Professional Ethics

&
Professional Accounting System

1st Internal Assessment

COMPONENT 1 – CASE ANALYSIS

COMPONENT 2 – ACCOUNTANCY PROBLEMS

Submitted by:
Shruti Agarwal
18010126050
BBA LLB (Hons.)
Division A
 COMPONENT 1: CASE ANALYSIS

1. Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of UP AIR 2016 SC 3302

The case illustrates that Advocate Mahipal Singh Rana, during a hearing, threatened a
presiding civil judge and challenged his authority as a judicial officer and the authority of the
court of law. He lost his temperament when an order was passed against him and hence,
threatened the Hon’ble Civil Judge stating that he will make sure that the respective judge
will no longer remain as a judge in the judiciary of Etah. He also openly challenged the
authority of the whole judiciary by disclosing the fact that already 15-20 cases have been
filed against him and thus, he is not afraid of anyone.

ISSUES

1. Whether a case has been made out for interference with the order passed by the High
Court convicting the appellant for criminal contempt and sentencing him to simple
imprisonment for two months with a fine of Rs.2,000/- and further imprisonment for two
weeks in default and debarring him from appearing in courts in judgeship at Etah;

2. Whether on conviction for criminal contempt, the appellant can be allowed to

practice.

RULES

• Section 20 (Contempt of Courts Act, 1971)- No court shall initiate any proceedings of
contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from
the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. —No court shall initiate
any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a
period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.

• Section 24 A (Advocates Act, 1961), which states the criteria under which an
Advocate can be disqualified from enrolment as an Advocate.

• Section 34 (Advocates Act,1961) a High Court can make rules laying down the
conditions subject to which an advocate shall be permitted to practice in the High Court and
the subordinate courts, but the fact is that many High Courts have not framed such rules. This
has resulted in confusion over the legitimacy of punishing errant advocates.

• Section 38 (Advocates Act, 1961), which states an appeal can be made to the Supreme
court by an aggrieved person within sixty days of the date on which the order is
communicated to him, prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court may
pass such order.

ANALYSIS

Our judicial system is enshrined in the Constitution with powers to dispense justice, including
their constitution and jurisdictions, and with powers to make their own rules. The Supreme
Court has been described as a court of record and conferred with all powers including the
powers to punish for its contempt under article 129 of the Constitution. The power to frame
rules, subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament and with the approval of the
President, has been conferred on the Supreme Court under article 145 of the Constitution.

The Court, while examining its powers under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the
Constitution with regard to awarding sentence of imprisonment together with suspension of
his practice as an Advocate, held that while in exercise of contempt jurisdiction, this Court
cannot take over jurisdiction of disciplinary committee of the Bar Council and it is for the Bar
Council to punish the advocate by debarring him from practice or suspending his licence as
may be warranted on the basis of his having been found guilty of contempt, if the Bar
Council fails to take action, this Court could invoke its appellate power under Section 38 of
the Advocates Act.

In the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) v. Union of India (April 1998), the Apex
Court ruled that the power available to a High Court or Supreme Court for inflicting
punishment on account of criminal contempt cannot be stretched to such an extent as to usurp
the statutory powers of the Bar Councils which have been delegated the power under the
Advocates Act, 1961 to cancel or suspend an advocate’s license. One may also argue that
even while the courts exercise contempt jurisdiction, the punishment can only be awarded as
explicitly provided under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
CONCLUSION

The Court held that under Section 24A of the Advocates Act, the enrolment of the
contemporary Advocate will stand suspended for two years. The Court also said that, as a
disciplinary measure for proved misconduct, the license of the contemnor will remain
suspended for further five years. The Court has however set aside the imprisonment imposed
on the Advocate keeping in mind his advanced age.

Further, in relation to a regulatory mechanism, it is necessary to address the mushrooming of

bar associations right from the Taluka level, up to the apex bodies also requires a regulatory
mechanism which includes their recognition and control by the bar council. This is obviously
coupled with special emphasis of not only controlling the advocates but the collective actions
of bar associations that have a local and even a nationwide implication on issues that are
concerned with proceedings of the court and with regard to the organization of lawyers
entering into other fields of activities. Towards this, the measures of punishments, the
inclusion of other types of misconducts and the disciplinary control with its effective
mechanism, both reformatory and deterrent, deserves to be introduced. This has become
necessary as the present law is gradually losing its effectiveness due to lack of appropriate
empowerment. The standards of professional ethics and behaviour, the training of lawyers
and facets of continuing legal education are other areas as well that require a passionate
consideration.

Thus, this case stands as a glaring example of the existing professional misconduct in the
legal profession in India in recent times.

2. Re: Rameshwar Prasad Goyal AIR 2014 SC 850.

Rameshwar Prasad Goyal filed an application for restoration of an appeal which was earlier
dismissed by the Court, as none appeared to press the appeal. The Court opined that the facts
contained in the restoration application were not correct and the counsel appearing for the
applicant was not able to clarify the same. The Court passed over the matter and asked the
counsel appearing to call the AOR, Goyal, who would be able to explain the factual
controversy. Goyal never turned up before the Court to explain the facts. It was pointed out
that Goyal had filed extremely large number of cases in the Supreme Court but never
appeared in the Court. In view of the refusal of the AOR to come to the Court, the Court
dismissed the application and issued a show cause notice to Goyal, as to why his name should
not be removed from the register of Advocates-On-Record.

ISSUE

Whether lending signature without taking any responsibility for conduct of a case amounts to
misconduct of his duty towards the court and defeats the purpose of having institution of
Advocates of Record.

RULES

• Order IV, Rule 6 and Rule 8A of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 Order IV- Advocates

ANALYSIS

According to Rule 8A of the Supreme Court Rules, when the court is satisfied on a complaint
given by any person or otherwise that an Advocate on Record (AOR) is guilty of any
misconduct, the court may pass an order to remove his name permanently or for a temporary
period from the register of the Advocate on Record and the same should be made known to
the Bar Council of India and the concerned State Bar Council.

This Hon’ble Court earlier held that in case of contemptuous, unbecoming or blameworthy
behaviour of an advocate, the court possesses the power to withdraw the privilege to practice
as an AOR because that privilege is conferred by the court itself. Therefore, it can be
established that the court has the authority to go against the AOR suo moto; without any
complaint being lodged against him in the court. Lawyers play an important part in the
administration of justice. The profession itself requires the safeguarding of high moral
standards. As an officer of the court the overriding duty of a lawyer is to the court, the
standards of his profession and to the public. Since the main job of a lawyer is to assist the
court in dispensing justice, the members of the Bar cannot behave with doubtful scruples or
strive to thrive on litigation. Lawyers must remember that they are equal partners with judges
in the administration of justice. If lawyers do not perform their function properly, it would be
destructive of democracy and the rule of law.

The court also observed that some members of the profession adopt perceptibly casual
approach to the practice of the profession as is evident from their absence when the matters
are called out, the filing of incomplete and inaccurate pleadings - many times even illegible
and without personal check and verification, the non- payment of court fees and process fees,
the failure to remove office objections, the failure to take steps to serve the parties, et al.
These acts not only amount to the contempt of the court but do positive disservice to the
litigants and create embarrassing situation in the court leading to avoidable unpleasantness
and delay in the disposal of matters.

In this case, Shri Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, AOR, not only tendered absolute and
unconditional apology and promised not to repeat the misconduct in future but also assured
the court that he would remain present in the court in all the cases where he had entered
appearance for either of the parties. In view of above, though the conduct of Shri Goyal,
AOR, has been reprehensible and not worth pardoning but considering the fact herein, his
conduct is censured and he has been warned to appear in court in all the cases wherever he
has entered appearance. The court was to examine his conduct for one year and if no
improvement is found, may initiate the proceedings again.

CONCLUSION

The legal profession is different from other professions in that what the lawyers do, affects
not only an individual but the administration of justice which is the foundation of the
civilised society. The casualness and indifference with which some members practice the
profession are certainly not calculated to achieve that purpose or to enhance the prestige
either of the profession or of the institution they are serving.

3. R.K.Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court (2009) 8 SCC 106.

This matter arose from a hit-and-run incident in which the defendant, Sanjiv Nanda, was
driving a BMW car while intoxicated and at a high speed, crushed to death six men which
included 3 policemen at the check post. NDTV (New Delhi Television) telecasted a program
in which it was shown that they had done a sting operation and in which it was shown that the
primary witness of the case from the prosecution side, Sunil Kulkarni was shown interacting
with R.K Anand (Senior Défense Counsel) and I.U Khan (Public Prosecutor). They
negotiated with the witness to sell out in the favour of defence for a very high price. I.U Khan
was suspended from the case, and the Delhi Bar Council demanded an explanation and
initiated an investigation into them. Suo Moto cognizance was taken by the Delhi High Court
of the expose by the NDTV which was telecasted on their channel. Delhi high court asked for
the tape of the recordings from the NDTV but the lawyers protested that the tape recordings
which were given to the court were tampered with.

ISSUES

1. Whether the conviction of the two appellants for committing criminal contempt of
court was justified and sustainable.

2. Whether the procedure adopted by the High Court in the contempt proceedings was
fair and reasonable, causing no prejudice to the two appellants.

3. Whether it was open to the High Court to prohibit the appellants from appearing
before the High Court and the courts subordinate to it for a specified period as one of the
punishments for criminal contempt of court.

4. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the punishments awarded to the
appellants could be said to be adequate and commensurate to their misdeeds.

RULES

• Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, which deals with the criminal contempt
of court meaning publication in the form of words, spoken or written, or by signs or visual
representations which tends to lower the reputation of the Court or interferes with the
judgment of the Court.

• Art. 132 of the Indian Constitution, states that An appeal shall lie to the Supreme
Court from any judgment, decree or final order of a High Court in the territory of India,
whether in a civil, criminal or other proceedings, that the case involves a substantial question
of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution.
• Art. 215 of the Indian Constitution, States Every High Court shall be a court of record
and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of
itself.

• Section 34 of the Advocates Act, 1961, which states ) a High Court can make rules
laying down the conditions subject to which an advocate shall be permitted to practice in the
High Court and the subordinate courts but the fact is that many High Courts have not framed
such rules. This has resulted in confusion over the legitimacy of punishing errant advocates.

ANALYSIS

R.K Anand was debarred from engaging in the court proceedings and in the Delhi High
Court. As stated under Article 145 of Indian Constitution and section 34 of Advocates Act,
1961, an Advocate does not have an absolute right of appearing in the Court proceedings.
Similarly, section 34 of Advocates Act, empowers the High Court to frame rules regarding the
Advocate to appear and engage in the court proceedings on the conditions of which an
Advocate shall have the permission to appear in the Court proceedings and shall be allowed
to practice in the Courts. Under Article 145 of Indian Constitution the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has been empowered to provide guidelines for rectifying the practicing of an Advocate
in the court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court has the authority to make laws governing the
function and protocol of the court. The person charged with criminal contempt is rarely given
the opportunity to cross- examine the witnesses. The High Court denied R.K. Anand’s request
to cross-examine Poonam Agarwal. However, it is worth noting to what degree the values of
expediency can take precedence over the interests of justice and truth-telling.

Furthermore, the denial of the right to cross examine was since the events in which both the
parties were involved were already recorded on the CDs and microchips. It was determined
that the statement of Poonam Agarwal will have no effect on the current situation. But it’s
worth noting that RK Anand was the one who doubted the CDs’ authenticity at first. It was
argued by RK Anand that the recordings in the CDs were interfered, and he offered the
Supreme Court to send these recordings as evidence to Central Forensic Science Laboratory
to make sure that whether it is interfered or not. Therefore, it seems that different criteria
were applied to determine the conviction of IU Khan and RK Anand respectively. Although
RK Anand’s attempt at bribing the witness must be condemned, a claim of partiality is
viewed as analogous to casting doubt on the judges’ credibility and challenging the
judiciary’s neutrality and independence. The Supreme Court’s stance is consistent with their
earlier statements on how a motivated request for recusal is likely to cause “hurt” to the
judges.

CONCLUSION

It can be concluded that R.K. Anand provided an opportunity for the Supreme Court to clarify
the law governing sting operations for sub judice cases and the subsequent contempt
proceedings under Contempt of Court, Act, 1971. Finally, the Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld
the conviction of Anand on the same charge by the Delhi High Court. The Supreme Court, on
the other hand, freed I U Khan, who had been convicted by the Delhi High Court. NDTV was
applauded and finally added to the decision that an Advocate should understand its role by
not demeaning the profession of an Advocate.

4. Central Bureau of Hyderabad v. K Narayan Rao (2012) 9 SCC 512

CBI, Hyderabad registered an FIR against P. Radha Gopal Reddy (A-1) and Udaya Shankar
(A-2), the then Branch Manager and the Assistant Manager, respectively of the Vijaya Bank,
Narayanaguda Branch, Hyderabad for abusing their official position as public servants and
for having conspired with private individuals, P. Kondala Rao (A-3) and N.S. Sanjeeva Rao
(A-4) and other unknown persons for defrauding the bank by sanctioning and disbursing
housing loans to 22 borrowers in violation of the bank’s rules and guidelines and thereby
caused wrongful loss of Rs. 1.27 crores to the bank and corresponding gain for themselves.
After completion of the investigation, the CBI filed charge sheet along with the list of
witnesses and the list of documents against all the accused persons wherein K. Narayana Rao,
the respondent who is a legal practitioner and a panel advocate for the Vijaya Bank was also
arrayed as A-6. The allegation against him was that he gave false legal opinion in respect of
10 housing loans. A-6 filed a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC before the High Court of
Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad for quashing the criminal proceedings against him which was
allowed by the HC. Being aggrieved, the CBI, Hyderabad filed this appeal by way of special
leave.
ISSUES

1. Whether the respondent, A-6, failed to discharge his duty by not pointing out the
ownership of the properties and forgery in the construction permission issued by the
municipal authorities and giving false legal opinion.

2. Whether the respondent conspired against the bank, which resulted in a considerable
loss to the bank.

RULES

• Indian Penal Code, 1860

• Section 120 B- Punishment of criminal conspiracy. Section 419- Punishment for

cheating by personation.

• Section 420- Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property. Section 467-
Forgery of valuable security, will, etc.

• Section 468- Forgery for purpose of cheating.

• Section 471- Using as genuine a forged [document or electronic record].

• Section 109- Punishment of abetment if the act abetted is committed in consequence

and where no express provision is made for its punishment.

• Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

• Section 13- Criminal misconduct by a public servant.

ANALYSIS

Mr. H.P. Raval, the learned Additional Solicitor General for the appellant, CBI, Hyderabad,
submitted that the main duty of the respondent, A-6, was to provide legal opinion on the
submitted relevant documents and failure in discharging the duty has resulted in the approval
of loans which in turn resulted in loss for the bank of about Rs. 1.27 crores. The respondent
was negligent in discharging his duty as he did not point out the ownership of the properties
and forgery in the construction permission issued by the municipal authorities which resulted
in loss. He further argued that A-6 conspired against the bank by giving false legal opinion
and thus, his name was included in the charge sheet. On the other hand, Mr. R.
Venkataramani, the learned counsel for the respondent, K. Narayan Rao, submitted that he
has not committed any offence much less an offence punishable under Section 120-B read
with Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 109 of IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section
13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. He further submitted that the
investigation revealed that the construction permission procured from the municipal
authorities was not genuine but the allegations on A-6 were not substantiated with concrete
evidence. He further submitted that a panel advocate is not capable of investigating the
genuineness of the documents and no one out of the 78 witnesses pointed out the involvement
of the respondent in the conspiracy. He argued that it is not necessary for a professional to be
experts in their position. A professional is to be judged based on comparing the professional’s
action with that of an ordinary man and in this case the respondent possessed the requisite
skills and thus, was not negligent in discharging his duty. He also argued that the criminal
conspiracy can be conceived only if there is an agreement among the parties to deceive, but
in this case, there is no evidence that such an agreement existed between the respondent and
the other accused. An act is said to be criminal is there is a criminal intent but in this case
intention is absent. He further submitted that the FIR did not bear the name of the respondent,
but the charge sheet did. It was noted that until or unless there is sufficient evidence against a
person to prove his guilt, there is no use in hearing the case in the first place. The court has
the power to quash an FIR filed against a person if there is no sufficient ground to prove their
guilt. The court was also of the opinion that a strong suspicion is a necessary ingredient to
proceed forward with a forgery case. If there is no prima facie evidence against the accused,
the magistrate has the power to dismiss the case. The court also observed that if there are two
possible views and one of it gives rise to suspicion only but not grave suspicion, the judge has
the power to discharge the accused and he is not obliged to see whether the trial will end in
acquittal or conviction.

CONCLUSION
The court held that since there is no prima facie evidence against the respondent (A-6), K.
Narayan Rao, there is no need in proceeding with the case further. Hence, the Supreme Court
agreed with the judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in quashing the
criminal allegations against the respondent and dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant,
CBI, Hyderabad.

5. Tushar D. Bhatt v. State of Gujarat (2009) 11 SCC 678

The appellant had joined service of Respondent No. 1 as a Food Inspector on 1.12.1982. The
appellant worked as a Food Inspector for 14 years at Ahmedabad and Gandhinagar Circle. In
the first time in 1996, he was transferred to Rajkot and he worked there for 3 years. On
30.9.1999, the appellant was transferred to Bhuj, he did not join the duty in Bhuj for a period
of 20 days and on 04.10.1999, the appellant sent a fax message stating that his mother was ill,
and he is not able to join his duty in Bhuj. The appellant was given a personal hearing by the
Respondent No. 2 asking to join work but even after that advice, he did not join the work.
Even the Assistant Commissioner of Bhuj on 04.01.2000 asked the appellant to join the duty
immediately. The Appellant was served with a show cause notice and the appellant blatantly
refused to join duty in Bhuj. Subsequently, an order dated 08.03.2000 was passed stating that
the appellant was suspended from the service with a pending enquiry. After this order, the
appellant made a symbolic report on 27.4.2000 with the pursuance of the order of transfer
dated 30.9.1999. The appellant was served with a charge sheet on 05.05.2000 with seven
charges. He was allowed to defend his case in the inquiry. The Inquiry report found that he
was guilty of the charges which were levelled against him and the report was sent to the
Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary authority occurred with the same and served the
appellant with a second show cause notice, calling him up to show up within 15 days or he
will be charged under Rule 6 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules.
The appellant replied to the show cause notice and considering the severity of the issue, the
appellant referred the matter to the highest authority that is State of Gujarat for passing
appropriate orders. An impugned order dated 25.5.2002, dismissed the services of the
appellant.

ISSUE
1. Whether the action of the Disciplinary authority under Rule 6 of the Gujarat Civil•
Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971 disproportionate to the guilt established or
there is violation of the fundamental rights or the principles of natural justice.

RULE

• Rule 6 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971- Nature of
penalties

ANALYSIS

The appellant challenged the dismissal order by filing a writ petition and the Learned Single
Judge by a comprehensive judgement dealt with every aspect of the case and included related
cases for deciding the present case. The Learned Single Judge of the Court observed that the
judicial review of action taken by the disciplinary authority against the delinquent was very
limited. The Learned Single Judge felt that the quantum of the punishment was shockingly
disproportionate to the guilt established. He believed that strict view was required to be taken
in the matter of discipline of the institution. According to him, when the disciplinary authority
has taken appropriate view in the facts and circumstances of the case, then it should not be
interfered with. The appellant was aggrieved by the order of the Learned Single Judge and
referred his matter to the High Court under Letters Patent Appeal. The Division bench
observed that the appellant flouted the order of transfer and indulged in brow beating with his
superior officers. The division bench highlighted all those intemperate languages of the
appellant and adhered what the learned Single Judge held in this matter. The Division Bench
knew that the matter had limited jurisdiction in terms of appeal, but the appellant was given
chance to appeal in the interests of the justice.

CONCLUSION

The Division Bench held that legal position has been crystallised in number of judgments that
transfer is an incidence of service and transfers are made according to administrative
exigencies. In the present case, the appellant’s tenure was for 18 years, and he was transferred
only twice. It cannot be said the appellant’s order of transfer was mala fide. The appellant
was not justified in defying his transfer order and the threats made by him against his
superiors. The Division Bench stated that the compliance of the transfer order is compulsory
until there is a genuine reason, if such compliance is not done, he would be exposed to the
disciplinary action under the relevant Rules. The Hon’ble Court held that the appellant’s
attitude towards his superiors was irrational, and the dismissal of the appellant was done in
the interest of discipline of any institution or organization and such an approach and attitude
of the employees cannot be countenanced.

6. Shambhu Ram Yadav v. Hanuman Das Khatry, AIR 2001 SC 2509.

It is a case of professional misconduct of an advocate. In this case, a complaint was filed by

the appellant against the respondents-Advocate before the Bar council of Rajasthan, which
was referred to the Disciplinary Committee by the State Bar Council. The complaint against
advocate was that he had written a letter to his client Mahant Rajagiri stating that another
client had informed him that the concerned judge accepts bribe to give favourable orders, and
so he should send an amount of Rs. 10,000 /- to get decision in his favour, and in case he can
influence the judge himself, there is no need to send Rs. 10,000 /- to be given to the judge.
The content of the letter was admitted by the respondent Advocate. However, in reply to the
complaint letter, he pleaded that the services of the presiding judge were terminated due to
taking illegal gratification, and that he had followed by norms of professional ethics and
brought this fact to the knowledge of the client to protect the interest of his client, and that the
money was not sent by the client to him. The State Bar Council concluded that the respondent
Advocate was guilty of professional misconduct and suspended him from practice for a
period of 2 years. The respondent advocate challenged this decision before the Bar Council of
India which enhanced the punishment and directed that the name of respondent be struck off
from the roll of Advocate and thus, he be debarred permanently from the practice of
advocacy. The Advocate filed a review petition before it against this decision and the same
was allowed, and the earlier order was modified by substituting the punishment of
permanently debarring him from practice with that of remanding him. Aggrieved from the
order, an appeal was filed to the Supreme Court under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961.

ISSUE
1. Whether the disciplinary committee can change the original order of suspension in
the• exercise of its review powers.

RULE

• Advocates Act, 1961

• Section 44- Review of orders by disciplinary committee. Section 38- Appeal to the
Supreme Court.

ANALYSIS

The Disciplinary Committee has the authority to review its order under Section 44 of the
Advocates Act, but the court noted that this provision has a limit and that a new decision by
the Disciplinary Committee on the same set of facts and evidence is not allowed. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court ruled on appeal that the Bar Council of India had considered all
relevant factors in reaching the conclusion that the Advocate was totally unfit to practice law
after writing such a letter, and that a penalty other than permanently barring him could not be
levied on the guilty respondent. The Court also observed that the power of review would not
give the Disciplinary Committee the authority to take a different view on the same evidence.
Considering the extent of the misconduct committed by the Advocate respondent, a
punishment of permanent debarment of practice was levied on the respondent, which was
changed in the exercise of review authority. It is the responsibility of the Bar Council to
uphold the required standards and to take disciplinary action against erring Advocates if they
fail to do so. The role of a lawyer is laid down under Part VI of the BCI Rules, and a primary
task is that of fulfilling the functioning and pleading or acting with integrity, respecting &
preserving the dignity of the Court, and respecting the interests of the client. The legal
profession was founded on the honesty and dignity of an advocate and the Advocates Act
1961 gave the authorities duty to act wherever it appears that such individuals or members of
Bar Associations have undermined its prestige and reputation.

The lawyer has spent over 50 years in the legal profession, and he does not dishonour the
profession but should have high moral standards. Further, the court held that the BCI cannot
take another view on the same facts in this case in the appeal petition.
CONCLUSION

This is a classic example, where the Bar Council of India permanently suspended a lawyer
alleging that his clients bribe the judge to obtain a favourable order. His advocacy that such a
judge was genuinely bribed and that he simply answered his client’s inquiries who requested
information, did not work in his favour. In addition, he has for the last fifty years been in a
clean record as a lawyer, did not soften the Court. On the other hand, considering the skills
and experience acquired over the years, the court suspended the convicted lawyer because of
the tainting of the legal profession.

7. Noratanmal Chouraria v. M R Murli & Anr., AIR 2004 SC 2440.

The appellant and the respondents are landlord and tenant, and a rent control proceeding was
initiated by the respondents against the appellant where they misconduct themselves while
the proceedings were pending in the Small Causes Court. When the appellant came out of the
court hall, the first respondent came from behind and hit him on his back and ran away
(8.10.1993), accompanied with some rowdy elements threatened to kill him which was
reported to the police (26.10.1993), and kicked him on his left knee with an intention to cause
injury and asked him not to appear in the court for evidence (1.3.1995). On receiving the
complaint, the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu initiated a
proceeding which was transferred to the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India
which noticed that in relation to the acts on the part of the respondent no criminal proceeding
was initiated by filing a complaint petition by the appellant and no charge sheet had also been
filed by the police. It held that the factum of the occurrence of the said incidents are not
reliable, and the first respondent appeared in the said litigation not as advocate but as litigant
in person. This order of the BCI refusing to enquire into the complaint of purported
misconduct on part of the respondent is questioned in this appeal by the appellant under
Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961.

ISSUE

1. Whether the acts on the part of the respondent amount to misconduct.

RULE
• Advocates Act, 1961.

• Section 35- Punishment of advocates for misconduct. Section 38- Appeal to the
Supreme Court

ANALYSIS

Mr. S.B. Upadhyay, the learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that Section 35 of the
Advocates Act, 1961 states that an advocate on the role of the Bar Council can be proceeded
against for committing any misconduct which may not be confined to professional
misconduct and thus, the Bar Council erred in passing the impugned order. He also argued
that the fact that the first respondent assaulted the appellant, asked him not to proceed with
case, threatened to kill him and kicked him are acts that are not expected of a member of
legal profession and thus, they must be held to be acts of misconduct. Mr. T. Raja, the learned
counsel for the respondents, submitted that the appellant had been harassing the respondent
by initiating false cases against him and the complaint in question is the eighth one and in the
other seven complaints no relief has been granted. He further argued that it is improbable that
if an act, like the one complained of, took place in a court room, it would not be brought to
the notice of the presiding officer. He submitted that neither any private complaint has been
filed nor any criminal proceeding has been initiated by the appellant and no evidence in
support of it has been produced before the BCI and thus, the impugned order should not be
interfered with by this court. It was noted that ‘misconduct’ is not capable of precise
definition, but it receives connotation from the context, delinquency in its performance and
its effect on the discipline and nature of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, must be
improper or wrongful behaviour, unlawful behaviour, wilful, forbidden act, a transgression of
established and definite rule of action or code of conduct but not mere error of judgment,
carelessness, or negligence in performing the duty. Its ambit must be construed with reference
to the subject matter and the context wherein the term occurs considering the scope of the
statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve. It was also observed that Section 35 of the
Advocates Act, 1961 imposes punishment for professional or other misconduct. A member of
legal profession is expected to maintain a standard in dignified and determined manner and a
lawyer is obligated to observe those norms which make him worthy of the confidence of the
community in him as an officer of the court. The charge must be such which would
necessitate initiation of disciplinary proceedings and the quantum of punishment must be
determined by applying the test of proportionality which would also depend upon the nature
of the acts complained of and thus, no universal rule can be laid down regarding initiation of
proceeding for misconduct of a member of the profession.

CONCLUSION

The court held that there was no reason as to why the appellant did not make any complaint
to the State Bar Council immediately of the incidents that took place and if he had lodged a
FIR there was no reason as to why he did not pursue it seriously. Even after the police filed
final forms the appellant did not file any protest petition or initiate any other proceeding
before the criminal court. Regarding the third incident which took place inside the court
room, it was expected of the appellant or his advocate to bring it to the notice of the court, but
nothing was done and even regarding the other two incidents no complaint was made before
the presiding officer. The Supreme Court held that the matter need not be pursued further, and
the impugned order need not be interfered with.

8. Prahlad Saran Gupta v. Bar Council of India, AIR 1997 SC 1338.

The appellant Prahlad Saran Gupta was a practicing lawyer at Ghaziabad, U.P. He was
appearing for the decree-holder in a case in the Court of Civil Judge, Ghaziabad. A complaint
was received by the U.P. State Bar Council from Rajendra Prasad alleging him withholding of
Rs 1,500/- without paying the decree-holder and with other allegations. The Bar Council
referred the case to its disciplinary committee, but it could not complete the proceedings
within one year and the same was transferred to the Bar Council of India under Section 36B
of the Advocates Act, 1961. The disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India did not
find merit in the allegation in the complaint that the appellant was grossly careless in
handling the execution case. However, the committee found the appellant guilty of gross
professional misconduct regarding withholding Rs. 1,500/- and imposed the punishment of
suspension from practice for a period of one year. Aggrieved by the order passed by the
disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India, the present appeal was filed by the
appellant before the Supreme Court under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961.
ISSUE

1. Whether the appellant is guilty of gross professional misconduct.

RULES

• Advocates Act, 1961

• Section 35- Punishment of advocates for misconduct. Section 36B- Disposal of

disciplinary proceedings.

• Section 38- Appeal to the Supreme Court

ANALYSIS

The counsel representing the appellant contended that the findings of the disciplinary
committee are not entirely accurate and that there are some inaccuracies. The disciplinary
committee found the appellant guilty of professional misconduct based on a charge of failure
to give notice under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The appellant was accused
of drafting the notice himself, but he shouldn’t have done so because he was a member of the
Railways’ Standing Council. It was argued that the charge was not filed against the
complainant and was instead presented to the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council
in the complainant’s application. The expert’s appeal to examine the handwriting was denied
by the disciplinary committee. The appellant demanded that the disciplinary committee verify
whether the handwriting in the notice matches the appellant’s handwriting, but the
disciplinary committee refused to approve the request, which is considered a mistake by the
BCI disciplinary committee. Rather than seeking an expert opinion on the appellant’s
handwriting, the committee declared that the appellant’s handwriting and the writing in the
notice are identical. The Supreme Court held that the disciplinary committee of BCI
committed a mistake in denying the appellant’s appeal. The court observed that it is not
advisable for a judge to compare handwriting and that it is preferable to seek expert advice
and assistance when doing so. The appellant was not found guilty of serious professional
wrongdoing simply because he drafted and served the notice under Section 80 of the CPC to
the railways. Since this is a quasi-criminal offence, it must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. If an expert’s opinion is used to compare the handwriting, it may be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. The disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India also issued an order
finding the appellant guilty of professional misconduct for the letter sent to Shri V.K. Gupta.
Shri Ram (judgement debtor) did not hand over the letter to V.K. Gupta, a lawyer in
Allahabad, according to the Supreme Court. Even though the Hon’ble Supreme Court
dismissed all the charges levelled against the appellant, it did find one allegation against the
appellant to be true: the appellant was found guilty of wrongfully withholding Rs. 1,500/-
from the decree holder. The appellant claimed that the said sum was levied with him by both
the decree holder and the judgement debtor in connection with a settlement that was reached
between the two parties, but that the appellant declined to pay the amount because it could
only be charged if both parties’ joint receipts were turned over to him. The disciplinary
committee objected to this. The Court held that the expected agreement between the parties
for Rs.1,500/- was deposited with the appellant, who did not return the money to the decree
holder or the judgement debtor and kept it for himself until he deposited it in the court, which
was against professional ethics and conduct, particularly because he was a senior counsel. As
a result, the Hon’ble Supreme Court ruled that the appellant was found guilty of gross
professional misconduct and was sentenced accordingly. The appellant is given a reprimand
for this aspect of his wrongdoing in order to satisfy the ends of justice.

CONCLUSION

The judgment was reasonable and in accordance with the rules. Professional misconduct rules
and professional ethics were reviewed by the Supreme Court. In this case, the appellant was
found guilty of improperly keeping the money for himself and failing to refund it to the
decree holder. This suggests that the appellant has betrayed the trust that his client has placed
in him. The Court believed there are various forms of professional misconduct that can be
committed by a lawyer, but the most serious is misappropriation of a client’s funds. As a
result, the Court correctly determined that the appellant was dismissed for this reason and
concluded that the appellant was found guilty of gross professional misconduct and was
sentenced accordingly

9. A.S. Mohd. Rafi v. State of Tamil Nadu [AIR 2011 SC 308]

In this case, the bone of contention is the resolution that was passed by the Bar Association of
Coimbatore stating that none of its members would defend the accused policemen during the
trial, which was the result of a criminal complaint filed against the policemen as they had
assaulted the lawyers. As a result of this, a Special Leave Petition was filed by the policemen,
in the Supreme Court of India against that very resolution claiming that it violated the
Constitution of India, precisely Article 22(1); the Rule 11, Chapter 2, Part 6 of the rules
framed by the Bar Council of India, titled as the ‘Standards of Professional Conduct and
Etiquettes’; and the Professional ethics.

ISSUE

1. Whether the resolution passed by the Bar Association that no member would defend
the police personnel was valid?

RULE

• Article 22(1) of the Constitution states: "No person who is arrested shall be detained
in custody without being informed, as soon as may not be, of the grounds for such arrest nor
shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his
choice".

• According to the Article 14 of the Constitution of India, “The State shall not deny to
any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of
India.” This article strikes the root of arbitrariness by guaranteeing to all the citizens of India
‘equality before law’ and ‘equal protection of law’.

• According to the Article 21 of Indian Constitution, “No person shall be deprived of

his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”

ANALYSIS

In the words of Judge Markandey Katju who presided over A. S. Mohammed V. State of
Tamil Nadu case in the Supreme Court, “Several Bar Association all over India, whether
High Court Bar Associations or District Court Bar Associations have passed resolutions that
they will not defend a particular person or persons in a particular criminal case. Sometimes
there are clashes between policemen and lawyers, and the Bar Association passes a resolution
that no one will defend the policemen in the criminal case in Court. Similarly, sometimes the
Bar Association passes a resolution that they will not defend a person who is alleged to be a
terrorist or a person accused of a brutal or heinous crime or involved in a rape case.

The duty to defend essentially means that it is the duty of the people, who are granted with
the powers to defend any person before the Court of Law, to defend them in each and every
possible situation and they cannot deny access to their services on any grounds, except when
there is conflict of interest.

According to the Rule 11 of Section II of Part VI of Bar Council Rules framed under Section
49(1)(c) of the Advocates Act, 1961, it is provided that, “An advocate is bound to accept any
brief in the Courts or Tribunals or before any other authorities in or before which he proposes
to practice at a fee consistent with his standing at the bar and the nature of the case. Special
circumstances may justify his refusal to accept a particular brief.”

Additionally, the fundamental right (Art.22 (a)) clearly states that each person has the right to
be defended in the Court of Law by a legal practitioner of his own choice. In this case the
policemen were denied access to the legal practitioners of their own choice because of a
resolution that was passed by the Bar Association stating that none of its members would take
up the case of the policemen because the policemen were previously indulged in assaulting
some lawyers. This is a clear violation of the fundamental right and the same cannot be
entertained by any Court of law.

In the light of the Article 14 of Indian Constitution which clearly indicates the fact that the
article was violated in this case. The policemen, though wrong on their part, were denied
access to the lawyers during the trial of the criminal appeal that was filed against them for
assaulting some lawyers due to certain pre-existing clashes between the lawyers and the
policemen. Here, the principle laid down in the Article 14 was grossly violated, as by denying
access to the rightful legal representation they were not given equality before law. The
fundamental right that has been guaranteed to all the citizens of India was not provided to the
appellants in this case. Further, in relation to Art. 21. In this case, the policemen were also
deprived of their personal liberty when they could not hire any lawyers to fight their case just
because a resolution was passed by the Bar Association of Coimbatore; that no member of the
concerned Coimbatore Bar Association would defend the accused policemen in the criminal
case filed against them, due to the previous assault done on some lawyers by the policemen.
The fundamental right of the policemen was clearly violated in this case and the resolution
passes by the Bar Association is not constitutional at all.

CONCLUSION

Professional ethics needs an attorney not to deny a brief, unless a client is not able to pay his
fee and the attorney is not otherwise involved i.e. there is a possibility of conflict of interest.
Consequently, the action taken by any bar association to pass such a resolution that none of
its members would appear on the ground for a specific accused whether on the ground of
being a police officer or on the ground of being a convicted terrorist, a rapist, a mass killer,
etc., is contradictory to all the standards of the Constitution, the Legislation, and professional
ethics. It is against the Bar's great values which have always stood up to defend people
accused of a crime. Indeed, such a resolution is a mockery to the legal community.

10. In Re: Arundhati Roy [AIR 2002 SC 1375:(2002) 3 SCC 343]

During the course of the writ petition by grassroots-movement Narmada Bachao Andolan, the
Court addressed issues of environmental damage and displacement of marginalized
communities due to the development of a reservoir dam on the river Narmada. Following a
Supreme Court order that allowed for the height of the dam to be increased, the Respondent
wrote an article criticizing this decision. Subsequently, protests were staged in front of the
gates of the Supreme Court by Narmada Bachao Andolan and the Respondent. This led to
contempt proceedings based on a complaint lodged with the police. During the proceedings,
all Respondents denied the allegations concerning specific slogans and banners and the
proceedings were dropped. However, along with her denial, Roy’s response to the show cause
notice criticized the Court for issuing proceedings in the first place.

Based on the above averments, suo moto contempt proceedings were initiated against the
Respondent for imputing motives to the Court. In her reply to the affidavit to the contempt
notice, the author reiterated her stance and stressed her continuous dissent against the
decision of the Supreme Court. She further noted that she believed this to be a matter of her
right to express her opinions as a citizen as well as a writer.
ISSUES

1. Whether the published article by the respondent can be prima facie held to be
disrupting the proceeding of the court and impair the dignity of the court.

2. Whether the right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by the constitution
holds immunity from the contempt. Can the intention be held as one of the significant criteria
to uphold any person for contempt?

RULES

• Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 Section 2- Definitions.

• Section 3- Innocent publication and distribution of matter not contempt. Section 4-

Fair and accurate report of judicial proceeding not contempt. Section 5- Fair criticism of
judicial act not contempt.

• Section 6- Complaint against presiding officers of subordinate courts when not

contempt. Section 7- Publication of information relating to proceedings in chambers or in
camera not contempt except in certain cases.

• Section 8- Other defences not affected. Section 12- Punishment for contempt of court.

• Section 14- Procedure where contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court or a High
Court.

• Section 15- Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases.

• Constitution of India, 1949

• Article 19- Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech etc.

• Article 32- Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part.

ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court upheld that Freedom of Speech and Expression enshrined under Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India comes with reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2).
The court observed that when there is a threat to the public security reasonable restrictions
can be imposed. One such exception to freedom of speech and expression is the Contempt of
Court Act, 1971. This Act was implemented to ensure that the Hon’ble Court and the Judicial
organ of the Government can function in a dignified manner. The court held that the contempt
of court proceedings was further initiated against her for making baseless allegations and for
outraging the judiciary. The court also stated that the entire petition is not considered for the
proceedings but only the parts pertaining to the judiciary. Such act on the part of the judiciary
was required to maintain the public confidence in this organ of the Government and this was
not initiated for the protection of an individual Judge. On these grounds the Hon’ble Court
found the respondent guilty of Contempt of Court. She was sentenced to one day of
imprisonment. She was also ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 2000. On failure of this she will be
subjected to imprisonment for three months.

CONCLUSION

In this landmark decision the Supreme Court made its attempt to restore the faith in Judiciary.
However, when we investigate the affidavit filed by the respondent, she mentioned about the
Tehelka scam. In this scam various political leaders were seen taking bribes. She criticized
the judiciary for not taking up action against such issues that is of national importance. But
when we think from the side of Judiciary the facts surrounding the scam were involving the
Executive organ of the Government. It cannot be concluded that the Judiciary can interfere in
all Executive actions. The respondent further said that it was her right to freedom of speech
and expression.

However, such freedom should not be used to provoke the public against the judiciary.
Hence, reasonable restrictions should be imposed on such freedom.
 COMPONENT 2: ACCOUNTANCY PROBLEMS

ANSWER 1.

Date Particulars LF Dr. Cr.

Cash A/c Dr. 1,00,000

To Capital A/c 1,00,000
[Being capital invested by way of cash]

Furniture A/c 7,000

To Cash A/c 7,000
[Being furniture purchased for cash]

Purchases A/c Dr. 3,000

To Cash A/c 2,000
To SLS Retail A/c 1,000
[Being goods purchased for part cash
and part credit]
 Law Brothers A/c Dr. 12,000
Cash A/c 5,000
To Sales A/c 17,000
[Being goods sold to Law brothers on
cash]
Drawings A/c Dr. 2,000
To Cash A/c 2,000
[Being cash withdrawn for personal use]

SLS Retail Store A/c Dr. 500

To Cash A/c 500
[Being creditors paid by cash]

Cash A/c Dr. 10,000

To Law Brothers A/c 10,000
[Being cash received from Law
brothers]

Salary A/c Dr. 2,000

To Cash A/c 2,000
[Being salaries paid by cash]

ANSWER 2.

Date Particulars LF Dr. Cr.

Cash A/c Dr. 57,500

Photography Equipment A/c Dr. 32,500
To Capital A/c 90,000
[Being owner invested cash and
equipment in business]

Prepaid Insurance A/c 3,000

To Cash A/c 3,000
[Being insurance premium paid]

Client A/c Dr. 10,000

To Services Rendered A/c 10,000
[Being services rendered to client for
Rs. 10,000]
 Office Supplies A/c Dr. 1400
To Cash A/c 400
To Outstanding Expenses A/c 1000
[Being Office supplies purchased]

Cash A/c Dr. 2,000

To Photography Fees A/c 2,000
[Being cash received for photography
fess]

Cash A/c Dr. 15,000

To Customer Advance A/c 15,000
[Being customer paid in advance for
future services]

Photography Equipment A/c 1,00,000

Dr. 25,000
To Cash A/c 75,000
To Notes Payable A/c
[Being photography equipment
purchased]