1) The case involved a chieftain of the Higaonon Tribe, Ha Datu Tawahig, who was absolved of rape charges by the Dadantulan Tribal Court. However, the victim still filed a complaint with city prosecutors who found probable cause and issued an arrest warrant.
2) Tawahig claimed the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997 granted jurisdiction to tribal courts over indigenous peoples. However, the court ruled the law did not intend to deprive regular courts of jurisdiction over criminal offenses.
3) The Supreme Court upheld the regional trial court's jurisdiction, stating that while customary laws have legitimacy, they do not allow evading criminal liability which is owed to the State
1) The case involved a chieftain of the Higaonon Tribe, Ha Datu Tawahig, who was absolved of rape charges by the Dadantulan Tribal Court. However, the victim still filed a complaint with city prosecutors who found probable cause and issued an arrest warrant.
2) Tawahig claimed the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997 granted jurisdiction to tribal courts over indigenous peoples. However, the court ruled the law did not intend to deprive regular courts of jurisdiction over criminal offenses.
3) The Supreme Court upheld the regional trial court's jurisdiction, stating that while customary laws have legitimacy, they do not allow evading criminal liability which is owed to the State
1) The case involved a chieftain of the Higaonon Tribe, Ha Datu Tawahig, who was absolved of rape charges by the Dadantulan Tribal Court. However, the victim still filed a complaint with city prosecutors who found probable cause and issued an arrest warrant.
2) Tawahig claimed the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997 granted jurisdiction to tribal courts over indigenous peoples. However, the court ruled the law did not intend to deprive regular courts of jurisdiction over criminal offenses.
3) The Supreme Court upheld the regional trial court's jurisdiction, stating that while customary laws have legitimacy, they do not allow evading criminal liability which is owed to the State
1) The case involved a chieftain of the Higaonon Tribe, Ha Datu Tawahig, who was absolved of rape charges by the Dadantulan Tribal Court. However, the victim still filed a complaint with city prosecutors who found probable cause and issued an arrest warrant.
2) Tawahig claimed the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997 granted jurisdiction to tribal courts over indigenous peoples. However, the court ruled the law did not intend to deprive regular courts of jurisdiction over criminal offenses.
3) The Supreme Court upheld the regional trial court's jurisdiction, stating that while customary laws have legitimacy, they do not allow evading criminal liability which is owed to the State
Ha Datu Tawahig v. Lapinid, G.R. No. 221139, March 20, 2019
Petitioner: Ha Datu Tawahig (Roderick D. Sumatra) Chieftain – Higaonon Tribe Respondent: Lineth Lapinid (Cebu City Prosecutor I), RTC Judge Estela Alma Singco and other prosecutors Ponente: LEONEN, J. FACTS: The Higaonon Tribe Council of Elders or the "Dadantulan Tribal Court" as alleged, absolved herein petitioner Ha Datu Tawahig or Roderick D. Sumatra, the Tribal Chieftain of Higaonon Tribe of liability for charges of rape against one Lorriane Fe P. Igot, and discharged him from criminal, civil, and administrative liability. On November 14, 2006, the victim Lorraine raised the case in a complaint-affidavit to the respondent City Prosecutor Lapinid who found probable cause to charge Sumatra with said crime of rape. The case was raffled to the RTC of Cebu City which issued an arrest warrant against Sumatra. Sumatra filed a motion to quash assailing the jurisdiction of the Court in his person pursuant to Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act granting jurisdiction to the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples. This was however contradicted by the RTC, saying that said law does not apply to prosecution of a "dispute" but only those claims over ancestral domain. On May 11, 2015, a certain Vicente B. Gonzales, Jr. (Gonzales) or Datu Bontito Leon Kilat represented himself to be a "customary lawyer" and filed a "Motion to Release the Indigenous Person". RTC however did not recognize his authority or competence to apt as counsel before a court of law. Petitioner maintains that a writ of mandamus must be issued to compel respondents to "uphold and respect" the Dadantulan Tribal Court Resolution, and "thereby release Sumatra from jail to stop his continued arbitrary detention." ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can invoke Republic Act No. 8371, or the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997, to evade prosecution and liability. RULING: No. The Court ruled that individuals belonging to indigenous cultural communities who are charged with criminal offenses cannot invoke Republic Act No. 8371, or the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997, to evade prosecution and liability under courts of law. Philippine legal system's framework for the protection of indigenous peoples was never intended and will not operate to deprive courts of jurisdiction over criminal offenses. SECTION 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development. Indeed, the State by virtue of this and other mandates for the indigenous cultural communities, shall institute and establish the necessary mechanisms to enforce and guarantee the realization of these rights, taking into consideration their customs, traditions, values, beliefs, interests and institutions, and to adopt and implement measures to protect their rights to their ancestral domains. "Jurisdiction and Procedures for Enforcement of Rights" under Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act enables the application of customary laws and practices in dispute resolution for Indigenous peoples. It lend legitimacy to and enable the continuing efficacy and viability of customary laws and practices to maintain order and dispense justice within indigenous cultural communities. They also work to segregate customary laws and practices in two (2) respects. First, they make customary laws and practices structurally and operationally distinct from enactments of the legislature and of those upon whom legislative power has been delegated, as well as regulations of general application. Second, they distinguish disputants belonging to the same indigenous cultural communities as the exclusive objects of the application of customary laws and practices. However, as initially stated, to yield criminal prosecution as in the case at bar would be to disregard the State and the Filipino people as the objects of criminal offenses. The application of customary laws may enable a measure of reparation for private injuries engendered by criminal offenses, but it will never enable the consummate recompense owed to the State and the Filipino people. Ultimately then, yielding prosecution would mean sanctioning a miscarriage of justice. Nowhere in the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does it state that courts of law are to abandon jurisdiction over criminal proceedings in favor of mechanisms applying customary laws. Petitioner derives no right from the Dadantulan Tribal Court to be spared from criminal liability. The Regional Trial Court is under no obligation to defer to the exculpatory pronouncements made by the Dadantulan Tribal Court. Instead, it must proceed to rule on petitioner's alleged liability with all prudence and erudition.