MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R.

187167, August 16, 2011

FACTS:
Congress passed R.A. in 1961. 3046 delineating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
Archipelagic State in accordance with UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying State parties' sovereignty
over their territorial sea. It was then amended in 1968 by R.A. 5446, which corrects some errors
in R.A. 3046 is reserving the right to draw baselines around Sabah.

R.A. amended it once more in 2009. 9522, in order to comply with UNCLOS III of 1984. The
requirements were met by shortening one baseline, optimizing the location of some base points,
and classifying KIG and Scarborough Shoal as an "island regime."

Petitioner now challenges the law's constitutionality for three reasons: it reduces the Philippine
maritime territory under Article 1; it opens the country's waters to innocent and sea lanes
passages, undermining our sovereignty and security; and treating KIG and Scarborough as a
"regime of islands" weakens our claim to those territories.

ISSUE: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional.

RULING:
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with territory acquisition or loss. It is simply a codified norm that
governs the behavior of states. RA 9522, on the other hand, is a baseline law that establishes
basepoints along coasts to serve as geographic starting points for measuring. It simply informs
the international community about the extent of our maritime space.

Domestically, if passages are an issue, the legislation can introduce laws designating routes
within archipelagic waters to monitor and control innocent and sea lanes passages. However, in
the absence of such, international law norms apply. The fact that archipelagic states' waters are
subject to both passages does not put them on a lower level than continental coastal states.
Furthermore, because RIOP is a customary international law, no modern state can use its
sovereignty to prevent such passage.

On the KIG issue, RA 9522 decided to follow the basepoints traced by RA 3046, thereby
increasing the Philippines' total maritime space. Furthermore, it commits the Philippines'
ongoing claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.

If not, it would be a violation of two UNCLOS III provisions: KIG and SS are far from our
baselines; if we draw to include them, we will violate the rules: that it should follow the
archipelago's natural configuration.

The Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC, GR No. 205728, July 5, 2016

FACTS: Bishop Vicente M. Navarra placed two (2) tarpaulins, each approximately six feet (6′)
by ten feet (10′) in size, near the San Sebastian Cathedral in Bacolod for public viewing. One of
the tarpaulins read, "Conscience Vote," and listed the candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team
Buhay" with a check mark or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with a "X." The electoral candidates were
categorized based on their vote on the passage of the RH Law.

Anyone who voted in favor of the law were labeled "Team Patay," and those who voted
opposed it were labeled "Team Buhay." When the tarpaulin was made aware of Comelec, which
sent a letter to Bishop Navarra trying to order its removal because it was in breach of Comelec
Resolution No. 9615 because the legal size for electoral propaganda material is only two feet
(2') by three feet (3'); otherwise, it will be required to file an electoral offensive threat against the
others. Worried about the impending risk of being prosecuted for exercising their right to free
expression, Bishop Navarra and others asked the Court to declare the contested Comelec
orders violate the constitution as well as permanently bar the former from trying to enforce them
within a week of notification and hearing.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the controversial tarpaulin is an election propaganda which the Comelec has the
power to regulate; otherwise its prohibition shall constitute an abridgment of the freedom of
speech.

RULING:
Whereas the tarpaulin could have an effect on the success or failure of the named political
candidates and parties, this does not necessarily imply that it is election propaganda. It is not
politicking.

Any candidate, political party, or party-list group did not pay for or post the tarpaulin "in
exchange for consideration." Unlike sponsored messages, personal opinions are still not
covered by the second paragraph of Section 1(4) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615, which
defines "political advertisement" or "election propaganda."
The caricature, while offensive to a few, is still part of free speech. The petitioner's decision to
label them as purveyors of death or purveyors of life based on a single problem a complex piece
of legislation at that—can quickly be considered as an attempt to associate the candidates and
party-list groups. Not everyone will agree with how their opinions were conveyed, and other
Catholic dioceses have chosen not to follow the petitioners' lead.

Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24, 1985 (220 Phil 422)
FACTS: The petitioners requested a writ of mandamus from the Court to oblige the respondent
state officials to submit numerous presidential decrees, correspondence of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive implementations, and executive regulations in the Official
Gazette. They did so to uphold the people's right to receive information on issues of public
interest, which is acknowledged in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Furthermore,
petitioners emphasize that Article 2 of the Civil Code needs the print edition of laws in order for
them to be beneficial.

ISSUE:
Whether or not laws of general application take effect even without being published as long as it
provides the date of effectivity

RULING:
"Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law
itself provides for the date of its effectivity." This is due to allowing laws to happen immediately
without publication will indeed deprive the public of knowledge of the establishment of a law that
primarily enforces them. Article 3 of the Civil Code, which states that "ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith," would be meaningless without any such public
release. Therefore as result, the Court determined that all unpublished general-application laws
still had no conditional influence and impact.

League of Cities v. COMELEC, GR No. 176951, February 15, 2011

FACTS: The League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry
P. Treas filed consolidated petitions for prohibition challenging the constitutionality of the sixteen
(16) laws converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws),
and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites
under the subject laws.

By a 6-5 vote, the Court En Banc granted the petitions and declared the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for disobeying Sections 10 and 6, Article X, as well as the equal protection
clause through its Decision dated November 18, 2008. The next Decision dated December 21,
2009, by a vote of 6-4, the Court En Banc declared the Cityhood Laws to be constitutional. On
August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc settled the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion to Annul the Decision of December 21, 2009, by a vote of 7-6.

ISSUE:
- Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution
- Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 6, and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution

HELD: The petition is held meritorious.

The Cityhood Laws are an example of Congress exercising its legislative authority. Legislative
power is the authority granted by the Constitution to make, amend, and repeal laws. The
Congress of the Philippines has been given this power by the Constitution, which expresses the
will of the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity.
Congress established the LGC through its legislative authority. Congress has the authority to
change or modify it, as it did when R.A. No. 9009. The power to amend laws was used again
when Congress passed the Cityhood Laws. But even so, Congress considered it better to
explicitly excluded respondent municipalities from such a hastily imposed modified income
requirement in order to maintain its higher calling of having to put flesh and blood to the LGC's
very intent and thrust, which is countryside innovation and independence, particularly given the
importance of these municipalities as engines of economic growth in their areas of jurisdiction.

The LGC was amended by R.A. No. 9009. However, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No.
9009 via the exemption clauses provided therein. As these Cityhood Laws specifically exempted
the municipalities in question from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are
indeed also amendments to the LGC.

Its significant difference lies in respondent municipalities' capabilities and economic feasibility to
become constituent cities of their areas of jurisdiction. Through implementing the Cityhood
Laws, Congress recognized respondent municipalities' capabilities and economic feasibility to
become the State's collaborators in advancing economic growth and development in the
provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC, as evidenced by the pendency of their
cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their unwavering exploration of cityhood up to
today.

The Resolution dated August 24, 2010, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood Laws are
declared CONSTITUTIONAL.

De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council and President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No.
191002, April 20, 2010

FACTS:
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno's mandatory retirement on May 17, 2010, comes just days after
the upcoming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.

The above situations stem from the uproar caused by Chief Justice Puno's impending
mandatory retirement on May 17, 2010, 7 days just after presidential election. In relation to
Section 9, Article VIII, Section 4(1) states that "vacancies shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof" from a "list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for each vacancy." Not only, but Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the
Constitution also, prohibits the President or Acting President from arranging meetings within two
months prior to the next presidential elections and up towards the date of the following
presidential elections.

The JBC generally decided to initiate the process of accepting the position of Chief Justice
through its en banc meeting on January 18, 2010. According to precedent, the JBC
"automatically considered" the five most senior Associate Justices of the Court for the said
position of Chief Justice: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justice Renato C.
Corona, Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco,
Jr., and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. The very last 2, regrettably, declined
their nominations in writings dated January 18, 2010, and January 25, 2010.

The Court will consider if the JBC correctly started the procedure, with a few of the opposition
intervenors claiming that the JBC could only do so then after the vacancy has already occurred.
A further question relates to whether the JBC can reinstate its procedure until the shortlist is
prepared, given that Section 4(1) of Article VIII requires the President to appoint a person from
the shortlist to fill a position on the Supreme Court regardless of whether it is the Chief Justice
or an Associate Justice within 90 days of the vacancy materializing.

ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon
his retirement.

HELD:

Two constitutional provisions are in conflict.

Section 15 of Article VII (Executive Department) is the first provision. A President or Acting
President cannot make appointments for two months prior to the next presidential elections and
through the end of the President's term, with the exception of temporary appointments to
executive positions where ongoing vacancies will adversely affect public service or jeopardize
public safety. Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), on the other hand, states: Section
4. (1). A Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices will comprise the Supreme Court. It may
hold a meeting en banc or, at its prerogative, in groups of three, five, or seven Members.
Whatever vacancy must be placed within ninety days of its incident.

Whereas if framers had planned to extend the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices, they could have noted so expressly. They couldn't
have overlooked the careful and thorough organization of the provisions. They can indeed
conveniently and certainly have published the prohibition stated explicitly in Section 15, Article
VII as being equally relevant to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII
itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
discloses that the prohibition against the President or Acting President scheduling appointments
within two months by the next presidential elections as well as up to the end of the President's
or Acting President's term.