SO ORDERED. second element of possession of illegal firearms.
The prosecution more than
Puno (C.J.), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco,
Jr., Nachura, Reyes and Leonardo-De Castro, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, joint judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.
Notes.—A person can not be convicted of a crime with which he was
not charged. (Civil Service Commission vs. Lucas, 301 SCRA 560 [1999])
While the Civil Service Commission is not bound by technical rules of
procedure in administrative proceedings, this does not preclude the CSC
from considering a document’s technical defects and the tardiness of its
submission in weighing its probative value. (Civil Service Commission vs.
Ledesma, 471 SCRA 589 [2005])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 164815. February 22, 2008.*
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Law; Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition;
Elements.—In illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the twin elements of (1) the existence
of the subject firearm and ammunition, and (2) the fact that the accused
who possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license
for it.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
451
Same; Same; Evidence; Witnesses; Either the testimony of a
representative of, or a certification from, the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a licensee
of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second
element of possession of illegal firearms.—As for petitioner’s lack of
authority to possess the firearm, Deriquito testified that a verification of
the Charter Arms Caliber .38 bearing Serial No. 52315 with the Firearms
and Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that the seized pistol was
not issued to petitioner. It was registered in the name of a certain Raul
Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila. As proof, Deriquito presented a
certification signed by Roque, the chief records officer of the same office.
The Court on several occasions ruled that either the testimony of a
representative of, or a certification from, the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a
licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
complied when it presented both.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Hearsay Evidence; Entries in Official
Records; The general rule is that a witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his personal knowledge, otherwise, the testimony is
objectionable for being hearsay; Entries in official records made in the
performance of his official duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by
a person in the performance of a duty specifically enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.—The general rule is that a witness
can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge;
that is, which are derived from his own perception. Otherwise, the
testimony is objectionable for being hearsay. On this score, the certification
from the Firearms and Explosives Division is an exception to the hearsay
rule by virtue of Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 44. Entries in official records.—Entries in official records made in the
performance of his official duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by
a person in the performance of a duty specifically enjoined by law,
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. It may be true that the
contents of said certification are only prima facie evidence of the facts
stated there. However, the failure of petitioner to present controverting
evidence makes the presumption unrebutted. Thus, the presumption
stands.452
Same; Same; Same; Presumptions; Policemen; While public officers
like policemen are accorded presumption of regularity in the performance of
their official duties, it is only a presumption which may be overthrown by
evidence to the contrary; Where there was an unusual facility by which a
Memorandum Receipt was issued, which issuance utterly lacked the usual
necessary bureaucratic constraints, the same was issued under questionable
circumstances.—Although petitioner is correct in his submission that
public officers like policemen are accorded presumption of regularity in the
performance of their official duties, it is only a presumption; it may be
overthrown by evidence to the contrary. The prosecution was able to rebut
the presumption when it proved that the issuance to petitioner of the
Memorandum Receipt was anything but regular. SPO3 Timbol, Jr.
testified that he issued the Memorandum Receipt to petitioner based on
the verbal instruction of his immediate superior, Col. Moreno. However, a
reading of Timbol’s testimony on cross-examination would reveal that
there was an unusual facility by which said receipt was issued to
petitioner. Its issuance utterly lacked the usual necessary bureaucratic
constraints. Clearly, it was issued to petitioner under questionable
circumstances.
Same; Same; Same; The existence of an unlicensed firearm may be
established by testimony, even without its presentation at trial; There may
1
also be conviction where an unlicensed firearm is presented during trial but
through inadvertence, negligence, or fortuitous event (for example, if it is
lost), it is not offered in evidence, as long as there is competent testimony as
to its existence.—Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the subject firearm and its
five (5) live ammunition were offered in evidence by the prosecution. Even
assuming arguendo that they were not offered, petitioner’s stance must
still fail. The existence of an unlicensed firearm may be established by
testimony, even without its presentation at trial. In People v.
Orehuela, 232 SCRA 82 (1994), the non-presentation of the pistol did not
prevent the conviction of the accused. The doctrine was affirmed in the
recent case of People v. Malinao, 423 SCRA 34 (2004). As previously stated,
the existence of the subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition were
established through the testimony of SPO2 Disuanco. Yuson also identified
said firearm. Petitioner even admitted its existence. We hasten to add that
there may also be conviction where an unlicensed firearm is presented
during trial but through inadvertence, negligence, or fortuitous event (for
example, if it is lost), it is453not offered in evidence, as long as there is
competent testimony as to its existence.
Same; Same; Ex Post Facto Laws; As a general rule, penal laws should
not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the character of an ex post
facto law; Although an additional fine of 15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No.
8294, the same is still advantageous to the accused, considering that the
imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum period
from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua under
P.D. No. 1866.—As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive
application, lest they acquire the character of an ex post facto law. An
exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to the
accused. According to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is “not as a right” of
the offender, “but founded on the very principles on which the right of the
State to punish and the commination of the penalty are based, and regards
it not as an exception based on political considerations, but as a rule
founded on principles of strict justice.” Although an additional fine of
P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still advantageous to
the accused, considering that the imprisonment is lowered to prision
correccional in its maximum period from reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua under P.D. No. 1866.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Pablito A. Carpio for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE law looks forward, never backward. Lex prospicit, non respicit. A
new law has a prospective, not retroactive, effect.1 However, penal laws
that favor a guilty person, who is not a
_______________
1 New Civil Code, Art. 4.
454habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect.1-a These are the
rule, the exception and exception to the exception on effectivity of laws.
Ang batas ay tumitingin sa hinaharap, hindi sa nakaraan.
Gayunpaman, ang parusa ng bagong batas ay iiral kung ito ay
pabor sa taong nagkasala na hindi pusakal na kriminal.
We apply the exception rather than the rule in this petition for review
on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with
modification that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City, finding
petitioner liable for illegal possession of a firearm.
The Facts
On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., SPO2 Antonio M. Disuanco of
the Criminal Investigation Division, Central Police District Command,
received a dispatch order2 from the desk officer.3 The order directed him
and three (3) other policemen to serve a warrant of arrest4 issued by Judge
Ignacio Salvador against petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso in a case for
kidnapping with ransom.5
After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on
petitioner, checking his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and
Bulacan.6 Eventually, the team proceeded to the Integrated National
Police (INP) Central Station at Culiat, Que-
_______________
1-a Revised Penal Code, Art. 22 provides: Retroactive effect of penal
laws.—Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the
person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is
defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the
convict is serving the same.
2 Exhibit “D.”
3 TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 4-5, 9.
4 Exhibit “B.”
5 TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 4, 7, 9.
6 Id., at p. 11.
455zon City, where they saw petitioner as he was about to board a
tricycle.7 SPO2 Disuanco and his team approached petitioner.8 They put
him under arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily
2
searched him.9 Found tucked in his waist10 was a Charter Arms, bearing without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the
Serial Number 5231511 with five (5) live ammunition.12 proper authorities.
Petitioner was then brought to the police station for questioning.13 CONTRARY TO LAW.
A verification of the subject firearm at the Firearms and Explosives Quezon City, Philippines, July 15, 1996.
Division at Camp Crame revealed that it was not issued to petitioner but (Sgd.)
to a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.14 Epifanio GLORIA VICTORIA C. YAP
Deriquito, the records verifier, presented a certification15 to that effect Assistant City Prosecutor18
signed by Edwin C. With the assistance of his counsel de parte, Atty. Oscar Pagulayan,
_______________ petitioner pleaded not guilty when arraigned on October 9, 1996.19 Trial on
the merits ensued.
7 Id., at p. 3. INP is now Philippine National Police. SPO2 Disuanco and Deriquito testified for the prosecution in the
8 Id., at p. 4. manner stated above.
9 Id., at pp. 5-6. _______________
10 TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 14-15; TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 10.
11 Exhibit “E.” 16 TSN, December 11, 1996, pp. 19-20.
12 Exhibits “E-1” to “E-5.” 17 Entitled “An Act Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession,
13 TSN, November 6, 1996, p. 6. Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms,
14 TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 21. Ammunition or Explosives or Instruments Used in the Manufacture of
15 Exhibit “C.” Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives, and Imposing Stiffer Penalties for
PNPFED 12 Jul[y] 1996 Certain Violations Thereof, and for Relevant Purposes.” This law was
CERTIFICATION issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 29, 1983. See Zuño, Sr.
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: v. Dizon, A.M. No. RTJ-91-752, June 23, 1993, 223 SCRA 584, 598.
This is to certify that [the] Revolver, Charter Arms, Cal. 38 with 18 Rollo, p. 35.
serial number 52315 is registered to RAUL PALENCIA 19 Id., at p. 38.
SALVATIERA of Sampaloc, Manila, acquired thru transfer f[ro]m 457
Wilburn Irwin Lucasan per index card d[a]t[e]d 10 December 1990. Upon the other hand, the defense version was supplied by the combined
This certification is issued for whatever legal purpose it may testimonies of petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R.
serve. Timbol, Jr. and Adrian Yuson.
FOR THE CHIEF, FED: Petitioner recounted that on July 10, 1996, he was fast asleep in the
EDWIN C[.] ROQUE (Sgd.) boarding house of his children located at Sagana Homes, Barangay New
P/Sr. Inspector Era, Quezon City.20 He was roused from his slumber when four (4) heavily
Chief, Records Br[.] armed men in civilian clothes bolted the room.21 They trained their guns at
456Roque, chief records officer of the Firearms and Explosive Division.16 him22 and pulled him out of the room. They then tied his hands and placed
Petitioner was then charged with illegal possession of firearm and him near the faucet.23 The raiding team went back inside and searched and
ammunition under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866,17 as amended. The ransacked the room.24 SPO2 Disuanco stood guard outside with
Information read: him.25 Moments later, an operative came out of the room and exclaimed,
“That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, “Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa loob!”26
Philippines, the said accused without any authority of law, did then and Petitioner was told by SPO2 Disuanco that “we are authorized to shoot
there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and you because there’s a shoot to kill order against you, so if you are planning
under his/her custody and control do so something, do it right now.”27 He was also told that there was a
One (1) cal. 38 “Charter Arms” revolver bearing Serial No. 52315 with standing warrant for his arrest.28 However, he was not shown any proof
five (5) live ammo. when he asked for it.29 Neither was the raiding group armed with a valid
search warrant.30
3
 According to petitioner, the search done in the boarding house was 33 Exhibit “1.”
illegal. The gun seized from him was duly licensed and covered by 34 Exhibit “1-A.”
necessary permits. He was, however, unable to present the documentation 35 TSN, June 4, 1996, pp. 2-6.
relative to the firearm because it 36 TSN, August 4, 1997, p. 7.
_______________ 37 Id., at p. 8.
38 Id.
20 TSN, February 19, 1997, pp. 19-21. 39 Id., at pp. 8-9.
21 Id., at p. 21. 40 Id., at p. 9.
22 Id. 459underwear.41 He also witnessed how they forcibly brought petitioner
23 Id., at p. 22. out of his room.42 While a policeman remained near the faucet to guard
24 Id., at pp. 3, 6. petitioner, three (3) others went back inside the room.43 They began
25 TSN, March 17, 1997, p. 5. searching the whole place. They forcibly opened his locker,44 which yielded
26 Id., at p. 4. the subject firearm.45
27 Id., at p. 10.
28 Id., at p. 11. RTC and CA Dispositions
29 Id., at p. 12.
30 Id., at p. 14. On May 6, 1998, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged,
458was confiscated by the police. Petitioner further lamented that when disposing as follows:
he was incarcerated, he was not allowed to engage the services of a counsel. “WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused guilty beyond
Neither was he allowed to see or talk to his family.31 reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866
Petitioner contended that the police had an axe to grind against him. as amended by Republic Act No. 8294 and hereby sentences him to suffer
While still with the Narcotics Command, he turned down a request of Col. the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period or from 4 years,
Romulo Sales to white-wash a drug-related investigation involving friends 2 months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum and to pay the
of the said police officer. Col. Sales was likewise subject of a complaint filed fine in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00).
with the Ombudsman by his wife. Col. Sales was later on appointed as the The gun subject of this case is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the
head of the unit that conducted the search in his boarding house.32 government. Let the same be put in trust in the hands of the Chief of the
SPO3 Timbol, Jr. of the Narcotics Command testified that he issued to PNP.
petitioner a Memorandum Receipt dated July 1, 199333 covering the SO ORDERED.”46
subject firearm and its ammunition. This was upon the verbal instruction Petitioner moved to reconsider47 but his motion was denied on August
of Col. Angelito Moreno. SPO3 Timbol identified his signature34 on the said 27, 1998.48 He appealed to the CA.
receipt.35 On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed with modification the RTC
Adrian Yuson, an occupant of the room adjacent to where petitioner was disposition. The fallo of the CA decision reads:
arrested, testified that on July 10, 1996, two (2) policemen suddenly _______________
entered his room as he was preparing for school.36 They grabbed his
shoulder and led him out.37 During all those times, a gun was poked at 41 Id., at p. 10.
him.38 He was asked where petitioner was staying. Fearing for his life, he 42 Id.
pointed to petitioner’s room.39 43 Id., at p. 11.
Four (4) policemen then entered the room.40 He witnessed how they 44 Id., at p. 12.
pointed a gun at petitioner, who was clad only in his 45 Id.
_______________ 46 Rollo, p. 44.
47 Exhibit “E.”
31 Id., at pp. 21-22. 48 Exhibit “F.”
32 TSN, March 17, 1997, pp. 22-26. 460
4
 “Verily, the penalty imposed by the trial court upon the accused-
appellant is modified to 4 years and 2 months as minimum up to 6
years as maximum.
WHEREFORE, with the foregoing MODIFICATION as to the
penalty, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other
respects.
SO ORDERED.”49
His motion for reconsideration50 having been denied through a
Resolution dated August 3, 2004,51 petitioner resorted to the present
petition under Rule 45.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for Our consideration:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF
PETITIONER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERRORS OF FACT AND LAW IN SUSTAINING THE
LEGALITY OF THE SEARCH AND THE VALIDITY AND
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED
THEREFROM DESPITE THE OVERWHELMING PROOF THAT THE
SAME IS THE FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN NOT UPHOLDING THE REGULARITY
AND VALIDITY SURROUNDING THE ISSUANCE OF THE
MEMORANDUM RECEIPTS (SIC) IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER WHICH
PROVES HIS INNOCENCE OF THE CRIME CHARGE (SIC).52 (Italics
supplied)
_______________
49 Rollo, p. 31.
50 Exhibit “I.”
51 Exhibit “B.”
52 Rollo, p. 125.
461Our Ruling
In illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the prosecution has
the burden of proving the twin elements of (1) the existence of the subject
firearm and ammunition, and (2) the fact that the accused who possessed
or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it.53
The prosecution was able to discharge its burden.
The existence of the subject firearm and its ammunition was
established through the testimony of SPO2 Disuanco.54 Defense witness
Yuson also identified the firearm.55 Its existence was likewise admitted by
no less than petitioner himself.56
As for petitioner’s lack of authority to possess the firearm, Deriquito
testified that a verification of the Charter Arms Caliber .38 bearing Serial
No. 52315 with the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame
revealed that the seized pistol was not issued to petitioner. It was
registered in the name of a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc,
Manila.57 As proof, Deriquito presented a certification signed by Roque, the
chief records officer of the same office.58
The Court on several occasions ruled that either the testimony of a
representative of, or a certification from, the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a
licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
second element
_______________
53 Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997, 269
SCRA 402; Mallari v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110569, December 19,
1996, 265 SCRA 456; People v. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, August 12, 1992,
212 SCRA 547.
54 TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 4, 7, 9.
55 TSN, August 4, 1997, p. 12.
56 TSN, March 17, 1997, pp. 14-15, 19.
57 TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 21.
58 Id., at pp. 19-20.
462of possession of illegal firearms.59 The prosecution more than complied
when it presented both.
The certification is outside the
scope of the hearsay rule.
The general rule is that a witness can testify only to those facts which
he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his
own perception.60 Otherwise, the testimony is objectionable for being
hearsay.61
_______________
59 People v. Taan, G.R. No. 169432, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA
219; Ungsod v. People, G.R. No. 158904, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA
282; People v. Lazaro, G.R. No. 112090, October 26, 1999, 317 SCRA 435,
citing Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997, 269
SCRA 402; Rosales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 106229-30, March 15,
1996, 255 SCRA 123; People v. Orehuela, G.R. Nos. 108780-81, April 29,
1994, 232 SCRA 82. See also Mallari v. Court of Appeals, supra note
53; People v. Solayao, G.R. No. 119220, September 20, 1996, 262 SCRA 255.
5
 60 Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 36.
61 The United States Federal Rule of Evidence defines hearsay as “a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.” Cleary, E.W., McCormick on Evidence (1984), 3rd ed., p. 729,
citing Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c). Accordingly, hearsay evidence is
objected to due to the following reasons:
Oath. Among the earliest of the criticisms of hearsay, and one
often repeated in judicial opinions down to the present, is the
objection that the out-of-court declarant who made the hearsay
statement commonly speaks or writes without the solemnity of the
oath administered to witnesses in a court of law. The oath may be
important in two aspects. As a ceremonial and religious symbol it
may induce in the witness a feeling of special obligation to speak the
truth, and also it may impress upon the witness the danger of
criminal punishment for perjury, to which the judicial oath or an
equivalent solemn affirmation would be a prerequisite condition.
xxx
Personal presence at trial. Another objection early asserted and
repeated of late is the want of opportunity, in re-
463
On this score, the certification from the Firearms and Explosives
Division is an exception to the hearsay rule by virtue of Rule 130, Section
44 of the Rules of Court which provides:
“Sec. 44. Entries in official records.—Entries in official records made
in the performance of his official duty by a public officer of the Philippines,
or by a person in the performance of a duty specifically enjoined by law,
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.”
It may be true that the contents of said certification are
only prima facie evidence of the facts stated there. However, the failure of
petitioner to present controverting evidence makes the presumption
unrebutted. Thus, the presumption stands.
_______________
spect to the out-of-court declarant, for observation of his demeanor,
with the light that this may shed on his credibility, that would be
afforded if he were a witness on the stand.
The solemnity of the occasion and possibility of public disgrace
can scarcely fail to impress the witness, and falsehood no doubt
becomes more difficult if the person against whom directed is
present.
Moreover, personal presence eliminates the danger that in the
oral reporting of an out-of-court statement that the witness
reporting the statement may do so inaccurately. It seems probable
that the reporting of words spoken is subject to special dangers of
inaccuracy beyond the fallibility common to all reproduction from
memory of matters of observation, and this seems a substantial
danger in the admission of hearsay. x x x
Cross-examination. It would be generally agreed today that
noncompliance with the third condition is the main justification for
the exclusion of hearsay. This is the lack of any opportunity for the
adversary to cross examine the absent declarant whose out-of-court
statement is reported by the witness. x x x In perhaps his most
famous remark, Wigmore described cross-examination as “beyond
any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery
of truth.” (Underscoring supplied) (Id., at pp. 727-728.)
464
Petitioner, however, raises several points which he says entitles him to
no less than an acquittal.
The assessment of credibility of witnesses
lies with the trial court.
First, petitioner says that the seizure of the subject firearm was
invalid. The search was conducted after his arrest and after he was taken
out of the room he was occupying.62
This contention deserves scant consideration.
Petitioner’s version of the manner and place of his arrest goes into the
factual findings made by the trial court and its calibration of the credibility
of witnesses. However, as aptly put by Justice Ynares-Santiago in People
v. Rivera:63
“x x x the manner of assigning values to declarations of witnesses on the
witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who
had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their
credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected on record. The
demeanor of the person on the stand can draw the line between fact and
fancy or evince if the witness is telling the truth or lying through his
teeth. We have consistently ruled that when the question arises as to which
of the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense is worthy of
belief, the assessment of the trial courts are generally viewed as correct and
entitled to great weight. Furthermore, in an appeal, where the culpability or
innocence of the accused depends on the issue of credibility of witnesses and
the veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial court are given the
highest degree of respect if not finality.”64 (Italics supplied)
_______________
6
 62 Rollo, pp. 8, 136. SPO3 Timbol, Jr. testified that he issued the Memorandum Receipt to
63 433 Phil. 343; 384 SCRA 12 (2002), citing People v. Sanchez, G.R. petitioner based on the verbal instruction of his immediate superior, Col.
Nos. 121039-45, January 25, 1999, 302 SCRA 21; People v. Librando, 390 Moreno.69 However, a reading of Timbol’s testimony on cross-
Phil. 543; 335 SCRA 232 (2000); People v. Deleverio, G.R. Nos. 118937-38, examination70 would reveal that
April 24, 1998, 289 SCRA 547; People v. Zaballero, G.R. No. 100935, June _______________
30, 1997, 274 SCRA 627.
64 People v. Rivera, id., at p. 352; p. 20. 69 TSN, June 4, 1997, pp. 3-6.
465The trial court found the prosecution version worthy of credence 70 Id., at pp. 7-11.
and belief. We find no compelling reason not to accept its observation on FISCAL: I am asking you why your office likewise issued [a] Memo
this score. Receipt if he [i.e., Colonel Angelito Moreno] normally issue (sic)
Worth noting is the fact that petitioner is a ranking police officer who a firearm for [an] officer of the PNP?
not only claims to be highly decorated,65 but have effected a number of A: Because our office has also authorized us to issue.
successful arrests66 as well. Common sense would dictate that he must Q: And who authorized your office?
necessarily be authorized to carry a gun. We thus agree with the Office of A: It is our Commanding Officer, Sir.
the Solicitor General that framing up petitioner would have been a very Q: And who authorized the Commanding Officer?
risky proposition. Had the arresting officers really intended to cause the INTERPRETER:
damnation of petitioner by framing him up, they could have easily Witness cannot answer.
“planted” a more incriminating evidence rather than a gun. That would Q: Where does the Commanding Officer derive his authority?
have made their nefarious scheme easier, assuming that there indeed was A: What I know is that the Commanding Officer is authorized to
one. [issue] firearm that will be issued to a PNP Officer but I do not
The pieces of evidence show that know who gave the authority to our officer.
petitioner is not legally authorized xxxx
to possess the subject firearm and Q: As such, do you keep inventory of such supplies?
its five (5) ammunition. A: Yes, Sir.
Second, petitioner insists that he is legally authorized to possess the Q: Do you have the inventory of this particular gun, the original?
subject firearm and its ammunition on the basis of the Memorandum A: Yes, Sir.
Receipt issued to him by the PNP Narcotics Command.67 Q: Do you have that inventory with you, that inventory of such gun,
Although petitioner is correct in his submission that public officers like the Memo Receipt?
policemen are accorded presumption of regularity in the performance of A: That firearm was not in my custody.
their official duties,68 it is only a presumption; it may be overthrown by Q: But you said a while ago it is with you, which is which, do you
evidence to the contrary. The prosecution was able to rebut the have or do you not have the listing of such inventory?
presumption when it A: None, Sir.
_______________ 467there was an unusual facility by which said receipt was issued to
petitioner. Its issuance utterly lacked the usual necessary bureaucratic
65 Rollo, p. 61. constraints. Clearly, it was issued to petitioner under questionable
66 TSN, March 17, 1997, p. 25. circumstances.
67 Rollo, pp. 11-12, 138. Failure to offer an unlicensed firearm as
68 Gutang v. People, 390 Phil. 805, 817-818; 335 SCRA 479, 492 (2000), evidence is not fatal provided there is
citing People v. William, G.R. No. 93712, June 15, 1992, 209 SCRA competent testimony as to its existence.
808; People v. Rumeral, G.R. No. 86320, August 5, 1991, 200 SCRA 194. Third, petitioner claims that the subject firearm and ammunition
See also Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3(m). should have been excluded as evidence because they were not formally
466proved that the issuance to petitioner of the Memorandum Receipt was offered by the prosecution71 in violation of Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules
anything but regular. of Court.72
7
 We note that petitioner contradicted himself when he argued for the
validity of the Memorandum Receipt and, at the same time, for the
exclusion in evidence of the subject firearm and its ammunition.
Petitioner’s act may result to an absurd
_______________
xxxx
FISCAL: Mr. Witness, other than this case, were there any
instances where you issued Memo Receipt as verbally directed
by your alleged Commanding Officer Moreno?
A: Yes, Sir, I’m only a RSO since November 1993.
Q: Precisely, 1991 to 1993, for a period wherein you claimed you hold
an office of RSO, has (sic) this the only time you issued?
A: Many time[s], Sir.
COURT: Let’s clarify this. The Court understands to (sic) your
previous answer that this is the first time that you have done this
procedure of issuing guns to an officer. Are you changing that
this is the first time and not many times?
A: That is the only first (sic) time, as instructed by the Commanding
Officer, Your Honor. (Italics supplied)
71 Rollo, pp. 11, 137-138.
72 Sec. 34. Offer of evidence.—The court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is
offered must be specified.
468situation where the Memorandum Receipt is declared valid, while the
subject firearm and its ammunition which are supposedly covered by the
Memorandum Receipt are excluded as evidence. That would have made the
Memorandum Receipt useless.
In any case, petitioner’s contention has no leg to stand on.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the subject firearm73 and its five (5) live
ammunition74 were offered in evidence by the prosecution.75 Even
assuming arguendo that they were not offered, petitioner’s stance must
still fail. The existence of an unlicensed firearm may be established by
testimony, even without its presentation at trial. In People v.
Orehuela,76 the
_______________
73 Exhibit “E.”
74 Exhibits “E-1” to “E-5.”
75 TSN, February 19, 1997, p. 14.
76 G.R. Nos. 108780-81, April 29, 1994, 232 SCRA 82, 95-96.
As Mr. Justice Feliciano held for the Court:
x x x Upon the other hand, we note also that the allegedly
unlicensed murder weapon was not presented in evidence by the
prosecution. What the prosecution did present to show absence of a
license or permit to possess the firearm used to kill Teoberto, was a
certification issued by the Bohol Regional Headquarters of the
Integrated National Police, dated 20 December 1989, x x x:
xxxx
We consider that the certification was adequate to show that the
firearm used by Modesta Orehuela in killing Teoberto Cañizares
was a firearm which Orehuela was not licensed to possess and to
carry outside his residence on the night that Teoberto Cañizares was
shot to death. That that firearm was a .38 caliber pistol was shown
by the testimony and report of NBI Ballistician Bonifacio
Ayag. When the above circumstances are taken together with the
testimony of the eye-witness that Modesto Orehuela was in fact in
possession of a firearm and used the same to kill Teoberto Cañizares,
we believe that accused Orehuela was properly found guilty of
aggravated or qualified illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition. (Italics supplied)
469non-presentation of the pistol did not prevent the conviction of the
accused.
The doctrine was affirmed in the recent case of People v. Malinao.77
As previously stated, the existence of the subject firearm and its five (5)
live ammunition were established through the testimony of SPO2
Disuanco.78 Yuson also identified said firearm.79 Petitioner even admitted
its existence.80
We hasten to add that there may also be conviction where an unlicensed
firearm is presented during trial but through inadvertence, negligence, or
fortuitous event (for example, if it is lost), it is not offered in evidence, as
long as there is competent testimony as to its existence.
Penal and civil liabilities
Petitioner was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition under the first paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866,
as amended. It provides that “[t]he penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person
who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any
firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used
or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.”
P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the time
petitioner committed the offense on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No. 8294
amended P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997,81
_______________
8
 77 G.R. No. 128148, February 16, 2004, 423 SCRA 34. See also People
v. Taan, supra note 59; People v. Taguba, 396 Phil. 366; 342 SCRA 199
(2000).
78 TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 4, 7, 9.
79 TSN, August 4, 1997, p. 12.
80 TSN, March 17, 1997, pp. 14-15, 19.
81 People v. Lazaro, supra note 59.
470during the pendency of the case with the trial court. The present law
now states:
“SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition
or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended
to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition.—The penalty
of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low-
powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of
similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or
instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm
or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.”
(Underscoring supplied)
As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application,
lest they acquire the character of an ex post facto law.82 An exception to this
rule, however, is when the law is
_______________
82 Mejia v. Pamaran, G.R. Nos. L-56741-42, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA
457, 472. An ex post facto law is one which:
1. Makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and
which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act;
2. Aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed;
3. Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when committed;
4. Alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction
upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of
the commission of the offense;
5. Assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect
imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when
done was lawful; and
6. Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of
a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
471advantageous to the accused. According to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo,
this is “not as a right” of the offender, “but founded on the very principles
on which the right of the State to punish and the commination of the
penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based on political
considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice.”83
Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294,
the same is still advantageous to the accused, considering that the
imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum
period84 from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua85 under P.D. No. 1866.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, prision
correccional maximum which ranges from four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years, is the prescribed penalty and will form the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum term shall
be one degree lower, which is prision correccional in its medium period
(two [2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day to four [4] years and
_______________
83 People v. Moran, 44 Phil. 387, 408 (1923), citing Fiore, Irre-
troactividad e Interpretacion de las Leyes.
84 Reyes, L.B., The Revised Penal Code, Book II, 2001 ed., p.
1021. PRISION CORRECCIONAL IN ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD.—4 years,
2 months and 1 day to 6 years
Minimum : 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 4 years, 9 months and
10 days
Medium : 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 5 years, 4 months and
20 days
Maximum : 5 years, 4 months and 21 days to 6 years
85 Id., at p. 1026. RECLUSION TEMPORAL IN ITS MAXIMUM
PERIOD TO RECLUSION PERPETUA.—17 years, 4 months and 1 day
to reclusion perpetua
Minimum : 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 18 years and 8
months
Medium : 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years
Maximum : Reclusion perpetua
472two [2] months).86 Hence, the penalty imposed by the CA is correct. The
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional medium, as minimum term, to six (6) years of prision
correccional maximum, as maximum term, is in consonance with the
Court’s ruling in Gonzales v. Court of Appeals87 and Barredo v. Vinarao.88
As to the subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition, their proper
disposition should be made under Article 45 of the Revised Penal
Code89 which provides, among others, that the proceeds and instruments
9
or tools of the crime shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
government.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 4, 2004
is AFFIRMED in full.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Chico-
Nazario and Nachura, JJ., concur.
_______________

86 Id., at p. 1021. PRISION CORRECCIONAL IN ITS MEDIUM

PERIOD.—2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months
Minimum : 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 2 years, 11 months
and 10 days
Medium : 2 years, 11 months and 11 days to 3 years, 6 months
and 20 days
Maximum : 3 years, 6 months 21 days to 4 years and 2 months.
87 343 Phil. 297; 277 SCRA 518 (1997).
88 G.R. No. 168728, August 2, 2007, 529 SCRA 120.
89 Art. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments
of the crime.—Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall
carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments
or tools with which it was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be the property of a third
person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of
lawful commerce shall be destroyed. (Italics supplied)
© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

10