Jurisdiction

● The power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case (Cuenca v. PCGG)
● It is also considered as an authority to execute the decisions rendered by the court.

It has reference to the power of the court over

● the subject matter,
● over the res or property in contest, and
● to the authority of the court to render the judgment or decree it assumes to make

Jurisdiction is the authority to decide a case, and not the decision rendered therein. The
authority to decide a case at all and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up
jurisdiction. The fact that the decision is erroneous does not divest the court that rendered it of
the jurisdiction conferred by law to try the case.

The test of jurisdiction

Whether the court has the power to enter into the inquiry and not whether the decision is right or
wrong.

The general rule is that proceedings conducted or decisions made by a court are legally void
where there is an absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter. This is true even where the
court in good faith believes that the subject matter is within its jurisdiction.

Aspects of jurisdiction
1. jurisdiction over the subject matter
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is referred to as the power of a particular court to hear the
type of case that is then before it. The term also refers to the jurisdiction of the court over the
class of cases to which a particular case belongs. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case
is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a
concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. Jurisdiction
being a matter of substantive law, the established general rule is that the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. The ruling in
Tijam on the matter of jurisdiction is the exception rather than the rule

a. jurisdiction over the person of parties

Jurisdiction over the plaintiff is acquired by his filing of a Complaint or petition.

On the other hand, over the defendant through (1) voluntary appearance in court or (2) thru
summons. Submission to the court’s jurisdiction takes the form of an appearance that seeks
affirmative relief except when the relief sought is for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction
of the court over the person of the defendant.

Jurisprudence suggests that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is required only in an
action in personam. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite in an
action in rem and quasi in rem.
 2. jurisdiction over the issues of the case
Jurisdiction over the issue is the power of the court to try and decide issues raised in the
pleadings of the parties (Reyes v. Diaz).

Generally, jurisdiction over the issues is conferred and determined by the pleadings of the
parties. The pleadings present the issues to be tried and determine whether or not the issues
are of fact or of law.

Jurisdiction over the issues may also be determined and conferred by stipulation of the parties
as when in the pretrial, the parties enter into stipulations of facts and documents or enter into an
agreement simplifying the issues of the case

3. jurisdiction over the res or thing involved in the litigation.

Lack of jurisdiction vs. excess of jurisdiction

● Lack of jurisdiction happens when the court or tribunal is not vested by law with authority
or power to take cognizance of a case.
● Excess of jurisdiction presupposes the existence of an authority for the court to assume
jurisdiction over a case but in the process of the exercise of that authority, it acts beyond
the power conferred upon it.

A decision rendered by a court devoid of jurisdiction may be the subject of a collateral attack, if
that jurisdictional defect appears on the face of the record. And where lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter appears on the face of the record, an appellate court may, on its own
initiative, dismiss the action

Jurisdiction in Civil Cases

Constitution and laws, such as Judiciary Act of 1980 as amended.

Boston Equity v. CA and Lolita Toledo

G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013

FACTS:
Petitioner Boston filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against the spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo. Herein respondent filed
an Answer and later on filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer in which she
alleged, among others, that her husband and co-defendant, Manuel, is already dead. The death
certificate of Manuel states the date of death about 2 years prior to the filing of herein action. As
a result, petitioner filed a motion to require respondent to disclose the heirs of Manuel. In
compliance, respondent submitted the required names and addresses of the heirs. Petitioner
then filed a Motion for Substitution praying that Manuel be substituted by his children as
party-defendants. It appears that this motion was granted by the trial court.

In 2004, about 6 years after filing her amended Answer, defendant filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground, among others, that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
Manuel pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. In turn, this will also deem
charges against her dismissed in accordance with the rule on solidary obligation of decedent
(Section 6, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court).

ISSUE:
Whether defendant is already estopped from questioning the court’s jurisdiction.

RULING:
No. The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as a result of estoppel
by laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter. Here, what respondent was questioning in her
motion to dismiss before the trial court was that court’s jurisdiction over the person of defendant
Manuel.

The court had no jurisdiction over Manuel Toledo’s person as the action was not pending before
he died, but rather he died prior to the institution of the action. Thus, substitution was invalid.
Petitioner should have impleaded the estate of Manuel Toledo instead. The Court ordered
dismissal of case against Manuel and his heirs and to proceed with the trial of civil case against
respondent Lolita Toledo only.

Roldan v. Spouses Barrios

G.R. No. 214803

FACTS:
Petitioner Roldan argues that foreclosure of mortgage is an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.

Defendants Spouses Barrios borrowed from plaintiff the sum of P250,000.00, payable within the
period of one year from said date, with an interest thereon at the rate of 5% per month; and to
secure the prompt and full payment of the principal and interest, defendants made and executed
on a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of plaintiff upon a parcel of land declared in the
name of Spouses Clarence Barrios and Anna Lee T. Barrios, assessed in the sum of
P13,380.00, tax effectivity for the year 2008.
The time for payment of said loan is overdue and defendant spouses failed and refused to pay
both the principal obligation and the interest due starting from February 2011 to the present
notwithstanding repeated demands

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
dismissed the case.

RULING:
No, foreclosure of mortgage is a real action, it is the assessed value of the property which
determines the court's jurisdiction. Considering that the assessed value of the mortgaged
property is only P13,380.00, the RTC correctly found that the action falls within the jurisdiction of
the first level court.

Iniego vs. Purganan

G.R. No. 166876

FACTS:
Private respondent Fokker Santos filed a complaint for quasi-delict and damages against Jimmy
Pinion, the driver of a truck involved in a traffic accident, and owner of the said truck and
employer of Pinion, Petitioner Iniego. The complaint stemmed from a vehicular accident when a
freight truck allegedly being driven by Pinion hit private respondent’s jitney which private
respondent Santos was driving at the time of the accident.

The plaintiff opines that RTC has exclusive jurisdiction because the cause of action is the claim
for damages, which exceeds P400,000.00.

Petitioner Iniego claims that actions for damages based on quasi-delict are actions that are
capable of pecuniary estimation. Petitioner argues further that should this Court find actions for
damages capable of pecuniary estimation, then the total amount of damages claimed by the
private respondent must exceed P400,000.00 in order that it may fall under the jurisdiction of
the RTC. Petitioner asserts, however, that the moral and exemplary damages claimed by private
respondent be excluded from the computation of the total amount of damages for jurisdictional
purposes because the said moral and exemplary damages arose, not from the quasi-delict, but
from the petitioner’s refusal to pay the actual damages.

ISSUES:
1. Whether actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are capable of pecuniary
estimation.
2. Whether the amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

RULING:
 1. Court rules that the subject matter of actions for damages based on quasi-delict is
capable of pecuniary estimation. Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are
primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money for the damages
suffered because of the defendant’s alleged tortious acts. The damages claimed in such
actions represent the monetary equivalent of the injury caused to the plaintiff by the
defendant, which are thus sought to be recovered by the plaintiff. This money claim is
the principal relief sought, and is not merely incidental thereto or a consequence thereof.
2. Yes, the total amount of damages claimed by the private respondent exceeds the
jurisdictional limit of P400,000.00 and remains under the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Petitioner argues that in actions for damages based on quasi-delict, claims for damages
arising from a different cause of action (i.e., other than the fault or negligence of the
defendant) should not be included in the computation of the jurisdictional amount. The
Court held that all claims for damages should be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court regardless of whether they arose from a single cause of action or
several causes of action. Rule 2, Section 5, of the Rules of Court allows a party to assert
as many causes of action as he may have against the opposing party. Subsection (d) of
said section provides that where the claims in all such joined causes of action are
principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of
jurisdiction. Whether or not the different claims for damages are based on a single cause
of action or different causes of action, it is the total amount thereof which shall govern.
Jurisdiction in the case at bar remains with the RTC, considering that the total amount
claimed, inclusive of the moral and exemplary damages claimed, is P490,000.00.

Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Standard Insurance Co., Inc., et al.

G.R. No. 140746, March 16, 2005

FACTS:
Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney owned by his mother Martina, respondent
herein. While raining and driving north bound along the National Highway in Talavera, Nueva
Ecija, a passenger bus by Pantranco North Express, Inc., was trailing behind. When the two
vehicles were traversing a curve along the highway, the passenger bus overtook the jeepney
and hit the left rear side of the latter and sped away. Crispin reported the incident to the Talavera
Police Station and respondent Standard Insurance Co., Inc. (Standard), insurer of the jeepney.

The total cost of the repair was P21,415.00, but respondent Standard paid only P8,000.00.
Martina Gicale shouldered the balance of P13,415.00. Afterwards, Standard and Martina,
demanded reimbursement from petitioners Pantranco and its driver Buncan, but they refused.
This prompted respondents to file with the RTC, Branch 94, Manila, a complaint for sum of
money. In their answer, both petitioners specifically denied the allegations in the complaint and
averred that it is the MTC, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case since the cause of
action of each respondent did not arise from the same transaction and that there are no
common questions of law and fact common to both parties.
ISSUE:
Whether RTC has jurisdiction over the subject of the action considering that respondents’
respective cause of action against petitioners did not arise out of the same transaction nor are
there questions of law and facts common to both petitioners and respondents.

RULING:
Yes, this case has a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantranco’s bus hitting the rear
side of the jeepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether petitioners are
negligent. There being a single transaction common to both respondents, consequently, they
have the same cause of action against petitioners.

The cause of action against petitioners arose out of the same transaction. Thus, the amount of
the demand shall be the totality of the claims. Standard’s claim is P8,000.00, while that of
respondent Martina is P13,415.00, or a total of P21,415.00. Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides
that the RTC has "exclusive original jurisdiction over all other cases, in which the demand,
exclusive of interest and cost or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to more than
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)." Clearly, it is the RTC that has jurisdiction over the instant
case. It bears emphasis that when the complaint was filed, R.A. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction
of the Metropolitan, Municipal and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts had not yet taken effect. It
became effective on April 15, 1994.

First Sarmiento Property Holdings v. PBCom

G.R. No. 202836, June 19, 2018

FACTS:
First Sarmiento obtained from PBCOM a P40,000,000.00 loan, which was secured by a real
estate mortgage over 1,076 parcels of land. On March 15, 2003, the loan agreement was
amended with the increase of the loan amount to P51,200,000.00. On September 15, 2003, the
loan agreement was further amended when the loan amount was increased to
P100,000,000.00.

In 2006, PBCOM filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage. It
claimed in its Petition that it sent First Sarmiento several demand letters, yet First Sarmiento still
failed to pay the principal amount and accrued interest on the loan. This prompted PBCOM to
resort to extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties, a recourse granted to it under the
loan agreement.

First Sarmiento claimed in its Complaint that it never received the loan proceeds of
P100,000,000.00 from PBCOM, yet the latter still sought the extrajudicial foreclosure of real
estate mortgage. It prayed for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction to enjoin the
Ex-Officio Sheriff from proceeding with the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage or registering
the certificate of sale in PBCOM's favor with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.
PBCOM asserted that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over First Sarmiento's Complaint
because the action for annulment of mortgage was a real action; thus, the filing fees filed should
have been based on the fair market value of the mortgaged properties.

ISSUE:
Whether RTC has jurisdiction since the Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage has a
subject incapable of pecuniary estimation because it was not intended to recover ownership or
possession of the mortgaged properties sold to respondent during the auction sale.

RULING:
Yes. In the case, petitioner contends that its complaint prayed for the annulment of the real
estate mortgage it entered into with respondent and not for the recovery or reconveyance of the
mortgaged properties because it was still the registered owner when it filed its complaint. The
evidence on record supports petitioner's claim; hence, there was no reason for the dismissal of
its Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Court held that petitioner never prayed for the reconveyance of the properties foreclosed during
the auction sale, or that it ever asserted its ownership or possession over them. Rather, it
assailed the validity of the loan contract with real estate mortgage that it entered into with
respondent because it supposedly never received the proceeds of the P100,000,000.00 loan
agreement

Tijam v. Sibonghanoy
23 SCRA 29
FACTS:
Spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced a civil case in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover
from them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the
complaint until the whole obligation is paid, plus costs. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of
attachment was issued by the court against defendants' properties, but the same was soon
dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity
Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on the 31st of the same month.

ISSUE:
Whether the question of jurisdiction is barred by estoppel by laches.

RULING:
Yes. The doctrine applies where a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure
affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party, it could have
raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI of Cebu to take cognizance of the
present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in
force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at
several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it
invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of
Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. To sanction such conduct on
its part, Court would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present
case and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and
unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.

It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to
dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a
plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches.

Figueroa v. People
G.R. No. 147406, 7-14-2008

FACTS:
An information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the petitioner
before the RTC of Bulacan, Branch 18. Trial on the merits ensued and on August 19, 1998, the
trial court convicted the petitioner as charged. In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner
questioned, among others, for the first time, the trial court’s jurisdiction.

The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision, considered the petitioner to have
actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus,
he was already estopped by laches from asserting the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is estopped by laches in challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court.

RULING:
No. The Court notes that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is
to be applied rarely—only from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine
must be applied with great care and the equity must be strong in its favor. When misapplied, the
doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice.
Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. Hence, the
Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies in attacking judgments rendered by courts or
tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the concerned cases. No laches will even attach when
the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.
Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in
assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal
before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to
attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of "estoppel by
laches" unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce
them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that
he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence,
change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes.

Calimlim v. Ramirez
204 Phil 25; 118 SCRA 399

FACTS:
A judgment for a sum of money was rendered in favor of Independent Mercantile Corporation
against a certain Manuel Magali by the Municipal Court of Manila. After said judgment became
final, a writ of execution was issued on July 31, 1961. The Notice of Levy made on September
21, 1961 on a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9138 registered in the
name of "Domingo Magali, married to Modesta Calimlim", specified that the said levy was only
against "all rights, title, action, interest and participation of the defendant Manuel Magali over the
parcel of land described in this title." The Certificate of Sale executed by the Provincial Sheriff of
Pangasinan on October 17, 1961 in favor of Independent Mercantile Corporation also stated
that the sale referred only to the rights and interest of Manuel Magali over the land described in
the TCT. Manuel Magali is one of the several children of Domingo Magali who had died in 1940
and herein petitioner Modesta Calimlim.

ISSUE:
Whether the petition is barred by estoppel by prior judgment.

RULING:
No. In order to avail of the defense of res judicata, it must be shown, among others, that the
judgment in the prior action must have been rendered by a court with the proper jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was rendered.

The petition filed by the petitioners was an apparent invocation of the authority of the
respondent Court sitting as a land registration court, reliance was apparently placed on Section
112 of the Land Registration Act. It has been settled by consistent rulings of the Court that a
court of first instance, acting as a land registration court, is a court of limited and special
jurisdiction. As such, its proceedings are not adequate for the litigation of issues pertaining to an
ordinary civil action, such as, questions involving ownership or title to real property.
 Duero v. CA
G.R. No. 131282, January 4, 2002

FACTS:
Petitioner Duero filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership
against Eradel and two others, namely, Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena. Petitioner Duero and
the Ruenas executed a compromise agreement, which became the trial court's basis for a
partial judgment rendered. In this agreement, the Ruenas through their counsel entered into a
Compromise Agreement with petitioner Duero, the former recognizing and binding themselves
to respect the ownership and possession of the latter. Private respondent Eradel was not a party
to said agreement, and he was declared in default for failure to file his answer to the complaint.

Eradel filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been occupying the land as a tenant of
Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He explained that he turned over the complaint and
summons to Laurente in the honest belief that as landlord, the latter had a better right to the
land and was responsible to defend any adverse claim on it. However, the trial court denied the
motion for new trial.

Eradel filed his petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the jurisdiction of RTC. The CA
gave due course to the petition, maintaining that private respondent is not estopped from
assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the RTC had jurisdiction.
2. Whether Erdael was estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC since he has
already sought affirmative relief from the RTC.

RULING:
1. No, the RTC had no jurisdiction. By the time Duero filed his complaint, RA 769117
(amending BP 129) had become effective, such that jurisdiction already belongs not to
the RTC but to the MTC pursuant to said amendment.
2. No, estoppel must be applied only in exceptional cases, as its misapplication could result
in a miscarriage of justice. Duero, who claims ownership of a parcel of land, filed his
complaint before a court without appropriate jurisdiction. Eradel, a farmer whose tenancy
status is still pending before the proper administrative agency concerned, could have
moved for dismissal of the case on jurisdictional grounds. But the farmer as defendant
therein could not be expected to know the nuances of jurisdiction and related issues.
This farmer, who is now the private respondent, ought not to be penalized when he
claims that he made an honest mistake when he initially submitted his motions before
the RTC, before he realized that the controversy was outside the RTC's cognizance but
within the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. To hold him in estoppel as the RTC did
would amount to foreclosing his avenue to obtain a proper resolution of his case.
 Velasquez Jr. vs. Lisondra Land
G.R. No. 231290

FACTS:
Perfecto Velasquez and Lisondra Land Inc. entered into a joint venture agreement to develop a
7,200-sqm. parcel of land into a memorial park. However, Lisondra Land did not secure the
required permit from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) within a reasonable
time which delayed the project construction. Thus, Perfecto filed against Lisondra Land a
complaint for breach of contract before the RTC.

Lisondra Land sought to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. It claimed that the
supposed violations involved real estate trade and business practices which are within the
HLURB's exclusive authority. Yet, the RTC ruled that it is competent to decide the case. Upon
appeal to the CA, the petition was granted and ordered to dismiss the case holding that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the complaint and explained that
Lisondra Land's alleged acts constitute unsound real estate business practices falling under the
HLURB's jurisdiction as provided in Section 1 of PD No. 1344.

Perfecto instituted a complaint before the HLURB claiming that Lisondra Land committed
unsound real estate business practices. Allegedly, Lisondra Land expanded the business
transactions outside the authorized project site and sold memorial lots without the required
permit and license. Also, Lisondra Land failed to develop the project following the approved plan
and mandated period. The HLURB Arbiter ruled in favor of Perfecto and found that Lisondra
Land violated the joint venture agreement. Thus, it rescinded the contract between the parties,
transferred the project management to Perfecto, and ordered Lisondra Land to pay fines,
damages and attorney's fees.

Lisondra Land filed a petition for review to the CA on the ground that the HLURB has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because the dispute is between joint venture
partners and is an intra-corporate controversy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Lisondra Land is estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the HLURB.

RULING:
Yes, the law has put in place the jurisdiction of courts and tribunals for the orderly administration
of justice. Thus, the doctrine of estoppel must be applied with great care and only when strong
equitable considerations are present. In this case, the unfairness is not only evident but
revolting. Lisondra Land should not be allowed to declare as useless all the proceedings had
between the parties and compel Perfecto to go up to his Calvary once more.

Perfecto originally filed his complaint against Lisondra Land before the RTC which has
jurisdiction over the controversy between the parties. However, Lisondra Land claimed that the
case is within the HLURB's exclusive authority. It maintained this theory before the CA which
eventually ordered the dismissal of the complaint. Afterwards, Perfecto relied on the final and
executory decision of the appellate court and refiled the action with the HLURB. Lisondra Land
actively participated in the proceedings before the HLURB. After receiving an adverse decision,
Lisondra Land questioned the jurisdiction of the HLURB and claimed that the RTC has the
authority to hear the case. This is where estoppel operates and bars Lisondra Land from
assailing the HLURB's jurisdiction.

According to jurisprudence, a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, question that same
jurisdiction. The SC found the present case exceptional and called for the application of
jurisdiction by estoppel.

Manchester Development Corp. v. CA

(Strict Doctrine)

FACTS:
Petitioners contend that the filing fee must be assessed on the basis of the amended complaint
by citing the case of Magaspi v. Ramolete. They contend that the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that the filing fee should be levied by considering the amount of damages sought in the
original complaint. Based on the allegations of the complaint as well as the designation, it is
both an action for damages and specific performance. The docket fee paid upon filing of
complaint in the amount only of P410.00 by considering the action to be merely one for specific
performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation is obviously
erroneous. Although the total amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of the
complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of the complaint totalling in the amount of
P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee.chanrobles.co When
this under-assessment of the filing fee in this case was brought to the attention of this Court
together with similar other cases an investigation was immediately ordered by the Court.
Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel with leave of court filed an amended complaint on
September 12, 1985 for the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as co-plaintiff and
by eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer
in the original complaint was maintained. After this Court issued an order on October 15, 1985
ordering the re-assessment of the docket fee in the present case and other cases that were
investigated, on November 12, 1985 the trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended
complaint by stating the amounts which they are asking for. It was only then that plaintiffs
specified the amount of damages in the body of the complaint in the reduced amount of
P10,000,000.00. 7 Still no amount of damages were specified in the prayer. Said amended
complaint was admitted.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction based on payment of docket fee from amended
complaint.

RULING:
No. The basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in the
original complaint and not in the amended complaint. The Court cannot close this case without
making the observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint
in this case of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the
amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no
other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket
clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded when, even
as this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an investigation, petitioner
through another counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of
damages being asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only when in obedience to the
order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that the amount of damages be
specified in the amended complaint, that petitioners’ counsel wrote the damages sought in the
much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer
thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required docket fee is obvious. The Court serves
warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of this unethical practice. To put a stop to
this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should
specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in
the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any
case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted,
or shall otherwise be expunged from the record. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar
pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee
based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case insofar
as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.

Sun Insurance Office Ltd., (SIOL), E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby vs. Hon.
Maximiano C. Asuncion and Manuel Chua Uy Po Tiong
(Liberal Doctrine)

FACTS:
Petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. filed a complaint with the RTC of Makati for the
consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial
declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent was
declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period.

On the other hand private respondent filed a complaint in the RTC of Quezon City for the refund
of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, initially against petitioner
SIOL, and thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. The
complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and
liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the suit. Although the
prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages sought, said amount may be
inferred from the body of the complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).

On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the second amended
complaint and stating therein that the same constituted proper compliance with the Resolution
of this Court and that a copy thereof should be furnished the Clerk of Court for the
reassessment of the docket fees. The reassessment by the Clerk of Court based on private
respondent's claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages"
amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was subsequently paid by private respondent.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the said order
of Judie Asuncion dated January 24, 1986.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee
has not been paid.

RULING:
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of
the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of
the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading
and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court,
the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess
and collect the additional fee.

United Overseas Bank v. Ros, et al.

G.R. No. 171532, August 7, 2007; 556 Phil. 178

FACTS:
In its Complaint, private respondent alleged that it obtained a loan from petitioner in the amount
of P80,000,000.00 secured by two Real Estate Mortgage Contracts. Petitioner, however,
allegedly mishandled the proceeds of the loan causing serious financial injury to private
respondent.

Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss the private respondent’s complaint on the ground of
improper venue since the said complaint included the prayer for the nullification of the
foreclosure of real estate mortgage, a real action which must be lodged before the RTC of the
place where the property or one of the properties is situated.

Private respondent amended its Complaint, this time praying for Accounting, Release of the
Balance of the Loan and Damages. In resolving petitioner’s Urgent Motion to Dismiss, the RTC
denied the same for lack of merit.

Private respondent filed another action for Injunction with Damages before the RTC. The filing of
the above-mentioned case prompted the petitioner to file a second Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of forum shopping. Manila RTC denied the second Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.

A third Motion to Dismiss was filed by the petitioner with the Manila RTC this time raising the
issue of jurisdiction. In its latest Motion to Dismiss, petitioner claimed that private respondent
failed to specify the amount of damages, either in the body or the prayer of its Second Amended
Complaint, in order to evade the payment of the docket fees. As a result, the Manila RTC cannot
acquire jurisdiction over the main action, which should be dismissed.

Manila RTC denied petitioner’s third Motion to Dismiss on the ground that petitioner was already
estopped to raise the issue. Having participated in several stages of the proceedings, and
having invoked the authority of the court by seeking an affirmative relief therefrom through the
filing of the Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner was now barred from assailing the authority of
the Court to hear and decide the case. 9. Similarly ill-fated was petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the foregoing Order which was denied by the RTC. 10. Aggrieved, petitioner
filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, alleging that the Manila RTC acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 11. Court of Appeals
affirmed the Manila RTC Order. The Court of Appeals likewise denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence, this petition

ISSUE:
Whether lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the amended complaint because of the
increase in the amount of damages claimed (₱600,000.00)

RULING:
The lower court acquired jurisdiction over the case when private respondent paid the docket fee
corresponding to its claim in its original complaint. Its failure to pay the docket fee corresponding
to its increased claim for damages under the amended complaint should not be considered as
having curtailed the lower court’s jurisdiction. Pursuant to the ruling in Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion, the unpaid docket fee should be considered as a lien on the judgment
even though private respondent specified the amount of ₱600,000.00 as its claim for damages
in its amended complaint.