Congress of the United States Washington, BO 20515 February 3, 2023 ‘The Honorable Lloyd J. Austin IIL Secretary Department of Defense 1000 Defense Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20301-1000 Dear Secretary Austin: We write to you to re-emphasize our concerns about the subversive activities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) within American institutions of higher education (IHE). As you are aware, Congress has long been concerned with the influence and infiltration of Confucius Institutes on the campuses of American IHEs. According to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Confucius Institutes “advance Beijing's preferred narrative and subvert important academic principles such as institutional autonomy and academic freedom.”" In response to this threat, Congress passed Sec. 1091 of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which prohibits Department of Defense (DoD) funding for Chinese Janguage instruction provided by a Confucius Institute. Congress also passed Sec, 1062 of the FY2021 NDAA which prohibits DoD funding for any IHE that hosts a Confucius Institute after October 1, 2023. Despite the implementation of these laws, Confucius Institutes are still alive and well at American IHEs, According to the National Association of Scholars, at least 28 universities have replaced the Confucius Institute with a similar program and 58 have maintained a partnership with a PRC university reached as a part of an agreement with a Confucius Institute.” To circumvent the law, the Office of Chinese Language Council International (otherwise known as Hanban), the Confucius Institute parent organization under the PRC Ministry of Education, was rebranded as the Center for Language Exchange and Cooperation in July 2020, The Chinese International Education Foundation (CIEF) now funds and oversees Confucius Institutes and many of their reconstituted programs and institutes.’ Partnership programs sponsored by CIEF should fall under the definition of Confucius Institutes within Sec. 1062 * Alexander Bowe, China's Overseas United Front Work: Background and nplications for the United States (Washington D.C.: U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2018), 12. hhups:/wow usce.govisites/defaulU files Research/ChinaY427s%4200 verseas”420United20Fron1%420Work* *%420Background?420and%20Implications%20for%20US_final_O.pdf ? Rachelle Peterson, Jan Oxnevad, and Flora Van, “Aer Confucius Institutes: China’s Enduring Influence on American Higher Education,” National Association of Scholar, June 15, 2022, htips/www.nas.org/reports/after= ‘confucius-institutes ull-report. Fim Banks et al. Jim Banks et af letter to Lloyd Austin, July 25, 2022. Letter. U.S. House of RepresentativesSee. 1062 will go into effect on October |, 2023 and is intended to apply to all Confucius Institutes and any similar programs sponsored by the PRC government. Yet, your department has awarded funding with contractual obligations to these institutions in question extending beyond the October 1, 2023 deadline and in viol: mn of the law. These concerns were underscored in a previous letter fiom House Republicans along with several questions about how the DoD will meet its Sec, 1062 requirements.‘ In a July 27" article highlighting the letter sent to your department, it was reported that “{t]he Defense Department declined a request for comment, saying the agency will respond directly to the letter’s authors.”* A response to this congressional inquiry was never given. In exercising proper Congressional oversight, we once again request your response to the following updated questions by February 24": 1 “bid If an IHE replaces a Confucius Institute with any other program or institute serving the same purpose and function and directly or indirectly funded, or materially supported by the PRC government, does the DoD consider the IHE hosting a Confucius Institute as defined by Sec. 1062 of the FY2021 NDAA? How does the DoD intend to maintain the intent of Sec. 1062 of the FY2021 NDAA to prevent PRC subversion through IHEs? Has the DoD been tracking the closure and restructuring of Confucius Institutes into programs and other partnerships that exist or that have been put in place as reconstituted Confucius Institutes? ‘What type of reporting and oversight is the DoD undertaking to ensure that the See. 1062 requirements are met, and IHE measures undertaken are adequate ahead of the October 1, 2023 deadline? Does the DoD consider a Confucius Institute or any similar program established by a one-time donation or endowment from the Chinese goverment or its instrumentality either before or after October 1,2023 a Confucius Institute? Would this not undermine Congress’ intent as a workaround for specific provisions that Congress required in Sec. 1062 of the FY2021 NDAA? Has the DoD issued or does it intend to issue a waiver to any IHE hosting Confucius Institutes in accordance with Sec. 1062 of the FY2021 NDAA? If so, please explain your reasons and criteria that the DoD developed to consider the issuance of a waiver. What measures has the DoD taken or intends to take to safeguard DoD-funded research at American IHEs that collaborate with Chinese univers ed on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List or that have ties with the Chinese military and defense industry? * Laura Spitalniak, “Republicans press Defense Department on plans for cutting ties with Confucius Institutes,” Higher Ed Dive, July 27, 2022, hips:/www. ive.com/newsrepublicans-press-defense-department. plans ing-ties-with-confucil628281We also request your response to these additional questions by February 24": 1 In 2023, has the DoD awarded new funding with contractual obligations extending. beyond the October 1, 2023 deadline to American IHEs with Confucius Institutes or equivalent successor institutes and programs? How are you restructuring, canceling, or re-awarding contracts that breach US Code and Sec. 1062 of the FY2021 NDAA? Sec, 1062 of the FY2021 NDAA was passed to ensure national security for the DoD. through the protection of intellectual property, preventing the diversion of funding, and maintaining a competitive edge over competitive threats. How is the DoD addressing these malign organizations from interfering with U.S. national interests and the diminishment of our national security initiatives? There are documented instances of Confucius Institutes using the cover of American IHEs to avoid federal transparency laws and develop close relationships with the private sector. Is the DoD tracking potential technology transfer threats— specifically, potential technology transfer threats posed by Confucius Institutes attempting to develop relationships with companies that are integral to the National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB)? ‘What actions has the DoD taken to ensure that we are not funding the PRC through Confucius Institutes or their derivative manifestations? Sincerely, Pat Fallon a Member of Congress Member of Congress Elise Stefanik Joe Wilson Member of Congress Member of CongressDan Crenshaw Member of Congress = Scott DesJarlais, M.D. Member of Congress Sling Candin Doug Lamborn ‘Member of Congress Beaty Can Lisa McClain Member of Congress te Mike Waltz Member of Congress fri f Eric A. “Rick” Crawford Member of Congress ¢ Oilf Nekuoen Bill Johnson Member of Congress ad Psa Neal P. Dunn, M.D. Member of Congress Claudia Tenney Member of Congress tanto, Bill Posey Member of Congress — Guy Reschenthaler Member of Congress Va John Moolenaar Member of Congress© Let Yoeet Michael Guest Member of Congress Ufitoraaa Rob Wittman Member of Congress (Redes8ag Acre. Qae 5 — Robert B. Aderholt Member of Congress Ke. Buck Ken Buck Member of Congress Lil Brian Babin Member of Congress Auahy SP Austin Scott Member of Congress Carlos A. Gimend. Member of Congress Ben Cline Member of Congress bgt Go August Pfluger Member of Congress Mory, EM bors Mary E. Miller Member of Congress