Plato on True and False Poetry

Author(s): M. Pabst Battin

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism , Winter, 1977, Vol. 36, No. 2
(Winter, 1977), pp. 163-174
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/429756

REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/429756?seq=1&cid=pdf-
reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

The American Society for Aesthetics and Wiley are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Wed, 08 Feb 2023 00:24:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 M. PABST BATTIN

Plato on True and False Poetry

IN BOOK X of the Republic, Plato argues One might, perhaps, suggest that all Plato
that poetry--he has in mind particularlyhas in mind in claiming that poetry is not
the poetry of Homer- must be excludedtrue is the trivial fact that poetry, insofar
from the ideal state on two grounds: it in- as it is fiction, describing mythical or leg-
flames the passions, and it isn't true. Eitherendary persons and events that did not
characteristic is sufficient to disrupt the happen, is not true in the way that a report
order of the just soul: poetry which inflames or description of actual persons or events is.
the passions strengthens ro Ov,uoeLt8s&, the But this cannot be an adequate account,
spirited part of the soul, so that it may gainsince the poetry with which Plato is most
control of the rational part; poetry which isconcerned, that of Hesiod and Homer, was
untrue weakens rT XoytcrrtKov, the rational thought, at least by most of Plato's contem-
part, so that it becomes unable to maintain poraries, to describe actual beings. The
control over the troublesome spirited and gods and heroes of Homeric and Hesiodic
appetitive parts. Should the rational partpoetry were believed to exist, or have
lose control for either reason, the irrational existed, not in some legendary or mythical
other world, but in this one; thus Plato
parts gain it, and the individual becomes
unjust. But a state peopled by unjust indi- would be quite unable to rest his case on
viduals cannot itself be just; thus, if in thethe claim that poetry is not true because it
Republic we are to envision the ideal, trulydescribes merely fictitious people and places.
just state, we must banish whatever pro-Besides, I think he has something much
duces injustice in individuals. Poetry, Platomore interesting in mind.
holds, is untrue and inflammatory, and so A symptom of the fact that Plato's point
produces injustice in individuals; it there- is not trivial occurs in some rather jarring
fore cannot be admitted, whatever its notes in the case against poetry. Plato says
beauties, to the ideal state. that he prizes nothing above the truth, and
That, in very simple terms, is the argu- yet when designing the ideal state elects to
ment against poetry advanced in the Repub- admit some poetry which is not true, and
lic. But notice that it rests on two central to exclude some poetry which is. But if it is
assumptions about the nature of poetry: truth - and truth alone - which strengthens
that it is untrue, and that it inflames the the rational part of the soul, and hence
favors the development of justice in the in-
emotions. While the second of these is per-
haps primarily of psychological interest, dividual
it and, consequently, the state, it
seems
is the first assumption that is philosophi- quite astonishing that he should make
such choices.
cally provocative, and which we shall exam-
ine here: the claim that poetry is not true. Let us consider a couple of curious pas-
sages. In Book II, when Socrates and his
M. PABST BATTIN is assistant professor of companions are discussing the educational
philosophy
at the University of Utah. regimen appropriate to the young guardians,

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Wed, 08 Feb 2023 00:24:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 164 B A T T I N

Socrates first claims that the stories Homer

"imitate the truth" (598B), that it is "pro-
and Hesiod tell about the gods are false,duced
and without knowledge of the truth"
(599A), and that it does not "lay hold on
then remarks (translation Shorey, italics
mine): truth" (600E). We know, of course, that for
Plato it is the Forms which are true, and
Even if they were true I should not think that thus that poetry which is "far from the
they ought to be thus lightly told to thoughtless
truth" is poetry which is far from the Forms.
young persons. But the best way would be to
bury them in silence, and if there were some But this is not very informative. If we are to
necessity for relating them, that only a very understand what he means in claiming that
small audience should be admitted under pledge poetry fails to reach truth, and in particular
of secrecy and after sacrificing, not a pig, but
if we are to comprehend why he admits some
some huge and unprocurable victim, to the end
sorts of tales and excludes others in the name
that as few as possible should have heard these
tales. (378A) of truth, we must find some way of speak-
ing with our own vocabulary of "true" and
Here the claim, albeit a hypothetical one, "false" which will make intelligible to us
is that some true stories ought not to be told. what it is for poetry to be "far from" the
Conversely, Socrates claims in several places Forms, and what it is to fail to "lay hold
that some stories which are not true should of truth."

be told. Not only is a child's first educationPerhaps we will be aided in this project
to be in fables, which are, "as a whole, false,"
by taking notice of a distinction in our own
though they do contain some truth (377A), language: we make use of at least two dis-
but as adults the inhabitants of the city are tinct senses of "true." While we generally
to be told "opportune falsehoods" whenever assume that "true" denotes a property of
the guardians deem it socially useful to do statements, and that a statement which has
so (389B). These so-called noble lies (among this property is one which "corresponds to"
them such tales as the myth of the metals) or correctly describes some object or state
of affairs in the world, we also recognize that
are to be devised by hireling poets under
this is not the only way in which we use the
the strictest scrutiny and censorship of the
term. Consider the following two statements:
guardians, and in the Laws form a major
part of the literary diet of the state (Laws(a) That today is Wednesday is true.
663D-664A).
(b) Jack's a true radical.
Such claims hardly seem those made by
a man who rejects poetry on the grounds We tend to assume that the first of these, in
that it does not "lay hold on truth" (600E).which the predicate "true" is applied to a
If truth were actually Plato's only criterion
statement, is the central or principal sense
for the admission of poetry, and if truthful-of the word "true"; "true" as it is used in
ness in poetry were as crucial to the justnessthe second context, however, is an equally
of the soul as he says it is, then we mightfamiliar phenomenon in our language. In
expect that all false poetry - including chil-this usage, it does not modify a statement;
dren's fables and the noble lies - would be it denotes a property of objects, in this case,
excluded, and that all true poetry - includ- radicals. In fact, it can apply to many sorts
ing any of the tales of Hesiod and Homer of entities: we speak of true remorse, true
that might be true - would be retained. courage,
But and true love; we speak of true
this is not the case. It seems, then, that leaders and true cowards; we speak of true
Plato's exclusion policy suffers from some granite, true red, and true hydrophobia.
sort of pervasive conceptual confusion about What we mean in these contexts is that the
the nature or importance of truth. object, or state of affairs, of which "true" is
With perhaps one exception, however, predicated is a paradigm or reliable example
Plato does not apply the terms "true"oforthe kind of thing it is; it is not in any way
"false" directly to poetry;1 what he does say,fake, artificial, or imperfect. A true red is
repeatedly, is that poetry is "far from a paradigm red, one which is genuinely,
the
truth" (597E, 598B, 602C), that it does not fully, and completely red, and is not adulter-

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Wed, 08 Feb 2023 00:24:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Plato on True and False Poetry 165

ated with any other hues. True concern is senses of "true" straight, we may be able to
that which is not colored by any ulterior see how Plato has been misinterpreted, what
motives; it is an example of the kind of he has in mind, and come to understand his
thing concern ought to be. In at least some seemingly curious position on true and false
cases involving human beings, this use of poetry.
"true" not only has this paradigmatic, nor- I suspect that what gives rise to the jar-
mative sense, but seems also to suggest that ring notes we detect in Plato's argument
the individual of whom the predication is that poetry is not true is that while we see
made has the property in question by nature, that both senses of "true" can be used of
and could not be otherwise. "Jack's a true the content of poetry, Plato means that
radical" and "Jane's a true pianist" suggest poetry is not true in a way connected with
that these individuals are what they are by one of these senses, and we tend to under-
nature, and given adequate opportunity for stand it in the other. Plato may be denying
development at all, could not have been that the statements of which poetry consists
otherwise.
are true, that is, that they correctly describe
We see, then, that in English we can dis-
objects or states-of-affairs in the world. Or
cern two distinct senses of "true." 2 The first
he may be denying that poetry portrays
of these uses, in which "true" is a predicatetrue x's, that is, objects which are paradigms
of statements and means that the statement
or trustworthy exemplars of their kinds,
correctly describes the world, or is conform- and which are not in any way fake, artifi-
able to fact, I shall call henceforth the de- cial, or imperfect. If we take him to deny
scriptive or factual sense of "true"; the sec-that poetry consists primarily of factually
ond, equally familiar at least in everyday correct statements, we will take him to be
English discourse, I shall call the paradig- telling us that poetry fails to tell us what is
matic or normative sense of "true," to sug-the case; if we understand him to deny that
gest that it is said of an entity which func-poetry describes paradigmatic entities, we
tions as a paradigm. In this latter senseshall take him to be saying that poetry fails
"true" means something like "genuine,"to show us what is best, or tell us what
"essential," "perfect," "ideal," and so forth.ought to be the case.
Greek also uses Xa qr7r7, usually trans- The modern reader may object that
lated "true," both as a predicate of state-poetry is not primarily a set of statements,
ments and as an adjective modifying nouns.but a collection of non-assertorial speech
This, of course, is not sufficient evidence thatacts. But it is clear that Plato thought of
the Greek word is bivocal, or that it has just poetry as a set of statements, each of which
those senses, either for Greek-users in gen-has a truth value. However, these state-
eral or for Plato in particular, that thements are presented in elaborately de-
English term does; it is evidence only thatscriptive, metaphorical, and/or pleasingly
the term can be used in two distinct gram-rhymed and metrical language; it is this
matical ways. Plato does use the term infeature which tends to obscure their truth
both grammatical ways; both usages, in fact,or falsity. For instance, he says in Book X
are to be found within Book X.3 While this that those who are ignorant of a craft--
does not guarantee that the senses he assigns cobbling or generalship, for instance - will
aXrlr6q are equivalent to the English sensesbe impressed by poetic accounts of these
of "true," however, in the absence of any crafts given in rhythm, meter, and har-
explicit discussion of the meaning(s) of thismony, "so mighty is the spell that these
term we must rely, if we are to understand adornments naturally exercise," but he adds
Plato's case at all, on our English-language that when these statements are "stripped
intuitions, at least to avoid the more com- bare of their musical coloring and taken by
mon interpretive errors. English-language themselves, I think you know what sort of
intuitions alone, of course, will not tell us a showing these sayings of the poets make"
what it means to be "far from the truth." (601B; cf. Gorgias 502B). I take this to
mean that a statement which, when pre-
But by keeping the factual and normative

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Wed, 08 Feb 2023 00:24:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 166 B ATTIN

sented in highly poetic language, or any equivalent

may strike in this one. Rather, it is
the hearer as true and significant, a statement of fact
may whichturn
asserts that some
out, when made straightforwardly entity (Jack) andis a paradigm
with- of its kind (radi-
out ornament, to be false cals), or anduninteresting.
it is false if Jack is not a paradigm
It is the statements or groups of
radical, or if state-
there is no entity Jack. Further
ments of which poetry consists, then,
assertions about this that
paradigm entity (e.g.
may be true or false. Of course, "Jack detestsany givenmay also be fac-
bureaucracy")
statement has both factual and normative tually true or false, depending on whether
truth values; if it is a statement, it either there is a Jack at all and whether, if he
does or it doesn't correctly describe some exists, he has the property of detesting
state-of-affairs, and it either does or it blureaucracy.
doesn't have to do with a paradigm object.We must notice, however, that factual
From the truth values of the component falsity does not entail normative falsity as
statements we can determine the truth value well. Whether or not the assertion about
either of any particular tale within that Jack correctly describes an actually exist-
poetry, or of a given work of poetry as aing individual, it may nevertheless pre-
whole: we can speak of "factually truesent a genuine paradigm. If it does, it
poetry" as poetry in which the crucial fac-gives rise to a normative claim. The as-
tual statements are true, and "normativelysumption at work here, of course, is the
true poetry" as that in which most or all of central Platonic one that whatever prop-
the important normative statements are erties are possessed by a paradigm entity are
true. (One might also apply the normativeto be possessed, though perhaps in lesser
sense of "true" directly to poetry itself, not
degree, by all entities of that kind: the
to its constituent statements, in order to paradigm is the norm or standard for what
speak of "true poetry" as opposed to fake,that kind of thing ought to be.4 It may
flawed or artificial poetry, as for instance instrike us as peculiar to hold that "norma-
greeting card verses, but this usage, while tive" claims may hold of objects incapable
quite legitimate, is nowhere relevant to the of volition: it seems odd to say that because
discussions in the Republic.) the paradigm stone is hard, a particular
If we are to respond to the jarring notesstone "ought" to be hard also, if it is to be
in the case against poetry, then, and ask correctly called a stone. But it does not strike
what Plato means by calling poetry "far us as odd to claim that because the para-
from the truth," we shall be asking whether digm citizen is just, a particular citizen
he has in mind poetry in which the crucial ought also to be just, if he is to be correctly
factual statements are false, or poetry incalled a citizen. Plato, however, makes no
which the important normative statements distinction between the ways in which enti-
are not true. As I've suggested, this is toties capable and incapable of volition par-
ask whether Plato's complaint is that poetry
ticipate in the Forms.
does not tell us what is the case, or that Of course, the paradigm need not be ac-
poetry fails to tell us what ought to be the
tually existing, at least not in this world;
case.
for Plato the true paradigms, the Forms,
But now while we understand how a do not exist in the actual world at all. Fur-
factually false statement fails to tell us what
thermore, descriptions of the paradigms are
is the case, it is not so clear how a norma- at best approximations, and not wholly sat-
tively true statement - that is, a statement isfactory substitutes for a full vision of the
about a true x - might tell us what oughtparadigms themselves. Nevertheless, de-
to be the case. I have claimed that the nor- scriptions of these paradigms do give rise
mative sense of "true" is that which is to normative claims. That is why Socrates
displayed in locutions like "Jack'sseeks a true
to define true justice, true piety, true
radical"; but this is not a claim that courage,
"Jack's and so forth; he is convinced that
a true radical" is itself a normative state- if he succeeds in doing so, we will know how
ment. It is not: normative statements are to live.
A normative claim can be engendered,
"ought" statements, and there is no "ought"

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Wed, 08 Feb 2023 00:24:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Plato on True and False Poetry 167

then, by a paradigmatic entity which does it: both fictional and nonfictional tales can
not exist in the actual world. The Forms exert normative claims.
do not exist in the actual world, but Itheythink we now have the skeleton for an
do give rise to normative claims. But intelligible
would account of Plato's notions about
poetry.
fictional figures or tales, myths, or stories of For Plato, statements about para-
imaginary beings do the same? Surely digmatic
not, entities, viz. the Forms, serve as
unless - and this is the crucial condition - bases for normative claims about entities of
that kind. Particular individuals, inhabit-
unless these fictional or imaginary figures
have properties very much like those ofing the real or fictional worlds, cannot be
the
real, i.e., Formal, paradigms. We know,full
forparadigms, in that they cannot be
Forms; but they can be more or less closely
instance, that there is a paradigm general:
participatory
there is a Form General. But suppose we in the Forms. Those indi-
viduals of whom we'd say, in ordinary talk,
hear a tale, albeit fictional, about a general
who is uncommonly brave, perspicacious, that they are true x's, are those who partici-
and skilled in deploying his forces: thepate
sortmost closely in the Forms. Because of
of man we'd call a "true general." He is not
this we are willing to say that they are para-
the true general, of course; there is only digmatic,
one and do serve as models of how
such, and that is the Form itself. If he other
were individuals of that sort ought to be.
an actual man, we would say that heApar-
heroic figure from poetry, then, if he par-
ticipates very closely in, say, the Form Cour-
ticipates very closely in the Form General,
much more closely than other generals.age,
But can and does serve as a model of what
a courageous
he is not. Nevertheless, the description of man ought to be: the coura-
geous man ought to be like the heroic figure.
this figure, although there is in fact no such
figure, is a very close approximation toWhatever
any the essential properties of the
description we might give to the Form, paradigm,
and those are the properties any as-
pirant to x-hood ought to have. If Euthy-
this fact too can give rise to normative
phro were truly pious, as he believes, then
claims. Since, as inhabitants of the Repub-
anyone aspiring to piety ought to have
lic, we hope to accustom ourselves to living
in accordance with descriptions of thosethe properties Euthyphro displays: among
Forms (for these, or laws based on them,
others, the property of accusing one's father.
Since, for Plato, we ought all to aspire to
are what philosophers who are returning
to the cave will bring to us) it would seempiety, the normative import of Euthyphro's
plausible that we should also be willingtale to - if he were truly pious- would be
this: we ought all, in similar circumstances,
guide our lives by any very close approxima-
tion to such descriptions. If a fictionalaccuse
tale our fathers.
describes a particular human action in such This account shows why for Plato we talk
a way that it coincides very closely with of the
normatively true statements, instead sim-
philosophers' description of, say, the Formply of normative statements. While such
Justice, that is an action we should emulate
talk may seem odd to modern ears, this is
in our own lives. because Plato's ontology includes something
ours (for the most part) does not: a genuine
Actually, this sort of case is spurious for
a consideration of Plato, inasmuch as the objective paradigm for every kind of thing
figures populating the myths of Homer and there is: namely, its Form.5 This fact of
Hesoid, the gods and heroes, were notPlato's metaphysics makes it possible to
determine the truth value of whatever di-
thought to be fictional, but to live or have
lived in the actual world. Plato never rectives or normative statements may be
claims that the gods and heroes Homer explicit
de-in or engendered by poetry: all one
scribes do not exist; he argues only need do is compare the object or individual
that
they cannot have the characteristicson which they are based to the true para-
Homer
ascribes to them, or that they are not digm,
divinethat is, the Form. If they correspond,
(391C-D). Whether the poetry Plato at isleast
con- with respect to the proper attributes
cerned with is fictional or not, then, is of the Form, then the normative statement
irrelevant to the case Plato makes againstarising from a description of the compared

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Wed, 08 Feb 2023 00:24:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 168 BATTIN

object can be said to be tale itself would involve true.

normatively the noble actions
It is statements about model individuals of the two fathers: it would describe the
and things, then - true generals, truly iron piousfather as admirable in encouraging or
men, even true chairs - which make de- even commanding his golden son to aspire
mands on those who read about them. A highly and to undergo the rigorous training
given poetic statement, of course, may required
also for the office of guardian; the
be factually true or false, but as suchgolden it has father, on the other hand, would be
no normative force. described as equally admirable in resolutely
Let's see how this account might work for casting out his iron son, to be reared among
a given sample of poetry. Let us consider the artisans or farmers. The tale might be
a tale of the kind Plato describes as a "noble told with great elaborateness and embellish-
lie": the familiar "parable of the metals." ment, as long as the behaviors of the char-
acters involved are in accordance with the
While all of you in the city are brothers . . . yet
social principle to be embodied in the tale.
God in fashioning those of you who are fitted
to hold rule mingled gold in their generation, forPlato says of the description of the tale
which reasons they are the most precious-buthe in provides - and he would no doubt also
the helpers silver, and iron and brass in the
say it of our embellished, poetic version -
farmers and other craftsmen. And as you are all
akin, though for the most part you will breed that it is false. Not only does he call it a
after your kinds, it may sometimes happen thatfalsehood (7Tro Ei8o;), but he says that it
a golden father would beget a silver son and that
"has not happened and perhaps would not
a golden offspring would come from a silver sire
and that the rest would in like manner be born
be likely to happen in our day," and that
it would
of one another. So that the first and chief injunc- require "no little persuasion" to
tion that the god lays upon the rulers is that make
of it believable (414C).
nothing else are they to be such careful guardians This is not merely a function of the fact
and so intently observant as of the intermixture that the tale is told in somewhat metaphori-
ot these metals in the souls of their offspring, and
if sons are born to them with an infusion of brass cal terms, and makes reference to "golden"
or iron they shall by no means give way to pity and "iron" natures; we could strip it of its
in their treatment of them, but shall assign metaphorical
to character, as well as its poetic
each the status due to his nature and thrust them ornament, and it would still be false, at
out among the artizans or the farmers. And
least insofar as it makes a factual assertion
again, if from these there is born a son with un-
about states of affairs in the world: that
expected gold or silver in his composition they
shall honour such and bid them go up higher, men are socially divided into classes irrespec-
some to the office of guardian, some to the tive of parentage, and that the two central
assistanceship, alleging that there is an oracle
characters have behaved as described.
that the state shall then be overthrown when the
man of iron or brass is its guardian. (415A-C)
However, even though the parable is ad-
mittedly factually false, it does describe the
We must be careful to note, of course, that way (Plato thinks) the world ought to be:
the parable is not stated in the Republic it describes a world in which the social
classes are scrupulously separated and in
in the form in which it would be told to the
populace of the ideal state. As a poetic which one's abilities, not one's genealogy,
work designed for the consumption of the determine one's class. The parable presents
populace, it might perhaps take the forma paradigm of social organization; if there
of a tale of two persons -one, the "iron" is a Form of Society as a whole, the view of
or lesser father of a "golden" or superior society given in this parable will correspond
son, the other the "golden" father, himself very closely to it. The tale's two heroes, the
a guardian, of a much inferior son of iron.iron and the golden fathers, are both "true
These might be purely fictional characters,citizens" or perhaps "truly just members"
or, more probably, they might be allegedly of that society; they too will participate very
actual gods or heroes, some of whose other closely in the Forms of their kinds. What-
characteristics or deeds might be selectedever characteristics they have, then, will
from the cultural stock as suitable for in- serve as bases for normative claims binding
on all
corporation in this tale. In any case, the other members of the state.

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Wed, 08 Feb 2023 00:24:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Plato on True and False Poetry 169

Plato himself sees that the parable has
normative import: he says that it serves
to enjoin or command (mrapay)yeXe 415B)
the rulers to act in certain ways. They are
to take extreme care of interbreeding in
from Homer's description of the three-
legged stool on which the disguised Odysseus
sits that "a stool ought to have three legs,"
we need only compare the description with
the Form Stool: if the Form also has three

their society; they are to be pitiless in seeing legs, then the poetic description is norma-
that their offspring are brought up not nec- tively true; otherwise it is not. But while
essarily among themselves, but within the the problem may seem silly when stated for
class to which they are suited (415B-C). It material objects (though we must remember
is obvious, then, that Plato recognizes that that Homeric poetry was touted as a reposi-
a mythical description of a non-actual so- tory of technical and practical information
ciety and of literary characters can - even about vehicles, weapons, and other material
when admittedly false - function in a nor- objects, as well as an authority on moral
mative way. Because the myth describes questions), it becomes more obvious and
the paradigm social organization ("the true more acute when stated for the moral vir-
society," as it were), and provides directives tues: courage, temperance, piety and so
for achieving it, it places an obligation upon forth. We know whether Homer is accu-
the hearers of that tale: they are to act in rately describing an act of true filial piety
such a way as to bring about the paradig- on the part of Telemachus by comparing
matic state-of-affairs described. The parable it with our view of the proper attributes of
presents an ideal fiction; the job of the Filial Piety itself (indeed, this is how we tel
hearers is to make it real. It may not be whether Telemachus is a "true son"), and
the case that all normatively true tales ac- we know whether Odysseus is truly coura-
tually provide explicit directives, but all geous (even though he feigned madness to
of them serve to display an optimum state- avoid the Trojan campaign) by determining
of-affairs - that is, they describe what ought whether the description Homer offers of his
to be the case, and so they all impose obliga- behavior would also correctly describe the
tions upon the hearers. Form Courage.
By composing tales in this way, Plato But while the solution seems easy, the
holds (both in the Republic and in the assessment is not, and that is because it is
Laws), hired poets could devise what would not easy to attain a view of the Forms. Only
properly be called "noble lies" to exhibit the philosopher, and then only after long
paradigm behavior, or the behavior of para- and rigorous practice of dialectic, can hope
digm figures, and hence supply the populace for such a view; the common man, chained
with a set of directives or instructions for in the cave, is virtually ignorant of the
living their lives. It is this feature, that Forms,
the and has no way of seeing them. The
noble lie displays an optimum state-of- common man can, at least in principle, de-
affairs and may furthermore yield directives termine whether any statement of poetry is
factually true -he can look about in his
for obtaining it, that is, directives for good
or socially beneficial action, that makes world
the quite well and discover whether the
noble lie noble, and distinguishes it from poetry in question accurately describes any-
common lies and ordinary falsehoods.thing A he sees there,6 but he has no way of
common lie is factually false and norma- looking about in the world of Forms. Con-
tively false or neutral; a noble lie is also sequently, he has in principle as well as in
factually false, but is normatively true. practice no way of knowing whether the
The account I have given points out,poetry as he is exposed to is normatively true.
we've seen, that the normative statements Of course, in the Republic there will be
to which poetic tales give rise have truth individuals, not confined to the cave, who
values, which are to be determined by com- are capable of assessing the normative truth
value of a given work of poetry, and then
paring the persons, actions, objects, or what-
ever is portrayed in the tale to the Forms oflabelling that work as true or untrue for
their kinds. If we are tempted to conclude the consumption of those common folk who

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Wed, 08 Feb 2023 00:24:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 170 B A T T I N

cannot make this determination themselves. than any real-world individual. Thi
Those individuals are, as we might expect, cause the poet may give only a pa
the philosophers; this is why philosopher- incomplete characterization of a fic
guardians are to control poetic outputfigure,in while a real-world figure alw
the just state. They will perform just the fully determinate characteristics. T
Socrates either had a wife named Xa
kind of activity we see Socrates himself per-
forming in Books II-III. Since Socrates,or as a wife named something else, or
a philosopher, has privileged acquaintance at all; but he must have had one of these
with the Forms, he knows what true justice features. But the poet, in describing a true
is, and so knows that the accounts Homer philosopher, can simply omit all reference
and Hesiod give of justice are grossly in- to his marital status - as well as any other
accurate. The lengthy analysis of the con- non-essential characteristics - and describe
tent of the Homeric and Hesiodic tales, be-only those features which are paradigmatic.
ginning in Book II at 362D and extending Such poetry, one might even claim, would
not be imitative of particular objects or
throughout a large part of Book III, consti-
tutes Socrates' evidence for the claim that individuals after all, and so would not be
these poets do not know what true justicethrice-removed from the Forms. Of course,
is; he is showing that their accounts do not which is purely paradigmatic will be
poetry
match his vision of the Forms. While the dull and colorless poetry indeed, but that is
philosopher-guardians will be able tonot
ex-Plato's concern: he is concerned only
that poetry not teach incorrect behavioral
clude such poetry from the state altogether,
lessons.
Socrates does the next best thing: he at-
tempts to warn those who cannot see this Poetry, then, at least in principle, might
fact themselves that Homer's poetry is succeed
not in depicting figures and objects
true.
which do participate closely in the Forms,
There is another reason for which one so closely that their descriptions may match
might think poetry would serve as those an un- of the Forms. This I take to be the
reliable model. Objects and figures who core areof the poets' claim to truth: that they
portrayed in poetry as paradigms of aretheir
in some way able to depict the "essence"
kinds (a true warrior, like Achilles;of some object or human action. Whether
a true
son, like Telemachus) have not onlythey para- actually do so or not is a matter for the
digmatic but non-paradigmatic properties philosopher to determine.
as well. Someone attempting to emulate, But what about poetry which does not de-
say, Achilles' true courage in the battlescribe fortrue x's; would we want to say that
Troy might copy those parts of theitpoetic is normatively false? I do not think so.
description which show him flying Earlier,
into an I called common lies "normatively
uncontrollable rage, or dragging the body to emphasize an essential differ-
neutral"
of Hector behind his chariot, and not those ence between factual and normative truth-
parts which show him engaging in battlevalues. Although we say that a statement
with reasoned fearlessness and daring. Thiswhich is not factually true is factually false,
risk, greatest when we are confronted withwe do not say that a description of some-
only a single instance or two of a certainthing which is not a true x is therefore a
kind of thing, is inherent in taking anydescription of a false x. If Jane is not a true
poetic description as normative: unless we pianist, that does not mean she's a false
already know the Form of the object orpianist, or not a pianist at all; she's a pian-
action described (in which case we will ist, alright, just not a very highly skilled one.
hardly need to use poetry as an authorita-
Descriptions of objects or properties which
are not paradigms are not therefore de-
tive guide), we may always mistake non-
scriptions of "anti-paradigms," if we can
paradigmatic features for the paradigmatic
ones.
imagine an object with properties just the
It is apparent, however, that opposite of those
the poetic or the paradigm would have;
fictional figure or object stands a better
they are simply not paradigms at all.
Nevertheless,
chance of serving as a genuine paradigm there are cases in which we

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Wed, 08 Feb 2023 00:24:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Plato on True and False Poetry 171

seem to want to say that a poetic description porters, and by the culture in general, to
is normatively false, not merely neutral. treat his poetry as exemplary, and is thus
When Socrates says that the trouble he finds led, like Euthyphro, to behave in the un-
with Hesiod and Homer is the fault of tell- seemly ways of Homer's heroes and gods.
ing lies, especially lies that are not good It cannot, Socrates believes, be true that
(377D), he means that what is so reprehen- Zeus accused his father. But if it were, as
sible about Hesiod and Homer is that their he makes quite clear in the canons of theol-
ogy formulated at the end of Book II, it
tales give rise to directives actually encour-
aging ignoble behavior. They set bad be- could not be the case that Zeus was acting
havioral examples, and are bad guides for as a true god, since a true god cannot cause
evil, and to accuse one's father is to cause
living one's life. The story about Uranus
evil. Nor is it true, as Homer claims, that
and Cronos (377E), for instance, is not only
factually false, in that no such series Zeus
of sent a misleading dream to Agamem-
events (according to Plato) ever did take
non, or that Apollo, singing at Thetis'
place, but it sets for us an example of just wedding, foretold happy fortunes for her
that kind of behavior which we should not progeny, when he knew he himself would
perform: it is what he calls the "utmost be the slayer of her son Achilles (383B). If
wrong" (adsK&v ra crXara 378B2). What it were, Zeus and Apollo would not be act-
ing as true gods do, for "the gods do not
makes these stories so pernicious is just that
they are examples- they are intended mislead by us by falsehoods in words or deed"
the author (or at least by his adherents) (383A). In short, the gods Homer describes
and understood by the audience as models are not paradigms. Consequently, the nor-
or guides for action, and neither author mative
nor claims which one might derive from
audience sees that they are guides to the such tales, as Euthyphro derives "I ought
wrong kind of action. Indeed, Euthyphro to accuse my father" from the tale of Zeus,
are false. They are derived from unreliable,
tries to justify the fact that he is prosecuting
his father for murder by arguing that Zeus nongenuine, spurious paradigms, the mis-
had put his own father in bonds (Euthyphro leading portraits of gods who are not true
5E-6C); he actually refers to the (Homeric) gods at all.
tales of Zeus as a "sure proof" (rEKIPLov )There is a bit of irony in this. The audi-
that he is doing the right thing. Socrates ence's understanding of Homer's poetry
takes Homer's complacent portrayal about of the gods and heroes as paradigmatic
Autolycus as a similar model of bad be- is not misguided: gods and heroes are, as it
havior, and says that Polemarchus probably were, by definition paradigmatic. Hence it
got his erroneous notion that justice is a
would seem quite proper that the audience
kind of theft from this source (Rep. 334B). take Homer's tales of the gods' behavior as
We cannot overemphasize the fact that models for its own; it would seem odd to
poetry, in Plato's time, was firmly con-
chastise Euthyphro for following Zeus, fore-
most among them. But what Euthyphro, or
sidered a proper source of behavioral models
and ethical norms: Homer was said to be the listener who regards Homer not as a
the "educator of all Greece" in moral as teller of tales but as a source of behavioral
well as technical matters. In fact, Plato models, does not realize is that Homer's
says, the supporters of Homer claim that accounts of the gods are wrong: Homer is
"we should order our entire lives bynot the describing true gods, but only what he
guidance of this poet" (606E). Of course, erroneously imagines them to be.
if Homer's poetry, whether or not intended But the listener has no way of knowing
as moral guidance, were not understood asHomer is the average listener's primary
this.
such (as we ourselves do not understand source of information about the gods, and
Homer), little harm would be done, and all since, Socrates assumes, the average listener,
that might occur when the audience listens unlike himself, has no conception of what
to Homer would be a bit of innocent recrea- divinity properly is, it never occurs to the
tion. But this is not what happens: rather, listener that Homer may be wrong. Socrates
the audience is encouraged by Homer's sup- and his companions can perform a bit of

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Wed, 08 Feb 2023 00:24:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 172 BATTIN

penetrating conceptual consider the jarring

analysis, notes con-
and in Plato's case
clude that to claim that God causes evil is
against poetry, and discover that they do
neither holy, nor profitable, nor evennot betray conceptual confusion after all.
con-
We had looked at a couple of curious pas-
sistent (see, for instance, the conclusions
sages: one in which Socrates says that the
they reach at the end of Book II, at 380C),
but the common man cannot do this: all stories Hesiod and Homer tell about the
gods, even if true, ought not to be told, an
that he knows is that he owes reverence to
the gods. If the gods are such as Homerone
de- in which Socrates says that falsehoods
scribes them, then that is what he is to such as the myth of the metals, should
revere. The way in which the common man for the good of the state - be told. Socrat
thinks that even if the stories Hesiod and
understands Homer is entirely appropriate
to Homer's subject matter, but he is un- Homer tell might conceivably be factually
wittingly duped by a misleading presenta-true - that is, correctly describe the actual
tion of that subject matter. behavior of the figures they describe - they
One might suggest that by careful warn-are not and cannot be normatively true:
they do not disclose what a genuine god is,
ing or antidote the audience could be dis-
suaded from taking Homer's tales as para-and they do not show the way a god, or
someone who emulates a god, is supposed
digms, or encouraged to question the accu-
racy of the accounts of the gods; indeed,to be. Conversely, even though the "noble
lies" which the guardians may find it serv-
there is some suggestion of antidotes at the
iceable
end of Book X (608A). But such an atti- to use in the interests of the state
tude towards Homer and his subject matter are literally false, they are nevertheless nor-
would be considered entirely inappropriate matively true. They describe what ought
by the common man: one does not question to be the case in the world, and are known
the source and standard for the central to do so by those philosophers who can com-
truths of one's culture, and one does not re- pare them with the Forms.
gard a god or a hero as anything but a From these examples we can clearly see
paradigm. If one does, then one is not re- what priorities Plato gives to the various
garding them as gods or heroes. The listener kinds of truth, and describe what we might
is caught in an uncomfortable dilemma: if call the "rule of inclusion" for poetry. We
he takes Homer's tales as exemplary, he is find six cases: those in which the particular
duped; and if he does not regard them aspiece or type of poetry is
exemplary, he is irreverent, and guilty of (1) both normatively and factually true
utmost impiety. Seeing this, Socrates draws (2) normatively true and factually false
the only conclusion he can: since there is
(3) normatively neutral and factually true
no satisfactory attitude the listener can
(4) normatively neutral and factually false
adopt towards Homer's poetry, the only rea-
sonable thing to do is to exclude it from (5) normatively false and factually true
the state altogether. (6) both normatively and factually false
This is a more important point for Plato'sCases of type (1), which are true in every
theory that it might seem, and one which way, are to be included; these would include
finally allows us to see that this theory is those hymns to the gods which do not show
not entirely irrational or bad-tempered, asthem behaving in reprehensible ways7 and
so many critics have suggested. What the the praises of good men mentioned at
audience does is to take texts which are not 607A. Those of type (6), true in no way, are
normatively true, since they do not describe excluded; Nettleship suggests that a "myth
genuine paradigms, as giving rise to reliablewhich represented God as doing evil" would
normative claims. They thus becomebe not
false in both senses.8 As the two examples
innocuous stories or mere recreations, but of the myth of the metals and the Homeric
and Hesiodic tales show, in cases (2) and (5)
dangers: they are misleading, deceptive, and
untrustworthy. normative truth takes priority over factual
Now, I think, we are in a position to re-truth: (2) is to be included but not (5).

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Wed, 08 Feb 2023 00:24:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Plato on True and False Poetry 173

The two remaining cases might seem to posed by poets under the most strict censor-
present a problem. In these cases, where ship. Plato almost seems to be no longer
no normative claim is either being advanced interested in truth as we usually understand
by the author or understood by the audience it at all - in any pretense to factual or his-
(cases of "innocent recreations," we would/ torical truth- but only in truth of the nor-
could call them), we might suspect that mative sort. Grote writes:
Plato would use factual truth as a criterion
That which he proposes for his commonwealth
of admittance: he might admit (3) but notis . . . a body of premeditated fictitious stories,
(4). But I can think of no instances in theprepared by poets under his inspection and con-
text of the Republic to support such a specu- trol. He does not set up any pretence of his-
lation, nor any to defeat it. But, I think, torical truth for these stories, when first promul-
gated: he claims no traditionary evidence, no
there is a reason for this: given the role of
divine inspiration, such as were associated more
poetry in Greek society, the cases in which or less with the received legends, in the minds
poetry is not only intended as normatively both of those who recited and of those who

neutral, but is so understood by the audi-heard them.9

ence, are few or nil. Poetry - at least
They are "pious frauds," Grote says, "con-
Homer's poetry - is always understood by
structed for an orthodox purpose," 10 and I
the audience, if not by the poets as well, as
exemplary. Certainly no tale of the gods or
hope to have dispelled any wonderment
about how they can be suitable fare for those
heroes can be normatively neutral - as we
who "prize truth above all else." They are,
saw, the only pious attitude one can adopt
for Plato, true, true in the most important
towards the gods and heroes is to treat them
as behavioral models - and this covers vir- sense, and true in just the way that Homer
is not.
tually all of Homer and the other major
poets as well. (3) and (4), then, are spurious
cases, cases which do not arise in the average
1 At the very end of the discussion of poetry in
listener's actual commerce with poetry. Book X, at 608A, Socrates says he will be glad if the
Given the four cases in which it is clear case can be made out that poetry. is most noble and
most true ( /3Xicarr)qv KaC aXrOea€rrT&'rv ); he clearly
what is to be admitted or excluded from the
implies that poetry is ignoble and false. In general,
state, we can digest them into a single more
however, he does not apply the terms "true" and
efficient rule, one which we might term the"false" to poetry as a whole, though he does describe
general "rule of inclusion" for poetry: particular tales within poetry as true or false.
2 This distinction is suggested by Gregory Vlastos'
Admit to the state all and only poetry which is
remarks on the term "real." In his paper "Degrees
normatively true, regardless of whether it ison Reality in Plato" (in Platonic Studies, Princeton
factually true or false. University Press, 1973, pp. 58-75), Vlastos points
out that the metaphysical puzzles engendered by
This, then, is the substance of Plato's the Theory of Forms (for instance, how can an
"attack on poetry" in the Republic: to argueimmaterial, nontemporal, invisible entity like the
that poetry which is false- normatively false Form Table be more real than an actual table,
- sense must be excluded from the state. Be- which you can kick?) dissolve if we abandon the
assumption that "real" means "existent," and do
cause the audience mistakenly assumes that not insist that Plato's claim that the Form Chair
poetry-especially Homer's-is normativelyis more real than a particular chair means that it
true, it presents a genuine danger to the"exists" more than that chair. It does not. But it
is more genuine, and more trustworthy as an ob-
state. The audience is led to believe that
ject of knowledge. In Vlastos' terminology, the
Homer describes true cobblers, true justice,
Form Chair is more "cognitively reliable," as well
and true gods, when in fact he does not.as more "reliably valuable," than any particular
As Grote points out, Plato, following chair,
out although it does not in the ordinary sens
the train of thought begun in the Republicexist, or "exist more" than any kickable chair. Thi
is what Plato means in saying that the Forms are
to its inevitable conclusion, proposes in "real":
the he means that they are genuine and trust-
Laws to admit to the state as its complete
worthy objects of knowledge.
cultural diet a body of "noble lies" like the
While the second sense of "true" we distinguished
myth of the metals, which are to be com- here, that in which the predicate serves to indicat

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Wed, 08 Feb 2023 00:24:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 174 B A TTI N

that its object is a paradigm or reliable example

also frequently of
used as a reply to questions, for
the kind of thing it is, may seem toinstance at 602D: asyn-
be nearly full statement of the assertion
onymous with the second sense ofbeing "real" described
admitted by Glaucon would be "'that scene-
by Vlastos, I do not think it is entirely painting . . . falls nothing short of witchcraft' is
synonymous;
at least in English, we can detect differences in the
true." As an example of the normative use of "true,"
meanings of: consider T7jv adXrrO 4xotv (612A3-4); Socrates is
(a) He's a true radical. speaking of the soul's "true nature," that is, its
(b) He's a real radical. genuine, essential nature.
(a) That's a true red. 4See David Keyt's paper "The Mad Craftsman
(b) That's a real red. of the Timaeus" (Phil. Review LXXX (1971), 230-
234) for a discussion of the distinction between the
(a) She showed real concclrl.
purely formal properties common to all Forms, such
(b) She showed true concernl.
as eternalness and immateriality, and the proper
In saying that someone is a real radical, you are attributes of a given Form, those properties which
pointing out that he is not an imposter or a federal make it the Form of the kind of thing it is. A par-
agent in disguise; he actually is a radical. But in ticular participating in a Form partakes of that
saying that he is a true radical, you are suggesting Form's proper attributes only, not its formal ones.
that he is not simply an ordinary radical; he is a 5We shall ignore here Plato's difficulties over
model or paradigmatic or perfect radical. Someone mud, hair, dirt, and other degrading objects. It is
who shows real concern is someone who is not fak-
tempting to claim that adequate grounds for ex-
ing; but someone who shows true concern iscluding
not poetry which deals with degrading things
-and this
merely showing concern, but showing the kind of would include ignoble behavior on the
concern which is unusually or admirably part
pure,of the gods, instances of lying, rape, theft,
genuine, etc. Consequently, I think Vlastos is "women
wrong wrangling with their husbands, women who
in claiming that in such cases, "real" can be are sub-sick, in love, or in labor, slaves doing slaves'
stituted for 'true" with little change of sense (seecowards, drunkards, neighing horses, lowing
work,
p. 59). A real radical and a true radical are both bulls, the noise of rivers, the roar of the sea, and
radicals, not imposters or mere enthusiasts; but a thunder" (395D-396B)-in short, the whole cata-
true radical is paradigmatic in a way that that real logue of horrors listed in Books II and III-rests
radical need not be. on the fact that such poetry does not imitate the
This argument, however, has been conducted in Forms-and
Eng- cannot, since there are no Forms of
lish. It may well be the case that in Greek, at least
such in
things to imitate in the first place. But such a
Plato's Greek, these second senses of "true" and claim would require some resolution on Plato's part
"real" are more nearly synonymous. After all, of Plato
the issue of whether there are Forms of things
does use the terms "real" and "true" interchangeably
which cannot be said to be good, beautiful, or true.
in some contexts; consider his use of forms of 6 Determining the factual corr ctncss of Homeric
a'XOELa and Tb 'ov at the beginning of Book X. orAtHesiodic poetry might in practice prove difficult,
596E9 he says that the painter's creations aresince not the gods and heroes described, while believed
ahr)0; seven lines later he says that what the to inhabit the actual world, are either elusive, in-
carpenter makes is not that which really is ( Tob ov ); visible, or dead. Nevertheless, one might in prin-
and only six lines beyond that he summarizes the ciple describe ways of establishing factual claims
argument by saying that the work of the carpenter about them; these ways would resemble ordinary
or any other craftsman is only a dim adumbration historical method.
TTpbs adXrOELtv "of truth." We see suggestions of a I.e., those tales of the gods which meet the cri-
similar interchanging of the terms "true" and terion developed at the end of Book II, and do not
"real" in the Divided Line passage at the end of show (1) that the gods cause evil, or (2) that the
Book VI. Vlastos also points out that at Republic gods change, alter, or mislead by falsehoods (382C-
389C the expressions Ta 'bvra XEyeLv, T'aXr"Or 383C).
hyTELV, are used synonymously, and further cites R. L. Nettleship, Lectures on Plalo's Republic.
Theateus 179C and 199A. Consequently, although New York, 1968, pp. 84-85. We would consider any
these second senses of "true" and "real" are not
fabricated story about wicked deeds to be false
synonymous in English, it may well be in
the case
both senses.
that in Greek-at least Greek as Plato uses it-
9 George Grote, Plato and the Other Companions
they are. In both cases, the sense connoted is that
of Sokrates (New York, 1973; reprint of the 1888
of genuineness, reliability, perfectness, edition),
trustworthi-
Vol. IV, p. 156. The passage he has in
ness as a model.
mind, I presume, is Laws 663D-664A.
3 Several examples of the factual sense of "true,"
10 Ibid., p. 157.
in which "true" is said of statements, are available
in Book X. In EL Ta XAEyo/eva 7rEPf'Om?rpov daXr)Or I wish to thank Gerasimos Santas, Charles Young,
(600B8-9), dhXrrO is actually an adjective modifying
Guy Sircello, and Nelson Pike for their attention to
Xeyo/LEva, but the import is clear: the statements this paper. I have also profited from comments by
made about Homer may be true or false. "True" is James Lescher, Mary Sirridge, and George Gale.

This content downloaded from

44.229.162.106 on Wed, 08 Feb 2023 00:24:26 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms