran, Reynaldo Biliran, Arsenio
Briones, Norma Cal, Marilyn Cañete, Edgardo Costante, Joy Bill
Dela Cruz, Marjorie Dela Cruz, John James Espinosa, Romar
Cañete, Timoteo C. Flores, Jemuel Gaudicos, Lily Lisondra,
Erwin Pacada, Alma Pagalan, Leonardo Peloño, Reynaldo
Poliquit, Virgilio Reuyan, Jesus Reuyan, Sr., Rogeleo Reuyan,
Arlan Silva, Carmelita Silva, Rommel Silva, Grace Temonera and
Erlinda Valencia, for their part, jointly filed their
"Comment/Opposition (To Petitioner's Petition for Review
on Certiorari Dated 19 April 2013)" 120 claiming that: (a) they are
actual occupants of the lots covered in the subject OCTs sought
to be reconstituted being residents therein; 121 (b) the lands
that they are presently occupying are actually owned by
Arroyo; 122 (c) the RTC, even if it has jurisdiction to entertain
Petitions for Reconstitution of Title, had no authority to issue
an order directing the demolition of the structures erected on
the areas covered by subject OCTs; 123 (d) there was failure to
faithfully comply with all jurisdictional requirements in R.A. No.
26 because the actual occupants of the lots covered by the
subject OCTs were never notified of the pendency of the
Petition for Reconstitution of Title before the RTC; 124 (e) they
were not accorded due process when Judge Omelio issued
the Writ of Demolition for they were never given a day in court
to present their arguments; 125 and (f) they have legal interest
in the outcome of the instant reconstitution of title as their
rights will be adversely affected by the final verdict. 126
The City of Davao likewise filed its Comment (Petition
for Review on Certiorari) 127 arguing that: (a) petitioner failed to
comply with the jurisdictional requirements enumerated in
Section 12 of R.A. No. 26 because some areas embraced by the
certificates of title sought to be reconstituted are situated
within the commercial and residential districts in the city and
that several government properties (Barangay Hall of Barangay
74-A situated in a lot covered by TCT No. T-2981 is located
within the property described in OCT No. 514; a portion of lot
under TCT No. T-131158 derived from OCT No. 377 is
registered in the name of the Republic; Talomo Police Station
which is part of the Davao City Police Office situated in a lot
covered by TCT No. FP-1243 and registered in the name of
Vicenta D. Lastima is located within the property embraced in
OCT No. 514) are "glaring to the eyes"; 128 (b) posting and
publication cannot cure the defects in the petition for
reconstitution which alleged that there are no structures
erected on the lands covered by certificates of title sought to
be reconstituted by petitioner; 129 and (c) it has a legal and valid
interest over the lands covered by the certificates of title
sought to be reconstituted because, aside from having
properties situated in the lands described in the subject
certificates, the RTC had granted and tried to implement
petitioner's motion to compel the city to issue a Fencing
Permit. 130
Atty. Cruzabra, on her part, filed a Manifestation and/or
Comment 131 adopting 132 the OSG's Comment and adding that:
(a) Judge Omelio proffered no valid reason in revoking his
inhibition and subsequently denying summarily the Republic's
Petition for Relief from Judgment; 133 (b) Judge Omelio indeed
granted petitioner's motion for the issuance of a Fencing
Permit on May 25, 2010 and issued an Order directing the City
Engineer of Davao City to issue the same permit; 134 (c) the RTC
as presided by Judge Omelio had no residual jurisdiction on
account of the CA's April 28, 2011 Resolution which hindered
the implementation of the former tribunal's directive against
the City of Davao for the issuance of a Fencing Permit; 135 (d)
petitioner failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements
under Sections 12 and 13 of R.A. No. 26 regarding the
allegations of absence or presence of structures on the lands
covered by certificates of title sought to be reconstituted and
service of notices to actual occupants; 136 (e) Judge Omelio had
already been dismissed by this Court from judicial service on
account of rendering the March 4, 2008 Decision; 137 and (f)
despite the CA's Decision which nullified the RTC's March 4,
2008 Decision, the current Register of Deeds who replaced her
upon retirement still proceeded to issue new original copies
OCT Nos. 219 138 and 301. 139
Reply
Petitioner, upon receiving the respective comments of
all respondents, filed a couple of sets of Reply 140 arguing that:
(a) respondents "failed to establish and prove with concrete
and convincing evidence" that they were present and were
occupying the properties covered by the subject OCTs "before
or during the inception of the proceedings; 141 (b) Judge Omelio
was justified in issuing a Fencing Permit because he had
retained "general supervisory control over the process of the
execution" relative to the March 4, 2008 Decision; 142 (c) the City
of Davao "failed to prove" that she failed to comply with the
jurisdictional requirements because the notice of hearing
relative to the instant petition for reconstitution of title case
was posted at the main entrance of the City Hall Building and
that the structures erected on the properties under the subject
OCTs have been erected after the same petition was filed
before the RTC; 143 (d) this Court's ruling in Heirs of Guzman,
Inc. does not constitute res judicata because the same principle
was only raised during the certiorari proceedings before the CA
and that same case was not decided on the merits and had
different sets of evidence; 144 (e) Judge Omelio's March 4, 2008
Decision became immutable and unalterable after it attained
finality; 145 (f) the OSG's recourse of seeking a relief from
judgment is not the proper remedy because it was guilty of
gross negligence when it failed to timely file a Motion for
Reconsideration or an appeal against Judge Omelio's March 4,
2008 Decision; 146 and (g) the unilateral reversal of the
voluntary inhibition was anchored on a valid reason as the lots
covered by the subject OCTs turned out to be different from
those previously handled by Judge Omelio when he was still
engaged in the private practice of law. 147
Issues
I
Whether the CA committed a reversible error in finding
grave abuse of discretion and reversing the RTC's
September 3, 2009 Order which summarily denied
the  Republic's petition for relief from judgment.
II
Whether the CA committed a reversible error in nullifying
the RTC's March 4, 2008 Decision through the issuance of
a Writ of Certiorari.
III
Whether the CA committed a reversible error in allowing
the actual occupants of the lots subject in the present
reconstitution of title case to participate in the certiorari
proceedings.
IV
Whether this Court should impose disciplinary sanctions
on Atty. Lanelyn D. Pangilinan (Atty. Pangilinan) and Atty.
Maria Theresa D. Biongan-Pescadera (Atty. Biongan-
Pescadera) for performing acts inconsistent with their
sworn duties as Members of the Bar.
Ruling
Parameters of Review
At the outset, this Court reiterates the basic
procedural rule that it is not a trier of facts and that only pure
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. 148 Although jurisprudence has
provided several exceptions to this rule, 149 such exceptions
must be alleged, substantiated and proved by the parties so
that this Court may effectively evaluate and review the factual
issues raised. 150 Notably, like all other modes of appeal, the
function of a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is
to enable this Court to determine and correct any error of
judgment committed in the exercise of jurisdiction. 151
By comparison, nothing is more settled than the
principle that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and
proved to exist. 152 Likewise, jurisprudence is also settled in
defining the phrase "grave abuse of discretion" as the
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction; or, the exercise of power in an arbitrary
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility,
so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty, to a virtual refusal to perform the mandated duty, or to
act at all in contemplation of the law. 153 In some rare
instances, the term "grave abuse" even refers to cases in which
there has been a gross misapprehension of facts 154 — but only
for the limited purpose of establishing the allegation of grave
abuse of discretion. 155 Correspondingly, the term "without
jurisdiction" means that the court acted with absolute lack of
authority; while the term "excess of jurisdiction" means that
the court transcended its power or acted without any statutory
authority. 156 As such, petitioner has the burden of proof to
show that the act of the public respondent in issuing the
impugned order (or decision, in some cases) lacked or
exceeded its jurisdiction because mere abuse is not enough —
it must be grave. 157 This is done by clearly showing, to the
satisfaction of the reviewing court, the presence of caprice and
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion on the part of the
inferior court or tribunal. 158
In seeking to utilize the benefit from a competent
court's corrective hand of certiorari, a petitioner must bear in
mind that such procedural remedy is essentially supervisory
and is specifically invoked to keep lower courts and other
tribunals within the bounds of their
jurisdiction. 159 A Writ of Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy
which may only be availed of when there is no appeal or when
there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. 160 Unlike the different modes of appeal, the
supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of
a Writ of Certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of
reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a lower court judgment
— on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of
the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. 161 This is
because a Writ of Certiorari is a remedy used to correct errors
of jurisdiction — for which reason, it must clearly show that the
public respondent had no jurisdiction to issue an order or to
render a decision. 162 Viewed in a different angle, such
extraordinary writ is strictly confined to the determination of
the propriety of the trial court's jurisdiction — whether it had
the authority to take cognizance of the case and if so, whether
the exercise of its jurisdiction has or has not been attended by
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. 163 Therefore, the remedy itself is narrow in
scope. 164
At this juncture, it now becomes important to point out
that, much like reviewing the legal correctness of a CA decision
in resolving a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 involving
decisions and final orders of the National Labor Relations
Commission, this Court will evaluate the case in the prism of
whether the CA correctly determined the presence or absence
of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court a
quo. 165 The ruling in Inocente v. St. Vincent Foundation for
Children and Aging, Inc., 166 explains this concept in the following
manner:
In resolving the present Rule 45 petition, we
are therefore, bound by the intrinsic limitations of
a Rule 65 certiorari proceeding: it is an extraordinary
remedy aimed solely at correcting errors of
jurisdiction or acts committed without jurisdiction, or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. It does
 not address mere errors of judgement, unless the Section 1. Disqualification of judges. — No
error transcends the bounds of the tribunal's judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which
jurisdiction. 167 he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
Accordingly, the questions that need to be answered
related to either party within the sixth degree of
while keeping the aforementioned parameters of review in consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
mind are the following: fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the
(1) Did the CA commit a reversible error in finding grave civil law, or in which he has been executor,
abuse of discretion on the RTC's part for issuing administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in
which he has been presided in any inferior court
the September 3, 2009 Order which summarily
when his ruling or decision is the subject of review,
denied the Republic's Petition for Relief from
without the written consent of all parties in interest,
Judgment? signed by them and entered upon the record.
(2) Did the CA commit a reversible error in nullifying the A judge may, in the exercise of his sound
RTC's March 4, 2008 Decision by issuing discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for
a Writ of Certiorari? just or valid reasons other than those mentioned
above.
This Court answers in the negative for the following
reasons: The aforementioned rule contemplates two (2) kinds of
inhibition: (a) compulsory; and (b) voluntary. 170 Under
On reversing and finding grave abuse
the first paragraph of the afore-cited Rule, it is conclusively
of discretion on the RTC's September
presumed that judges cannot actively and impartially sit in the
3, 2009 Order which summarily
instances mentioned. 171 The second paragraph, which
denied the  Republic's Petition for
embodies voluntary inhibition, leaves to the sound discretion
Relief from Judgment
of the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for other just
I.  The CA was correct in holding that Judge and valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide. 172 It is
Omelio went beyond the bounds of his the latter kind of inhibition which rests on the subjective
authority when he: (a) unilaterally withdrew ground of conscience; that is why cases under such category
his inhibition, (b) re-assumed jurisdiction, should be analyzed on a case-to-case basis.
and (c) summarily denied the  Republic's
In the case of Judge Omelio's voluntary inhibition, this
Petition for Relief from Judgment.
Court makes it clear that a trial judge who voluntarily inhibits
A critical component of due process is a hearing before himself loses jurisdiction to hear a case. 173 However, while a
an impartial and disinterested tribunal. 168 All the other judge in extremely rare instances may reconsider his previous
elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be inhibition and re-assume jurisdiction after a careful re-
meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial assessment of the circumstances of the case, 174 the better
and biased judge. 169 Such constitutional principle is the basis course is to disqualify himself to avoid being misunderstood
of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court which states: and to preserve his reputation for probity and objectivity. 175
 A judge who voluntarily inhibits himself from handling a
case means that he had doubts regarding his impartiality. Such
recusal is commendable on his part for it preserves the
integrity of the Judiciary's ability to dispense impartial justice.
However, a re-assumption of jurisdiction on the part of the
judge who had previously inhibited from a particular
proceeding gives the public an impression that he may have
acquired some form of personal interest in the outcome of the
case. For reasons of preserving the public's faith in the
Judiciary's capability to dispense impartial justice, the best
option of a judge who made a prior voluntary inhibition is to
continue the same. This is especially applicable to multi-
sala courts such as the RTC of Davao City. 176 Section 8 (a),
Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC 177 entitled "Guidelines on the
Selection of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers,
Prerogatives and Duties," which also happens to govern the
mechanism for assignment of cases to different branches in a
multi-sala court, provides:
SEC. 8. Raffle and re-assignment of cases in
ordinary courts where judge is disqualified or voluntarily
inhibits himself/herself from hearing case. —
(a) Where a judge in a multiple-branch court is
disqualified or voluntarily inhibits himself/herself, the
records shall be returned to the Executive
Judge and the latter shall cause the inclusion of the
said case in the next regular raffle for re-assignment.
A newly-filed case shall be assigned by raffle to the
disqualified or inhibiting judge to replace the case so
removed from his/her court. (citations omitted)
Indeed, no case may be assigned without being raffled,
and no judge may choose the cases assigned to him. 178 The
raffle of cases is intended to ensure the impartial adjudication
of cases by protecting the integrity of the process of
distributing or assigning cases to judges. 179 Such process
assures the public that the right of the parties to be heard by
an impartial and unbiased tribunal is safeguarded while also
protecting judges from any suspicion of impropriety. 180 More
importantly, "[t]his Court has repeatedly and consistently
demanded 'the cold neutrality of an impartial judge' as
the indispensable imperative of due process." 181
It now becomes clear from the foregoing discussions
that Judge Omelio exceeded the bounds of his authority when
he bypassed the raffling process and re-assumed jurisdiction
over the Republic's Petition for Relief from Judgment — both
without any apparent justification. Judge Omelio's failure to
heed the guidelines provided in Section 8 (a) of A.M. No. 03-8-
02-SC amounts to a serious transgression of due process as
the litigants (most especially respondents) were deprived of
the benefits of a fair and neutral resolution of their case.
Worse, Judge Omelio also violated the basic tenets of due
process when he denied the Republic's Petition for Relief from
Judgment without conducting a hearing; thereby denying the
State an opportunity to raise its concerns or objections on the
re-assumption of jurisdiction as provided in Section 6, Rule 38
of the Rules of Court. 182 Due to these serious jurisdictional
transgressions, this Court considers him absolutely devoid of
authority in taking action on and expeditiously denying
the Republic's Petition for Relief from Judgment. Since orders
of inhibition are judicial in nature, 183 due process
requirements apply and the parties should at least be heard
before any act or resolution may be done resulting either in
the denial of any motion to inhibit or in the re-assumption of
jurisdiction by a presiding magistrate; thereby making the
instant case under one of those several instances where the
corrective hand of certiorari may be utilized. 
ETHIDa
At this point, however, this Court is not yet ready to
make a sweeping statement of totally prohibiting judges from
re-assuming jurisdiction in a case where he had already
inhibited from as there might still be some unforeseen and
unpredictable instances calling for such an extraordinary
measure. Nevertheless, magistrates should be guided by
the rule that a re-assumption of jurisdiction may only be
done in a manner that does not to contravene any existing
administrative issuance of this Court.
Thus, this Court holds that the RTC's September 3, 2009
Order denying the Republic's Petition for Relief from Judgment
is void for being tainted with grave abuse of discretion as a
result of Judge Omelio's unauthorized re-assumption of
jurisdiction.
II.  The CA was correct in taking cognizance of
an order denying the Petition for Relief from
Judgment because a Writ of Certiorari is a
comprehensive remedy against errors of
jurisdiction.
As discussed earlier, a Writ of Certiorari may only be
issued for the correction of jurisdictional errors or grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. 184 Being an "inflexible" 185 remedy of "limited
scope and of narrow character" 186 "designed for the correction
of jurisdictional errors," 187 it cannot substitute for a lost
appeal. 188
However, the instances in which certiorari will issue
cannot be defined, because to do so is to destroy the
comprehensiveness and usefulness of the extraordinary
writ. 189 Jurisprudence recognizes certain situations when the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be deemed proper,
such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable
damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge
capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where
there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal
would be slow, inadequate and insufficient; (e) where the issue
raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved;
and (g) in case of urgency. 190 Moreover, the same remedy may
be availed of even if the lost appeal was occasioned by
a party's neglect or error in the choice of remedies when: (a)
public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates;
(b) the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) the writs
issued are null and void; or (d) the questioned order amounts
to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. 191 Ultimately,
it is better on balance that this Court look beyond procedural
requirements and overcome the ordinary disinclination to
exercise supervisory powers so that a void order of a lower
court may be controlled to make it conformable to law and
justice. 192
Relatedly, the principle of liberal construction of
procedural rules has been allowed by this Court in the
following cases: (a) where a rigid application will result in
manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, especially if a party
successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned
final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or
from the recitals contained therein; (b) where the interest of
substantial justice will be served; (c) where the resolution of
the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious
discretion of the court; and (d) where the injustice to the
adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed. 193 In addition, jurisprudence also teaches us that,
aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which
would warrant the suspension of the Rules of the most
mandatory character and an examination and review by the
appellate court of the lower courts findings of fact, the other
elements that should be considered are the following: (a)
the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (b)
the merits of the case; (c) a cause not entirely attributable to
the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of the rules; (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory; and (e) the other party will not be
unjustly prejudiced thereby. 194
 In this case, the records show that the RTC's March 4,
2008 Decision was received by Davao City's Office of the City
Prosecutor on March 10, 2008; while the same judgment was
received by the OSG only on March 27, 2008. Technically, the
State through the OSG has fifteen (15) days from its actual
receipt on March 27, 2008 or until April 11, 2008 to appeal the
RTC's March 4, 2008 Decision — not fifteen (15) days from the
deputized prosecutor's receipt on March 10, 2008 or until
March 25, 2008. Suspiciously, Atty. Velasco, the RTC's Clerk of
Court, prematurely declared the RTC's March 4, 2008
Decision as final and executory on March 28, 2008 — only a
day after the OSG actually received the said judgment. 195 This
obviously goes against the established jurisprudential principle
that "copies of orders and decisions served on the deputized
counsel, acting as an agent or representative of the Solicitor
General, are not binding until they are actually received by the
latter"; 196 all in acknowledgement of the OSG's principal role as
the "principal law officer and legal defender of the
Government" 197 as provided under Section 35 (1), Chapter 12,
Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. This means
that the proper basis for computing a reglementary period and
for determining whether a decision had attained finality is
service on the OSG. 198
Confoundingly, the OSG opted to file a Petition for Relief
from Judgment against the RTC's March 4, 2008 Decision on
May 26, 2008 — the sixtieth (60th) calendar day from receipt of
such Judgment on March 27, 2008. 199 Regrettably, even if the
same pleading was filed within the reglementary period to file
a Petition for Relief from judgment, the OSG still pursued
the wrong remedy and effectively lost its statutory right to appeal.
It could have ignored the prematurely-issued March 31, 2008
Entry of Judgment and, instead, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration or new trial from the March 4, 2008 Decision
or a notice of appeal before the lapse of April 11, 2008. 200
Nevertheless, this Court finds the attendant
circumstances strongly compelling as to warrant the
suspension of the applicable mandatory rules regarding strict
compliance of reglementary periods and proper modes of
review. The proceedings for the execution of the March 4,
2008 Decision — pursuant to the prematurely-declared March
31, 2008 Entry of Judgment — had already commenced even
before the OSG's last day to file a motion
for reconsideration (or new trial) or notice of appeal on
April 11, 2008 had lapsed. As such, Judge Omelio's acts of
passively allowing Atty. Velasco to issue the subject Entry of
Judgment prematurely and failing to take any corrective steps
amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority
because it unnecessarily forces the aggrieved party (in this
case, the Republic) to participate in parallel proceedings of
pursuing concurrent remedies (of execution and of appeal
or certiorari, when pursued due to grave abuse of discretion) —
thereby giving rise to multiplicity of suits. 201 Participating in
multiple parallel proceedings is not only vexatious; 202 it also
unnecessarily wastes the time and resources of the adversely
affected party. Given this observation, it now appears that
Judge Omelio was indifferent to both the misapplication
of rules on strictly complying with reglementary periods as well
as the consequences on the part of the parties affected by the
spawning of concurrent proceedings before the RTC (for
execution and writ of demolition proceedings) and the CA
(for certiorari proceedings). Since Judge Omelio's act — in giving
due course to petitioner's Urgent Motion for Execution instead of
dismissing it outright — appears to be in tolerance of Atty.
Velasco's erroneous issuance of the March 31, 2008 Entry of
Judgment, any likelihood that the OSG's Motion for
Reconsideration or Notice of Appeal from the March 4, 2008
Decision might be given due course or granted is virtually nil.
Moreover, Judge Omelio's May 25, 2010 Order which
directed the Davao City Engineer's Office to issue a Fencing
Permit over the properties covered by the OCTs sought to be
reconstituted, as well as the October 8, 2010 Writ of
Demolition for the clearing of structures erected on the
properties covered by the same OCTs while
the certiorari proceedings before the CA were still pending,
conclusively show that judicial authority had been exercised in
an oppressive manner. The situation should have called for the
application of "judicial courtesy" on his part which is exercised
by suspending a lower court's proceedings although there is no
injunction or an order from a higher court as a matter of
respect and for practical considerations. 203 And even though
judicial courtesy remains the exception rather than the rule, it
will apply as there is a strong probability that the issues
before the higher court would be
rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation
of the proceedings in the lower court. 204
Since a substantial number of actual occupants (of the
lots covered by the OCTs sought to be reconstituted) had
started to file their respective pleadings-in-intervention, the
RTC through Judge Omelio should have exercised a
considerable amount of prudence by refraining from
performing or engaging in acts which are consistent with
executing a final judgment. Issuing a Fencing Permit and a
demolition writ for existing structures are the constitutive of
final acts of execution which is almost certain to inflict an
irreversible damage on the parties involved and frustrate
whatever action that the CA may adopt to resolve the entire
pending dispute. As such, Judge Omelio should have exercised
due restraint in giving due course to petitioner's pleadings
which practically sought for the execution of the RTC's March 4,
2008 Decision even without an injunctive writ issued by the CA.
His insouciant attitude in continuing to conduct proceedings
incidental to execution only added to the complexity of the
entire dispute, annoyingly belabored all parties into
participating in several unnecessary proceedings, and made
the attendant conundrums considerably burdensome for
higher courts to untangle.
Hence, under these oppressive circumstances, it is fair
to conclude that the CA correctly took cognizance of
respondents' petitions for certiorari in spite of
the Republic having lost its right to appeal.
On nullifying the RTC's March 4,
2008 Decision through the issuance of
a Writ of Certiorari
I.  The CA correctly nullified the RTC's March
4, 2008 Decision when it issued the subject
Writ of Certiorari.
The doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of
judgment articulates that a decision which has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable; it may no longer be
modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it
be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court
of the land. 205 This principle is a matter of sound public policy,
which rests upon the practical consideration that every
litigation must come to an end. 206
Nonetheless, the immutability of judgment doctrine
admits of some exceptions which are: (a) the correction of
clerical errors; (b) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which
cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void judgments; and (d)
whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. 207 Of
these exceptions, the last couple of items in the enumeration
(void judgments and supervening evident rendering the
execution unjust and inequitable) may not be summarily
performed by the court concerned because they are
necessarily threshed out in another proceeding.
 In a procedural context, a final and executory judgment
may be set aside in one of the following: (a) petition for relief
from judgment under Rule 38; (b) direct action to annul and
enjoin the enforcement of the judgment; 208 and (c) direct
action either by certiorari or by collateral attack against the
challenged judgment which is void upon its face, or that the
nullity of the judgment is apparent by virtue of its own
recitals. 209 This means that some exceptions to the
immutability of judgment doctrine have been expanded to
include the grounds of the foregoing remedies. "Void
judgments," for example, encompasses the grounds
enumerated under Rules 38 and 47 to include: (a) fraud; (b)
accident; (c) mistake; (d) excusable negligence; (e) denial of due
process; 210 (f) extrinsic fraud; and (g) lack of jurisdiction.
Likewise, supervening events which render the execution of an
unjust and inequitable final judgment also allow an aggrieved
party to pursue the remedy of filing a Petition
for Certiorari against the order or writ of execution. 211
In the case at hand, it was the RTC's September 3, 2009
Order which summarily denied the Republic's Petition for Relief
from Judgment — not the March 4, 2008 Decision which
granted the petition for reconstitution — that was reviewed
under certiorari. If Section 1, Rule 65 is to be followed in its
literal sense, the CA's actions would be limited
to nullifying (or modifying) the RTC's September 3, 2009
Order of denial and directing the reinstatement of
the proceedings relative to the Republic's Petition for Relief
from Judgment. 212 Doing so would only delay the resolution
of the entire dispute leading to a circuitous and protracted
litigation between all parties; thereby wasting not only their
time and resources but also the Judiciary's. Since the records
available to the CA and this Court are substantial enough to
enable it to determine whether the March 4, 2008 Decision is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion, there now arises a need
to apply the concept of equity jurisdiction and allow a pro
tanto review — in a certiorari proceeding — of all the RTC's
issuances in other proceedings. This is because the March 4,
2008 Decision gave rise to the Republic's Petition for Relief
from Judgment. Thus, consistent with this Court's
constitutional mandate to promulgate rules which shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, 213 precursor proceedings and their
corresponding issuances which are intimately related to
issuances being reviewed under extraordinary and
comprehensive certiorari proceedings may be passed upon
pursuant to the concept of equity jurisdiction.
To start with, equity is the principle by which substantial
justice may be attained in cases where the prescribed or
customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate. 214 In relation
to the concept of equity, equity jurisdiction aims to provide
complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to
adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case
because of a resulting legal inflexibility when the law is applied
to a given situation. 215 For equity jurisdiction to be successfully
invoked, the factual antecedents of a plea for the exercise of
liberality must be clear. 216
As firmly established in the records of the case, special
circumstances were indeed attendant (i.e., the presence of
several intervenors who are actual occupants of the lots
covered by the OCT's sought by petitioner to be reconstituted
and who are in danger of being deprived of their occupation).
The same set of circumstances necessitates this Court to
suspend the usual application of procedural rules in order to
address serious allegations of injustices brought about by the
complexity of the proceedings. As clarified earlier, when
available records undoubtedly support the facts which are
enough for this Court to pass upon the merits of a case
intimately related to the one being reviewed at bench, a pro
tanto review of such related case (especially in
a certiorari proceeding) becomes justifiable.
 Here, the CA was justified in nullifying the March 4,
2008 Decision in a certiorari proceeding. Considering the
aforementioned special circumstances, a reinstatement of the
proceedings relative to the Petition for Relief from Judgment
will only make the dispute between the contending parties
protracted and circuitous. Fittingly, this Court also deems it
proper that the issue regarding the March 4, 2008 Decision's
jurisdictional validity be resolved now to avoid further delay in
the disposition of this case. 217 Under the present
circumstances and also by reason of the adequacy of available
records, the CA was justified in wielding the powers of a cert
writ when it: (1) exercised equity jurisdiction albeit
unknowingly; and (2) resolved the issue on whether to grant or
deny the Petition for Relief from Judgment as if it were filed
before it.
Relatedly, this Court deems it best to clarify that the CA
also did not err in unknowingly or subconsciously applying the
concept of equity jurisdiction even if the grounds for a
successful Petition for Relief from Judgment were absent in
this case. Admittedly, the records bear no evidence that Atty.
Velasco's act (of prematurely entering a judgment which had
not yet become final) was a result of petitioner's acts,
fraudulent or otherwise. In both Rules 38 and 47, the grounds
referred to here are those which have been committed by
prevailing parties — not those which have been committed
by the court or its personnel because the same may be
corrected by means of an appeal. 218 This notwithstanding,
equity jurisdiction may be exercised by the CA in
a certiorari proceeding for it to nullify a judgment being
assailed in a petition for relief because serious allegations of
lack or absence of jurisdiction were raised. Failure to
comply with mandatory jurisdictional requirements in a special
proceedings case is one such instance.
Finally, as regards petitioner's assertion of the
immutability of final judgments doctrine, this Court rejects the
same as respondents raised serious allegations affecting the
RTC's authority to take cognizance of the subject
reconstitution case and power to render the March 4, 2008
Decision. In this instance, a re-examination as to
the jurisdictional validity of the March 4, 2008 Decision
cannot simply be barred or prevented by a simple invocation
of the immutability doctrine. Once the allegations of absence
of jurisdiction are proven by the party assailing it, it now
becomes the burden of the other to prove presence of
jurisdiction. Special proceedings cases are dependent on
express statutory requirements regarding jurisdiction in order
for said proceedings and judgments to be wholly valid. Thus, in
the case of reconstitution of title, a petitioner has the burden
to successfully substantiate with evidence all the statutorily-
mandated jurisdictional requirements.
II.  The CA correctly found the RTC to have
exceeded its jurisdiction in granting the
petition for reconstitution of title despite the
failure of petitioner to comply with some
jurisdictional requirements.
Jurisdiction is the basic foundation of judicial
proceedings. 219 It is simply defined as the power and authority
— conferred by the Constitution or statute — of a court to hear
and decide a case. 220 Without jurisdiction, a judgment
rendered by a court is null and void and may be attacked
anytime. 221 Indeed, a void judgment is no judgment at all — it
can neither be the source of any right nor the creator of any
obligation; all acts performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect. 222
In adjudication, the concept of jurisdiction has
several aspects, namely: (a) jurisdiction over the subject
matter; (b) jurisdiction over the parties; (c) jurisdiction over
the issues of the case; and (d) in cases involving property,
jurisdiction over the res or the thing which is the subject of the
litigation. 223 Additionally, a court must also acquire jurisdiction that power or authority is projected into judgment — the first
over the remedy in order for it to exercise its powers validly deals with the powers of the court in the real and substantive
and with binding effect. 224 sense while the other class with the procedure by which such
powers are put into action. 230 As in this case, special
First, jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to
proceedings are creatures of statutes (or constitutional
hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings
provisions in the case of extraordinary writs like habeas corpus)
in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority
that do both — confer jurisdiction on specific courts while
which organizes the court. 225 Second, jurisdiction over the
providing for a specific procedure to be followed in order
parties is the power of the courts to make decisions that are
for the resulting judgment to be valid. The reason is that a
binding on them and is based on due process. 226 This is
special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
acquired through voluntary appearance, in the case of the
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. 231 It is unlike
plaintiff or petitioner, or through the coercive power of legal
ordinary civil actions in which a party called a "complainant"
processes, in the case of the defendant or
who seeks for either the enforcement or protection of a right
respondent. 227 Third, jurisdiction over the issues pertains to a
or the prevention or redress of a wrong. 232 Here, the case has
tribunal's power and authority to decide over matters which
one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of
are either disputed by the parties or simply under
a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse
consideration. This aspect of jurisdiction is closely tied to
party. 233 As such, the trial court must have jurisdiction to take
jurisdiction over the remedy and over the subject matter
cognizance of such petition or application in compliance with
which, in turn, is generally determined in the allegations of the
the specific procedure provided by law. The authority to
initiatory pleading (complaint or petition) and not the result of
proceed is conferred by a statute which is why
proof. 228 However, unlike jurisdiction over the subject-matter,
the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory and the
jurisdiction over the issues may be conferred by either express
same must be strictly complied with. 234 One must be mindful
or implied consent of the parties. 229 Fourth, jurisdiction over
that the acquisition of jurisdiction is not a direct result of the
the res pertains to the court's authority over the object or thing
inherent power of courts to settle actual controversies
subject of the litigation as well as its power to bind the same
involving injured or conflicting rights per se — it traces its
with its judgment. Last, jurisdiction over the remedy pertains to
source from substantive laws which set or fix jurisdictional
authority of a tribunal to take cognizance and pass upon the
requirements for petitioners to not only allege but
propriety of petitioner or complainant's reliefs sought. The
also prove in order to vest and validate the handling
same aspect of jurisdiction is dependent on either the statute
tribunal's authority as well as the proceedings already
providing for a specific procedure for the recognition of a
conducted. This makes jurisdiction in special proceedings
particular right (i.e., reconstitution of certificate of title,
primarily dependent on petitioner's strict compliance with
registration of title, etc.) or the procedure promulgated by this
statutory requirements which fix the authority of the court to
Court pursuant to its constitutional powers (i.e., habeas
take cognizance of the case and pass a judgment thereon.
corpus,  quo warranto, declaratory relief, etc.). 
cSEDTC

Consequently, a petitioner's noncompliance with jurisdictional

Pertinently, certain statutes confer jurisdiction, power, requirements in a special proceedings case removes a court's
or authority while others provide for the procedure by which authority thereby rendering the whole proceedings void.
 At this juncture, the issue that needs to be resolved is:
Was petitioner able to comply with the jurisdictional
requirements enumerated in R.A. No. 26?
This Court answers in the negative.
Reconstitution 235 of title is a special
proceeding. 236 Being a special proceeding, a petition for
reconstitution must allege and prove certain specific
jurisdictional facts before a trial court can acquire
jurisdiction. 237 R.A. No. 26, as amended, is the special law
which provides for a specific procedure for the reconstitution
of Torrens certificates of title lost or destroyed; Sections 2 and
3 thereof provide how original certificates of title and transfer
certificates of title shall be respectively reconstituted and from
what specific sources successively enumerated therein such
reconstitution shall be made. 238 It confers jurisdiction upon trial
courts to hear and decide petitions for judicial reconstitution;
however, before the court can properly act, assume and
acquire jurisdiction or authority over the petition and grant the
reconstitution prayed for, petitioner must observe certain
special requirements and mode of procedure prescribed by
the law. 239 More importantly, substantial compliance with
jurisdictional requirement is not enough because the
acquisition of jurisdiction over a reconstitution case is hinged
on a strict compliance with the requirements of the law. 240
Conversely, noncompliance with all jurisdictional
requirements in special proceedings (such as reconstitution of
title) adversely affects the trial court's jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case and, in cases where a specific
procedure is outlined by law, over the remedy pursued by
petitioner. Failure to comply with any of the jurisdictional
requirements for a petition for reconstitution renders the
whole proceedings null and void. 241 Strict observance of
this rule is vital to prevent parties from exploiting
reconstitution proceedings as a quick but illegal way to obtain
Torrens certificates of title over parcels of land which turn out
to be already covered by existing titles. 242 Comparatively, this
Court cannot even take a lenient approach in resolving
reconstitution cases because liberal construction of
the Rules does not apply to substantive
requirements specifically enumerated by a
statute, 243 especially so if matters affecting jurisdiction are
involved. In other words, the principle of liberality cannot be
applied to statutory requirements as they are not
technical rules of procedure which may be brushed aside by
the courts to serve the higher reason of resolving the case on
the merits. In special proceedings, the merits directly hinges on
petitioner's compliance with statutory requirements proven in
court to establish a status, right or particular fact.
Accordingly, in obtaining a new title in lieu of the lost or
destroyed one, petitioner must be mindful of R.A. No. 26 which
laid down procedures that must be strictly followed in view of
the danger that reconstitution could be the source of
anomalous titles or unscrupulously availed of as an easy
substitute for original registration of title proceedings. 244 Even
in the absence of an opposition, a petition for reconstitution
which does not strictly adhere to the requirements of the law
will not be granted in the pretext that the same proceeding will
not affect the ownership or possession of the
property. 245 Hence, it is the reason why this Court has held in
numerous cases involving reconstitution of title that
noncompliance with the prescribed procedure and
requirements deprives the trial court of jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the case and, consequently, all its
proceedings are rendered null and void. 246
For the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the petition
for reconstitution, the occupants of the property should be
notified of the petition. 247 In other words, it is beyond cavil that
the requirement of actual notice to
the occupants and the owners of the adjoining property
under Sections 12 and 13 of R.A. No. 26 is itself mandatory to
vest jurisdiction upon the court in a petition for reconstitution
of title and essential in order to allow said court to take the
case on its merits. 248 Verily, noncompliance with these
requirements, especially as regards the notice of hearing as
provided for under Section 13 of the same law, is fatal and the
trial court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the petition for
reconstitution. 249 This Court emphasizes that the purposes of
the stringent and mandatory character of the legal
requirement of mailing the notice to the actual occupants of
property covered by the certificates of title to be reconstituted
are: (a) to safeguard against spurious and unfounded land
ownership claims; (b) to apprise all interested parties of the
existence of such action; and (c) to give them enough time to
intervene in the proceeding. 250 At all times, clear and
convincing evidence proving the jurisdictional requirements
must exist before a court may order the reconstitution of a
destroyed or lost title. 251
In this case, petitioner's allegation that the subject
property was unoccupied at the time of the instant case's
inception, aside from being unsubstantiated, eventually turned
out to be false when a Writ of Demolition was sought after to
execute the judgment of reconstitution. The presence of
inhabited artificial and permanent structures erected on a
particular land is an obvious indication of occupation or
possession. To have such structures, inhabited by third
persons, demolished through a court process is a clear act of
recognition that the same land is indeed adversely occupied or
possessed. Petitioner's act of seeking for the issuance of
a Writ of Demolition is patently incongruous with the
allegations in her petition for reconstitution of title that "there
are no buildings or other structures of strong materials on the
above-mentioned pieces of land which do not belong to
[her]." 252 Moreover, she also failed to adduce any proof that
the subject lots were actually unoccupied at the time she filed
her petition for reconstitution of title as the records bear that
the TCTs in the name of the intervenors-respondents have
already been issued by the Registry of Deeds. These
observations can only mean that petitioner failed to prove the
jurisdictional requirement of sending notices to actual
occupants and registered owners of the land covered by the
certificate of title sought to be reconstituted. Therefore, the
proceedings before the RTC (as presided by Judge Omelio)
which resulted in the grant of the petition for reconstitution of
title is void for being tainted with grave abuse of discretion as a
consequence of petitioner's failure to prove all the
jurisdictional requirements set in R.A. No. 26.
Besides, the Court En Banc's pronouncement here is in
consonance with its dictum in  Peralta v. Judge
Omelio  (Peralta) 253 — a portion of which pertains to an
administrative complaint filed by Atty. Cruzabra against Judge
Omelio involving the latter's March 4, 2008 Decision and
proceeds from facts identical and intimately related to the case
at hand — which reads:
Cruzabra charges respondent with ignorance
of law and procedure, misconduct, bias, partiality and
oppression in granting Denila's petition for
reconstitution despite the previous ruling of this
Court in Heirs of Don Constancio Guzman, Inc. v. Hon.
Judge Emmanuel Carpio against the reconstitution of
OCT Nos. 219, 337, 67 and 164, and the failure of
Denila to comply with the jurisdictional requirements
under R.A. No. 26 (indicating (1) the nature and
description of the buildings and improvements not
belonging to the owner of the land; and (2) the names
and addresses of occupants or persons in possession
of the property).
Cruzabra likewise assails respondent for
revoking his previous inhibition and denying
the Republic's petition for relief from judgment
without conducting a hearing as required by
 Section 6, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. The reason (a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of
for similar denial of the motion for reconsideration title;
filed by the OSG was also flimsy: the notice of hearing
(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's
was addressed only to the Clerk of Court, even as the
duplicate of the certificate of title;
parties were all furnished with copies of the motion.
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title,
xxx xxx xxx
previously issued by the register of
However, we find respondent administratively deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
liable in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2273 for gross ignorance of
(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of
the law in (a) refusing to adhere to a prior ruling of
registration or patent, as the case may
this Court against the reconstitution of certain OCTs;
be, pursuant to which the original
(b) reversing his previous inhibition in SP Proc. No.
certificate of title was issued;
7527-2004; and (c) taking cognizance of Denila's
motion for indirect contempt. (e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds,
by which the property, the description
In granting Denila's petition for reconstitution
of which is given in said document, is
of original and owner's duplicate copies of OCTs
mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or
registered in the name of Constancio S. Guzman and
an authenticated copy of said document
Isabel Luna, respondent failed to take judicial notice
showing that its original had been
of this Court's previous ruling rendered in Heirs of
registered; and
Don Constancio Guzman, Inc. v. Hon. Judge Emmanuel
Carpio which involved the same OCT Nos. 219, 337, 67 (f) Any other document which, in the judgment
and 164. The Resolution rendered by this Court's of the court, is sufficient and proper
Third Division is herein reproduced: basis for reconstituting the lost or
destroyed certificate of title.
xxx xxx xxx
[xxx xxx xxx]
But more important, respondent granted the
petition for reconstitution in SP Proc. 7527- SEC. 12. Petitions for
2004 despite noncompliance with the reconstitution from sources
requirements under R.A. No. 26. enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e),
2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e) and/or 3(f) of
The applicable provisions are Sections 2, 12
this Act, shall be filed with the proper
and 13 which state:
Court of First Instance, by the
SECTION 2. Original registered owner, his assigns, or any
certificates of title shall be person having an interest in the
reconstituted from such of the property. The petition shall state or
sources hereunder enumerated as contain, among other things, the
may be available, in the following following: (a) that the owner's
order: duplicate of the certificate of title had
been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-
owner's mortgagee's or lessee's taken from a prior certificate of title
duplicate had been issued, or, if any covering the same property.
had been issued, the same had been
SEC. 13. The court shall cause
lost or destroyed; (c) the location, area
a notice of the petition, filed under the
and boundaries of the property;
preceding section, to be published, at
(d) the nature and description of
the expense of the petitioner, twice in
the buildings or improvements, if
successive issues of the Official
any, which do not belong to the
Gazette, and to be posted on the main
owner of the land, and the names
entrance of the provincial building and
and addresses of the owners of
of the municipal building of the
such buildings or improvements;
municipality or city in which the land is
(e) the names and addresses of the
situated, at least thirty days prior to
occupants or persons in possession
the date of hearing. The court shall
of the property, of the owners of
likewise cause a copy of the notice to
the adjoining properties and all
be sent, by registered mail or
persons who may have any interest
otherwise, at the expense of the
in the property; (f) a detailed
petitioner, to every person named
description of the encumbrances, if
therein whose address is known, at
any, affecting the property; and (g) a
least thirty days prior to the date of
statement that no deeds or other
hearing. Said notice shall state, among
instruments affecting the property
other things, the number of the lost or
have been presented for registration,
destroyed certificate of title, if known,
or, if there be any, the registration
the name of the registered owner, the
thereof has not been accomplished, as
names of the occupants or persons in
yet. All the documents, or
possession of the property, the
authenticated copies thereof, to be
owners of the adjoining properties
introduced in evidence in support of
and all other interested parties, the
the petition for reconstitution shall be
location, area and boundaries of the
attached thereto and filed with the
property, and the date on which all
same: Provided, That in case the
persons having any interest therein
reconstitution is to be made
must appear and file their claim or
exclusively from sources enumerated
objections to the petition. The
in Section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the
petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit
petition shall be further be
proof of the publication, posting and
accompanied with a plan and
service of the notice as directed by the
technical description of the property
court.
duly approved by the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office, or In this case, the petition for reconstitution of
with a certified copy of the description the subject OCTs is based on Section 2(c), that is, on
certified true copies of the said titles issued by a legal
custodian from the LRA. However, the amended
petition and the notice of hearing failed to state
the names and addresses of the occupants or
persons in possession of the property and all
persons who may have any interest in the
property as required by Section 12. There is also no
compliance with the required service of notice to
the said occupants, possessors and all persons
who may have any interest in the property.
Records reveal that Denila indeed failed to
disclose in her amended petition for
reconstitution that there are occupants and
possessors in the properties covered by the subject
OCTs. Third parties, including the City Government of
Davao filed motions for intervention in CA-G.R. SP
03270-MIN and manifested before the CA Cagayan de
Oro City that several structures and buildings,
including a barangay hall, a police station and a major
public highway would be affected by the order for the
issuance of a fencing permit and writ of demolition
issued by respondent. These occupants and
possessors have not been notified of the
reconstitution proceedings. The March 4, 2008
decision itself shows that no notice was sent to any
occupant, possessor or person who may have an
interest in the properties.
The requirements prescribed by Sections 12
and 13 of R.A. No. 26 are mandatory and compliance
with such requirements is jurisdictional. Notice of
hearing of the petition for reconstitution of title must
be served on the actual possessors of the property.
Notice thereof by publication is insufficient.
Jurisprudence is to the effect settled that in petitions
for reconstitution of titles, actual owners and
possessors of the land involved must be duly served
with actual and personal notice of the petition.
Compliance with the actual notice requirement is
necessary for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction
over the petition for reconstitution. If no notice of the
date of hearing of a reconstitution case is served on a
possessor or one having interest in the property
involved, he is deprived of his day in court and the
order of reconstitution is null and void.
In Subido v.  Republic  of the Philippines, this
Court ruled:
As may be noted, Section 13
of R.A. No. 26 specifically enumerates
the manner of notifying interested
parties of the petition for
reconstitution, namely: (a) publication
in the Official Gazette; (b) posting on
the main entrance of the provincial
capitol building and of the municipal
building of the municipality or city in
which the land is situated; and (c) by
registered mail or otherwise, to every
person named in the notice. The
notification process being
mandatory, noncompliance with
publication and posting
requirements would be fatal to the
jurisdiction of the reconstituting
trial court and invalidates the
whole reconstitution proceedings.
So would failure to notify, in the
manner specifically prescribed in said
Section 13, interested persons of the
initial hearing date. Contextually,
Section 13 particularly requires that
the notice of the hearing be sent to
the property occupant or other
persons interested, by registered mail
or otherwise. The term "otherwise"
could only contemplate a notifying
mode other than publication, posting,
 or [through] the mail. That other compliance with the prerequisites for the acquisition
mode could only refer to service of of jurisdiction under R.A. No. 26, and disregarding
notice by hand or other similar mode adverse findings or evidence of high officials of LRA
of delivery. that militates against the reconstitution of titles, to be
of serious character warranting his dismissal from the
It cannot be over-emphasized that R.A. No.
service. We also charged Judge Velasco with
26 specifically provides the special requirements
knowledge of this Court's pronouncement in Alabang
and procedures that must be followed before the
Development Corporation v. Valenzuela and other
court can properly act, assume and acquire
precedents admonishing courts to exercise the
jurisdiction over the petition and grant the
"greatest caution" in entertaining petitions for
reconstitution prayed for. These requirements, as
reconstitution of allegedly lost certificates of title and
the Court has repeatedly declared, are mandatory.
taking judicial notice of innumerable litigations and
Publication of notice in the Official Gazette and the
controversies that have been spawned by the reckless
posting thereof in provincial capitol and
and hasty grant of such reconstitution of allegedly
city/municipal buildings would not be sufficient.
lost or destroyed titles as well as of the numerous
The service of the notice of hearing to parties
purchasers who have been victimized by forged or
affected by the petition for reconstitution,
fake titles or whose areas simply expanded through
notably actual occupant/s of the land, either by
table surveys with the cooperation of unscrupulous
registered mail or hand delivery must also be made.
officials.
In the case at bar, the "posting of the notice at the
place where TCT No. 95585 is situated" is not, as Here, respondent's bad faith in disregarding
urged by petitioner, tantamount to compliance with the jurisdictional requirements in reconstitution
the mandatory requirement that notice by registered proceedings is evident in his order for the issuance of
mail or otherwise be sent to the person named in the a fencing permit and writ of demolition in favor of
notice. Denila. Respondent should have been alerted by
the presence of actual occupants and possessors
In view of what amounts to a failure to
when, after the finality of the March 4, 2008 Decision
properly notify parties affected by the petition for
which ordered the reconstitution of the subject
reconstitution of the date of the initial hearing
OCTs, Denila moved for the issuance of a writ of
thereof, the appellate court correctly held that the
demolition for such belied her allegation in the
trial court indeed lacked jurisdiction to take
amended petition that "[T]here are no buildings or
cognizance of such petition. And needless to stress,
other structures of strong materials on the above-
barring the application in appropriate cases of
mentioned pieces of land, which do not belong to
the estoppel principle, a judgment rendered by a court
the herein petitioner" and the absence of any name
without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case is
and address of any occupant, possessor or person
void, ergo, without binding legal effect for any
who may have an interest in the properties.
purpose.
With the failure to serve actual notice on
In Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Velasco, we
these occupants and possessors, Branch 14 had not
have held Judge Tirso Velasco's acts of proceeding
acquired jurisdiction over SP Proc. No. 7527-2004,
with the reconstitution despite awareness of lack of
 and therefore the March 4, 2008 Decision
rendered by respondent is null and void.
A decision of the court without jurisdiction is null
and void; hence, it can never logically become final
and executory. Such a judgment may be
attacked directly or collaterally.
But respondent's bad faith is most evident in
his reversal of his inhibition in SP Proc. No. 7527-2004
to act upon the petition for relief from judgment.
Respondent voluntarily inhibited himself after
rendition of the decision, only to resume handling the
case and immediately denied the said petition for
relief despite the previous order of Judge Tanjili
setting the petition for hearing, and completely
ignoring the jurisdictional defects of the decision
raised by the OSG and Cruzabra.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
Judge George E. Omelio, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Davao City is
found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and
violation of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct and is hereby DISMISSED FROM THE
SERVICE, with forfeiture of all his retirement benefits,
except his accrued leave credits, and with perpetual
disqualification for re-employment in any branch,
agency or instrumentality of the government,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
This Decision is immediately EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED. 254 (emphases supplied;
citations omitted)
In this case, the afore-cited portion in Peralta clearly
shows that Judge Omelio's March 4, 2008 Decision cannot be
legally revived and reinstated. It is obvious that the very reason
why Judge Omelio was dismissed from the judicial service by
the Court En Banc was precisely because he was adjudged to
be grossly ignorant of the law when he took cognizance of and
eventually granted the subject petition for reconstitution of the
subject certificates of title filed by petitioner despite the lack
of jurisdictional requirements. Judge Omelio even failed to
verify and cite a single evidence from the records which
reasonably supports petitioner's factual allegations pertaining
to the jurisdictional requirement of mailing notices to actual
occupants or possessors of a property subject in a
reconstitution case. Clearly, the RTC's grant of reconstitution
favoring petitioner in its March 4, 2008 Decision was devoid of
factual basis. This is due to the basic principle that courts
cannot grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence
presented in support thereof because due process
considerations require that judgments must conform to and be
supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in
court. 255 Therefore, the RTC's March 4, 2008 Decision penned
by Judge Omelio is beyond salvage.
III.  The RTC ignored the basic principles of res
judicata in allowing the reconstitution of
OCT Nos. 219, 337, 67 and 164.
Res judicata is defined as a matter adjudged; a thing
judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by
judgment. 256 Under this rule, a final judgment or decree on the
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the
rights of the parties or their privies, in all later suits and on all
points and matters determined in the previous suit. 257 To
invoke res judicata, the elements that should be present are: (a)
the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (b)
the decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) the
disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
(d) there must be as between the first and second action,
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. 258
 Corollarily, judgments and final orders constituting res
judicata are categorized into different concepts which have
distinctive effects as provided under Section 47 of Rule 39 as
follows:
SECTION 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.
— The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by
a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as
follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a
specific thing or in respect to the probate of a
will, or the administration of the estate of a
deceased person, or in respect to the personal,
political, or legal condition or status of a
particular person or his relationship to another,
the judgment or final order is conclusive upon
the title to the thing, the will or administration,
or the condition, status or relationship of the
person; however, the probate of a will or
granting of letters of administration shall only
be prima facie evidence of the death of the
testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with
respect to the matter directly adjudged or as
to any other matter that could have been raised
in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors in interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating for the
same thing and under the same title and in
the same capacity; and,
(c) In any other litigation between the same
parties or their successors in interest, that only
is deemed to have been adjudged in
a former judgment or final order which
appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.
(emphases supplied) SDAaTC
It can be deduced in the aforementioned provisions
that there are three (3) loose categories of final and executory
judgments as regards their effects on subsequent and related
proceedings. Paragraph (a) of the foregoing rule is commonly
known to speak of judgments in rem; paragraph (b) is said to
refer to judgments in personam; and paragraph (c) is the
concept understood in law as "conclusiveness of judgment." 259
Traditionally, paragraphs (b) and (c) are both in
personam proceedings technically pigeonholed in prior cases
before this Court under the blanket of the res
judicata proper. 260 Here, only two (2) concepts of res
judicata were previously recognized — (a) "bar by prior
judgment" as enunciated in Section 47 (b), Rule 39; and (b)
"conclusiveness of judgment" as embodied in Section 47
(c), Rule 39. 261 However, the concept of res judicata also
embraces in rem proceedings embodied in paragraph
(a) because "a judgment or final order against a specific thing . .
. is conclusive upon the title to the thing  [or the res]." 262 This
means that a judgment is directed "against the thing" which, as
a consequence, "binds the whole world" because persons
dealing with such "thing" are bound by the disposition of the
tribunal which ruled on its legal status. 263 As a consequence, a
final and executory judgment concluding an in
rem proceeding becomes part of the legal attributes of the
thing being litigated in which all persons dealing with it
are bound to respect.
Accordingly, since special proceedings pertain to a
declaration of status, right or particular fact, judgments therein
are said to be in rem as it binds the whole world. The reason
for the all-encompassing reach of final in rem judgments is
that the "whole world" had been constructive parties (with
non-participants usually subjected to a prior order of general
default) to the case the moment the jurisdictional requirement
of publication was met by petitioner. Such is also the reason
why special proceedings present a justiciable
controversy as they treat the declaration of a thing's legal
status as a claim of interest against everyone. Here, what is
crucial is the due publication of such notice because it brings in
the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide it. 264 In other words, an in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. 265
As applied in this case, this Court emphasizes that
proceedings for judicial reconstitution of certificates of title are
proceedings in rem. 266 The object of such proceeding is to bar
indifferently all who might be minded to make any objection
against the right sought to be enforced, hence the judgment
therein is binding theoretically upon the whole world. 267 Here,
it is required that the court must acquire jurisdiction over
the res in order to render a valid judgment thereon — it is done
either: (a) by seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a
result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the
power of the court is recognized and made effective. 268 In
other words, the exercise of in rem jurisdiction depends on the
court's exercise of exclusive custody and control over
the res. 269 Consequently, this makes the requirement of
acquiring jurisdiction over the person of petitioner in a
subsequent reconstitution case even unnecessary. 270
More importantly, it is the compliance of jurisdictional
requirements (such as the service of notice to all the actual
occupants of the land covered by the certificate of title sought
to be reconstituted) that vests the court with jurisdiction to
validly take cognizance and rule on a reconstitution case.
Adequately proving all factual allegations which are part of
jurisdictional requirements with preponderant evidence is
mandatory for the court to successfully acquire jurisdiction
over the res and to render its own adjudicative power effective.
Once jurisdiction is validly obtained by the court and the
judgment in the reconstitution case becomes final, the findings
therein can no longer be opened for review. 271 Thus, it follows
that a person who is not a party to a previously settled
reconstitution of title case cannot seek for the same remedy
without violating the principle of res judicata.
In the case at hand, this Court had already ruled in the
case of Heirs of Guzman, Inc. that OCT Nos. 219, 337, 67 and
164 in the name of Constancio and Isabel cannot be
reconstituted because they have already been cancelled,
transferred and registered in the name of other owners; one of
them being Arroyo. Even if disposed by this Court through an
unsigned resolution, the same ruling would still constitute an
actual adjudication on the merits because the legal basis cited
to support the conclusion on why there was an absence of
reversible error committed in the challenged judgment
signifies this Court's assent to the findings and conclusion of
the lower court. 272 Though an unsigned resolution is neither
reported nor doctrinal, 273 the judgment in this case is directed
to the properties themselves and, thus, binds not only those
who participated therein but also those who subsequently deal
with the same properties involved. Obviously, the present case
filed by petitioner seeking to have the certificates of same title
reconstituted cannot legally prosper for the simple reason that
she had already been prevented by the rule on res
judicata from re-litigating the same matter. Therefore, Judge
Omelio committed a fatal error amounting to grave abuse of
discretion for ordering the reconstitution of OCT Nos. 219, 337,
67 and 164 in the name of Guzman and for disregarding the
final and executory judgment regarding the legal status of
these certificates of title.
IV.  Judge Omelio denied the  Republic's Motion
for Reconsideration in utter disregard of
established jurisprudence.
 The general rule is that the three (3)-day notice
requirement in motions under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court is mandatory. 274 Nonetheless, when the
adverse party had been afforded the opportunity to be heard,
and has been indeed heard through the pleadings filed in
opposition to the motion, the purpose behind the 3-day notice
requirement is deemed realized. 275 In effect, the defect was
cured for the adverse party was still notified of the existence of
said pleading. 276
In perfunctorily denying the Republic's motion for
reconsideration, Judge Omelio pointed out
citing Col.  Alvarez v. Judge Diaz, et al. (Col. Alvarez), 277 that "[a]
notice hearing addressed to the clerk of court and not to the
parties is no notice at all." 278 However, he failed to take note of
the fact in Col.  Alvarez that no proof was presented that the
motion was indeed received by the counsel of the adverse
party (save for the testimony of the movant's counsel that he
delivered the motion personally to the adverse party's counsel)
which was the reason why the same pleading was considered
as a mere scrap of paper. No such negative factual finding was
made in the October 1, 2009 Order which denied
the Republic's Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, for lack of
adequate basis in ordering such denial, this Court finds that
the same order is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Propriety of the Intervention
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not
originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant
therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to
protect or preserve a right or interest that may be affected by
those proceedings. 279 However, it is not an absolute right for
the statutory rules or conditions for the right of intervention
must be shown. 280 Accordingly, to allow intervention: (a) it
must be shown that the movant has legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or is otherwise qualified; and (b)
consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of
the rights of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced,
or whether the intervenor's rights may be protected in
a separate proceeding or not — both requirements must
concur, as the first is not more important than the
second. 281 To sum it up, the legal interest as qualifying factor
must be of a direct and immediate character so that the
intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal
operation of the judgment. 282 Hence, in all cases, the
allowance or disallowance of a Motion for Intervention rests on
the sound discretion of the court after consideration of the
by
appropriate circumstances. 283
Here, the previous discussions are clear that R.A. No.
26 requires petitioners in reconstitution of title cases to send
notices to actual occupants of the land covered by certificates
of title sought to be reconstituted. Since the City of Davao and
the intervenors-private respondents are indeed actual
occupants of different portions of lots covered by the subject
certificates of title sought by petitioner to be reconstituted,
they have a clear legal interest to protect. While reconstitution
does not vest ownership because the only fact that has to be
established its whether or not the original owner's duplicate
copy of a certificate of title is still in existence, 284 it emboldens
the person — whose name appears on the face of the
certificate of title as the registered owner — to exercise acts of
dominion over the land identified and described therein.
Additionally, a registered owner also enjoys the benefit and
comfort of not having to ward off any collateral attack on the
certificate of title. 285 Such complication was confirmed by the
fact that petitioner applied for and was issued with a Writ of
Demolition as well as a favorable directive for the issuance of a
Fencing Permit. This only bolsters all respondents' claim that
their interests will not be protected in a separate proceeding.
Demolition of permanent structures and perimeter fencing
adversely affects the possessory rights of all occupants in an
immensely onerous manner. It is an ample basis for a court
handling a reconstitution of title case to implead the un-
notified occupants who may be deprived of their undisturbed
possession.
For these reasons, it now becomes clear that such de
jure recognition of ownership is favorable to the registered
owner because a reconstituted certificate of title has certain
adverse implications against the possessory rights of actual
occupants. As a consequence, these actual occupants are now
forced to defend their possessory rights as they are likely to be
considered as the intruders. Verily, a separate proceeding
undertaken for the purpose of assailing the true ownership of
the person whose name is registered on the face of the
certificate of title is circuitous and only contributes to the
clogging of court dockets. Hence, the CA did not commit a
reversible error in allowing all respondents to intervene in
the certiorari proceedings initiated by the Republic in seeking
to have its Petition for Relief from Judgment granted.
Administrative Sanctions Against
Erring Members of the Bar
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity
and good moral character of members of the Bar for them to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all
times. 286 Lawyers should set a good example in promoting
obedience to the Constitution and the laws. 287 This is because
a lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not
only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends
of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the
respect of the community to the legal profession. 288 That is
why the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to
the bar, and to the public. 289 To this end, all members of the
bar are strictly required to at all times maintain the highest
degree of public confidence in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of their profession. 290 Indeed, the law is an exacting
taskmaster. Membership in the Bar, as so appropriately put, is
a privilege burdened with conditions. 291
Keeping in mind these general ethical guidelines, this
Court proceeds to evaluate the acts of Atty. Pangilinan (one of
petitioner's counsels), Atty. Velasco (RTC Davao City-Branch
14's Clerk of Court) and Atty. Biongan-Pescadera (Davao City's
current Register of Deeds) which appear to be inconsistent
with their sworn duties as Members of the Bar.
I.  Atty. Lanelyn D. Pangilinan
Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly
misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or
authority. 292 It is the duty of all officers of the court to cite the
rulings and decisions of the Supreme Court
accurately. 293 Misquoting or intercalating phrases in the text of
a court decision constitutes willful disregard of the lawyer's
solemn duty to act at all times in a manner consistent with the
truth. 294
Atty. Pangilinan, in the present petition for review, cited
this Court's ruling in Republic v. Marasigan, et al.
(Marasigan) 295 which the pertinent portions reproduced in
verbatim as follows:
Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 is entitled Notice
of initial hearing, publication, etc., and provides, inter
alia, that:
The public shall be given
notice of initial hearing of the
application for land registration by
means of (1) publication; (2) mailing;
and (3) posting.
As regards publication, it specifically provides:
 Upon receipt of the order of
the court setting the time for initial
hearing, the Commissioner of Land
Registration shall cause a notice of
initial hearing to be published once in
the Official Gazette and once in a
newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines: Provided, however, that
the publication in the Official Gazette
shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court. x x x
This proviso was never meant to dispense
with the requirement of notice by mailing and
by posting. What it simply means is that in so far as
publication is concerned, there is sufficient
compliance if the notice is published in the Official
Gazette, although the law mandates that it be
published "once in the Official Gazette and once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."
However, publication in the latter alone would not
suffice. This is to accord primacy to the official
publication.
That such proviso was never meant to
dispense with the other modes of giving notice, which
remain mandatory and jurisdictional, is obvious from
Section 23 itself. If the intention of the law were
otherwise, said section would not have stressed in
detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all
persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of
the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties,
and occupants of the land.
The above view of the Court of Appeals
negates one of the principal purposes of the Decree,
which is clearly expressed in its exordium, namely, to
strengthen the Torrens System through safeguards to
prevent anomalous titling of real property. It opens
wide the doors to fraud and irregularities in land
registration proceedings and in proceedings for the
reconstitution of certificates of title. Judicial notice
may be taken of the fact that only very few have
access to or could read the Official Gazette, which
comes out in few copies only per issue. If publication
in the Official Gazette of the notice of hearing in both
proceedings would be sufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon the court, owners of both unregistered and
registered lands may someday painfully find out that
others have certificates of title to their land because
scheming parties had caused their registration, or
secured reconstituted certificates of title thereto and
sold the property to third parties.
The belabored argument of respondent Court
of Appeals that it would be unfair to impose upon the
private respondent the duty to comply with the
requirement of service of notice because it was not
through her fault that the original copy of the
Transfer Certificate of Title was lost is unacceptable
since the law does not make any exception or
exemptions; besides, it is, to say the least, a ludicrous
proposition. Equally unacceptable is the opinion of
said Court that it was the  duty of the trial
court to serve the required notices and private
respondent should not be prejudiced if it failed to do
so. It suggests, quite unfortunately, and gives the
wrong impression that mandatory requirements of
notices may be dispensed with if the failure to comply
with them is attributable to the court. It likewise
negates the principles of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency which the Constitution directs
public officials and employees to faithfully observe.
We should stress here that lapses on the part of
courts or their personnel cannot be made a reason or
a justification for non-observance of laws. By the very
nature of their functions, they should be the first to
obey the laws. 296 (emphases supplied)
In advocating for petitioner's cause, Atty. Pangilinan
boldly claimed that this Court held that "[u]nder Sec[tion] 13
of R.A. No. 26, the duty to send notices of the petition for
reconstitution to adjoining owners and actual occupants
is imposed upon the [trial] court" 297 instead of reflecting the
real ruling which clearly enunciated that
"[e]qually unacceptable is the opinion of said Court that it was
the duty of the trial court to serve the required notices and
private respondent should not be prejudiced if it failed to do
so[;] [i]t suggests, quite unfortunately, and gives the wrong
impression that mandatory requirements of notices may be
dispensed with if the failure to comply with them is
attributable to the court." Such blatant act of misquoting
jurisprudence is a clear badge of some desperate effort to
mislead this Court into thinking that it was the RTC's and not
petitioner's duty to notify actual occupants in a reconstitution
of title case. It is the height of disrespect on the part of Atty.
Pangilinan to insinuate that the RTC should have taken up
petitioner's cudgels in complying with the jurisdictional
requirements for the latter's petition for reconstitution to
prosper even when the contrary statutory principle had
already been clarified by jurisprudence. More so, her act of
mangling the unequivocal statements in Marasigan is
intellectually dishonest and is insulting to the intelligence of
the Members of this Court.
Another important and fundamental tenet in legal
ethics is that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his or her
client — but not at the expense of truth and the administration
of justice. 298 As officers of the court tasked with aiding this
court in its dispensation of justice, 299 lawyers take an oath that
they will not wittingly or willingly promote any groundless, false
or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the
same. 300 Unfounded suits only serve to disrupt rather than
promote the orderly administration of justice. 301 Moreover, an
appeal is not a matter of right but a statutory
privilege. 302 Being a mere privilege, all lawyers should put in
mind that an appeal cannot be abusively utilized to support or
advance utterly meritless causes. Thus, it is unethical for a
lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process such as
prosecuting patently frivolous and meritless appeals or
institute clearly groundless actions. 303
In advancing petitioner's desire to have OCT Nos. 219,
337, 67 and 164 reconstituted in the name of both spouses
Constancio and Isabel, Atty. Pangilinan greatly appears to have
chosen to ignore this Court's ruling in the case of Heirs of
Guzman, Inc. which had already considered the same
certificates of title to have been validly cancelled, transferred
and registered in the name of third persons. Instead of
disagreeing with petitioner's intransigent stance of pursing the
reconstitution of these certificates of title, she allowed herself
to be used as an instrument of disruption in the administration
of justice. Arguing that res judicata does not apply for the flimsy
reason that petitioner is a stranger to the case in Heirs of
Guzman, Inc. despite the obvious fact that the same judgment
involved the status and nature of the lands covered by OCT
Nos. 219, 337, 67 and 164 even treads dangerously along the
border of gross ignorance of the law. 304 Atty. Pangilinan should
have been totally familiar with the basic principle that "[t]he
judicial reconstitution of title is a proceeding in rem,
constituting constructive notice to the whole world." 305 To
make matters worse, she argued before this Court in this
manner:
131. It must be noticed that the case of Heirs of
Constancio Guzman, Inc. v. Hon. Judge Emmanuel
Carpio was primarily dismissed because of
violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts, it
being a direct appeal to the Supreme Court
from the trial court on its Order dated May 12,
2003 dismissing the petition for
reconstitution. The merits of the petition
was not discussed by the Supreme
Court[.] 306 (emphases supplied)
 Contrastingly, the following portion of this Court's ruling
in Heirs of Guzman, Inc. is hereunder reproduced in verbatim as
follows:
Moreover, even if we were to decide the
instant case on the merits, the petition would still
fail. Reconstitution of certificates of title, within the
meaning of RA 26, means the restoration of the
instrument which is supposed to have been lost
or destroyed in its original form and condition.
Petitioner failed to prove that the certificates of title
intended to be reconstituted were in fact lost or
destroyed. On the contrary, the evidence on record
reveals that the certificates of title were cancelled on
account of various conveyances. In fact, the parcels of
land involved were duly registered in the names of
the present owners whose acquisition of title can be
clearly traced through a series of valid and fully
documented transactions. 307 (emphases supplied)
Such temerity of Atty. Pangilinan to deceive this Court
into thinking that the ruling in Heirs of Guzman, Inc. did not
tackle the merits of the prior reconstitution cases involving
OCT Nos. 219, 337, 67 and 164 amounts to a betrayal of the
Lawyer's Oath. Such act unbecoming of a respected member of
the Bar clearly warrants administrative disciplinary sanctions.
II.  Atty. Ray Uson Velasco
Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility requires that a lawyer be updated in the latest
laws and jurisprudence. 308 There is less than full compliance
with the demands of professional competence, if a member of
a bar does not keep himself abreast of the trend of
authoritative pronouncements. 309 More importantly, it is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles. 310 Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they
may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their
obligations as members of the bar. 311 Falling short of this duty
amounts to gross ignorance of the law which is the disregard
of basic rules and settled jurisprudence. 312
Relatedly, this Court has long held that "[the]
administration of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden
of responsibility [which] requires that everyone involved in its
dispensation — from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk
— live up to the strictest standards of competence, honesty,
and integrity in the public service." 313 As the assumption of
public office is impressed with paramount public interest,
which requires the highest standards of ethics, persons
aspiring for public office must observe honesty, candor and
faithful compliance with the law. 314 As to clerks of court who
are officers of the court, 315 these principles place a great deal
of responsibility on their shoulders being the chief
administrative officers of their respective courts. 316 As chief
administrative officers, clerks of court must show competence,
honesty and probity since they are charged with safeguarding
the integrity of the court and its proceedings. 317 This is
consistent with Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel 318 which commands court personnel to
perform their official duties properly and diligently at all
times. 319
In this instance, this Court reproduces in verbatim the
relevant portion of the March 28, 2008 Certification 320 issued
by Atty. Velasco as follows:
CERTIFICATION
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the DECISION issued
by this Court dated March 4, 2008 in Special Proc.
Case No. 7527-2004, entitled PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
RECONSTITUTION OF ORIGINAL and OWNER'S
DUPLICATE OF ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OF
THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR DAVAO CITY and THE
INSCRIPTION OF THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION
 THERETO; HELEN P. DENILA, Petition copies of which
were received by the counsel for the petitioner on
March 5, 2008 and by the Register of Deeds for the
City of Davao on March 10, 2008, has now become
FINAL and EXECUTORY.
This Certification is issued upon the request of
the Petitioner.
Davao City, Philippines, March 28, 2008.
(signed)
ATTY. RAY USON
VELASCO
Clerk of Court V
The aforementioned Certification became the basis of
the March 31, 2008 Entry of Judgment 321 also issued by Atty.
Velasco which, in turn, became the basis of the April 23,
2008 322 Writ of Execution 323 which he also issued pursuant to
Judge Omelio's grant of petitioner's April 18, 2008 Urgent
Motion for Execution. Undoubtedly, Atty. Velasco's March 28,
2008 Certification triggered the series of irregularities
subsequently committed by Judge Omelio relative to the
untimely and hastily conducted execution proceedings of the
March 4, 2008 Decision.  acEHCD
Atty. Velasco — being a member of the Bar employed
by the Judiciary as Branch Clerk of Court — had been utterly
remiss of his duty to be conversant with prevalent
jurisprudence. The Court in National Power Corporation v.
National Labor Relations Commission, et al., 324 had already
declared in an unequivocal manner that "copies of orders and
decisions served on the deputized counsel, acting as agent or
representative of the Solicitor General, are not binding until
they are actually received by the latter." This means that the
reglementary period to file an appeal or Motion for
Reconsideration begins to run against the government only
upon receipt of the judgment or final order by the OSG. For
issuing a Certification attesting that the March 4, 2008 Decision
had become final and executory, even without any information
as to the OSG's actual receipt of such judgment, Atty. Velasco
ignored very nature of the Solicitor General's unequivocal
mandate for the government in legal proceedings — more
particularly in all land registration and related
proceedings. 325 Such thoughtless disregard of basic principles
on service of judgments or final orders to the OSG amounts to
gross ignorance of the law and is inconsistent with a Clerk of
Court's duty to show competence, honesty and probity. It
besmirches the Judiciary's reputation and erodes the people's
faith in the justice system.
III.  Atty. Maria Theresa D. Biongan-Pescadera
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that "[a] lawyer shall uphold
the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes." By virtue of this Canon,
lawyers should always keep in mind that, although upholding
the Constitution and obeying the law is an obligation imposed
on every citizen, a lawyer's responsibilities under Canon 1
mean more than just staying out of trouble with the law; as
servants of the law and officers of the court, lawyers are
required to be at the forefront of observing and maintaining
the rule of law. 326 Any act or omission that is contrary to, or
prohibited or unauthorized by, or in defiance of, disobedient
to, or disregards the law is included in the scope of "unlawful"
conduct which, in turn, does not necessarily imply the element
of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include
such element. 327 In the context of Canon 1, respect for the law
encompasses faithful adherence to the legal processes.
Concomitantly, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court includes the "willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court" as one of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are called upon
to obey court orders and processes and respondents
deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard
thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for
contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. 328 Graver
responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to
uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their
processes. 329 Moreover, Section 3 (b), Rule 71 of the
same Rules makes "[d]isobedience of or resistance to a
lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court" one of the
grounds from indirect contempt. Since "contempt of court" has
been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public
authority, 330 even a defiance directed against a judgment of a
superior court which has not yet attained finality and is
pending for review before this Court is considered
contemptuous.
Before proceeding to examine Atty. Biongan-
Pescadera's official actions as Register of Deeds in relation to
this case, this Court stresses that government lawyers in the
discharge of their official tasks have more restrictions than
lawyers in private practice. 331 Since public office is a public
trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the
government service is more exacting than the standards for
those in private practice. 332 As such, government lawyers
should be more sensitive to their professional obligations as
their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the
public eye. 333
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government
office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government
official. 334 However, if said misconduct as a government official
also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may
be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar. 335
In this case, although the CA's July 25, 2012 Decision
granting the Petition for Certiorari (as well as the RTC's
September 3, 2009 Order denying the petition for relief from
judgment and the RTC's March 4, 2008 Decision granting the
Petition for Reconstitution of Title) had not yet become
final when the OCT Nos. 301 and 219 were re-issued, the fact
still remains that Atty. Biongan-Pescadera ignored a standing
judgment of a superior court. Performing an act contrary to a
decision of a superior court, even if the same has not yet
attained finality, is a clear act of contempt and defiance against
duly-sanctioned legal processes. Worse, her act of re-issuing
some of the presently disputed certificates of title only added
to the factual complexity of this case making it more
burdensome for the courts in related or derivative disputes to
resolve. The least that Atty. Biongan-Pescadera could have
done was to maintain the status quo and wait for the case to
become final and executory (or ultimately settled by this Court)
before performing any act which would drastically affect the
rights and obligations of the parties. Additionally, as to OCT No.
219, Atty. Biongan-Pescadera also ignored this Court's ruling
in Heirs of Guzman, Inc. which had long attained finality and
has barred by res judicata any future litigation affecting the
same certificate of title.
Rules establishing structured legal processes command
respect, especially from lawyers from both the public and the
private sectors, for they are not empty rituals but part and
parcel of the justice system itself. Without deference to legal
processes, the administration of justice will run haywire
causing confusion and instability as to the rights and
obligations of the parties in all stages of litigation. Hence, Atty.
Biongan-Pescadera's utter indifference to established court
processes and complete disregard of the basic principle of res
judicata are inconsistent with a government lawyer's sworn
duty to "obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes."
Conclusion Pescadera to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for appropriate action.
In sum, this Court reiterates that noncompliance
with all the statutorily-mandated jurisdictional requirements in The Division Clerk of Court is
a Petition for Reconstitution of Certificate of Title renders the hereby ORDERED to FURNISH the Office of the Court
consequential proceedings void. For the trial court's Administrator and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines copies
jurisdiction in a reconstitution of title case to be validated, it of this Decision.
must be clearly shown that petitioner had substantiated all the
No pronouncement as to costs.
jurisdictional requirements with preponderant evidence.
Blatantly, petitioner failed to prove the jurisdictional fact that SO ORDERED.
notices were effectively sent to all occupants of the lots Leonen, Carandang, Zalameda  and  Gaerlan, JJ., concur.
covered by the certificates of title sought to be reconstituted.
 
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, this
Footnotes
Court:
1. Also referred to as "Tomoteo" in some parts of the rollo.
1) DENIES Helen P. Denila's Petition for Review
on Certiorari and AFFIRMS the July 25, 2012 2. Rollo, pp. 10-55.
Decision of the Court of Appeals — Special 3. Id. at 57-96; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello with
Former Twenty-Second Division, in CA-G.R. SP Associate Justices Edgardo T. Lloren and, concurring.
No. 03270-MIN, for failure to establish that the
4. Id. at 107-112; penned by former Presiding Judge George E. Omelio.
latter committed a reversible error in finding
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the 5. Id. at 102-103, see Heirs of Don Constancio Guzman, Inc. v. Judge
Regional Trial Court for promulgating the March Carpio, G.R. No. 159579, November 24, 2003 (Unsigned
Resolution).
4, 2008 Decision as well as the September 3,
2009 and October 1, 2009 Orders in Special 6. Id.
Proceeding Case No. 7527-2004;
7. Id.
2) NULLIFIES Original Certificates of Title Nos. 219 and
8. Id.
301 for being irregularly issued by Atty. Maria
Theresa D. Biongan-Pescadera; 9. Id.

3) REFERS the findings against Atty. Ray Uson Velasco to 10. G.R. No. 159579, November 24, 2003 (Unsigned Resolution).
the Office of the Court Administrator for 11. Rollo, pp. 101-106.
appropriate action; and
12. Id. at 103.
4) REFERS the findings against Atty. Lanelyn D.
Pangilinan and Atty. Maria Theresa D. Biongan- 13. Id. at 104-105.

14. Id. at 103.
15. Id. at 101. 40. Id.

16. Id. at 104. 41. Id.

17. Id. at 103. 42. Id. at 217.

18. Id. 43. Id. at 114.

19. Id. at 104. 44. Id. at 117.

20. Id. 45. Id. at 113.

21. Id. 46. Id. at 60.

22. Id. 47. Id.

23. Id. 48. Id. at 60 and 115.

24. Id. at 105. 49. Id. at 60.

25. Id. at 217. 50. Id. at 296-297.

26. Id. at 109-111. 51. Id. at 61.

27. Id. at 109. 52. Id.

28. Id. 53. Id.

29. Id. at 122-124. 54. Id. at 19; see also Peralta v. Judge Omelio, 720 Phil. 60, 72 (2013).

30. Id. 55. Id. at 82.

31. Id. at 110. 56. Id. at 283.

32. Id. 57. Id. at 116-118.

33. Id. 58. Id. at 117-118.

34. Id. 59. Id. at 117.

35. Id. 60. Id. at 118.

36. Id. 61. Id. at 61.

37. Id. 62. Id. at 61-62.

38. Id. at 111. 63. Id. at 62.

39. Id. at 112. 64. Id. at 21 and 63.

65. Id. 88. Id. at 97-100.

66. Id. 89. Id. at 99.

67. Id. at 63-64. 90. Id. at 10-55.

68. Id. at 21 and 64. 91. Id. at 311-312.

69. Id. at 65. 92. Id. at 314-316.

70. Id. at 65-66. 93. Id. at 24-28.

71. Id. at 66. 94. Id. at 28.

72. Id. 95. Id. at 30-31.

73. Id. at 66-67. 96. Id. at 31-33.

74. Id. at 67 and 300-301. 97. Id. at 33-35.

75. Id. at 68. 98. Id. at 35-36.

76. Id. at 69-70. 99. Id. at 36-38.

77. Id. at 70 100. Id. at 38-40.

78. Id. at 71. 101. Id. at 40-43.

79. Id. at 298-310. 102. Id. at 43-45.

80. Id. at 309-310. 103. Id. at 45-48.

81. Id. at 57-96. 104. Id. at 48-49.

82. Id. at 73-74. 105. Id. at 222.

83. Id. at 74-81. 106. 210 Phil. 445, 448 (1983).

84. Id. at 81-84. 107. Rollo, pp. 223-224.

85. An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of
Torrens Certificates of Title Lost or Destroyed (September 25,
1946); citation omitted.
86. Rollo, pp. 84-95; citing Republic  v. Spouses  Sanchez, 527 Phil. 571,
585-599 (2006); citation omitted; Republic v. Heirs of Julio Ramos,
627 Phil. 123, 134-136 (2010).
87. Id. at 95.
108. Id. at 225-226, citing Gov. Garcia v. Hon. Burgos, 353 Phil. 740, 771
(1998).
109. Id. at 226-228, citing Miraflor v. Hon. Carpio-Morales, 250 Phil. 487,
492 (1988).
110. Id. at 228-229, citing Funtila v. Court of Appeals, 181 Phil. 442, 447
(1979).
111. Id. at 230-234, citing Quasha Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Office v. 131. Id. at 281-295.
The Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, 622 Phil. 738,
132. Id. at 282.
749 (2009).
133. Id. at 282-283.
112. Id. at 234-236, citing Conducto v. Judge Monzon, 353 Phil. 796, 812-
815 (1998); Lantaco, Sr. v. Judge Llamas, 195 Phil. 325, 341 (1981). 134. Id. at 283-284.
113. Id. at 236-240, citing Republic  v. Spouses  Sanchez, 527 Phil. 571, 595 135. Id. at 284.
(2006).
136. Id. at 285-289, citing Alabang Development Corporation v. Hon.
114. Id. at 240-241, citing Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 284 Valenzuela, 201 Phil. 727, 731 (1982); The  Director of Lands v.
Phil. 343, 354 (1992); Francisco v. Judge Bautista, 270 Phil. 503, Court of Appeals, 190 Phil. 311, 372 (1981); Manila Railroad
507 (1990); Estoesta, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 258-A Phil. 779, 789- Company v. Moya, 121 Phil. 1122, 1127 (1965).
790 (1989); citation omitted.
137. Id. at 290.
115. Id. at 241-242, citing Marawi Marantao General Hospital, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 402 Phil. 356, 370-371 (2001). 138. Id. at 314-316.

116. Id. at 168-175. 139. Id. at 311-313.

117. Id. at 169-170. 140. Id. at 248-273 and 323-346.

118. Id. at 170-172, citing Sempio v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 627, 636 141. Id. at 249.
(1998). 142. Id. at 249 and 251.
119. Id. at 172-174. 143. Id. at 251-255 and 336-338.
120. Id. at 367-382. 144. Id. at 255-261 and 331-336.
121. Id. at 368. 145. Id. at 261-263 and 338-340.
122. Id. at 369. 146. Id. at 263-265 and 324-327.
123. Id. at 370. 147. Id. at 266-269 and 327-331.
124. Id. at 371-375. 148. Mangahas v. Court of Appeals, 588 Phil. 61, 77 (2008).
125. Id. at 375-378. 149. See Carbonell v. Carbonell-Mendes, 762 Phil. 529, 537 (2015).
126. Id. at 378-379. 150. Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167, 169 (2016).
127. Id. at 205-212. 151. See Marasigan v. Fuentes, 776 Phil. 574, 581 (2016); citation
128. Id. at 205-207. omitted.

129. Id. at 207. 152. Novateknika Land Corporation v. Philippine National Bank, 706 Phil.
414, 423 (2013); Spouses Bergonia v. Court of Appeals, 680 Phil.
130. Id. at 207-209. 334, 341 (2012); citation omitted.
153. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 678 Phil. 358, 397-398 (2011); citation
omitted.
154. United Coconut Planters Bank v. Looyuko, 560 Phil. 581, 592 (2007);
citation omitted.
155. See Abedes v. Court of Appeals, 562 Phil. 262, 276 (2007).
156. Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank, 575 Phil. 384, 396 (2008), citing Alafriz v.
Nable, 72 Phil. 278, 280 (1941); citation omitted.
157. Tan v. Spouses Antazo, 659 Phil. 400, 404 (2011).
158. See Olanolan v. Commission on Elections, 494 Phil. 749, 756-757
(2005).
159. Cruz v. People, 812 Phil. 166, 171 (2017).
160. Cunanan v. Court of Appeals, 793 Phil. 400, 409 (2016).
161. China Banking Corporation v. Cebu Printing and Packaging
Corporation, 642 Phil. 308, 320 (2010).
162. AGG Trucking v. Yuag, 675 Phil. 108, 120 (2011).
163. Ysidoro  v. Hon. Leonardo-de Castro, 681 Phil. 1, 14-15 (2012).
164. Spouses Dipad v. Spouses Olivan, 691 Phil. 680, 686 (2012), citation
omitted.
165. See Our Haus Realty Development Corporation v. Parian, 740 Phil.
699, 709 (2014).
166. 788 Phil. 62 (2016).
167. Id. at 73-74.
168. Webb v. People, 342 Phil. 206, 215 (1997).
169. People v. Hon. Ong, 523 Phil. 347, 356 (2006); citation omitted.
170. Chin v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 440, 449 (2003).
171. BGen (Ret.) Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hon. Justice Hernandez, 645 Phil. 550, 557
(2010).
172. Pagoda Philippines, Inc. v. Universal Canning, Inc., 509 Phil. 339, 345
(2005); citation omitted.
173. See City Government of Butuan v. Consolidated Broadcasting System,
Inc., 651 Phil. 37, 52 (2010); citation omitted.
174. Id.
175. Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, 467 Phil. 290, 306
(2004).
176. See Section 14 (l), Chapter II of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (August
14, 1981), as amended.
177. February 15, 2004.
178. See Supreme Court Circular No. 7, September 23, 1974 (per Chief
Justice Querube C. Makalintal); see also Andres v. Judge
Majaducon, 594 Phil. 591, 601 (2008).
179. In Re: Partial Report on the Results of the Judicial Audit Conducted in
the MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City, 567 Phil. 103, 123 (2008).
180. See Re: An Undated Letter with the Heading "Expose" of a Concerned
Mediaman on the Alleged Illegal Acts of Judge Julian C. Ocampo III
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities Branch 1, Naga City and Clerk
of Court Renato C. San Juan, MTCC Naga City, 411 Phil. 504, 519
(2001).
181. Lai v. People, 762 Phil. 434, 442 (2015).
182. Section 6. Proceedings after answer is filed. — After the filing of the
answer or the expiration of the period therefor, the court shall
hear the petition and if after such hearing, it finds that the
allegations thereof are not true, the petition shall be dismissed;
but if it finds said allegations to be true, it shall set aside the
judgment or final order or other proceeding complained of
upon such terms as may be just. Thereafter the case shall stand
as if such judgment, final order or other proceeding had never
been rendered, issued or taken. The court shall then proceed to
hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for a new
trial or reconsideration had been granted by it (Section
6, Rule 38 of the RULES OF COURT).
183. Atty. Fernandez v. Judge Vasquez, 669 Phil. 619, 628 (2011); citation
omitted.
184. Bugaoisan v. OWI Group Manila, Inc., 825 Phil. 764, 774 (2018).
185. See Cruz v. People, 812 Phil. 166, 172 (2017).
186. See Gabriel v. Petron Corporation, 829 Phil. 454, 460 (2018).
187. See Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, 479
Phil. 768, 779 (2004); citations omitted.
188. See De los Reyes v. People, 516 Phil. 89, 92 (2006); citation omitted.
189. Heirs of Spouses Reterta v. Spouses Mores and Lopez, 671 Phil. 346,
360 (2011).
190. Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, 671 Phil. 320, 338 (2011).
191. Hanjin Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd./Nam Hyum Kim v. Court
of Appeals, 521 Phil. 224, 244-245 (2006); see Acain v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 239 Phil. 96, 104 (1987).
192. Bordomeo v. Court of Appeals, 704 Phil. 278, 296 (2013).
193. Abrenica v. Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol and Tibayan, 534 Phil. 34,
46 (2006).
194. Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 452 Phil. 665, 674 (2003); citation
omitted.
195. Rollo, p. 114.
196. National Power Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
339 Phil. 89, 101 (1997); citation omitted.
197. Gonzales v. Chavez, 282 Phil. 858, 875-876 (1992); citation omitted.
198. Republic  of the Philippines v. Viaje, 779 Phil. 405, 415 (2016);
citations omitted.
199. Rollo, p. 74.
200. A Motion to Recall an Entry of Judgment is practically a useless
remedy at this point as it does not have the effect of
suspending the reglementary period to file an appeal.
Moreover, judgments or orders become final and executory by
operation of law — not by judicial declaration (Philippine Savings
Bank v. Papa, 823 Phil. 725, 736 [2018]). The finality of a
judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary
period of appeal if no appeal is perfected, or no motion for
reconsideration or new trial is filed (Barrio Fiesta Restaurant v.
Beronia, 789 Phil. 520, 539 [2016]; citation omitted). Verily, the
trial court need not even pronounce the finality of the order or
judgment as the same becomes final by operation of law
(Franco-Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 587 Phil. 307, 317 [2018]). In
other words, an entry of judgment does not make the judgment
so entered as final and executory when it is not so in truth
because it merely records the fact that a judgment, order or
resolution has become final and executory — it
is not the  operative act  that makes the judgment, order or
resolution final and executory (Realty Sales Enterprises, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 254 Phil. 719, 723 [1989]).
201. Public policy is firmly set against unnecessary multiplicity of suits
(See Riviera Golf Club, Inc. v. CCA Holdings, B.V., 760 Phil. 655, 671
[2015]; citations omitted).
202. Cf.  Magestrado v. People, 554 Phil. 25, 40 (2007).
203. Bro. Oca v. Custodio, 814 Phil. 641, 675 (2017); citations omitted.
204. Sara Lee Philippines, Inc. v. Macatlang, 750 Phil. 646, 654 (2015).
205. FGU Insurance Corporation v. Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br.
66, 659 Phil. 117, 123 (2011).
206. Mercury Drug Corporation v. Spouses Huang, 817 Phil. 434, 445
(2017); citations omitted.
207. Villa v. Government Service Insurance System, 619 Phil. 740, 750
(2009); citation omitted.
208. Now embodied in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court which was
promulgated pursuant to Section 9 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980).
209. Macabingkil  v. People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, 164 Phil.
328, 345 (1976); cited in Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil.
250, 264 (1997).
210. See Diona v. Balangue, 701 Phil. 19, 31 (2013).
211. See BPI Employees Union-Metro Manila v. Bank of the Philippine
Islands, 673 Phil. 599, 614 (2011); see Section 1 (f), Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court; see also De  Ocampo v. RPN-9/Radio
Philippines Network, Inc., 775 Phil. 169, 177 (2011).
212. Additionally, the parties cannot also speculate that the derivative
effect of annulling an order denying a petition for relief from
judgment will also have the effect of granting such petition for
relief because the original dismissal was summary and did not
give the parties the opportunity to fully-ventilate their causes or
positions.
213. See CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5, par. 5.
214. Reyes v. Lim, 456 Phil. 1, 10 (2003).
215. Regulus Development, Inc. v. Dela Cruz, 779 Phil. 75, 86 (2016).
216. Viva Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Keppel Philippines Marine, Inc., 781 Phil.
95, 122 (2016).
217. Cf.  Orquiola v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 323, 332 (2002).
218. See Baclaran Marketing Corporation v. Nieva, 809 Phil. 92, 103
(2017); City of Dagupan v. Maramba, 738 Phil. 71, 91
(2014); Redeña v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 358, 368
(2007); Agan v. Heirs of Spouses Nueva, 463 Phil. 834, 841 (2003),
see also Section 2, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
219. People v. Mariano, 163 Phil. 625, 629 (1976).
220. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Hong, 682 Phil. 66, 72 (2012).
221. Bilag v. Ay-ay, 809 Phil. 236, 243 (2017).
222. Padre v. Badillo, 655 Phil. 52, 54 (2011).
223. Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 711 Phil. 451, 464
(2013).
224. De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation, 748 Phil. 706, 723
(2014).
225. United States v. Jayme, 24 Phil. 90, 92 (1913).
226. People's General Insurance Corporation v. Guansing, G.R. No.
204759, November 14, 2018.
227. See Prudential Bank (now Bank of the Philippine Islands) v. Magdamit,
Jr., 746 Phil. 649, 666 (2014).
228. Cf.  Navaja v. De Castro, et al., 761 Phil. 142, 150-151 and 153 (2015).
229. Bernabe v. Vergara, 73 Phil. 676, 677 (1942).
230. De Jesus v. Garcia, 125 Phil. 955, 960 (1967).
231. Section 3 (c), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court.
232. See Heirs of Yaptingchay v. Hon. Del Rosario, 363 Phil. 393, 398
(1999).
233. Montañer v. Shari'a District Court, 4th Shari'a Judicial District, Marawi
City, 596 Phil. 815, 826 (2009).
234. See The Government of the Philippines v. Aballe, 520 Phil. 181, 191-
192 (2006).
235. Judicial reconstitution of title under R.A. No. 26 is akin to other
special proceedings which generally require not only the
publication of notices but must also be served to interested
parties (see Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 74; Section 3 of Rule 76;
Sections 2, 3 and 4 of Rule 86; Sections 7 and 8 of Rule 89;
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 91; Section 6 of Rule 93; Sections 4 and
5, Rule 99; Sections 3 and 5, Rule 103; Sections 2 and
4, Rule 104; Sections 3 and 4, Rule 105; Sections 3 and
4, Rule 106; Sections 4 and 6, Rule 107; Sections 4 and
5, Rule 108) as well as the presentation in evidence (preliminary
marking and formal offer) of such proof of publication and
service to notices of hearing to interest parties as part of
mandatory jurisdictional requirements; see also Sections 9, 11
and 13 of R.A. 26. To prove compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements before the court should receive
evidence in support of the petition, the petitioner is
required to mark as exhibits the proof of publication and
service of notice to the interested parties as well as proof
of the actual publication of the notice of hearing.
236. See Republic  v. Hon. Mangotara, 638 Phil. 353, 469 (2010); see also
Section 22 of R.A. No. 26.
237. See Tahanan Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 203 Phil.
652, 681 (1982).
238. Alipoon v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 591, 598 (1999).
239. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. v. Cabrigas, 411 Phil. 369,
387-388 (2001).
240. Republic  v. De Asis, Jr., 715 Phil. 245, 255 (2013).
241. Republic v. Camacho, 711 Phil. 80, 93 (2013).
242. Republic v. Santua, 586 Phil. 291, 300 (2008).
243. Cf.  Castillo v. Republic, 667 Phil. 729, 746 (2011).
244. See Angat v. Republic, 609 Phil. 146, 167 (2009).
245. See Republic v. Mancao, 764 Phil. 523, 524-525 (2015).
246. Republic v. Susi, 803 Phil. 348, 358 (2017).
247. Opriasa v. The City Government of Quezon City, 540 Phil. 256, 266
(2006).
248. Republic v. Court of Appeals, 368 Phil. 412, 424 (1999).
249. See Allama v. Republic, 283 Phil. 538, 543 (1992).
250. Republic v. Estipular, 391 Phil. 211, 221 (2000).
251. Dela Paz v. Republic, 820 Phil. 907, 920 (2017).
252. Rollo, p. 104.
253. 720 Phil. 60 (2013).
254. Id. at 75-76, 91-97 and 104.
255. See Gaffney v. Butler, 820 Phil. 789, 801-802 (2017); citation
omitted.
256. Mallion v. Alcantara, 536 Phil. 1049, 1054 (2006); citation omitted.
257. Spouses Topacio v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, 649
Phil. 331, 342 (2010); citation omitted.
258. Ligtas v. People, 766 Phil. 750, 772 (2015).
259. See Ocampo v. Domalanta, 127 Phil. 566, 571 (1967); citation
omitted.
260. See Spouses  Antonio v. Vda. De Monje, 646 Phil. 90, 98-100 (2010).
261. Government Service Insurance System v. Group Management
Corporation, 666 Phil. 277, 312 (2011).
262. The following are some of the examples of actions in rem:
petitions directed against the "thing" itself or the res which
concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption,
correction of entries in the birth certificate; or annulment of
marriage; nullity of marriage; petition to establish illegitimate
filiation; registration of land under the Torrens system; and
forfeiture proceedings (Frias v. Alcayde, 826 Phil. 713, 730
(2018)).
263. Cf.  De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation, 748 Phil. 706,
725 (2014).
264. The  Barco v. Court of Appeals, 465 Phil. 39, 57 (2004); see also Civil
Service Commission v. Magoyag, 775 Phil. 182, 190 (2015).
265. The  Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 239, 248 (1997).
266. See Republic v. Castro, 594 Phil. 124, 132 (2008).
267. Republic v. Court of Appeals, 317 Phil. 653, 660 (1995); citation
omitted.
268. Biaco v. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, 544 Phil. 45, 55 (2007);
citation omitted.
269. See R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943 (1999).
270. See Alba v. Dela  Cruz, 17 Phil. 49, 62 (1910).
271. See Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Lim, 208 Phil. 394, 406 (1983).
272. See Agoy v. Araneta Center, Inc., 685 Phil. 246, 251 (2012).
273. Section 6 (c), Rule 13 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court (A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC [May 4, 2010]).
274. Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, 514 Phil. 166, 294. Adez Realty, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, 289 Phil. 766, 773
167 (2005). (1992).

275. Cabrera v. Ng, 729 Phil. 544, 550 (2014). 295. 275 Phil. 243 (1991).

276. See Philippine National Bank v. Judge Paneda, 544 Phil. 565, 579 296. Id. at 252-254.
(2007).
297. Rollo, p. 32.
277. 468 Phil. 347, 363 (2004).
298. In Re: G.R. No. 157659 "Eligio P. Mallari v. Government Service
278. Rollo, p. 121. Insurance System, et al.," 823 Phil. 164, 176 (2018).

279. Ongco v. Dalisay, 691 Phil. 462, 468 (2012); citation omitted. 299. Punzalan v. Judge Plata, 423 Phil. 819, 833 (2001).

280. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Heirs of Estanislao 300. Paz v. Atty. Sanchez, 533 Phil. 503, 510 (2006).
Miñoza, 656 Phil. 537, 549 (2011).
301. Cf.  Duduaco v. Judge Laquindanum, 504 Phil. 9, 16 (2005).
281. Executive Secretary v. Northeast Freight Forwarders, Inc., 600 Phil.
302. See Heirs of Arturo Garcia I v. Municipality of Iba, Zambales, 764 Phil.
789, 799-800 (2009).
408, 416 (2015).
282. Virra Mall Tenants Association, Inc. v. Virra Mall Greenhills
303. Millare  v. Atty. Montero, 316 Phil. 29, 34 (1995).
Association, Inc., 674 Phil. 517, 525-526 (2011).
304. See Rollo, pp. 40-43.
283. Quinto v. Commission on Elections, 627 Phil. 193, 219 (2010);
citations omitted. 305. Muñoz v. Atty. Yabut, Jr., 665 Phil. 488, 514 (2011).
284. Billote v. Solis, 760 Phil. 712, 726 (2015). 306. Rollo, pp. 41-42.
285. See Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 556, 561 (1998). 307. As cited in Peralta v. Judge Omelio, 720 Phil. 60, 88 (2013).
286. Sipin-Nabor v. Atty. Baterina, 412 Phil. 419, 424 (2001). 308. Spouses Williams v. Atty. Enriquez, 518 Phil. 372, 376 (2006); citation
omitted.
287. See Garrido v. Attys. Garrido and Valencia, 625 Phil. 347, 362 (2010).
309. People v. Judge Gacott, Jr., 312 Phil. 603, 612 (1995).
288. Santiago v. Atty. Fojas, 318 Phil. 79, 87 (1995).
310. Cerilla v. Atty. Lezama, 819 Phil. 157, 168 (2017).
289. Burbe v. Atty. Magulta, 432 Phil. 840, 851 (2002).
311. Hernandez v. Atty. Padilla, 688 Phil. 329, 336 (2012).
290. Ong v. Atty. Grijaldo, 450 Phil. 1, 5 (2003); citation omitted.
312. See Department of Justice v. Judge Mislang, 791 Phil. 219, 227 (2016).
291. Berenguer v. Carranza, 136 Phil. 75, 76 (1969).
313. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Necessario, 707 Phil. 328,
292 Commission on Elections v. Judge Noynay, 354 Phil. 262, 273 (1998).
333 (2013); citation omitted.
293. Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 461 Phil. 517, 533
314. Judge Caguioa (Ret.) v. Aucena, 688 Phil. 1, 8 (2012).
(2003); citation omitted.
315. See Radiowealth, Inc. v. Agregado, 86 Phil. 429, 439 (1950).
316. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Reyes, 566 Phil. 325, 334   (Denila v. Republic, G.R. No. 206077, [July 15, 2020])
|||

(2008); citation omitted.

317. Cabanatan v. Molina, 421 Phil. 664, 673-674 (2001).

318. A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC (Effective June 1, 2004).

319. Escaño v. Manaois, 799 Phil. 622, 635 (2016).

320. Rollo, p. 114.

321. Id. at 113.

322. Id. at 60.

323. Id. at 115.

324. 339 Phil. 89, 101 (1997).

325. Republic v. Planes, 430 Phil. 848, 863-864 (2002); citations omitted.

326. Re: Report on the Financial Audit Conducted on the Books of Accounts

of Atty. Raquel G. Kho, Clerk of Court IV, Regional Trial Court, Oras,
Eastern Samar, 549 Phil. 539, 542 (2007).

327. Jimenez v. Atty. Francisco, 749 Phil. 551, 565 (2014); citation omitted.

328. Sebastian v. Atty. Bajar, 559 Phil. 211, 224 (2007).

329. Bantolo v. Atty. Castillon, Sr., 514 Phil. 628, 633 (2005); citation
omitted.

330. Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Distribution Management Association

of the Philippines, 672 Phil. 1, 10 (2011).

331. Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez, 520 Phil. 117, 127 (2006).

332. Olazo v. Justice Tinga (Ret.), 651 Phil. 290, 299 (2010).

333. Igoy v. Atty. Soriano, 419 Phil. 346, 359 (2001); citation omitted.

334. Gonzales-Austria v. Judge Abaya, 257 Phil. 645, 659 (1989); citation

omitted.

335. Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig, 448 Phil. 198, 207 (2003); citation
omitted.
 
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 156759. June 5, 2013.]
ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR.,
ISAIAS ALBANO, LILY REYES, JANET BAY, JESUS R.
GALANG, AND RANDY HAGOS,  petitioners, vs.
FRANCISCO R. CO, JR.,  respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN,  J  :
p
To warrant the substituted service of the summons and
copy of the complaint, the serving officer must first attempt to
effect the same upon the defendant in person. Only after the
attempt at personal service has become futile or impossible within
a reasonable time may the officer resort to substituted service.
The Case
Petitioners-defendants in a suit for libel brought by
respondent — appeal the decision promulgated on March 8,
2002 1 and the resolution promulgated on January 13,
2003, 2 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) respectively dismissed
their petition for certiorari, prohibition and  mandamus  and denied
their motion for reconsideration. Thereby, the CA upheld the order
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 51, in Manila had issued on
March 12, 2001 denying their motion to dismiss because the
substituted service of the summons and copies of the complaint
on each of them had been valid and effective. 3
Antecedents
On July 3, 2000, respondent, a retired police officer
assigned at the Western Police District in Manila, sued
AbanteTonite, a daily tabloid of general circulation; its Publisher
Allen A. Macasaet; its Managing Director Nicolas V. Quijano; its
Circulation Manager Isaias Albano; its Editors Janet Bay, Jesus R.
Galang and Randy Hagos; and its Columnist/Reporter Lily Reyes
(petitioners), claiming damages because of an allegedly libelous
article petitioners published in the June 6, 2000 issue of
AbanteTonite. The suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-97907, was
raffled to Branch 51 of the RTC, which in due course issued
summons to be served on each defendant, including
AbanteTonite, at their business address at Monica Publishing
Corporation, 301-305 3rd Floor, BF Condominium Building, Solana
Street corner A. Soriano Street, Intramuros, Manila. 4  TSaEcH
In the morning of September 18, 2000, RTC Sheriff Raul
Medina proceeded to the stated address to effect the personal
service of the summons on the defendants. But his efforts to
personally serve each defendant in the address were futile
because the defendants were then out of the office and
unavailable. He returned in the afternoon of that day to make a
second attempt at serving the summons, but he was informed that
petitioners were still out of the office. He decided to resort to
substituted service of the summons, and explained why in his
sheriff's return dated September 22, 2000, 5 to wit:
SHERIFF'S RETURN
This is to certify that on September 18, 2000, I
caused the service of summons together with copies of
complaint and its annexes attached thereto, upon the
following:
1. Defendant Allen A. Macasaet,
President/Publisher of defendant AbanteTonite, at
Monica Publishing Corporation, Rooms 301-305 3rd
Floor, BF Condominium Building, Solana corner A.
 Soriano Streets, Intramuros, Manila, thru his secretary
Lu-Ann Quijano, a person of sufficient age and
discretion working therein, who signed to acknowledge
receipt thereof. That effort (sic)  to serve the said
summons personally upon said defendant were made,
but the same were ineffectual and unavailing on the
ground that per information of Ms. Quijano said
defendant is always out and not available, thus,
substituted service was applied;
2. Defendant Nicolas V. Quijano, at the same
address, thru his wife Lu-Ann Quijano, who signed to
acknowledge receipt thereof. That effort (sic) to serve
the said summons personally upon said defendant
were made, but the same were ineffectual and
unavailing on the ground that per information
of (sic)  his wife said defendant is always out and not
available, thus, substituted service was applied;
3. Defendants Isaias Albano, Janet Bay, Jesus R.
Galang, Randy Hagos and Lily Reyes, at the same
address, thru Rene Esleta, Editorial Assistant of
defendant AbanteTonite, a person of sufficient age and
discretion working therein who signed to acknowledge
receipt thereof. That effort (sic)  to serve the said
summons personally upon said defendants were made,
but the same were ineffectual and unavailing on the
ground that per information of (sic)  Mr. Esleta said
defendants is (sic)  always roving outside and gathering
news, thus, substituted service was applied.
Original copy of summons is therefore,
respectfully returned duly served.
Manila, September 22, 2000.  IaEHSD
On October 3, 2000, petitioners moved for the dismissal of
the complaint through counsel's special appearance in their
behalf, alleging lack of jurisdiction over their persons because of
the invalid and ineffectual substituted service of summons. They
contended that the sheriff had made no prior attempt to serve the
summons personally on each of them in accordance with Section 6
and Section 7, Rule 14 of the  Rules of Court. They further moved to
drop AbanteTonite as a defendant by virtue of its being neither a
natural nor a juridical person that could be impleaded as a party in
a civil action.
At the hearing of petitioners' motion to dismiss, Medina
testified that he had gone to the office address of petitioners in
the morning of September 18, 2000 to personally serve the
summons on each defendant; that petitioners were out of the
office at the time; that he had returned in the afternoon of the
same day to again attempt to serve on each defendant personally
but his attempt had still proved futile because all of petitioners
were still out of the office; that some competent persons working
in petitioners' office had informed him that Macasaet and Quijano
were always out and unavailable, and that Albano, Bay, Galang,
Hagos and Reyes were always out roving to gather news; and that
he had then resorted to substituted service upon realizing the
impossibility of his finding petitioners in person within a
reasonable time.
On March 12, 2001, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss,
and directed petitioners to file their answers to the complaint
within the remaining period allowed by the  Rules of
Court, 6 relevantly stating:
Records show that the summonses were served
upon Allen A. Macasaet, President/Publisher of
defendant AbanteTonite, through Lu-Ann Quijano; upon
defendants Isaias Albano, Janet Bay, Jesus R. Galang,
Randy Hagos and Lily Reyes, through Rene Esleta,
Editorial Assistant of defendant AbanteTonite (p. 12,
records). It is apparent in the Sheriff's Return that on
several occasions, efforts to served (sic) the summons
personally upon all the defendants were ineffectual as
they were always out and unavailable, so the Sheriff
served the summons by substituted service.
 Considering that summonses cannot be served
within a reasonable time to the persons of all the
defendants, hence substituted service of summonses
was validly applied. Secretary of the President who is
duly authorized to receive such document, the wife of
the defendant and the Editorial Assistant of the
defendant, were considered competent persons with
sufficient discretion to realize the importance of the
legal papers served upon them and to relay the same to
the defendants named therein (Sec. 7, Rule 14, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, defendants are directed to file their
Answers to the complaint within the period still open to
them, pursuant to the rules.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting
that the sheriff had immediately resorted to substituted service of
the summons upon being informed that they were not around to
personally receive the summons, and that AbanteTonite, being
neither a natural nor a juridical person, could not be made a party
in the action.
On June 29, 2001, the RTC denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. 7 It stated in respect of the service of summons,
as follows:
The allegations of the defendants that the
Sheriff immediately resorted to substituted service of
summons upon them when he was informed that they
were not around to personally receive the same is
untenable. During the hearing of the herein motion,
Sheriff Raul Medina of this Branch of the Court testified
that on September 18, 2000 in the morning, he went to
the office address of the defendants to personally serve
summons upon them but they were out. So he went
back to serve said summons upon the defendants in
the afternoon of the same day, but then again he was
informed that the defendants were out and unavailable,
and that they were always out because they were
roving around to gather news. Because of that
information and because of the nature of the work of
the defendants that they are always on field, so the
sheriff resorted to substituted service of summons.
There was substantial compliance with the rules,
considering the difficulty to serve the summons
personally to them because of the nature of their job
which compels them to be always out and unavailable.
Additional matters regarding the service of summons
upon defendants were sufficiently discussed in the
Order of this Court dated March 12, 2001.
Regarding the impleading of AbanteTonite as defendant, the
RTC held,  viz.:
"AbanteTonite" is a daily tabloid of general
circulation. People all over the country could buy a copy
of "AbanteTonite" and read it, hence, it is for public
consumption. The persons who organized said
publication obviously derived profit from it. The
information written on the said newspaper will affect
the person, natural as well as juridical, who was stated
or implicated in the news. All of these facts imply that
"AbanteTonite" falls within the provision of Art. 44 (2 or
3), New Civil Code. Assuming arguendo that
"AbanteTonite" is not registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, it is deemed a corporation by
estoppels considering that it possesses attributes of a
juridical person, otherwise it cannot be held liable for
damages and injuries it may inflict to other persons. ICHAaT
Undaunted, petitioners brought a petition for certiorari,
prohibition,  mandamus  in the CA to nullify the orders of the RTC
dated March 12, 2001 and June 29, 2001.
Ruling of the CA
 On March 8, 2002, the CA promulgated its questioned by a third person who relies in good faith on such
decision, 8 dismissing the petition for certiorari, representation. IaECcH

prohibition,  mandamus, to wit: There being no grave abuse of discretion

We find petitioners' argument without merit. committed by the respondent Judge in the exercise of
The rule is that certiorari  will prosper only if there is a his jurisdiction, the relief of prohibition is also
showing of grave abuse of discretion or an act without unavailable.
or in excess of jurisdiction committed by the WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
respondent Judge. A judicious reading of the The assailed Orders of respondent Judge
questioned orders of respondent Judge would show are AFFIRMED.
that the same were not issued in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment. There are factual bases SO ORDERED. 9
and legal justification for the assailed orders. From the
On January 13, 2003, the CA denied petitioners' motion for
Return, the sheriff certified that "effort to serve the
reconsideration. 10
summons personally . . . were made, but the same were
ineffectual and unavailing . . . . Issues
and upholding the trial court's finding that there was a Petitioners hereby submit that:
substantial compliance with the rules that allowed the
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR
substituted service.
OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL
Furthermore, the CA ruled: COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER
Anent the issue raised by petitioners that HEREIN PETITIONERS.
"AbanteTonite is neither a natural or juridical person
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
who may be a party in a civil case," and therefore the
case against it must be dismissed and/or dropped, is REVERSIBLE ERROR BY SUSTAINING THE
untenable. INCLUSION OF ABANTE TONITE AS PARTY
IN THE INSTANT CASE. 11
The respondent Judge, in denying petitioners'
motion for reconsideration, held that: Ruling
xxx xxx xxx The petition for review lacks merit.

AbanteTonite's newspapers are circulated Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction  in personam  —
nationwide, showing ostensibly its being a corporate the power of the court to render a personal judgment or to subject
entity, thus the doctrine of corporation by estoppel may the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings
appropriately apply. rendered in the action — is an element of due process that is
An unincorporated association, which essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions  in
represents itself to be a corporation, will be estopped rem  or  quasi in rem. Jurisdiction over the defendantin an action  in
from denying its corporate capacity in a suit against it rem  or  quasi in rem  is not required, and the court acquires
jurisdiction over an action as long as it acquires jurisdiction over
the  res  that is the subject matter of the action. The purpose of
summons in such action is not the acquisition of jurisdiction over
the defendant but mainly to satisfy the constitutional requirement
of due process. 12
The distinctions that need to be perceived between an
action  in personam, on the one hand, and an action  in
rem  or  quasi in rem, on the other hand, are aptly delineated
in  Domagas v. Jensen, 13 thusly: 
HATICc
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an
action determine its character. Whether a proceeding
is  in rem, or  in personam, or  quasi in rem  for that
matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by
these only. A proceeding in  personam  is a proceeding to
enforce personal rights and obligations brought against
the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the
person, although it may involve his right to, or the
exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to
compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance
with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a
proceeding in personam  is to impose, through the
judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability
directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this
character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically
perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary
liability on him. An action  in personam  is said to be one
which has for its object a judgment against the person,
as distinguished from a judgment against the prop[er]ty
to determine its state. It has been held that an action  in
personam  is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or
obligations; such action is brought against the person.
As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is
well-settled that it is an injunctive act  in personam.
In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that
proceedings to enforce personal rights and obligations
and in which personal judgments are rendered
adjusting the rights and obligations between the
affected parties is in  personam. Actions for recovery of
real property are in personam.  TaDSCA
On the other hand, a proceeding  quasi in rem  is
one brought against persons seeking to subject the
property of such persons to the discharge of the claims
assailed. In an action  quasi in rem, an individual is
named as defendant and the purpose of the
proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the
obligation or loan burdening the property.
Actions  quasi in rem  deal with the status, ownership or
liability of a particular property but which are intended
to operate on these questions only as between the
particular parties to the proceedings and not to
ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible
claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon
the parties who joined in the action.
As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case against a
defendant who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines
because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his
person unless he voluntarily appears in court; but when the case is
an action in rem  or  quasi in rem  enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14
of the  Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case because they have jurisdiction over the  res,
and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is
not essential. In the latter instance, extraterritorial service of
summons can be made upon the defendant, and such
extraterritorial service of summons is not for the purpose of
vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for the purpose of
complying with the requirements of fair play or due process, so
that the defendant will be informed of the pendency of the action
against him and the possibility that property in the Philippines
belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be subjected
to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and he can thereby take
steps to protect his interest if he is so minded. On the other hand,
when the defendant in an action  in personam  does not reside and
is not found in the Philippines, our courts cannot try the case
against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction evidence the defendant may have in support of his defense. With
over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court. 14 
aSTHDc the proper service of the summons being intended to afford to
him the opportunity to be heard on the claim against him, he may
As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action
also waive the process. 22 In other words, compliance with
voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by the
the rules regarding the service of the summons is as much an
act of filing the initiatory pleading. As to the defendant, the court
issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction. 23
acquires jurisdiction over his person either by the proper service
of the summons, or by a voluntary appearance in the action. 15 Under the  Rules of Court, the service of the summons
should firstly be effected on the defendant himself whenever
Upon the filing of the complaint and the payment of the
practicable. Such personal service consists either in handing a copy
requisite legal fees, the clerk of court forthwith issues the
of the summons to the defendant in person, or, if the defendant
corresponding summons to the defendant. 16 The summons is
refuses to receive and sign for it, in tendering it to him. 24 The rule
directed to the defendant and signed by the clerk of court under
on personal service is to be rigidly enforced in order to ensure the
seal. It contains the name of the court and the names of the
realization of the two fundamental objectives earlier mentioned. If,
parties to the action; a direction that the defendant answers within
for justifiable reasons, the defendant cannot be served in person
the time fixed by the  Rules of Court; and a notice that unless the
within a reasonable time, the service of the summons may then be
defendant so answers, the plaintiff will take judgment by default
effected either (a) by leaving a copy of the summons at his
and may be granted the relief applied for. 17 To be attached to the
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
original copy of the summons and all copies thereof is a copy of
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copy at his office or regular
the complaint (and its attachments, if any) and the order, if any,
place of business with some competent person in charge
for the appointment of a guardian ad litem. 18
thereof. 25 The latter mode of service is known as substituted
The significance of the proper service of the summons on service because the service of the summons on the defendant is
the defendant in an action  in personam  cannot be made through his substitute.  DHESca

overemphasized. The service of the summons fulfills two

It is no longer debatable that the statutory requirements of
fundamental objectives, namely: (a) to vest in the court jurisdiction
substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully,
over the person of the defendant; and (b) to afford to the
and any substituted service other than that authorized by statute
defendant the opportunity to be heard on the claim brought
is considered ineffective. 26 This is because substituted service,
against him. 19 As to the former, when jurisdiction  in personam  is
being in derogation of the usual method of service, is
not acquired in a civil action through the proper service of the
extraordinary in character and may be used only as prescribed
summons or upon a valid waiver of such proper service, the
and in the circumstances authorized by statute. 27 Only when the
ensuing trial and judgment are void. 20 If the defendant knowingly
defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time
does an act inconsistent with the right to object to the lack of
may substituted service be resorted to. Hence, the impossibility of
personal jurisdiction as to him, like voluntarily appearing in the
prompt personal service should be shown by stating the efforts
action, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction
made to find the defendant himself and the fact that such efforts
of the court. 21 As to the latter, the essence of due process lies in
failed, which statement should be found in the proof of service or
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any
sheriff's return. 28 Nonetheless, the requisite showing of the
impossibility of prompt personal service as basis for resorting to Nor can we sustain petitioners' contention that Abante
substituted service may be waived by the defendant either Tonite could not be sued as a defendant due to its not being either
expressly or impliedly. 29 a natural or a juridical person. In rejecting their contention, the CA
categorized Abante Tonite as a corporation by estoppel as the
There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to
result of its having represented itself to the reading public as a
serve the summons upon each of petitioners in person at their
corporation despite its not being incorporated. Thereby, the CA
office address, the first in the morning of September 18, 2000 and
concluded that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
the second in the afternoon of the same date. Each attempt failed
holding that the non-incorporation of Abante Tonite with the
because Macasaet and Quijano were "always out and not
Securities and Exchange Commission was of no consequence, for,
available" and the other petitioners were "always roving outside
otherwise, whoever of the public who would suffer any damage
and gathering news." After Medina learned from those present in
from the publication of articles in the pages of its tabloids would
the office address on his second attempt that there was no
be left without recourse. We cannot disagree with the CA,
likelihood of any of petitioners going to the office during the
considering that the editorial box of the daily tabloid disclosed that
business hours of that or any other day, he concluded that further
although Monica Publishing Corporation had published the tabloid
attempts to serve them in person within a reasonable time  would
on a daily basis, nothing in the box indicated that Monica
be  futile. The circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. He was
Publishing Corporation had owned Abante Tonite.
not expected or required as the serving officer to effect personal
service  by all means  and at all times, considering that he was WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated
expressly authorized to resort to substituted service should he be on March 8, 2002; and ORDERS petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
unable to effect the personal service within a reasonable time. In
SO ORDERED.
that regard, what was a reasonable time was dependent on the
circumstances obtaining. While we are strict in insisting on Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes,
personal service on the defendant, we do not cling to such JJ., concur.
strictness should the circumstances already justify substituted
 
service instead. It is the spirit of the procedural rules, not their
letter, that governs. 30 
SCDaET
Footnotes

In reality, petitioners' insistence on personal service by the 1.Rollo, pp. 53-59; penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria
(retired), with Associate Justice Teodoro P. Regino (retired) and
serving officer was demonstrably superfluous. They had actually
Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador concurring.
received the summonses served through their substitutes, as
borne out by their filing of several pleadings in the RTC, including 2.Id. at 61-62.
an answer with compulsory counterclaim ad cautelam  and a pre- 3.Id. at 134-136.
trial brief ad cautelam. They had also availed themselves of the
modes of discovery available under the  Rules of Court. Such acts 4.Id. at 108.
evinced their voluntary appearance in the action. 5.Id. at 109.

6.Id. at 134-136.
7.Id. at 149-150.
8.Supra  note 1, at 56.
9.Id. at 57-58.
10.Supra  note 2.
11.Rollo, p. 33.
12.Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127692, March 10, 2004, 425
SCRA 98, 104.
13.G.R. No. 158407, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 663, 673-674.
14.Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corporation, G.R. No.
172242, August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA 170, 187-188;  Romualdez-
Licaros v. Licaros, G.R. No. 150656, April 29, 2003, 401 SCRA 762,
769-770;  Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108538, January
22, 1996, 252 SCRA 92.
15.Pursuant to Section 20, Rule 14 of the  Rules of Court, the defendant's
voluntary appearance in the action is equivalent to the service
of summons; see also  Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 93262, November 29, 1991, 204 SCRA 343,
347;  Munar v. Court of Appeals, 238 SCRA 372, 379;  Minucher v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97765, September 24, 1992, 214 SCRA
242, 250.
16.Section 1, Rule 14,  Rules of Court.
17.Section 2, Rule 14,  Rules of Court.
18.Id.
19.Umandap vs. Sabio, Jr., G.R. No. 140244, August 29, 2000, 339 SCRA
243, 247.
20.Vda. de Macoy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95871, February 13, 1992,
206 SCRA 244, 251;  Venturanza v. Court of Appeals, No. L-7776,
December 11, 1987, 156 SCRA 305, 311-312;  Filmerco
Commercial Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-70661,
April 9, 1987, 149 SCRA 193, 198-199;  Consolidated Plywood
Industries, Inc. v. Breva, No. L-82811, October 18, 1988, 166 SCRA
589, 593-594;  Philippine National Construction Corp. v. Ferrer-
Calleja, No. L-80485, November 11, 1988, 167 SCRA 294, 301.
21.La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103200,
August 31, 1994, 236 SCRA 78, 86.
22.Keister v. Navarro, No. L-29067, May 31, 1977, 77 SCRA 209, 214-
215;  Vda. de Macoy v. Court of Appeals, supra  note 20.
23.Samartino v. Raon, G.R. No. 131482, July 3, 2002, 383 SCRA 664, 670.
24.Section 6, Rule 14,  Rules of Court.
25.Section 7, Rule 14,  Rules of Court.
26.Keister v. Navarro, supra  note 22, at 215.
27.Ang Ping v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126947, July 15, 1999, 310 SCRA
343, 350.
28.Keister v. Navarro, supra, note 22; see also  Wong v. Factor-Koyama,
G.R. No. 183802, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 256, 268;  Jose
v. Boyon, G.R. No. 147369, October 23, 2003, 414 SCRA 216,
222;  Casimina v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 147530, June 29, 2005, 462
SCRA 171, 177-178;  Oaminal v. Castillo, G.R. No. 152776,
October 8, 2003, 413 SCRA 189, 196-197;  Laus v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 101256, March 8, 1993, 219 SCRA 688, 699.
29.E.g., in  Orosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118696, September 3,
1996, 261 SCRA 376, 379, where the substituted service was
sustained notwithstanding that the requirement for the
showing of impossibility of personal service of summons was
not complied with by the sheriff before resorting to substituted
service, because the defendants subsequently filed a motion
for additional time to file answer, which was deemed a waiver
of objection to the personal jurisdiction of the trial court.
30.Robinson v. Miralles, G.R. No. 163584, December 12, 2006, 510 SCRA
678, 684.
  (Macasaet v. Co, Jr., G.R. No. 156759, [June 5, 2013], 710 PHIL 167-
|||
183)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143788. September 9, 2005.]
DANFOSS, INC.,  petitioner, vs. CONTINENTAL
CEMENT CORPORATION,  respondent.
Cesar C. Cruz & Partners  for petitioner.
Pangilinan Britanico Sarmiento & Franco Law Offices  for
respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; CAUSE OF ACTION;
DEFINED. — A cause of action is defined under Section 2, Rule 2 of
the same Rules as: Sec. 2. Cause of action, defined. — A cause of
action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another. It is the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by
the defendant in violation of the primary right of the plaintiff.
2. ID.; ID.; MOTION TO DISMISS; GROUNDS; LACK OF CAUSE
OF ACTION; THE INSUFFICIENCY MUST APPEAR ON THE FACE OF
THE COMPLAINT. — In order to sustain a dismissal on the ground
of lack of cause of action, the insufficiency must appear on the
face of the complaint. And the test of the sufficiency of the facts
alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of action is whether
or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid
judgment thereon in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.
For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit
the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPLAINT SUFFERED A FATAL
INFIRMITY SINCE IT WAS PREMATURELY FILED. — Respondent's
complaint suffered from another fatal infirmity. It was premature.
The obligation of petitioner to respondent was not yet due and
demandable at the time the latter filed the complaint. The alleged
violation of respondent's right being no more than mere
speculation, there was no need to call for judicial intervention. The
premature invocation of the court's intervention was fatal to
respondent's cause of action. Hence, the dismissal of respondent's
complaint was in order.
 
DECISION
CORONA,  J  : p
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure of the February 11, 2000
decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-55645, and its
resolution dated June 7, 2000 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. 
HIAcCD
The antecedents show that on November 5, 1998,
respondent Continental Cement Corporation (CCC) filed a
complaint for damages against petitioner DANFOSS and
Mechatronics Instruments and Controls, Inc. (MINCI) before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, alleging that:
xxx xxx xxx
6. On 1 September 1997, Plaintiff CCC purchased from
defendant MINCI two (2) unit 132 KW Danfoss
Brand Frequency Converter/Inverter for use in
the Finish Mill of its Cement Plant located in
 Barrio Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan. The said
purchase is covered by a Purchase [Order] (PO)
No. 36625 . . . .
6.1 Under the terms and conditions of the
purchase order, the delivery of the two
(2) unit Frequency Converter are to be
delivered within eight (8) to ten (10)
weeks from the opening of the letter of
credit;
7. Defendant MINCI, immediately relayed the purchase
order of plaintiff CCC to the other defendant
DANFOSS, represented by Messrs. Klaus Stove
and Hans Vigaard, who in turn forwarded the
same to their Asian Regional Office in Singapore
and Head Office in Denmark for the shipment of
the orders to the Philippines.
7.1 Defendant DANFOSS' commitment to deliver
the two (2) unit Danfoss Brand
Frequency Converter/Inverter to plaintiff
CCC was relayed by defendant MINCI to
CCC upon the assurance of Messrs.
Stove and Vigaard of DANFOSS.
8. On September 1997, plaintiff CCC received the pro-
forma invoice of defendant MINCI through fax
transmission dated 2 September 1998,
indicating the mode of payment through
irrevocable letter of credit in favor of Danfoss
Industries Pte. Ltd. . . .
8.1 Plaintiff CCC executed and opened a letter
of credit under LC No. 970884 in favor of
DANFOSS INDUSTRIES PTE. LTD., with
address at 6 Jalan Pesawat, Singapore
619364, which is the Asian Regional
Office of defendant DANFOSS . . .
9. Defendant MINCI informed plaintiff CCC through fax
transmission dated 17 September 1997, that the
two (2) unit Frequency Converter/Inverter are
ready for shipment, and at the same time
requested for the amendments of the letter of
credit changing the port of origin/loading from
Singapore to Denmark. . . .
9.1 In compliance, plaintiff CCC amended the
letter of credit changing the port of
origin from Singapore to Denmark. . . .
10. On 6 November 1997, defendant MINCI informed
plaintiff CCC that Danfoss Industries Pte. Ltd.
was still checking the status of the shipment of
the two (2) unit Frequency Converter/Inverter
with Danfoss Denmark.
10.1 In reply, plaintiff CCC through a letter dated
7 November 1997, reiterated its
demand that every delay in the
shipment of the two (2) unit Frequency
Converter/Inverter will cause substantial
losses in its operations and requested
for the early work out and the
immediate shipment of the frequency
converter to avoid further loss to the
company. . . .
11. However, on 9 November 1997, defendant
DANFOSS, informed the other defendant MINCI
through fax transmission, copy furnished
plaintiff CCC, that the reason why DANFOSS has
delivery problems was that some of the
supplied components for the new VLT 5000
series did not meet the agreed quality standard.
That means that their factory was canvassing
for another supplier. And at that moment, there
was no clear message when normal production
will resume. . . .
12. Due to this information received, plaintiff CCC
surmised that defendants MINCI and DANFOSS
 could not be able to deliver the two (2) unit
Frequency Converter within the maximum
period of ten (10) weeks period from the
opening of the Letter of Credit, as one of the
conditions in the Purchase Order dated 1
September 1997.
12.1 Thereafter, no definite commitment was
received by plaintiff CCC from
defendants MINCI and DANFOSS for the
delivery of the two (2) unit Frequency
Converter.
13. By reason of the delay of the defendants MINCI and
DANFOSS to deliver the two (2) unit Frequency
Converter/Inverter under PO No. 36625, plaintiff
CCC, through its Purchasing Manager, informed
defendant MINCI in a letter dated 13 November
1997, of the plaintiff's intention to cancel the
said order. . . .
13.1 As a consequence thereof, plaintiff CCC has
suffered an actual substantial
production losses in the amount of Eight
Million Sixty-four Thousand Pesos
(P8,064,000.00) due to the time lost and
delay in the delivery of the said two (2)
unit Frequency Converter/Inverter.
Likewise, plaintiff CCC was compelled to
look for another supplier.
xxx xxx xxx 2
On February 17, 1999, petitioner DANFOSS filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that it did not state a cause
of action:
xxx xxx xxx
The above allegations of the complaint clearly
establish the following key constitutive facts:
1. Defendant's period of delivery is from 8 to 10
weeks from the opening of the letter of
credit on September 9, 1997 or until
November 19, 1997.
2. Defendant Danfoss, although having
problems with its supplier during the
period prior to defendant's cancellation,
nevertheless, plaintiff never alleged that
Danfoss Denmark cannot perform its
obligation to deliver by the 10th week or
on November 20, 1997. Admittedly,
plaintiff only surmised that defendant
Danfoss could not deliver.
3. Before the period for delivery has expired on
November 19, 1997, the plaintiff
cancelled its order on November 13,
1997. The cancellation took place seven
(7) days before the expiry of the
defendant's obligation to deliver on
November 19, 1997.
4. Neither plaintiff nor defendant Danfoss
changed the date of delivery, what
plaintiff changed in the letter of credit
was only the port of origin/loading from
Singapore to Denmark. The period of
delivery as stipulated in the pro forma
invoice issued by defendant MINCI
remained intact, that is for a period of 6
to 10 weeks from the opening of the
letter of credit on September 9, 1997 or
until November 19, 1997 was still in
force when the plaintiff cancelled its
order on November 13, 1997. Defendant
Danfoss has not incurred in delay and
has 7 days more within which to make
delivery. Plaintiff, having cancelled the
order on November 13, 1997 before the
 expiry of defendant Danfoss' delivery
commitment, defendant Danfoss's
principal could not have been in default.
5. Plaintiff never made an extrajudicial demand
for the delivery of two (2) units
Frequency Converter on its due date. On
the contrary, as above alleged, plaintiff
cancelled its order on November 13,
1997.
6. Plaintiff's claim for damages could not have
accrued until after defendant incurred
in delay.
The above allegations neither prove any right of
the plaintiffs arising from the transactions nor a
violation of such right. It is submitted that this
Honorable Court based on the complaint, cannot
render a valid judgment against the defendant Danfoss.
The plaintiff's cause of action against Danfoss or
plaintiff's right to demand delivery cannot arise earlier
than November 19, 1997, which is the last day for the
defendant Danfoss's principal (Danfoss Denmark) to
deliver the two (2) units Frequency Converter. As
admitted by the plaintiff, it cancelled its order on
November 13, 1997, or six (6) days before the expiry of
the defendant's obligation to deliver. Indeed, defendant
Danfoss's obligation to deliver is not yet demandable.
The period of 8 to 10 weeks for the delivery of plaintiff's
purchase order of two (2) units Frequency Converter
was established for the benefit of both the plaintiff and
the defendant Danfoss. As such, plaintiff cannot
demand delivery before the period stipulated. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
From the allegations of the complaint, there is
also no clear and categorical demand for the fulfillment
of the plaintiff's obligation to deliver by the 10th week
or on November 19, 1997.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Court that the Complaint be dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action. 3
The court a quo denied the motion to dismiss in its
order 4 dated May 28, 1999, holding that:
xxx xxx xxx
In the Court's opinion, the issue of whether or
not the defendants incur delay in the delivery of the
equipment in question within the period stipulated is a
debatable question which necessitates actual trial on
the merits where the parties have to adduce evidence
in support of their respective stance.
While the defendants contend that the
stipulated period of delivery had not lapsed yet when
the plaintiff cancelled its order of the two equipments
in question as the cancellation took place seven (7) days
before the expiry date of the defendants' obligation to
deliver, the plaintiff's position is that the acts of the
defendants had made compliance with their obligation
to deliver within the period stipulated, impossible,
hence, there was no need for a demand as the law
provides that "when demand would be useless, as
when the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to
perform." The plaintiff's contention if properly and
strongly supported by evidence during the hearing of
the merits of the case may well negates (sic) the
defendant's contrary stand.
As to the argument of the defendant MINCI that
it cannot be held liable jointly with the defendant
Danfoss due to the fact that it was merely an "agent" of
Danfoss, the Court finds the same a debatable issue
considering the stand of plaintiff that the defendant
MINCI dealt with the former not as an agent but also as
a principal. The issue at hand necessitates the
presentation of evidence which has to be done during
the hearing on the merits of the case where the issue of
 damages incurred by either of the parties may well be
taken up and judgment be rendered after presentation
of evidence by the parties.
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the two
motions to dismiss, interposed separately by the
defendants as earlier stated, are both denied.
SO ORDERED. 5
Danfoss filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but
it was denied. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter also
denied Danfoss' petition for lack of merit. The CA likewise denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, hence, this appeal.
The only issue for our consideration is whether or not the
CA erred in affirming the denial by the court a quo of petitioner's
motion to dismiss the complaint for damages on the ground that it
failed to state a cause of action.
Section 1 (g), Rule 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure provides that:
Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but
before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on
any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states
no cause of action;
A cause of action is defined under Section 2, Rule 2 of the
same Rules as:
Sec. 2. Cause of action, defined. — A cause of
action is the act or omission by which a party violates a
right of another.
It is the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the
defendant in violation of the primary right of the plaintiff. 6
In order to sustain a dismissal on the ground of lack of
cause of action, the insufficiency must appear on the face of the
complaint. And the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint to constitute a cause of action is whether or not,
admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment
thereon in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. For this
purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the
truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 7
After a careful perusal of the allegations in respondent's
complaint for damages against petitioner, we rule that the same
failed to state a cause of action. When respondent sued petitioner
for damages, petitioner had not violated any right of respondent
from which a cause of action had arisen. Respondent
only surmised that petitioner would not be able to deliver the two
units frequency converter/inverter on the date agreed upon by
them. Based on this apprehension, it cancelled its order six days
prior to the agreed date of delivery. How could respondent hold
petitioner liable for damages (1) when petitioner had not yet
breached its obligation to deliver the goods and (2) after
respondent made it impossible for petitioner to deliver them by
cancelling its order even before the agreed delivery date?
The trial court erred in ruling that the issue of whether or
not the defendants incurred delay in the delivery of the equipment
within the period stipulated was a debatable question. It said that
trial on the merits was necessary and the parties had to adduce
evidence in support of their respective positions. 8 But what was
there to argue about when, based on the allegations of the
complaint, petitioner was not yet due to deliver the two units
frequency converter/inverter when respondent cancelled its
order? It still had six days within which to comply with its
obligation. The court a quo should not have denied petitioner's
motion to dismiss the complaint (for its failure to state a cause of
action) when, on its face, it was clear that petitioner had not yet provide it the parts needed to make timely delivery of the
reneged on its obligation to deliver the frequency frequency converter/inverter ordered by respondent.  IEcDCa

converter/inverter on the date mutually agreed upon by the

Furthermore, respondent's complaint suffered from
parties. Moreover, the obligation itself was negated by no less
another fatal infirmity. It was premature. The obligation of
than respondent's own act of cancelling its order even before the
petitioner to respondent was not yet due and demandable at the
prestation became due and demandable. Where therefore was the
time the latter filed the complaint. The alleged violation of
breach? Where was the damage caused by petitioner? There was
respondent's right being no more than mere speculation, there
none.
was no need to call for judicial intervention.
Consequently, it was wrong for the CA to affirm the order
The premature invocation of the court's intervention was
of the trial court denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the
fatal to respondent's cause of action. 11 Hence, the dismissal of
complaint for its failure to state a cause of action.
respondent's complaint was in order.
The principle of anticipatory breach enunciated in Blossom &
In sum, since respondent's  fear that petitioner might not be
Company, Inc. v. Manila Gas Corporation 9 does not apply here. In
able to deliver the frequency converter/inverter on time was not
that case, Blossom & Company, Inc. entered into a contract with
the cause of action referred to by the Rules and jurisprudence, the
Manila Gas Corporation for the sale and delivery of water gas and
motion to dismiss the respondent's complaint for damages for
coal gas tar at stipulated prices for a period of four years. On the
lack of cause of action should have been granted by the trial court.
second year of the contract, Manila Gas willfully and deliberately
In addition, the dismissal of the complaint was warranted on the
refused to deliver any coal and water gas tar to Blossom and
ground of prematurity.
Company, Inc. because it was asking for a higher price than what
had been previously stipulated by them. The price of its tar WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition. The assailed
products had gone up. We held that: decision of the CA dated February 11, 2000 and its resolution
dated June 7, 2000 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-
. . . even if the contract is divisible in its
performance and the future periodic deliveries are not
98-35997 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
yet due, if the obligor has already manifested his refusal Branch 80, is hereby DISMISSED.
to comply with his future periodic obligations, "the
SO ORDERED.
contract is entire and the breach total," hence, there
can only be one action for damages. 10 Panganiban, Acting C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez and Garcia,
JJ., concur.
Thus, the principle contemplates  future periodic
deliveries and a willful refusal to comply therewith. Here, the Carpio Morales, J., is on official business.
obligation was single and indivisible — to deliver two units of
 
frequency converter/inverter by November 19, 1997. The records
do not show that petitioner refused to deliver the goods on the Footnotes
date agreed upon. On the contrary, petitioner exerted efforts to
make good its obligation by looking for other suppliers who could
 1.Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., and concurred in by
Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and Associate Justice Martin
S. Villarama, Jr., Special Tenth Division, Rollo, pp. 46-50.

2.Rollo, pp. 55-61.

3.Rollo, pp. 82-89.

4.Penned by Judge Agustin S. Dizon, RTC, Branch 80, Quezon City.

5.Rollo, pp. 107-108.

6.Joseph v. Bautista, G.R. No. 41423, 23 February 1989, 170 SCRA 540,
cited in Regalado, F., Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, 7th
Revised Edition, 1999, p. 66.

7.Consolidated Dairy Products v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 100401, 24

August 1991, 212 SCRA 810.

8.RTC decision, supra at note 5.

9.55 Phil. 226 (1930).

10.Id.

11.Laguna CATV Network, Inc. v. Maraan, 440 Phil. 734 (2002).

  (Danfoss Inc. v. Continental Cement Corp., G.R. No. 143788,

|||

[September 9, 2005], 506 PHIL 487-496)

 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 252467. June 21, 2021.]
FRANK COLMENAR, in his capacity as an heir of
the late FRANCISCO
COLMENAR, * petitioner, vs. APOLLO A.
COLMENAR, JEANNIE COLMENAR MENDOZA,
VICTORIA JET COLMENAR, PHILIPPINE ESTATES
CORPORATION, AMAIA LAND CORPORATION,
CRISANTA REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, PROPERTY COMPANY OF
FRIENDS, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE
PROVINCE OF CAVITE, respondents.
DECISION
LAZARO-JAVIER,  J  :
p
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari 1 seeks to reverse
and set aside the Order 2 dated May 22, 2020 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Trece Martires City, Cavite in Civil
Case No. TMCV-062-18 dismissing the complaint of petitioner
Frank Colmenar for declaration of nullity of deeds of
extrajudicial settlement of estate, deeds of sale, cancellation of
titles, and damages against respondents Philippine Estates
Corporation (PEC), Amaia Land Corporation (Amaia), Crisanta
Realty Development Corporation (Crisanta Realty), and
Property Company of Friends (ProFriends), on the ground that
the complaint failed to state a cause of action as against them.
In dismissing the case, the trial court applied the 2019
Amendments to the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure even though it was allegedly not feasible and it
caused injustice to petitioner.
Antecedents
In his complaint 3 filed on September 11, 2018,
petitioner essentially averred:
(a) He is the second child of Filipino-born Francisco
Jesus Colmenar and American Dorothy Marie Crimmin. Their
family lived in Cleveland, Ohio, United States of America. 4
(b) Following his parents' divorce, his father Francisco
Jesus Colmenar returned to the Philippines. Despite the
distance between him and his father, he remained close to the
latter. In fact, when his own child was born, Francisco Jesus
Colmenar visited them in Las Vegas, Nevada, where he and his
family lived. Francisco Jesus Colmenar confided in him that he
(Francisco Jesus Colmenar) had met a woman named Loida. 5
(c) Years later, he learned that his father had died. The
latter left real properties located at General Trias, Cavite, all
registered in his father's name, viz.: (i) an interest in a property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 579 with an
area of 130,743 sq. m.; (ii) an interest in the property under
TCT No. 588 with an area of 806 sq. m.; (iii) half an interest in
the property under TCT No. 572 measuring 27,175 sq. m.; and
(iv) 1/6 interest in the property under TCT No. 25848 with an
area of 117,476 sq. m. 6
(d) He also learned that respondents Apollo Colmenar
(Apollo), Jeannie Colmenar Mendoza (Jeannie), and Victoria Jet
Colmenar (Victoria) executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate of Francisco Jesus Colmenar dated May 16, 2008 and
another Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased
Francisco Jesus Colmenar and Loida Colmenar dated July 8,
2011 where they made it appear that they were the surviving
heirs of Francisco Jesus Colmenar, and by virtue thereof,
allocated unto themselves the interests of his late father in the
aforesaid properties. 7
(e) Apollo, Jeannie, and Victoria thereafter sold to
ProFriends the property under TCT No. 25848 on January 3,
2012; to Crisanta Realty the property under TCT No. 572
through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 21, 2012;
and to PEC the property under TCT No. 579 through a Deed of
Sale dated May 22, 2013. Much later, PEC sold this property to
Amaia in whose name TCT No. 057-2013024578 was issued. 8
(f) These sales were made without his knowledge and
consent. The individual respondents effectively deprived him
of his successional rights under Philippine laws as a legitimate
son of his late father. Thus, he secured the services of counsel
and sent demand letters to individual respondents to invoke
his successional rights. Apollo's counsel, however, refused to
meet with him. His subsequent demand letters were also
ignored. 9
(g) The Deeds of Sale in PEC's favor are void because the
individual respondents, not being heirs of Francisco Jesus
Colmenar, had no rightful claim and interest over the property
under TCT No. 579. Consequently, PEC also did not confer any
right on Amaia when the former sold this property to the
latter. 10 For the same reason, the sale in favor of Crisanta
Realty and ProFriends are also void. 11
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. TMCV-062-18
and raffled to RTC-Trece Martires City, Cavite, Branch 23.
ProFriends, 12 PEC, 13 and Crisanta Realty 14 filed their
respective answers. ProFriends invoked as affirmative defense
lack of cause of action, while PEC and Crisanta Realty, averred
that the complaint failed to state a cause of action against
them. They also invoked the following common defenses: (1)
they are innocent purchasers for value; and (2) petitioner's
claim is barred by laches and/or prescription.
Apollo 15 and Amaia, on the other hand, filed their
respective motions to dismiss. Amaia, like PEC and Crisanta
Realty, averred that the complaint stated no cause of action
against it and that it was a buyer in good faith. 16
Crisanta Realty and PEC then filed a Motion for Leave of
Court to Set the Case for Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative
Defenses (Motion for Leave of Court). 17
On April 1, 2019, the trial court, through then Assisting
Judge Bonifacio S. Pascua, issued an Order 18 granting the
aforesaid motion and setting their affirmative defenses for
hearing on May 27, 2019. In the same order, the trial court
deferred the resolution of the motions to dismiss of Apollo and
Amaia.
Through Order 19 dated December 26, 2019, however,
Assisting Judge Jean Desuasido-Gill (Judge Gill) set aside the
April 1, 2019 Order and deemed PEC and Crisanta Realty's
Motion for Leave of Court, as well as Apollo and Amaia's
respective motions to dismiss, submitted for resolution.
On February 12, 2020, Judge Gill issued an Omnibus
Order 20 denying these motions, viz.:
MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Anent the Motion to Dismiss filed by
Defendants Apollo Colmenar (Apollo) and Amaia Land
Corporation (Amaia), the Court hereby DENIES said
Motions. The issues raised by the Defendants are
complex and the matters raised are evidentiary,
which can be best threshed out during trial.
Defendants Apollo and Amaia are directed to file their
Answer within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
MOTIONS TO HEAR AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
 The Court exercises its discretion under
Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court to DENY the
Motion to Hear Affirmative Defenses. The issues
raised in this case by each party are complex. The
xxx xxx xxx
affirmative defenses raised by defendants Crisanta
Realty Development Corporation (Crisanta) and
Philippine Estates Corporation (PEC) are matters
better threshed out in trial. 21
xxx xxx xxx
PEC, 22 Crisanta Realty, 23 and Amaia 24 filed their
respective motions for reconsideration. At the same time,
Amaia filed its Answer 25 pleading anew its affirmative defenses
that the complaint failed to state a cause of action against it, it
was an innocent purchaser for value, and petitioner's claim
had prescribed.
Meantime, the 2019 amendment to the Rules of
Court took effect on May 1, 2020.
Thereafter, the trial court, still through Judge Gill, issued
the assailed Order dated May 22, 2020, 26 dismissing the
complaint as against PEC, Crisanta Realty, Amaia, and
ProFriends on ground that the complaint failed to state a cause
of action against them. 27 Judge Gill stated that she applied
Section 12, Rule 8 of the 2019 Amendments to the Revised
Rules on Civil Procedure, thus:
For comment and resolution of the Court are
the Affirmative Defenses filed by: Philippine Estates
Corporation (PEC), Amaia Land Corporation (Amaia),
Crisanta Realty Development Corporation (Crisanta),
and Property Company of Friends, Inc. (ProFriends).
They are being resolved in consonance with
Rule 8, Section 12, particularly pars. (a) and (c) of the
2020 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which took effect on May 1, 2020. As per
this new provision, the Court shall motu
proprio resolve the affirmative defense if
claim [sic] allegedly states no cause of action, among
others. The Court marries the case status with the
new provision. 28
The Court rules to DISMISS the Complaint vs.
PEC and AMAIA.
Nowhere in the Complaint did Plaintiff allege
that Defendant PEC is a purchaser in bad faith or that
it has notice of the defect in the title of Defendants
Siblings Colmenar.
In a complaint for recovery of ownership of
real property, the Supreme Court held that:
Where the complaint for recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel
of land alleges that some of the
defendants bought said land from
their co-defendants who had a
defective title thereto but does not
allege that the purchasers were
purchasers in bad faith or with notice of
the defect in the title of their vendors,
there is a failure to state a cause of
action.
A complaint states a cause of action if it avers
the existence of the three essential elements of a
cause of action, namely:
i) the legal right of the plaintiff;
ii) the correlative obligation of the defendant;
iii) the act or omission of the defendant in
violation of said legal right.
If the allegations in the complaint do not aver
the concurrence of these elements, the complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action.
 Amaia has similar arguments for dismissal as
PEC. Defendant AMAIA purchased the subject
property from PEC. The Complaint's omission to
allege that PEC and Amaia are not purchasers in good
faith or that they had notice of defect in the title of
their predecessors in interest makes the Complaint
fail to state a cause of action.
An innocent purchaser for value is protected
by the Torrens system of registration under Section
53 of PD 1529. Under this section, while a legal
remedy is available for fraud perpetrators in
obtaining Title to property, the remedy is not
available against an innocent purchaser for value.
Both PEC and Amaia, the latter a company in
the business of realty or land sales, enumerated the
due diligence they observed in procuring or
purchasing the subject property which are, among
others: keen inspection of titles; physical inspection of
land; inspection of neighboring or adjacent lands;
inquiries in the Register of Deeds; circumspect
inspection of any defect of Title.
As PEC and Amaia are innocent purchasers for
value of the subject land, the Plaintiff loses the legal
remedy that could have been afforded by Section 53.
There is no cause of action against PEC and Amaia.
Premises considered: 1/ the Complaint
against Philippine Estates Corporation is DISMISSED
for lack of cause of action, sans pronouncement as to
Damages, [Attorney's] Fees and Compulsory
Counterclaim; 2/ PEC's Motion for Reconsideration to
Hear Affirmative Defenses is rendered MOOT.
Likewise, the Complaint as against Amaia
Land Corporation is hereby Dismissed for lack of
cause of action, bereft of pronouncement as to the
Counterclaim and Cross-claim.
Crisanta Realty Development Corporation
Crisanta's Affirmative Defenses strongly echo
PEC's.
Crisanta's Affirmative Defenses of No Cause of
Action against it AND innocent purchaser for value
displayed the same narrative in PEC's affirmative
defense.
The Court reached the same conclusions: 1/
the Complaint against Crisanta Realty Development
Corporation is DISMISSED for lack of cause of action,
sans pronouncement as to Damages, [Attorney's]
Fees and Compulsory Counterclaim; 2/ Crisanta's
Motion for Reconsideration to Hear Affirmative
Defenses is rendered MOOT.
Property Company of Friends, Inc.
Profriends Affirmative Defense relied on No
cause of action.
Profriends alleged that although it is being
impleaded in the Complaint as a purchaser of the
parcel of land previously covered by TCT No. 25848, it
allegedly has no obligation insofar as plaintiff is
concerned. Plaintiff failed to provide in its Complaint
factual and legal basis for the prayer of cancellation of
the Deed of Sale in Profriend's favor, as well as the
new TCT issued under it, as a result of the sale.
Again, the Court finds no cause of action
against Profriends to support the Complaint.
Profriends is a purchaser in good faith, the
property it bought is covered by the Torrens Title.
The Court reiterates the discussion in PEC's
and Amaia's cases above, as conclusive ground for
dismissal of the Complaint against Profriends.
Wherefore, the Complaint against Property
Company of Friends, Inc. is DISMISSED for lack of
cause of action, bereft of pronouncement as to the
Compulsory Counterclaim.
 FINAL ORDERS:
Preceding any progression of this case, in
order to be consistent with the 2020 Amendments to
the Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly Rule 7,
Section 6 (b) and (c) the Court orders the Plaintiff to
file within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days
from receipt hereof: 1/ a summary of its witnesses
and their intended testimonies; 2/ the judicial
affidavits of the said witnesses; 3/ true copy of the
documentary evidence and object evidence of all the
allegations to support the claim, if none filed, as
suppletory to its initial pleading.
Let this case be set for a possible marking of
Exhibits and true copy of documents, including
Judicial Affidavits of Plaintiff's witnesses on Tuesday,
June 30, 2020 @ 1:15 o'clock in the afternoon in the
Courtroom of RTC Branch 23, Trece Martires City. This
case will be heard face to face.
The Court stands pat on the Default Order
against Defendants Jeannie Colmenar Mendoza and
Victoria Jet Colmenar, and strongly NOTES the non-
Answer of Defendant Apollo A. Colmenar, despite
Court Order of February 12, 2020. The period for
Apollo A. Colmenar to file Answer has lapsed.
So Ordered. 29
Noticeably, the inclusion of the name of ProFriends was
erroneous since ProFriends actually pleaded a different
affirmative defense — lack of cause of action.
In light of the proscription against filing a motion for
reconsideration under Section 12, Rule 15 30 of the 2019 Rules
on Civil Procedure and in view of the singular question of law
purportedly involved, petitioner directly sought relief from the
Court.
The Present Petition
Petitioner now seeks affirmative relief from the Court
against the assailed Order dated May 22, 2020. He faults Judge
Gill for applying the 2019 Rules on Civil Procedure to the case,
and based thereon, motu proprio acted on the affirmative
defenses of respondent companies despite the clear injustice it
caused to him. 31 He asserts that although admittedly
procedural rules may be applied to actions already pending
prior to their effectivity, the 2019 Amendments expressly
proscribe their application to pending actions when "in the
opinion of the court, their application would not be feasible or
would work injustice, in which case the procedure under which the
cases were filed shall govern." 32 Here, Judge Gill motu
proprio acted on and granted the affirmative defenses of
respondent companies despite previously denying them
through her Omnibus Order dated February 12, 2020. This
hasty turn-about caused him great prejudice as he was
peremptorily deprived of the opportunity to assert his claim
against respondent companies. More so considering the trial
court's earlier pronouncement that the issues presented could
be better threshed out through a full dressed trial. Worse, he
could not even seek a reconsideration from the assailed
disposition because Section 12, Rule 15 of the 2019
Amendments prohibits the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of court actions on affirmative defenses. 33
Petitioner further posits that Judge Gill had earlier ruled
on the affirmative defenses through her Omnibus Order dated
February 12, 2020. The pending matters at the time the 2019
Amendments took effect were respondent companies' motions
for reconsideration of the February 12, 2020 Omnibus Order. If
Judge Gill was truly insistent on applying the new rules in the
case, she should have denied the motions for reconsideration
pursuant to Section 12 (e), Rule 8 of the 2019
Amendments which prohibits the filing of a motion for
reconsideration where an affirmative defense is denied. 34
 Further, by motu proprio resolving the affirmative
defenses, Judge Gill totally disregarded the requirement set
forth under Section 12 (c), Rule 8 of the 2019 Amendments that
the court "shall motu proprio resolve the above affirmative
defenses within thirty (30) calendar days from the filing of the
answer." ProFriends filed its answer with affirmative defense as
early as December 2018; PEC and Crisanta Realty, on January 3,
2019; and Amaia on February 27, 2020. Thus, when she
resolved their respective affirmative defenses on May 22, 2020,
she did so way beyond the 30-day period provided under
the 2019 Amendments. 35
Lastly, Judge Gill gravely erred when she decreed that
the complaint failed to state a cause of action as against
respondent companies in view of the absence of a material
allegation that they were purchasers in bad faith or had notice
of a defect in the sellers' titles. In truth, the complaint bears the
material allegations that petitioner is the heir of Francisco
Jesus Colmenar, the registered owner of the properties which
were sold to respondent companies by Apollo, Jeannie, and
Victoria, who were not heirs of Francisco Jesus Colmenar. A
purchaser may be impleaded in an action if said purchaser
acquired the property from a seller who had no right over the
said property. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao v.
Prudencio, 36 decreed that a transferee's claim of good faith
does not preclude a cause of action against it. Thus, the lack of
specific allegation in the complaint that respondent companies
acquired the properties in bad faith does not equate to failure
to state a cause of action against them. 37
In their Comment dated January 22, 2021, 38 PEC and
Crisanta Realty aver that the petition must be dismissed since
it actually raises a question of fact. For petitioner is asking the
Court to evaluate the allegations in the complaint and
determine whether the same make out a case against
respondent companies, which is basically a question of fact,
thus, outside the purview of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court. 39 Contrary to petitioner's claim, Judge Gill did not err in
applying the 2019 Rules on Civil Procedure to the case for Rule
144 of the Rules itself clearly ordains that the same may be
applied to all pending proceedings. In fact, Judge Gill had
consistently applied the 2019 Rules in all proceedings before
her court. 40 In any event, Judge Gill was correct in holding that
the complaint failed to state a cause of action against them.
Petitioner, indeed, did not allege in his complaint that they are
purchasers in bad faith or that they had notice of any defect in
the titles of the properties they bought from individual
respondents who are also children of Francisco Jesus
Colmenar, albeit, from a different wife. In effect, the complaint
failed to state the particular right, if any, which they supposedly
violated. They were innocent purchasers for value. They
exercised the required diligence when they investigated the
property before buying it. Their diligent investigation did not
yield anything suspicious about the properties and their
corresponding titles. 41
For its part, Amaia reiterates the arguments in its
Comment 42 dated January 25, 2021 that the complaint indeed
failed to state a cause of action against it. The complaint did
not bear any allegation that respondent companies were
purchasers in bad faith. As innocent purchasers for value, they
are protected by law. 43 Also, the trial court was correct when it
applied the 2019 Amendments and acted on respondent
companies' affirmative defenses. The 2019
Amendments clearly uses the word "shall" to qualify its
effectivity provision, hence, it applies as well to pending
cases. 44
On the other hand, ProFriends, in its Comment 45 dated
January 29, 2021, also faults petitioner for improperly raising
here a mixed question of fact and law, which is not allowed
under Rule 45. Petitioner should have gone first to the Court of
Appeals in consonance with the rule on the hierarchy of
courts. 46
Issues
1. Does the petition raise pure questions of law?
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it
applied the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Revised Rules on
Civil Procedure (now known as the 2019 Rules of Procedure) to
resolve the affirmative defenses pleaded by respondent
companies?
3. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it
dismissed the complaint against respondent companies on
ground that it failed to state a cause of action against them?
Ruling
The petition raises pure questions of law
The issues for resolution are:
First. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it
applied the 2019 Amendments to resolve the affirmative
defenses pleaded by respondent companies, albeit the case
was already pending when the 2019 Amendments took effect?
and
Second. Assuming the allegations in the complaint to be
true, does the complaint state a cause of action against
respondent companies?
A "question of law" exists when the doubt hinges on
what the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on
the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the issue
raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. The test for determining whether the supposed error
was one of "law" or "fact" is not the appellation given by the
parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing
court can resolve the issues raised without evaluating the
evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is
one of fact. In other words, where there is no dispute as to the
facts, the question of whether the conclusions drawn from
these facts are correct is a question of law. If the question
posed, however, requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding
circumstances and their relationship to each other, the issue is
factual. 47
Here, the first question of whether the trial court
committed reversible error when it applied the 2019
Amendments to resolve the affirmative defenses pleaded by
the respondent companies, albeit the same was already
pending when these Amendments took effect is one of law.
In Central Realty and Development Corp. v. Solar Resources,
Inc., 48 the Court held that the issue of whether the trial court
correctly applied a specific law or rules to a particular case is a
question of law, viz.:
Was the denial of petitioner's motion for
judgment on the pleadings correct? Is Solar's action
for specific performance barred by res judicata? Is
summary judgment in the case proper? These are
precisely the questions being raised here. The
resolution of these questions rests solely on what the
law or the rules provides on the given set of
circumstances. In other words, the Court ought to
look only into whether the trial court correctly
applied the law or rules in the case. These are
pure questions of law which do not require the
examination of evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
As for the second issue, whether the allegations in the
complaint, assuming them to be true, state a cause of action
against respondent companies is also one of law. The Court
stressed in Bases Conversion Development Authority v.
Reyes, 49 that where there is no dispute as to the facts, the
question of whether the conclusions drawn from these facts
are correct is a question of law. Indeed, in resolving whether
the complaint here, based on its allegations, states a cause of
action against respondent companies, the Court need not re-
evaluate the credibility of any witnesses or the veracity of any
evidence. The Court only needs to examine the complaint
itself, the allegations of which are assumed to be true, in order
to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action
against respondent companies for declaration of nullity of
deeds of extrajudicial settlement of estate, deeds of sale,
cancellation of titles, and damages against respondent
companies. To repeat, this is a pure question of law.
In fine, petitioner's direct resort to the Court is in
accordance with Rule 45, which ordains:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.
— A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax
Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts,
whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review
on certiorari. The petition may include an application
for a writ of preliminary injunction or other
provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of
law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner
may seek the same provisional remedies by verified
motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any
time during its pendency.
As held in Daswani v. Banco de Oro, 50 when only
questions of law remain to be addressed, a direct recourse to
the Court under this remedy is the proper mode of appeal.
We now resolve the case on the merits.
The trial court gravely erred when
it applied the 2019 Amendments to
resolve the affirmative defenses
pleaded by respondent companies
The 2019 Amendments have been incorporated into
the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, now known as
the 2019 Rules on Civil Procedure. And as with all things new,
precedence is generally scarce, hence, its application must be
done with utmost caution and in strict adherence to its
provisions.
Rule 144 of the 2019 Rules, provides:
The 2019 Proposed Amendments to the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern all cases filed
after their effectivity on May 1, 2020, and also all
pending proceedings, except to the extent that in
the opinion of the court, their application would
not be feasible or would work injustice, in which
case the procedure under which the cases were filed
shall govern. (Emphasis supplied)
As worded, the 2019 Amendments shall also govern all
pending cases commenced before they took effect on May 1,
2020, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court, their
application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which
case, the procedure under which the cases were filed shall govern.
Here, the case commenced with the filing of the complaint in
September 2018 and remained pending when the 2019
Amendments took effect.
As it was, Judge Gill applied Section 12, Rule 8 of
the 2019 Amendments when she supposedly resolved motu
proprio the affirmative defense of respondent companies, that
is, the complaint failed to state a cause of action, thus:
Section 12. Affirmative defenses. — (a) A defendant
shall raise his or her affirmative defenses in his or her
answer, which shall be limited to the reasons set forth
under Section 5(b), Rule 6, and the following grounds:
1. That the court has no jurisdiction over the
person of the defending party;
2. That venue is improperly laid;
3. That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
 4. That the pleading asserting the claim states
no cause of action; and
5. That a condition precedent for filing the claim
has not been complied with.
(b) Failure to raise the affirmative defenses at the
earliest opportunity shall constitute a waiver
thereof.
(c) The court shall motu proprio resolve the above
affirmative defenses within thirty (30)
calendar days from the filing of the answer.
(Emphasis supplied)
The records though readily show that when Judge
Gill motu proprio resolved the affirmative defenses on May 22,
2020, the prescribed thirty (30)-day period had long expired.
ProFriends filed its answer with affirmative defense 51 in
December 2018; PEC 52 and Crisanta Realty 53 on January 3,
2019; and Amaia 54 on February 27, 2020. Judge Gill should
have, therefore, desisted from applying the 2019
Amendments to the case below, specifically Section 12, Rule 8
thereof, because when she did, the same was no longer
feasible.
Another. It was inaccurate for Judge Gill to say that she
was motu proprio acting on the affirmative defenses. In truth,
she had already resolved this common affirmative defense of
failure to state a cause of action, together with the other
affirmative defenses in her Omnibus Order dated February 12,
2020. There, she denied the motions to dismiss and motions to
set the affirmative defenses for hearing because in her words,
"the issues x x x are complex x x x and are x x x better threshed
out in trial." 55 Too, PEC, Crisanta Realty, and Amaia all had
pending motions for reconsideration of the Omnibus Order
dated February 12, 2020 when Judge Gill "motu proprio"
resolved their common affirmative defense, and dismissed the
case based on, and consequently considered the pending
motions for reconsiderations as moot. Thus, instead of
applying the 2019 Amendments, Judge Gill could have simply
resolved the pending motions for reconsiderations of PEC,
Crisanta Realty, and Amaia.
But this is not all. The worst part is when Judge Gill
ignored the injustice caused by the application of the 2019
Amendments to the case. For as a consequence, petitioner lost
his substantial right to be heard on the common affirmative
defense of PEC, Crisanta Realty, and Amaia, and his right to
seek a reconsideration of the order of dismissal which were
both granted him under the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure.
This brings us to the third and last issue: did the
complaint fail to state a cause of action against respondent
companies?
The complaint stated a cause of action
against respondent companies
To recall, there are two (2) sets of affirmative defenses
raised below, viz.: (1) the complaint failed to state a cause of
action, raised by PEC, Amaia, and Crisanta Realty; and (2) lack
of cause of action, raised by ProFriends.
In the Omnibus Order dated February 12, 2020, Judge
Gill did not resolve the affirmative defense of lack of cause of
action raised by ProFriends. She only resolved the common
affirmative defense of PEC, Amaia, and Crisanta Realty that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action. And yet, in the
assailed Order dated May 22, 2020, the case against ProFriends
was also dismissed on the ground that the complaint failed to
state a cause of action, the common affirmative defense raised
only by PEC, Amaia, and Crisanta Realty. 56
It has been repeatedly held, however, that failure to
state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct
and separate grounds to dismiss a particular action. Zuñiga-
Santos v. Santos-Gran 57 explained that failure to state a cause
of action refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the
pleading, while lack of cause of action refers to the
insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. Dismissal for
failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest
stages of the proceedings through a motion to dismiss under
Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Court or raised as an affirmative
defense in an answer, while dismissal for lack of cause of
action may be raised any time after the questions of fact have
been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or
evidence presented by the plaintiff. Asia Brewery, Inc. v.
Equitable PCI Bank 58 further explained:
Failure to state a cause of action is not the
same as lack of cause of action; the terms are not
interchangeable. It may be observed that lack of
cause of action is not among the grounds that may be
raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court. The dismissal of a Complaint for
lack of cause of action is based on Section 1 of Rule
33, which provides:
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. —
After the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the
defendant may move for dismissal on
the ground that upon the facts and
the law the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. If his motion is denied
he shall have the right to present
evidence. If the motion is granted but
on appeal the order of dismissal is
reversed he shall be deemed to have
waived the right to present evidence.
If the Complaint fails to state a cause of
action, a motion to dismiss must be made before
a responsive pleading is filed; and the issue can be
resolved only on the basis of the allegations in the
initiatory pleading. On the other hand, if the
Complaint lacks a cause of action, the motion to
dismiss must be filed after the plaintiff has rested
its case.
In the first situation, the veracity of the
allegations is immaterial; however, in the second
situation, the judge must determine the veracity of
the allegations based on the evidence presented.
xxx xxx xxx
Hence, in order to resolve whether the
Complaint lacked a cause of action, respondent must
have presented evidence to dispute the presumption
that the signatories validly and intentionally delivered
the instrument.
xxx xxx xxx
The test to determine whether a complaint
states a cause of action against the defendants is this:
admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of
fact made in the complaint, may a judge validly grant
the relief demanded in the complaint? 59 (Emphasis
supplied)
Consequently, the trial court erred in dismissing the
complaint against ProFriends on ground that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action, an affirmative defense it did
not raise, and which is completely different from what it
actually raised, i.e., lack of cause action. And strictly speaking,
lack of cause of action may only be raised after the questions
of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations or
admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff. Before then,
it cannot be raised as a ground for dismissal; much less can the
court dismiss the case on that ground.
We now go to the dismissal of the complaint against
PEC, Amaia, and Crisanta Realty on the ground that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action against them.
 A cause of action is defined as an act or omission by
which a party violates a right of another. 60 A complaint states a
cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three
(3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in
favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever
law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c)
an act or omission on the part of the named defendant
violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of
the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter
may maintain an action for recovery of damages. If the
allegations of the complaint do not state the concurrence of
these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion
to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. 61
Here, the complaint for declaration of nullity of Deeds
of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, Deeds of Sale,
Cancellation of Titles, and Damages alleges:
1. Plaintiff Frank Colmenar x x x is the
legitimate son of the late Francisco Jesus Colmenar
(Deceased) and Dorothy Marie Crimmin (Dorothy). 62
xxx xxx xxx
28. Years later, Plaintiff learned of the
unfortunate demise of his father. 63 x x x
xxx xxx xxx
29. Upon his death, Deceased left real
properties registered under his name, to wit:
(1) An interest in a real property located in
General Trias, Cavite, with an area of
130,743 square meters then covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 579;
(2) One-half (1/2) interest in a real property
located in General Trias, Cavite, with
total area of 27,175 square meters then
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
572;
(3) One-sixth (1/6) interest in a real property
located in General Trias, Cavite with a
total land area of 117,476 square
meters then covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 25848; and
(4) An interest in a real property located in
General Trias, Cavite with a total land
area of 806 square meters then covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 588.
30. Several years later, Plaintiff learned that
Defendants Apollo, Jeannie, and Victoria made it
appear that they were the heirs of the Deceased in
the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 16 May
2008 involving a real property then covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-579 registered in
the name of the Deceased, and a portion of a real
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
572 registered in the name of the Deceased and Angel
Colmenar, both properties being located at General
Trias, Province of Cavite.
31. Defendants Apollo, Jeannie, and Victoria
committed the same misrepresentations when they
executed the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estates of
Deceased Francisco Colmenar and Loida
Colmenar dated 8 July 2011 involving a real property
then covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
579 issued in the name of the Deceased and another
real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
25848 in the name of the Deceased, among others,
both properties being located at General Trias,
Province of Cavite.
32. Using the foregoing deeds of extrajudicial
settlement of estate as authority, Defendants Apollo
and Jeannie executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 22
May 2013 in favor of Defendant PEC covering a real
 property then covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 579 issued in the name of the Deceased. For her
part, Defendant Victoria, executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated 22 May 2013 in favor of Defendant PEC
covering a real property with Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 579 issued in the name of the Deceased.
32.1. Subsequently, Defendant PEC
sold the property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 579 to Defendant
Amaia, which by then was already
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 057-2013024578 in the name of
Defendant PEC.
33. In the same manner, Defendants Apollo,
Jeannie, and Victoria executed a Deed of Sale dated 12
September 2012 in favor of Defendant Crisanta,
covering a real property then covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 943212 issued in the name of the
Deceased and a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 3 January
2012 in favor of Defendant Profriends covering a
portion of a real property then covered [by] Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 25848 in the name of the
Deceased, among others.
34. All the actions of Defendants Apollo,
Jeannie and Victoria were made without the
knowledge and consent of Plaintiff. Worse, said
Defendants did the same depriving Plaintiff of his
successional rights under Philippine laws as the
legitimate son of the Deceased. 64
xxx xxx xxx
47. However, Defendant PEC did not earlier
acquire any right or interest over the property since
the Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by Defendants
Apollo, Jeannie and Victoria are void.
47.1. The said deeds are void since
Defendants Apollo, Jeannie, and
Victoria had no interest over the
property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 579. Hence, they
had no right to sell the same to
Defendant PEC.
48. Despite not having acquired any right or
interest over the property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 579, Defendant PEC still
subsequently sold the said property to Defendant
Amaia. x x x 65
xxx xxx xxx
54. Subsequently, or on 21 September 2012,
Defendants Apollo, Jeannie and Victoria executed a
deed of sale involving the property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 943212 in favor of
Defendant Crisanta.
55. It bears stressing, however, that
Defendants Apollo, Jeannie, and Victoria are not [the]
heirs of the Deceased. Therefore, they had no right to
dispose of the property covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 943212 in favor of Defendant Crisanta. 66
xxx xxx xxx
60. Defendants Apollo, Jeannie and Victoria
subsequently sold Francisco Colmenar's share
in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25848 to Defendant
Profriends.
61. It bears stressing, however, that
Defendants Apollo, Jeannie, and Victoria are not [the]
heirs of the Deceased. Therefore, they had no right to
dispose of the property covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 25848 in favor of Defendant Profriends. 67
xxx xxx xxx
64. On account of the Deeds of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate and void Deeds of Absolute
Sale executed by Defendants Apollo, Jeannie, and
 Victoria, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 579, 943212,
25848 were cancelled.
65. To reiterate, however, Defendants Apollo,
Jeannie, and Victoria had no right to transfer the
properties to Defendant corporations.
66. Consequently, the titles issued by
Defendant Registry of Deeds under the name of
Defendant Amaia, which originated from the title
issued to Defendant PEC, should be cancelled. In the
same manner, the titles issued by the Defendant
Registry of Deeds to Defendants Crisanta and
Profriends are earnestly requested to be cancelled. 68
In essence, petitioner essentially avers that: (a) he is the
legitimate son and lawful heir of Francisco Jesus Colmenar; (b)
his father left real properties in the Philippines, the rights and
interests of which would legally pass on to his heirs upon his
death; (c) the individual respondents are not the lawful heirs of
Francisco Jesus Colmenar, thus, have no claim to the properties
left by the latter; (d) the individual respondents, nonetheless,
despite being devoid of any right in or authority over the estate
of his father, were able to effect a void extrajudicial settlement
of his father's estate, and thereafter, a void sale of his father's
properties in favor of respondent companies, which, as a
consequence, also did not acquire a valid title hereto.
In Asia Brewery, Inc. v. Equitable PCI Bank 69 the Court
ordained that the test to determine whether a complaint states
a cause of action against the defendants is — admitting
hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the
complaint, may a judge validly grant the relief demanded in the
complaint?
Here, assuming the foregoing allegations to be true,
petitioner as legitimate child and lawful heir of Francisco Jesus
Colmenar has the right to the relief prayed for, i.e., to declare
as void the extrajudicial settlement of estate effected by the
individual respondents who, not being lawful heirs of his
father, had no legal right to settle the estate; and to declare as
void the subsequent deeds of sale executed by these individual
respondents in favor of respondent companies which
consequently also did not derive any valid title from the
individual respondents.
In Unciano v. Gorospe 70 the Court underscored the
fundamental principle that no one can give what he does not
have. In other words, a seller may sell only what he or she
owns, or that which he or she does not own but has authority
to transfer, and a buyer can acquire only what the seller can
legally transfer. As the Court emphasized in Daclag v.
Macahilig, 71 in a contract of sale, it is essential that the seller is
the owner of the property he is selling. Under Article 1458 of
the New Civil Code, the principal obligation of a seller is to
transfer the ownership of the property sold. Article 1459 of the
same provides that the thing must be licit and the vendor must
have a right to transfer the ownership thereof at the time it is
delivered. Nool v. Court of Appeals, 72 further enunciated
Article 1505 of the New Civil Code which provides that "where
goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and
who does not sell them under authority or with consent of the
owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the
seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct
precluded from denying the seller's authority to sell."
Hence, whether respondent companies were buyers in
bad faith or had knowledge of the defect in the title of the
seller is not the issue nor the trigger that gave rise to the
complaint. Petitioner's causes of action hinged on his averment
that the individual respondents are not the owners of the
properties, hence, they cannot validly sell the same to
respondent companies, nor convey any title to the latter by
reason of the invalid sale. The spring cannot rise above its
source. Needless to state, the trial court cannot inject its own
theory to take the place of the actual allegations in the
complaint. Besides, where petitioner in this case has no actual
or personal knowledge of the good faith or bad faith of the
buyers in the purchase of the properties, how could he
possibly allege it in the complaint? In any event, good faith or
lack of bad faith is a matter of defense for the buyers in this
case. It can be pleaded in the answer and proved during the
trial.
As enunciated in Sindophil, Inc. v. Republic, 73 the
presumption that a holder of a Torrens title is an innocent
purchaser for value is disputable and may be overcome by
contrary evidence, thus:
Sindophil insists that it bought the Tramo
property from Ty in good faith and that it was an
innocent purchaser for value. However, the
presumption of good faith and that a holder of a title
is an innocent purchaser for value may be overcome
by contrary evidence.
Here, the Republic presented evidence that
TCT No. 10354, from which Sindophil's TCT No.
132440 was derived, was void. As found by the
Regional Trial Court:
Record shows that Certificate
of Title No. 6735, wherein the lot
claimed by defendant, Marcelo R.
Teodoro, lot 3270-B, is derived
therefrom, is under the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, dated
October 17, 1913. Nothing in the
subsequent annotations was under
the name of any of the defendants
and neither the subject TCT No.
10354.
With the Republic having put forward
evidence that the Tramo property claimed by
Sindophil belongs to the Republic, the burden of
evidence shifted to Sindophil to prove that its title to it
was valid. Concomitantly, it had the burden of proving
that it was indeed a buyer in good faith and for value.
As this Court said in Baltazar v. Court of Appeals, "the
burden of proving the status of a purchaser in
good faith and for value lies upon him who asserts
that status" and "[i]n discharging that burden, it is
not enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of
good faith, i.e., that everyone is presumed to act in
good faith. The good faith that is [essential here] is
integral with the very status which must be proved."
(Emphasis supplied)
In any event, the trial court's reliance on Spouses
Castillo v. Heirs of Madrigal 74 is utterly misplaced. It is not on
all fours with the present case. Spouses Castillo involved a
conveyance of property registered in the names of the Castillo
Siblings. The conveyance appeared to have been executed by
all the registered co-owners, albeit the plaintiffs later
disclaimed their participation in the conveyance and sued for
recovery of possession and ownership. Meantime the property
had already been conveyed from the original buyer to a
company who invoked the right of an innocent buyer for value.
The Court ruled:
Where the complaint for recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land alleges
that some of the defendants bought said land from
their co-defendants who had a defective title thereto
but does not allege that the purchasers were
purchasers in bad faith or with notice of the defect in
the title of their vendors, there is a failure to state a
cause of action. By reason of this failure, private
respondent Susana Realty, Inc. is presumed to be an
innocent purchaser for value and in good faith,
entitled to protection under the law. 75
Here, the allegations in the complaint do not speak of
co-ownership between petitioner and the individual
respondents insofar as the subject properties are concerned.
There is no allegation either that the corresponding certificates
of title which the respondent individuals transacted with 1. Rollo, pp. 11-45.
respondent companies bore all the names of the respondent 2. Penned by Assisting Judge Jean Desuasido-Gill, id. at 54-58.
individuals, as well as the name of petitioner himself as their
co-owner. Nor is there any allegation that the deeds of sale 3. Id. at 60-78.
executed in favor of respondent companies were signed not 4. Id. at 60-61 and 65.
only by individual respondents but also by petitioner himself,
5. Id. at 66-67.
all of them being supposedly co-owners of the properties. On
the contrary, the allegations in the complaint, assuming them 6. Id. at 67-68.
to be true, are all about the unlawful conveyances of the
7. Id. at 68.
properties by the respondent individuals who had no right to
do so since the true and lawful owner of these properties is 8. Id. at 68-69 and 73-74.
petitioner, no other. 9. Id. at 69-70.
All told, the trial court gravely erred when it held that 10. Id. at 72-73.
the complaint failed to state a cause of action against
11. Id. at 73-75.
respondent companies, and based thereon, dismissed the
complaint against them. 12. Id. at 159-166.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Order 13. Id. at 244-273.

dated May 22, 2020 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23,
14. Id. at 289-317.
Trece Martires, Cavite in Civil Case No. TMCV-062-18 REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Complaint is REINSTATED as against 15. Apollo's motion was not attached to the petition. Neither was its
Philippine Estates Corporation, Crisanta Realty Development content mentioned in the petition or any of its annexes.
Corporation, Amaia Land Corporation, and Property Company 16. Id. at 169-192.
of Friends. The trial court is DIRECTED to PROCEED with the
17. Id. at 329-332.
resolution of the case with UTMOST DISPATCH.
18. Id. at 358.
SO ORDERED.
19. Id. at 359-361.
Perlas-Bernabe, M.V. Lopez, Rosario and  J.Y. Lopez, ** JJ.,
concur. 20. Id. at 362-364.

  21. Id. at 363.

Footnotes 22. Id. at 365-382.

* Francisco Colmenar's full name is "Francisco Jesus Colmenar." 23. Id. at 386-403.

** Designated as additional member per Special Order No. 2822 dated 24. Id. at 406-420.
April 7, 2021.
25. Id. at 421-450.
26. Id. at 54-58. 49. 711 Phil. 631, 638-639 (2013).

27. Id. at 56-58. 50. 765 Phil. 88, 97 (2015).

28. Id. at 54. 51. Rollo, pp. 159-166.

29. Id. at 56-58. 52. Id. at 244-272.

30. Section 12. Prohibited motions. — The following motions shall not be 53. Id. at 289-317.
allowed: x x x (c) Motion for reconsideration of the court's
54. Id. at 421-448.
action on the affirmative defenses; x x x.
55. Id. at 363.
31. Rollo, p. 29.
56. Id. at 363.
32. Id. at 31-32.
57. See 745 Phil. 171, 177-178 (2014); also see Aquino v. Quiazon, 755
33. Id. at 33-34.
Phil. 793, 808 (2015).
34. Id. at 34-35.
58. 809 Phil. 289 (2017).
35. Id. at 35-36.
59. Id. at 297, 299.
36. 794 Phil. 462 (2016).
60. Spouses Chu v. Benelda Estate Development Corporation, 405 Phil. 936,
37. Rollo, pp. 36-43. 946 (2001).

38. Id. at 482-508. 61. Zuñiga-Santos v. Santos-Gran,  supra note 57, at 180.

39. Id. at 490-494. 62. Rollo, pp. 60-61.

40. Id. at 494-500. 63. Id. at 67.

41. Id. at 500-507. 64. Id. at 67-69.

42. Id. at 628-655. 65. Id. at 72-73.

43. Id. at 644-653. 66. Id. at 74.

44. Id. at 639-644. 67. Id. at 75.

45. Id. at 677-682. 68. Id. at 75-76.

46. Id. at 678-680. 69. Supra note 58, at 299.

47. Republic v. Gallo, 823 Phil. 1090, 1102 (2018), citing Spouses Miano v. 70. G.R. No. 221869, August 14, 2019.
Manila Electric Co., 800 Phil. 118, 122 (2016).
71. 582 Phil. 138, 153 (2008).
48. G.R. No. 229408, November 9, 2020.
72. 342 Phil. 106, 117-118 (1997).
 73. G.R. No. 204594, November 7, 2018.

74. 275 Phil. 605 (1991).

75. Id. at 612.
 

  (Colmenar v. Colmenar, G.R. No. 252467, [June 21, 2021])

|||

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 209969. September 27, 2017.]

JOSE SANICO AND VICENTE

CASTRO,petitioners, vs. WERHERLINA P.
COLIPANO,respondent.

DECISION

CAGUIOA,  J  :
p

Before the Court is a Petition for Review

on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioners Jose Sanico (Sanico) and Vicente Castro (Castro),
assailing the Decision 2 dated September 30, 2013 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 01889. The CA affirmed
with modification the Decision 3 dated October 27, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Danao City (RTC) which found
Sanico and Castro liable for breach of contract of carriage and
awarded actual and compensatory damages for loss of income
in favor of respondent Werherlina P. Colipano (Colipano).The
CA reduced the compensatory damages that the RTC
awarded. 
CAIHTE
Antecedents
Colipano filed a complaint on January 7, 1997 for breach
of contract of carriage and damages against Sanico and
Castro. 4 In her complaint, Colipano claimed that at 4:00 P.M.
more or less of December 25, 1993, Christmas Day,she and
her daughter were paying passengers in the jeepney operated
by Sanico, which was driven by Castro. 5 Colipano claimed she
was made to sit on an empty beer case at the edge of the rear
entrance/exit of the jeepney with her sleeping child on her
lap. 6 And, at an uphill incline in the road to Natimao-an,
Carmen, Cebu, the jeepney slid backwards because it did not
have the power to reach the top. 7 Colipano pushed both her
feet against the step board to prevent herself and her child
from being thrown out of the exit, but because the step board
was wet, her left foot slipped and got crushed between the
step board and a coconut tree which the jeepney bumped,
causing the jeepney to stop its backward
movement. 8 Colipano's leg was badly injured and was
eventually amputated. 9 Colipano prayed for actual damages,
loss of income, moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees. 10
In their answer, Sanico and Castro admitted that
Colipano's leg was crushed and amputated but claimed that it
was Colipano's fault that her leg was crushed. 11 They admitted
that the jeepney slid backwards because the jeepney lost
power. 12 The conductor then instructed everyone not to panic
but Colipano tried to disembark and her foot got caught in
between the step board and the coconut tree. 13 Sanico
claimed that he paid for all the hospital and medical expenses
of Colipano, 14 and that Colipano eventually freely and
voluntarily executed an Affidavit of Desistance and Release of
Claim. 15
After trial, the RTC found that Sanico and Castro
breached the contract of carriage between them and Colipano
but only awarded actual and compensatory damages in favor
of Colipano. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision states:
WHEREFORE,premises considered, this Court
finds the defendants LIABLE for breach of contract of
carriage and are solidarily liable to pay plaintiff:
1. Actual damages in the amount of P2,098.80;
and
2. Compensatory damages for loss of income in
the amount of P360,000.00.
No costs.
SO ORDERED. 16
Only Sanico and Castro appealed to the CA, which
affirmed with modification the RTC Decision. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision states:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant
appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated
October 27, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
25, Danao City, in Civil Case No. DNA-418, is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award for
compensatory damages for loss of income in
paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion of the RTC's
decision, is reduced to P200,000.00.
SO ORDERED. 17
Without moving for the reconsideration of the CA
Decision, Sanico and Castro filed this petition before the Court
assailing the CA Decision.
Issues
 a. Whether the CA erred in finding that Sanico and
Castro breached the contract of carriage with
Colipano;
b. Whether the Affidavit of Desistance and Release of
Claim is binding on Colipano; and
c. Whether the CA erred in the amount of damages
awarded.
The Court's Ruling
The Court partly grants the petition.
Only Sanico breached the contract of
carriage.
Here, it is beyond dispute that Colipano was injured
while she was a passenger in the jeepney owned and operated
by Sanico that was being driven by Castro. Both the CA and
RTC found Sanico and Castro jointly and severally liable. This,
however, is erroneous because only Sanico was the party to
the contract of carriage with Colipano.
Since the cause of action is based on a breach of a
contract of carriage, the liability of Sanico is direct as the
contract is between him and Colipano. Castro, being merely
the driver of Sanico's jeepney, cannot be made liable as he is
not a party to the contract of carriage.
In Soberano v. Manila Railroad Co.,18 the Court ruled that
a complaint for breach of a contract of carriage is dismissible
as against the employee who was driving the bus because the
parties to the contract of carriage are only the passenger, the
bus owner, and the operator, viz.:
The complaint against Caccam was therefore
properly dismissed. He was not a party to the
contract; he was a mere employee of the BAL. The
parties to that contract are Juana Soberano, the
passenger, and the MRR and its subsidiary, the BAL,
the bus owner and operator, respectively; and
consequent to the inability of the defendant
companies to carry Juana Soberano and her baggage
and personal effects securely and safely to her
destination as imposed by law (art. 1733, in relation to
arts. 1736 and 1755, N.C.C.), their liability to her
becomes direct and immediate. 19 
DETACa
Since Castro was not a party to the contract of carriage,
Colipano had no cause of action against him and the complaint
against him should be dismissed. Although he was driving the
jeepney, he was a mere employee of Sanico, who was the
operator and owner of the jeepney. The obligation to carry
Colipano safely to her destination was with Sanico. In fact, the
elements of a contract of carriage existed between Colipano
and Sanico: consent,as shown when Castro, as employee of
Sanico, accepted Colipano as a passenger when he allowed
Colipano to board the jeepney, and as to Colipano, when she
boarded the jeepney; cause or consideration,when Colipano, for
her part, paid her fare; and, object,the transportation of
Colipano from the place of departure to the place of
destination. 20
Having established that the contract of carriage was
only between Sanico and Colipano and that therefore Colipano
had no cause of action against Castro, the Court next
determines whether Sanico breached his obligations to
Colipano under the contract.
Sanico is liable as operator and
owner of a common carrier.
Specific to a contract of carriage, the Civil Code requires
common carriers to observe extraordinary diligence in safely
transporting their passengers. Article 1733 of the Civil
Code states:
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature
of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
 bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over the goods is further expressed in Articles 1734,
1735 and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers is further set forth in Articles 1755 and
1756.
This extraordinary diligence, following Article 1755 of
the Civil Code, means that common carriers have the
obligation to carry passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.
In case of death of or injury to their passengers, Article
1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or negligent, and this
presumption can be overcome only by proof of the
extraordinary diligence exercised to ensure the safety of the
passengers. 21
Being an operator and owner of a common carrier,
Sanico was required to observe extraordinary diligence in
safely transporting Colipano. When Colipano's leg was injured
while she was a passenger in Sanico's jeepney, the
presumption of fault or negligence on Sanico's part arose and
he had the burden to prove that he exercised the
extraordinary diligence required of him. He failed to do this.
In Calalas v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court found that
allowing the respondent in that case to be seated in an
extension seat, which was a wooden stool at the rear of the
jeepney, "placed [the respondent] in a peril greater than that to
which the other passengers were exposed." 23 The Court
further ruled that the petitioner in Calalas was not only "unable
to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him
for the injury sustained by [the respondent],but also, the
evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting
passengers." 24
Calalas squarely applies here. Sanico failed to rebut the
presumption of fault or negligence under the Civil Code. More
than this, the evidence indubitably established Sanico's
negligence when Castro made Colipano sit on an empty beer
case at the edge of the rear entrance/exit of the jeepney with
her sleeping child on her lap, which put her and her child in
greater peril than the other passengers. As the CA correctly
held:
For the driver, Vicente Castro, to allow a seat
extension made of an empty case of beer clearly
indicates lack of prudence. Permitting Werherlina to
occupy an improvised seat in the rear portion of the
jeepney, with a child on her lap to boot, exposed her
and her child in a peril greater than that to which the
other passengers were exposed. The use of an
improvised seat extension is undeniable, in view of
the testimony of plaintiff's witness, which is consistent
with Werherlina's testimonial assertion. Werherlina
and her witness's testimony were accorded belief by
the RTC. Factual findings of the trial court are entitled
to great weight on appeal and should not be
disturbed except for strong and valid reasons,
because the trial court is in a better position to
examine the demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying. 25
The CA also correctly held that the defense of engine
failure, instead of exonerating Sanico, only aggravated his
already precarious position. 26 The engine failure "hinted lack
of regular check and maintenance to ensure that the engine is
at its best, considering that the jeepney regularly passes
through a mountainous area." 27 This failure to ensure that the
jeepney can safely transport passengers through its route
which required navigation through a mountainous area is
proof of fault on Sanico's part. In the face of such evidence,
there is no question as to Sanico's fault or negligence.
Further, common carriers may also be liable for
damages when they contravene the tenor of their obligations.
Article 1170 of the Civil Code states:
ART. 1170. Those who in the performance of
their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the
tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
In Magat v. Medialdea,28 the Court ruled: "The phrase 'in
any manner contravene the tenor' of the obligation includes
any illicit act or omission which impairs the strict and faithful
fulfillment of the obligation and every kind of defective
performance." 29 There is no question here that making
Colipano sit on the empty beer case was a clear showing of
how Sanico contravened the tenor of his obligation to safely
transport Colipano from the place of departure to the place of
destination as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, and with
due regard for all the circumstances.
Sanico's attempt to evade liability by arguing that he
exercised extraordinary diligence when he hired Castro, who
was allegedly an experienced and time-tested driver, whom he
had even accompanied on a test-drive and in whom he was
personally convinced of the driving skills, 30 are not enough to
exonerate him from liability — because the liability of common
carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees. This is the express mandate of
Article 1759 of the Civil Code: 
aDSIHc
ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the
death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former's employees,
although such employees may have acted beyond the
scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of
the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not
cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
The only defenses available to common carriers are (1)
proof that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed
in Article 1756, 31 and (2) following Article 1174 of the Civil
Code, proof that the injury or death was brought about by an
event which "could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
were inevitable," or a fortuitous event.
The Court finds that neither of these defenses obtain.
Thus, Sanico is liable for damages to Colipano because of the
injury that Colipano suffered as a passenger of Sanico's
jeepney.
The Affidavit of Desistance and
Release of Claim is void.
Sanico cannot be exonerated from liability under the
Affidavit of Desistance and Release of Claim 32 and his payment
of the hospital and medical bills of Colipano amounting to
P44,900.00. 33
The RTC ruled that "the Affidavit of Desistance and
Release of Claim is not binding on plaintiff [Colipano] in the
absence of proof that the contents thereof were sufficiently
translated and explained to her." 34 The CA affirmed the
findings of the RTC and ruled that the document was not
binding on Colipano, as follows:
Finally, We sustain the RTC's finding that the
affidavit of desistance and release of claim, offered by
defendants-appellants, are not binding on
Werherlina, quoting with approval its reflection on the
matter, saying:
 x x x this Court finds that the
Affidavit of Desistance and Release of
Claim is not binding on plaintiff in the
absence of proof that the contents
thereof were sufficiently explained to
her. It is clear from the plaintiff's
circumstances that she is not able to
understand English, more so
stipulations stated in the said Affidavit
and Release. It is understandable that
in her pressing need, the plaintiff may
have been easily convinced to sign the
document with the promise that she
will be compensated for her
injuries. 35
The Court finds no reason to depart from these findings
of the CA and the RTC.
For there to be a valid waiver, the following requisites
are essential:
(1) that the person making the waiver possesses the
right, (2) that he has the capacity and power to
dispose of the right, (3) that the waiver must be clear
and unequivocal although it may be made expressly
or impliedly, and (4) that the waiver is not contrary to
law, public policy, public order, morals, good customs
or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized
by law. 36
While the first two requirements can be said to exist in
this case, the third and fourth requirements are, however,
lacking.
For the waiver to be clear and unequivocal, the person
waiving the right should understand what she is waiving and
the effect of such waiver. Both the CA and RTC made the
factual determination that Colipano was not able to
understand English and that there was no proof that the
documents and their contents and effects were explained to
her. These findings of the RTC, affirmed by the CA, are entitled
to great weight and respect. 37 As this Court held in Philippine
National Railways Corp. v. Vizcara:38
It is a well-established rule that factual findings by the
CA are conclusive on the parties and are not
reviewable by this Court. They are entitled to great
weight and respect, even finality, especially when, as
in this case, the CA affirmed the factual findings
arrived at by the trial court. 39
Although there are exceptions to this rule, 40 the
exceptions are absent here.
Colipano could not have clearly and unequivocally
waived her right to claim damages when she had no
understanding of the right she was waiving and the extent of
that right. Worse, she was made to sign a document written in
a language she did not understand.
The fourth requirement for a valid waiver is also lacking
as the waiver, based on the attendant facts, can only be
construed as contrary to public policy. The doctrine
in Gatchalian v. Delim,41 which the CA correctly cited, 42 is
applicable here:
Finally, because what is involved here is the
liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by
passengers in respect of whose safety a common
carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence,we must
construe any such purported waiver most strictly
against the common carrier. For a waiver to be valid
and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals,
public policy or good customs. To uphold a supposed
waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured
passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited
in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the
standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the
law from common carriers and hence to render that
 standard unenforceable. We believe such a
purported waiver is offensive to public policy. 43
"[P]ublic policy refers to the aims of the state to
promote the social and general well-being of the
inhabitants." 44 The Civil Code requires extraordinary diligence
from common carriers because the nature of their business
requires the public to put their safety and lives in the hands of
these common carriers. The State imposes this extraordinary
diligence to promote the well-being of the public who avail
themselves of the services of common carriers. Thus, in
instances of injury or death, a waiver of the right to claim
damages is strictly construed against the common carrier so as
not to dilute or weaken the public policy behind the required
standard of extraordinary diligence.
It was for this reason that in Gatchalian,the waiver was
considered offensive to public policy because it was shown
that the passenger was still in the hospital and was dizzy when
she signed the document. It was also shown that when she saw
the other passengers signing the document, she signed it
without reading it. 
ETHIDa
Similar to Gatchalian,Colipano testified that she did not
understand the document she signed. 45 She also did not
understand the nature and extent of her waiver as the content
of the document was not explained to her. 46 The waiver is
therefore void because it is contrary to public policy. 47
The Court reiterates that waivers executed under
similar circumstances are indeed contrary to public policy and
are void. 48 To uphold waivers taken from injured passengers
who have no knowledge of their entitlement under the law and
the extent of liability of common carriers would indeed dilute
the extraordinary diligence required from common carriers,
and contravene a public policy reflected in the Civil Code.
Amount of compensatory damages
granted is incorrect.
On the amount of damages, the RTC awarded P2,098.80
as actual damages and P360,000.00 as compensatory damages
for loss of income, as follows:
[T]his Court can only award actual damages in the
amount that is duly supported by receipts, that is,
P2,098.80 and not P7,277.80 as prayed for by plaintiff
as there is no basis for the amount prayed for.
However, considering that plaintiff has suffered the
loss of one leg which has caused her to be limited in
her movement thus resulting in loss of livelihood, she
is entitled to compensatory damages for lost income
at the rate of P12,000.00/year for thirty years in the
amount of P360,000.00. 49
The CA, on the other hand, modified the award of the
RTC by reducing the compensatory damages from P360,000.00
to P200,000.00, thus:
By virtue of their negligence, defendants-
appellants are liable to pay Werherlina compensatory
damages for loss of earning capacity. In arriving at the
proper amount, the Supreme Court has consistently
used the following formula:
Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual Income
— Living Expenses (50% of gross annual
income)]
where life expectancy = 2/3 (80 — the age of the deceased).
Based on the stated formula, the damages due to
Werherlina for loss of earning capacity is:
Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80-30)] x (P12,000.00 x 50%)
  = (2/3 x 50) x P6,000.00
  = 33.33 x P6,000.00
  = P200,000.00
The award of the sum of P200,000.00 as
compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity is
 in order, notwithstanding the objections of
defendants-appellants with respect to lack of
evidence on Werherlina's age and annual income. 50
Sanico argues that Colipano failed to present
documentary evidence to support her age and her income, so
that her testimony is self-serving and that there was no basis
for the award of compensatory damages in her favor. 51 Sanico
is gravely mistaken.
The Court has held in Heirs of Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano
v. Heirs of Irene B. Bien 52 that testimonial evidence cannot be
objected to on the ground of being self-serving, thus:
"Self-serving evidence" is not to be taken literally to
mean any evidence that serves its proponent's
interest. The term, if used with any legal sense, refers
only to acts or declarations made by a party in his
own interest at some place and time out of court,and
it does not include testimony that he gives as a
witness in court. Evidence of this sort is excluded on
the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is, lack
of opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse
party and on the consideration that its admission
would open the door to fraud and fabrication. In
contrast, a party's testimony in court is sworn and
subject to cross-examination by the other party,
and therefore, not susceptible to an objection on
the ground that it is self-serving. 53
Colipano was subjected to cross-examination and both
the RTC and CA believed her testimony on her age and annual
income. In fact, as these are questions of facts, these findings
of the RTC and CA are likewise binding on the Court. 54
Further, although as a general rule, documentary
evidence is required to prove loss of earning capacity,
Colipano's testimony on her annual earnings of P12,000.00 is
an allowed exception. There are two exceptions to the
general rule and Colipano's testimonial evidence falls under
the second exception, viz.:
By way of exception, damages for loss of
earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence
of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is
self-employed earning less than the minimum wage
under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be
taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no
documentary evidence is available; or (2) the
deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning
less than the minimum wage under current labor
laws. 55
The CA applied the correct formula for computing the
loss of Colipano's earning capacity:
Net earning capacity = Life expectancy x [Gross
Annual Income - Living Expenses (50% of gross annual
income)],where life expectancy = 2/3 (80 - the age of
the deceased).56
However, the CA erred when it used Colipano's age at
the time she testified as basis for computing the loss of
earning capacity. 57 The loss of earning capacity commenced
when Colipano's leg was crushed on December 25, 1993. Given
that Colipano was 30 years old when she testified on October
14, 1997, she was roughly 27 years old on December 25, 1993
when the injury was sustained. Following the foregoing
formula, the net earning capacity of Colipano is P212,000.00. 58
Sanico is liable to pay interest.
Interest is a form of actual or compensatory damages
as it belongs to Chapter 2 59 of Title XVIII on Damages of
the Civil Code.Under Article 2210 of the Civil Code, "[i]nterest
may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed upon damages
awarded for breach of contract." Here, given the gravity of the
breach of the contract of carriage causing the serious injury to
the leg of Colipano that resulted in its amputation, the Court
deems it just and equitable to award interest from the date of from October 27, 2006 until finality of this
the RTC decision. Since the award of damages was given by the Decision.
RTC in its Decision dated October 27, 2006, the interest on the
The total amount of the foregoing shall, in turn, earn
amount awarded shall be deemed to run beginning October
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of this
27, 2006. 
Decision until full payment thereof.
cSEDTC

As to the rate of interest, in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.

SO ORDERED.
Court of Appeals,60 the Court ruled that "[w]hen an obligation,
not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, Peralta, ** Perlas-Bernabe  and  Reyes, Jr.,JJ.,concur.
an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be Carpio, * J.,is on official leave.
imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per
 
annum." 61 Further, upon finality of the judgment awarding a
sum of money, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum Footnotes
from such finality until satisfaction because the interim period * On official leave.
is considered a forbearance of credit. 62 Subsequently, in Nacar
** Per Special Order No. 2487 dated September 19, 2017.
v. Gallery Frames,63 the rate of legal interest for loans or
forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate 1. Rollo,pp. 13-122 (inclusive of Annexes).
allowed in judgments was lowered from 12% to 6%.Thus, the
2. Id. at 37-49. Penned by Associate Justice Pamela Ann Abella Maxino,
applicable rate of interest to the award of damages to Colipano with Associate Justices Edgardo L. Delos Santos and Maria Elisa
is 6%. Sempio Diy concurring.
WHEREFORE,premises considered, the petition for 3. Id. at 50-56. Penned by Presiding Judge Sylva G. Aguirre-Paderanga.
review is hereby PARTLY GRANTED.As to petitioner Vicente
Castro, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 4. Id. at 57-63 (inclusive of Annexes).
30, 2013 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the complaint 5. Id. at 57.
against him is dismissed for lack of cause of action. As to
6. Id. at 50, 58.
petitioner Jose Sanico, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.Petitioner Jose 7. Id. at 58.
Sanico is liable and ordered to pay respondent Werherlina 8. Id.
Colipano the following amounts:
9. Id.
1. Actual damages in the amount of P2,098.80;
10. Id. at 59.
2. Compensatory damages for loss of income in the
amount of P212,000.00; 11. See id. at 64, 66.

3. Interest on the total amount of the damages awarded 12. Id. at 66.

in 1 and 2 at the rate of 6% per annum reckoned 13. Id.
14. Id. at 66-67. 37. See British Airways v. Court of Appeals,349 Phil. 379, 390
(1998),citing Meneses v. Court of Appeals;316 Phil. 210, 222
15. Id. at 67.
(1995).
16. Id. at 56.
38. 682 Phil. 343 (2012).
17. Id. at 48-49.
39. Id. at 353, citing Cebu Shipyard & Eng'g Works, Inc. v. William Lines,
18. 124 Phil. 1330 (1966). Inc.,366 Phil. 439, 451 (1999),further citing Meneses v. Court of
Appeals,supra note 37; Tay Chun Suy v. Court of Appeals,299 Phil.
19. Id. at 1336. 162, 168 (1994);First Philippine International Bank  v. CA,322 Phil.
20. See Peralta de Guerrero v. Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc.,106 Phil. 485, 280, 319 and 335-337 (1996);Fortune Motors (Phils.) Corp. v.
487 (1959). CA,335 Phil. 315, 330 (1997).

21. CIVIL CODE, Art. 1756. 40. See Medina v. Asistio, Jr.,269 Phil. 225, 232 (1990).

22. 388 Phil. 146 (2000). 41. 280 Phil. 137 (1991).

23. Id. at 149, 153. 42. Rollo,p. 48.

24. Id. at 153. 43. Supra note 41, at 144-145; italics in original, emphasis supplied.

25. Rollo,p. 45. 44. Caguioa, supra note 36, at 14.

26. See id. 45. See rollo,pp. 47-48, 55.

27. Id. 46. Id.

28. 206 Phil. 341 (1983). 47. CIVIL CODE, Art. 1409 (1).

29. Id. at 349, citing Arrieta v. National Rice and Corn Corp.,119 Phil. 339, 48. Id.
347 (1964). 49. Rollo,pp. 55-56.
30. Rollo,pp. 25-26. 50. Id. at 45-46.
31. CIVIL CODE, Art. 1756. 51. Id. at 20-23.
32. See rollo,p. 52. 52. 533 Phil. 57 (2006).
33. Id. at 67. 53. Id. at 68; emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted.
34. Id. at 55. 54. Philippine National Railways Corp. v. Vizcara,supra note 38, at 353.
35. Id. at 47-48. 55. Serra v. Mumar,684 Phil. 363, 374 (2012);citations omitted.
36. Eduardo P. Caguioa, COMMENTS AND CASES ON CIVIL LAW CIVIL 56. Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency Corp. v. Borja,432 Phil. 913, 924
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. 1 (1967 3rd Ed.), p. 13. (2002).
 57. See rollo,p. 46.

58. Computed as follows:
Net Earning Capacity
 
 
 
 
= Life expectancy x [Gross Annual Income - Living
Expenses (50% of gross annual income)],where life
expectancy = 2/3 (80 - the age of the deceased)
= [2/3 x (80 - 27)] x (P12,000.00 x 50%)
= (2/3 x 53) x P6,000.00
= 35.33 x P6,000.00
= P212,000.00

59. Actual or Compensatory Damages, Arts. 2199 to 2215.

60. 304 Phil. 236 (1994).

61. Id. at 253; italics in original.

62. Id. at 254.

63. 716 Phil. 267 (2013).

  (Sanico v. Colipano, G.R. No. 209969, [September 27, 2017], 818 PHIL
|||

981-1001) SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 211563. September 29, 2021.]

SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION,

INC., petitioner, vs. MABALACAT INSTITUTE,
INC., respondent.

DECISION

HERNANDO,  J  :p

Challenged in this appeal is the August 30, 2013

Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA/appellate court) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 93376, and its February 26, 2014
Resolution 2 finding petitioner Santos Ventura Hocorma
Foundation, Inc. (SVHFI) guilty of forum shopping when it filed
two different actions, one for collection of sum of money and
the other an unlawful detainer suit in two different courts.
The Antecedents:
SVHFI claimed that it is the registered and absolute
owner of a parcel of land with an area of 11,451 square meters
(sq.m.), situated in Mabalacat, Pampanga, more particularly
described as Lot No. 530 and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. (TCT) T-195826-R, issued in its name (subject lot).
Mabalacat Institute, Inc. (MII), which is now known as Don
Teodoro V. Santos Institute, occupies said lot without paying
rent and only through its tolerance since the year 1983 until
March 14, 2002. 3
Nevertheless, through SVHFI's March 14, 2002 letter, 4 it
informed MII that beginning April 1, 2002, it will be charged a
rental fee for its use and occupancy of the subject lot at the
monthly rate of P50.00 per sq.m. which is payable on or before
the 5th day of each month. However, in MII's June 7, 2002 reply
letter, 5 it refused to comply with SVHFI's demand.
In view of MII's refusal, SVHFI wrote another letter 6 on
July 11, 2002, demanding the rental payment for the months of
April to July 2002 in the total amount of P2,519,220.00 within
15 days from receipt thereof. Otherwise, it must vacate the
subject lot. However, MII still failed to comply therewith. 7
In view of the foregoing, SVHFI filed a Complaint 8 for
collection of a sum of money against MII. The case was raffled
to Branch 150, Regional Trial Court, Makati City (court a quo)
and docketed as Civil Case No. 02-1326 (Collection Case). 9
Instead of filing an answer, MII filed a Motion to
Dismiss 10 the complaint on the ground that the
court a quo had not validly acquired jurisdiction because it was
not properly served with summons. 11
In its March 12, 2003 Order, 12 the court a quo denied
MII's Motion to Dismiss. MII moved for reconsideration 13 of the
said Order but the same was likewise denied in its September
25, 2003 Order. 14
MII then sought to nullify the RTC's March 12, 2003 and
September 25, 2003 Orders before the CA through a Petition
for Certiorari 15 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was
denied in the appellate court's July 13, 2005 Decision 16 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 80547. MII moved for reconsideration, which was
likewise denied in the appellate court's September 16, 2005
Resolution. 17
Unfazed, MII filed with this Court a Petition for Review
on Certiorari 18 docketed as G.R. No. 167876. However, it was
dismissed through this Court's July 4, 2005 Resolution 19 on the
following grounds: (i) the petition was considered as unsigned
pleading for failure to verify the same in accordance with
Section 4, Rule 7 in relation to Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court; and (ii) the petition lacks sufficient showing that the
assailed judgement was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
On March 29, 2006, MII filed its Answer with
Compulsory Counter-claim 20 with the court a quo in the
Collection Case which was admitted in the Order dated June
27, 2007. 21
Thereafter, the court a quo set the Collection Case for
pre-trial. However, prior to the scheduled pre-trial, on
September 28, 2007, MII filed a Motion to Dismiss 22 the
complaint on the ground of forum shopping. It argued that the
failure of SVHFI to report to the court a quo that it filed the
Ejectment Case despite the explicit requirement of Section 5
(c), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court was a willful and deliberate act
of forum shopping on account of which its complaint should be
dismissed. MII likewise charged SVHFI with violating the rule on
splitting of a single cause of action as set forth in Sections 3
and 4, Rule 2 of the same Rules. 23
 While the court a quo's proceedings were underway,
SVHFI filed a Complaint 24 for Ejectment on June 20, 2006
against MII. It was raffled to the sixth Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Mabalacat and Magalang, Pampanga and
docketed as Civil Case No. 06-2568 (Ejectment Case). 25
Ruling of the Regional
Court:
In its March 31, 2008 Order 26 the court a quo granted
MII's motion to dismiss, thereby dismissing the Collection Case,
to wit:
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is Granted.
Civil Case No. 02-1326 is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED. 27
Aggrieved, SVHFI filed a Motion for
Reconsideration 28 which the RTC denied in its October 6, 2008
Order. 29
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
SVHFI filed an appeal 30 with the appellate court,
wherein the sole issue raised was whether or not SVHFI was
guilty of forum shopping when it filed two different actions, i.e.,
the Collection and Ejectment Cases, in two different
courts. 31 In its August 30, 2013 Decision, 32 the appellate court
ruled in the affirmative, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
premises, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and
the March 31, 2008 Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 150 in the City of Makati in Civil Case No. 02-
1326 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 33
Both parties filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration 34 which were both denied in the appellate
court's February 26, 2014 Resolution. 35
Thus, both parties filed their respective Petitions for
Review on Certiorari 36 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In
MII's Petition, docketed as G.R. No. 211531, it asserts that the
appellate court failed to resolve the issue it raised as to
whether or not it should be allowed to present evidence to
prove its compulsory counterclaim pursuant to Section 6, Rule
Trial
16 of the Rules of Court, as amended. 37 It claims that the
dismissal of the complaint under the said provision was
without prejudice to the prosecution in the same or separate
action of a counterclaim pleaded in the answer. 38 Thus, it
prays that We order the court a quo to hear ex-parte the
presentation of its evidence for its compulsory counterclaim. 39
On the other hand, in SVHFI's instant petition, docketed
as G.R. No. 211563, it argues that the appellate court erred in
sustaining the trial court's finding that it is guilty of forum
shopping. 40 It asserts that the identity of the rights asserted in
a collection of rent is different from an ejectment
proceeding. 41
In Our April 21, 2014 Resolution 42 We denied MII's
petition in G.R. No. 211531, to wit:
In this appeal, MII cries foul over the silence of
the Court of Appeals' decision and resolution
regarding the fate of its counterclaim. MII claimed
that it had already apprised the Court of Appeals
about its counterclaim in its Reply Brief and motion
for reconsideration.
xxx xxx xxx
We deny the petition.
It must be mentioned at the outset that MII is
not actually challenging the merits of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals. MII is just
concerned about the apparent disregard of its
counterclaim in both.
 The fate of the counterclaim of MII, however,
is not for the Court of Appeals to decide; it is for the
RTC. And the RTC was only unable to act upon MII's
request because, according to the trial court, it
already transmitted the records of Civil Case No. 02-
1326 to the Court of Appeals due to the pendency of
CA-G.R. CV No. 93376. This reasoning employed by
the RTC was never challenged by MII; rather MII
merely took the same as a cue to inform the Court of
Appeals about its request to present evidence on its
counterclaim before the RTC.
Hence, We find no error on the part of the
Court of Appeals in making no disposition as to MII's
counterclaim in its decision and resolution in CA-G.R.
CV No. 93376.
Subsequently, in G.R. No. 211531, MII moved for
reconsideration which this Court denied in its July 9, 2014
Resolution. 43 Thus, the same became final and executory on
September 9, 2014. 44
Issue
The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether
SVHFI committed forum shopping when it filed two different
actions, i.e., the Collection and Ejectment Cases, in two
different courts.
Our Ruling
We resolve to grant SVHFI's Petition.
We hold that SVHFI did not violate the rule on forum
shopping when it filed the Ejectment Case while the Collection
Case has been pending for four years.
The determinative factor
violations of the rule against
forum shopping is whether
elements of litis pendentia are
present, or whether a final
judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in
another.
In Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction
Development Co. 45 (Intramuros), We explained that "[f]orum
shopping is the practice of resorting to multiple fora for the
same relief, to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable
judgment." 46
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court prohibits forum
shopping by requiring the plaintiff or principal party to certify
under oath that he or she has not commenced any action
involving the same issues in any court. 47 In Orix Metro Leasing
and Finance Corp. v. Cardline, Inc., 48 We pointed out that the
"rule against forum shopping seeks to address the great evil of
two competent tribunals rendering two separate and
contradictory decisions. Forum shopping exists when a party
initiates two or more actions, other than appeal or certiorari,
grounded on the same cause to obtain a more favorable
decision from any tribunal." 49
The elements of forum shopping are: (i) identity of
parties, or at least such parties representing the same interest;
(ii) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the latter
founded on the same facts; and (iii) any judgment rendered in
one action will amount to res judicata in the other action. 50
In Spouses Reyes v. Spouses Chung, 51 We explained the
test to determine whether a party violated the rule against
forum shopping, to wit:
It has been jurisprudentially established that
forum shopping exists when a party avails himself of
in several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially
the founded on the same transactions and the same
essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
 substantially the same issues either pending in or
already resolved adversely by some other courts.
The test to determine whether a party
violated the rule against forum shopping is
whether the elements of litis pendentia are
present, or whether a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in another. Simply put,
when litis pendentia or res judicata does not exist,
neither can forum shopping exist.
The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the
identity of parties, or at least such as representing the
same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity of the two cases such that judgment in
one, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other. On the other
hand, the elements of res judicata, also known as bar
by prior judgment, are: (a) the former judgment must
be final; (b) the court which rendered it had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c)
it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there
must be, between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action. 52 (Emphasis supplied)
SVHFI was not guilty of
shopping.
In the instant case, We find that the second and third
elements of forum shopping and litis pendentia are lacking.
Thus, We are of the firm view that there is no identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for between a suit for collection of
sum of money and an unlawful detainer case, and that any
judgment rendered in one of these actions would not amount
to res judicata in the other action.
Firstly, there is no identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for between both actions.
The only issue that must be settled in an ejectment
proceeding is physical possession of the property
involved. 53 Thus, in actions for unlawful detainer, a complaint
sufficiently alleges said cause of action if it states the following
elements, to wit: (1) initially, the possession of the property by
the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon
notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of the termination of
the latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant
remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (4) within one year from the
making of the last demand to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment. 54
On one hand, the purpose of the Collection Case was to
compel MII to pay its rent in view of its occupancy on the
subject lot from the time of SVHFI's initial demand to vacate
the subject lot. Thus, in Pro-Guard Security Services Corp. v.
Tormil Realty and Development Corp., 55 this Court pointed out
that the party adjudged to be the lawful possessor in an
ejectment suit is entitled to compensation, reckoned from the
time he demanded the adverse party to vacate the disputed
property.
On the other hand, in the Ejectment Case, SVHFI's cause
forum of action stemmed from the prejudice it suffered due to the
loss of possession of its property. Nonetheless, its claims in the
Collection Case do not have a direct relation to its loss of
material possession of the subject lot. 56 Thus, We emphasized
Our pronouncement in Araos v. Court of Appeals, 57 which We
likewise reiterated in Lajave Agricultural Management and
Development Enterprises, Inc. v. Spouses Javellana 58 (Lajave) to
wit:
The rule is settled that in forcible entry or
unlawful detainer cases, the only damage that can be
recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the
 leased property. The reason for this is that in such
cases, the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that
of rightful possession; hence, the damages which
could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could
have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused
by the loss of the use and occupation of the property,
and not the damages which he may have suffered but
which have no direct relation to his loss of material
possession.
Secondly, any judgment rendered in ejectment cases of
forcible entry or unlawful detainer will not amount to res
judicata in a civil case of collection of sum of money for unpaid
rent of the same property and vice versa.
Settled is the rule that the only issue raised in ejectment
cases is that of physical possession of the property. 59 Thus, in
forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the only damage that
can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the leased
property. 60 Hence, the damages which could be recovered are
those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere
possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and
occupation of the property. On the other hand, in a civil suit for
collection of sum of money, what is sought to be recovered is
the payment of rentals only without regard to the unlawfulness
of the occupancy. 61
Our pronouncement in Lajave, is instructive, to wit:
[D]id Agustin commit violation of the rules on
forum shopping, on splitting of a single cause of
action, and on litis pendentia when he filed the
complaint for collection of sum of money during
the pendency of the unlawful detainer cases?
We answer in the negative.
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, a perusal of the records
shows that the second and third requirements [of litis
pendentia] are lacking. While the complaints appear to
involve the same parties and properties, we find,
however, no identity of causes of action. In the
unlawful detainer cases filed by Agustin, in view of
Lajave's failure to vacate the subject properties and
non-payment of rentals, his cause of action
stemmed from the prejudice he suffered due to
the loss of possession of his properties and the
damages incurred after the dispossession.
Meanwhile, in the complaint for collection
of sum of money, the same was founded upon
alleged violation of Lajave, as lessee, of certain
stipulations with regard to payment of the
lease, i.e., whether Lajave correctly paid the rental
fees for the subject period as stipulated in the lease
agreement.
It must be emphasized anew that in
forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the only
damage that can be recovered is the fair rental
value or the reasonable compensation for the use
and occupation of the leased property. The reason
for this is that in such cases, the only issue raised in
ejectment cases is that of rightful possession;
hence, the damages which could be recovered are
those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a
mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the
use and occupation of the property, and  not the
damages which he may have suffered but which have
no direct relation to his loss of material
possession. 62 (Emphasis supplied; underscoring on
the original).
We are not unaware of Our ruling in Intramuros. In said
case, petitioner instituted an ejectment case against the
respondent in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) while
respondent filed a case for specific performance against
petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC). In the specific an institution of an ejectment suit does not constitute as forum
performance case, respondent prayed that petitioner be shopping even if the issue of unpaid rentals between the same
compelled to offset respondent's unpaid rentals. In addition, parties and of the same property is pending before another
an interpleader case was filed against them in the RTC wherein court.
the complainant prayed that the RTC determine which
An action for collection of sum of
between the parties was the rightful lessor of the subject
money may not be joined with an
property in view of the respondent's threats to evict the
ejectment suit, otherwise a
tenants therein.
misjoinder of causes of action
Thus, We held that "any recovery made by petitioner of would ensue.
unpaid rentals in either its ejectment case or in the specific
Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court prohibits the
performance case must bar recovery in the other, pursuant to
joinder of an ordinary action, such as an action for collection of
the principle of unjust enrichment." 63 Our foregoing
sum of money and a special civil action, such as an ejectment
pronouncement is in fact consistent with Our ruling in the
suit. Said provision reads:
instant case. In the Ejectment Case, the sole issue was the
restoration to the rightful possessor of the subject lot who was Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. — A party
may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
deprived of the same. The rightful possessor would then be
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have
entitled to the fair rental value for the use and occupation of
against an opposing party, subject to the following
the property. conditions:
On the other hand, in the Collection Case, what is (a) The party joining the causes of action shall
sought to be recovered is the payment of rentals, without comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
regard to the legality of MII's occupancy or damages which
(b) The joinder shall not include special
SVHFI allegedly suffered but which have no direct relation to its
civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
loss of material possession. Both issues may be decided by the
courts wherein they are pending. However, any amount that (c) Where the causes of action are between
the same parties but pertain to different venues or
the victor may have recovered in the ejectment suit due to the
jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the
damage caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the
Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of
property, may no longer be recovered in the Collection Case on action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and
the ground of unjust enrichment. the venue lies therein; and
We further note that in Intramuros, this Court resolved (d) Where the claims in all the causes of action
the issue of possession, without further remanding the case to are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate
the MeTC which would cause undue delay. Thus, the issue of amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.
the rightful possession was settled even if the issue of unpaid (Emphasis supplied.)
rentals was still pending before the RTC in the complaint for Thus, in Lajave, We pointed out that "an action for
specific performance. 64 This further strengthens our view that collection of sum of money may not be properly joined with
the action for ejectment. The former is an ordinary civil action
requiring a full-blown trial, while an action for unlawful
detainer is a special civil action which requires a summary
procedure."
Thus, We explained, to wit:
[I]nsofar as the complaint for collection of sum of
money is concerned, it is not a simple case of
recovering the unpaid balance of rentals. It must be
pointed out that there are several factors to
consider if and when the collection of sum of
money will prosper, i.e., the determination if indeed
recovery of the alleged balance is proper, the correct
amount of rental to be paid or recovered, the
intention and/or agreement of the parties as to the
terms of payment of rental in order to arrive at a
correct amount, among others. Indeed, as correctly
observed by the appellate court, the resolution of
whether Lajave paid the correct rental fees and if
there is a deficiency in the payment of rentals
requires a full-blown trial through the submission
of documentary and testimonial evidence by the
parties which cannot be passed upon in a
summary proceeding. 65 (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the Collection Case requires a full-
blown trial for the parties to show evidence on the propriety of
paying rent and its rightful amount. These may not be
accomplished in an ejectment proceeding which is summary in
nature.
Therefore, this Court finds SVHFI not guilty of forum
shopping when it filed the Ejectment Case subsequent to the
Collection Case, while the latter is still pending. In both cases,
there is no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for,
and that any judgement on any of these cases would not
amount to res judicata on the other.
In the Ejectment Case, the cause of action stemmed
from the prejudice that SVHFI allegedly suffered due to the loss
of possession of the subject lot. On the other hand, the
Collection Case was founded on the appropriate amount of
rental fees that are allegedly due and the damages that SVHFI
allegedly suffered but which have no direct relation to its loss
of material possession.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Santos Ventura Hocorma
Foundation, Inc.'s Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED.
The Court of Appeals' August 30, 2013 Decision and February
26, 2014 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 93376 are
hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The instant case
is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 150 which is DIRECTED to continue its proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe, Inting, J.Y. Lopez * and Dimaampao, JJ.,
concur.
 
Footnotes
* Designated as additional Member per Raffle dated September 15,
2021 vice J. Gaerlan who recused due to prior action in the CA.
1. Rollo, pp. 26-33. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and
concurred in by Associate Justices Michael P. Elbinias and Nina
G. Antonio-Valenzuela.
2. Id. at 34-35.
3. Id. at 14 and 27.
4. CA rollo, p. 78.
5. Id. at 84.
6. Id. at 85.
7. Rollo, pp. 27-28.
8. CA rollo, pp. 87-92. 32. Id. at 26-33.

9. Rollo, p. 27. 33. Id. at 30.

10. CA rollo, pp. 108-109. 34. Id. at 34.

11. Rollo, p. 28. 35. Id.

12. CA rollo, pp. 110-111. 36. Id. at 8-23.

13. Id. at 112. 37. Id. at 10.

14. Rollo, pp. 16 and 28; See also CA rollo, pp. 112-114. 38. Id. at 8.

15. CA rollo, pp. 115-133. 39. Id. at 12.

16. Id. at 134-145; penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner and 40. Id. at 17.
concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Jose C.
41. Id. at 19.
Mendoza.
42. Rollo, pp. 27-30; Notice dated April 21, 2014.
17. Id. at 146.
43. Id. at 46.
18. Id. at 147-189.
44. Id. at 49-50.
19. Id. at 190.
45. 827 Phil. 303, 327 (2018).
20. Rollo, p. 28; See also CA rollo, pp. 194-208.
46. Id., citing Dy v. Mandy Commodities, Inc., 611 Phil. 74, 84 (2009).
21. See Rollo, p. 29.
47. Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Presbitero, Jr., 757
22. CA rollo, pp. 209-216.
Phil. 454, 468 (2015).
23. Rollo, p. 29.
48. 778 Phil. 280, 292 (2016).
24. Id. at 28.
49. Id., citing Arevalo v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 193415, April
25. Id. 18, 2012, 670 SCRA 252, 267.

26. CA rollo, pp. 217-223. Penned by Presiding Judge Elmo M. Alameda. 50. Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 624 Phil. 396, 400 (2010), citing Cruz v.
Caraos, G.R. No. 138208, April 23, 2007, 521 SCRA 510, 522. See
27. Id. at 730.
also Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corp. v. Cardline,
28. Rollo, p. 29. Inc.,  supra note 48.

29. Id.; See also CA rollo, p. 224. 51. 818 Phil. 225 (2017), citing Dayot v. Shell Chemical Company (Phils.),
Inc., G.R. No. 156542, June 26, 2007, 525 SCRA 535, 545-546. See
30. CA rollo, pp. 15-16. also Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction
31. Rollo, p. 29. Development Co.,  supra note 45.
52. Id. at 234.
53. See Mangaser v. Ugay, 749 Phil. 372, 381 (2014).
54. Rosario v. Alba, 784 Phil. 778, 787 (2016), citing Zacarias v. Ancay, G.R.
No. 202354, September 24, 2014, 736 SCRA 508; Republic v.
Sunvar Realty Development Corporation, 688 Phil. 616
(2010); Macaslang v. Spouses Zamora, 664 Phil. 337 (2011).
in Civil Case No. 08-119138 is currently pending with Branch 37,
Regional Trial Court, Manila, by virtue of petitioner's
counterclaim. As the parties dispute the amounts to be offset
under the July 27, 2004 Memorandum of Agreement and
respondent's actual back and current rentals due, the
resolution of that case is better left to the Regional Trial Court
for trial on the merits.

55. 738 Phil. 417, 425 (2014). 65. Supra note 55.

56. See Lajave Agricultural Management and Development Enterprises, Inc.  

v. Spouses Javellana, G.R. No. 223785, November 7, 2018.   (Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. v. Mabalacat Institute,
|||

57. 302 Phil. 813, 819 (1994). Inc., G.R. No. 211563, [September 29, 2021])

58. Supra.

59. Echanes v. Spouses Hailar, 792 Phil. 724, 730 (2016), citing Barrientos

v. Rapal, 669 Phil. 438, 444 (2011).

60. La Campana Development Corp. v. Ledesma, 643 Phil. 257, 266 (2010).

61. Lajave Agricultural Management and Development Enterprises, Inc. v.

Spouses Javellana,  supra note 55.

62. Id.

63. Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction Development

Co.,  supra note 46.

64. Id. at 334 and 338-339. We held:

Ordinarily, this case would now be remanded to the

Metropolitan Trial Court for the determination of the rightful
possessor of the leased premises. However, this would cause
needless delay inconsistent with the summary nature of
ejectment proceedings. Given that there appears sufficient
evidence on record to make this determination, judicial
economy dictates that this Court now resolve the issue of
possession.

xxx xxx xxx

However, this Court cannot award unpaid rentals to petitioner
pursuant to the ejectment proceeding, since the issue of rentals
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 154598. August 16, 2004.]
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf
of the minor child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE
FRANCISCO THORNTON,  petitioner,  vs. ADELFA
FRANCISCO THORNTON,  respondent.
DECISION
CORONA,  J  :
p
This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the July 5, 2002 resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals,
Sixteenth Division, in CA G.R. SP No. 70501 dismissing the petition
for habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of
substance. The dispositive portion 2 read:
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition
for habeas corpus on the grounds that: a) this Court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition;
and b) the petition is not sufficient in substance.
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were
married on August 28, 1998 in the Catholic Evangelical Church at
United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth
to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco
Thornton.
However, after three years, respondent grew restless and
bored as a plain housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as
a "guest relations officer" in a nightclub, with the freedom to go
out with her friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was out of the
country, respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving
her daughter in the care of the househelp.
Petitioner admonished respondent about her
irresponsibility but she continued her carefree ways. On
December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her
daughter Sequiera without notifying her husband. She told the
servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta.
Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the
designated Family Court in Makati City but this was dismissed,
presumably because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan.
Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of
respondent and their daughter. However, he did not find them
there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan,
issued a certification 3 that respondent was no longer residing
there. 
IEaHSD
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of
respondent's cellular phone bills showing calls from different
places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other
provinces. Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus,
this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of
habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals
on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case. It
ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave
family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for
habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding
the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa
129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):
Under Sec. 9(1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction
to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction
was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act
expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction
finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court.
In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family
Courts Act was enacted. It provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. — The
Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following
cases:
xxx xxx xxx
b. Petition for guardianship, custody of
children, habeas corpus in relation to
the latter.
The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly
repeal BP 129 and RA 7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of
this Court to issue writ of habeas corpus in custody of
minor cases is concerned? The simple answer is, yes, it
did, because there is no other meaning of the word
"exclusive" than to constitute the Family Court as the
sole court which can issue said writ. If a court other
than the Family Court also possesses the same
competence, then the jurisdiction of the former is not
exclusive but concurrent — and such an interpretation
is contrary to the simple and clear wording of RA 8369.
Petitioner argues that unless this Court
assumes jurisdiction over a petition for habeas corpus
involving custody of minors, a respondent can easily
evade the service of a writ of habeas corpus on him or
her by just moving out of the region over which the
Regional Trial Court issuing the writ has territorial
jurisdiction. That may be so but then jurisdiction is
conferred by law. In the absence of a law conferring
such jurisdiction in this Court, it cannot exercise it even
if it is demanded by expediency or necessity.
Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not
within the authority of this Court — or any court for
that matter — to determine. The enactment of a law on
jurisdiction is within the exclusive domain of the
legislature. When there is a perceived defect in the law,
the remedy is not to be sought from the courts but only
from the legislature.
The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases
involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA
8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such
petitions. 
TIcAaH
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that
Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas
Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC,
effective May 15, 2003) has rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of
the rule provides that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in
the Supreme Court, 4 Court of Appeals, or with any of its members
and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines. 5
The petition is granted.
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case
since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to
issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly
repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by giving family courts
exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers
intended it to be the sole court which can issue writs of habeas
corpus. To the court a quo, the word "exclusive" apparently cannot
be construed any other way.
We disagree with the CA's reasoning because it will result in
an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without
legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals
who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for
would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family
courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective
territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from
one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the
petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal
remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of
the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. As
observed by the Solicitor General:  aECSHI
Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the
avowed policy of the State is to "protect the rights and
promote the welfare of children." The creation of the
Family Court is geared towards addressing three major
issues regarding children's welfare cases, as expressed
by the legislators during the deliberations for the law.
The legislative intent behind giving Family Courts
exclusive and original jurisdiction over such cases was
to avoid further clogging of regular court dockets,
ensure greater sensitivity and specialization in view of
the nature of the case and the parties, as well as to
guarantee that the privacy of the children party to the
case remains protected.
The primordial consideration is the welfare and best
interests of the child. We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction
over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. Again,
to quote the Solicitor General:
To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise
jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus
involving a minor child whose whereabouts are
uncertain and transient will not result in one of the
situations that the legislature seeks to avoid. First, the
welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex
parte nature of habeas corpus proceedings will not
result in disruption of the child's privacy and emotional
well-being; whereas to deprive the appellate court of
jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be avoided by
the legislature: the child's welfare and well being will be
prejudiced.
This is not the first time that this Court construed the word
"exclusive" as not foreclosing resort to another jurisdiction. As
correctly cited by the Solicitor General, in Floresca vs. Philex Mining
Corporation, 6 the heirs of miners killed in a work-related accident
were allowed to file suit in the regular courts even if, under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, the Workmen's Compensation
Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.
We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General
that:
While Floresca involved a cause of action
different from the case at bar, it supports petitioner's
submission that the word "exclusive" in the Family
Courts Act of 1997 may not connote automatic
foreclosure of the jurisdiction of other courts over
habeas corpus cases involving minors. In the same
manner that the remedies in the Floresca case were
selective, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and
Family Court in the case at bar is concurrent. The Family
Court can issue writs of habeas corpus enforceable only
within its territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, in
cases where the territorial jurisdiction for the
enforcement of the writ cannot be determined with
certainty, the Court of Appeals can issue the same writ
enforceable throughout the Philippines, as provided in
Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
 
 The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be
granted by the Supreme Court, or any member
thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the
Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the
instances authorized by law, and if so granted it
shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines,
and may be made returnable before the court
or any member thereof, or before a Court of
First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing
and decision on the merits.  It may also be
granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge
thereof, on any day and at any time, and
returnable before himself, enforceable only within
his judicial district. (Emphasis supplied)
In ruling that the Commissioner's "exclusive" jurisdiction
did not foreclose resort to the regular courts for damages, this
Court, in the same Floresca case, said that it was merely applying
and giving effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice
in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and implemented by the Civil
Code. It also applied the well-established rule that what is
controlling is the spirit and intent, not the letter, of the law:
"Idolatrous reverence" for the law sacrifices the
human being. The spirit of the law insures man's
survival and ennobles him. In the words of
Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit
giveth life."
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the
social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as
implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is
not an exercise of the power of law-making, but is
rendering obedience to the mandates of the
fundamental law and the implementing legislation
aforementioned.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be
incapable of being used in more than one sense. Sometimes, what
the legislature actually had in mind is not accurately reflected in
the language of a statute, and its literal interpretation may render
it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice or contradiction. 7 In the
case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word "exclusive" will
result in grave injustice and negate the policy "to protect the rights
and promote the welfare of children" 8 under the Constitution and
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This
mandate must prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the
guiding principle in construing the provisions of RA 8369.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that
implied repeals are not favored:
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible,
and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the
inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is
expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare
leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must
be so interpreted and brought into accord with other
laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The
fundament is that the legislature should be presumed
to have known the existing laws on the subject and not
have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts
must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all
efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and
give effect to all laws on the subject." 9
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to
revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court
to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors.
Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA
7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does
not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from
issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of
minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony
with RA 7029 and BP 129 — that family courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in
petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at
issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been
settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC Re: Rule on
Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to
Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. — A
verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving
custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court.
The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to
which the Family Court belongs.
xxx xxx xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable
anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made
returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court
within the region where the petitioner resides or where
the minor may be found for hearing and decision on
the merits. (Emphasis Ours)
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with
family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors
is involved. 
IEAaST
One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for
the child all over the country is not an unreasonable availment of a
remedy which the Court of Appeals cited as a ground for
dismissing the petition. As explained by the Solicitor General: 10
That the serving officer will have to "search for
the child all over the country" does not represent an
insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such a
task is no more different from or difficult than the duty
of the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest,
since the latter is likewise enforceable anywhere within
the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition
for habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is hereby REINSTATED
and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban and Carpio Morales, JJ  ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J  ., is on leave.
Footnotes
1.Penned by Associate Justice Hilarion A. Aquino and concurred in by
Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Regalado E. Maambong.
2.CA Decision, p. 3.
3.Rollo, p. 49.
4.Article VIII. Section 5. "The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
  (1) Exercise original jurisdiction . . . over petitions for . . . habeas
corpus.
   xxx xxx xxx."
5.Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. — A verified petition for a
writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed
with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its
judicial region to which the Family Courts belong.
   xxx xxx xxx
  The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ
shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may
be returnable to a Family Court or any regular court within the
region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be
found for hearing and decision on the merits.
 6.136 SCRA 141 [1985]. STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON, GRACE
7.Agpalo, Statutory Constitution, 1986, p. 98.
LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP,  respondents.

8.SEC. 2. State and National Policies. — The State shall protect the rights
and promote the welfare of children in keeping with the Tanjuatco, Oreta  and  Tanjuatco  for petitioners.
mandate of the Constitution and the precepts of the United
Pecabar Law Offices  for private respondents.
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child . . .

9.Republic vs. Marcopper Mining, 335 SCRA 386 [2000].

SYLLABUS
10.Ibid. at 120.

  1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; NON-PAYMENT

OF DOCKET FEE; RENDERS NULL AND VOID AND COMPLAINTS
  (Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, [August 16, 2004], 480 PHIL
AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS WHERETO. — The rule is
|||

224-235)
well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of
the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court."
Thus, in the present case the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only P410.00 as
docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint
thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes
there is no such original complaint that was duly filed which
could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the
amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and
actions taken by the trial court are null and void. The Court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or
similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court,
much less the payment of the docket fee based on the
amounts sought in the amended pleading.  cdasia

EN BANC 2. ID.; ID.; COMPLAINT; CONTENTS; AMOUNT

OF MANDAMUS MUST BE SPECIFIED NOT ONLY IN THE BODY
[G.R. No. 75919. May 7, 1987.] BUT ALSO IN THE PRAYER. — All complaints, petitions, answers
and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading
AL.,  petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in
CITYLAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that
 fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record. The
court acquires jurisdiction over any upon payment of the
prescribed docket fee.
RESOLUTION
GANCAYCO, J  .:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the
resolution of the Second Division of January 28, 1987 and
another motion to refer the case to and to be heard in oral
argument by the Court En Banc filed by petitioners, the motion
to refer the case to the Court en banc is granted but the motion
to set the case for oral argument is denied.
Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing
fee must be assessed on the basis of the amended complaint
cite the case of Magaspi vs. Ramolete. 1 They contend that the
Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the filing fee should be
levied by considering the amount of damages sought in the
original complaint.
The environmental facts of said case differ from the
present in that —
1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land with
damages, 2 while the present case is an action for torts and
damages and specific performance with prayer for temporary
restraining order, etc. 3
2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint
seeks not only the annulment of title of the defendant to the
property, the declaration of ownership and delivery of
possession thereof to plaintiffs but also asks for the payment
of actual, moral, exemplary damages and attorney's fees
arising therefrom in the amounts specified therein. 4 However,
in the present case, the prayer is for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the
action against the defendants' announced forfeiture of the
sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property in
question, to attach such property of defendants that may be
sufficient to satisfy any judgment that may be rendered, and
after hearing, to order defendants to execute a contract of
purchase and sale of the subject property and annul
defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff, ordering
defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff actual,
compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said
amounts as may be proved during the trial as attorney's fees
and declaring the tender of payment of the purchase price of
plaintiff valid and producing the effect of payment and to make
the injunction permanent. The amount of damages sought is
not specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint
alleges the total amount of over P78 Million as damages
suffered by plaintiff. 5
3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest
difference of opinion as to the nature of the action in the
Magaspi case. The complaint was considered as primarily an
action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of
land. The damages stated were treated as merely ancillary to
the main cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of only P60.00
and P10.00 for the sheriff's fee were paid. 6
In the present case there can be no such honest
difference of opinion. As may be gleaned from the allegations
of the complaint as well as the designation thereof, it is both
an action for damages and specific performance. The docket
fee paid upon filing of complaint in the amount only of P410.00
by considering the action to be merely one for specific
performance where the amount involved is not capable of
pecuniary estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the
total amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of
the complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of the complaint
totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which should be the
basis of assessment of the filing fee. 
prll
4. When this under-assessment of the filing fee in this
case was brought to the attention of this Court together with
similar other cases an investigation was immediately ordered
by the Court. Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel with
leave of court filed an amended complaint on September 12,
1985 for the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as
co-plaintiff and by eliminating any mention of the amount of
damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the
original complaint was maintained. After this Court issued an
order on October 15, 1985 ordering the re-assessment of the
docket fee in the present case and other cases that were
investigated, on November 12, 1985 the trial court directed
plaintiffs to rectify the amended complaint by stating the
amounts which they are asking for. It was only then that
plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in the body of the
complaint in the reduced amount of P10,000,000.00. 7 Still no
amount of damages were specified in the prayer. Said
amended complaint was admitted.
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court
ordered the plaintiffs to pay the amount of P3,104.00 as filing
fee covering the damages alleged in the original complaint as it
did not consider the damages to be merely ancillary or
incidental to the action for recovery of ownership and
possession of real property. 8 An amended complaint was filed
by plaintiff with leave of court to include the government of the
Republic as defendant and reducing the amount of damages,
and attorney's fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said amended
complaint was also admitted. 9
In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only
one for recovery of ownership but also for damages, so that
the filing fee for the damages should be the basis of
assessment. Although the payment of the docketing fee of
P60.00 was found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held
that since the payment was the result of an "honest difference
of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee"
the court "had acquired jurisdiction over the case and the
proceedings thereafter had were proper and
regular." 10 Hence, as the amended complaint superseded the
original complaint, the allegations of damages in the amended
complaint should be the basis of the computation of the filing
fee. 11
In the present case no such honest difference of
opinion was possible as the allegations of the complaint, the
designation and the prayer show clearly that it is an action for
damages and specific performance. The docketing fee should
be assessed by considering the amount of damages as alleged
in the original complaint. 
cdtai
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled
"that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket
fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court." 12 Thus, in
the present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither
can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction
upon the Court. 13 For all legal purposes there is no such
original complaint that was duly filed which could be amended.
Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and
all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court
are null and void.
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the
present case that the basis of assessment of the docket fee
should be the amount of damages sought in the original
complaint and not in the amended complaint.
The Court cannot close this case without making the
observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed
the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification The ruling in the Magaspi case 14 in so far as it is inconsistent
of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint. This
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied
is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the
for lack of merit.
payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket
clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent SO ORDERED.
practice was compounded when, even as this Court had taken Teehankee, C.J ., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an investigation, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento  and  Cortes,
petitioner through another counsel filed an amended JJ  ., concur.
complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages
Paras, J  ., took no part.
being asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only when
in obedience to the order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the  
trial court directed that the amount of damages be specified in Footnotes
the amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the
damages sought in the much reduced amount of 1.115 SCRA 193.
P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the 2.Supra, p. 194.
prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required
3.P. 64, Rollo.
docket fee is obvious.
4.Magaspi vs. Ramolete, supra, pp. 114-115.
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action
upon a repetition of this unethical practice. 
cdrep 5.Pp. 65-66,  Rollo.

To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all 6.Magaspi case, supra, p. 194.

complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings
should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not
only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said
damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing
fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this
requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall
otherwise be expunged from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of
the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket
fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.
7.Pp. 121-122, Rollo.
8.Magaspi vs. Ramolete, supra, pp. 199-200.
9.Pp. 201-202, Rollo.
10.Supra, 115 SCRA 204-205.
11.Supra, 115 SCRA 205.
12.Supra, 115 SCRA 204, citing Malimit vs. Degamo, G.R. No. L-17850,
Nov. 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 450, 120 Phil. 1247; Lee vs. Republic, L-
15027, Jan. 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 65.
13.Gaspar vs. Dorado, L-17884, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 331;
Tamayo vs. San Miguel Brewery, G.R. No. L-17449, January 30,
 1964; Rosario vs. Carandang, 96 Phil. 845; Campos Rueda Corp.
vs. Hon. Judge Bautista, et al., G.R. No. L-18452, Sept. 29, 1962.
14.Supra.
 
  (Manchester Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75919
|||
(Resolution), [May 7, 1987], 233 PHIL 579-586)
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 79937-38. February 13, 1989.]
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B.
PHILIPPS AND D.J. WARBY,  petitioners, vs. HON.
MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge,
Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City
and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG,  respondents.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles Law
Offices for petitioners.
Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & Sanvicente Law Offices for
private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTES; PROCEDURAL LAWS; APPLIED RETROSPECTIVELY. —
Private respondent claims that the ruling in Manchester (149 SCRA
562) cannot apply retroactively to Civil Case No. Q-41177 for at the
time said civil case was filed in court there was no
such Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private respondent avers
that what is applicable is the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v.
Ramolete, wherein this Court held that the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was
insufficient. The contention that Manchester cannot apply
retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutes regulating the
procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; VESTS IN COURTS UPON
PAYMENT OF THE PRESCRIBED DOCKET FEES. — It is not simply
the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but
the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court
with jurisdiction over the subject- matter or nature of the action.
Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. ID.; ID.; PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIMS AND THIRD-PARTY
CLAIMS; NOT CONSIDERED FILED UNLESS PRESCRIBED DOCKET
FEE IS PAID. — The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims,
third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be
considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor
is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a
reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
4. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF ADDITIONAL FEE REQUIRED WHERE
JUDGMENT AWARDS CLAIM NOT SPECIFIED IN THE PLEADING. —
Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing
of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing
fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified
in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J  : p
Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not a
court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and
proper docket fee has not been paid.
On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL
for brevity) filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Metro Manila for the consignation of a premium refund on
a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of
its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private
respondent was declared in default for failure to file the required
answer within the reglementary period.  cdasia
On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a
complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the refund
of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially against
petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J.
Warby as additional defendants. The complaint sought, among
others, the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary
and liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and
costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not
quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be
inferred from the body of the complaint to be about Fifty Million
Pesos (P50,000,000.00).
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as
docket fee which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his
objection. Said objection was disregarded by respondent Judge
Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over said case.
Upon the order of this Court, the records of said case together
with twenty-two other cases assigned to different branches of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which were under investigation
for under-assessment of docket fees were transmitted to this
Court. The Court thereafter returned the said records to the trial
court with the directive that they be re-raffled to the other judges
in Quezon City, to the exclusion of Judge Castro. Civil Case No. Q-
41177 was re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was then vacant.
On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in
Administrative Case No. 85-10-8752-RTC directing the judges in
said cases to reassess the docket fees and that in case of
deficiency, to order its payment. The Resolution also requires all
clerks of court to issue certificates of re-assessment of docket fees.
All litigants were likewise required to specify in their pleadings the
amount sought to be recovered in their complaints.
On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala
Civil Case No. Q-41177 was temporarily assigned, issued an order
to the Clerk of Court instructing him to issue a certificate of
assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent and, in
case of deficiency, to include the same in said certificate.
On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was
filed by petitioners. On August 30, 1984, an amended complaint
was filed by private respondent including the two additional
defendants aforestated.
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q- 41177
was thereafter assigned, after his assumption into office on
January 16, 1986, issued a Supplemental Order requiring the
parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-report
signifying her difficulty in complying with the Resolution of this
Court of October 15, 1985 since the pleadings filed by private
respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to be
recovered. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed a
"Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein a
claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual compensatory
damages" in the prayer. In the body of the said second amended
complaint however, private respondent alleges actual and
compensatory damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of
about P44,601,623.70.
On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order
admitting the second amended complaint and stating therein that
the same constituted proper compliance with the Resolution of
this Court and that a copy thereof should be furnished the Clerk of
Court for the reassessment of the docket fees. The reassessment
by the Clerk of Court bases on private respondent's claim of "not
less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages"
amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was subsequently
paid by private respondent.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals questioning the said order of Judge Asuncion dated
January 24, 1986.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental
complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as
damages so the total claim amounts to about P64,601,623.70. On
October 16, 1986, or some seven months after filing the
supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid the
additional docket fee of P80,396.00. 1
On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
ruling, among others, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Denying due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
L-09715 insofar as it seeks annulment of the order.
(a) denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the
complaint, as amended, and
(b) granting the writ of preliminary attachment, but
giving due course to the portion thereof questioning
the reassessment of the docketing fee, and requiring
the Honorable respondent Court to reassess the
docketing fee to be paid by private respondent on the
basis of the amount of P25,401,707.00." 2
Hence, the instant petition.
During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the
said judgment of respondent court, private respondent paid the
additional docket fee of P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988. 3
The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals erred
in not finding that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over
Civil Case No. Q-41177 on the ground of non-payment of the
correct and proper docket fee. Petitioners allege that while it may
be true that private respondent had paid the amount of
P182,824.90 as docket fee as herein-above related, and
considering that the total amount sought to be recovered in the
amended and supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the
docket fee that should be paid by private respondent is
P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the same, petitioners
contend that the complaint should be dismissed and all incidents
arising therefrom should be annulled. In support of their theory,
petitioner cite the latest ruling of the Court in Manchester
Development Corporation vs. CA,  4 as follows:
"The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will
not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the
 payment of the docket fee based on the amounts
sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the
Magaspi Case in so far it is inconsistent with this
pronouncement is overturned and reversed."
On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling
in Manchester cannot apply retroactively to Civil Case No. Q-41177
for at the time said civil case was filed in court there was no
such Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private respondent avers
that what is applicable is the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v.
Ramolete, 5 wherein this Court held that the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was
insufficient.
 
The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this
case is untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts
will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent. 6
In Lazaro vs.  Endencia and Andres, 7 this Court held that the
payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable
step for the perfection of an appeal. In a forcible entry and
detainer case before the justice of the peace court of Manaoag,
Pangasinan, after notice of a judgment dismissing the case, the
plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with said court but he deposited
only P8.00 for the docket fee, instead of P16.00 as required, within
the reglementary period of appeal of five (5) days after receiving
notice of judgment. Plaintiff deposited the additional P8.00 to
complete the amount of the docket fee only fourteen (14) days
later. On the basis of these facts, this court held that the Court of
First Instance did not acquire jurisdiction to hear and determine
the appeal as the appeal was not thereby perfected.
In Lee vs. Republic,  8 the petitioner filed a verified declaration of
intention to become a Filipino citizen by sending it through
registered mail to the Office of the Solicitor General in 1953 but
the required filing fee was paid only in 1956, barely 5-1/2 months
prior to the filing of the petition for citizenship. This Court ruled
that the declaration was not filed in accordance with the legal
requirement that such declaration should be filed at least one year
before the filing of the petition for citizenship. Citing Lazaro, this
Court concluded that the filing of petitioner's declaration of
intention on October 23, 1953 produced no legal effect until the
required filing fee was paid on May 23, 1956.  llcd
In Malimit vs.  Degamo, 9 the same principles enunciated
in Lazaro and Lee were applied. It was an original petition for quo
warranto contesting the right to office of proclaimed candidates
which was mailed, addressed to the clerk of the Court of First
Instance, within the one-week period after the proclamation as
provided therefor by law. 10 However, the required docket fees
were paid only after the expiration of said period. Consequently,
this Court held that the date of such payment must be deemed to
be the real date of filing of aforesaid petition and not the date
when it was mailed.
Again, in Garica vs. Vasquez,  11 this Court reiterated the rule that
the docket fee must be paid before a court will act on a petition or
complaint. However, we also held that said rule is not applicable
when petitioner seeks the probate of several wills of the same
decedent as he is not required to file a separate action for each
will but instead he may have other wills probated in the same
special proceeding then pending before the same court.
Then in Magaspi,  12 this Court reiterated the ruling
in Malimit and Lee that a case is deemed filed only upon payment
of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filing in court.
Said case involved a complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land with damages filed in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu. Upon the payment of P60.00 for the docket
fee and P10.00 for the sheriff's fee, the complaint was docketed as
Civil Case No. R-11882. The prayer of the complaint sought that
the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of the
defendant be declared as null and void. It was also prayed that
plaintiff be declared as owner thereof to whom the proper title
should be issued, and that defendant be made to pay monthly
rentals of P3,500.00 from June 2, 1948 up to the time the property
is delivered to plaintiff, P500,000.00 as moral damages, attorney's
fees in the amount of P250,000.00, the costs of the action and
exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00.
The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay
the correct amount of the docket fee to which an opposition was
filed by the plaintiff alleging that the action was for the recovery of
a parcel of land so the docket fee must be based on its assessed
value and that the amount of P60.00 was the correct docketing
fee. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay P3,140.00 as filing
fee.
The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended complaint
to include the Republic as the defendant. In the prayer of the
amended complaint the exemplary damages earlier sought was
eliminated. The amended prayer merely sought moral damages as
the court may determine, attorney's fees of P100,000.00 and the
costs of the action. The defendant filed an opposition to the
amended complaint. The opposition notwithstanding, the
amended complaint was admitted by the trial court. The trial court
reiterated its order for the payment of the additional docket fee
which plaintiff assailed and then challenged before this Court.
Plaintiff alleged that he paid the total docket fee in the amount of
P60.00 and that if he had to pay the additional fee it must be
based on the amended complaint.
The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff
may be considered to have filed the case even if the docketing fee
paid was not sufficient. In Magaspi, We reiterated the rule that the
case was deemed filed only upon the payment of the correct
amount for the docket fee regardless of the actual date of the
filing of the complaint; that there was an honest difference of
opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee in that
as the action appears to be one for the recovery of property the
docket fee of P60.00 was correct; and that as the action is also for
damages, We upheld the assessment of the additional docket fee
based on the damages alleged in the amended complaint as
against the assessment of the trial court which was based on the
damages alleged in the original complaint.  LLjur
However, as aforecited, this Court
overturned Magaspi in Manchester.  Manchester involves an action
for torts and damages and specific performance with a prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order, etc. The prayer in
said case is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction during the pendency of the action against the
defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by
the plaintiffs for the property in question, the attachment of such
property of defendants that may be sufficient to satisfy any
judgment that may be rendered, and, after hearing, the issuance
of an order requiring defendants to execute a contract of
purchase and sale of the subject property and annual defendants'
illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff. It was also prayed that
the defendants be made to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally,
actual, compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of
said amounts as may be proved during the trial for attorney's fees.
The plaintiff also asked the trial court to declare the tender of
payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and sufficient for
purpose of payment, and to make the injunction permanent. The
amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although
the body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78
Million allegedly suffered by plaintiff. 
cdrep
Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the amount of
only P410.00 for the docket fee based on the nature of the action
for specific performance where the amount involved is not
capable of pecuniary estimation. However, it was obvious from the
allegation of the complaint as well as its designation that the
action was one for damages and specific performance. Thus, this
court held the plaintiff must be assessed the correct docket fee
computed against the amount of damages of about P78 Million,
although the same was not spelled out in the prayer of the
complaint.
Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave of court,
filed a amended complaint on September 12, 1985 by the
inclusion of another co-plaintiff and eliminating any mention of
the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer
in the original complaint was maintained.
On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the re-assessment of the
docket fee in the said case and other cases that were investigated.
On November 12, 1985 the trial court directed the plaintiff to
rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which they
were asking for. This plaintiff did as instructed. In the body of the
complaint the amount of damages alleged was reduced to
P10,000,000.00 but still no amount of damages was specified in
the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed
only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date
of filing in court," this Court held that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case by payment of only P410.00 for the
docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby
vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes they was no
such original complaint duly filed which could be amended.
Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all
subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court were
declared null and void. 13
The present case, as above discussed, is among the several cases
of under-assessment of docket fee which were investigated by this
Court together with Manchester. The facts and circumstances of
this case are similar to Manchester.  In the body of the original
complaint, the total amount of damages sought amounted to
about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount of damages asked for
was not stated. The action was for the refund of the premium and
the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment with damages.
The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On
January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an amended complaint
wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than
P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in the body
of the complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is
approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was
admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the
additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less
than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental
complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in
damages so that his total claim is approximately P64,601,620.70.
On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an additional docket
fee of P80,396.00. After the promulgation of the decision of the
respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein private respondent
was ordered to be reassessed for additional docket fee, and
during the pendency of this petition, and after the promulgation
of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid an
additional docket fee on P62,132.92. Although private respondent
appears to have paid a total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket
fee considering the total amount of this claim in the amended and
supplemental complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70,
petitioner insists that private respondent must pay a docket fee of
P257,810.49.
The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the
present case. The pattern and the intent to defraud the
government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the
filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second
amended complaint.
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional
docket fee until the case was decided by this Court on May 7,
1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the
government, this Court held that the court a quo did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint could
not have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was
null and void.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is
called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent
demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the
decision in Manchester must have had that sobering influence on
private respondent who thus paid the additional docket fee as
ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change for
stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket
fee as may be ordered.
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was
paid is still insufficient considering the total amount of the claim.
This is a matter which the clerk of court of the lower court and/or
his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should
determine and, thereafter, it any amount is found due, he must
require the private respondent to pay the same.
Thus, the Court rules as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee,
that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is
not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party
claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed
until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court
may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but
also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the
filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed
filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of
the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said
lien and assess and collect the additional fee. 
liblex
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk
of Court of the court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and
determine the additional filing fee that should be paid by private
respondent considering the total amount of the claim sought in
the original complaint and the supplemental complaint as may be
gleaned from the allegations and the prayer thereof and to require
private respondent to pay the deficiency, if any, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C  .J  ., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortés, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea  and  Regalado, JJ  .,  concur.
 
Footnotes
 
1.Annexes 1, 1-A, 1-B of Comment of private respondent.
2.Page 34, Decision of the Court of Appeals; p. 57 Rollo.
3.Annex 2 to Memorandum of private respondent.
4.149 SCRA 562 (1987).
5.115 SCRA 193, 204 (1982).
6.People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764 (1946); Alday vs. Camilon, 120 SCRA
521 (1983) and Palomo Building Tenants Association, Inc. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 133 SCRA 168 (1984).
 7.57 Phil. 552 (1932).

8.10 SCRA 65 (1964).

9.12 SCRA 450 (1964).

10.Section 173, Revised Election Code.

11.28 SCRA 3301 (1969).

12.Supra.

13.Supra, pp. 567-568.

  (Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 79937-38, [February

|||

13, 1989], 252 PHIL 280-292)

FIRST DIVISION as shown by the statement hereto attached as
Annex "A" which was verified and and (sic)
reconciled with the books of the FIRST PARTY.
[G.R. No. 169108. April 18, 2006.]
2. Simultaneously with the signing
hereof, the FIRST PARTY shall pay 25% of the
INTERCONTINENTAL BROADCASTING
aforesaid amount and the balance to be paid in
CORPORATION (IBC-13), Rep. by Its President
staggered payments, payable in three (3)
Renato Bello,  petitioner, vs. HON. ROSE MARIE
installments.
ALONZO LEGASTO and ANTONIO
SALVADOR,  respondents. 3. The FIRST PARTY agrees to offset the
airtime 320-30's daytime spots against the
FOUR MILLION (P4,000,000.00) PESOS
marketing fee due to the FIRST PARTY under the
DECISION separate Marketing Agreement between IBC
and Colours Network, Inc., represented by
ANTONIO SALVADOR at P12,500/spot. These
YNARES-SANTIAGO,  J  : p
airtime spots shall be utilized by the SECOND
PARTY on ROS basis.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the March
4. The balance of 6,080-30's primetime
16, 2005 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. spots airtime shall mean usage in commercial
85085 which denied the petition filed by petitioner placement for TV commercials. In the event of
Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13) for lack of privatization, the said spots will be valued at the
merit, and its July 22, 2005 Resolution 2 denying the motion for company's prevailing market price and be made
reconsideration. payable upon demand.

The pertinent facts as found by the Court of Appeals are 5. Both parties shall submit a motion to
as follows: dismiss the case pending before Branch 88 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.  aEHADT

For the purpose of putting an end to the suit for

a sum of money docketed as Civil Case No. Q-96-26330 With the submission of the
before Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon foregoing Compromise Agreement alongside the parties'
City, petitioner, as First Party, and private respondent 8 June 1998 joint manifestation and motion to dismiss,
Antonio Salvador, as Second Party, entered into Civil Case No. Q-96-26330 was dismissed on July 4,
a Compromise Agreement dated 22 May 1998 which 1998.
contained the following stipulations, to wit:
On 18 December 2000, however, petitioner
"1. The FIRST PARTY shall pay the commenced an action to declare the
amount of TWO MILLION (P2,000,000.00) PESOS aforesaid Compromise Agreement null and void ab initio.
By then already privatized and under a new
management, petitioner alleged, among other matters,
that aside from its non-existent cause or object, said
agreement was entered into by its erstwhile
management without the requisite approval of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG);
and, that private respondent should refund the
P2,000,000.00 he received in virtue thereof and pay his
overavailment of its 506.75 ROS spots amounting to
P1,140,187.50. Incorporating claims for exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses,
petitioner's complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
00-42707 before public respondent's sala.
Contending that petitioner unjustifiably
refused to comply with its obligation under
paragraph 4 of the selfsame Compromise Agreement,
on the other hand, private respondent filed the 5
January 2001 complaint for Specific Performance
and Damages against petitioner, its President,
Boots Anson Roa, and Legal Counsel and Corporate
Secretary, Atty. Azucena Garcia. Docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-01-43036 before Branch 220 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, private
respondent's complaint sought the grant of the
following reliefs:
"WHEREFORE, it is prayed that
judgment be rendered directing defendant
IBC to comply with paragraph 4 of the
compromise agreement in accordance with
the tenor thereof and to order all the
defendants to jointly and severally pay the
plaintiff the following:
1. P200,000.00 as actual damages;
2. P500,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. P300,000.00 for and as attorney's
fees.
Plaintiff further prays for such other
equitable reliefs as may be warranted in the
premises."
With the two cases subsequently consolidated
before public respondent, private respondent filed a
motion for issuance of a writ of attachment on
September 23, 2003. Maintaining that, computed on the
average price of P90,000.00 per 30-second spot, his
claim already totaled P540,000.000.00 private
respondent alleged, among other matters, that
petitioner was guilty of gross insincerity and bad faith in
instituting Civil Case No. Q-00-42707; and, that with the
sale of its DMZ-FM Station to Blockbuster Broadcasting
System, petitioner manifested its determination to
defeat his claim by leaving no sufficient security
therefore (sic). On the theory that petitioner's answer to
his complaint tendered no genuine issue as to any
material fact, private respondent later filed a motion for
summary judgment dated 28 February 2004.
On February 5, 2004, petitioner filed a
motion styled as one for dismissal and/or
suspension of all proceedings in the aforesaid
consolidated cases. Calling public respondent's
attention to the fact that private respondent only
paid P8,517.50 in docket fees, petitioner maintained
that, rather than for specific performance and
damages as indicated in his complaint, private
respondent's cause of action was actually one for a
sum of money, the totality of the latter's claim, as
disclosed in his motion for issuance of a writ of
attachment, translated into unpaid docket fees
amounting to P5,452,237.50; and, that private
respondent's suit should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction or, at the very least, suspended until
payment of the correct docket fees. The motion was
duly opposed by private respondent on 16 February
2004. 3 (Emphasis added)
 On March 26, 2004, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 99, issued an Order 4 denying petitioner's motion
to dismiss and/or suspension of all proceedings pending
payment by respondent of the appropriate docket fees. The
trial court held that petitioner is estopped from raising the
issue of deficient docket fee in view of its active participation in
the proceedings; that the deficiency in the filing fees did not
divest it of its jurisdiction hence the proceedings need not be
dismissed or suspended. The unpaid docket fees, however,
would be treated as a judgment lien if favorable to respondent.
After the denial of its motion for
reconsideration, 5 petitioner filed on July 14, 2004 a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. On September 29,
2004, it filed a manifestation apprising the appellate tribunal
that on August 20, 2004, the trial court rendered judgment on
respondent's motion for summary judgment, the decretal
portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court
resolves to:
1. DENY the motion for the issuance of writ of
attachment for having become moot and
academic;
2. RENDERS SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDERS IBC-13
to pay ANTONIO SALVADOR the sum of:
a. Php540,000,000.00 representing the rounded
monetized value of the 5,980 (out of
6,080) airtimes spots with 12% interest
per annum thereon from the time of the
filing of the complaint in January 2001
until fully paid;
b. Php100,000.00 as and by way of attorney's
fees.
SO ORDERED. 6
In its Decision dated March 16, 2005, the Court of
Appeals found no abuse of discretion in the denial of
petitioner's motion to dismiss and/or suspend the
proceedings. 7 It held that non-payment of the appropriate
docket fees did not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction to try
the case and that the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy has the responsibility to make the deficiency
assessment. 8
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied 9 hence this petition.  aScITE
Petitioner contends that respondent failed to pay the
correct docket fees thus the trial court never acquired the
requisite jurisdiction over the case; that granting the lower
court never lost its jurisdiction notwithstanding the deficiency
assessment, it should have, in the interest of prudence and fair
play, at least ordered the suspension of proceedings pending
payment of the appropriate docket fees. 10
The petition lacks merit.
Contrary to petitioner's assertion, jurisdiction was
properly acquired in this case. In the case of Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 11 we declared that:
The Court cannot close this case without making
the observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel
who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting
any specification of the amount of damages in the
prayer although the amount of over P78 million is
alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly
intended for no other purpose than to evade the
payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the
docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. This
fraudulent practice was compounded when, even as
this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and
ordered an investigation, petitioner through another
counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting all
mention of the amount of damages being asked for in
 the body of the complaint. It was only when in
obedience to the order of this Court of October 18,
1985, the trial court directed that the amount of
damages be specified in the amended complaint, that
petitioners' counsel wrote the damages sought in the
much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of
the complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The design
to avoid payment of the required docket fee is obvious.
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic
action upon a repetition of this unethical practice.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all
complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being
prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also
in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in
the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any
pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall
not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will
not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the
payment of the docket fee based on the amounts
sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the
Magaspi case, in so far as it is inconsistent with this
pronouncement is overturned and reversed. 12
The aforequoted pronouncement, however, has no
application in the instant case. These stringent requirements
have been relaxed in the subsequent case of Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion 13 which laid down the following
rules:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of docket fee, the court may
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but
in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims,
third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not
be considered filed until and unless the filing fee
prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow
payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in
no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. 
SEIcAD
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a
claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently,
the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall
be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and
collect the additional fee. (Emphasis added)
Subsequently in Tacay v. Regional Trial Court of Tagum,
Davao Del Norte, 14 the phrase "awards of claims not specified
in the pleading" was clarified to refer only to damages arising
after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading. 15 Be that
as it may, we find that the court a quo properly acquired
jurisdiction over the case.
In Proton Pilipinas Corporation v. Banque Nationale de
Paris, 16 a case in which the docket fees paid by the plaintiff
were also insufficient, we held that:
With respect to petitioner's argument that the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case in
light of the insufficient docket fees, the same does not
lie.
 True, in Manchester Development Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, this Court held that the court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees, hence, it concluded that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
It bears emphasis, however, that the ruling
in Manchester was clarified in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.
(SIOL) v. Asuncion when this Court held that in the
former there was clearly an effort to defraud the
government in avoiding to pay the correct docket fees,
whereas in the latter the plaintiff demonstrated his
willingness to abide by paying the additional fees as
required.
xxx xxx xxx
The ruling in Sun Insurance Office was echoed in
the 2005 case of Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Achilles
Melicor 17
Plainly, while the payment of the
prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional
requirement, even its non-payment at the time of
filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of
the case, as long as the fees is paid within the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period,
more so when the party involved demonstrates
a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing
such payment. Thus, when insufficient filing
fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs
and there was no intention to defraud the
government, the  Manchester  rule does not
apply.
A perusal of respondent's January 5, 2001 complaint
shows that he prayed for the following reliefs:
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that judgment be
rendered directing defendant IBC to comply with
paragraph 4 of the compromise agreement in
accordance with the tenor thereof and to order all the
defendants to jointly and severally pay the plaintiff the
following:
1. P200,000.00 as actual damages;
2. P500,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. P300,000.00 for and as attorney's fees.
Plaintiff further prays for such other equitable
reliefs as may be warranted in the premises. 18
On the other hand, paragraph 4 of the Compromise
Agreement which is the subject of the aforequoted prayer
stipulates:
4. The balance of 6,080-30's primetime spots
airtime shall mean usage in commercial placement for
TV commercials. In the event of privatization, the said
spots will be valued at the company's prevailing market
price and be made payable upon demand. 19
When the two aforementioned portions are taken
together, it becomes apparent that at the time of the filing of
the January 5, 2001 complaint by the respondent, paragraph 4
of the Compromise Agreement cannot yet be quantified in
monetary terms. The value of the 6,080-30's primetime spots
was dependent upon the privatization of the petitioner and its
prevailing market price for the primetime spots. The only basis
then for the computation of the docket fees are the damages
that the respondent prays to be awarded to him. It was only
when the trial court rendered its summary judgment of August
20, 2004 that respondent's prayer for specific performance was
valued at P540,000,000.00. 20
We also note that prior to the filing of the complaint for
specific performance, respondent requested for a meeting
with the members of petitioner's Board of Directors to discuss
the monetary equivalent of paragraph 4 of the Compromise
Agreement. Thus, in the letter dated October 26,
2000 21 addressed to petitioner's President, respondent stated
thus:
With the upcoming privatization of IBC-13 before the
year ends as published in several newspapers, may I
reiterate our request to have a meeting with the
present Board of Directors of IBC-13, the Committee on
Privatization and/or Management Committee, so we
After this meeting, may we discuss the cost per spot in
pursuant to article 4 of our Compromise Agreement
before Privatization as published in the Daily Inquirer
(see attached). 22
The foregoing indicate that respondent did not have a
clear basis in computing the exact quantitative value of
paragraph 4 of the Compromise Agreement.  IADaSE

can finally discuss and settle the price of the current

market of the primetime spot of IBC-13 as embodied on On the other hand, the P8,517.00 docket fees were
(sic) paragraph 4 of our Compromise Agreement dated computed on the basis of what was legally quantifiable at the
May 22, 1998. time of the filing of the complaint. Upon proof of payment of
the assessed fees by the respondent, the trial court properly
For your further reference, our company took the
acquired jurisdiction over the complaint. Jurisdiction once
initiative of getting the official note card of all the TV
stations and we hereby forward a copy of these such as; acquired is never lost, it continues until the case is
terminated. 23
         
      Primetime Rate Card per 30's In the case at bar, the respondent relied on the
1. ABS-CBN Channel 2 P131,250.00   assessment made by the docket clerk which turned out to be
2. PTV Channel 4 35,000.00  
3. ABC Channel 5 75,000.00   incorrect. The payment of the docket fees, as assessed,
4. GMA Channel 7 117,000.00   negates any imputation of bad faith or an intent to defraud the
5. RPN Channel 9 92,000.00   government by the respondent. Thus, when insufficient filing
6. IBC Channel 13 ?  
fees were initially paid by the respondent and there was no
On November 29, 2000, respondent again wrote the intention to defraud the government, the Manchester  rule does
petitioner in this wise: not apply. 24 Hence, the trial court properly acquired
This is to inform you that our Compromise Agreement jurisdiction over the instant suit.
dated May 22, 1998 is final. Further, Section 2 of Rule 141 of the Rules of
Since your auditor claims that he doesn't have basis in Court clearly provides that:
the computation of the spots presented by the SGV, we Sec. 2. Fees in lien. — Where the court in its final
agreed to submit a Comparative Statement of the 6,080 judgment awards a claim not alleged, or a relief
spots. The primary objective is to find the truth and different from, or more than that claimed in the
veracity as supported by pertinent documents/papers pleading, the party concerned shall pay the additional
that became the basis of our Compromise Agreement fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in
and further your basis in paying the additional 1.5 satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of court shall assess
Million Pesos Cash in pursuant to paragraph I of the and collect the corresponding fees.
Compromise Agreement. We are ready next week to
meet your internal auditor. While we understand petitioner's apprehension that the
failure to collect the appropriate docket fees carries
detrimental repercussions to the efficient administration of 2.Id. at 55-56.
justice, we cannot sustain its stand that in this case the 3.Id. at 44-47.
judiciary will be defrauded of considerable docket fees. Based
on the computations made by the petitioner, the appropriate 4.Id. at 138-140. Penned by Judge Rose Marie Alonzo-Legasto.
docket fees is no less than P5,452,237.50. Such amount, if later 5.Id. at 148.
found to be proper, constitutes a judgment lien on the P540
6.Id. at 281.
million awarded to the respondent by the trial court by way of
summary judgment. 7.Id. at 51-52.

Thus, the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of 8.Id. at 53.
Quezon City, Branch 99, or his duly authorized representative
9.Id. at 55-56.
is hereby ordered to assess the amount of deficient docket
fees due from the respondent, which will constitute a 10.Id. at 30.
judgment lien on the amount awarded to him by summary 11.G.R. No. L-75919, May 7, 1987, 149 SCRA 562.
judgment and to enforce the said judgment lien and to collect
12.Id. at 568-569.
the additional fee. 
THCSEA

13.G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 274, 285.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
14.G.R. Nos. 88075-77, December 20, 1989, 180 SCRA 433.
DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 16, 2005 and
Resolution dated July 22, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA- 15.Id. at 442.
G.R. SP No. 85085 are AFFIRMED. 16.G.R. No. 151242, June 15, 2005, 460 SCRA 260, 274-276.
The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon 17.G.R. No. 140954, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 460, 475.
City, Branch 99, or his duly authorized deputy is hereby
ordered to enforce the judgment lien and to assess and collect 18.Rollo, p. 72.
the additional fees from the respondent. 19.Id. at 75.
SO ORDERED. 20.Id. at 281.
Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico- 21.Id. at 85.
Nazario, JJ., concur.
22.Id. at 91.
 
23.Gimenez v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-37933, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 1, 5.
Footnotes
24.Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor , G.R. No. 140954, April 12, 2005, 455
1.Rollo, pp. 43-54. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia- SCRA 460, 475.
Salvador and concurred in by Associate Justices Conrado M.
 
Vasquez, Jr. and Aurora Santiago-Lagman.
  (Intercontinental Broadcasting Corp. (IBC-13) v. Alonzo Legasto, G.R.
|||

No. 169108, [April 18, 2006], 521 PHIL 469-481)

 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 221815. November 29, 2017.]
GLYNNA FORONDA-
CRYSTAL, petitioner, vs. ANIANA LAWAS
SON, respondent.
DECISION
REYES, JR.,  J  :
p
In law, nothing is as elementary as the concept of
jurisdiction, for the same is the foundation upon which the courts
exercise their power of adjudication, and without which, no rights
or obligation could emanate from any decision or resolution.
The Case
Challenged before this Court via this Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 02226
promulgated on March 12, 2015, which affirmed in toto the
Decision 2 dated November 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 55 of Mandaue City. Likewise challenged is the
subsequent Resolution 3 promulgated on October 19, 2015
which upheld the earlier decision.
The Antecedent Facts
Petitioner is the daughter of Eddie Foronda, the
registered owner of a parcel of land located in Barrio Magay,
Municipality of Compostela, Province of Cebu. The latter
derived his title over the property from a successful grant of a
Free Patent (Free Patent No. VII-519533), which is covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. OP-37324, more
particularly described as follows: 
ATICcS
A PARCEL OF LAND (lot 1280, Case 3, Pls .962)
situated in the Barrio of Magay, Municipality of
Compostela, Province of Cebu, Island of Cebu.
Bounded on the SE., along line 1-2 by Lot 707 (As 07-
01-000033-amended); along line 2-3 by Lot 1275; on
the SW., along line 3-4 by Lot 1281; on the NW., along
line 4-5 by Lot 1315; along line 5-6 by Lot 1314; on the
NE., along line 6-7 by Lot 1392, along line 7-1 by Lot
1279, all of Compostela, Cadastre x x x. 4
On March 15, 1999, Aniana Lawas Son (respondent)
instituted an action for reconveyance and damages against
Glynna Foronda-Crystal (petitioner) alleging that, for twelve
and a half years, she has been the lawful owner and possessor
of the subject lot. She alleged that she purchased the same
from a certain Eleno T. Arias (Arias) on August 4, 1986 for a
sum of P200,000.00. According to her, since her acquisition,
she has been religiously paying real property taxes thereon as
evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 16408A, which was issued
under her name. 5
According to the respondent, the issuance of the Free
Patent in favor of the petitioner's father was "due to gross
error or any other cause." 6 In support thereof, the respondent
alleged that "there is no tax declaration in the name of
patentee Eddie Foronda" and that this "goes to show that
Eddie Foronda is not the owner of lot 1280 and neither has
payment of real estate taxes been made by him when he was
still alive or by his heirs." 7
 On April 13, 1999, herein petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds of (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) venue is
improperly laid, (3) action has prescribed, and, (4) lack of cause
of action. A week thereafter, the RTC issued an Order dated
April 20, 1999, 8 which dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. The RTC asserted that the "market value of the
subject property per Tax Declaration No. 16408 (Annex B,
Complaint) is P2,830.00" and thus, jurisdiction over the case
lies with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan-Compostela,
Cebu.
However, in yet another Order 9 dated July 23, 1999,
issued by the RTC following herein respondent's motion for
reconsideration, the RTC reconsidered and set aside its earlier
ruling based on the following ratiocination: (1) Paragraph III of
the Complaint stated that the property was worth P200,000.00;
(2) the Court has "judicial knowledge that under the BIR zonal
valuation, the property located at Magay, Compostela, Cebu
carries the value that may summed (sic) up to more than
P20,000.00 for the property with an area of 1,570 square
meters"; 10 and (3) the "tax declaration, sometimes being
undervalued, is not controlling." 11 Hence, trial ensued.
On November 24, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision in
favor of the respondent. The Register of Deeds of Cebu was
ordered to cancel OCT No. OP-37324, and to issue, in lieu
thereof, a new one under the name of the respondent. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants:
1) Declaring the issuance of Original
Certificate of Title No. OP-37324 (Free Patent No. VII-
519533) in the name of Eddie Foronda a grave error
since he is not the owner of Lot 1280, and therefore
null and void;
2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Cebu to
cancel Original Certificate of Title No. OP-37324 (Free
Patent No. VII-519533) and to issue, in lieu thereof, a
new one in the name of Aniana Lawas Son of
Compostela, Cebu. No pronouncement as to damages
and costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED. 12
Aggrieved, petitioner herein elevated the case to the CA.
The material allegations that she presented included the
following: (1) the RTC rendered its decision with undue haste
considering that the same was promulgated even before the
expiration of the period within which the parties' respective
memoranda were to be filed; (2) the respondent was not able
to prove that the lot she acquired from Arias was Lot No. 1280;
(3) the respondent failed to prove that she was in actual
physical possession of the subject property whereas the
petitioner was able to do so since 1972; (4) the RTC erred in its
order to cancel OCT No. OP-37324 and to issue, in lieu thereof,
a new title in herein respondent's name; and (5) the action filed
by the respondent was already barred by prescription and
laches.
On March 12, 2015, the CA rendered the assailed
Decision, which affirmed the RTC decision. The fallo of CA
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 55, Mandaue City dated November 24,
2006 in Civil Case No. MAN-3498, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 13
On October 19, 2015, the Resolution 14 issued by the CA
denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
The Issues
The petitioner anchors her plea for the reversal of the
assailed decision on the following grounds: 15
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING
THIS CASE ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF
JURISDICTION OF THE RTC OF MANDAUE CITY
OVER THIS CASE AS THE ASSESSED VALUE OF
THE PROPERTY SUBJECT OF THIS CASE IS
P1,030.00 AND THE PROPERTY IS LOCATED IN
COMPOSTELA, CEBU.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING
THE PROCEEDINGS AS WELL AS THE JUDGMENT
RENDERED BY THE RTC AS VOID.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING
ARTICLE 434 OF THE CIVIL CODE TO THE CASE AT
BAR.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT LOT NO. 1280 WAS A PUBLIC GRANT TO
WHICH EDDIE FORONDA WAS ISSUED A FREE
PATENT.
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE ACTION IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION.
VI. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE ACTION IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION
(SIC).
VII. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE VALIDITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE
DECISION OF THE RTC IS QUESTIONABLE
BECAUSE IT WAS RENDERED WITH UNDUE
HASTE.
The foregoing assignment of errors could be
summarized in three main issues: (1) whether or not the RTC
validly acquired jurisdiction over the case, and whether or not
the RTC decision was void ab initio; (2) whether or not the
Original Certificate of Title issued under the name of
petitioner's father should be canceled and set aside on the
strength of the respondent's allegations of ownership over the
same; and (3) whether or not the action is already barred by
prescription.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
On the Issue of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a
court to hear, try, and decide a case. 16 In order for the court or
an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case
on the merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over
the subject matter. 17 It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the
subject matter is the power to hear and determine the general
class to which the proceedings in question belong; it is
conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of
any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that
it exists. 18
What is relevant in this case, therefore, is the
delineation provided for by law which separates the
jurisdictions of the second level courts — the Regional Trial
Courts — and the first level courts — the Metropolitan Trial
Courts (MeTC), Municipal Trial Courts (MTC), Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts (MCTC), and Municipal Trial Courts in the Cities
(MTCC). cSEDTC
 This can be easily ascertained through a reading of
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7691. 19
According to this law, in all civil actions which involve
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction where the
assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00 or, for civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds
P50,000.00. 20 For those below the foregoing threshold
amounts, exclusive jurisdiction lies with the MeTC, MTC, MCTC,
or MTCC. 21
For a full discourse on the resolution of the present
petition, emphasis must be given on the assessed values 22 —
not the fair market values — of the real properties concerned.
According to the case of Heirs of Concha, Sr. v. Spouses
Lumocso, 23 the law is emphatic that in determining which court
has jurisdiction, it is only the assessed value of the realty
involved that should be computed. Heirs of Concha, Sr. averred
this definitive ruling by tracing the history of the The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended. It said:
The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as
well as its forerunner, Section 44(b) of R.A. 296, as
amended, gave the RTCs x x x exclusive original
jurisdiction. x x x Thus, under the old law, there was
no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is
one, the subject matter of which was incapable of
pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P.
129 or one involving title to property under Section
19(2).
The distinction between the two classes
became crucial with the amendment introduced
by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994 which expanded the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts. x
x x. Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction
over cases the subject matter of which involves "title
to, possession of, real property or any interest
therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided
between the first and second level courts, with the
assessed value of the real property involved as
the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to
"unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which
would result in the speedier administration of
justice." 24 (Emphasis, underscoring and formatting
supplied, citations omitted) 
AIDSTE
Time and again, this Court has continuously
upheld Heirs of Concha, Sr.'s ruling on this provision of law. 25 In
fact, in Malana, et al. v. Tappa, et al. 26 the Court said that
"the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses
the word 'shall' and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve
title to or possession of real property where the assessed value
does not exceed P20,000.00." 27
To determine the assessed value, which would in turn
determine the court with appropriate jurisdiction, an
examination of the allegations in the complaint is necessary. It
is a hornbook doctrine that the court should only look into the
facts alleged in the complaint to determine whether a suit is
within its jurisdiction. 28 According to the case of Spouses Cruz
v. Spouses Cruz, et al., 29 only these facts can be the basis of the
court's competence to take cognizance of a case, and that one
cannot advert to anything not set forth in the complaint, such
as evidence adduced at the trial, to determine the nature of
the action thereby initiated. 30
It is not a surprise, therefore, that a failure to allege the
assessed value of a real property in the complaint would result
to a dismissal of the case. This is because absent any allegation
in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it
cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's action. Indeed,
the courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market
value of the land. 31 This is the same ratio put forth by the
Court in the case of Spouses Cruz v.  Spouses Cruz, et al., 32 where
the case was dismissed partly on the basis of the following:
The complaint did not contain any such
allegation on the assessed value of the property.
There is no showing on the face of the complaint that
the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of petitioners.
Indeed, absent any allegation in the complaint of the
assessed value of the property, it cannot be
determined whether it is the RTC or the MTC which
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
petitioners' action. 33 (Citations omitted)
In Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals, 34 the Court had no
qualms in dismissing the case for failing to allege the assessed
value of the subject property. Similar to Spouses
Cruz, 35 Quinagoran  36 held that: "Considering that the
respondents failed to allege in their complaint the assessed
value of the subject property, the RTC seriously erred in
denying the motion to dismiss. Consequently, all proceedings
in the RTC are null and void, and the CA erred in affirming the
RTC."
This is not to say, however, that there is no room for a
liberal interpretation of this rule. In Tumpag v. Tumpag, 37 the
Court, through Justice Brion, provided for an instance when an
exception to the strict application could be allowed. It said:
Generally, the court should only look into the
facts alleged in the complaint to determine whether a
suit is within its jurisdiction. There may be instances,
however, when a rigid application of this rule may
result in defeating substantial justice or in prejudice
to a party's substantial right. 38
In that case, there was also no allegation of the
assessed value of the property. However, the Court pointed
out that the facts contained in the Declaration of Real Property,
which was attached to the complaint, could have facially
resolved the question on jurisdiction and would have rendered
the lengthy litigation on that very point unnecessary. 39 In
essence, the Court said that the failure to allege the real
property's assessed value in the complaint would not be fatal
if, in the documents annexed to the complaint, an allegation of
the assessed value could be found.
A reading of the quoted cases would reveal a pattern
which would invariably guide both the bench and the bar in
similar situations. Based on the foregoing, the rule on
determining the assessed value of a real property, insofar as
the identification of the jurisdiction of the first and second level
courts is concerned, would be two-tiered:  SDAaTC
First, the general rule is that jurisdiction is
determined by the assessed value of the real property
as alleged in the complaint; and
Second, the rule would be liberally applied if
the assessed value of the property, while not alleged
in the complaint, could still be identified through a
facial examination of the documents already attached
to the complaint.
Indeed, it is by adopting this two-tiered rule that the
Court could dispense with a catena of cases specifically dealing
with issues concerning jurisdiction over real properties.
In upholding these afore-quoted rule, however, the
Court is not unmindful of the cases of Barangay Piapi v.
Talip  40 and Trayvilla v. Sejas 41 where the market value of the
property, instead of the assessed value thereof, was used by
the Court as basis for determining jurisdiction.
In Barangay Piapi, 42 the complaint did not allege the
assessed value of the subject property. What it alleged was the
market value thereof. The Court held that, in the absence of an
allegation of assessed value in the complaint, the Court shall
consider the alleged market value to determine jurisdiction.
 Notably, this case referred to Section 7 (b), Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court, which deals with Legal Fees, to justify its
reliance on the market value. It said:
The Rule requires that "the assessed value
of the property, or if there is none, the estimated
value thereof,  shall be alleged by the claimant." It
bears reiterating that what determines jurisdiction is
the allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed
for. Petitioners' complaint is for reconveyance of a
parcel of land. Considering that their action involves
the title to or interest in real property, they should
have alleged therein its assessed value. However, they
only specified the market value or estimated value,
which is P15,000.00. Pursuant to the provision of
Section 33 (3) quoted earlier, it is the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Padada-Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, not
the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case. 43 (Italics
in the original, and emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
However, the rule alluded to above, while originally
containing the sentence: "In a real action, the assessed value of
the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof
shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in
computing the fees," has already been deleted through an
amendment by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC. As it currently stands,
Section 7 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. —
a) For filing an action or a permissive OR
COMPULSORY counter-claim, CROSS-CLAIM, or
money claim against an estate not based on
judgment, or for filing a third-party, fourth-party, etc.
complaint, or a complaint-in-intervention, if the total
sum claimed, INCLUSIVE OF INTERESTS, PENALTIES,
SURCHARGES, DAMAGES OF WHATEVER KIND, AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES, LITIGATION EXPENSES AND COSTS
and/or in cases involving property, the FAIR
MARKET value of the REAL property in
litigation STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX
DECLARATION OR CURRENT ZONAL VALUATION OF
THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, WHICHEVER IS
HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS NONE, THE STATED VALUE OF
THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION OR THE VALUE OF THE
PERSONAL PROPERTY IN LITIGATION AS ALLEGED BY
THE CLAIMANT, is: x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Two things must be said of this: first, Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court concerns the amount of the prescribed filing
and docket fees, the payment of which bestows upon the
courts the jurisdiction to entertain the pleadings to be
filed; 44 and second, the latest iteration of the same provision
already deleted the phrase "estimated value thereof," such
that the determination of the amount of prescribed filing and
docket fees are now based on the following: (a) the fair market
value of the real property in litigation stated in the current tax
declaration or current zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue; or (b) the stated value of the real or personal
property in litigation as alleged by the claimant.
A reading of the discourse on this would indicate that
the jurisdiction referred to above does not deal with the
delineation of the jurisdictions of the first and second level
courts, but with the acquisition of jurisdiction by the courts
through the payment of the prescribed filing and docket fees.
This is the same tenor of the Court's decision
in Trayvilla. In that case, where no assessed value was likewise
alleged in the complaint, the Court determined jurisdiction by
considering the actual amount by which the property was
purchased and as written in the Amended Complaint. The
Court stated that:
However, the CA failed to consider that in
determining jurisdiction, it could rely on the
declaration made in the Amended Complaint that the
 property is valued at P6,000.00. The handwritten
document sued upon and the pleadings indicate
that the property was purchased by petitioners
for the price of P6,000.00. For purposes of filing
the civil case against respondents, this amount
should be the stated value of the property in the
absence of a current tax declaration or zonal
valuation of the BIR. 45 (Emphasis supplied)
But then again, like the discussion
on Barangay Piapi above, Trayvilla was one which dealt with the
payment of the required filing and docket fees. The crux of the
case was the acquisition of jurisdiction by payment of docket
fees, and not the delineation of the jurisdiction of the first and
second level courts. In fact, Trayvilla interchangeably used the
terms "assessed value" and "market value" in a manner that
does not even recognize a difference.
Like Barangay Piapi, therefore, Spouses Trayvilla must
not be read in the context of jurisdiction of first and second
level courts as contemplated in the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980, as amended, 46 where the assessed values of the
properties are required. These cases must perforce be read in
the context of the determination of the actual amount of
prescribed filing and docket fees provided for in Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court. 
acEHCD
Having laid out the essential rules in determining the
jurisdiction of the first and second level courts for civil actions
which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, the Court now shifts focus to the specific
circumstances that surround the current case.
In here, the respondent failed to allege in her complaint
the assessed value of the subject property. Rather, what she
included therein was an allegation of its market value
amounting to P200,000.00. 47 In the course of the trial, the
petitioner asserted that the assessed value of the property as
stated in the tax declaration was merely P1,030.00, and
therefore the RTC lacked jurisdiction.
The question thus posed before this Court was whether
or not the RTC should have dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction, and in the affirmative, whether or not the RTC
decision should be rendered void for being issued without
jurisdiction.
As discussed above, settled is the requirement that
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, required
the allegation of the real property's assessed value in the
complaint. That the complaint in the present case did not aver
the assessed value of the property is a violation of the law, and
generally would be dismissed because the court which would
exercise jurisdiction over the case could not be identified.
However, a liberal interpretation of this law, as opined
by the Court in Tumpag, 48 would necessitate an examination of
the documents annexed to the complaint. In this instance, the
complaint referred to Tax Declaration No. 16408A, attached
therein as Annex "B," which naturally would contain the
assessed value of the property. A perusal thereof would reveal
that the property was valued at P2,826.00.
On this basis, it is clear that it is the MTC, and not the
RTC, that has jurisdiction over the case. The RTC should have
upheld its Order dated November 8, 2006 which dismissed the
same. Consequently, the decision that it rendered is null and
void.
In the case of Maslag v. Monzon, 49 the Court had
occasion to rule that an order issued by a court declaring that
it has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case when under the law it has none cannot likewise be
given effect. It amounts to usurpation of jurisdiction which
cannot be countenanced. Since the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, as amended, already apportioned the jurisdiction
of the MTC and the RTC in cases involving title to property,
neither the courts nor the petitioner could alter or disregard Footnotes
the same. 1. Penned by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, and concurred in by
In yet another case, Diona v. Balangue, 50 the Court ruled Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles and Associate Justice Marilyn
that void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at B. Lagura-Yap; rollo, pp. 52-79.
all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any 2. Id. at 125-128.
obligation. No legal rights can emanate from a resolution that
3. Id. at 88-92.
is null and void. As said by the Court in Cañero v. University of
the Philippines: 51 4. Id. at 53.

A void judgment is not entitled to the respect 5. Id. at 103-104.

accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely
6. Id.
disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in
which effect is sought to be given to it. It has no legal 7. Id. at 104-105.
or binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any
place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not 8. Id. at 115.
entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no 9. Id. at 116.
protection to those who seek to enforce. In other
words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity, and 10. Id.
the situation is the same as it would be if there was 11. Id.
no judgment. 52
12. Id. at 127-128.
Thus, considering the foregoing, it would be proper for
the Court to immediately dismiss this case without prejudice to 13. Id. at 79.
the parties' filing of a new one before the MTC that has 14. Id. at 88-92.
jurisdiction over the subject property. Consequently, the other
15. Id. at 25-26.
issues raised by the petitioner need not be discussed further.
16. Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of Customs, G.R.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
No. 209830, June 17, 2015, 759 SCRA 306, 310, citing Spouses
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 02226 dated March 12, 2015, and
Genato v. Viola, 625 Phil. 514, 527 (2010).
the Resolution dated October 19, 2015 of the Court of Appeals,
as well as the Decision dated November 24, 2006 of the 17. Id.
Regional Trial Court, Branch 55 of Mandaue City, are 18. Id., See  Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v. Republic, 679
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for being issued without Phil. 508 (2012), citing Allied Domecq Philippines, Inc. v. Villon, 482
jurisdiction. This is without prejudice to the filing of the parties Phil. 894, 900 (2004).
of the proper action before the proper court.  SDHTEC

19. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (1980), as amended by Rep. Act No.

SO ORDERED. 7691 (1994).

Carpio, Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe  and  Caguioa, JJ., concur. 20. Id. Sec. 19 (2).

21. Id. Sec. 33 (3). 41. G.R. No. 204970, February 1, 2016, 782 SCRA 578, 591.

22. According to the case of Geonzon v. Heirs of Legaspi (586 Phil. 750, 42. Barangay Piapi v. Talip, supra note 40.
751 [2008]), assessed value is understood to be the worth or
43. Id. at 398.
value of property established by taxing authorities on the basis
of which the tax rate is applied. It is synonymous to taxable 44. Trayvilla v. Sejas, supra note 41.
value and could be computed by multiplying the fair market
value with the assessment level (Hilario v. Salvador, 497 Phil. 45. Id. at 592-593.
327, 336 [2005]). 46. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (1980).
23. 564 Phil. 580, 599 (2007), citing Hilario v. Salvador, 497 Phil. 327 47. Rollo, p. 104.
(2005).
48. Tumpag v. Tumpag, supra note 28.
24. Heirs of Concha, Sr. v. Spouses Lumocso, supra at 596-597.
49. 711 Phil. 274, 285-286 (2013).
25. See San Pedro v. Asdala, 611 Phil. 30 (2009).
50. 701 Phil. 19, 25-26 (2013).
26. 616 Phil. 177 (2009).
51. 481 Phil. 249 (2004), as cited in Imperial v. Armes, G.R. No. 178842,
27. Id. at 188. January 30, 2017.
28. Tumpag v. Tumpag, G.R. No. 199133, September 29, 2014, 737 SCRA 52. Cañero v. University of the Philippines, id. at 267.
62, 69.
  (Foronda-Crystal v. Son, G.R. No. 221815, [November 29, 2017])
|||

29. 616 Phil. 519 (2009).

30. Id. at 523-524.

31. Hilario v. Salvador, supra note 22, at 336.

32. Supra note 29.

33. Id. at 527-528.

34. 557 Phil. 650, 661 (2007).

35. Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Cruz, et al., supra note 29, at 528.

36. Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals, supra note 34, at 661.

37. Supra note 28.

38. Id. at 70.

39. Id. at 70-71.

40. 506 Phil. 392, 397 (2005).

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136109. August 1, 2002.]
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC.,  petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
MANUEL DULAWON,  respondents.
Balbin Reyes Aguila & Associates  for petitioner.
Sarol & Dapeg Law Office  for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court a
complaint for breach of contract of lease with damages against
petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction contending that it is the Municipal Trial Court
which has jurisdiction as the complaint was basically one for
collection of unpaid rentals in the sum of P84,000.00, which does
not exceed the jurisdictional amount of P100,000.00 for Regional
Trial Courts. The trial court denied the motion. Petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, but the latter
dismissed the same. Hence, this petition.  TDcAIH
In affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court ruled that the allegations in the complaint in the
case at bar plainly showed that private respondent's cause of
action is breach of contract. It is settled that a breach of contract is
a cause of action either for specific performance or rescission of
contracts. The action for specific performance case, irrespective of
the amount of rentals and damages sought to be recovered, is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable exclusively by
the Regional Trial Court.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; JURISDICTION OF ACTIONS
INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION; HOW DETERMINED. —
In Russell, et al. v. Vestil, et al., the Court held that in determining
whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action
or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction over the action will depend
on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where
the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, the action is one where the subject of the
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, which is
cognizable exclusively by Regional Trial Courts.
2. ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER OF CASE;
HOW DETERMINED. — It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by
the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or
some of the claims asserted therein.
3. ID.; COURTS; REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS; HAVE EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION OVER ACTIONS OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. — It is
settled that a breach of contract is a cause of action either for
specific performance or rescission of contracts. In Manufacturer's
Distributors, Inc. v. Siu Liong, the Court held that actions for specific
performance are incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore
fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Here, the
averments in the complaint reveal that the suit filed by private
respondent was primarily one for specific performance as it was
aimed to enforce their three-year lease contract which would
incidentally entitle him to monetary awards if the court should find
that the subject contract of lease was breached. As alleged therein,
petitioner's failure to pay rentals due for the period from January
to March 1997, constituted a violation of their contract which had
the effect of accelerating the payment of monthly rentals for the
years 1997 and 1998. The same complaint likewise implied a
premature and unilateral termination of the term of the lease with
the closure of and removal of all communication equipment in the
leased premises. Under the circumstances, the court has to
scrutinize the facts and the applicable laws in order to determine
whether there was indeed a violation of their lease agreement that
would justify the award of rentals and damages. The prayer,
therefore, for the payment of unpaid rentals in the amount of
P84,000.00 plus damages consequent to the breach is merely
incidental to the main action for specific performance. . . . Clearly,
the action for specific performance case, irrespective of the
amount of rentals and damages sought to be recovered, is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable exclusively by
the Regional Trial Court.  CcHDaA
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO,  J  : p
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 45987 dated April 30, 1998 2 and its
resolution dated October 15, 1998 3 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
On June 18, 1997, private respondent Manuel Dulawon filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25, a
complaint for breach of contract of lease with damages against
petitioner Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI).
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction contending that it is the Municipal Trial Court which
has jurisdiction as the complaint is basically one for collection of
unpaid rentals in the sum of P84,000.00, which does not exceed
the jurisdictional amount of P100,000.00 for Regional Trial Courts.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, 4 as well as
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 5 Hence, petitioner went to
the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari. On April 30, 1998,
the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The dispositive
portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED. 6
The motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision
was denied on October 15, 1998. Hence, this petition.
The issue for resolution in this petition is whether or not
the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by
private respondent.
Pertinent portion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7691, provides:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional
Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
xxx xxx xxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand,
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the
value of the property in controversy exceeds One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such
 other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand,
exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). 7
Corollary thereto, Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of
whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional amount
under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the
damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of
the main cause of action. However, in cases where the
claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of
the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
xxx xxx xxx
In Russell, et al. v. Vestil, et al., 8 the Court held that in
determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which
is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily
for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction over the action
will depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic
issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence
of, the principal relief sought, the action is one where the subject
of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, which is
cognizable exclusively by Regional Trial Courts.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in
the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective
of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims
asserted therein. 9
In the case at bar, the allegations in the complaint plainly
show that private respondent's cause of action is breach of
contract. The pertinent portion of the complaint recites:
xxx xxx xxx
2. That sometime during the end of the year
1995, defendant through its appropriate officials
negotiated with plaintiff the lease of a portion of the
latter's building . . .
3. That the lease contract was effective for a
period of three (3) years or from January 1, 1996 to
January 1, 1998 with advance payment for the year
1996. The advance was not however given in lump sum
but on installment. One check that was given in
payment of one month's rental for 1996 was even stale
and had to be changed only after demand;
4. That as per contract the monthly rental for
1997 was P3,300.00 while for 1998, it is P3,700.00;
5. That the defendant surreptitiously removed
its equipments and other personalities from the leased
premises and failed to pay rentals due for the months
of January to March 1997 to the damage and prejudice
of plaintiff; that this failure and refusal on the part of
plaintiff accelerated the payment of all rentals for each
month for the years 1997 and 1998;
6. That the acts of defendant amounts to a
breach of contract which is unlawful and malicious, as
in fact, it caused plaintiff serious anxiety, emotional
stress, and sleepless nights for which he is entitled to
moral damages;
7. That plaintiff conveyed his feelings to Mr.
Ronald C. Manalastas as evidenced by a letter dated
January 7, 1997 a copy of which is hereto attached to
form part hereof as Annex "B". This was later followed
by a letter of plaintiff's counsel a machine copy of which
is hereto attached to form part hereof and marked as
 Annex "C". Both these letters landed on deaf ears
thereby aggravating the worries/anxieties of plaintiff;
8. That the period agreed is for the benefit of
both parties and any unilateral termination constitutes
breach of contract;
9. That defendant actually used the leased
premises during the year 1996; that had it not been for
the contract, plaintiff could have leased the premises to
other persons for business purposes; that this unlawful
and malicious breach of contract cannot be lawfully
countenanced hence defendant must be taught a
lesson by being ordered to pay exemplary damages;
xxx xxx xxx. 10
It is settled that a breach of contract is a cause of action
either for specific performance or rescission
contracts. 11 In Manufacturer's Distributors, Inc. v. Siu Liong, 12 the
Court held that actions for specific performance are incapable of
pecuniary estimation and therefore fall under the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court. 13 Here, the averments in the complaint
reveal that the suit filed by private respondent was primarily one
for specific performance as it was aimed to enforce their three-
year lease contract which would incidentally entitle him to
monetary awards if the court should find that the subject contract
of lease was breached. As alleged therein, petitioner's failure to
pay rentals due for the period from January to March 1997,
constituted a violation of their contract which had the effect of
accelerating the payment of monthly rentals for the years 1997
and 1998. The same complaint likewise implied a premature and
unilateral termination of the term of the lease with the closure of
and removal all communication equipment in the leased
premises. 14 Under the circumstances, the court has to scrutinize
the facts and the applicable laws in order to determine whether
there was indeed a violation of their lease agreement that would
justify the award of rentals and damages. The prayer, therefore,
for the payment of unpaid rentals in the amount of P84,000.00
plus damages consequent to the breach is merely incidental to the
main action for specific performance. Similarly, in Manufacturer's
Distributor's Inc., 15 the Court explained —
xxx xxx xxx
That plaintiff's complaint also sought the
payment by the defendant of P3,376.00, plus interest
and attorney's fees, does not give a pecuniary
estimation to the litigation, for the payment of such
amounts can only be ordered as a consequence of the
specific performance primarily sought. In other words,
such payment would be but an incident or consequence
of defendant's liability for specific performance. If no
such liability is judicially declared, the payment can not
be awarded. Hence, the amounts sought do not
represent the value of the subject of litigation.
of
"Subject matter over which jurisdiction can not
be conferred by consent, has reference, not to the res
or property involved in the litigation nor to a particular
case, but to the class of cases, the purported subject of
litigation, the nature of the action and of the relief
sought (Appeal of Maclain, 176 NW. 817)."
Specifically, it has been held that:
"The Court has no jurisdiction of a suit for
specific performance of a contract, although the
damages alleged for its breach, if permitted, are within
the amount of which that court has jurisdiction."
(Mebane Cotton Breeding Station vs. Sides, 257 SW. 302;
21 C.J.S. 59, note).
xxx xxx xxx
Clearly, the action for specific performance case,
irrespective of the amount of rentals and damages sought to be
recovered, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable
exclusively by the Regional Trial Court. The trial court, therefore,
did not err in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss.
 WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is 9.Russell, supra, citing Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA 239
DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- [1997]; Cañiza v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 640 [1997].
G.R. SP No. 45987 is AFFIRMED. 10.Rollo, pp. 25-27.
SO ORDERED. 11.Davao Abaca Plantation Company, Inc. v. Dole, Philippines, Inc ., 346
SCRA 682, 688 [2000], citing Baguioro v. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 12
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Kapunan,  and  Austria-Martinez,
[1946].
JJ., concur.
12.16 SCRA 680, 683 [1966].
 
13.See also Amorganda v. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA 203 [1988].
Footnotes
14.Complaint, paragraphs 5 and 8; Exhibit "B", Rollo, p. 31.
1.Thirteenth Division, composed of Associate Justices: Angelina
Sandoval-Gutierrez, (Chairman and ponente), Romeo J. Callejo, 15.Supra.
Sr., (member), and Mariano M. Umali (member).
  (Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
|||

2.Rollo, p. 48. G.R. No. 136109, [August 1, 2002], 435 PHIL 62-69)
3.Ibid., p. 63.

4.Ibid., p. 39

5.Ibid., p. 46.

6.Ibid., p. 53.

7.Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7691, which took effect in 1994,
and Circular 21-99, the jurisdictional amount for Regional Trial
Court should be adjusted as follows: Five years after the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 7691, the amount exceeds Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00); and five years
thereafter, the amount exceeds Three Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P300,000.00). However, in the case of Metro Manila, the
above-mentioned jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted after
five years from the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7691 such that
the amount exceeds Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P400,000.00) [Feria, Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated,  2001, Vol.
1, pp. 163-164.]

8.304 SCRA 738, 744 [1999], citing Singson v. Isabela Sawmill, 88 SCRA

623 [1979]; Raymundo v. Court of Appeals, 213 SCRA 457 [1992].