1NC---HOT---R1---WW SJ vs Eagan LS

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Advantage CP

The United States federal government should

---increase its artificial intelligence air and missile defense security cooperation with
Turkiye;
--- increase its artificial intelligence air and missile defense security cooperation with
the Baltics;
--- substantially increase its missile defense systems;
--- substantially increase its F-35 fighter jet sales to Turkiye;
--- incentivize relevant allies to substantially increase their air and missile defense;
AND
--- ban its alliance commitment, including security cooperation, with the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Solves – no warrant for why NATO is key.
Joel R. Hillison 14. Professor of National Security Studies at the U.S. Army War College and an
Adjunct Professor at Gettysburg College. He is the author of Stepping Up: Burden-sharing by NATO’s
newest members and spent three years working in NATO. “Stepping Up: Burden Sharing by NATO's
Newest Members.” Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, pp. 183-187, 2014.
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1939&context=monographs //EM
A RATIONAL CHOICE EXAMINATION OF FINDINGS
The rational choice explanation for continued burden sharing by new members of NATO
after accession emphasizes the benefits of maintaining a reputation as a credible partner .
Certainly, members join and remain in NATO for both the tangible and the intangible benefits of being in a powerful alliance. With a combined
population of almost 880 million and a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of $28.5 trillion,4 NATO membership offers a degree of
physical and psychological security to its member states.
The rational benefits of being in an alliance have also been studied in international relations theory. In his game-theoretic study of alliances,
Alastair Smith found that defensive alliances deterred aggression. The more reliable the alliance was, the greater the deterrent effect it had. In his
words, “nations form alliances because it improves the outcomes they expect to receive.”5 Certainly, this concern for physical and psychological
security was influential in the burden sharing decisions of recent new NATO members. As the current Romanian President said in an interview,
“with the accession to NATO, the Romanians felt safe . . . NATO meant the beginning of our road to prosperity.”6
Finally, a rational choice explanation might emphasize the quid pro quo that supports burden sharing decisions of member states in NATO.
Certainly,there have been side payments made by the U nited S tates to new member states in order to
encourage greater levels of military spending and in order to reward contributions to NATO
and U.S.-led missions in the war on terrorism. For example, Poland received a generous $3.5 billion

loan to buy F16 aircraft after committing sizable forces to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
(OIF).7 In addition, NATO established the Joint Forces Training Centre in Poland in 2004. Both the Czech Republic and

Hungary received side payments from the U nited S tates for their support in the war on
terror ism.8 In 2002, the 1999 wave of new members received a combined $35 million in Foreign Military Financing with an equal amount
requested for 2003 and 2004.9 Estonia, one of the 2004 waves of new NATO members, was scheduled to receive over $6 million per year over
the same period.10 In 2005, in addition to normal International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
assistance, President George W. Bush requested $200 million from Congress “for coalition allies that have supported military efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan.”11 NATO also uses incentives to influence its member states. These incentives include investments in infrastructure resources by
NATO common funds. For example, Poland funded most of its airfield renovation program through the NATO Security Investment Program
(NSIP).12 Romania, a big supporter of both OIF and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), was rewarded with the rotation of U.S.
forces into Romania for training as part of Joint Task Force East.13
While the side payments discussed above provide some incentive, NATO has the greatest leverage over aspiring member states prior to accession
through conditionality. In the case of NATO, conditionality consists of “specific conditions which an aspiring state must fulfill before accession.
These conditions comprised of both adherence to the community values and the ability to contribute to the functional tasks of the
organization.”14 The assessment of whether or not these conditions have been met is a subjective and very political matter. Oftentimes,
geostrategic concerns can trump accomplishment of accession standards, as in the case of Georgia and the Ukraine, which have not been granted
admittance into the Membership Action Plan (MAP) due to concerns over relations with Russia. Accession into NATO requires unanimous
agreement by existing members and ratification by the legislatures of the member states. It is not surprising, then, that aspiring NATO members
are keen to demonstrate they have not only met the intent of the conditions established, but also the objective benchmarks established by the
Alliance. One of the two most recent NATO members, Albania, is a good example. In a recent visit to NATO Headquarters, Albanian
representatives were “very proud to say they (were) meeting the 2% (GDP) benchmark as well as deployment and sustainability criteria.”15
These public declarations support the explanations based on conditionality and are consistent with the burden sharing behavior of new member
states reviewed earlier.
Not surprisingly, conditionality was an effective tool in influencing aspiring NATO members. In Judith Kelley’s study of international
institutions in the early post-Cold War period, she found that membership prerequisites were an essential factor in changing state behavior.16
Kelley also acknowledged that socialization played a role. Kelley found that while most changes in state behavior could be attributed to
conditionality, “socialization-based efforts often guided them.”17 Yet, these explanations alone cannot explain why new NATO members did not
free-ride once they became members of NATO. In fact, many new members increased their troop support to NATO missions after gaining
membership. NATO Director of Policy
Planning Jamie Shea specifically addressed the issue of free-riding incentives after accession.
The argument that once in the alliance, new members will slack off is not fair. For example, Romania currently has 720 (troops)
deployed to Afghanistan and is trying to find another 120. That is not a bad effort for a new NATO member.18
conditionality is just one incentive to induce norm conforming behavior.
However,

NATO has several informal mechanisms to reward states that support Alliance efforts after

being granted membership . Research has shown that rewards can help states to
overcome the incentives to free-ride.19 First, NATO uses a variety of prestige rewards that are not
only beneficial for domestic political use, but are sought out by both diplomatic and military
bureaucrats for their own benefit. These rewards range from hosting summits , conferences , or
exercises to the assignment of commands and staff positions. One example of these types of rewards is called “flags
to post.” A flags to post conference is convened to assign general officer billets to member states. These conferences often result in a contentious
debate; these leadership positions not only yield influence in the Alliance but also prestige at home to the officers assigned to fill them.
During NATO missions, command positions are also allocated on the basis of relative troop contributions. Unless the forces are under a standing
NATO Headquarters, such as the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, then command usually goes to the state with the largest number of troops in that
sector or in the overall mission. NATO also provides material incentives in the form of investments. This reward allows leaders to bring home the
bacon to their national constituents and thus build support for contributions to NATO. For example, NATO investment into Poland exceeded
Poland’s contributions to NATO’s infrastructure budget in 2004.20 A portion of these NATO funds is being used to construct a training facility
individual states within
in the city of Bydgoszcz.21 This facility will cost approximately 33 million Euros to build. Finally,

NATO often provide incentives to other members to reward cooperation . As the largest
and most powerful member (and leader ) of the Alliance, the U nited S tates often times provides
these incentives .
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N&C CP

The United States federal government ought to initiate a thirty-day notice-and-

comment rulemaking process with a citizen advisory council over whether to
substantially increase its artificial intelligence air and missile defense security
cooperation at least in Turkiye with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the
area of artificial intelligence and implement the results pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act protocol.
Current N&C [Notice and Comment] exceptions for the DoD deck democratic
processes.
Laurian 07 [Lucie Laurian is an assistant professor in urban and regional planning at the University of
Iowa. Her research focuses on environmental planning, the impact of polluted sites on local populations,
and public participation in environmental decisions concerning the management of toxic sites, 6-1-2007,
Deliberative Planning through Citizen Advisory Boards: Five Case Studies from Military and Civilian
Environmental Cleanups, SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0739456X06298819]
Eric
In contrast, although the military is formally under civilian control, it has traditionally allowed for little public

access to information about military processes and decisions. DOD culture does not embrace democratic
participatory processes, but rather “betray[s] a fear of losing control” (Szasz and Meuser 1997,
220). In this context, military personnel are “trained to operate in a culture where disclosure and broad participation in
decision making [is] a break of security , not state of the art in management science ” (James Souby,
DOIT/WGA 1993a, np, cited in Szasz and Meuser 1997, 217). The
DOD therefore tends to view public participation as
cooptation and assumes that, if properly channeled , participation can be productive by improv ing
public acceptance of DOD decisions (e.g., Shepherd and Bowler 1997). Furthermore, DOD’s national defense mission
and its longstanding culture of secrecy do not promote transparency. The War on Terrorism has decreased the information available to the public
about military installations and activities (Dahl 2004). As a result, citizens have to file increasing numbers of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
requests to obtain information about environmental conditions at defense sites (see the Military Environmental Forum of the Center for Public
Environmental Oversight for numerous examples; CPEO 2005). As with the DOD, the DOE’s security mission is accompanied by a longstanding
culture of secrecy (e.g., Bradbury 1994; Carnes et al. 1996). DOE does not maintain public databases of environmental management projects,
tends not to share information (Greenberg et al. 1997; Bradbury, Branch, and Malone 2003), and until recently proceeded with little public
consultation (Lowrie and Greenberg 2000). Until the 1980s, CERCLA requirements provided the formal participation forum at DOE installations.
Public participation is thus a late addition to DOE’s decision-making processes (Bradbury 1994).

But the CP revives their legitimacy and the democratic element

Bull 21 [Reeve T. Bull is the Research Director at the Administrative conference of the United States,
10-12-2021, Democratizing and technocratizing the notice-and-comment process, Brookings,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/10/12/democratizing-and-technocratizing-the-notice-and-
comment-process/] Eric
Another possible approach that I have explored in a different context would involve convening a  citizen advisory
panel . The agency could assemble a demographically representative group of citizens,
provide them with briefing materials, and then ask them to offer their input on the issue the
agency is considering. To
ensure that the agency achieves demographic representativeness and avoids conflicts of
interest, the agency could either task an independent team of officials with assembling the panel or contract
out the function to a private firm. This approach ensures that the public perspective is not only
representative but also well-informed . Of course, agencies have always been able to convene citizen advisory
committees, but the cost of doing so was once prohibitive (around $200,000 per year, by my estimate). One of the few silver linings of
the COVID-19 pandemic, however, is the fact that videoconferencing has become far more sophisticated
and far cheaper . Agencies are already using videoconferencing to expand participation in other contexts, and convening an advisory
committee by Zoom or another online platform would eliminate virtually all associated expenses other than

staff time .
A third approach is a public opinion poll. In many ways, this is the most attractive and cost-effective approach, and it does not require any
advances in technology. However, it also poses the most legal challenges. Under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), agencies must undergo an
elaborate, months-long approval process prior to circulating any survey instrument to ten or more individuals. To the extent agencies express
interest in conducting such polls, Congress might consider amending the PRA to facilitate this process.
By taking any of these approaches, agencies could alleviate some of the pressure on the notice-and-comment
process. No one could credibly attack an agency for ignoring public opinion expressed in comments in favor of public
opinion ascertained by a much more reliable mechanism. Interest groups and even individual commenters would hopefully take
notice and modify their behavior accordingly, abandoning efforts to flood the notice-
and-comment process, which would become increasingly fruitless, and instead focus
on engaging with the more constructive methods of public participation.
Meaningful N&C reinvigorates democracy
Hickman 16, *Kristin E., Harlan Albert Rogers Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law
School. **Mark Thomson, Law clerk to the Honorable Ed Carnes, United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit. (“Open Minds and Harmless Errors: Judicial Review of Postpromulgation Notice and
Comment”, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 261, pg. 308, Available at:
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol101/iss2/1)

Correspondingly, n otice-a n d- c omment rulemaking procedures “ reintroduce public participation and

fairness to affected parties after governmental authority has been delegated to unrepresentative agencies.”229 “Although the Constitution
empowers the President to keep federal officers accountable, administrative agencies enjoy in practice a significant degree of independence.”230
Some degree of agency independence is inevitable—even desirable—especially because elected representatives
typically lack the time and technical expertise required to address the complex regulatory problems modern society poses.231 But too much

independence on the part of unelected agency representatives threatens the ideal of

democratic representation .232 Providing for direct , meaningful public involvement
through prepromulgation notice and comment procedures inserts an element of democracy into the
rulemaking process and thereby legitimates resulting rules .233

Backsliding leads to nuclear war and threat-multiplication

Kendall-Taylor 19, Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a
New American Security (CNAS) (Andrea, February 26 th, “Autocracy’s Advance and Democracy’s Decline:
National Security Implications of the Rise of Authoritarianism Around the World”,
https://www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-testimony/testimony-before-the-house-permanent-
select-committee-on-intelligence-1, accessed 7/21/19)

The growing prevalence of personalized autocracies is cause for concern because they tend to
produce the worst outcomes of any type of political regime: they tend to produce the
most risky and aggressive foreign policies; the most likely to invest in nuclear
weapons;7 the most likely to fight wars against democracies;8 and the most likely to
initiate interstate conflicts .9 As the adventurism of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, Uganda’s Idi
Amin, and North Korea’s Kim Jong-un suggests, a lack of accountability often
translates into an ability to take risks that other dictatorial systems simply cannot
afford.
Russia underscores the link between rising personalism and aggression . Although
Putin’s actions in Crimea and Syria were designed to advance a number of key Russian
goals, it is also likely that Putin’s lack of domestic constraints increased the level of risk
he was willing to accept in pursuit of those goals. Putin’s tight control over the media ensures
that the public receives only the official narrative of foreign events. Limited access to outside
information makes it difficult for Russians to access unbiased accounts of the goings-on in the rest of the
world and gauge Putin’s success in the foreign policy arena. Putin’s elimination of competing voices
within his regime further ensures that he faces minimal accountability for his foreign policy actions.
Politics in China show many of these same trends. Xi’s increasingly aggressive posture
in the South China Sea has occurred alongside the rising personalization of the political
system. Xi has amassed substantial personal power since coming to office in 2012 and
continues to roll back the norms of the post-Mao collective leadership system. If Xi
further consolidates control and limits accountability—particularly over military and
foreign policy bodies—research suggests that he, too, could feel free to further
escalate his aggressive rhetoric and actions in the South China Sea .
Not only do personalist dictatorships pursue aggressive foreign policies—they are also
often difficult and unpredictable partners . Research underscores that, thanks to limited
constraints on decisionmaking, personalist leaders generally have the latitude to
change their minds on a whim , producing volatile and erratic policies.10 Moreover,
personalist leaders—think Putin, Bolivian President Evo Morales, and Venezuelan
President Nicolás Maduro—are among those autocrats who are most suspicious of U.S.
intentions and who see the creation of an external enemy as an effective means of
boosting public support. Anti-U.S. rhetoric, therefore, is most pronounced in personalist settings.
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T-Article 5

Topical affs change A5.

Fukuyama ’22 [Francis; Jan 31; Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow and director of the Ford Dorsey
Master’s in International Policy program at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for
International Studies; “Dangerous Revisionism,”
https://www.americanpurpose.com/blog/fukuyama/dangerous-revisionism/]
NATO is
This doesn’t mean that NATO could or should have been expanded indiscriminately. As I argued in an earlier post,

fundamentally a security treaty built around its Article V guarantee that an attack on one
member would be considered as an attack on all . Countries that cannot actually be defended by the alliance
should face a very high barrier to entry. This is not a matter of principle, but one of physical geography
and military logistics. This is why I was opposed to offering eventual membership to Ukraine and Georgia back at the time of the
Bucharest Declaration in 2008; there was no realistic way for the Article V commitment to be met if those countries faced a determined Russian
attack.

Limits and ground---infinite small modifications overstretch neg research burden –

undermines preparedness.
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Conditioning CP
The fifty states and relevant subnational actors should suspend the administration of
federal programs until the United States federal government substantially increases
its artificial intelligence air and missile defense security cooperation at least in Turkiye
with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the area of artificial intelligence
*Note: thanks for telling us that you don’t have it prepped on the server Ian

It competes and solves---conditioning the plan never fiats it, but results in federal
adoption AND aggressively expands dual sovereignty.
Bloomberg ’21 [Scott; September 17; Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of
Law; Social Science Research Network, “Frenemy Federalism,” Draft Manuscript, p. 2-40]
i. Uncooperative Federalism
Dean Heather Gerken and Professor Jessica Bulman-Pozen have categorized state legalization of marijuana as an instance of uncooperative
federalism.108 In their influential 2009 essay, Uncooperative Federalism, Gerken and Bulman-Pozen observe that scholars had traditionally
Under the “ state autonomy ” model of
conceived of our system of federalism through one of two lenses.

federalism, the states and the fed eral government are dual sovereign s who act as
autonomous rivals , allowing states to act as dissenters to federal policies they deem undesirable.
109 In contrast, under the “cooperative federalism” approach, the states are like agents or servants of the federal government, dutifully carrying
out a federal program to achieve a shared objective.110
Uncooperative federalism presents a third type of relationship between the states and the federal government, one that
recognizes a principal’s or master’s dependence on their agents or servants, and the concomitant
power of an embedded agent or servant to push back against their superior. 111 Sometimes, the
states do not dutifully cooperate in administer ing a federal program, but actively seek
to change or undermine that program. They are uncooperative .
Gerken and Bulman-Pozen identify three categories of state actions that constitute uncooperative federalism. The first is “licensed” dissent, which
occurs when “Congress explicitly contemplates that states will deviate from federal norms in implementing federal policy, but states take that
invitation in a direction the federal government may not anticipate.”112 State efforts to catalyze federal welfare reform provide an example. In
the 1980s, states such as Wisconsin and Michigan utilized a waiver provision of the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children welfare
program (“AFDC”) to “recast an entitlement for poor families struggling to raise children into a temporary grant for recipients who would
quickly move into the private workforce.”113 Departing from the existing federal policy, the states began enacting welfare-to-work requirements
that required welfare recipients to actively seek employment and terminated AFDC benefits after a set period of time.114 These
uncooperative state s largely succeed ed in changing federal welfare law when Congress passed the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.115
The second form of uncooperative federalism occurs when states exploit gaps in federal regulatory schemes. In
such cases, “the federal government does not contemplate state variation but states have sufficient discretion that they

find ways to contest federal policy .”116 Gerken and Bulman-Pozen offer California’s efforts to regulate air pollution more
stringently than the EPA as an example of this strain of uncooperative federalism. The state has successfully exploited a

narrow exception to the Clean Air Act’s preemption provision to drive federal emissions standards for
decades.117
The third, and “strongest,” form of uncooperative federalism is civil disobedience, where states “simply refuse to comply

with the national program or otherwise obstruct it .”118 Gerken and Bulman-Pozen cite state pushback to the
Patriot Act as an example. After Congress passed the Act, several states enacted resolutions that prohibited their agencies from assisting the
This uncooperative action had real effect , as “the fed eral
federal government in enforcing the Act.119

government relies on the states for enforcement assistance .”120

In early 2009, the federal-state relationship regarding marijuana fit within the uncooperative federalism framework, falling into the civil
disobedience bucket.121 At that point, thirteen states had legalized medical marijuana, a costly blow to the federal government due to its
dependence on the states for assistance in enforcing marijuana prohibition.122 The DEA, meanwhile, was “actively working to undermine the
decriminalization efforts underway in California, the state with the most nationally visible decriminalization policy.”123 Indeed, federal
prosecutions of individual medical marijuana users and marijuana businesses in California were commonplace in the early 2000s.124
ii. Increased Federal Cooperation
There is a great deal more cooperation in the federal-state marijuana relationship than there was when Gerken and Bulman-Pozen originally
described it as uncooperative federalism. Since 2009, dozens more states have legalized medical marijuana and many have also legalized the drug
In conjunction with these state policy change s , the fed eral government ’s
for recreational use.

policy changed as well: It became far more cooperative with the states.
Though the fed eral government indisputably has the constitutional authority to prosecute
marijuana businesses and users operating in states where marijuana is legal, over the years it has agreed – expressly at times and tacitly at
others – to allow those businesses and users to avoid prosecution. This form of federal cooperation began with a series of DOJ memoranda
instructing U.S. Attorneys not to prosecute marijuana businesses and users acting in compliance with state law.
In 2009, Deputy Attorney General David Ogden issued a policy memorandum to U.S. Attorneys titled “Investigations and Prosecutions in States
Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana.”125 The “Ogden Memo,” as it has become known, instructed U.S. Attorneys in states that legalized
medical marijuana to deprioritize the enforcement of federal marijuana law against individuals who use medical marijuana in compliance with
state law.126 As a result, the federal government stopped prosecuting medical marijuana users unless the user failed to comply with
state law in a manner that implicated one of several “potential federal interest[s]” listed in the Ogden Memo.127

Reasserting state sovereignty counterbalances governance failures from federal

encroachment---extinction.
Mihalakas ’19 [Nasos; May 21; Global Professor of Law at the University of Arizona, LL.M. from
University College London, J.D. from the University of Pittsburgh School of Law; The Federalism
Project, “The Need for Governance Reform – Symptoms vs. Cause,”
https://the-federalism-project.org/2019/05/21/the-need-for-governance-reform-symptoms-vs-cause/]
There is no doubt that we live in “challenging” times. We face ‘social challenges,’ from racial discrimination to gender inequality, women’s
rights (reproductive or otherwise) that will have to be addressed, LGBTQ issues (recognition of gay marriage), a gun violence epidemic due to
both inadequate gun control laws but also excessive violence in our society, etc. We also face ‘ economic challenge s ,’
like stagnant salaries and low wages, job insecurity (due to automation or outsourcing), taxes that are too high for
some and not high enough for others, mounting student debt, and yes massive income inequality. And, of course, we do face ‘ external

challenges ’, from nuclear prolif eration in the Korea n peninsula, to ISIS and religiously
motivated global terror ism, to global warming and climate change!

Yet, most of these issues are but symptoms of a greater cause . Their existence, or our inability to

overcome them, is being caused by a much greater problem in our society that unless we address soon we risk

permanent societal failures within the next 20 to 30 years.

This greater cause is our very own  failing system of governance !!!
Though brilliant in its original construction by the founding fathers, our Federal system of governance (separation of powers, check and balances,
During the past 200 years, we
separate Federal and State governments) is grossly off track and highly unbalanced.

witnessed a steady transfer of power away from the States and into the Fed eral government,
and within the Federal government we saw a similar steady concentration of power in the hands of the Executive (the singular President), and to a
certain extend the Supreme Court (due to Congressional acquiescence).
This did not happen due to some conspiracy by the ‘powerful elite’ or through interference by foreign powers. It happened gradually (almost
naturally), as a response to major failures at the State level: in dealing with slavery and racial discrimination (see Civil War and Jim Crow laws in
the south), in dealing with market failures and the need to regulate business and provide a safety net (see Great Depression, The New Deal and
the Great Society), in fighting a Cold War with the Soviet Union (see expansion of military and intelligence services to advance US foreign
policy).
Today, power and authority to deal with issues and solve problems is highly concentrated at the Federal level, away from ordinary people and
their ability to monitor let alone influence elected politicians. 
There is so much power concentrated at the Fed eral level, and in particular in the hands of one person (the
President) that it makes Washington politicians constant targets of special interests and
lobbying organizations, makes negotiations for compromise impossible because there is so much at stake,
and it has created a highly unbalanced system (where “checks and balances” are not fully implemented and more
often can’t work effectively).
Washington gridlock, dysfunction, polarization, and partisanship have led to the inability to pass a budget (balanced or otherwise), or address the
need for immigration reform, or provide for adequate healthcare coverage and affordable prescription drugs, or even implement proper tax
reform. Therefore,unless we address these ‘ systemic ’ failures of our system of governance, unless
we implement institutional changes and  fix the process , we will never get lasting solutions to our

current and future societal challenges .

Unfortunately, there is no one thing we can do, no ‘magic bullet’ that can fix the dysfunction of our Federal system of governance (because it’s
not just ‘the Federal government’ that needs reform, but also/primarily Congress and the Judiciary). Rather, there are several things (from specific
process changes through laws/regulations to Constitutional amendments) that we will have to changes now, in order to see improvement in the
function of our system of governance in the next 20 to 30 years.
There is a parallel example to this system of governance failures, and it’s that of ‘global warming.’  Global temperatures have been rising, due to
greenhouse gases (caused by human activity – burning fossil fuels like coal and oil), presenting an existential threat to our planet and our way of
life. However, fossil fuels are not inherently evil, used by certain people bent on the destruction of humanity!  Energy from fossil fuels was
instrumental in facilitating the industrial revolution, which brought progress and technological innovations during the past 150 years, that helped
the whole world to advance, prosper, and better connect. It was not until recently that we realized that the constantly expanding use of fossil fuels
by humans is contributing to rising temperatures, and if we don’t do something now to ‘bent the curve’, then in 20 to 30 years from now
temperatures will rise to levels that can be devastating to the planets ecosystem, and by extension us humans.
Concentration of power at the Federal level, over the past 200 years, though not inherently evil (downright necessary and proper
during some critical periods), has reached a point of pure dysfunction . The proof of the

unsustainable nature of our current system (like rising temperatures are a proof of global warming) is income
inequality. During the past 50 years, we have witnessed a steady concentration of wealth at the hands of the top 10% (and primarily the top
1%).
And although one can look at our society today statically and say: “things are still ok: there are rich people and poor people, and we are still the
most powerful and wealthy nation in the world – so what’s the problem?”… the trend keeps going upwards: currently over 70% of our national
wealth is concentrated at the hands for the top 10%. When do we need to do something to stop this trend?  When it gets to 80%, or 90%?
Democrats and Republicans (now thanks to Donald Trump) both agree on the existence of a ‘powerful elite, in cahoots with the political
establishment, bent on exploiting the middle class’… yet both party’s solution is the same: win political power and cut or raise taxes, regulate
more or less, appoint some type of judges… in essence, deal with the symptoms and not the underlying cause!
If we want to address the underlying cause of income inequality (and outsourcing of jobs, health-care failures, racial
tensions, education funding, women’s rights, public housing, etc.), then we need to reform our system of governance, before we can
consider specific policy priorities. By fixing the legislative process, restoring proper checks, correcting the imbalance within the government
branches and return ing powers back to the States … we can get on a path where we see real results within the next 20 to
30 years.
Otherwise, gridlock and dysfunction at the Federal level will only get worse !
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DSCA DA

The DSCA [Defense Security Cooperation Agency] is strong now

Joe Gould 22, "Senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, covering the intersection of national
security policy, politics and the defense industry."
https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/06/30/european-arms-demand-grows-as-russia-fallout-
deepens/ //pipk
The changed security environment in Europe will mean increased demand from its allies
for integrated missile defenses, early warning systems, air-to-air missiles and
i ntelligence, s urveillance and r econnaissance platforms, a senior U.S. defense official
said Thursday.
The assessment comes as rattled European countries are committing to boost their militaries in
the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. U.S. government officials, while racing to
send weapons to Ukraine , are also working to backfill allies who have sent arms to
Ukraine or are keen to strengthen their conventional defenses.
“Globally, that demand is increasing, and I do think we will continue to explore with our
partners how they want to look at that,” Jed Royal, the deputy director of the D efense
S ecurity C ooperation A gency, said during a call with reporters. He said needs vary by country.
While the State Department has primary responsibility for approving arms exports, the DSCA , a
Pentagon agency central to foreign military sales, has taken a key role in U.S. and
allied efforts to send and replace billions of dollars worth of weapons both from existing
military supplies and through new procurements.
“DSCA wants to make sure we are not only thinking in terms of backfilling the U nited
S tates but certainly backfill[ing] for allies and partners as they continue to support
Ukraine as well,” Royal said. “I spend a lot of time with our allies and partners and ... the
demand is certainly coming in a really significant way.”
Potentially driving demand, NATO announced this week it plans to increase the size of
its rapid reaction force from 40,000 to 300,000 troops by next year. Forces would be
based in their home countries but deploy further east, where the alliance would
stockpile equipment and ammunition .
Beyond air defenses, the focus of Europe’s defense investments should shift toward networks, strike
weapons and munitions, logistics and base construction, Capital Alpha Partners Managing Director Byron
Callan said in a note to investors Thursday.
“Open questions remain about how the Russian threat is assessed in 2025-30, how U.S. commitments to
NATO are weighed depending on the 2024 [U.S. presidential] election outcome, and views on the needs
and capacity of the European defense industrial base,” Callan said.
With an eye on the health of Europe’s defense industry, the European Union has sought
to incentivize deals among its members. Earlier this month, EU officials were expected to meet
with member nation delegates to craft ground rules for a €500 million (U.S. $523 million) fund meant to
promote quick purchases of bloc-made military equipment.
The U.S. has been working with more than 50 countries to see what weapons they can
send to Ukraine. Though the initial focus has been on Russian-made weapons Ukrainian
forces were familiar with, Ukraine has received more advanced weapons and the training
to go with them as the war’s continued.
DSCA has been part of the Pentagon’s internal efforts to find and fix defense
industrial base constraints exposed by the Ukraine effort, and it’s put new focus on
acquiring nonstandard systems for allies . That has included the AeroVironment Switchblade
300 loitering munition for Ukraine, Royal said.
“We found that there’s a lot of systems that are not standard systems that the U.S.
acquires for itself that are nonetheless very valuable and worthwhile to our partners ,”
Royal said. “So we’re looking at those non-program-of-record systems and making sure
that we are using our program offices to prioritize those requirements for allies and
partners just as we would for more standard acquisition systems.”
Beyond Europe , India and other importers of weapons from Russia, the world’s No. 2 arms
vendor, have had to rethink those arrangements as widespread sanctions cripple [hurt]
Russia’s ability to make and export defense equipment. Without mentioning any specific
countries, Royal echoed other U.S. officials who have said the west, if not the U.S., might eat into
Russia’s market share .
“ We need to be able to demonstrate the reliability of the Western industrial base, the
U.S. industrial base, a friendly industrial base, in order to be able to make sure that
allies and partners globally can find an alternative to Russian systems in the future ,” he
said. “That’s very much part of our thinking as well.”

Security cooperation trades off

Gregory Dykeman 7, Colonel in the U.S. Army, Chief of Effects Assessment and Targeting in the
Strategic Operations Directorate, MultiNational Force Iraq. "Security Cooperation: A Key to the
Challenges of the 21st Century" https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/1916.pdf //pipk
security cooperation still faces numerous challenges. Both the
Despite successes in execution, as a strategy,

international and domestic strategic environments will test our abilities to implement a
cooperative strategy framework for the foreseeable future. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan,
domestic entitlement programs, and outdated legislative authorities will leave DoD
struggling to properly resource the activities necessary to meet our objectives. DoD must also
address program effectiveness and improve coordination across the U.S. Government and with our allies.

Resource challenges to security cooperation derive from fiscal constraints,

Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO), Global Force Posturing, and outdated authorities . From a fiscal
standpoint, the strategic environment will make the task of addressing our security challenges problematic for the foreseeable future. DoD’s 2007 budget is projected
to be 3.9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). As a percentage of GDP, DoD outlays are historically low and have not kept pace with the growth of GDP over the
last 40 years.31 However, the rising costs of mandatory government entitlement spending associated with Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security are projected to
account for 11 percent of the U.S. GDP by 2016 and will exert pressures on a budget that economic growth alone is unlikely to alleviate.32 Entitlement obligations
will likely result in political pressure to further reduce defense discretionary spending in order to forestall greater budget deficits. Despite the constrained fiscal
environment, DoD outlays must continue to grow to meet our global engagement requirements. This should be a continuous strategic communication message
implemented by DoD senior leadership to Congress and the American people to counter a growing view that the federal government already spends too much on
national defense.33
Despite having the authority to plan and conduct security cooperation within their area of
responsibility (AOR), GCCs currently lack sufficient dedicated resources to support their security
cooperation strategy. In addition, existing resources are limited by multiple and conflicting
policy and legislation . Up to 30 sources of funding regulated by various authorities and
guidelines are required to implement GCC security cooperation strategies.34 Security Assistance
programs like international military education and training (IMET), foreign military financing (FMF), and financial management service (FMS) are State Department
funded, and COCOMs have limited ability through the interagency process to influence where and how this money is spent.35 Other sources like Warsaw Initiative
Funding (WIF) and Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) funding support military exercises and capacity building efforts but continue to come under increased
program management scrutiny. In the past, security cooperation funding by Service Components has contributed significantly to COCOM plan execution. However,
Service Chiefs face growing fiscal obligations. As an example, the Army delayed submitting its 2008-13 Program Objective Memorandum in an effort to avoid a
QDR strategy and resource mismatch.36 A mismatch still exists, and the Army faces a growing problem in funding current equipment wartime reset requirements and
its modernization efforts. In recent congressional testimony, the Army Chief of Staff outlined the Army equipment reset bill at $17.01 billion for FY 2007, with
expected requirements beyond 2007 to be $12 to $13 billion per year though the conflict and a minimum of 2 to 3 years beyond.37 Additionally, the Army will need
fiscal realities
nearly $200 billion for the Future Combat System and its associated spin-off technologies to meet modernization requirements.38 These

suggest Service components will have fewer resources to dedicate to security cooperation,
as Service Chiefs, who already have less interest in engagement programs, struggle to meet their Title 10 responsibilities to train, organize, and equip their forces.39
To overcome these hurdles, funding streams must be consolidated and reforms initiated that provide GCCs more influence in the allocation of funding resources for
security cooperation.

COCOMs will also likely face continued challenges in finding sufficient resources in
the form of military personnel to conduct security cooperation programs . The Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan (JSCP) does not apportion forces specifically for security cooperation, and they must come from forces assigned to a COCOM’s AOR or that
temporarily deploy for engagement activities.40 For the foreseeable future, the deployment requirements to support the GWOT will continue to leave few
opportunities for active and reserve component units to participate in coalition and multinational exercises. In struggling to meet its surge requirements in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the U.S. military is falling short in its ability to resource the steady-state deterrence and partner enabling missions called for in the QDR strategy.41 To
address this shortcoming, President George W. Bush’s 2008 budget contains proposed funding for an additional end-strength increase of 92,000 troops for the Army
and Marine Corps by 2013.42 This increase is not only necessary now, but also is required post-Iraq/Afghanistan. The Army must be forthright and convincing with
the nation’s civilian defense leadership about the future force structure required to meet the myriad of “Boots on the Ground” tasks necessitated by an uncertain and
complex environment.43

That prevents Russia War– extinction

The Economist 6/30, "How to win Ukraine's long war"
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2022/06/30/how-to-win-ukraines-long-war //pipk
Ukraine won the short war. Mobile and resourceful, its troops inflicted terrible losses and
confounded Russian plans to take Kyiv. Now comes the long war. It will drain weapons,
lives and money until one side loses the will to fight on. So far, this is a war that Russia
is winning .
In recent days its forces have taken the eastern city of Severodonetsk . They are advancing on
Lysychansk and may soon control all of Luhansk province. They also threaten Slovyansk, in the north of next-door Donetsk. Ukrainian leaders
say they are outgunned and lack ammunition. Their government reckons as many as 200 of its troops are dying each day.
Fortunately for Ukraine, that is not the end. The Russian advance is slow and costly.
With nato-calibre weapons, fresh tactics and enough financial aid, Ukraine has every
chance of forcing back Russia’s armies. Even if lost territory will be hard to retake, Ukraine can
demonstrate the futility of Vladimir Putin’s campaign and emerge as a democratic,
Westward-looking state. But to do so it needs enduring support. And that is still in
doubt.
On the face of it, a long war suits Russia. Both sides are using huge amounts of
ammunition, but Russia has vastly more. The Russian economy is much larger than
Ukraine’s and in far better shape. In pursuit of victory, Russia is willing to terrorise and demoralise the Ukrainians by
committing war crimes, as it did by striking a shopping mall in Kremenchuk this week. If needs be, Mr Putin will impose grievous suffering on
his own people.
However, the long war does not have to be fought on Mr Putin’s terms. Potentially, Ukraine
has vast numbers of motivated fighters. It can be supplied by the West’s defence industry . In 2020,

before sanctions, the economies of nato were more than ten times bigger than
Russia’s.
Ukraine’s turnaround begins on the battlefield, by stopping and reversing the Russian advance. Mr Putin’s generals will continue to have more
the sophisticated nato systems now arriving have longer range and greater
weapons, but

accuracy . By adopting tactics devised in the cold war, when nato too was outnumbered
by the Red Army, Ukraine should be able to destroy Russian command posts and supply
depots. Ukraine scored a success on June 30th, when it used nato weapons to drive
Russian forces off Snake Island, a strategic prize in the Black Sea. It should aim to
impose a “ hurting stalemate ”, in which it takes back similarly symbolically important
territory, such as the city of Kherson, imposing a heavy price on Russia.
If Russia starts to lose ground on the battlefield, dissent and infighting may spread in
the Kremlin . Western intelligence services believe that Mr Putin is being kept in the dark by his
subordinates. He has a habit of replacing his commanders—reportedly including General Alexander
Dvornikov, brought in after the invasion’s first chaotic weeks. The West can raise the cost to Russia of a long war by continuing to press
sanctions, which threaten lasting harm to Russia’s economy. It can split Russia’s elites from Mr Putin by welcoming dissenters from business and
politics, and encouraging them to see that their country should not throw away its future on a pointless and costly campaign.
Will the West stay the course ? At a summit on June 23rd, the European Union awarded Ukraine candidate status, promising a
deep level of engagement over the next decade. At another summit in Germany this week, the g7 affirmed and strengthened sanctions against
Russia. And at a third in Madrid, nato acknowledged the Russian threat by substantially increasing its presence on the alliance’s eastern front.
Yet Ukraine is a heavy burden. Western defence industries are formidable, but struggle to
produce large volumes, especially of ammunition. Ukraine’s government has a monthly deficit of $5bn and the
country will need rebuilding after the war. Public support for Ukraine in the West will be buffeted by a
host of pressures, from inflation to elections—including, as soon as 2023, campaigning in
America that may involve a presidential bid by that Ukrainophobic Putin admirer, Donald
Trump.
And the global costs of a long war will grow. Mr Putin has been blockading exports of grains
and sunflower oil from Ukraine’s ports, which will cause unrest and starvation in poorer
importing countries. He seems to be trying to create gas shortages in the eu this winter by
preventing members from building stocks over the summer. If unity falls apart over
energy, as eu states hoard gas, it will disintegrate over Ukraine, too. To complicate
matters further, nato members worry that if Ukraine gains the upper hand, Mr Putin will
escalate. That could draw them into a catastrophic war with Russia .
You can see where Mr Putin is heading. He will take as much of Ukraine as he can, declare victory and then call on Western nations to impose
his terms on Ukraine. In exchange, he will spare the rest of the world from ruin, hunger, cold and the threat of nuclear Armageddon.
To accept that deal would be a grave miscalculation. Ukraine would face permanent
Russian aggression. The more Mr Putin believes he has succeeded in Ukraine, the
more belligerent he will become . He set out his ambitions in a speech this month, smirking as he talked about how Peter the
Great seized parts of Sweden. He will fight tomorrow with whatever weapons work for him today.

That means resorting to war crimes and nuclear threats, starving the world and
freezing Europe .
The best way to prevent the next war is to defeat him in this one . Leaders need to explain to their
people that they are not only defending an abstract principle in Ukraine, but also their most fundamental interest: their own security. The eu needs
Ukraine must have more weapons. The risk
to shore up its energy markets so that they do not fracture next winter.

of escalation today is real, but if a bad peace is forced on Ukraine Mr Putin’s nuclear
threats will not stop. They will only become more dangerous , especially if Russia’s
conventional forces are at a disadvantage.
 To prevail means
In the long war ordinary Russians will suffer and Ukrainians endure unspeakable pain for Mr Putin’s vanity.
marshalling resources and shoring up Ukraine as a viable, sovereign, Western-leaning country—an outcome that its
defiant people crave. Ukraine and its backers have the men, money and materiel to overcome Mr Putin. Do they all have the will?
6
 1NC—OFF
Dip Cap DA

A new series of visits restores diplomatic engagement -- the plan trades off.
Daniel L. Byman 22, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy, 7/8/22, “Biden’s
difficult task: Reviving US partnerships in the Middle East,” https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-
chaos/2022/07/08/bidens-difficult-task-reviving-us-partnerships-in-the-middle-east/
As President Joe Biden prepares to travel to the Middle East, his administration faces several challenges in its
relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other regional (non-treaty) allies. At the most basic
level, the United States and these allies do not share the same priorities. Part of why
Biden is traveling to Saudi Arabia is to convince the country’s leaders to pump more oil
as global prices soar. In addition, the United States seeks to maintain pressure on the
Islamic State group (IS) to prevent the terror organization from rebuilding. Yet both the Russia-
Ukraine war and the struggle against the remnants of IS are ancillary concerns for regional states , and they are concerned that

the U.S. focus on Asia and Europe will make the U nited S tates a less useful security
partner.
Iran , the foreign policy priority for Israel, Saudi Arabia, and many other regional states, is a major sticking point. Indeed, most regional allies
oppose the Biden administration’s efforts to restore the Iran nuclear deal, seeing it as making too many concessions to Tehran and fearing that the
United States in general will not stand up to Iranian aggression and subversion. With regular Iranian missile strikes on Iraq and missile strikes
from Iran’s Houthi allies in Yemen on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, this fear is quite strong. Nuclear talks appear to be
floundering, and the Biden administration will need to decide whether to try to revive them at the risk of further alienating regional
states or abandon them only to work on the next challenge — how to create other diplomatic — and military — options

that will stop the Iranian bomb and ensure regional security . Iran, for its part, will interpret the Biden visit as
the United States further siding with its regional enemies.
Middle
Russia is another sticking point. The United States is trying to create a global coalition to oppose Russian aggression in Ukraine.

Eastern states , however, see Russia as a source of wheat, while their populations question why Ukraine should be
the subject of global solidarity while Syria was not. Many are more anti-American than pro-Ukraine. Regardless of regime
views on Ukraine, Russia is also a military player in Syria, and Israel works with Moscow to ensure that Israel can strike Iranian assets in Syria
without interference from Russian forces.
In order to win over regional leaders, Biden will also need to curtail some of his critical rhetoric. This is especially true with his condemnation of
the Saudi murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi and the brutal Saudi and UAE war in Yemen. These are the right stances from a human rights
perspective, but Riyadh and its allies will not be accommodating in other areas if they are the subject of regular, public criticism.
Actually walking back his comments on these grave human rights issues would be politically difficult even if Biden were inclined to openly
abandon the moral high ground. In practice, refraining from future criticism, the legitimacy bestowed by the trip itself, and other steps that make
it clear that Riyadh is being embraced, not shunned. As in the past, the United States is again emphasizing that pragmatic concerns like oil prices
and Iran, not human rights, will drive U.S. policy toward the kingdom.
Making these problems more difficult , the Biden administration inherited a weak hand from its
predecessors. U.S. engagement with the Middle East has declined dramatically since the George W. Bush
administration, when 9/11 and the Iraq War put the region at the center of U.S. foreign policy . President
Barack Obama tried to reduce U.S. involvement in the Middle East, and President Donald Trump, while more sympathetic to autocratic Arab
Biden administration has emphasized great power
allies, also favored limited U.S. involvement in the region. The
competition, with the war in Ukraine and the rivalry with China dominating strategic thinking. Biden’s trip
is thus occurring with a regional perception that the U nited S tates is focused on other parts of
the world and at home, with little appetite for resolving regional disputes and leading regional allies as
it sought to in the past. Indeed, Biden’s understandable focus on energy and Russia will reinforce this, making it clear that it is non-
regional concerns that are driving his visit rather than shared interests. The Biden administration also claims the trip is to encourage Saudi Arabia
to formally make peace with Israel, though U.S. officials almost certainly recognize a formal peace is highly unlikely even though Riyadh and
Israel have stepped up their security partnership.
Making the job even harder, Middle Eastern allies have preferred Republican presidents. Gulf state rulers believe Republican leaders are more
anti-Iran and less concerned about human rights. Israeli leaders too believe Republicans are more pro-Israel and more likely to stand up to
Tehran. In addition, regional allies rightly recognize that Trump or another disruptive leader may again assume the U.S. presidency. The
U S
nited tates, in other words, will be considered an erratic ally, with policies and interest in the Middle East varying wildly by
administration.
One goal that may have more success is encouraging U.S. allies to work together. The United States historically has preferred bilateral
cooperation, with countries working with Washington more than with one another. As the U.S. limits its involvement, however, it will want
regional states to step up and combine their efforts, whether this is to counter Iran or to resolve regional wars like those in Yemen and Libya.
Israel, with its formidable military and intelligence services, can play an important role here, offering high-end capabilities, such as providing
radar systems to Bahrain and the UAE, when the United States is reluctant to do so for political reasons.
The United States is also likely to have help from partners in sustaining the fighting against IS and other dangerous jihadi groups. Although this
struggle is less of a priority for allies, they too worry about violent jihadism and will continue longstanding intelligence and military cooperation.
Jihadi groups also remain weak compared with their past selves, limiting the effort required.
Regional partners will be aware of U.S. pivoting to focus on Asia and Europe, and Biden’s visit will not change this perception. The best the
administration can hope for is to make clear , both in private and in public, that the U nited S tates will remain
diplomatically and militarily involved in the Middle East, whether it be to counter IS or deter Iran . The
president’s visit is thus a useful signal , even if regional states will remain unsatisfied.
Perhaps the best that can be hoped from this trip is simply to restart the U.S. engagement with its allies in the region. Such a goal
doesn’t promise big wins — there may at best be modest concessions like a Saudi announcement it will pump a small amount of additional oil —
For now , the U.S. relationship with regional allies is transactional,
but it offers the hope of future improvements.

with little trust or respect on either side. Repeated visits by high-level officials will make them more
likely to listen to Washington and consider U.S. interests rather than see U.S. concerns as irrelevant, or even opposed, to their day-to-
day problems.

Disengagement greenlights regional instability -- extinction.

H. Brandon Morgan 22, U.S. Army Officer and non-resident fellow at the Modern War Institute,
6/7/22, “The Imperative of Middle East Regional Order and U.S. Diplomacy,”
https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2022/6/7/the-imperative-of-middle-east-regional-order-and-us-
diplomacy
For U.S. strategists seeking to thwart rising Chinese hegemony or Russian military imperialism, the idea
of America leaving a volatile Middle East to its fate may sound appealing . Civil war in Syria and Yemen coupled with
the troubled democracies in Iraq and Sudan are only a few examples showcasing Washington’s ongoing regional challenges. President Biden’s
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan in August 2021 perhaps reflected the country’s general frustration with America’s Middle East
engagement over the past two decades. Indeed, U.S. ambivalence towards recent Iran-backed Houthi strikes against Saudi and Emirate oil
strategic
facilities suggest that Washington is ready to accept broader strategic disengagement from the region, come what may. But

disengagement from the Middle East to focus on China and a war-bound Russia will likely come at high
cost for Washington. Indeed, without a U.S.-supported Middle East security architecture, the long
simmering tensions could erupt into a firestorm of region wide conflict inevitably requiring
American military intervention to prevent an oil crisis or renewal of transnational terrorism . This would
completely undermine Washington’s desire to pivot strategic focus towards the Indo-Pacific . But
insuring against negative outcomes in the Middle East—the region of traditional U.S. focus—also provides the
opportunity for the rise of positive outcomes in economic growth and institutional development. This
would not only provide positive trade benefits for the U.S., but it would also promote an American friendly regional order
while limiting the growing influence of China and Russia. Fortunately , the tools to prevent strategic
crises and promote Middle East regional growth lie increasingly less in military capacity and more in the
realm of diplomatic and economic engagement. This excess of military capacity in the Middle
East could prove highly valuable in the Indo-Pacific and Eastern Europe .
A POTENTIAL NUCLEAR POWDER KEG IN THE MAKING
These attacks by Iranian irregular-proxy forces, combined with their turnkey nuclear program ,
suggests that the U.S. maximum pressure strategy has placed America’s interests of regional stability and
energy security at serious risk. Additionally, U.S. disengagement from the region—signaled by America’s reluctance to counter Iran’s
attacks—has led the Arab-Israeli coalition to determine that accelerating a conventional weapons buildup is
the only way to ensure their own protection.[7] U.S. disengagement, Arab-Israeli arms buildup, and Iranian
asymmetric warfare may have the potential to become its own cycle of violence and instability . Left
unchecked , this cycle could contain grave risk of escalation towards regional conflict—one in which Iran could
resort to completing its nuclear weapons program and spark incipient proliferation . A Middle Eastern war
between Iran and an Arab-Israeli coalition could
place the security of the Hormuz Strait and Suez Canal at risk,
requiring active intervention by the European and Asian powers whose economies fundamentally rely on
the energy and trade flow from these vital trade corridors . Some may argue that with America’s limited energy imports from
the region, these outside powers should be the ones to resolve such a conflict.[8] But allowing other great powers such as China, Russia, and
others to rewrite the Middle East’s security architecture with the U.S. on the sidelines is not in the geopolitical interests of the American
government. To prevent such an outcome, finishing a renewed nuclear deal is a central imperative for U.S. interests.
FOUNDATIONS OF A REGIONAL ORDER
If a renewed nuclear deal could be completed, the U.N. Security Council plus Germany would be able to extend Iran’s nuclear breakout time
from three weeks to six months, establish a verifiable nuclear inspection regime, and forestall a nuclear crisis in the Middle East.[9] Despite these
crucial benefits, there are still some who call for the U.S. to reject the deal entirely. Critics often state that the economic benefits to Iran will only
increase Tehran’s ability to wage proxy warfare, building an ever-larger arsenal of missiles and drones against the U.S. and regional partners.[10]
Indeed, Iran’s economy grew by 13.4% in 2016—all before full sanctions relief implementation, strongly suggesting that Iran stands to benefit
from a renewed deal.[11] But it is important to remember that although Iran has long maintained its asymmetric and ballistic missile capabilities,
the scale and severity of attacks against strategic oil infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., and Persian Gulf came after U.S. withdrawal from
the nuclear deal in 2018. This suggests that while Tehran is not likely to surrender the Revolutionary Guard and proxy-force funding in the short
term, it is possible for the U.S. to establish a security dialogue that minimizes regional tensions and builds momentum for further diplomatic
victories in the long term.
A regional security architecture in the Middle East must be founded on reassurance to Arab-
Israeli partners, continued deterrence against Iran, and good faith negotiations. The U.S. should revitalize its diplomatic
engagement with Arab-Israeli partners. Importantly, this requires astute diplomacy that recognizes that a general pivot to other regions does
not equate to complete strategic disengagement from the Middle East. The U.S. should reassure its Arab-Israeli partners that the American
government will diplomatically support the coalition against attacks by Iran while offering economic assistance in the aftermath of Iranian strikes.
To deter Iran, the U.S. must re-signal its willingness and determination to conduct proportional military counterstrikes in response to Tehran’s
military aggression that threatens American partners in the region. With U.S. security assurances established, the coalition can slow the pace of
their arms buildup. This would reduce Iran’s perceived need to respond with asymmetrical strikes, thus limiting
the escalation cycle. By reestablishing Iranian deterrence, Washington will garner greater maneuvering
space to negotiate mutually desirable outcomes.
7
 1NC—OFF
Rider DA

Schumer is looking to attach Permitting Reform to a must pass bill, but the GOP
will block now. Plan’s fiat ensures passage.
BOLTON 9/19 (Alexander, “GOP’s bad blood threatens Manchin side deal,”
https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/3651078-gops-bad-blood-threatens-manchin-side-deal/) //pa-ww
Senate Republicans are threatening to sink Sen. Joe Manchin’s side deal on permitting reform, partly
because they are still angry over the West Virginia Democrat’s flip-flop on the sweeping climate, health and tax bill that
Congress passed last month. Senate Majority Leader Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) promised in late July to add Manchin’s permitting

reform legislation to a must-pass end-of-September government funding bill in order to secure Manchin’s vote for the Inflation
Reduction Act, which included hundreds of billions of dollars to fight climate change. The initial plan was to pass the stopgap funding measure with permitting
reform first in the Senate, putting pressure on House Democrats to go along with it to avoid a possible government shutdown in early October. But now

Republican senators say a continuing resolution combined with Manchin’s permitting reform proposal
probably won’t get 10 GOP votes in the upper chamber. They say there’s little appetite for
giving Manchin a big political and policy victory after he shocked them over the summer by announcing a deal with
Schumer on the Inflation Reduction Act. “I don’t think you can count on any Republicans to commit to vote for something they haven’t seen,” said Sen. John Cornyn
(R-Texas), who raised concerns about the fact that Manchin hasn’t yet circulated an updated draft of his permitting reform bill. “Generally speaking, Republicans are
for permitting reform. I think given what Sen. Manchin did on the reconciliation bill has engendered a lot of bad blood,” Cornyn added. Many Republicans felt misled
by Manchin after he announced his support for a sweeping tax reform and climate bill only hours after Republican senators voted for a $280 billion chips and science
bill — something Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) threatened to block if Democrats were still actively considering a budget reconciliation bill with
tax increases. “Relationships are important around here, and I think people felt like he misled them,” Cornyn said. “There’s not a lot of sympathy on our side for
providing Sen. Manchin a reward for his flip-flop on the reconciliation.” Cornyn and many other Senate Republicans are pushing to replace Manchin’s proposal with
permitting reform legislation crafted by his home-state colleague, Sen. Shelley Moore Capito (R-W.Va.), that would do more to speed the approval of fossil-fuel
Senate Republican Whip John Thune (S.D.) also raised serious doubts about the
extraction and other projects.

prospect of a short-term government funding measure getting 10 or 11 Republicans votes to overcome a

filibuster if Manchin’s permitting reform bill is included. “I think the more likely way to get an outcome is for them to try and
produce 12 Democrats for Capito’s proposal,” Thune said. Thune warned that passing a continuing resolution to avoid a government shutdown is “a much heavier lift”
if the legislation is first considered in the Senate with Manchin’s proposal as a part of it. He said Republican support would be much stronger for a stopgap funding
measure that included Capito’s version of permitting reform. Republicans have doubts whether Manchin’s proposal goes far enough or whether it would be
implemented by the Biden administration. “We understand based on what we do know that it’s not very strong,” Thune said of Manchin’s language, adding, “there’s a
ton of skepticism on our side.”

Fiat makes the plan “must-pass”.

Curtis W. Copeland 8, Specialist in American National Government, Government and Finance Division,
CRS Report for Congress, “Congressional Influence on Rulemaking and Regulation Through
Appropriations Restrictions,” 8/5/08, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34354.pdf
Although the substantive reasons leading to the adoption of these regulatory restrictions are numerous (e.g., economic interests, or to
support or oppose end-ofadministration rules), their inclusion in appropriations legislation as a matter of legislative strategy
appears to be prompted by two factors: (1) Congress’ ability via its “power of the purse” to control agency action, and (2) the fact
that appropriations bills are considered “must pass” legislation. As one observer put it, “Because everyone
knows that Congress must pass such legislation, it is tempting to try and attach incidental
provisions that otherwise might lack the political momentum (or even majority support) necessary
for passage.”119 In that regard, several of the regulatory restrictions discussed in this report were also in separate legislation that had not
moved since they were introduced. The use of regulatory restrictions in appropriations bills is also likely to continue for the foreseeable future.
The examples provided in this report indicate that they are a formidable “tool” in the “toolbox” of congressional oversight and control of
executive agencies.
Permitting Reforms greenlight fossil fuel production leading to extinction via
warming
ZHOU 9/13 (Li; Vox, “The Democratic infighting over Joe Manchin’s “side deal,” explained,”
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2022/9/13/23351561/joe-manchin-permitting-reforms-
progressives-inflation-reduction-act) //pa-ww
Whether the government is forced to shut down at the end of the month may hinge on Democrats’ approach to permitting reform, an issue that has divided the party in
recent weeks. Permitting is the process for getting federal approval for energy projects, including oil and gas pipelines, which often undergo extensive review for their
environmental impact. It can be a long and expensive process, and while Republicans and Democrats agree that the experience could be improved, they differ on what
Manchin (D-WV), a chair of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources committee who has deep ties to the coal
those reforms should entail. Sen. Joe

industry, has long taken issue with the current permitting process , arguing that it’s too convoluted. This summer, he

struck a deal with Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer: In exchange for Manchin’s backing on the Inflation Reduction Act, Schumer
guaranteed a vote on permitting reforms that would streamline approval of fossil fuel and renewable energy projects. Last week, Schumer announced that he plans to
attach these permitting reforms to the short-term spending bill that’s expected to fund the government through mid-December, also known as a continuing resolution
(CR). The decision has prompted pushback from more than 70 House members, including many progressives, and Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT). In a letter sent to both
Schumer and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi last week, House lawmakers argue Manchin’s reforms would make it easier to
greenlight harmful oil and gas projects, and reduce constituents’ abilities to oppose such endeavors. Additionally, they claim that
attaching the policies to a must-pass bill would force lawmakers to choose between “protecting … communities from further
pollution or funding the government.” Sanders, in a fiery floor speech last week, echoed many of these concerns, and later said that he would not vote for a CR that
includes permitting reforms. For now, it’s uncertain if Democratic opposition to the permitting reforms would be sufficient to sink a CR altogether. Although 76
House members have expressed their opposition, they have not indicated whether they would block the bill if it was put on the floor. Depending on how many
lawmakers are willing to vote down the bill in the lower chamber, there could be enough Republican support to make up for those losses. Similarly in the Senate,
Republican support could neutralize Sanders’s vote in opposition. It’s also possible that progressive pressure affects the final legislative text of the permitting reform,
which has yet to be released. “I don’t know how a CR vote will go if it includes the permitting rider, but the opposition is loud and only getting louder,” said Rep.
Raúl Grijalva (D-AZ), the chair of the House Natural Resources Committee, in a statement. “I encourage leadership to listen to its caucus and keep us out of a
the proposed reforms is still
shutdown standoff that nobody wants.” What’s in Manchin’s proposed permitting reform? While the legislative text for

would put
being finalized, a memo that Manchin’s office circulated earlier this year has many Democrats and activists worried. Policies outlined in that memo

a two-year cap on environmental reviews by the government for major projects under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
Currently, there is no cap on how long these reviews can take, flexibility that some activists and Democrats say is important to ensure that the communities affected
have time to submit their input and have those concerns be properly evaluated. On average, a current NEPA review takes 4.5 years, according to the Council on
Environmental Quality. “Shortening the timeline doesn’t mean better review, it means worse review,” says Jean Su, the energy justice program director at the Center
for Biological Diversity, who said these agencies also need more funding to properly do their jobs. The proposed reforms would also limit the
amount of time in which opponents of a project could bring court challenges to its approval, another effort that activists see as curbing
the opportunity for a community to bring forward issues it may have with a particular buildout. Manchin and others who would like to expedite the consideration of
these energy projects say doing so would accelerate energy production, boost private sector investments, and create new jobs. The memo also calls on the president to
name 25 high-priority energy projects that would have their permitting prioritized, including fossil fuel and renewable energy efforts. The idea here is that fossil fuel
prioritization of fossil fuels,
projects would continue to be treated as important investments alongside other clean energy efforts. The ongoing

however, is a chief issue for progressives who see expenditures on them as counterintuitive. They note that any new policy that

boosts fossil fuel production is one that ignores the severity and root of climate change. “At a time
when climate change is threatening the very existence of our planet , why would anybody be talking about substantially increasing
carbon emissions and expanding fossil fuel production in the United States?” asked Sanders in his floor speech. Finally, the memo proposes requiring the federal
government to take the action needed to complete the Mountain Valley Pipeline, a controversial 300-mile natural gas pipeline that extends from West Virginia to
Virginia, which has had multiple permits rejected by the courts due to its effects on the environment. This specific provision has prompted massive pushback from
activists, hundreds of whom visited the Capitol last week. They argue that if included in the final bill, it would amount to the federal government overruling both
community concerns about the pipeline’s impact as well as pushback from the courts. A separate memo shared among Senate Democrats has stressed how an
expedited permitting process could help certain renewable energy projects, though Su says
permitting reform would be more likely to benefit fossil fuel projects, which typically
face more extensive permitting delays because of the degree of review needed. This second memo suggests that permitting changes
could more efficiently establish interstate transmission lines for electric power, which will be needed to fuel the country’s shift to clean energy. Democrats opposed to
Manchin’s proposal, however, seem largely unswayed by this claim, and are more focused on how its provisions could boost fossil fuel projects.
Stability Advantage
 1NC – TURN – NATO Bad
We’ll concede that the aff boosts deterrence to make NATO more effective – that’s
bad.
NATO is unsustainable, U.S. reduces its commitments now to NATO allows for EU-
led defense.
Shifrinson ’21 (Joshua, PhD in political science/international relations from the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute and Assistant Professor with the
Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University and a term member of the Council on Foreign
Relations. Shifrinson’s research focuses on U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy, European and Asian
security, alliance politics, and diplomatic history, “The Dominance Dilemma: The American Approach to
NATO and its Future,” pg online @ https://quincyinst.org/report/the-dominance-dilemma-the-american-
approach-to-nato-and-its-future/ //um-ef)
Although Trump has now left office, NATO is nonetheless in for difficult times , as strategic circumstances change and China’s rise draws American attention toward East Asia. Though
some European NATO members now express interest in helping to counter Beijing, and the alliance itself is working to stake out a position on China’s rise, as the NATO Reflection Group Report underscored in November 2020,

the United States will inevitably be more invested in Asian developments than will other
NATO members The net result presents .16 substantive divides in the alliance two possible avenues for deeper, .

the U S may be impelled to devote fewer resources and attention to

First, if competition with Beijing escalates, nited tates

European affairs This would invert the Cold War experience creating the potential for
. ,

the alliance to wither away as American attention moves elsewhere and NATO’s
European members seek alternatives for their security as . Alliances, after all, usually change as new threats appear;

American priorities change NATO cohesion may decline , as well. Then, too, European actors might also be expected to complain about
prospective American “abandonment.” Mounting Chinese–American competition may also encourage NATO’s European members to distance themselves, perhaps dramatically, from the United States. During the contest with the
Soviet Union, European allies regularly feared that Soviet–American tensions might entangle them in a conflict with Moscow at times and places beyond their control. A U.S.–China contest would carry even greater risks. With less at
stake in Asia, NATO’s European members can be expected to separate themselves from U.S. policy. If the United States were to respond by pressuring its European allies to assist against Beijing, an alliance rupture would become

America’s
possible. President Biden’s path forward Recognizing these limits, what are the options for the United States under the Biden administration? Any policy must start from a recognition that

postwar mission in Europe has reached a natural end-state born of overwhelming success .
Great powers no longer pose threats to dominate the region’s security or deny the independence of most countries therein. China, of course, is making economic and political inroads in the area, but is also encountering increasing
opposition as it overplays its hand and, in any case, does not threaten the survival or sovereignty of European states. Russia, on the other hand, has notable military capabilities that can threaten neighbors along its immediate perimeter,
but it lacks the wherewithal to imperil countries much beyond that. Moreover, its force structure seems designed to raise the costs for any U.S.–led NATO operation near Russia’s own borders, just as Europe’s member states have the

economic and military capacity to oppose any Russian designs. As a result, a stable European balance of power can exist . This is a sea-change from the postwar,
or even post–Cold War periods. NATO’s original purpose has been vindicated; the victory is won. Any policy must start from a recognition that America’s postwar mission in Europe has reached a natural end-state born of

the United States faces diminishing returns , and several negative results ,
overwhelming success. In addition,

from continuing its present approach to NATO . The alliance has now been enlarged to the point where few strategically meaningful European actors exist
outside of NATO’s orbit, even as those that exist, such as Ukraine, would constitute a net loss for U.S. national security by risking a direct conflict with Moscow. In short, little can be gained from continued expansion.

Likewise, as European leaders continue pressing for greater autonomy from the United
States and NATO, the U.S. will generate increased friction with its allies if it continues to
suppress their initiatives in this direction . This tension, meanwhile, comes at a time when Europe itself is of diminishing relative importance to an American grand
strategy increasingly fixed on Asia, as most of the actors involved recognize. As the U.S.–led alliance continues moving toward Russia’s borders, it may play some role in driving Moscow and Beijing to cooperate in international
affairs. In short, U.S. policy in Asia complicates U.S. strategy in Europe, and vice-versa. The United States requires a course correction. U.S. policy toward NATO now injects a large degree of instability and unsustainability into the
region, which ironically possesses the preconditions for an unprecedented degree of stability thanks in part to prior U.S. efforts. In consequence, the Biden administration should consider proceeding along four tracks, with the goal of
significantly reducing the U.S. security presence via NATO. Ending enlargement In coordination with its partners, the United States should credibly renounce further NATO enlargement. Whatever one makes of the merits of
America’s post–1945 presence in Europe, the gains from further enlargement are few and the risks substantial. Several pathways exist to develop a policy of ceasing enlargement. Most directly, the U.S. government could simply
declare it will not support the alliance’s further growth; thanks to NATO’s “one state, one vote” procedures, this would be enough to scuttle a further expansion push. Less unilaterally, U.S. planners could attempt to craft an intra–
NATO consensus that expansion is no longer worth the costs. Given that many alliance members have long been skeptical of the merits of expansion — German policymakers, for example, were famously ambivalent over the
Bucharest Declaration of 2008, which embraced Ukraine’s and Georgia’s interest in NATO membership — forging a broad front on this agenda ought not be difficult. Along the way, U.S. and allied diplomats should also seek to
dampen the membership aspirations of those states still outside the alliance. Cutting troop commitments Second, the U.S. government should forgo permanently stationing combat forces in the Eastern European states admitted to

encourage
NATO since the Cold War. Amid mounting calls to bolster the alliance’s presence along the so-called “eastern flank” due to collapsing relations with Moscow, the U.S. government should

European NATO members to bear primary responsibility for defense obligations east of
the Oder–Neisse line . Not only have NATO’s European members taken an active role in the alliance’s ongoing “Enhanced Forward Presence” in Poland and the Baltic States; there is more than
enough latent military capability in the European portion of the alliance to see this task through.17 For example, the former members of the Warsaw Pact (excluding Albania and the Baltic States) that have joined NATO since 1995
have nearly the same gross domestic product ($1.55 trillion, measured in 2010 dollars) as Russia ($1.76 trillion). Their population, 92 million people versus Russia’s 144 million, is also significant. Add in the other European members

even limited growth in non–U.S.

of NATO, and the numbers shift decisively against Russia. Although non–U.S. military investments in NATO remain underwhelming,

NATO defense capabilities could provide a significant force able to take the lead in thus
Eastern Europe The United States should promote this result , with the goal of shifting
.

the defense burden in Europe to the highly capable states in the area to reduce U.S.
defense obligations. The United States ought to prepare for a broader
Rebalancing trans–Atlantic politics

recalibration of political responsibilities in Europe . Precisely because the United States has other domestic and international obligations, and because

conditions are ripe to empower the European allies

NATO’s European members are increasingly disenchanted with U.S. predominance, . The

to strengthen intra–European solidarity and cooperation while the United States

objective should be

steps back from active management of European security . The United States should pivot toward becoming the pacifier of last resort
rather than the manager of early squabbles.

Ensures Russian War

Julie Wilhelmsen 22, PhD, political science, senior research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of
International Affairs, “Russian Certainty of NATO Hostility: Repercussions in the Arctic,” Arctic Review of
Law and Politics, Vol. 13 pp 114-142
3.1 A dangerous world , with NATO as its source
Official Russian texts stress that European and global stability and security are under threat; there is war in Ukraine and in the Middle East, and
remilitarization and rising tensions in Europe. Several state collapses have paved the way for societal meltdown, terrorism and chaos.
salient is the view of an unstable situation in which order could be replaced by
Particularly

chaos at any time: this description permeates the body of Russian official texts .43
The main source of these intensifying crises seems to be NATO / US A/West. “Like lava from a

volcano , demolishing on its way everything positive, accumulated over the past decade, Western countries are
creating new dividing lines ... the interna- tional security system has been undermined by the actions of the US and its
allies”.44 Accordingly, the world is often said to be in a state of controlled instability – which springs, as explained below, from these entities’
hybrid or false nature as regards their intentions and activities.45 The US “exclusivity” and “arrogant” approach to international law are
“contagious bacteria” fostering terrorism and instability.46
The picture of the dangerous world that NATO is contributing to create is con- structed through juxtaposition to the alternative, safe world
which Russia is held to build and represent: a multipolar world governed through a polycentric system. This ideal world requires
the “formation of a common space for peace , security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”, “the realisation of the principle
of equal and indivisible security” and “the primacy of international law and the UN”.47 In con- trast to NATO, the OSCE is the “cornerstone of
implementing equal and indivisible security”.48 This is a world with a “ balance of interests and compromises” rather
than “force and aggression ”49 where “everyone has the right to express their point of view”50 – in short a “new and more just
world order”.51 In MOD texts this alterna- tive order is said to be “gaining traction”.52 The MFA also notes that, post-Crimea, enmity has
Russia has hopes that
become an anomaly, as the “objective trend” is problem-solving through “collective efforts”.53

“ pragmatism in the interests of inter- national and European security” can penetrate the “ NATO
system”.54 However, in June 2018, the MFA noted an “increasingly clear” “contradiction” between the West seeking to maintain dominance
and “the objectively strengthening multipolarity”.55
Thisoverarching narrative of current world affairs shows how NATO and the wider Western social entity subsumed
under it are cast as the offensive and hostile sources of chao s and conflict – juxtaposed to Russia, fighting to
defend a just and stable world. Let us now turn to NATO’s hostility as detailed in Russian official texts.
3.2 NATO as hostile and deceptive by nature
From Russian representations, we suggest that it is their diagnosis of NATO/USA/ West’s very nature that makes this entity look so hostile. The
Western antagonist is construed as a Janus-faced actor , ostensibly value-oriented but ultimately
driven by “ colonial thinking ”56 and the unceasing desire for geopolitical expansion,57 seeking “to glue
[...] more and more geopolitical space” to itself 58 – motives that are clearly offensive. This representation is achieved through the frequent use
of expressions such as “posing as defenders of democracy and human rights”, “allegedly acciden- tal shelling of civilians”,59 “citing far-fetched
pretexts for allegedly necessary protec- tion”,60 and the repeated use of adjectives such as artificial. For example: “NATO has a policy of
artificially whipping up the situation;”61 the Ukraine situation is “artificially inflated from outside”.62 The Russian leadership advances the
dichot- omy of NATO as saying one thing and doing the opposite: NATO “declarations”, “solemn promises”, “on paper”, “words” repeatedly
contradict “actual fact” and “practice”63 – for instance by proclaiming freedom of choice but in practice forcing countries to choose the West,
and saying “security for all” but in practice building only their own security.64
NATO’s front – including its talk of “fair democracy ” and “ h uman r ights” and unfounded
In Russian discourse,

accusations towards Russia – constitutes a smoke-screen hiding its ulterior motive of geopolitical gains; the US
“rhetoric of moral val- ues” is “only on the surface. Of course, there is a big battle going on”.65 “Real facts are hushed up” and “accusations
made to divert attention”.66 Conflict is created from nothing by “instrumentalizing”67 and “speculating” in universal values.68 To Russia,
Kremlin sees offens ive geopolitics as the primordial
NATO’s values are fake, but its hostility is real. The

driving force at NATO’s core – a posture described as “ genetic ” and a reflex.69 It is NATO’s
“desire” that the course to deter Russia be “irreversible”.70 Moreover, NATO is seen as unpredictable : it may

undertake hostile acts at any time for no reason. Indeed: “people should be prepared for [...] someone in
Washington waking up the next morning in a bad mood and deciding to start a coup d’état in yet another
place”.71 NATO is “archaic”,72 “full of emotions”,73 and “acts without explaining the reasons”.74
Underscoring our point that today’s distrust is (re-) produced inter alia through rhetoric that invokes historical animosity, we find NATO’s
deceptive nature re- constituted through multiple references to broken promises at the end of the Cold War. Many of these construe the
above-mentioned opposition between NATO’s words and practice. In the present situation of renewed conflict, rhetoric lamenting Russia’s
conveys the view that NATO was always guided by hostile intent . Recalling 1990, when
past naïveté

Western leaders allegedly promised that NATO would not move “ an inch ” to the East, Russian
Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov in February 2018 concludes that “the so-called ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ which was reached, was, in
fact, trampled upon by our Western colleagues. Probably, in the future we will try to better understand who is a gentleman, and who is not”.75
Moreover, official statements assert a Cold War “déjà-vu”76 and persistent Cold War thinking and rhetoric in the West.77 These references to
Cold War rivalry make it self-evident that NATO today harbours malign intentions.
The picture emerging from our analysis is that the official Russian NATO dis- course is a conspiracy theory (conceived in a common-sense way):
it holds thatNATO is the vehicle in an anti-Russia plot in which the US A pulls all the strings . In
this conspiracy discourse, NATO as an organization has very limited agency: it is sometimes described as

merely an “ instrument ” that can be “moved” to sow division and build walls.78 Agency lies with the US A; NATO
is the Americans’ “ powerful tool ” for “strong influence in Europe”.79 The US A “decides the bloc
discipline ”, “makes all the decisions in NATO”.80 Russia is targeted: the “thesis” of “Russian aggression” features
prominently in this conspiracy theory. Indeed, “anti-Russian attitudes [...] are born in Washington [...] and then implemented in Europe within
the framework of the notorious ‘transatlantic solidarity’”.81
The pervasive notion of secrecy and hidden agendas bolsters such conspiracy thinking; “But when our Western partners put forward the slogan
‘either with us or against us’, addressing it to our neighbours, including the countries of the former USSR, this is actually a veiled way to turn
someone into an enemy”.82 The sense of coordination exemplified here by MFA spokesperson Maria Zakharova in July 2016 hints at
conspiracy: “like in a good orchestra, many Western countries, practically on a daily basis, accuse Russia of threatening someone”.83 Someone
must be con- ducting the “orchestra” – the USA is implied. As we see it, this logic of conspiracy eradicates any uncertainty as to intent, thus
serving as an important mechanism by which the strategic Other is established as hostile.
In sum, the pattern of representations above projects NATO as inevitably hostile by nature .
This identification is achieved through the mix of predicates, historical analogies and discursive juxtapositions and mergers. It

contributes to constituting NATO as dangerous to Russia in a totalizing way . Given this basic
identification, how then does Russia present NATO’s activities in the world since 2014?

AND China war

Rohrs 22 [Michael Rohrs is a VP of Finance at the International foreign Language at HarperCollins
Publishers, 7-4-2022, What is NATO aiming for? To scare China, expand its military business in the
Asia-Pacific or threaten global peace?, European Sting - Critical News & Insights on European Politics,
Economy, Foreign Affairs, Business & Technology - europeansting,
https://europeansting.com/2022/07/04/what-is-nato-aiming-for-to-scare-china-expand-its-military-
business-in-the-asia-pacific-or-threaten-global-peace/] Eric
Let’s try to connect the dots. Back
in 2020, when the newbie European Commission took office and there was no
war in Ukraine in the first place, the EU shockingly described China “a systemic rival”. Two years later and after
a war of Russia in Ukraine the G7 countries promulgated a $600 billion plan to counter China’s Belt and Road, although they had all more or less
benefited from it. Also, G7 accused China’s stance at the “East and South China Seas”. And a couple of days later, as if it was
nicely planned, which it was, NATO came to officially name China as a challenge for the many years to come. The
dot connection shows that the world had been trying to hurt China’s rise in global power already since 2020 when the freshman Commission
called for the first time in 50 years of productive diplomatic ties the country a systemic rival, despite depending on its trade with the Asian giant
in order to prosper.
Not unexpectedly, NATO’s Cold War declaration to China infuriated the  Chinese side  that is feeling
more and more an unprovoked hostility by the West. Sure, China has its own domestic worries
e.g. Taiwan but did China start the blame game with the West or declared unprovoked a Western
country as challenge ? What is NATO aiming for? To scare China, expand its military business in the Asia-Pacific or
threaten global security and peace?
The most likely eventuality of the above can only be the latter , only that this is the world’s mere biggest
accomplishment since World War II. The fact that NATO doesn’t seem to care for it anymore
and starts a new Cold War with gigantic China is simply beyond comprehension.
Instead of the world trying to chill out, recuperate losses from the war in Ukraine and the financial and health systems’
catastrophe caused by the pandemic and so many other curses, the West goes back to zero sum games in the 21st century that

can blow up global peace in less than a minute . When will NATO and the peer learn from rich
human history, the atrocity of global war conflicts and the sheer vanity of human opportunism? Not quite soon seems to be the answer,
sadly.

China rise is peaceful

Shifrinson, 19 – Joshua, Assistant Professor of International Relations with the Pardee School of
Global Affairs at Boston University; “Should the United States Fear China’s Rise?,” The Washington
Quarterly, http://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2019/01/Winter-2019_Shifrinson_0.pdf
Nevertheless, considered in light of what a true relegation strategy would entail and the steps China might but has not taken, the comparatively
China has not increased the rate of its military
limited nature of Chinese predation becomes clear. For one,

spending over the last decade even as its economy has grown; in fact, Chinese military
expenditures remain below the rates witnessed in both the late Cold War period and in
the early 2000s.39 Likewise, Chinese land reclamation and military deployments in the East
and South China Seas have only involved territories previously claimed by the Chinese
government ; China has not expanded its maritime claims so much as taken a unilateral
approach toward resolving existing disputes.40 It has also done little to strengthen its
nuclear arsenal even though this force remains vulnerable to American disruption.41
Above all, it has made no moves to try to evict the United States from East Asia by either

declaring a sphere of influence in the region42 or undercutting the U.S. alliance

network.43 In fact, facing suggestions by the Trump administration that the United States might retrench, Chinese leaders have
signaled they want the United States to remain active in the area.44 Ultimately, and as other analysts note,
Chinese efforts contain some competitive elements, but these are also notably constrained in their scope
and degree .45 This strategy makes sense. On one level, China’s rise has moved it near the top of the East
Asian pecking order. A quarter century ago, China lagged behind states such as Russia and Japan economically and militarily,
but now its economy outstrips all states involved in the region except for the United States. 46
The military balance tells a similar story: China is far from a military hegemon, but given Japan’s limited
investment in its military, Russia’s focus on Europe (and friendly relationship with China), the still-
nascent emergence of India as a regional player, and the relative weakness of other
countries around China’s periphery, the United States is the principal external security
impediment to China’s continued rise .47 Under these conditions—absent another great power
competitor—China faces incentives to try to shift the distribution of power further against
the United States. By the same measure, however, China’s relative rise from a position of marked
inferiority vis-à-vis the United States means it also faces strong incentives to avoid
provoking the United States too much or too soon.48 Not only might overly aggressive
Chinese activities court a war with the United States that the PRC might well lose, but—even short of war —it
might prompt further U.S. efforts to stymie China’s continued growth. Given these conditions,
Chinese leaders have good reason to embark on a slow and cautious predatory
campaign —a weakening strategy—that tries to shift the distribution of power against the United
States while operating below a threshold that might catalyze a hostile response. In short,
limited predation—not an overt and outright push to overtake and challenge the United States—is the name of China’s
current and highly rational game . As significantly, it appears Chinese leaders are aware of the
structural logic of the situation. Despite ongoing debate over the extent to which China has departed from its long-standing
“hide strength, bide time” strategy first formulated by Deng Xiaoping in favor a more assertive course seeking to increase Chinese influence in
Chinese leaders and China watchers have been at pains to point out that Chinese
world affairs,

strategy still seeks to avoid provoking conflict with the United States .49 As one analyst notes,
China’s decision to carve out a more prominent role for itself in world politics has been
coupled with an effort to reassure and engage the United States so as to avoid
unneeded competition while facilitating stability .50 Chinese leaders echo these themes,
with one senior official noting in 2014 that Chinese policy focused on “properly address[ing] conflicts and differences through dialogue and
Xi Jinping himself has underlined these currents, arguing even
cooperation instead of confrontational approaches.” 51
before taking office that U.S.-Chinese relations should be premised on “ preventing conflict and

confrontation ,” and more recently vowing that “China will promote coordination and cooperation with other major countries.” 52
Ultimately, as one scholar observes, there is “ hardly evidence that [… China has] begun to focus on hegemonic

competition.” 53 Put another way, China’s leaders appear aware of the risks of taking an overly
confrontational stance toward a stillpotent United States and have scoped Chinese
ambitions accordingly.
Russia is status-seeking
Deborah Larson and Alexei Shevchenko 14, “Russia says no: Power, status, and emotions in
foreign policy (j.postcomstud.2014.09.003 Communist and Post-Communist Studies ,Vol.47(3-4), p.269-
279)
Realism would expect Russia to assert its
In this essay we outline a theoretical framework for explaining ostensible shifts and vacillation in Russia's foreign policy.

predominance Liberals would attribute Putin's anti-American

in neighboring areas where it would come into conflict with the United States and China.

stance to his return to authoritarianism and domestic repression A review and the corresponding need for an external enemy.

of Russia's actions since the end of the Cold War, does not lend support to either however,

power or domestic politics as the main source of variation in Russian foreign policy .

Instead, Russia's stance toward the United States has been strongly influenced by the
degree of external validation of its self-image as a great power. Russia is striving for
enhanced global recognition while at the same time retaining its national identity. Russia reacts strongly, at times emotionally, to perceived humiliation and disrespect. We argue that a better understanding of Russia's status

theoretical argument derives from social identity

concerns is essential not only to understand Moscow's volatile behavior but to encourage its cooperation in global governance. Our

theory (SIT) (Hogg and Abrams, 1988, Tajfel, 1978, Tajfel, 1982, Tajfel and Turner, 1979) in social psychology , which argues that social groups strive for a positively distinctive identity and offers hypotheses concerning the
identity management strategies used by groups to enhance their relative position. Extrapolating the identity management techniques predicted by SIT to status-seeking in the international arena, we argue that states may enhance their relative standing by imitating more advanced states
(strategy of social mobility), trying to displace the higher-ranked state (strategy of social competition), or finding a new arena in which to be superior (strategy of social creativity). Emotions accompanying aggrieved status (in particular anger and vengefulness) can explain the intensity of
social competition as well as the breakdown of social creativity efforts. We apply these theoretical insights to Russian status-seeking since the end of the Cold War as a plausibility probe. 1. Explaining Russia's assertiveness What explains Russia's abrupt shifts and prickly sensitivity to

Russia's increased
alleged slights and insults? Available theoretical explanations account neither for the pattern of changes in Russian policy, nor for the tone of grievance frequently adopted by Russian elites.

assertiveness might be viewed as the inception of long-awaited “balancing” against U.S.

predominant power . Russia's opposition to U.S. initiatives in the United Nations (U.N.) could be described as “soft balancing,” that is, coalition-building and diplomatic bargaining within international institutions to constrain the dominant power

genuine balancing strategy for Russia would entail competition with the
(Layne, 2006). On the other hand, a

United States for predominant influence in Eurasia forming an anti-U.S. coalition with while

China Russia has avoided commitments to these states

and other non-Western states, as advocated by Russian Eurasianists, but (Tsygankov, 2008, Tsygankov, 2014).

An even more pessimistic interpretation argues that Moscow is trying to overturn the
post-Cold War order , restore its position as a global superpower, and reassert control over its lost empire in a modern guise (Bugajski, 2009, Lucas, 2014). While Russia's takeover of Crimea and its behavior during the 2014 Ukrainian crisis

Russia's determination to prevent further enlargement of

seem on the surface to validate this “offensive realist” reading of Russian foreign policy,

NATO and its demand for a droit de regard (historically, an intrinsic aspect of great
power status in international politics), should not be confused with imperial
expansionism . Russia's aspiring for greater regional influence may lead to spoiler
behavior, but not full-scale revisionism. Others charge that Russia's assertiveness reflects the “energy superpower” strategy, an effort to use Russia's energy exports as an instrument of power and
prestige (Baev, 2008, Goldman, 2008). It is difficult to see how Russian elites could reasonably expect to carry out such a policy, given Russia's greater dependence on the European energy market (for two-thirds of its foreign exchange revenue) than Europe's on Russian gas (about 25 percent
of their imports) (Trenin, 2007, p. 107). Relative changes in the market price of oil and gas are imperfectly correlated with Russia's overall stance toward the West. Russia's recent chilly relations with the United States coincide with the emergence of U.S. shale gas, which has lowered the
market price of gas (Herszenhorn and Kramer, 2013). Another explanation rooted in the liberal tradition and popular among prominent Russia watchers views anti-Westernism in Moscow's foreign policy as an attempt to distract public attention from the growing centralization of Russia's

Despite his anti-American rhetoric,

domestic politics and shift towards authoritarianism, camouflaged as “sovereign democracy” or discourse about national specificity (Shevtsova, 2007, Shevtsova, 2010).

though, Putin has continued the policy of allowing U.S. military and supplies to transit
through Russian territory and on removing chemical weapons to from Afghanistan and has cooperated important geopolitical problems such as

from Syria and negotiating Iran's nuclear program. the future of A number of scholars have attributed the deterioration of Russian relations with the United States and Europe to
Russia's desire to recover its status as a great power and reaction to perceived humiliations by the United States, going back to the 1990s when Russia's wishes on international security issues were ignored (Stent, 2014, Sakwa, 2011, Simes, 2007, Trenin, 2006, Tsygankov, 2008). Building on
that insight, we attempt to place Russia's status aspirations within a well-developed theoretical framework from social psychology that relates social groups' desire for status to their strategies for achieving a positively distinctive identity – Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Larson and
Shevchenko, 2003, Larson and Shevchenko, 2010; Clunan, 2009). The next section discusses SIT and a typology of strategies by which states can improve their international standing. We also introduce complementary research on emotions evoked by disrespect for status, depending on the
target's attribution of responsibility. In the third section, we apply this framework to the Russian elite's 1990s status frustrations. The fourth section analyzes Putin's social creativity strategy, and the fifth discusses Putin's emotional reaction to the U.S. failure to accept Russia as an equal. The
sixth section reviews why President Obama's efforts to redress some of Russia's status grievances failed, only to provoke more intense anger from Russia and anti-American rhetoric. 2. Identity, status and emotions According to SIT, social groups strive to attain an identity that is both positive
and distinctive (Tajfel and Turner, 1979, Turner, 1975). Similarly, states are concerned with intangible needs for positive self-esteem and recognition as well as power and wealth. A group assesses its relative standing through comparison to a reference group, one that is similar but slightly
superior (Brown and Haeger, 1999). If the group's standing is inferior on important dimensions, it may decide to pursue an identity management strategy. The group may try to emulate a higher status group (social mobility), compete with it for preeminence (social competition), or establish
excellence in a different area (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Applied to international relations, states may enhance their relative standing by imitating more advanced states, trying to outdo the higher-ranked state, or finding a new arena in which to be superior. To be successful, a strategy of social
mobility requires that elite group boundaries be permeable to new members (Ellemers et al., 1990, Tajfel and Turner, 1979). If elite group boundaries are impermeable (Ellemers, 1993) and the status hierarchy is perceived as unstable or illegitimate, groups may turn to social competition
(Turner and Brown, 1978). Social competition aims at besting the higher-status group in its own domain, striving to be better on some comparative dimension (Turner, 1975). Similarly, states engage in social competition when they strive to have the most destructive weapons, acquire more
clients than the other, display advanced weapons in parades, intervene militarily against a weaker power, prevent the other state from achieving particular goals or act as a spoiler to block collective efforts to restore regional stability. If existing status distinctions appear to be legitimately
based, or at least durable, groups may try to establish a new area in which to be superior—social creativity. Groups may reevaluate what is ostensibly a negative trait as positive, as in the “gay pride” movement. Or groups may identify a new area in which they are better than the established
group (Lemaine, 1974). The concept of “Asian values”—stressing that these states are more harmonious, orderly, and communitarian than the individualistic and materialistic West—is an example of this. States may use social creativity to achieve prestige on criteria other than those
conventionally associated with being a great power (military capabilities or economic weight) such as regional leadership, diplomatic influence, economic growth rate, cultural achievements, or norm entrepreneurship. For a social creativity strategy to succeed, the higher-status group must
accept the new value dimension as positive and acknowledge that the lower-status group does indeed stand out on this dimension (Tajfel, 1978, p. 96–97) The higher-status group is more likely to acknowledge the out-group's accomplishments if it believes that its own position is legitimate
and secure (ibid., pp. 89–90). Refusal by the higher-status group to recognize a group's status claims shows disrespect (Wolf, 2011), which is likely to result in an escalation of inter-group competition (Tajfel, 1978: 89–90) and increased hostility from the lower-status group (Brown and Ross,
1982). Having one's self-esteem or dignity reduced is humiliating (Saurette, 2006). Reactions to perceived humiliations and slights are likely to exhibit intense emotions. SIT provides a link between individual-level psychological theories of emotion and collectivities such as states. SIT holds
that when individuals identify with a group, they experience actions toward the group as if aimed at them personally—similar to emotions experienced when a favorite soccer team wins or loses. Members react emotionally to events that thwart or further group goals (Sasley, 2011, Smith,
1993, Smith, 1999). Maintaining or improving group status is a fundamental goal. When a group loses status, the emotions experienced depend on the perceived cause of this loss. When the group perceives that its own actions were responsible for loss of status, it will experience shame and
embarrassment (Kemper, 1978, p. 61). When others are perceived as responsible for loss of status—through humiliation, withholding approval or deference, denial of expected benefits—the group will display anger (Kemper, 1978, p. 128). The emotion of anger or irritation often leads to
offensive action tendencies against the out-group (designed to harm either verbally or physically in retaliation for injuries to dignity and prestige). Belief that the in-group is strong increases the level of emotion and the likelihood of offensive action (Mackie et al., 2000). Anger is elicited by
perception of injustice or illegitimacy. The purpose of an offensive reaction is not merely to deter repeated humiliations in the future, but to restore power and status, to return the situation to a desired state of affairs (Shaver et al., 1987; pp. 1077–1078). A lower-status group may experience
malicious pleasure or Schadenfreude at the misfortunes or failures of a higher-status group, which is perceived to have mistreated it (Leach et al., 2003). Vengefulness is prompted by others' unfair denial of status, and is intended to restore actors to their rightful positions (Barbalet, 1998, p.
136). Unlike anger, which is an acute emotion, vengefulness may endure over an extended period of time, motivating retaliatory action on an occasion far removed from the original provocation (Mackie et al., 2000). The influence of both anger and vengefulness on status-seeking efforts can
be illustrated by Khrushchev's desire to get back at the Americans for years of humiliating over flights of Soviet territory by spy planes. When the Soviets shot down a U-2 spy plane less than two weeks before the 1961 Paris summit, Khrushchev decided not to disclose the Soviet downing of
the plane, wait for the United States government to come up with a false cover story about the missing plane, and then embarrass Washington by revealing it to be false (Taubman, 2003, p. 446, 455, 458). After exposing President Eisenhower's equivocation, Khrushchev demanded a personal
apology, ending the summit before it began (Fursenko and Naftali, 2006, p. 290). A focus on status-seeking, as well as the emotions accompanying failure to win respect, helps to explain some of the shifts in Russian foreign policy, beginning with the abandonment of Russia's immediate

The collapse of the Soviet Union threatened

post-Cold War policy of trying to integrate with the West, as we discuss below. 3. Yeltsin's diplomacy: from social mobility to social competition

both the value and distinctiveness of Russia's identity. Russia suffered profound internal
and external identity crises, exacerbated by the difficulty of adjusting to the rapid decline in its status and loss of its position as a superpower (Hopf, 2002, Trenin, 2002). At the root of difficulties in post-Cold War relations

In the early 1990s, Kozyrev pursued a

between Russia and the West was Russia's self-conception as a great power and the West's refusal to accept that status. Foreign Minister Andrei and other Russian liberals

strategy of social mobility, aspiring to be admitted to higher-status Western clubs such as

GATT, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Group of Seven (G-7), and even the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization The Clinton administration, however, held off (CIS, 1992).

admitting Russia into elite Western clubs until it was a stable, capitalist democracy (Stent, 2005, p. 265). The U.S. decision in early 1994 to enlarge NATO to include former members of the Warsaw Pact indicated that Russia would not be admitted into
“civilization,” just as it appeared to be playing by the rules (Aron, 1998, p. 33). As consolation, Russia was invited into the Partnership for Peace, established in 1994 supposedly as a transition to NATO membership, although it was unlikely that Russia would ever graduate (Trenin, 2011, p.

in
104). Negotiations for Russia's membership were prolonged by insistence that Russia should have a special status, above the other Eastern European states (Light, 1996). Although Russia was a member of the Contact Group on the former Yugoslavia, beginning

August 1995, NATO carried out sustained bombing of Serbian positions in Bosnia over
Russia's fervent and loud opposition Widespread , prompting heated rhetoric from Boris Yeltsin about igniting “the flames of war in Europe” (Lynch, 2001, p. 16).
dissatisfaction with Kozyrev's concessions led to his replacement as foreign minister to the West by

Primakov used “multipolar” diplomacy to restore Russia's

Yevgeny Primakov (Tsygankov, 2006, pp. 83–84; Trenin, 2002, pp. 273–275). From 1996 to 1999,

status by forming diplomatic partnerships to check the United States , a strategy of social competition (Pushkov, 1998, Pushkov, 2000).
Primakov tried to mediate on Iraq and Kosovo to establish Russia's centrality as a key player (Lo, 2002, pp. 89–90, 107–108, 142). In the end, Primakov's balancing strategy did not restrain the United States from enlarging NATO or carrying out military action against Iraq and Yugoslavia

use of NATO to bomb Yugoslavia, bypassing the United Nations Security

(Tsygankov, 2006, p. 106). The

Council was regarded as particularly humiliating

where Russia had a veto, marking the end of the (Baranovsky, 2000, p. 454–455),

strategic partnership between Russia and the West for many Russian elites (Antonenko, 2007). Russian elites were particularly concerned that NATO had abandoned its traditional
defensive strategy, asserting the right to carry out military actions outside its area of responsibility in the name of humanitarian intervention (Torkunov, 2000). The change in Russian foreign policy was symbolized by the “Primakov loop” (Trenin, 2011, p. 105): when he learned of the
Kosovo bombing, Primakov ordered his plane, which was headed toward the United States, to turn around in midair (Goldgeier and McFaul, 2009, p. 253). Russians sought to regain respect and to throw the U.S. off balance by sending 200 Russian peacekeepers to capture the airport of
Pristina before NATO troops arrived, risking a dangerous military clash between U.S. and Russian soldiers (Talbott, 2002, pp. 342–347). At the end of the 1990s, Russian efforts to regain great power status seemed to be doomed to failure, with Moscow viewed as an angry anachronism in
world politics, making empty threats. Although Russia was invited to join the G-7 in 1997, largely to mitigate Yeltsin's humiliation over NATO's enlargement, the organization was still “G-7 plus Russia,” because Russia was only admitted to the political side rather than to the conference of
finance ministers (Talbott, 2002, p. 124, 237). The West declined to accept Russia as a member of the elite clubs of NATO and the EU, although Russians believed that their representatives should be at least co-chairs (Trenin, 2006). In addition to the scope and complexity of economic and
political reforms required for Russia to be accepted, social mobility would have entailed Russia's imitation of the higher-status Western states, a humiliating position for a former superpower. To add insult to injury, Russia's image was further damaged by Yeltsin's numerous health problems
and frequent erratic behavior fueled by too much alcohol during foreign trips and dealings with foreign dignitaries. As Clinton's former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott (2002) reveals, U.S. officials sometimes took advantage of Yeltsin's drinking problem to gain more concessions

By the turn of the millennium, optimistic expectations

from Russia—perhaps a perfect metaphor for the Russian perception of its relations with the U.S. during the 1990s.

that Russia would become a partner with the West were replaced with disillusionment and the

Russia was treated as a

belief that Russia's interests had been ignored. Contrary to Yeltsin's and others' assumption that Russia would assume the status of a coequal superpower with the United States, by the United States

defeated state and “junior partner” In (Pushkov, 2007, Simes, 2007). The gap between Russia's self-image as a great power and its reception by the West evoked anger and frustration among Russian elites.

this case, however, Russia did not pursue social competition, but sought to achieve
prestige in a different area than geopolitical might. 4. Putin's social creativity Widespread realization of the futility of social competition encouraged the formation of a new foreign policy strategy, one based on a more accurate and
realistic assessment of the post-Cold War status hierarchy. Efforts at competing with the United States had been humiliatingly fruitless, only accentuating Moscow's inferiority to Washington. Russia's possession of Soviet status markers such as nuclear weapons and a permanent seat in the
U.N. Security Council were increasingly irrelevant in a unipolar world where the United States was able to act unilaterally. Primakov's diplomatic balancing and partnerships with other major powers merely registered Russia's current low standing while failing to generate new sources of
Russian prestige and legitimation in the post-Cold War system. In addition to its weak economy and declining military, in contrast to the Cold War, Russia lacked a militant anti-Western ideology that might have attracted followers. In an era of peace between the leading international powers,
geopolitical competition (the most visible manifestation of social competition in the past) remained largely subdued (Jervis, 2002). After recovering from the shock of unipolarity and having restored a modicum of economic and political stability in the early 2000s, Russian leaders themselves

Yeltsin's successor Putin decided to seek status

realized that they did not wish to change the international system but to achieve a higher status position within it. Accordingly, , Vladimir

by identifying new areas where Russia could assume a prominent role —a strategy of social creativity. Not surprisingly in light of

Putin's principal foreign policy goal

Russia's stunning decline in the 1990s, was to restore Russia's great upon his election at the end of 1999

power status Putin seized the opportunity provided by September 11,

(Hanson, 2004, Lo, 2003, Mankoff, 2009, pp. 23–24). the

2001, terrorist attacks against the United States to reframe Russia's identity as partner a with the

and to align with the United States

West in the war on terror Bush and Putin declared their (Lo, 2003, pp. 124–125, 128–129). President George W.

relationship a “strategic partnership.” Russia shared with the United States valuable
political and military intelligence allowed U.S. planes to fly over Russian about international terrorists,

territory, acquiesced to U.S. military bases in Central Asia, participated in international

search and rescue missions, and gave increased assistance to an anti-Taliban force in
Afghanistan Before the 2001 U.S.–Russia summit, Putin privately
, the Northern Alliance (Aron, 2002). November

compared his relationship with Bush to that between Franklin Roosevelt and Winston
Churchill This attempt at becoming a partner required
during World War II (Baker and Glasser, 2005, p. 135). with the United States, however,

validation by the United States. 5. Aggrieved status, emotions, and a crisis for social creativity For social creativity to be successful, the dominant power must accept the aspiring state's efforts to attain recognition in a

The Bush administration, however, did not regard Russia as an equal partner
new area. (Hanson, 2004, p. 173;

as became apparent with failure to consult before invading Iraq, a former

Shevtsova, 2007, p. 230), Bush's with Putin

Soviet client Instead of showing respect the

where Russia had substantial financial stakes (Balmforth, 2003). for Russia's status as a regional power, with a droit de regard in the post-Soviet space,

Bush administration supported “color” revolutions in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005), regime changes that were perceived as humiliating interference in
Russia's backyard. The Ukrainian “Orange Revolution,” in particular, was a shock and personal slap on the face for Putin, who had staked his personal reputation on victory for the pro-Russian candidate, only to see the election results overturned as fraudulent by the Ukrainian opposition and

the West (Shevtsova, 2007, p. 230, 237–238, 240; Lo, 2008, p. 94; Mankoff, 2009, p. 117, 119, 123; Judah, 2013, pp. 84–86). Putin complained about the lack of respect
showed to Russia , as in December 2004 when he compared the United States to a “strict uncle in a pith helmet instructing others how to live their lives,” and in 2006 when he referred to the United States as wolf “who knows who to eat and is not about

). In his emotional and bellicose February 2007 Munich address, Putin

to listen to anyone” (Shevtsova, 2007, p. 233

accused the United States of having “overstepped its national borders in every way,” as evidenced by

even obliquely compared U.S. policies to

the “economic, political, cultural, and educational policies it imposes on other nations” (Putin, 2007). At a Victory Day celebration in May 2007, Putin

those of the Third Reich (Kramer, 2007a, Kramer, 2007b). As the literature on status, power, and emotions would predict, emotions of anger and vengefulness associated with not receiving due recognition led to offensive reactions, which
were amplified by perceptions of the increased strength of the lower-status party. Russian elites were more confident in making claims to great power status given the increase in the price of oil from $27 a barrel in 2000 to $130 a barrel by mid-2008 (Stent, 2008, p. 1092). As the minister of
defense Sergei Ivanov wrote in 2006, “Russia has now completely recovered the status of great power that bears global responsibility for the situation on the planet and the future of human civilization” (Tsygankov, 2008, p. 49). Russia reacted harshly to U.S. plans to deploy elements of its
missile defense system, ostensibly directed at Iran, on Polish and Czech territory in 2007—including threatening to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty—in part because the missile interceptors could be the basis for a larger system undermining Russia's nuclear

Russians felt that the

deterrent (RFE/RL Newsline, 2007) but primarily because Russia had once again been excluded from a major European security decision, contrary to the prerogatives of a great power (Economist, 2007b, p. 70). The

United States had violated its commitment not to deploy significant conventional military
forces on the territories of states recently added to NATO , part of the 1997 Russia-NATO Founding Act. The choice of the Czech Republic and Poland as the site

Nevertheless, Putin offered to allow

of the initial deployment heightened Russian ire over NATO's enlargement (Pikayev, 2009, Slocombe, 2008). at the June 2007 G8 summit in Heiligendamm, Germany,

the United States to use the radar at Azerbaijan as part of a joint missile defense system , adding

The United States rejected Putin's offer of cooperation

a newly built radar to the offer at a follow-up summit with Bush in Kennebunkport, Maine (Economist, 2007a). on

A month later, Putin suspended Russian cooperation with the

the grounds that the radars were not technically suitable.

Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (Kramer and Shanker, 2007) and in August, he resumed regular strategic bomber patrols over the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans (Kramer, 2007a, Kramer, 2007b).

Russia's desire to assert its comeback was encapsulated in the Russia–Georgia on the international stage

War Georgian President Saakashvili launched an artillery attack followed

(Sherr, 2009, pp. 204–207). On August 7, Mikhail

by ground invasion of the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali, killing several Russian
peacekeepers. Saakashvili had hoped to seize South Ossetia as a fait accompli, before
Russia had time to react. Russian troops subsequently occupied important towns of
Georgia to teach the Georgians a lesson Putin felt
, apart from South Ossetia, and the Russian Air Force destroyed much of Georgia's military infrastructure (Trenin, 2011, p. 30).

that Russia's status as a great power was threatened. Putin intervened in Georgia primarily to reassert Russia's predominant interest in the area, which was endangered by the
possibility of imminent membership for Georgia and Ukraine in NATO. Saakashvili's foreign policy priorities were for Georgia to join Western security and economic structures and to reassert control over the breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Viewing Saakashvili as a
model democratic reformer (even after his November 2007 crackdown on the political opposition), the Bush administration encouraged his efforts to restore Georgian territorial integrity instead of acting as an honest broker in resolving the “frozen conflict” (Cooley and Mitchell, 2009). In
April 2008, the NATO Summit at Bucharest promised Ukraine and Georgia eventual membership in NATO (not a membership action plan), although Putin had joined the summit for the first time to express his objections in person, informing Bush that this was a “red line” for Russia
(Cooper et al., 2008, Asmus, 2010, pp. 134–135). The NATO-Bucharest decision, a compromise between the French-German and U.S. positions, achieved the worst of both worlds, angering the Russians without satisfying the Ukrainians or Georgians (Trenin, 2011, p. 28). In addition to

anger, vengefulness was an important factor in Russia's response to Georgia 's attempt to take over the disputed provinces. In February
2008, the West had recognized Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence without UN approval, an action that Putin had strongly opposed. Russian diplomats had drawn comparisons between Kosovo and the Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. If Kosovo could be
independent, why not the breakaway provinces of Georgia (Antonenko, 2007)? Georgian President Saakashvili was also aware of the parallels, cautioning EU leaders and U.S. officials that Russia was likely to retaliate against Georgia if Kosovo were allowed to secede from Serbia without
Russian approval, but Western diplomats assured him that Russia was bluffing (Asmus, 2010, p. 100). Shortly after the Georgian war, Russia recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, although none of the other states in the Commonwealth of Independent States followed

Russia's emotional response

suit, including even Belarus. was costly. Although Russia easily won the to Georgian defiance

war, foreign capital flight damaged the Russian economy , as the benchmark Russian Trading System index fell by nearly fifty percent (Kramer, 2008a, Kramer,
2008b). From the Georgian war onward, Russia would no longer tolerate further expansion of NATO or expansion of U.S. influence into states of the former Soviet Union. Russian President Medvedev (2008) affirmed Russia's “privileged interests” in the post-Soviet space. As noted by

The Obama administration's

Lukyanov (2012), for Russia the war “was something approaching psychological revenge after a 20-year geopolitical retreat, proof that Moscow can say no.” 6. Anger mismanagement

policy to “reset” relations with Russia, inaugurated in February 2009, was based in part on redressing injured Russian
prestige and national pride. The term “reset” implied that the Obama administration was jettisoning aspects of President Bush's foreign policy that were most objectionable to Russia, such as wooing countries in the post-Soviet space or placing missiles and radars in former

For Russian leaders the major appeal of the “reset” policy

members of the Warsaw Pact, while cooperating with Russia on issues of common interest.

was the promise of a more equal relationship with Washington. Since its possession of a sizable nuclear arsenal is one of the few remaining
areas where Russia and the U.S. are equals, the Russian side was pleased that Obama initiated negotiations for a new START agreement, signed in spring 2010 and promptly ratified by the U.S. Senate and Russian Duma (Goldgeier, 2009, p. 23). START negotiations emerged as an important
vehicle for restoring Russia's status as at least a “quasi-superpower” (Economist, 2009, p. 23). Russian leaders reciprocated by agreeing to open up an air corridor, allowing up to 4500 flights per year of U.S. troops and equipment to Afghanistan. By spring 2011 twenty percent of American
cargo and fifty percent of U.S. troops transited through Russia (Economist, 2011). The Obama administration refrained from directly criticizing Russian treatment of dissidents or human rights (Baker, 2009a). The Russian leadership was also relieved by Obama's September 2009 decision to
put on the back burner another humiliating issue—deployment of the U.S. missile defense systems in Eastern Europe–in favor of a four-phased system in which the first phase would consist of smaller missile interceptors based on ships and aimed at Iranian missiles (Baker, 2009b). During

Russian foreign
her July 2010 tour of the former Soviet states, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton emphasized that the United States would maintain good relations with Russia as well as with Georgia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan (Economist, 2010b).

policy moved in a more constructive and pragmatic direction , as reflected in

improvement of relations with Poland and the Baltics, settlement of the marine
previously tense

border with Norway, greater reliance on soft power in its relationship with post- instruments

Yushchenko Ukraine, and presentation, as Medvedev termed it, of “a smiling face to the
world” (Interfax, 2010). In addition to appreciation of the status accommodation aspects of the “reset,” Moscow's cooperation was motivated by recognition of the dangers of dependence on natural resource exports and the need to diversify, a realization that was brought home

Cooperation between Russia and the United

by the 2008–2009 financial crisis, and a goal that would require cooperation with the West to obtain foreign investment and technology.

States reached its height in spring 2010, when Obama and Medvedev signed the New
START Treaty U.S., French, and British troops were invited to
in Prague (Baker and Bilefsky, 2010); for the first time

participate in Moscow's Victory Day parade annual May 9 to commemorate victory over Nazi Germany in World War II (Economist, 2010a; Barry, 2010); and Russia reached agreement with

Despite these
other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council on the most severe sanctions yet against Iran's nuclear program. Moscow later canceled the sale of advanced S-300 ground-to-air missiles to Iran (Sanger and Kramer, 2010).

promising beginnings, in 2011–2012 the reset entered a period of diminishing returns , largely

because the policy was focused on agreements on particular issues, without connection obtaining

to a larger vision for the relationship. As observed by Thomas Graham (2011), a former senior director for Russia in the Bush White House, the problem with the “reset” was that it never had a coherent

Aiming to assuage
answer for “what the two countries should aspire to now so as to foreclose a return to dangerous geopoliticl rivalry and hold open the promise of mutually advantageous strategic partnership,” (Russia Profile Experts, 2011).

some of the symptoms of Russia's anger and frustration, the reset ultimately failed to
address the root cause s of Moscow's grievances over its loss of status. As a recent study of U.S.–Russian relations notes, “a central
 In June 2011, the NATO-Russia
Russian objective has been to regain its status as a great power and be treated as an equal by the United States—a goal that was constantly frustrated” (Stent, 2014, p. xi).

Council rejected Moscow's idea of a joint anti-missile system

, created in 2002 for joint projects and cooperation, in favor of two separate systems linked by

To add to the humiliation, the U.S. and its NATO allies turned down Russia's
information exchange.

demands for legally binding guarantees and technical limitations to ensure that future European ABM systems would not be directed against Russia (Ivanov, 2011). In a replay of the 2007 dispute, Russia
reacted angrily to Obama's decision to proceed with a European missile defense system that would entail putting missile interceptors in Romania and Poland, including warning of a possible preemptive strike against missile defense sites (Clover and Dyer, 2012). In his May 9, 2012 speech
commemorating the anniversary of victory over Nazi Germany, President Putin, elected in March, declared that Russia had “a great moral right” to the respect of other nations, because of its role in defeating Nazi Germany. He informed President Obama that he would not be attending the G-
8 summit meeting that the U.S. president had moved to Camp David—so that Putin would not feel excluded from the subsequent NATO summit in Chicago—because he was needed in Moscow to help select the new cabinet (the responsibility of Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev) (Cooper
and Barry, 2012). This was a snub, perhaps in retaliation for Obama's failure to attend the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Vladivostok. Humiliated and angered by the 2011–2012 domestic protests accompanying Putin's return to presidency, Putin's team once again invoked
the threat of Washington-sponsored “color revolutions,” at one point directly blaming the U.S. Department of State and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton for sponsoring the opposition movement (Anishchuk and Gutterman, 2013; Trenin, 2013a). Even the triumph of Russia's 2012

Russian political circles were predictably enraged by the

admission into the WTO, after two decades of negotiations, was marred by Russian status grievances.

decision of the U.S. Congress to replace the obsolete Cold War-era Jackson–Vanik
amendment with the December Magnistky Rule of Law
(which conditioned trade relations with the USSR on freedom of Jewish emigration) 2012 Sergey

Accountability Act viewing it as intolerable

(which denied visas to Russian officials implicated in “gross human rights violations” and froze their U.S. assets),

interference in their domestic affairs (Herszenhorn, 2012).1 According to Alexei Pushkov, chair of the Russian Duma's international affairs committee, the Magnitsky Act reflected American “pure double

Russia responded tit for tat

standards.” Russia was castigated for its human rights practices while authoritarian partners of the U.S., including China, continued to get a pass from Washington (Weir, 2013). , first with a bill targeting
political nongovernmental organizations receiving financial support from the United States and prohibiting U.S. adoptions of Russian orphans. The latter provision was ostensibly designed to protect Russian children from abuse by American parents, but attracted much opposition within
Russia, including from some members of Putin's cabinet (Economist, 2013). A day after the United States released the name of Russian officials subject to sanctions Russia provided its own list of eighteen current and former U.S. officials who would be barred from entering Russia. A
spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry, Alexander Lukashevich, commented that the United States must realize that it cannot conduct its relationship with Moscow “in the spirit of mentoring and undisguised diktat” (Barry, 2013). Putin's resentment over the West's use of Russia's
March 2011 abstention, rather than a veto, of a UN SC resolution 1973, allowing the NATO air campaign against Gaddafi's troops in Libya, to promote “regime change” in that country contributed to Russia's falling out with the West over the civil war in Syria, which broke out in 2012
(Economist, 2012). Tellingly, Putin initially signaled his willingness to cooperate with the U.S. in stopping the war and leading the post-conflict peace process, but insisted that this should be a cooperation of equals, a condition which Washington, despite the reset rhetoric, refused to accept
(Trenin, 2013b). By saying “no” to Western intervention in Syria and by supporting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in his military campaign against rebels Putin aimed at restoring Russia's status as an “indispensable power” in global politics and earning the respect of China and other
rising powers (Baev, 2013). Russian status concerns and related emotions were prominently on display in the summer 2013 Russo-American spat over the fate of Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency contractor, who fled the United States to Hong Kong and later to Moscow
after exposing the U.S. government's wide-ranging communications surveillance programs. While attempting to avoid damaging relations with Washington (Putin publicly demanded that Snowden stop leaking information damaging to the U.S. national security as a pre-condition of his stay
in Russia), the Russian side ultimately could not afford to succumb to American pressure to extradite Snowden due to considerations of prestige. The decision to grant Snowden temporary political asylum in Russia was influenced by “Russian irritation at the U.S. presumption that the
American justice system's demands must be honored but that Washington is free to criticize and impugn the activities of Russian courts and law enforcement” (Gvosdev, 2013). The Russian response was also in part driven by vengefulness. Putin could not resist the temptation to embarrass
the U.S. by exposing the hypocrisy of American democratic rhetoric and by positioning Russia as a genuine protector of civil liberties. As Putin declared, tongue-in-cheek to the laughter and applause of his audience in May 2014, “Russia is not a country that extradites fighters for human
rights” (Kremlin.ru, 2014). In the end, Russian (and American) status concerns wound up contributing to a new low point in the relationship, leading to the U.S. decision to cancel the Obama–Putin meeting originally planned at the sidelines of the September 2013 G-20 summit in St.
Petersburg, the first time an American president had called off a bilateral summit in decades (Baker and Meyers, 2013). An opportunity for cooperation with the United States, however, unexpectedly presented itself when it became clear in September 2013 that the Obama administration
faced the likelihood of failing to secure congressional authorization for punitive military strikes against Syria. Russian diplomats seized the moment by promoting a plan to place Syria's chemical weapons under international control, thus helping the U.S. to save face by embracing a
diplomatic solution to the crisis and at the same time enhancing Russia's prestige as a world power broker (Baker and Gordon, 2013). This episode of social creativity, however, could not prolong the life of the “reset” relationship. In addition to halting further expansion of NATO, since the
2008 war with Georgia Russia has resisted the extension of the European Union's economic domain to the former Soviet sphere. Moscow's distrust of the European Union was further provoked by the European Union's Eastern Partnership Program, which was presented as a “civilizational
choice” for post-Soviet states—a characterization likely to be regarded as an insult by Moscow. At the same time, Putin, who had previously included Russia within the European cultural sphere, started positioning Russia as a unique civilization, a genuine repository of traditional Christian
values in contrast to the moral decadence of contemporary Europe (Merry, 2014, Aron, 2014). Moscow applied pressure on Moldova, Armenia, and Ukraine not to sign association and free trade agreements with the EU (which could disrupt those countries' economic ties with Russia) in favor
of joining a Russia-led customs union, the first step in Putin's ambitious project for a Eurasian Union, an economic and civilizational project separate from the West (Herszenhorn, 2013). As the Russian political class was basking in the triumph of the successful 2014 winter Olympics games

When
in Sochi—the most expensive Olympic Games in history, designed to celebrate Russia's resurgence as a great power and Putin's personal vanity project (Herzenhorn, 2014)—the biggest crisis in Russia's relationship with the West since the end of the Cold War struck.

the Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich, who had earlier declined to sign the EU
partnership agreement under Russian pressure, was toppled by the street protest
movement Putin immediately perceived his ouster as yet another “orange
and fled in the evening of February 21, 2014,

revolution.” He treated it not only as a geopolitical threat (since it raised the possibility of Kiev's reneging on the 2010 agreement that allowed Russia to station

but also as a personal humiliation, which this time, a full decade after the first
its fleet in Crimea until 2042),

one, he was determined not to tolerate. While Russia had contingency plans for undoubtedly

sudden instability Putin's subsequent behavior can better be explained as

in Ukraine, as some Western analysts pointed out,

“fundamentally driven by psychological impulses and highly emotional responses ” to the crisis

The presence in the provisional Ukrainian government of

(Mendelson and Harvey, 2014), an “angry and ad hoc” reaction to the situation in Kiev (Sakwa, 2014).

several ultra-nationalists and

(a few of whom had publicly praised Nazism and embraced the legacy of Stepan Bandera, the Ukrainian World War II nationalist leader who fought with the Nazis against the Soviet army)

their immediate call for rescinding the status of Russian as a second language , later vetoed by the interim president,

gave Putin the ground to denounce the new provisional regime as

along with other anti-Russian measures,

illegitimate Within a week, Russian special operations forces and troops

, extremist, Russophobic, and pro-fascist (Kramer, 2014).

secured control over strategic locations across the peninsula , while the Crimean parliament, partially disbanded and partially voting in the presence of the
masked gunmen who were under control of Sergei Aksyonov, alias “Goblin,” known for his connections with the mafia, declared independence from Ukraine and scheduled a referendum on joining Russia (Reuters, 2014). Moscow first manipulated and then was quick to recognize the
fraudulent results of the referendum. On March 18, 2014, Putin and Crimean leaders signed a treaty of accession making Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (the location of the Russian Black Sea Fleet) parts of the Russian Federation (Meyers and Barry, 2014). Putin's address to the country's
political elite before signing the accession treaty was emotional and defiant in the face of the threat of Western economic sanctions and Russia's expulsion from the G-8. Putin emphasized that after the Soviet collapse, the Russian people became “one of the biggest—if not the biggest—
divided nation in the world” and pledged to protect the rights of compatriots abroad. He appealed to Russian history, pride, and glory, but also to shame over losing the former superpower status by calling the loss of Crimea after the collapse of the Soviet Union an “outrageous historical
injustice” which Russia had to accept because it was simply too weak to protect its interests. He scorned the West for accusing Russia of violating international law and invoked the right of nations to self-determination to justify Russia's actions in Crimea. If Ukraine could secede from the
USSR and Kosovo Albanians were permitted by the West to separate from Serbia, then citizens of Crimea had the right to join with Russia. The Russian president also revisited several themes of his 2007 Munich speech, lamenting the loss of stability in international politics after the end of
bipolarity and accusing the United States of attempting to rule by force. He recited the list of state grievances over not being treated as an equal partner, ranging from the enlargement of NATO and the 1999 bombings of Belgrade to the threat of sanctions over Crimea and continuing
restrictions on Russian import of technologies and exports. In short, in his view, Western behavior constituted a return to the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth century policies of containment, which Russia could no longer tolerate. By recognizing the interim Ukraine government, which
quickly emerged after the departure of Yanukovich, the United States and the EU had crossed a “red line.” “Russia found itself in a position it could not retreat from. If you compress the spring all the way to its limit, it will snap back hard.” Like other countries Russia had its “own national

After taking over Crimea, Russia engaged in spoiler behavior

interests that need to be taken into account and respected” (Putin, 2014).

designed to humiliate and destabilize Ukraine by providing military, economic, and political support to the pro-Russian separatists in the Ukraine's south-east, the majority of whom were
Russian citizens, led by two former FSB (Federal'naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti, the successor to the KGB) officers, Alexander Borodai and Igor Girkin (with the nickname Strelkov), who later resigned (Buckley, 2014). Russia's overarching goal was probably to force the Ukrainian authorities
to accept federalization of the country, which would have weakened Kiev's control over the southeast and eliminated the very possibility of future Ukrainian membership in NATO (Fenenko, 2014). Moscow remained defiant when faced with the threat of Western economic sanctions,
Russia's de-facto expulsion from the G-8, and international outrage over the July 17, 2014 destruction of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 with 298 passengers on board over eastern Ukraine—a tragedy attributed to the pro-Russian separatists' inability to distinguish between a military target and

With the remnants of Russia's social

a civilian passenger jet, but also potentially implicating Russia, which was suspected of delivering powerful anti-aircraft missiles to the rebels (MacFarquhar, 2014).

creativity supplanted by what one journalist dubbed “the ideology of ressentiment” over
the loss of “imperial greatness” U.S.–Russian relations increasingly appeared to be (Remnick, 2014, p. 61),

an escalating rivalry , analogous to the nineteenth century Great Game between Russia and Britain for influence over Central and South Asia—except for the asymmetric character of the twenty-first century version—with the U.S. and Russia
competing for influence over such states as Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia (Trenin, 2014). According to historian Geyer (1987, p. 205), the Great Game for Russia was motivated by considerations of prestige and the desire to at least appear to be a great power. Karaganov (2014), an
influential Russian foreign policy expert, suggested a more troubling historical analogy to a Western-imposed “velvet-gloved version of the Versailles policy” which “by pushing Russia into the periphery of global politics” had unleashed “a kind of Weimar syndrome in Russia, a great nation
whose dignity and interests were trampled underfoot.” 7. Conclusion Although the danger of military conflict among major powers has dramatically receded in the post-Cold War era, states continue to compete for status and prestige. The desire for status is particularly acute for Russia, which

The Russian takeover

suffered a catastrophic decline in its position in the 1990s and has viewed itself as a great power for centuries. Consistent with psychological research and theory, Russia responded emotionally to perceived humiliation.

of Crimea and the 2014 Ukrainian crisis illustrate the risk that continued Russian
bitterness over its loss of great power status could lead to a return of geopolitical
competition. As Deng (2008, p. 292) observes in his study of Chinese status concerns, “withholding due status recognition based on zero-sum power politics logic and negative stereotype-driven categorization is a recipe for a traditional great-power struggle.”

Perceived humiliation and status dissonance better account for twists and turns in
Russia's relationship with the West than more conventional power or interest-based
explanations. Russia was obstructionist and vocal in opposing U.S. policies in the late nineties, when Russia's economy was on the verge of collapse. Since late 2011, Russia has been assertive and anti-Western, despite lower energy prices and lessened

Contrary to the idea that Russia's policy reflects cold calculation of consistent
European dependence on Russian gas.

national interests, Putin's emotional rhetoric and defiant reaction to Western criticism
discourages needed foreign investment in Russia's economy. Periods of U.S.–Russian
cooperation have coincided with efforts by U.S. policymakers to show respect for Russia
as an equal partner, as in the initial phase of the reset policy. At the same time, Russian
elites are hypersensitive, and may overreact to perceived insults that were not intended as such. Domestic politics within the United States is a
complicating factor, as the Obama administration was unable to prevent passage by Congress of the Magnitsky Act. The literature on identity, status and emotions suggests that isolation and exclusion of emerging great powers will evoke anger, vengefulness, and competition to supplant the

Continued indifference to Russia's great power aspirations, especially in the former

dominant powers.

Soviet space, will encourage Russian elites' sense of injury and humiliation leading to , possibly

further conflict.
EU solves various conflict areas
Seán O Regan 16, Master’s Degree in Commerce and Government from the University College Cork,
Postgraduate Diploma in Conflict and Dispute Resolution from Trinity College, Dublin, Higher Diploma in
Accounting, Business, Accounting, Tax, and Law from Dublin City University, “Conflict Resolution
Revisited: Peaceful Resolution, Mediation and Responsibility to Protect”, All Azimuth: A Journal of
Foreign Policy and Peace, Volume 5, Issue 1, January, p. 70-73
Thus, there is a well-rehearsed commitment to the principle of peace and by implication
the peaceful resolution of disputes. The bipolar world order established after the Second World War made a mockery of
this commitment. The term conflict prevention in this era meant containing the potential for nuclear war

between the major blocs . The ideological struggle between those blocs was carried into conflict all
over the globe , notably in East Asia (Korea and Vietnam), Africa (the Congo and Angola) and Latin
America (Chile and Nicaragua). The international community’s response was generally to insert peacekeeping
forces between parties in conflict without necessarily dealing with the root causes of the conflict. Many such conflicts
ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but long-suppressed animosities between the constituent republics of
that Union and its client states erupted . The international community’s failure to deal with the ethnic/sectarian
conflicts in the Caucasus and South Eastern Europe on the one hand and the Rwanda genocide on the other
impelled discussion of conflict prevention from academia to foreign policy formation. While the UN and the OSCE had
long-standing commitments to conflict prevention, exercise of all possible options was in practice limited by international politics. When it
became clear that, as Smith12 put it, the balance of terror of the Cold War would not be replaced by peace and security, the issue of conflict
prevention became prominent for the international community.
3. Current Conflict Resolution Practice
Van Waalraven13 explored the conflict policies of a sample of Western countries (Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom) and found that general conflict policy, as against specific conflict intervention, was embedded in other, mainly development
assistance, policies. He found it difficult to identify generic approaches to conflict prevention, although all countries examined used similar
language in their descriptions of conflict and its causes, even if there was only vague consensus on what those causes are.
the E uropean U nion, at its June 2001 meeting in Gothenburg,14 endorsed a programme of conflict
The Council of

prevention,15 stating this would “improve the Union’s capacity to undertake coherent early
warning, analysis and action [to prevent conflict]” and that “[c] onflict prevention is one of the
main objectives of the Union’s external relations and should be integrated in all its relevant aspects.” This
document and the European Security Strategy16 provided the foundation for the elaboration of a whole

series of policies, including the promotion of mediation in conflict prevention and resolution. It was followed in 2009 by
the “Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities,”17 which uses the term mediation to encompass improved
communication, negotiation, dialogue and facilitation through the offices of a third party, namely the EU. In this document mediation can be
directive and coercive. It
also notes the EU’s financial power and moral authority as positive factors
in a mediation process.
 1NC – A2: Russia – Baltics
[a] ZERO card that says using hypersonics escalates into nukes – means the
scenario starts at zero.
[b] No Baltics Invasion
Bremmer 21 [Ian Bremmer is President and Founder of GZERO Media. He hosts the weekly digital
and broadcast show, 03-19-2021, Putin's next move won't be a Baltic invasion that could unify NATO,
GZERO Media, https://www.gzeromedia.com/the-red-pen/putins-next-move-wont-be-a-baltic-invasion-
that-could-unify-nato] Eric
Could Putin launch another invasion
And the title asks a provocative question, " ?" Aron links the current political
moment in Russia, big protests, struggling economy, and Putin's own thirst for power and popularity, with the factors that led to Russia's
incursion into Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014. He lays out the possibility that Russia could make military
moves yet again, potentially against Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania, the three Baltic states that all happen to be members of both the
European Union and NATO.
Some context: This has been quite a week for US/Russia relations. President Biden in an interview with ABC News agreed with an assertion that
Vladimir Putin is a "killer," I think he called him "soulless," too. And Russia responded by recalling their ambassador to the United States. All
this comes as the American intelligence community released a report this week claiming that Russia had launched yet another campaign in the
2020 election to undermine Biden.
So a logical question would be: What is Putin's next move? Could he wage yet another military campaign?
Now, as with many of the pieces that we look at, some points Aron makes are right on the money. Yes, Putin did gain a lot of popularity after the
operation in Crimea, especially. And yes, NATO faces real issues; Turkey is barely an ally these days, countries are slow rolling in terms of
spending cash that they're promised, the French are talking about strategic autonomy, and yes, Putin always seems to have a surprise or two up
his sleeve. But we are completely not convinced by the argument that an invasion of the Balts may be on its way.
So let's take out the Red Pen.
First, Aron writes that Putin's interventions, especially in Ukraine "worked," driving a "Crimean consensus" that victory in war overshadows
troubles at home.
Sure, the Crimea intervention "worked" for Putin. Until it didn't. Putin has had to downplay military involvement in Ukraine of late to avoid a
backlash from a Russian public that cares primarily about domestic issues still, like pensions, for example. And let's not forget that getting
involved in Libya, in Syria, even in Nagorno-Karabakh didn't yield any real popularity bump of note for Putin.
Next, Aron writes that "we tend to repeat what worked." That is, Putin reached for the military lever before when he faced trouble, so he might do
so again.
Well, Putin's decision making doesn't occur in a vacuum. Every past intervention was driven by national interest and foreign policy goals. Does
Putin care about Putin? Of course. But Putin can't be sure that cooking up a foreign war would help matters it home. In fact, it might actually
make them worse.
Finally, Aron says that Putin may consider a "fast and victorious poke at NATO's eastern flank," targeting the Baltic states and breaking NATO.
An attack on the Baltics may be fast or it may be victorious, but probably not both . And Putin
knows this . Western leaders are conflicted about the alliance, but an assault on full-
fledged NATO State and EU members is exactly the kind of provocation that could
awaken it . Putin understands this. He hardly wants to bring the alliance together as it's eroding.
Low-cost efforts to steadily undermine legitimacy and grabbing targets of opportunity when
available , that is much more Putin's speed.

[c] Russia is losing in Ukraine now – decreases adventurism.

Bergman 5/22- director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in
Washington, D.C.,(Max Bergmann, “Russia’s Coming Great Power Struggle,” CSIS, May 12, 2022,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-coming-great-power-struggle)//mcu
On Monday, all eyes were on Red Square for the annual May 9 victory day celebration to see what Vladimir Putin would do. The answer was not
much. Instead of mobilizing the country for total war against Ukraine or declaring some sort of Potemkin victory, Putin stayed the course. This is
not because the current trajectory of Russia’s operation in Ukraine is working as planned. What has become apparent in the war in
Ukraine, especially since Russia gave up its offensive against Kyiv, is that there is a gap between Russia’s grandiose
geopolitical objectives and its capacity to deliver. In the case of Ukraine, escalating the conflict might turn the war in Putin’s
favor, but mass mobilization would not guarantee success in the battlefield. It could also lead to intense public backlash, putting his regime at
risk. Thus, the two defining obsessions of the Putin era—regime survival and Russia’s geopolitical might—are in tension. As sanctions take their
toll and battlefield losses mount, the gap between Putin’s ambitions and Russia’s capacity is likely to grow. As a leader obsessed with geopolitics,
Putin will inevitably engage in a desperate scramble to maintain Russia’s great power status, but he will find it incredibly difficult in the weeks,
months, and years ahead to do so. The basic problem for Putin is that Western strategy to weaken Russia is working
better than anyone could have expected . Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s comment may have overstepped when he
bluntly said, “We want to see Russia weakened.” But underlying Austin’s comments is a clear sense of confidence that the strategy is clearly
working. The initial thrust of this strategy began on the economic front with sanctions. The original assumption behind sanctions was not that
they would get Putin to end the war. Banks do not stop tanks, after all. But instead, by imposing significant medium- to long-
term costs on Russia, such that in the next 1 year, 5 years, and 10 years, the Russian economy would be
severely weakened, the Kremlin would be forced into a tough juggling act between guns (geopolitical
ambition) or butter (domestic tranquility). What has surprised U.S. policymakers is the speed and intensity through which the U.S.
and European public have demanded stronger actions. European outrage has led to a far stronger sanctions response than imagined possible
before the war. Europe has demonstrated it is willing to bear substantial economic costs to weaken
Russia and is now moving at an incredible pace to decouple from Russia , now targeting Russian oil. This is
having a devastating impact on Russia’s economy . The Russian Central Bank survey reveals expectations of soaring
inflation, economic contraction, and no growth. Furthermore, Russia
is facing a massive brain drain as up to 200,000
Russians may have left the country by the second week of March alone . It has also suffered substantial damage to its
burgeoning tech industry, as it lost access to some overseas markets and may lose up to 170,000 tech workers. The biggest surprise, however, is
the performance of Ukraine on the battlefield, the ineptitude of Russia’s military, and the game-changing efficacy
Western security assistance. Russia’s forces have suffered shocking losses . The Pentagon estimates
that Russia has lost around 25 percent of the combat power it had used to invade Ukraine , with the UK defense
minister claiming that Russia suffered losses of 15,000 in personnel and over 2,500 in large equipment. If the war ended tomorrow, Russia would
have considerable costs to recapitalize its forces—build more tanks and Kalibr cruise missile systems, as well as train new personnel—not to
mention seek to address the deficiencies exposed in the war. But the war is not going to end tomorrow, and the long-term costs to
Russia will grow. Thus, Russia finds itself in a huge hole. But to make matters much worse for the Kremlin, the export
controls—one of the most innovative aspects of the sanctions—is just starting to bite. The export controls are designed to
restrict commercial exports to Russia of advanced technology . This raises major questions for the Kremlin. For instance,
how will Russia be able to rebuild its military when it cannot buy semiconductors to build new Kalibr
cruise missiles? When a Western component used to manufacture Russian tanks breaks, will Russia be
able to get another? If not, can it build its own? According to the White House, two major plants that specialize in
manufacturing and repair of tanks—Uralvagonzavod Corporation and the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant—have suspended their work due to the lack
of foreign components. There is no doubt that Russia will aggressively pursue work-arounds . Sanctions evasion will be a
nonstop pursuit, aided by China, as well as other complicit countries. Russia will use “burner banks” that pop up to handle a transaction, get
sanctioned, and go away. It will use shell companies, smugglers, and the criminal underworld to gain access to materials. It will, in short, act like
North Korea. But while this type of smuggling can support a bespoke missile development operation, it is highly uncertain whether this will
suffice to keep the Russian defense industrial sector humming. Nevertheless, even if Russia finds a way, acquiring items
through the black market and through convoluted means will add substantial costs, further depleting
Russia’s economic coffers. Russia will seek to turn to domestic production, pursuing classic import substitution, hoping domestic
production will replace imported goods. This could work in some areas, but items like semiconductors cannot just be conjured out of thin air,
especially when Russia’s knowledge workers have fled in droves. Even if Russia can replace imported parts domestically,
this will still add costs and is unlikely to result in the same level of quality of imported goods . Whether
export controls succeed in starv ing Russia of the technology and machinery necessary to rebuild
its military is of immense geopolitical importance. Russia’s defense industrial prowess is key to its foreign policy and
undergirds its relationships with countries across the globe. This is especially true for a country like India. India is dependent on the Russian arms
industry and has $8 billion worth of outstanding military orders from Russia, and also needs a continuous supply of spare parts and components.
Indian officials said they expect some short-term delays in the “S-400 Triumf missile systems, Grigorovich-class stealth frigates, and
Kalashnikov AK 203-7.62x39mm assault rifles, as well as spares supplies for Kilo-class submarines, MiG-29 fighters, and Kamov Mi-17 military
transport helicopters. . . . India today imports over 10,000 types of spares and line replacement units worth over $500 million annually from
Russia.” Will Russia be able to meet its deliveries? If Russia can’t deliver, India will have to scramble, increasingly turning to U.S., European,
and Asian partners for alternatives. But beyond India, Russia’s defense industrial troubles could severely impact its foreign policy with countries
around the world. In Southeast Asia, Vietnam is reliant on Russia’s defense industry and could be further alienated by closer Sino-Russian
relations. Furthermore, 50 percent of Africa’s defense industrial imports come from Russia. Thus, if sanctions and export restrictions
work as expected, Putin will have to scramble to maintain Russia’s global standing . The most direct way
for Putin to assert Russia’s strength and deter the West from taking advantage of a militarily weakened Russia, is nuclear
saber rattling. This is already evident in loose talk from Russian officials, leading to understandable
concerns about risks of nuclear escalation. Reviving such concerns in the West could be a boon to a
Kremlin, as it might foster prestige-building Cold War-era nuclear talks or help constrain Western
belligerence. Russia could also continue to look to asymmetric means to hit back and impose costs on the West. Cyberattacks,
political influence and disinformation campaigns, money laundering and corruption efforts are few of the
many tools in its toolbox. However, its effectiveness has eroded somewhat, as Russia has lost the element
of surprise. The United States and Europe have obsessively studied Russia’s active measures campaigns since 2016. Russian disinformation
campaigns on the war in Ukraine have had little impact on the West. Instead, it is the United States, with its aggressive disclosures of intelligence,
and Ukraine, with Zelensky filming cell phone videos and posting Ukrainian battlefield successes on social media, that have been winning the
information war. Russian political influencing efforts will also prove increasingly difficult . Putin-friendly politicians,
can still attempt at the
from Marine Le Pen in France to Matteo Salvini in Italy, have sought to create their distance. Russia
margins to impact politics, corrupting politicians or secretly donating or funding political campaigns . But
U.S. and European intelligence and law enforcement are focused on this threat . Additionally, the massive
wealth and influence of Russian oligarchs, which has had a corrosive impact on their democratic hosts,
has been aggressively uprooted. Russia has thus lost one of its most important soft power
tools . The end result is that the West is both on guard and has built up a degree of resilience. Cyberattacks
against the West are another potential option for Putin. There are significant concerns about the vulnerability of critical
infrastructure in the United States to Russian cyberattacks. But attacks on critical infrastructure , such as the May 2021 Colonial
Pipeline attack, allegedly by a nominally private Russian actors, also carry greater risks for the Kremlin now. While the Biden
administration decided to prioritize summitry with Putin rather than responding in kind, a Russian cyberattack in this environment
would likely be treated far differently, possibly resulting in a U.S. cyber response against Russian infrastructure or expanding direct
involvement in Ukraine. A vulnerable Russia, with its hands full in eastern Ukraine, will likely be

nervous about provoking an escalatory spiral.

Turkiye Advantage
 1NC – A2: Turkey Prolif
[a] This S-400 crisis has existed for multiple years – prolif should have happened.
[b] No scenario for war – none articulated in ev or the 1AC tags.

[c] Scenario makes no sense – its talking about Iranian prolif NOT turkey prolif.
insert
Adam Garfinkle 18, Founding Editor of The American Interest and a Senior Fellow at the Foreign
Policy Research Institute, “The U.S.-Turkish Unraveling and the Arabs”, American Interest, 09-03-2018,
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/09/03/the-u-s-turkish-unraveling-and-the-arabs///SJ
logic of the security dilemma is such that in the absence of the credible U.S. provision
Now, the
of extended deterrence , Turkey would feel pressure to develop its own nuclear weapons.
That it has not exerted itself in that direction, despite its formidable engineering and scientific capacities,
illustrates the stability of Turkish trust in U.S . protection—until recently—and the ability of both sides
to bracket the core security relationship away from various disagreements. As with other nuclear-armed states, should
Turkey go its own way it would do so with no active intention of actually using such weapons, but rather as a kind of insurance policy against
diplomatic extortion at the hands of other nuclear-armed powers.
But of course if Turkey, no longer tethered to U.S. security protection in one way or another, developed nuclear weapons
for such a purpose, other regional states would probably feel obliged to develop or otherwise acquire
their own weapons, if they could, as an insurance policy against nuclear extortion by Turkey.3 They have already
practiced that way of thinking in reaction to the possibility of an Iranian nuclear breakout, of course.
Indeed, that kind of hedging behavior is exactly what analysts have discussed for many years now as the so-called N+
danger inherent in the development of Iranian nuclear weapons. It is not just the
mousetrap effect of proliferation that
danger posed by Iranian nuclear weapons, bad enough as that would be, but the

would likely drive other states to want such an insurance policy : Saudi Arabia, the UAE,
Egypt, Algeria , and so on.
Now, some observers have argued that nuclear weapons are really not very important after all. If the United States and the Soviet Union, as well
as China, France, and the United Kingdom, survived the Cold War without any nuclear use, it must be because deterrence is easy and hence
stable, since all rational people know that the weapons are unusable save for the since-become-impossible exception of a state holding a
monopoly over them. One well-known scholar, Kenneth Waltz, argued persistently that the more nuclear the weapons the better—because they
would sober everyone up and lead to more stability and fewer wars. Happily, those with actual government responsibility did not agree.
It is,
It is unspeakably lazy thinking to glibly superimpose the U.S.-Soviet Cold War deterrence experience onto places like the Middle East.
one thing to maintain stable deterrence when there are only two, or a small number of,
after all,
nuclear powers, and quite another to maintain stable deterrence when the number of nuclear
actors gets larger and becomes somewhat open-ended as more states lean that way. Under such
conditions it becomes much more difficult to calculate what a sufficient deterrent is, and so efforts to
make sure of having “enough” can touch off a multilateral arms competition in which sufficiency becomes an ever-moving target, almost
it becomes much more difficult to imagine crisis stability if one or
impossible to hit. At the same time

more states resort to launch-on-warning deployment postures, which are more likely when young arsenals are small
and unprotectable against preemptive attack.
Other important potential differences between U.S.-Soviet Cold War deterrence and potential multiparty deterrence in the Middle East exist, too.
Let us note just three.
First, U.S. and Soviet arsenals displayed clear lines of civil-military authority in highly
institutionalized state systems, but many Middle Eastern countries lack both such clear lines of authority and

highly institutionalized arrangements, being instead looser and more personalized by nature.
Second, it was taken for granted that both U.S. and Soviet leaderships cared about the safety of their
populations, a necessary assumption for effective deterrence. But in some heterogeneous and authoritarian Middle
Eastern countries this premise may not so surely apply—think both Iraq and Syria under minoritarian (and coincidentally
Ba‘athi) leadership, both of which committed mass murder against its own citizens.
U.S.-Soviet deterrence operations became inextricably bound up in the minds of observers with
And third,
intercontinental ballistic missile delivery systems. The result is that some people today think that if missiles can be limited in
one way or another, then the dangers of nuclear weapons, even if they come to exist, would be much mitigated. This is delusional because it is
if your
technologically obtuse. You need intercontinental ballistic missiles if you’re trying to shoot a warhead across an ocean. But
enemy target is not across an ocean, but, as in the Middle East, quite nearby, airplanes are immensely
less expensive and more reliable as delivery systems.
The basic point is that in both theory and practice, there is little difference between the proliferation

stimulating effects of a Turkish nuclear weapons breakout and an Iranian one. So if the U.S.-
Turkish strategic partnership unravels, logic does indeed suggest a Turkish effort to develop its
own nuclear capabilities . (Of course, the same kinds of pressures pertain to other key countries were they to lose, one way or
another, their U.S. nuclear umbrellas, including Germany, Japan, South Korea, and others.)
Turkish government could probably develop deliverable nuclear warheads at least on its side
If that happens, the

of the ocean within two to three years. If the Iranian government had thought for its own good reasons to avoid
overt testing and breakout postures once the nuclear deal expires by calendar or “is expired” by volition, a Turkish bomb
would make that posture far more difficult to justify. One could therefore imagine a situation of twinned or
near-simultaneous breakouts of Turkish and Iranian nuclear weapons even a mere three, four, or five years from now. The shock to the

region would be profound , and possibly very dangerous .

[d] No Turkish proliferation.

Ülgen and Perkovich 15, Perkovich works primarily on nuclear strategy and nonproliferation issues;
cyberconflict; and new approaches to international public-private management of strategic
technologies, Ülgen is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, where his research focuses on
Turkish foreign policy, nuclear policy, cyberpolicy, and transatlantic relations, (George and Sinan, April
10th, 2015, “Why Turkey Won’t Go Nuclear”, https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/10/why-turkey-
won-t-go-nuclear-pub-59756)
Each of these potential nuclear dominoes should be analyzed separately and carefully. And, as far as Turkey is concerned, the
conventional wisdom seems to be largely wrong .
Turkey does have a nascent nuclear energy program. After decades of false starts, the Turkish government signed a contract with Russia in 2010
for the construction and operation of the country’s first nuclear power plant. The project, located on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast, is now
under construction.
The Turkish government’s effort to secure other international suppliers has been complicated by the fact that the terms offered by Russia are
significantly more generous than those proposed by its competitors. Still, Turkey is in negotiations with a Franco-Japanese consortium for the
construction of a second nuclear power plant on the Black Sea.
Turkey has valid economic arguments for developing the capacity to produce nuclear energy. Primary
energy imports comprise almost half of Turkey’s chronic current-account deficit, because the country imports more than 90% of its oil and
Turkey’s electricity demand continues to grow at 5-6% per year. Turkish
natural gas. Moreover, unlike in Europe,

policymakers see nuclear power as an almost indispensable tool for enhancing energy security
and reducing the import bill.
These economic interests , combined with national-security considerations, give Turkey an
incentive not to seek nuclear weapons. As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
Turkey is prohibited from developing military applications of the technology. If it were
perceived to be breaking this commitment, other states, including those that would otherwise contribute to its nuclear energy program,

would turn against it and jeopardize its ability to meet growing demand at an
affordable cost . This, in turn, would undermine the economic growth that has been central to
sustaining the government’s popular support over the past two decades.
Moreover, Turkey is a member of NATO and thus benefits from the security guarantee that the alliance provides, including its nuclear umbrella.
Indeed, the US has based nuclear weapons in Turkey for decades. More recently, NATO and the US have deployed ballistic missile defenses in
the country. If the Turkish government sought to acquire its own nuclear weapons, it would jeopardize these security guarantees and turn NATO
against it.
Turkey lacks the know-how and technical infrastructure to produce a nuclear
In any case,

weapon quickly, and the country would need a long time – probably more than a decade – to
develop this capacity. During this period, Turkey would face severe political , economic , and
security pressures not only from the US and other NATO states, but also from Russia, Iran, and others.
Meanwhile, Turkey’s immediate security threats would be exacerbated . Nuclear weapons

would do little to reduce the dangers posed by Syria’s violent disintegration, the rise of the
Islamic State, and the unresolved challenge of Kurdish separatism. Turkey’s relations with Iran, which heretofore
have been manageable, could become more prone to crisis.
risks could in
All of these considerations point to the serious risks that seeking nuclear weapons would pose to Turkey’s security. These

turn exacerbate internal discord in the country at a time when the ruling Justice and Development Party is

struggling to retain popular support .

 1NC – A2: ISIS
[a] No evidence says coordination in BMDs allows ISIS coordination.
[b] Other groups thump.
Phil 1AC Torres 19, earned a BA in Philosophy with Honors from the University of Maryland,
College Park, where he completed his thesis under Lindley Darden and won the Schlaretzki Prize for
being the "most outstanding" student in the department, 10/25/2019, “Who Wants to Destroy the
World?”, https://onezero.medium.com/who-wants-to-destroy-the-world-e7571c66397
Another type of omnicidal actor comes in the form of apocalyptic terrorists who believe
that to save the world, it must first be destroyed. ISIS , arguably the largest and richest
terrorist group in history, is a paradigm case . While some members of ISIS probably
didn’t hold apocalyptic beliefs, the leadership most certainly did — and they made
strategic decisions based on these beliefs. The man who essentially founded ISIS, Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, believed that Islam’s version of Armageddon was about to unfold around the
small Syrian town of Dabiq. Hence, the name of the group’s propaganda magazine, Dabiq. After the U.S. military
killed al-Zarqawi in 2006, leadership of ISIS transferred to Abu Ayyub al-Masri, a
fevered apocalypticist who insisted that the Islamic end-of-days messianic figure, the
“Mahdi,” was about to appear in Iraq. Like al-Zarqawi, he based his strategy on his apocalyptic
belief — and it backfired. He soon met his end at the hands of Western forces.
Both of these individuals really believed that the end was nigh, and that it was their duty to use

violence — catastrophic violence , to be more specific — to bring about the apocalypse. ISIS members talked

about acquiring nuclear weapons , releasing deadly pathogens, and building dirty
bombs . I personally haven’t spoken to a single terrorism scholar who doesn’t think that ISIS
would have gleefully push ed a “destroy-the-world” button, especially if Western forces were marching
toward Dabiq.
But ISIS is far from the only apocalyptic group . Famously, the doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo
attempted to trigger Armageddon by releasing sarin in the Tokyo subway in 1995. Here in the U.S.,
more than a dozen hate groups subscribe to Christian Identity , an apocalyptic worldview
that endorses the use of catastrophic violence as a means of triggering a “race war” that will initiate the
end of the world. And one of the bloodiest conflicts in human history, the Taiping Rebellion, involved an
apocalyptic movement called the “Taiping Heavenly Kingdom.” This was led by a man named Hong
Xiuquan, who believed that he was the brother of Jesus Christ, “commissioned by the Lord of Heaven to
slay the devil-demons (Manchus) whose rule had brought ruin to China.”
A final type of omnicidal actor lingers within the outermost fringe of radical environmentalist, anarcho-
primitivist, and Neo-Luddite ideologies. Ted Kaczynski, better known as the Unabomber , provides an
example par excellence. Beginning in 1978, Kaczynski perpetrated numerous domestic terrorist attacks,
killing three people and injuring 23 others. A former UC Berkeley mathematics professor and Harvard
alumnus, Kaczynski didn’t wish for humanity to go extinct. Rather, he wanted to trigger a global
revolution against industrial society, with the ultimate goal of causing its collapse. Kaczynski ultimately
didn’t care whether his revolution would cause people to die, since in his utilitarian calculus the ends
would justify the means. As Kaczynski wrote in 1995: “This revolution may or may not make use of
violence; it may be sudden or it may be a relatively gradual process spanning a few decades. Its object
will be to overthrow not governments but the economic and technological basis of the present society.”
In contrast, other actors in this category have explicitly embraced pro-extinction convictions. For
example, the Gaia Liberation Front ( GLF ), an ecoterrorist group, holds as their mission “the total
liberation of the Earth, which can be accomplished only through the extinction of the Humans as a
species.” In advocating this, they argue that “if any Humans survive, they may start the whole thing over
again. Our policy is to take no chances.”
How might they accomplish their omnicidal aims? GLF contends that bioengineering is “the specific
technology for doing the job right of annihilating humanity — and it’s something that could be done by
just one person with the necessary expertise and access to the necessary equipment.” They continue: “…
genetically engineered viruses… have the advantage of attacking only the target species. To complicate
the search for a cure or a vaccine, and as insurance against the possibility that some Humans might be
immune to a particular virus, several different viruses could be released (with provision being made for
the release of a second round after the generals and the politicians had come out of their shelters).”
This parallels an anonymous article in the Earth First! Journal, published in 1989, meaning that this idea
has been around for a while: “Contributions are urgently solicited for scientific research on a species
specific virus that will eliminate Homo shiticus from the planet. Only an absolutely species specific virus
should be set loose. Otherwise it will be just another technological fix. Remember, Equal Rights for All
Other Species.”
While the most radical fringe of the environmentalist movement has avoided the limelight in recent years, some experts, such as the terrorism
scholar Frances Flannery, expect a resurgence as climate and biodiversity crises worsen. This poses an obvious danger in a world replete with
Technologies such as gene
bullets and bombs; but it poses an existential threat in a world of cheap and easy gene editing.

drives , digital-to-biological converters , and CRISPR-Cas9 are making it increasingly

feasible to synthesize designer pathogens that could be far more devastating than
anything found in nature.
[c] ISIS is dead.
Vohra 22 [Anchal Vohra, 4-26-2022, "ISIS Can't Even Direct Lone-Wolf Attacks Anymore", Foreign
Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/26/the-islamic-state-cant-even-pull-off-lone-wolf-attacks-
anymore/, DOA: 10-21-2022 //ArchanSen]
Since the Islamic State was territorially defeated in 2019, analysts have been debating
whether the group will reemerge as a major threat. That conversation became urgent in January when the group
carried out a prison break in Hasakah, northeast Syria, to free thousands of its members. In 2020, the group claimed an average of 45 attacks in
Syria every month. It has also gained strength in Afghanistan and in parts of Africa over the last few years. At least two recent terrorist attacks in
Israel, in the cities of Beersheba and Hadera, were claimed by Islamic State sympathizers.
While it is true that the Islamic State’s ideology has not evaporated, the group no longer
seems capable of directing even basic lone-wolf attacks . Most of the recent attacks claimed
by the group were carried out by individuals who simply piggybacked on its jihad
without having any logistical or material support.
The Islamic State’s resurgence in the West is a possibility, but there are no signs of it as of yet. The Islamic State has neither

the manpower nor the resources , and above all it has lost the popularity it once had to
lure disaffected Europeans to launch massive attacks in the West. “I don’t think the Ukraine war matters
much for what happens with IS,” said Aron Lund, a fellow with the Century Foundation. He added that in its latest message the group is merely
trying “to sound relevant and up to date, latching onto current events.”
An analysis of the attacks claimed by the group since its fall shows that it remains weak and has been
reduced to merely making appeals to sympathizers in the West that it isn’t even sure it
still has . The group no longer has a physical state, which had played a huge role in enticing young Muslims living
on the fringes of Western societies to join its ranks. Nor does it have control of oil wells and taxes from locals,
which it had used to run its affairs and fund extremist attacks. Moreover, intelligence cooperation between European
intelligence services and their Middle Eastern counterparts is much stronger than it once
was. Islamic State members have been arrested in several European nations, and their subsequent court trials have sent a deterring message to
potential recruits. Joining the Islamic State is simply not as attractive as it once was for wannabe jihadis in Europe. “ It has not really
pulled off any major attacks in Europe since 2017. Five years is a very long time for a
jihadist group that used to be front and center on the security map,” said Olivier Guitta, managing
director of the risk consultancy GlobalStrat.
Guitta added that he did not believe that Western security agencies were being distracted by the war in Ukraine and that the war does not really
make a difference for the Islamic State’s ability to pull off terrorist attacks in Europe. “ If they could, they would have done
so since 2017 or even during the pandemic. Except in Africa and Afghanistan where it has really expanded its
operations, the group has retreated almost everywhere else. The caliphate is now only a small fraction of what it was in 2015,” he said.  
 1NC – A2: Cyprus
[a] The internal link is Greece winning – no reason why that escalates.
[a] Mfw Ian cuts impact defense instead of an impact – it’s not profitable to be
drawn in, US will cool the conflict, and Russia has no incentive to trigger A5 – I’ll
insert a rehighlighting.
Dimitri 1AC Rodionov 20, Дмитрий Родионов, professional journalist and translator, director of the
Center for Geopolitical Studies at the Institute for Innovative Development, “Война внутри НАТО:
Столкновения Франции и Турции из-за газа Кипра не избежать?,” or “War Within NATO: Can a
Confrontation between France and Turkey over Cyprus be Prevented?” Free Press, 9/26/20, translated by
Yandex, https://svpressa.ru/war21/article/276888/
***ORIGINAL***
В последние месяцы резко обострился конфликт между Турцией и Грецией вокруг спорных газовых месторождений на кипрском шельфе, разрабатываемых Анкарой. Причем, конфликт внес раскол в единство Евросоюза, так как Кипр потребовал жестких мер в
отношении Турции, пригрозив заблокировать введение санкций против Белоруссии. Среди тех, кто наиболее последовательно выступает за жесткие меры против Анкары, особое место занимает Франция. Стоит вспомнить, что Франция была одной из тех стран, которые
способствовали формированию независимого греческого государства и всегда последовательно поддерживала Афины, в том числе, в конфликтах с Турцией, которые не раз ставили страны на грань войны, и лишь членство обеих в НАТО предотвращало такой сценарий.
Эммануэль Макрон продолжил эту традицию, и сегодня он главный политический оппонент своего турецкого коллеги Реджепа Тайипа Эрдогана в Европе. Порой возникает впечатление, что у Макрона личная неприязнь к турецкому лидеру. «Мы должны быть жесткими с
турецким правительством, а не с турецким народом, который заслуживает большего, чем правительство Эрдогана», — говорил Макрон в ходе саммита Med-7. Еще цитата: «Турция больше не является партнером в Средиземноморском регионе» и что сегодняшняя встреча
призвана прояснить ее красные линии и подход к турецкой агрессии против Греции и Кипра". Почему же Макрон так активно вмешивается в этот конфликт и активно выступает против Турции? Напомню, в соседней Ливии они тоже по разные стороны баррикад. Он
просто зарабатывает личный политический капитал? Или что-то еще? По итогам встречи Med-7 было принято коммюнике, в котором стороны предупредили о составлении списка санкций в случае продолжения Турцией геологической разведки на кипрском морском
шельфе. При этом надо полагать, что на саммите лидеры стран занимались не только выражением вербальной поддержке Греции и Кипра. По некоторым данным в кулуарах Макрон и греческий премьер Мицотакис обсуждали соглашения о сотрудничестве в области
обороны между двумя странами, закупке многоцелевых истребителей Rafale и другого французского оборонного оборудования. Что это означает? Стоит ли ожидать войны? И какую роль здесь может сыграть Франция? Напомним, что конфликты между Афинами и
Анкарой, способные привести к реальному военному столкновению, возникают регулярно. До сего момента их удавалось гасить усилиями НАТО и, в первую очередь, США, которые больше всех заинтересованы в единстве альянса. Однажды, впрочем, дошло и до
реальной войны вокруг Кипра, ситуация с которым остается нерешенной до сих пор, и, похоже, нынешние события еще больше отдаляют ее решение. Но сегодня отношения Анкары с Вашингтоном, откровенного говоря, не самые лучшие, как и с Европой. К тому же, по
мнению Европы, Эрдоган перешел все допустимые «красные черты». Апофеозом эскалации конфликта вокруг спорных месторождений стал июньский инцидент, когда турецкий фрегат отказался выполнить распоряжение о досмотре груза со стороны французского
фрегата, в составе миссии ЕС по контролю за соблюдением эмбарго ООН на поставки оружия в Ливию. При этом турецкий боевой корабль взял на прицел французский, что во Франции было охарактеризовано как «исключительно враждебные и агрессивные действия». В
конце августа Франция совместно с Грецией, Италией и Республики Кипр провела военные учения возле спорного острова, которые, как сообщается, являются лишь первым этапом реализации инициативы укрепления четырехстороннего военно-морского и военно-
воздушного присутствия в Восточном Средиземноморье. Учения стали ответом на действия Анкары, которая направила свое исследовательское судно Oruc Reis в сопровождении группы военных кораблей для сейсмической разведки на греческом морском шельфе близ
острова Кастелоризо. В Афинах это назвали провокацией и привели вооруженные силы в боевую готовность, подчеркнув, что Греция будет отстаивать свои суверенные права любыми способами. А вот цитата Эрдогана в ответ на заявления французского президента:
«Господин Макрон, у вас будет еще много проблем, связанных со мной. Лучше не связывайтесь с турецким народом и Турцией». Это уже похоже на угрозу. Напомним, Париж уже готовится поставить грекам боевые самолеты. В ответ Анкара нацелила ЗРК С-400 на
спорный морской район и заявила о намерении приобрести российские многоцелевые истребители пятого поколения Су-57. Впрочем, большой вопрос: дойдет ли до прямого военного столкновения между Францией и Турцией? Турецкие вооруженные силы считаются
вторыми по мощи в НАТО после США. Но Франция ядерная держава. Тем не менее, в случае повторения июньского инцидента, конфликт может вспыхнуть от одного неосторожного движения… Стоит отметить, что не очень понятна позиция Вашингтона. Недавно
Соединенные Штаты отменили многолетнее эмбарго на поставки оружия Кипру, чем вызвали негодование Анкары. С другой стороны, госсекретарь Майк Помпео осторожно намекал на необходимость учитывать интересы турецкого населения при разработке Кипрского
месторождения и отчитывал президента Кипра за то, что тот дает возможность российским военным кораблям останавливаться в кипрских портах. Так на чьей стороне Вашингтон, и готов ли он вообще, как и прежде, стать модератором конфликта? И чем может
закончиться этот конфликт? — Французские интересы в Средиземноморье, в Африке и на Ближнем Востоке никто не отменял. Франция по-прежнему по-хозяйски ведет себя во многих бывших колониях и у их соседей", — отмечает руководитель экспертного совета
Фонда стратегического развития Игорь Шатров. — И хоть та же Ливия была одно время итальянской, а не французской колонией, она всегда оставалась плацдармом борьбы между французской короной и Османской империей. В разные годы для этого находились свои
основания. Сейчас это углеводороды и протяженное побережье, которое позволяет поставить под контроль поток мигрантов из Африки в Европу. Поддержка Греции и Кипра в противостоянии с Турцией — это еще один из бастионов этого французско-турецкого
противостояния. «СП»: — По мнению многих экспертов, Париж и Афины движутся по пути заключения антитурецкого оборонительного союза, Париж, к тому же активно вооружает Грецию. Это ли не эскалация? Для чего это? Дойдет ли до реальных военных
столкновений? — Эрдоган затеял рискованную геополитическую игру, в которую вовлечены и ядерные державы — Россия, США, Франция, Великобритания. Играя на противоречиях между ними и между ними и другими странами, он повышает собственные ставки и
потихоньку превращает Турцию в ведущую державу региона. Ливия и Кипр — плацдармы этой «войны. При этом не думаю, что в планах турецкой «большой игры» есть вооруженный конфликт с Францией и Грецией. Это невыгодно ни Турции, ни Франции, ни Греции.
Невыгодно, потому что бесперспективно, все равно придется мириться, а это будет выглядеть как поражение. Однако покусывать друг друга эти союзники по НАТО будут продолжать. Ведь напряженность вовне легко «продается» внутри. И у Эрдогана, и у Макрона есть
потребность в такой внешнеполитической активности. Она позволяет более уверенно разговаривать с избирателем. В то время как «великий западный кормчий» — Соединенные Штаты заняты своими внутренними проблемами, а по внешнеполитической повестке
отделываются хоть и громкой, но риторикой, и Франция, и Турция способны на силовые действия «на земле». Пока никто не следит, похоже, думают в Париже и Анкаре, есть возможность перераспределить и ресурсы, и влияние. Но для реального столкновения нужны
очень веские основания. «СП»: — А что Вашингтон? С Эрдоганом у него не очень хорошие отношения. Они отменили многолетнее эмбарго на поставки оружия Кипру. С другой стороны, совсем уж настраивать против себя Турцию тоже невыгодно… — У Вашингтона
своих проблем сейчас вагон и маленькая тележка. Как минимум, до президентских выборов внутренние вопросы в Белом доме будут в приоритете. И вот этой передышкой и намерены воспользоваться как в Париже, так и в Анкаре. При всем при том понятно, что Турция
нужна Соединенным Штатам в роли ближневосточного жандарма. И у США есть инструмент для воздействия на Турцию. Это курдский вопрос. Так что как только представится возможность, США не упустят своего шанса вмешаться и охладить союзников, сохранив их в
одном блоке". — Прежде всего, на эти отношения нужно бросить геополитический взгляд, — считает политолог Владимир Можегов. — На лицо конфликт идеологий. Проще говоря: Эрдоган хочет возродить Османскую империю, а Макрон выступает как представитель
мондиалистских элит. То есть, с позиций прямо противоположных. Мондиалистов крайне раздражают притязания Эрдогана на воскрешение Великой Турции, Эрдоган же ведет себя слишком импульсивно. Отсюда эти постоянно искрящие конфликты. Ну и конечно
интересы французов в Ливии и других бывших французских колониях. В то время как Эрдоган притязает на роль защитника всего традиционного ислама. «СП»: — Франция активно вооружает Грецию. Это ли не эскалация? Для чего это? Чем это может кончиться? —
Думаю, ничем. Во всяком случае, до тех пор, пока ведущие геополитические игроки — Россия и США не намерены будут раздувать конфликт. Насчет России здесь можно быть совершено спокойным — ей война не нужна. С Америкой сложнее. Если у власти останется
Трамп, он конечно, не допустит конфликта. Если к власти придут демократы, а с ними в актуальную политику вернется глобалистская повестка и отмороженные неоконы, можно ждать чего угодно. В первую очередь — эскалации Ближневосточных конфликтов, а следом
— цепной реакции, в которой конфликт Эрдогана с Макроном и Грецией может сыграть не последнюю роль. Позиции демократов и консерваторов в США прямо противоположны. Трамп выступает за традиционный многополярный мир, мир нескольких центров силы, на
которых будет держаться стабильность мира. В этом широком смысле и большая Турция, и большая Россия — его стратегические союзники. Демократы — за глобальный мир с одним единственным центром силы. А значит: за обращение всего мира в зону «управляемого
хаоса». В случае победы Байдена изменится всё. Рано или поздно (скорее рано, они будут наверстывать упущенное за президентство Трампа время) весь мир будет зажжен тлеющими и горячими конфликтами, это неизбежно. При этом, народы будут загнаны под
домашний арест ковидных карантинов и со страхом ожидать последствий.

***TRANSLATION***
In recent months, the conflict
between Turkey and Greece over the disputed gas fields on the Cyprus shelf developed by Ankara has sharply
escalated. Moreover, the conflict has split the unity of the European Union, as Cyprus demanded tough measures against Turkey, threatening
to block the introduction of sanctions against Belarus. Among those who most consistently advocate tough measures against Ankara, France
occupies a special place. It is worth remembering that France was one of those countries that contributed to the formation of an independent
Greek state and has always consistently supported Athens, including in conflicts with Turkey, which more than once put the countries on the
verge of war, and only the membership of both in NATO prevented such a scenario. Emmanuel Macron continued this tradition, and today he is
the main political opponent of his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Europe. Sometimes it seems that Macron has a personal dislike
for the Turkish leader. "We must be tough with the Turkish government, not with the Turkish people, who deserve more than the Erdogan
government," Macron said during the Med-7 summit. Another quote: "Turkey is no longer a partner in the Mediterranean region" and that today's
meeting is intended to clarify its red lines and approach to Turkish aggression against Greece and Cyprus." Why is Macron so actively
intervening in this conflict and actively opposing Turkey? Let me remind you that in neighboring Libya, they are also on different sides of the
barricades. Is he just earning personal political capital? Or something else? As a result of the Med-7 meeting, a communique was adopted, in
which the parties warned about drawing up a list of sanctions in case Turkey continues geological exploration on the Cyprus sea shelf. At the
same time, it should be assumed that at the summit, the leaders of the countries were engaged not only in expressing verbal support for Greece
and Cyprus. According to some reports, Macron and Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis discussed agreements on defense cooperation between the
two countries, the purchase of multi-purpose Rafale fighters and other French defense equipment. What does this mean? Should we expect war?
And what role can France play here? Recall that conflicts between Athens and Ankara, which can lead to
a real military clash, occur regularly. Until now, they have been extinguished by the efforts
of NATO and, first of all, the United States, which is most interested in the unity of the alliance. Once, however, it came to a real
war around Cyprus, the situation with which remains unresolved to this day, and it seems that the current events further delay its solution. But
today, Ankara's relations with Washington, frankly speaking, are not the best , as well as with Europe. In addition,
according to Europe, Erdogan has crossed all acceptable "red lines". The apotheosis of the escalation of the conflict over the disputed fields was
the June incident when a Turkish frigate refused to comply with an order to inspect the cargo from a French frigate, as part of the EU mission to
monitor compliance with the UN arms embargo on Libya. At the same time, the Turkish warship took aim at the French, which in France was
described as"exceptionally hostile and aggressive actions". In late August, France, together with Greece, Italy and the Republic
of Cyprus, conducted military exercises near the disputed island, which are reportedly only the first stage of the
initiative to strengthen the quadrilateral naval and air presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. The
exercise was a response to the actions of Ankara, which sent its research vessel Oruc Reis, accompanied by a group of warships for
seismic exploration on the Greek sea shelf near the island of Kastelorizo. In Athens, this was called a provocation and put the armed forces on
alert, stressing that Greece will defend its sovereign rights by any means. And here is a quote from Erdogan in response to the statements of the
French president: "Mr. Macron, you will have many more problems related to me. It is better not to get involved with the Turkish people and
Turkey." It already looks like a threat. Recall that Paris is already preparing to supply the Greeks with combat aircraft. In response, Ankara
targeted the S-400 air defense system at the disputed sea area and announced its intention to purchase Russian fifth-generation Su-57 multirole
fighters. However, the big question is: will it come to a direct military clash between France and Turkey? The
Turkish armed forces are considered the second most powerful in NATO after
the United States. But France is a nuclear power. However, in the event of a repeat of the June incident, the conflict may
break out from one careless movement… It is worth noting that Washington's position is not very clear. The United States
recently lifted a long-standing arms embargo on Cyprus, angering Ankara. On the other hand, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo cautiously hinted
at the need to take into account the interests of the Turkish population when developing the Cyprus field and chastised the President of Cyprus for
allowing Russian warships to stop in Cypriot ports. So whose side is Washington on, and is it even ready, as before, to become a moderator of the
conflict? And how can this conflict end? - French interests in the Mediterranean, Africa and the Middle East have not been canceled. France
continues to behave like a master in many former colonies and their neighbors, " said Igor Shatrov, head of the Expert Council of the Strategic
Development Fund. - And although the same Libya was at one time an Italian, and not a French colony, it has always remained a springboard for
the struggle between the French crown and the Ottoman Empire. In different years, there were reasons for this. Now it is hydrocarbons and a long
coast that allows you to control the flow of migrants from Africa to Europe. The support of Greece and Cyprus in the confrontation with Turkey
is another of the bastions of this French-Turkish confrontation. "SP": - According to many experts, Paris and Athens are moving towards the
conclusion of an anti-Turkish defensive alliance, Paris is also actively arming Greece. Isn't this an escalation? What is it for? Will it come to real
military clashes? — Erdogan has started a risky geopolitical game, in which the nuclear powers — Russia,
the United States, France, and the United Kingdom-are also involved. Playing on the contradictions between
them and between them and other countries, he raises his own stakes and slowly turns Turkey into the leading power in the
region. Libya and Cyprus are the springboards of this " war.  At the same time, I do not think that

there is an armed conflict with France and Greece in the plans of the Turkish "big
game". This is not profitable for Turkey, France, or Greece. It is unprofitable,
because it is hopeless, you will still have to put up with it, and it will look like a defeat.
However, these NATO allies will continue to bite each other. After all, the tension outside is easily "sold" inside. Both Erdogan and Macron have
a need for such foreign policy activity. It allows you to talk more confidently with the voter. While the "great Western pilot" - the United States is
busy with its internal problems, and on the foreign policy agenda they get off with loud, but rhetoric, both France and Turkey are capable of
forceful actions "on the ground". While no one is watching, it seems, think in Paris and Ankara, there is an opportunity to redistribute both
resources and influence. But for a real collision, you need a very good reason. "SP": - And what about Washington? He doesn't have a very good
relationship with Erdogan. They lifted a long-standing arms embargo on Cyprus. On the other hand, it is also unprofitable to completely
antagonize Turkey… "Washington has its own problems right now with a car and a small cart. At least until the presidential election, domestic
issues in the White House will be a priority. And it is this respite that we intend to take advantage of both in Paris and in Ankara. At the same
time, it is clear that the United States needs Turkey in the role of a Middle Eastern gendarme. And the US has a tool to influence Turkey. This is a
as soon as the opportunity presents itself, the US will not miss its chance to
Kurdish issue. So

step in and cool the allies by keeping them in the same bloc ." — First of all, these relationships need to
throw a geopolitical view, the analyst believes Vladimir Morehow. - On the face of the conflict of ideologies. Simply put: Erdogan wants to
revive the Ottoman Empire, and Macron acts as a representative of the Mondialist elites. That is, from the positions of the exact opposite.
Mondialists are extremely irritated by Erdogan's claims to resurrect Greater Turkey, while Erdogan is behaving too impulsively. Hence, these are
constantly sparking conflicts. And of course the interests of the French in Libya and other former French colonies. While Erdogan claims to be
the defender of all traditional Islam. "SP": - France is actively arming Greece. Isn't this an escalation? What is it for? How can this end?
as long as the leading geopolitical players-Russia and the United
"Nothing, I think. In any case,

States-do not intend to inflate the conflict. As for Russia, you can be completely calm
here — it does not need a war. America is more difficult. If Trump remains in power, he will certainly not
allow a conflict. If the Democrats come to power, and with them the globalist agenda and the frostbitten neocons return to current politics, you
can expect anything. First of all, the escalation of the Middle East conflicts, and then-a chain reaction, in
which the conflict between Erdogan and Macron and Greece may play an important role. The positions of the
Democrats and conservatives in the United States are directly opposite. Trump stands for a traditional multipolar world, a world of several centers
of power, on which the stability of the world will be maintained. In this broad sense, both greater Turkey and greater Russia are its strategic
allies. The Democrats are for a global world with one single center of power. This means: for turning the whole world into a zone of
"controlled chaos". If Biden wins, everything will change. Sooner or later (rather sooner, they will make up for lost time during the Trump
presidency), the whole world will be ignited by smoldering and hot conflicts, it is inevitable. At the same time, the peoples
will be driven under house arrest by covid quarantines and fear the consequences.

[b] Sometimes cutting Turkish think tanks is funny, but not when it comes back to
bite you by being radically pro-Trump – Biden win makes conflict “inevitable”.
Dimitri 1AC Rodionov 20, Дмитрий Родионов, professional journalist and translator, director of the
Center for Geopolitical Studies at the Institute for Innovative Development, “Война внутри НАТО:
Столкновения Франции и Турции из-за газа Кипра не избежать?,” or “War Within NATO: Can a
Confrontation between France and Turkey over Cyprus be Prevented?” Free Press, 9/26/20, translated by
Yandex, https://svpressa.ru/war21/article/276888/
***ORIGINAL***
В последние месяцы резко обострился конфликт между Турцией и Грецией вокруг спорных газовых месторождений на кипрском шельфе, разрабатываемых Анкарой. Причем, конфликт внес раскол в единство Евросоюза, так как Кипр потребовал жестких мер в
отношении Турции, пригрозив заблокировать введение санкций против Белоруссии. Среди тех, кто наиболее последовательно выступает за жесткие меры против Анкары, особое место занимает Франция. Стоит вспомнить, что Франция была одной из тех стран, которые
способствовали формированию независимого греческого государства и всегда последовательно поддерживала Афины, в том числе, в конфликтах с Турцией, которые не раз ставили страны на грань войны, и лишь членство обеих в НАТО предотвращало такой сценарий.
Эммануэль Макрон продолжил эту традицию, и сегодня он главный политический оппонент своего турецкого коллеги Реджепа Тайипа Эрдогана в Европе. Порой возникает впечатление, что у Макрона личная неприязнь к турецкому лидеру. «Мы должны быть жесткими с
турецким правительством, а не с турецким народом, который заслуживает большего, чем правительство Эрдогана», — говорил Макрон в ходе саммита Med-7. Еще цитата: «Турция больше не является партнером в Средиземноморском регионе» и что сегодняшняя встреча
призвана прояснить ее красные линии и подход к турецкой агрессии против Греции и Кипра". Почему же Макрон так активно вмешивается в этот конфликт и активно выступает против Турции? Напомню, в соседней Ливии они тоже по разные стороны баррикад. Он
просто зарабатывает личный политический капитал? Или что-то еще? По итогам встречи Med-7 было принято коммюнике, в котором стороны предупредили о составлении списка санкций в случае продолжения Турцией геологической разведки на кипрском морском
шельфе. При этом надо полагать, что на саммите лидеры стран занимались не только выражением вербальной поддержке Греции и Кипра. По некоторым данным в кулуарах Макрон и греческий премьер Мицотакис обсуждали соглашения о сотрудничестве в области
обороны между двумя странами, закупке многоцелевых истребителей Rafale и другого французского оборонного оборудования. Что это означает? Стоит ли ожидать войны? И какую роль здесь может сыграть Франция? Напомним, что конфликты между Афинами и
Анкарой, способные привести к реальному военному столкновению, возникают регулярно. До сего момента их удавалось гасить усилиями НАТО и, в первую очередь, США, которые больше всех заинтересованы в единстве альянса. Однажды, впрочем, дошло и до
реальной войны вокруг Кипра, ситуация с которым остается нерешенной до сих пор, и, похоже, нынешние события еще больше отдаляют ее решение. Но сегодня отношения Анкары с Вашингтоном, откровенного говоря, не самые лучшие, как и с Европой. К тому же, по
мнению Европы, Эрдоган перешел все допустимые «красные черты». Апофеозом эскалации конфликта вокруг спорных месторождений стал июньский инцидент, когда турецкий фрегат отказался выполнить распоряжение о досмотре груза со стороны французского
фрегата, в составе миссии ЕС по контролю за соблюдением эмбарго ООН на поставки оружия в Ливию. При этом турецкий боевой корабль взял на прицел французский, что во Франции было охарактеризовано как «исключительно враждебные и агрессивные действия». В
конце августа Франция совместно с Грецией, Италией и Республики Кипр провела военные учения возле спорного острова, которые, как сообщается, являются лишь первым этапом реализации инициативы укрепления четырехстороннего военно-морского и военно-
воздушного присутствия в Восточном Средиземноморье. Учения стали ответом на действия Анкары, которая направила свое исследовательское судно Oruc Reis в сопровождении группы военных кораблей для сейсмической разведки на греческом морском шельфе близ
острова Кастелоризо. В Афинах это назвали провокацией и привели вооруженные силы в боевую готовность, подчеркнув, что Греция будет отстаивать свои суверенные права любыми способами. А вот цитата Эрдогана в ответ на заявления французского президента:
«Господин Макрон, у вас будет еще много проблем, связанных со мной. Лучше не связывайтесь с турецким народом и Турцией». Это уже похоже на угрозу. Напомним, Париж уже готовится поставить грекам боевые самолеты. В ответ Анкара нацелила ЗРК С-400 на
спорный морской район и заявила о намерении приобрести российские многоцелевые истребители пятого поколения Су-57. Впрочем, большой вопрос: дойдет ли до прямого военного столкновения между Францией и Турцией? Турецкие вооруженные силы считаются
вторыми по мощи в НАТО после США. Но Франция ядерная держава. Тем не менее, в случае повторения июньского инцидента, конфликт может вспыхнуть от одного неосторожного движения… Стоит отметить, что не очень понятна позиция Вашингтона. Недавно
Соединенные Штаты отменили многолетнее эмбарго на поставки оружия Кипру, чем вызвали негодование Анкары. С другой стороны, госсекретарь Майк Помпео осторожно намекал на необходимость учитывать интересы турецкого населения при разработке Кипрского
месторождения и отчитывал президента Кипра за то, что тот дает возможность российским военным кораблям останавливаться в кипрских портах. Так на чьей стороне Вашингтон, и готов ли он вообще, как и прежде, стать модератором конфликта? И чем может
закончиться этот конфликт? — Французские интересы в Средиземноморье, в Африке и на Ближнем Востоке никто не отменял. Франция по-прежнему по-хозяйски ведет себя во многих бывших колониях и у их соседей", — отмечает руководитель экспертного совета
Фонда стратегического развития Игорь Шатров. — И хоть та же Ливия была одно время итальянской, а не французской колонией, она всегда оставалась плацдармом борьбы между французской короной и Османской империей. В разные годы для этого находились свои
основания. Сейчас это углеводороды и протяженное побережье, которое позволяет поставить под контроль поток мигрантов из Африки в Европу. Поддержка Греции и Кипра в противостоянии с Турцией — это еще один из бастионов этого французско-турецкого
противостояния. «СП»: — По мнению многих экспертов, Париж и Афины движутся по пути заключения антитурецкого оборонительного союза, Париж, к тому же активно вооружает Грецию. Это ли не эскалация? Для чего это? Дойдет ли до реальных военных
столкновений? — Эрдоган затеял рискованную геополитическую игру, в которую вовлечены и ядерные державы — Россия, США, Франция, Великобритания. Играя на противоречиях между ними и между ними и другими странами, он повышает собственные ставки и
потихоньку превращает Турцию в ведущую державу региона. Ливия и Кипр — плацдармы этой «войны. При этом не думаю, что в планах турецкой «большой игры» есть вооруженный конфликт с Францией и Грецией. Это невыгодно ни Турции, ни Франции, ни Греции.
Невыгодно, потому что бесперспективно, все равно придется мириться, а это будет выглядеть как поражение. Однако покусывать друг друга эти союзники по НАТО будут продолжать. Ведь напряженность вовне легко «продается» внутри. И у Эрдогана, и у Макрона есть
потребность в такой внешнеполитической активности. Она позволяет более уверенно разговаривать с избирателем. В то время как «великий западный кормчий» — Соединенные Штаты заняты своими внутренними проблемами, а по внешнеполитической повестке
отделываются хоть и громкой, но риторикой, и Франция, и Турция способны на силовые действия «на земле». Пока никто не следит, похоже, думают в Париже и Анкаре, есть возможность перераспределить и ресурсы, и влияние. Но для реального столкновения нужны
очень веские основания. «СП»: — А что Вашингтон? С Эрдоганом у него не очень хорошие отношения. Они отменили многолетнее эмбарго на поставки оружия Кипру. С другой стороны, совсем уж настраивать против себя Турцию тоже невыгодно… — У Вашингтона
своих проблем сейчас вагон и маленькая тележка. Как минимум, до президентских выборов внутренние вопросы в Белом доме будут в приоритете. И вот этой передышкой и намерены воспользоваться как в Париже, так и в Анкаре. При всем при том понятно, что Турция
нужна Соединенным Штатам в роли ближневосточного жандарма. И у США есть инструмент для воздействия на Турцию. Это курдский вопрос. Так что как только представится возможность, США не упустят своего шанса вмешаться и охладить союзников, сохранив их в
одном блоке". — Прежде всего, на эти отношения нужно бросить геополитический взгляд, — считает политолог Владимир Можегов. — На лицо конфликт идеологий. Проще говоря: Эрдоган хочет возродить Османскую империю, а Макрон выступает как представитель
мондиалистских элит. То есть, с позиций прямо противоположных. Мондиалистов крайне раздражают притязания Эрдогана на воскрешение Великой Турции, Эрдоган же ведет себя слишком импульсивно. Отсюда эти постоянно искрящие конфликты. Ну и конечно
интересы французов в Ливии и других бывших французских колониях. В то время как Эрдоган притязает на роль защитника всего традиционного ислама. «СП»: — Франция активно вооружает Грецию. Это ли не эскалация? Для чего это? Чем это может кончиться? —
Думаю, ничем. Во всяком случае, до тех пор, пока ведущие геополитические игроки — Россия и США не намерены будут раздувать конфликт. Насчет России здесь можно быть совершено спокойным — ей война не нужна. С Америкой сложнее. Если у власти останется
Трамп, он конечно, не допустит конфликта. Если к власти придут демократы, а с ними в актуальную политику вернется глобалистская повестка и отмороженные неоконы, можно ждать чего угодно. В первую очередь — эскалации Ближневосточных конфликтов, а следом
— цепной реакции, в которой конфликт Эрдогана с Макроном и Грецией может сыграть не последнюю роль. Позиции демократов и консерваторов в США прямо противоположны. Трамп выступает за традиционный многополярный мир, мир нескольких центров силы, на
которых будет держаться стабильность мира. В этом широком смысле и большая Турция, и большая Россия — его стратегические союзники. Демократы — за глобальный мир с одним единственным центром силы. А значит: за обращение всего мира в зону «управляемого
хаоса». В случае победы Байдена изменится всё. Рано или поздно (скорее рано, они будут наверстывать упущенное за президентство Трампа время) весь мир будет зажжен тлеющими и горячими конфликтами, это неизбежно. При этом, народы будут загнаны под
домашний арест ковидных карантинов и со страхом ожидать последствий.

***TRANSLATION***
In recent months, the conflict
between Turkey and Greece over the disputed gas fields on the Cyprus shelf developed by Ankara has sharply
escalated. Moreover, the conflict has split the unity of the European Union, as Cyprus demanded tough measures against Turkey, threatening
to block the introduction of sanctions against Belarus. Among those who most consistently advocate tough measures against Ankara, France
occupies a special place. It is worth remembering that France was one of those countries that contributed to the formation of an independent
Greek state and has always consistently supported Athens, including in conflicts with Turkey, which more than once put the countries on the
verge of war, and only the membership of both in NATO prevented such a scenario. Emmanuel Macron continued this tradition, and today he is
the main political opponent of his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Europe. Sometimes it seems that Macron has a personal dislike
for the Turkish leader. "We must be tough with the Turkish government, not with the Turkish people, who deserve more than the Erdogan
government," Macron said during the Med-7 summit. Another quote: "Turkey is no longer a partner in the Mediterranean region" and that today's
meeting is intended to clarify its red lines and approach to Turkish aggression against Greece and Cyprus." Why is Macron so actively
intervening in this conflict and actively opposing Turkey? Let me remind you that in neighboring Libya, they are also on different sides of the
barricades. Is he just earning personal political capital? Or something else? As a result of the Med-7 meeting, a communique was adopted, in
which the parties warned about drawing up a list of sanctions in case Turkey continues geological exploration on the Cyprus sea shelf. At the
same time, it should be assumed that at the summit, the leaders of the countries were engaged not only in expressing verbal support for Greece
and Cyprus. According to some reports, Macron and Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis discussed agreements on defense cooperation between the
two countries, the purchase of multi-purpose Rafale fighters and other French defense equipment. What does this mean? Should we expect war?
And what role can France play here? Recall that conflicts between Athens and Ankara, which can lead to
a real military clash, occur regularly. Until now, they have been extinguished by the efforts
of NATO and, first of all, the United States, which is most interested in the unity of the alliance. Once, however, it came to a real
war around Cyprus, the situation with which remains unresolved to this day, and it seems that the current events further delay its solution. But
today, Ankara's relations with Washington, frankly speaking, are not the best , as well as with Europe. In addition,
according to Europe, Erdogan has crossed all acceptable "red lines". The apotheosis of the escalation of the conflict over the disputed fields was
the June incident when a Turkish frigate refused to comply with an order to inspect the cargo from a French frigate, as part of the EU mission to
monitor compliance with the UN arms embargo on Libya. At the same time, the Turkish warship took aim at the French, which in France was
described as"exceptionally hostile and aggressive actions". In late August, France, together with Greece, Italy and the Republic
of Cyprus, conducted military exercises near the disputed island, which are reportedly only the first stage of the
initiative to strengthen the quadrilateral naval and air presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. The
exercise was a response to the actions of Ankara, which sent its research vessel Oruc Reis, accompanied by a group of warships for
seismic exploration on the Greek sea shelf near the island of Kastelorizo. In Athens, this was called a provocation and put the armed forces on
alert, stressing that Greece will defend its sovereign rights by any means. And here is a quote from Erdogan in response to the statements of the
French president: "Mr. Macron, you will have many more problems related to me. It is better not to get involved with the Turkish people and
Turkey." It already looks like a threat. Recall that Paris is already preparing to supply the Greeks with combat aircraft. In response, Ankara
targeted the S-400 air defense system at the disputed sea area and announced its intention to purchase Russian fifth-generation Su-57 multirole
fighters. However, the big question is: will it come to a direct military clash between France and Turkey? The
Turkish armed forces are considered the second most powerful in NATO after
the United States. But France is a nuclear power. However, in the event of a repeat of the June incident, the conflict may
break out from one careless movement… It is worth noting that Washington's position is not very clear. The United States
recently lifted a long-standing arms embargo on Cyprus, angering Ankara. On the other hand, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo cautiously hinted
at the need to take into account the interests of the Turkish population when developing the Cyprus field and chastised the President of Cyprus for
allowing Russian warships to stop in Cypriot ports. So whose side is Washington on, and is it even ready, as before, to become a moderator of the
conflict? And how can this conflict end? - French interests in the Mediterranean, Africa and the Middle East have not been canceled. France
continues to behave like a master in many former colonies and their neighbors, " said Igor Shatrov, head of the Expert Council of the Strategic
Development Fund. - And although the same Libya was at one time an Italian, and not a French colony, it has always remained a springboard for
the struggle between the French crown and the Ottoman Empire. In different years, there were reasons for this. Now it is hydrocarbons and a long
coast that allows you to control the flow of migrants from Africa to Europe. The support of Greece and Cyprus in the confrontation with Turkey
is another of the bastions of this French-Turkish confrontation. "SP": - According to many experts, Paris and Athens are moving towards the
conclusion of an anti-Turkish defensive alliance, Paris is also actively arming Greece. Isn't this an escalation? What is it for? Will it come to real
military clashes? — Erdogan has started a risky geopolitical game, in which the nuclear powers — Russia,
the United States, France, and the United Kingdom-are also involved. Playing on the contradictions between
them and between them and other countries, he raises his own stakes and slowly turns Turkey into the leading power in the
region. Libya and Cyprus are the springboards of this " war. At the same time, I do not think that there is an armed conflict
with France and Greece in the plans of the Turkish "big game". This is not profitable for Turkey, France, or Greece. It is unprofitable, because it
is hopeless, you will still have to put up with it, and it will look like a defeat. However, these NATO allies will continue to bite each other. After
all, the tension outside is easily "sold" inside. Both Erdogan and Macron have a need for such foreign policy activity. It allows you to talk more
confidently with the voter. While the "great Western pilot" - the United States is busy with its internal problems, and on the foreign policy agenda
they get off with loud, but rhetoric, both France and Turkey are capable of forceful actions "on the ground". While no one is watching, it seems,
think in Paris and Ankara, there is an opportunity to redistribute both resources and influence. But for a real collision, you need a very good
reason. "SP": - And what about Washington? He doesn't have a very good relationship with Erdogan. They lifted a long-standing arms embargo
on Cyprus. On the other hand, it is also unprofitable to completely antagonize Turkey… "Washington has its own problems right now with a car
and a small cart. At least until the presidential election, domestic issues in the White House will be a priority. And it is this respite that we intend
to take advantage of both in Paris and in Ankara. At the same time, it is clear that the United States needs Turkey in the role of a Middle Eastern
gendarme. And the US has a tool to influence Turkey. This is a Kurdish issue. So as soon as the opportunity presents itself, the US will not miss
its chance to step in and cool the allies by keeping them in the same bloc." — First of all, these relationships need to throw a geopolitical view,
the analyst believes Vladimir Morehow. - On the face of the conflict of ideologies. Simply put: Erdogan wants to revive the Ottoman Empire, and
Macron acts as a representative of the Mondialist elites. That is, from the positions of the exact opposite. Mondialists are extremely irritated by
Erdogan's claims to resurrect Greater Turkey, while Erdogan is behaving too impulsively. Hence, these are constantly sparking conflicts. And of
course the interests of the French in Libya and other former French colonies. While Erdogan claims to be the defender of all traditional Islam.
"SP": - France is actively arming Greece. Isn't this an escalation? What is it for? How can this end? "Nothing, I think. In any case, as long as the
leading geopolitical players-Russia and the United States-do not intend to inflate the conflict. As for Russia, you can be completely calm here —
it does not need a war. America is more difficult. If Trump remains in power, he will certainly not allow a conflict. If the Democrats come to
power, and with them the globalist agenda and the frostbitten neocons return to current politics, you can expect anything. First of
all, the escalation
of the Middle East conflicts, and then-a chain reaction, in which the conflict
between Erdogan and Macron and Greece may play an important role. The positions of the Democrats and
conservatives in the United States are directly opposite. Trump stands for a traditional multipolar world, a world of several centers of power, on
which the stability of the world will be maintained. In this broad sense, both greater Turkey and greater Russia are its strategic allies. The
Democrats are for a global world with one single center of power. This means:
for  turning the  whole world  into  a zone of "controlled  chaos". If Biden wins,
everything will change. Sooner or later (rather sooner, they will make up for lost time
during the Trump presidency),  the  whole world  will be  ignited by  smoldering and  hot

conflicts, it is inevitable. At the same time, the peoples will be driven

under house arrest by covid quarantines and fear the consequences.
 1NC – A2: Central Asia Conflict
[a] 1AC Tastekin is not close to saying U.S relations being better stops Turkish
drone markets.
[b] Turkish drone markets has existed for years.
1AC Tastekin 9/26 [Fehim Tastekin is a Turkish journalist “Are Turkish drones complicating
disputes in Central Asia?”, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/09/are-turkish-drones-
complicating-disputes-central-asia ,9/26/22. IMP]
Amid fraught ties with the West, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been increasingly looking to the east in
recent years. He has signaled that Turkey would like to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is dominated by Russia and China, and sought to
boost Turkish influence in Central Asia, drawing on ethnic and linguistic bonds with the Turkic nations in the region. 
How the sale of the Bayraktars will affect those efforts is thus a pertinent question. Ankara is so in a rush to sell TB2 drones that it seems to care little for the
consequences. 
Echoing that approach, an analysis carried by the state-run Anatolia news agency said, “Flashpoints such as the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border clashes, the enmity of
radical elements in the Armenian armed forces to both the new status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Pashinyan government, threats arising from Afghanistan after
the US withdrawal and many other regional risks show that there is a vast area of activity for Turkish armed drones.”
In November 2021, Turkey spearheaded the creation of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, marking
the culmination of various cooperation initiatives since the 1990s. Tajikistan is not part of the group as its population is predominantly Persian-speaking. 
The OTS secretary-general sided openly with Kyrgyzstan after the latest flare-up, drawing protests from Tajikistan. This outlook casts a shadow on Turkey’s stated
impartiality toward Central Asian republics.
According to Kerim Has, a Moscow-based Turkish academic specializing on Eurasian affairs, the debut of Turkish drones in the recurring border clashes between
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan has added a new dimension to the conflict. The
expansion of the Turkish drone market in Central Asia
could deepen Turkey’s military-strategic influence in a region that Russia sees as its backyard and annoy Moscow, he told Al-
Monitor, though any countermove appears unlikely at present, given Russia’s growing troubles in Ukraine.

TB2 drones have tipped the scale in favor of Kyrgyzstan after Tajikistan enjoyed a relative
For Has, the

military edge for years . “While Kyrgyzstan usually suffered the heavier losses in previous border clashes, Tajikistan is suffering serious losses this
time,” he said, stressing that the use of the Bayraktars has reinforced perceptions that Turkey is siding with Kyrgyzstan.
The scholar cautioned that drone sales might ultimately bring more harm than benefits for Turkey. He said, “The current situation could hurt Turkey’s ties with
Tajikistan or encourage Tajikistan to acquire drones from Turkey, Iran or Russia to restore the balance vis-a-vis Kyrgyzstan. Should the drones come from Iran, this
could expand Tehran’s influence. And if Turkey sells drones to Tajikistan as well, it could face reactions from Kyrgyzstan. Thus, the drone trade could hardly please
both sides. Turkey risks harming its relations for the sake of a few hundred million dollars in profits for Erdogan’s inner circle.”

[c] No drones impact -- empirics.

Horowitz et al. 16, *Michael C., Professor of political science and the associate director of Perry World
House at the University of Pennsylvania, **Sarah E. Kreps, Professor of Government and Adjunct
Professor of Law at Cornell University, ***Matthew Fuhrmann, Professor of Political Science at Texas
A&M University. (11/10/16, "Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate over Drone Proliferation", MIT
Press Journals, https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00257) *language edited---
brackets denote a change
The concerns outlined above certainly have merit . Still, it is important not to overstate
the risk of drone deployments for regional or international stability. For example, none of
the aforementioned incidents led to armed military engagement . On the contrary ,
emerging norms regarding the consequences of shooting down a drone , though clearly still
in the early stages, suggest that states distinguish between the shooting down of
[inhabited] manned and unmanned [uninhabited] systems . Thus, even if there is an
accident and a drone is brought down, it is less likely to trigger a crisis or military
escalation than those in the pessimistic camp imply . For example, when Pakistan shot
down an Indian surveillance drone in the Kashmir region in the summer of 2015 that it said
strayed beyond the line of control, India did not escalate the long-simmering conflict to war.106
Similarly, compare the [restrained] muted international discussion when Turkey shot down a
drone flying on its border with Syria in the fall of 2015 with the diplomatic crisis between
Turkey and Russia that erupted when Turkey brought down a [ inhabited ] manned SU-24.107
Countries appear to know that opponents will value drones differently from manned
aircraft, and behave accordingly . Thus, drones carrying out surveillance and
reconnaissance missions need not be destabilizing . This may not always be the case, however,
because the rules of engagement in this context are not yet clearly defined.
 1NC – A2: Meltdowns
[a] Reactors mentioned are Ukrainian – a. they don’t send BMD to Ukraine – not a
NATO state and b. those attacks have already happened.
[b] No meltdowns and no impact to them
Bradley 16 (Arthur, PhD in Electrical Engineering from Auburn University, former NASA engineer,
2/3/16, “Would A Long-Duration Blackout Cause Nuclear Armageddon?”
http://www.thesurvivalistblog.net/would-a-long-duration-blackout-cause-nuclear-armageddon/ ] lr
The good news is that nuclear fission can be stopped in under one second through the insertion of

control rods. Those control rods are automatically inserted near the fuel rods either by a hydraulic system or through the
when the electrical grid goes
use of an electromagnetic deadman switch that activates when power is removed. That means that

down or an emergency shutdown is initiated, fission would automatically stop one

second later . That’s a good thing, but it doesn’t make the reactor inherently safe. Even without fission, the fuel rod assemblies remain incredibly hot,
perhaps a thousand degrees C. If they were not actively cooled, pressure and temperatures would build in the reactor until something breaks—not good. After

three days of active cooling, however, the reactor would be thermally cool enough to open , should it
be deemed necessary to remove the fuel rod assemblies. The second major risk has to do with cooling of the spent fuel rod assemblies. Nuclear fuel rod assemblies
have a usable life on the order of 54-72 months (depending on reactor type). Every 18-24 months, the reactor is brought down and serviced. While it is down, the
fuel rod assemblies are removed, and 1/3 of them are replaced with fresh assemblies. Think of this like rotating cans of food in your emergency pantry. In the U.S.,
fuel rods are not refurbished like in other countries. Instead, they are carefully stored in giant pools of water laced with boric acid—imagine a swimming pool at
your local YMCA that is 75-feet deep. Those spent fuel rod assemblies are still incredibly radioactive, and they continue to generate heat. Water in the pool must
therefore be circulated to keep them cool. How long must the fuel rods be cooled? According to Mr. Hopson, the answer is 5-7 years. After that, the rods are cool
enough to be removed and stored in reinforced concrete casks. Even then, the rods continue to be radioactive, but their heat output can be passively managed.
Nuclear plants obviously require electricity to operate their cooling pumps, not to mention their control systems. That power is normally tapped off of the electricity

when the grid itself goes

that the reactor generates. If the plant is offline, the power is provided by the electrical grid. But what happens

down? The short answer is that large on-site diesel generators automatically activate to provide
electricity. And if those should fail, portable diesel generators, which are also on-site , can be connected.
Recent standardization has also ensured that generators can be swapped between plants without

the need to retrofit connectors. There are also a couple of additional emergency systems that can be used

specifically to cool the reactor. These include the turbine-driven-auxiliary-feedwater pump ,

which uses steam generated by the reactor to power a cooling turbine. The pump requires an
operator, but it runs completely without electricity . This system, however, is meant only for emergency cooling of the
in the
reactor during those critical first few days when the fuel rod assemblies are being brought down in temperature, not for long-term cooling. And finally,

worst case, most plants have a method of bringing in river or ocean water to flood the
reactor . This typically damages the cooling system, but again, it helps to cool and cover the reactor
core should all else fail. Unlike in other countries, permission from the federal government is not required to flood
the reactor. With backup systems to the backup systems, it would seem that there’s nothing to
worry about , right? Under all but the direst of circumstances, I think that assessment is correct. However, one could imagine a scenario in which the grid
was lost and the diesel generators ran out of fuel. Speaking of fuel, how much is actually stored onsite? It depends on the plant, but at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant,

for example, there is enough fuel to run the emergency diesel generators for at least 42 days. I say at least
because it would depend on exactly what was being powered. Once the reactor was cooled down, a much smaller system, known as the Residual Heat Removal
System, would be all that was required to keep the fuel assemblies cool, both in the reactor and the spent fuel rods pool. The generators and onsite fuel supply

could power that smaller cooling system for significantly longer than if they were powering the larger reactor cooling system . Even if we assumed
a worst case of forty-two days, it’s hard to imagine a scenario in which that would not be enough time to
bring in additional fuel either by land, water, or air . Nonetheless, let’s push the question a little further. What
would happen in the unlikely event that the diesel fuel was exhausted? Even with the reactor having been successfully cooled, the biggest risk would continue to be
overheating of the fuel rod assemblies, both in the reactor and the spent fuel rods pool. Without circulation, the heat from the fuel rod assemblies could boil the
surrounding water, resulting in steam. In turn, the water levels would drop, ultimately exposing the fuel rods to air. Once
exposed to air, their
temperatures would rise but not to the levels that would melt the zirconium cladding. Thankfully, that
means that meltdown would not occur . The steam might well carry radioactive contaminants into the air,
but there would be no release of hydrogen and, thus, no subsequent explosions . The situation
would certainly be dangerous to surrounding communities, but it wouldn’t be the nuclear
Armageddon that many people worry about.