The Spanish-American War made the United States a powerful force for the remainder of

the 20th century. Millions of colonial subjects and the duties of guarding and maintaining an

empire came with the conquest of America. It entangled the nation in the conflicts and affairs of

other countries, whether it was for the better or worse. The country was overtaken by a wave of

passion, which strengthened the presidency and supported the long-held notion that the New

World was better. Following this, Americans turned their gaze abroad as never before, believing

they were poised for something bigger. The roots and impacts of this war will be examined

throughout this essay.

By the 1890s, all that remained of Spain's once-vast dominion in the New World was

Cuba and Puerto Rico. Cuban revolutionaries fought against Spanish control for several decades,

notably the Ten Years' War between 1868 and 1878. The Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894 and the

Great Depression of 1893 both severely harmed the Cuban economy. Duty rates on sugar, which

is essential to Cuba, increased by 40%. The island was suffering greatly under Spanish authority,

and in late February 1895, insurgencies broke out once more as a result of the collapse of the

sugar market (Divine et al., 2005, p. 413).

In order to collect money, acquire weapons, and carry out a propaganda operation to

affect American public opinion, Cuban revolutionaries organized a junta in New York City. The

militants' hit-and-run tactic prompted the Spanish army to withdraw. The Spanish commander,

who had triumphed in 1878 using similar strategies, dispatched almost two hundred thousand

soldiers, and he sought to trap the rebels in the eastern region of the island so that they could be

encircled and exterminated (Divine et al., 2005, p. 413).

Americans' sympathy for the insurgents was fuelled by newspaper articles. Two

newspaper publishers in New York City wanted to take advantage of the situation in Cuba to
boost newspaper sales. These publishers were Joseph Pulitzer of the New York World and

William Randolph Hearst of the New York Journal. As a result, they disseminated descriptions

of some of the most heinous crimes committed by the Spanish, as well as reports of rebel

triumphs and accounts of Spanish soldiers harassing Cuban women. The yellow colour of the

comic strips in both journals led to the term "yellow journalism". It was believed that one of the

main reasons for the Spanish-American War was yellow journalism (Divine et al., 2005, p. 413).

The insurrection started under Grover Cleveland's presidency whereas he preferred

Spanish control to instability that might draw outsider involvement. He anticipated that by

declaring neutrality, the public's opposition to the annexation of Cuba would be suppressed.

Cleveland disregarded the 1896 congressional resolution acknowledging Cuban hostilities. He

offered to arbitrate the situation as an option, but Spain declined (Divine et al., 2005, p. 413).

Although he inclined significantly in favor of the revolutionaries, President McKinley

argued for neutrality when he assumed office in March 1897. He learned that Weyler's policies

had left Cuba in a condition of death and devastation as soon as he dispatched a dependable

assistant there for a fact-finding expedition. Along with the report, McKinley offered to arbitrate

the dispute, but he also lamented Spain's "uncivilized and cruel" actions and showed compassion

for the suffering. Spain had every right to put up a battle against the insurrection, but the United

States urged it be done so humanely (Divine et al., 2005, p. 413).

A change in Madrid's administration toward the end of 1897 briefly put an end to the

dilemma. The new administration decided to give the Cubans some measure of autonomy and

called Weyler back. Additionally, it announced an amnesty for political prisoners and freed

Americans who were detained in Cuban facilities. McKinley praised the new measures but urged

Spain to put a stop to the uprising in a humanitarian manner. Spanish army commanders
instigated riots in Havana in January 1898 as a result of the new autonomy policy, which eroded

Madrid's support from the president (Divine et al., 2005, p. 413).

A battleship with the name Maine was dispatched to Havana by McKinley to demonstrate

strength and protect American citizens. The New York Journal published a letter that had been

stolen from Enrique Dupuy de Lôme, the Spanish ambassador to Washington, on February 9,

1898. De Lôme described McKinley as "weak," "a would-be politician," and "a bidder for the

adulation of the audience" in the letter, which was sent in private to a friend. The remark

infuriated many Americans, but McKinley himself was more concerned with other portions in

the letter that implied a lack of seriousness on the part of Spain in the discussions. De Lôme

resigned right away, but the harm had already been done (Divine et al., 2005, p. 413 & 414).

The Maine sank in Havana port on February 15 as a result of an explosion, killing 266

people. Americans screamed out for war despite McKinley's plead for restraint and his

assurances that he would look into the situation right away. Recent analyses of the Maine event

place the responsibility for the sinking on an inadvertent internal explosion, but in 1898,

Americans accused Spain, particularly in light of the investigating board's report that imputed the

sinking to an external (and so likely Spanish) explosion (Divine et al., 2005, p. 414).

Early in the month of March 1898, McKinley requested $50 million in emergency

defense funding, which Congress swiftly granted. On March 27, McKinley delivered Spain his

final plea. In essence, he urged Spain to announce an armistice, renounce its reconcentration

strategy, and advance Cuba's freedom. In response, the Spanish made a few concessions, but not

the crucial ones, in McKinley's viewpoint (Divine et al., 2005, p. 414).

McKinley hesitantly penned his proclamation of war. It was heard by Congress on April

11, 1898. On April 19, the Congress voted a joint resolution recognizing Cuba's independence
and giving the president the go-ahead to expel the Spanish using militarily. Henry M. Teller, a

senator from Colorado, proposed the Teller Amendment, which guaranteed that the United States

had no plans to annex the island. A declaration of war was approved by Congress on Monday,

April 25, and McKinley signed it later that day (Divine et al., 2005, p. 414).