1NC---GBX---R1

1
 1NC—OFF
投反对票拥抱亚裔
Solves and avoids the Asian negation DA.
2
 1NC—OFF
T-USFG

Interpretation and violation - the affirmative should defend the hypothetical

implementation of a topical plan – they don’t.

The USFG’ denotes the three branches.

U.S. Legal 16, organization offering legal assistance and attorney access, “United States Federal
Government Law and Legal Definition,” https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-
government/
The U nited S tates F ederal G overnment is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with
the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature , which is the US

Congress, ii) Executive , comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary . The US
Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government.

The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not
expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

Security cooperation is authorized by US Code.

Tankel ’20 [Stephen and Tommy; October 28; associate professor at American University, an adjunct
senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, has served on the House Foreign Affairs
Committee and in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; non-resident senior associate
at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for
security cooperation and was the senior defense and intelligence adviser to Senate Majority Leader Harry
Reid; War on the Rocks, “Retooling U.S. Security Sector Assistance,”
https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/reforming-u-s-security-sector-assistance-for-great-power-
competition]
The U nited S tates provides security sector assistance to foreign civilian and military forces, agencies,
and institutions ranging from local law enforcement and judicial systems to standing
militaries. This assistance is intended to strengthen U.S. access to key territories and facilities, shape partners’ national security decision-
making and governance, and build their capacity and capabilities for use against shared threats and adversaries. It also promotes the
U.S. defense industry via arms transfers, supports the infrastructure and operations of
multilateral organizations such as NATO , and increases military interoperability. The State Department
implements assistance across the entire security sector, including organizations
responsible for defense , law enforcement , and security of key assets like ports and
borders. The Department o f Defense has a narrower mandate , and provides assistance
to partner militaries under the umbrella of security cooperation . The Pentagon also
engages in a range of other activities — combined exercises, staff talks, port visits, and
officer exchanges — that fall under security cooperation as well. We use the term security sector assistance
for simplicity, and distinguish where these additional security cooperation activities are relevant. The U.S. government does not typically define
Foreign Military Sales as assistance, but we believe it should, and that it ought to factor Direct Commercial Sales into its assistance planning as
well. Both types of sales can lead to sustained U.S. engagement with a partner in the form of training, maintenance, and sustainment for the
purchased items.
Over the last several years, the national security enterprise has, with a great many fits and starts, endeavored to shift its broader focus — from weapons systems to diplomacy — away from counter-terrorism and toward strategic competition with state actors. As part of this shift, policymakers have attempted to realign security assistance to contribute more directly to strategic competition,
primarily by creating new resources for security assistance in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. The European Deterrence Initiative, launched in 2014, has allocated around $6 billion annually to enhance America’s deterrent posture vis-à-vis Russia. It has been supplemented by the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, authorized by Congress in Fiscal Year 2016 to provide $250
million in security assistance to bolster Ukraine’s security. Congress also created the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative in 2014, later re-designated as the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative, and funded it as a five-year, $425 million security assistance effort, which it has since extended through FY2025. This program is intended to improve the ability of Southeast and East
Asian nations to address growing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. In the FY2021 defense bill currently being finalized, Congress is set to authorize a Pacific Deterrence Initiative, modeled on the European Deterrence Initiative, with as much as $6 billion annually to improve U.S. posture in the Asia-Pacific region, reportedly with a significant security assistance component.
These efforts have been laudable, but far from sufficient. The European Deterrence Initiative has largely been used to shift enduring costs for U.S. military presence in Europe into the Overseas Contingency Operations portion of the defense budget. It has also dedicated the vast majority of funds to posture and equipment pre-positioning, with little attention to security assistance beyond
combined exercises — a significant missed opportunity. The Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative has been managed insularly by the U.S. Europe Command, which has bypassed synchronization with other Defense Department and U.S. government stakeholders, leading to a focus on the provision of “training and equipment at the expense of developing a long-term strategic vision and
implementation of meaningful defense reform.” In the Asia-Pacific, the Maritime Security Initiative has shown promise, but its relatively limited funding has failed to significantly contribute to a rebalance of assistance toward the region, and it has largely funded projects with little deterrent value. Incoming U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander Adm. Philip Davidson declared, “China is now
capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States.” Moreover, none of these initiatives have prioritized partner security sector governance — a vital element of any strategy that seeks to shape the behavior of U.S. allies and partners. As Congress considers the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, it is essential that these mistakes — failure to integrate
security assistance with other instruments of national power, overemphasis on posture at the expense of cooperation, and too little ambition for assistance initiatives — are not repeated. Even avoiding them, however, will go only so far in terms of optimizing security sector assistance for the challenges ahead. The U.S. government should also address broader challenges with the way
security sector assistance is prioritized and executed.
Still an Outmoded Instrument
To increase the effectiveness of security sector assistance for strategic competition, the United States should address deficiencies related to where and how it uses this assistance. Currently, assistance is focused on the wrong countries and being used to build the wrong capabilities. Assistance remains over-directed toward countries in the Middle East, Africa, and South and Central Asia,
rather than to those in Europe and Southeast Asia where the main competition with Russia and China occurs. There are several reasons for this disparity.
First, annual commitments to Israel and Egypt — totaling $3.3 billion and $1.3 billion, respectively — eat up a large portion of the Foreign Military Financing budget. The origins of U.S. munificence to both countries is linked to the “payoff for peace,” that is, the U.S. commitment to Israel and Egypt after they signed the 1979 Camp David Accords. Distinct from the Foreign Military
Sales program, through which the State Department brokers purchases of U.S.-made defense articles and defense services by foreign partners, the Foreign Military Financing program provides grants and loans to help partners, generally lower-income countries, purchase those articles and services. It is intended to be the premier program for building the capabilities of frontline allies and
partners. Given its purpose, one would think that the United States would be steering more Foreign Military Financing toward Europe and Asia.
Second, the 9/11 attacks brought new requirements: promoting counter-terrorism cooperation and rapidly building the capacity of local partner forces, especially the creation or enhancement of tactical units, to address “urgent and emergent threats.” This naturally led to a focus on countries where terrorists operated or might take root, which reinforced the geographic focus on the Middle
East, and expanded it to include countries in Central and South Asia. This focus was especially marked at the Defense Department. The amount of assistance it administers climbed significantly since 9/11, and totaled just over $7.5 billion in the FY2021 budget request. Approximately $6.5 billion comes from contingency funds for capacity building in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other conflict
zones. Supporting these conflicts created additional security assistance cost centers among partners that played critical roles supporting counter-terrorism operations and U.S. logistics footprints. For example, Pakistan received over $23 billion in security assistance and military reimbursements as a result of its importance to the United States as a counter-terrorism partner after 9/11.
Jordan has also experienced a marked increase in assistance over the same period, receiving close to $10 billion.
Overall, the United States spends about $20 billion annually on security sector assistance, of which only approximately 8 percent is allotted to Europe, East Asia, and the Pacific, according to Security Assistance Monitor. Addressing this imbalance will require the departments of State and Defense to reprioritize their budget requests, and Congress to cease earmarking security sector
assistance dollars based on outmoded objectives.
The overriding focus on counter-terrorism in U.S. security sector assistance programs and national security strategy more broadly over the past two decades has not only contributed to its orientation toward the Middle East, Africa, and South and Central Asia. It also compounded challenges related to how the United States uses assistance, specifically America’s emphasis on countering
urgent threats and on capacity building for counter-terrorism or special operations units. Where the State Department provides assistance to civilian security sector forces and institutions in other countries, it overemphasizes building tactical capabilities for law enforcement (that is, training small operational units on narrow capabilities like interdicting narcotraffickers or conducting
counterterrorism raids) at the expense of the administrative capacity and professionalism of these forces and institutions. Defense Department assistance has similarly focused on building the tactical capabilities of partner militaries. Such tactical assistance — which often includes status-signaling weapons systems and resources to supplement partner personnel training budgets — is often
prioritized by partners as well, particularly in the absence of effective U.S. messaging on the importance of broader reforms.
The U.S. emphasis on counter-terrorism led to a buildup of Special Operations Command and the services’ special operations forces components as well, and a commensurate focus on building the capacity of their special operations counterparts in other countries. Although the services dispense assistance, they don’t invest much in terms of the planning necessary to tie the execution of
this assistance to either specific objectives or longer-term engagements. Other than the Army’s Security Force Assistance Brigades, the services don’t organize for the security sector assistance mission. Even in the Asia-Pacific, the main focus of assistance prior to the Maritime Security Initiative was the special operations forces capacity-building mission in the Philippines. This focus on
special operations force has left the services, and U.S. partners’ conventional forces, out of the equation in many places. Iraq and Afghanistan are a notable exception, but even in these countries the United States has focused on building specific types of military units with a heavy emphasis on partner special operations capacity.
While the United States has directed security sector assistance toward the Middle East and South and Central Asia, and focused more on building partners’ tactical capacity for counter-terrorism, Russia and China are using aggressive military pressure to coerce neighbors and compete in new domains, such as cyber and space. They are also using instruments of statecraft outside the
traditional security arena, such as economic pressure, lawfare, and even technical standards-setting. For example, China has used commercially flagged fishing vessels to perform militia-like functions in support of its activities around South China Sea features. Russia has used its cyber capabilities to disrupt critical infrastructure, interfere in elections, undermine political leaders, and
spread disinformation throughout NATO-aligned Eastern Europe. The United States has failed to keep pace — either on its own in terms of its use of all instruments of national power, or in terms of the security assistance it provides partners to enhance their capabilities to mount effective responses and build resilience.
Optimizing Security Sector Assistance
If security assistance is to be an effective tool in strategic competition, then the U.S. government needs to step up its game. Washington should develop a sophisticated, integrated planning process at the State Department and Department of Defense for security assistance; significantly increase the Foreign Military Financing budget, or redirect spending from the Middle East and North
Africa to Asia and Eastern Europe; use security assistance to convey strategic messages to both rivals and partners; and feature human rights considerations more prominently when engaging in arms sales. This would require the United States to address underlying deficiencies in planning, prioritization, and execution in ways that account for the unique challenges that Russian and
Chinese approaches to competition bring: the use of disinformation, private security contractors, cyber tools, and civilian and commercial actors such as commercial fishing fleets. This is not to suggest that Washington should look to security sector assistance as the solution to all of its national security challenges — far from it. Rather, assistance should be better integrated with other
instruments of national power. The following recommendations are intended to close the gap between where the United States currently is regarding its use of security sector assistance and where it needs to be to compete effectively. Some of these recommendations are focused more squarely on China and Russia, whereas others relate to broader reforms to the security sector assistance
enterprise.
First, it is essential to create coordinated, department-wide planning processes at the departments of State and Defense. The U.S. government is hamstrung by inefficient and incoherent planning and coordination processes that do not allocate assistance based on U.S. foreign policy priorities, country prioritization, availability of resources, and regional and country-specific assumptions.
Congressional earmarks make prioritization more difficult, but getting rid of them won’t solve the problem. Policymakers should recognize the fundamentally interdisciplinary nature of many aspects of strategic competition and begin to break down stovepipes both within and between key agencies involved in the planning and execution of security assistance. Interagency coordination
should move beyond mere deconfliction and concurrence toward a truly collaborative real-time planning and response. Lack of coordination also exists within departments, which should reform their assistance planning processes. Of equal importance, security sector assistance planning and prioritization should account for the fact that China and Russia are mounting sustained challenges
to governance and rule of law at the regional, national, and multinational levels. Advancing governance and rule of law therefore should be a key aim of assistance.

The State Department has a wider mandate for security assistance , encompassing both
military aid and assistance for civilians. It is also supposed to use security assistance to
advance broader, more long-term objectives like trade and investment, efforts to help
allies and partners develop an innovation base, and major diplomatic initiatives. To fulfill this
mission, the State Department should develop a planning process that elevates common interagency objectives for assistance, deconflicts
competing objectives where necessary, identifies security assistance resources projected to be available for the period of time necessary to
achieve such objectives, and recommends the allocation of assistance based on U.S. foreign policy priorities. Those priorities should be derived
from the next administration’s national security strategy and informed by the availability of resources, and regional and country-specific
assumptions. State also needs to create a framework to guide the use of assistance as dictated by the above planning process in alignment with
other instruments of national power, and a framework for factoring in how arms sales — both Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial
Sales — might affect U.S. security assistance planning and broader U.S. foreign policy objectives. Last year, the House of Representatives passed
a State Authorization Act that required these and other reforms, but it has languished in the Senate since then.
Defense Department assistance should focus narrowly on four inherently military objectives: supporting State Department-coordinated efforts to build long-term capacity so that an ally or partner can manage its own security challenges; achieving a fundamental improvement in U.S. posture
to prevail (including via coalitions) in a potential contingency, for example by assisting a partner to build a deep-water port or develop the capability to contribute in a specific role to potential coalition operations; generating short-term capacity when deemed necessary to achieve strategic
objectives or improving interoperability for a specific goal; and responding to real-time developments, such as deterrent signaling, personnel recovery, or humanitarian response. Defense Department planners should be required to identify the objective(s) they’re serving and justify their plans
on that basis. They also should be conducting a rigorous analysis to identify gaps in Pentagon plans for contingency scenarios involving near-peer competitors or other real-time developments that could impact U.S. interests, and basing priorities for security assistance on those gaps. Stronger
links between contingency planning and security cooperation will help focus Defense Department security assistance and advance strategic competition.
Second, a more sophisticated and coordinated planning process should lead the United States to redirect security assistance to U.S. allies and partners in Asia and Eastern Europe, and expand the nature of assistance provided. The U.S. government has begun shifting some assistance, such as
Section 333 capacity building administered by the Pentagon, away from U.S. Central Command countries to countries in the U.S. European Command and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command regions. The State and Defense departments need to accelerate this shift to compete more effectively with
Russia and China. The United States should be using Foreign Military Financing, as well as Maritime Security Initiative funding and other programs, to help regional states in Asia develop anti-access/area denial systems to challenge Chinese power-projection operations. The departments of
State, Defense, and Homeland Security should also be coordinating to increase support for U.S. Coast Guard cooperation with allies and partners to challenge China’s white hull strategy.
Realizing a significant reallocation of security assistance in support of strategic competition will require increasing the overall budget for Foreign Military Financing. These budgets have declined from a peak of $9.4 billion in FY2015 to the current year’s $7.5 billion, while the importance
placed on security cooperation with allies and partners and the variety of threats they face have increased. The amount of such an increase will depend on the needs of key allies and partners, and whether Congress is willing to reduce Foreign Military Financing to Israel and Egypt, which in
some years accounts for nearly two-thirds of the program’s budget. Unquestionably, the State Department can improve its prioritization of the remaining amount, which is spread across more than 100 partners globally, but those limited resources go only so far.

In our experience, selling Congress on an injection of resources or on reductions to Israel and Egypt will require considerable effort. The State
Department would need not only to provide a compelling strategy for how resources that can be freed up by reducing commitments to Israel and
Egypt will be used to improve America’s national security posture. It also will need to provide a convincing assessment that such reductions will
not infringe on Israel’s qualitative military edge in the region or lead to a breakdown in the peace treaties between Israel and Egypt. We believe
these crucial U.S. interests — Israel’s security and regional stability — can be maintained at lower aid levels. However, we are also realistic
about the political challenges that make such a shift so difficult regardless of what any policy analysis suggests. For this reason, although we
typically would recommend starting with a reallocation of existing resources before increasing the overall budget, in this instance we recognize
that directing more money to the problem might be the least-worst option. A compelling case can be made for new resources and authorities to
expand the types of aid provided under Foreign Military Financing — including to address the gaps identified above, such as cyber
security and law enforcement . The argument will be strongest if it is articulated within broader strategies for competing with
China and Russia.
In addition to Foreign Military Financing, there are a mix of other programs the United States could use to
increase the capacity and capabilities of key Eastern European NATO allies. As Max Bergmann observed on these pages a
few years ago, Congress is likely to be unwilling to provide much assistance funding through traditional grant methods, especially as Eastern
European countries are wealthier than typical grant assistance recipients. This approach is deeply flawed: Many of Eastern Europe’s governments
lack the economic wherewithal to engage in the types of military development necessary to compete with Russia. Moreover, the United States has
clear and urgent goals in the region that should not be left dependent on the vicissitudes of partners’ budget politics. At the same time, we agree
with Bergmann that the United States cannot and should not shoulder too much of the responsibility for these countries, which should
demonstrate a commitment to acquisitions. One of the problems with Foreign Military Sales, though, is that U.S. weapons systems that Eastern
European militaries would need to compete with Russia are top-of-the-line and likely unaffordable for midtier countries. Providing excess
defense articles is one workaround, but this puts recipients at the mercy of what is available. Bergmann’s recommendation that the United States
provide a mix ofgrants and loans to help NATO countries make acquisitions themselves is a fine one, and
we would offer complementary or alternative approaches as well. The U.S. government could consider a lend-lease program in
which equipment itself is provided via a loan or low-cost lease for a period of time to be used in an agreed-upon manner, after which the recipient
could purchase the equipment at a reduced cost. Pooled sales and multilateral cooperative platforms
modeled on
the Movement Coordination Center Europe are other promising solutions. Any one of these models would be an improvement on the current
approach.
domains stretching beyond traditional military strength
As China, Russia, and others compete across a range of
— cyber security, law enforcement, and disinformation — the U.S. government should enhance its ability to
provide timely, relevant assistance in these areas. In our experience in government, American allies and partners routinely ask for this assistance.
 Cyber security assistance is meagerly resourced
Yet, U.S. capacity building in each of these areas is immature.
and often ad hoc, with limited assistance programs spread incoherently across government agencies. Likewise, intelligence and
law enforcement capacity building are limited and often plagued by turf battles. Enabling allies and partners to
counter disinformation represents an emerging area of focus, and Washington should rise to the occasion. In many of these areas, effective
governance is often one of the most crucial gaps America’s allies and partners confront. To meet these challenges, the United States should
reimagine security sector assistance, factor in its impact on governance and rule of law, and increase the involvement of the departments of
Homeland Security, Justice, and Treasury.

Vote Neg—two impacts

[1] Procedural Fairness -- Debate is a competition that necessitates boundaries and
limits that ensure one side doesn’t win by default which creates fair participation and
actualizes the benefits of their side.
[2] Clash— specific research over points of difference enables third and fourth level
testing necessary to motivate advocacy and argumentative reflection which check
bias and avoid debate from turning into a lecture.
Dybvig and Iverson 2k [Kristin Chisholm Dybvig, Arizona State University, and Joel O. Iverson,
Arizona State University, 2000. “Can Cutting Cards Carve into Our Personal Lives: An Analysis of
Debate Research on Personal Advocacy” https://debate.uvm.edu/dybvigiverson1000.html]
Mitchell (1998) provides a thorough examination of the pedagogical implication for academic debate. Although Mitchell acknowledges
that debate  provides preparation for participation in democracy , limiting debate to a laboratory where
students practice their skill for future participation is criticized. Mitchell contends:
For students and teachers of argumentation, the heightened salience of this question should signal the danger that critical thinking and oral
advocacy skills alone may not be sufficient for citizens to assert their voices in public deliberation. (p. 45)
Mitchell contends that the laboratory style setting creates barriers to other spheres, creates a "sense of detachment" and causes debaters to
argumentative agency [which] involves the
see research from the role of spectators. Mitchell further calls for "

capacity to contextualize and employ the skills and  strategies  of argumentative discourse in fields
of  social  action , especially wider spheres of public deliberation" (p. 45). Although we agree with Mitchell that debate can be an
even greater instrument of empowerment for students, we are more interested in examining the impact of the intermediary step of research.
In each of Mitchell's examples of debaters finding creative avenues for agency, there had to be a motivation to act. It is our contention that the
research conducted for competition is a major  catalyst to propel their action,
change their opinions, and to provide a  greater  depth of  understanding  of the issues involved.
The level of research involved in debate creates an in-depth understanding of issues. The level of research conducted during a year of debate is
quite extensive. Goodman (1993) references a Chronicle of Higher Education article that estimated "the level and extent of research required of
the average college debater for each topic is equivalent to the amount of research required for a Master's Thesis (cited in Mitchell, 1998, p.
55). With this extensive quantity of research, debaters attain a high level of investigation and (presumably) understanding of a topic. As a
result of this level of understanding, debaters become knowledgeable citizens who are further empowered to make informed opinions
and energized to take action. Research helps to educate students (and coaches) about the state of the world.
Without the guidance of a debate topic , how many students would do  in-
depth  research  on  female genital mutilation in Africa, or  U nited  N ations sanctions on
Iraq ?  The competitive nature of policy  debate  provides an impetus for students
to  research  the topics that they are going to debate. This in turn fuels students’ awareness of issues that go beyond their
front doors . Advocacy flows from this increased awareness. Reading books and articles about the suffering of people thousands of miles
away or right in our own communities drives people to become involved in the community at large.
Research has also focused on how debate prepares us for life in the public sphere. Issues that we discuss in debate have found their way onto
the national policy stage, and training in intercollegiate debate makes us good public advocates . The public sphere is the
arena in which we all must participate to be active citizens. Even after we leave debate, the skills that we have gained should help us to be
better advocates and citizens. Research has looked at how debate impacts education (Matlon and Keele 1984), legal training (Parkinson, Gisler
and Pelias 1983, Nobles 19850 and behavioral traits (McGlone 1974, Colbert 1994). These works illustrate the impact that public debate has on
students as they prepare to enter the public sphere. 
The debaters who take active roles such as protesting sanctions were probably not  actively  engaged
in the issue until their research drew them into the topic. Furthermore, the process of intense research for
debate may actually change the positions debaters hold. Since debaters typically enter into a topic with only cursory (if any) knowledge of the
issue, the research process provides exposure to issues that were previously unknown. Exposure to the literature on a topic can create,
reinforce or alter an individual's opinions. Before learning of the School for the America's, having an opinion of the place is impossible. After
hearing about the systematic training of torturers and oppressors in a debate round and reading the research, an opinion of the "school" was
developed. In this manner, exposure to debate research as the person  finding the evidence, hearing it as the
opponent in a debate round (or as judge) acts as an initial spark of awareness on an issue . This process of discovery seems to
have a similar impact to watching an investigative news report.
Mitchell claimed that debate could be more than it was traditionally seen as, that it could be a catalyst to empower people to act in the social
arena. We surmise that there is a step in between the debate and the action. The intermediary step where people are inspired to agency is
based on the research that they do. If students are compelled to act, research is a main factor in compelling them to do so.  Even if students
are not compelled to take  direct  action, research still changes opinions  and attitudes.
Research often compels students to take action in the social arena. Debate topics guide students in a direction that allows them to explore what
the college policy debate topic was,
is going on in the world. Last year 

Resolved: That the U nited  S tates  F ederal  G overnment should adopt a policy of constructive engagement, including
the immediate removal of all or nearly all economic sanctions, with the government(s) of one or more of the following nation-states: Cuba, Iran,
Iraq, Syria, North Korea. 
spurred quite a bit of activism on the college debate circuit. Many students become actively involved in protesting for the
This topic 

removal of sanctions from at least one of the topic countries. The college listserve was used to rally people in

support of various movements to remove sanctions on both Iraq and Cuba. These messages were posted after the research on
the topic began. While this topic did not lend itself to activism beyond rallying the government, other topics have allowed students to take their
beliefs outside of the laboratory and into action.
In addition to creating awareness, the research process can also reinforce or alter opinions. By discovering new information in the research
process, people can question their current assumptions and perhaps formulate a more informed opinion. One example comes from
a summer debate class for children of Migrant workers in North Dakota (Iverson, 1999). The Junior High aged students chose to debate the
adoption of Spanish as an official language in the U.S. Many students expressed their concern that they could not argue effectively against the
proposed change because it was a "truism." They were wholly in favor of Spanish as an official language. After researching the topic throughout
their six week course, many realized much more was involved in adopting an official language and that they did not "speak 'pure' Spanish or
English, but speak a unique dialect and hybrid" (Iverson, p. 3). At the end of the class many students became opposed to adopting Spanish as an
official language, but found other ways Spanish should be integrated into American culture. Without research, these students would have
maintained their opinions and not enhanced their knowledge of the issue. The students who maintained support of Spanish as an official
language were better informed and thus also more capable of articulating support for their beliefs. 
The examples of debate and research impacting the opinions and actions of debaters indicate the strong potential for a direct relationship
between debate research and personal advocacy. However, the debate community has not created a new sea of activists immersing this planet
in waves of protest and political action. The level of influence debater search has on people needs further exploration. Also, the process of
research needs to be more fully explored in order to understand if and why researching for the competitive activity of debate generates more
interest than research for other purposes such as classroom projects.
Since parliamentary debate does not involve research into a single topic, it can provide an important reference point for examining the impact
of research in other forms of debate. Based upon limited conversations with competitors and coaches as well as some direct coaching and
judging experience in parliamentary debate, parliamentary forms of debate has not seen an increase in activism on the part of debaters in the
United States. Although some coaches require research in order to find examples and to stay updated on current events, the basic principle of
this research is to have a commonsense level of understanding(Venette, 1998). As the NPDA website explains, "the reader is encouraged to be
well-read in current events, as well as history, philosophy, etc. Remember: the realm of knowledge is that of a 'well-read college student'"
(NPDA Homepage,http://www.bethel.edu/Majors/Communication/npda/faq2.html). The focus of research is breadth, not depth. In fact, in-
depth research into one topic for parliamentary debate would seem to be counterproductive. Every round has a different resolution and for
APDA, at least, those resolutions are generally written so they are open to a wide array of case examples, So, developing too narrow of a focus
could be competitively fatal. However, research is apparently increasing for parliamentary teams as reports of "stock cases" used by teams for
numerous rounds have recently appeared. One coach did state that a perceived "stock case" by one team pushed his debaters to research the
topic of AIDS in Africa in order to be equally knowledgeable in that case. Interestingly, the coach also stated that some of their research in
preparation for parliamentary debate was affecting the opinions and attitudes of the debaters on the team.
Not all debate research appears to generate personal advocacy and challenge peoples' assumptions. Debaters must switch sides, so they
supporting  and
must inevitably debate against various cases. While this may seem to be inconsistent with advocacy, 

researching  both sides of an argument actually created  stronger advocates . Not only did
debaters learn both sides of an argument, so that they could defend their positions against
attack , they also learned the nuances of each position. Learning and the intricate nature of various  policy
proposals  helps debaters to strengthen their own stance  on issues.

Education that we receive under model is good –

[1] IR -- Even abstract concepts like negotiating between the US and Russia
provides a template for studying human interactions and helps break down the
impulse for rightness vs. transgression dichotomies which characterizes
interpersonal hostility.
Earle 86 [Professor of Psychology, The Ohio State University. International Relations and the
Psychology of Control: Alternative Control Strategies and Their Consequences. Political Psychology,
Vol. 7, No. 2 (Jun.,1986), pp. 369-375. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3791131.pdf]
Research into the psychology of control has revealed that control needs are key elements of individual psychological functioning. This paper
argues that a “need for control’’ framework is also useful for understanding actions and ideologies at the national and international levels. It
critically analyzes prevalent strategies for exerting control in this domain and proposes alternative
strategies which permit greater fulfillment of control needs . These alternatives emerge from an
examination of potential similarities between satisfaction of control needs within the separate
but parallel domains of international relations and interpersonal relations .
Political psychology has the potential to translate issues of i nternational r elations into the terms of
human interpersonal encounter . In my view, such a translation enhances our ability to think
creatively about the current world situation.
The students
in my freshman psychology course recently surprised me by adopting this approach for an in-class assignment. I had
asked them to role-play a negotiating session between the U nited S tates and the Soviet Union on
the issue of arms control . My assumption had been that they would act out the roles of political leaders on both sides, and would
proceed by exchanging official positions on arms control issues. Instead, they took the viewpoint of ordinary Ameri-can and
Soviet citizens and exchanged candid remarks concerning their feelings about the nuclear danger.
Their tone of earnest sincerity was in stark contrast to the kind of elaborate posturing, deceitfulness, and strategic “positioning” that usually
characterizes this kind of endeavor at the diplomatic level. Having translated the arms race into its smallest constituent parts—the feelings of
individual Soviet and American citizens—they had stripped away the layers of pretense and revealed the rigidly arbitrary nature of their country’s
“party line.” After the role-play had ended, the students pressed me to admit that, if the political and military leaders on both sides were removed
from the picture, much of the current conflict between the two countries could be settled by a consensus of common citizens from both sides.
It only occurred to me later that, regardless of the practicality of their solution, my class had arrived at it by a highly unusual means: They had
asserted that the problems were amenable to human control by acknowledging their own
individual human reactions to the dangers of continued international confrontation . I choose to
focus here not on the solution my students proposed but on the impulse behind their proposal. The need expressed by these students to render
these issues “controllable” in some fashion is a basic one. Perhaps an examination of this need, and the more vs. less healthy ways it can be
satisfied, holds the key to a novel approach to international relations.
The concept of a “need for control” has recently received much attention within the field of psychology. The belief that one can exercise control
over one’s outcomes is said to be critical to psychological well-being (Glass and Singer, 1972; Langer, 1983; Seligman, 1975; Wortman and
Brehm, 1975). Research has shown that the negative consequences of a stressful event on physical and mental health can be overcome by a sense
of control—i.e., a belief in one’s ability to cope with (respond effectively to) the event (Anderson, 1982; Langer and Rodin, 1976; Perlmuter and
Monty, 1979; Weiss, 1972). The accumulating body of research in this area has promising applications for the restoration and maintenance of
psychological health in a wide range of human environmental settings.
To date, feelings of control have been studied as an attribute of individual psychological functioning. However, the recent work of Fred
Rothbaum and John Weisz and their colleagues (Rothbaum et al., 1982; Weisz et al., 1984) suggests that a “need for control” analysis may also
be useful for understanding the functioning of individual nations within the international arena. Rothbaum et al. distinguish between primary and
secondary forms of control. Primary control is the ability to enhance one’s rewards by doing something to influence existing realities (e.g., other
people, circumstances). In secondary control, rewards are obtained by accommodating to existing realities and maximizing satisfaction with
things as they are.
In other words, people attempt to gain control not only by bringing the environment into line with their wishes (primary control) but also by
bringing themselves into line with environmental forces (secondary control). Weisz et al. argue that cultures differ in the extent to which they
emphasize primary vs. secondary forms of control. They conclude that the proper relation between the two forms of control involves a dynamic
interplay between them, and warn that too heavy an emphasis on either primary or secondary control may be maladaptive for cultures as well as
individuals.
citizens and policymakers
Extending the logic of Weisz et al. to the realm of international relations, it can be assumed that

alike define the requirements of national self-interest in somewhat the same terms they use to
evaluate their own individual sense of well-being . For example, there is widespread agreement that a key element of a
“healthy” American psyche is a sense of national potency (“primary control,” in our terms) in the international arena. Ronald Reagan’s
Presidency has been lauded by both supporters and detractors for its “restoration” of this sense of control after the “humiliating” decade of the
1970s—a legacy of Vietnam, the oil embargo, and the Iranian hostage crisis (cf. Yankelovich, 1982). Whether or not such a felt sense of control
(or lack of same) would be sustained by an objective appraisal, it is nonetheless real if it has real consequences for domestic political priorities
and foreign policy actions.
Given the present context of international relations, is an enhanced sense of control by one nation purchased at the expense of diminished control
by other nations? [The Weisz et al. analysis does not attempt to address this key issue.] Under what conditions can this zero-sum notion of control
be overcome? If the attainment of a sense of control is indeed an important objective within the world community, then these questions are
critical.
The answer may lie in exploring alternative strategies for attaining primary control . For example, the
prevailing strategy requires nations to maximize their power vis a vis potential adversaries . Yet
the sense of control thus attained is always tenuous , because (a) the technological basis for
maintaining such relative power may be eclipsed by breakthroughs on the other side, (b) such technology is subject to
dissemination to third parties, thus diluting the power of its former owners, and (c) power that involves the domination of one nation by another
(either directly or through surrogates) is bound to be resisted by those subject peoples whose own needs for control have been thwarted.
Numerous examples attest to the existence of these needs (under the guise of “nationalism” and “self-determination” or “revolution” and
“rebellion”—depending on the orientation of the describer) as a continued source of frustration for the great powers in their attempts to maintain
the stability of client states.
Faced with these difficulties of asserting primary control, both the U nited S tates and the Soviet
Union have come to rely heavily on a form of secondary control that Weisz et al. refer to as interpretive control .
This is the attempt to interpret events so as to derive a sense of meaning and purpose from
them. In the current great power struggle, this assumes the form of rigidly ideological beliefs about the
nature of the “other side’’ and the necessity of continued struggle . It allows individual
persons and actions to be subsumed under a “grand scheme” of impersonal global forces (e.g.,
“good” vs. “evil” ). The interpretive route to control works to the extent that it provides a reassuring sense of order and predictability.
However, this unifying vision is purchased at the expense of an empirically based analysis of

what the rest of the world is doing and why . Reality is distorted to fit the dichotomy of
rightness (on one’s own behalf) vs. transgression .
The selective “management” of information about foreign policy successes vs. failures is essential to this enterprise [the U.S. invasion of Grenada
provides a recent example; see e.g., Middleton (1984) and Nelson (1983)]. Unfortunately, such selective information-gathering seriously impairs
foreign policy. Numerous authors have described occasions on which great powers have become the captives of their own over-simplified world
views (e.g., Didion, 1983; Tuchman, 1984; Sick, 1985).
Extended use of this secondary control strategy requires a blurring of the distinction between international politics and fiction. The Soviet Union
does not enjoy a monopoly in this regard. Within the last year, the Vietnam War veteran has been resurrected as an American hero, and American
audiences have eagerly imbibed his cinematic revenge against the North Vietnamese in “Rambo,” “Missing in Action,” and their television
counterparts.
A related phenomenon is the president’s identification with the on-screen personas of fellow actors Clint Eastwood and Sylvester Stallone, whose
adherence to simplified credos belie the gnawing complexities of value choices in the real world. Such reactions are likely not unique to
Americans or to their current president. Instead, they are symptomatic of the frustrations incurred by nations who have failed in their attempts to
exert active control over world events.
The control needs themselves are legitimate; the strategies that are currently employed for satisfying those needs are not. Use of such measures
guarantees that the cycle will repeat itself—i.e., that unrealistic thinking and erroneous judgment will serve as the basis for future foreign policy
actions.
The question remains: If the nations of the world cannot afford continued reliance on such an ineffective (and unbalanced) “mix” of control
strategies, what are the alternatives? As suggested above, the answer lies in exploring alternative conceptions of “control.” Rather than
conceiving of control as a subject-object relationship, in which the “object” is a fixed quantity (of land, resources, subject populations) to be
apportioned among contending powers, one could instead consider it in the context of a subject-subject relationship, a dy-namic system in which
control needs are realized by the exercise of mutual influence.
An analogy between the realms of international relations and interpersonal relations may
serve to illustrate this distinction. In a personal relationship that is subject-object-based , each
party has a mutually exclusive sphere of self-interest (“turf”) to be protected; the relationship
must be negotiated on the basis of how much turf each party will cede to the other in exchange for
similar consideration. A failure of negotiation may lead to unilateral attempts by either/both
parties to grab some of the other’s turf. “Compromise” and “confrontation” thus define the
parameters of this type of relationship.
Alternatively , a personal relationship may be subject-subject-based , to the extent that the
relationship is not primarily directed toward the issue of sharing vs. hoarding (of a separate domain of self-interest)
but rather toward a redefinition of self and self-interest in terms of the relationship . Satisfaction in such a
relationship is not derived from the amount of turf seized from, or conceded by, the other party. Instead it obtains from the opportunity
to exert positive influence over the other’s outcomes , and in turn to be the beneficiary of the other’s positive consideration
and favorable regard (cf. Kelley, 1979; Kelley and Thi-baut, 1978).

[2] NATO -- Debating the consequences of NATO enlargement is enables cost-

benefit analysis AND teaches students the decision-making process of allied
countries.
Goldgeier and Shifrinson ’20 [James and Joshua; 2020; School of International Service at
American University; Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University; International Politics,
“Evaluating NATO enlargement: scholarly debates, policy implications, and roads not taken,” p. 291–
321]
evaluating the legacy of NATO enlargement is not easy . Large-scale
Given this complex history,

and long-lasting policies generally carry multiple consequences , including some unanticipated at the
time of the policy’s creation. This is especially true with NATO expansion, where proponents and critics of the efort identify a range of positive
and negative externalities. As noted, prior discussions have tended to focus narrowly on either enlargement’s costs or its benefts, with critics
making the case that enlargement has caused the collapse of US–Russian relations (and is even responsible for provoking the Russian invasion of
Ukraine) and proponents praising the policy as one of the great success stories of US postCold War foreign policy.
This disinclination to weigh both costs and benefits may be partly paradigmatic . Realist scholars
tend to downplay the relevance of NATO enlargement’s efects on domestic societies in and around Europe to emphasize issues related to
European security and great power politics. Conversely, constructivists and liberal analysts focus on enlargement’s success in promoting Western
values (broadly defned), democracy, and capitalism in post-Cold War Europe, rather than exclusively (or primarily) evaluating the hard security
students of policy processes , for their part, have written about the policy
dimension of expansion. And

management aspects of enlargement, including what it tells us about national security

decision-making in the USA and other allied countries and how enlargement has
affected NATO as an organization (Brown 1995; Russett and Stam 1998; Reiter 2001; Epstein 2005; Thies et al. 2006;
Bunde and Noetzel 2010; Adler 2008).
Recognizing the limits of single-paradigm treatments, we argue that the NATO enlargement debate does not lend itself to identifcation of a single
aspect of enlargement’s legacy as its sine qua non. Instead, the distinct approaches and issues embraced by scholars (and NATO itself)
underscore the need for a broadbased effort to assess different aspects of enlargement, in order to arrive at a net assessment of enlargement for
it is time to assess the costs and
any or all of the actors involved. A quarter century after enlargement began in earnest,

benefits of the policy and to consider the costs and benefits of potential alternatives
proposed for securing Western interests, providing security to newly free countries in Central and Eastern Europe,
and/or fnding a place for Russia in a post-Cold War Europe. The point, in short, is to leverage analytic eclecticism

to arrive at overarching judgments of the policy.

Building upon Kenneth Waltz’s ‘levels of analysis’ (1959) approach toward understanding the sources of international competition while
modifying it for an issue that is as much institutional as international, we argue that NATO enlargement’s legacy needs to be analyzed at the
international level, at the domestic level, and at the organizational level. In doing so, it’s necessary to also account for the
fact that the consequences of enlargement can vary by the actors involved. After all, even if
NATO enlargement has antagonized Russia and harmed US–Russian relations, it may have also plausibly added to the security enjoyed by
diferent states in Western or Eastern Europe; likewise—and as some US policymakers suggest—enlargement may facilitate the European allies’
tendency to cheap ride on the USA, but subsequently give the USA greater infuence over European security debates (Posen 2014; Williams 2013;
Layne 2001; Tonelson 2001). Moreover, and as emphasized below, it is important to keep in mind that available to address any policy
European security after the end of the Cold War carried costs and benefits of some kind. The core question facing analysts evaluating the legacy
of NATO enlargement is not whether enlargement was normatively good or bad, but in what aspects enlargement yielded positive or negative
effects and how those compare to the effects of the alternatives available.
International debates
The first set of issues addressed in this volume concerns enlargement’s international consequences and, in particular, its effects on the primary players vis-à-vis enlargement: Russia, the USA, and non-US NATO members. Here, scholarly and policy attention tends to fix on NATO members’ relations with Russia. When the possibility of enlargement was first broached, many analysts and
former policymakers cautioned that it would sully East–West relations by rousing Russian suspicions and redivide the continent (e.g., Brown 1995; Mandelbaum 1995, 9–13; Friedman 1998). As noted, Russian policymakers railed against the policy starting in the early 1990s, just as US analysts strove to reconcile NATO enlargement with Russian concerns.
With the downturn in East–West relations beginning in the late 2000s, the question became whether and to what extent the collapse of Moscow’s relationship with the USA and its allies was at least partly a response to NATO enlargement. Certainly many Russian officials and a number of Western analysts view East–West tensions in these terms, treating NATO enlargement as a major
source of Russian insecurity and thus a significant factor in prompting Moscow’s recent bellicosity (e.g., Herszenhorn 2014; Matlock 2014; Mearsheimer 2014). Given that the NATO expansion discussion began in the early 1990s, however, and yet East–West relations did not worsen until the 2000s, there are debates over the extent of causality (Marten 2015, 2018; McFaul et al. 2014).
The question remains: To what degree, if any, did NATO enlargement prompt deterioration in East–West relations from their initial post-Cold War high, and how does enlargement compare to other policies (e.g., the wars against Serbia, Iraq, and Libya, and Western support for civil society in Russia and other post-Soviet states) in the panoply of Russian grievances? Closely linked to
this is an ongoing policy issue: Given current attitudes in Washington, Moscow, and beyond, would a credible end to further NATO enlargement substantially improve East–West dynamics, particularly if the alliance committed not to extend further into the former Soviet Union (O’Hanlon 2017; Rumer and Sokolsky 2019)?
If relations with Russia present one criterion for evaluating the international consequences of enlargement, then US grand strategy offers another. The USA is the largest member of NATO financially, militarily, and demographically and has long been the principal proponent of enlargement inside the alliance. Although US policymakers were not always fixed on expanding the alliance,
the last quarter century has seen enlargement occupy a progressively more prominent place in US strategic discussions vis-à-vis Europe (Porter 2018). Still, the growing centrality of enlargement is not universally accepted as a net gain for the USA (Kay 1998, 103–114). Proponents see the link between the USA and an expanded NATO as contributing to European peace and economic
growth in ways that redound to the USA’s advantage (Brooks and Wohlforth 2016, 115–118, 171–184; Brands 2016, 3). Critics, however, allege that treating NATO and its continued ability to expand as the lodestone of US engagement in Europe is problematic; not only does it encourage allies to cheap ride on US security largesse, but it may encourage risky allied behaviors that can
ensnare the USA in a broader set of security problems than it would otherwise face (Posen 2019; Walt 2017). In other words, NATO enlargement might be in the interests of the new member states, but might not bolster US security.
Still a third lens through which to evaluate the international consequences of enlargement concerns its effect on non-US NATO members. At the start of NATO enlargement, many policymakers in non-US NATO member states—including leaders in the UK, France, and Germany—were lukewarm about enlargement (Waltz 2000; Wolff 2000). Echoing skeptics in the USA, even
policymakers who wanted to sustain NATO questioned the rationale for the alliance taking on new members and expanding its security obligations in Europe at a time when defense budgets were falling. To what degree have such concerns been vindicated by subsequent events, or been proved overly skeptical? On the other hand, the end of the Cold War left countries formerly under
Soviet domination without a natural security anchor and facing great uncertainty over their relations with Russia and their immediate neighbors. Admission into NATO could help solve these problems while further adding the prestige of joining with the winning side in the Cold War and the benefits of aligning with the USA at the height of its power. A thorough analysis should probe
whether these advantages have accrued in the form intended.
NATO went east while trying to accommodate competing imperatives by limiting NATO’s military presence around Eastern Europe, engaging Russia (albeit in limited form) to forestall the possibility of a military confrontation, and insulating the process from domestic and foreign critics. Twenty-five years later, the effort to harmonize the West’s myriad goals after the Cold War has
demonstrably failed. Tensions with Russia are spiking, NATO planners confront the possibility that the alliance might need to undertake military action in Eastern Europe, and there are ongoing discussions about permanently stationing forces beyond Germany. Currently, it is unclear whether NATO’s security commitments to Eastern Europe are viable—that is, whether the alliance has
military options to protect states in the area at an acceptable political and strategic price. Questions also remain over (1) the willingness and/or ability of NATO’s traditional members to secure Eastern Europe in whole or in part, and (2) whether other security options exist for structuring Western and/or Eastern European security. Scholars thus need to know the extent to which NATO can
credibly honor commitments to its post-Cold War members, as well as how enlargement has altered Europe’s security architecture and the nature of security problems on the continent. Underlying all this is a basic counterfactual: All things being equal, are NATO’s members better or worse off with the alliance having expanded after the Cold War?
Domestic-level considerations
The domestic consequences of NATO expansion provide another way of evaluating enlargement’s legacy. Policymakers must generate political backing for any foreign policy initiative, especially if it is to prove sustainable (Hagan 1995, 122–124; Foyle 1999; Howell and Pevehouse 2007). Objectives must be clarified and tools to obtain those objectives identified to give guidance to the
organs of government and to address domestic critics.Footnote5 Above all, policymakers must engage domestic constituencies to encourage domestic winners from any policy while placating any losers (Mayer 1992; Friman 1993). NATO enlargement—with its contentious domestic debates and implications for European security—is no exception. Further, domestic politics are often
shaped by international politics, raising debates over how domestic security discussions are colored by the international repercussions (for good and for ill) of NATO’s eastward move (Gourevitch 1978).
This dynamic has been on display in many NATO members. The US case is instructive. At the start of the enlargement debate in the early 1990s, the scope of the pro-enlargement coalition remained unclear. A number of senior officials in the Bush and Clinton administrations supported the initiative. Still, opposition came from certain quarters of the Departments of State and Defense—
where officials worried about relations with Russia, the provision of new security guarantees, or both—as well as from some senior Congressional leaders, such as Georgia senator Sam Nunn, and from a range of analysts in the academy and at think tanks (Stuart 1996, esp. table 1). By the fall of 1994, however, the internal enlargement debate was largely over, even if some opposition to
the policy remained (particularly at the Pentagon). The political coalition that enabled enlargement to go forward in the coming years was taking shape. Proponents inside the Clinton administration presented enlargement as a tool of democracy promotion in Central and Eastern Europe while Republicans on Capitol Hill, who gave enlargement a push in their 1994 Contract with America,
were intent on showing their resolve to defend the newly free areas of Central and Eastern Europe from possible Russian revanchism. Both groups sought in part to appeal to voters of Eastern European descent, who were viewed as important constituencies in key midwestern states (Goldgeier 1999, 73–85).
Soon, a strong domestic consensus favoring enlargement formed and became predominant in US policymaking circles (Porter 2018). Alternative approaches discussed in the early to mid-1990s, such as emphasizing NATO’s Partnership for Peace, using CSCE as the basis for a pan-European security architecture, or encouraging security solutions in Eastern Europe through the European
Union, fell by the wayside as policymakers treated an expanded NATO as the crux of the US’ post-Cold War efforts to craft a Europe whole, free, and at peace (Kornblum 2019).
More dramatically, US policymakers on both sides of the political aisle have made support for NATO’s presence in Europe and continued expansion eastward a lodestone of US strategy. Senior officials from both parties regularly pledge US fidelity to the alliance, whereas suggestions that the USA might not fully embrace the alliance—as some inferred from Trump’s failure to commit to
NATO’s Article V security guarantees early in his presidency—have been criticized (Wright 2017). This consensus, however, raises two interrelated issues central to understanding the course and consequences of NATO enlargement in US foreign policy. First, why did an enlargement consensus rapidly take hold in Washington, swamp challengers, and dominate policy discussions?
Second, and more difficult to assess, is the strategic question: What, if any, strategic risks follow from treating NATO in its post-Cold War borders as the central pillar of US engagement in Europe and bypassing consideration of alternative options in shaping the US approach toward Europe?
In important ways, the Russian debate was the mirror image of that in the USA. As the Soviet Union broke apart, Yeltsin and many of the Russian reformers around him sought a cooperative relationship with the USA and NATO, seeing NATO’s continuation as an element of stability in the post-Cold War world. As, however, it became increasingly clear that NATO was to expand into
Eastern Europe, Russian opposition spiked. As early as the mid-1990s, Yeltsin and some of his advisers warned Clinton that enlargement would empower Russian nationalists, threaten reformers’ tenure, and endanger vital Russian interests (Goldgeier and McFaul 2003, 183-210). Moreover, Russian discomfort remained even after Clinton responded by delaying enlargement until after
Yeltsin’s 1996 reelection—and became especially salient once former Warsaw Pact and Soviet states began entering the alliance from the late 1990s.
Seemingly both playing to and reifying the resulting sense of what many analysts describe as ‘humiliation,’ Russian presidents Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev have made opposition to NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe a tenet of their foreign agenda and domestic narratives since the mid-2000s. Significantly, there is ongoing scholarly and policy discussion over whether this
opposition primarily stems from genuine security concerns or from politically useful appeals to Russian nationalism (Mydans 2004; Eurasia News 2018; Sweeney 2010). Still, any assessment of NATO enlargement must grapple with the extent to which (1) it undercut Russian proponents of a more cooperative East–West relationship since the 1990s, and (2) the prospect of future
expansion empowers Russian hawks today. Answers to these questions are of more than historical interest—they can help guide strategists seeking to stabilize relations with Moscow.
With regard to non-US NATO members, two distinct domestic considerations merit engagement. The first concerns political support for NATO versus its continental competitors. As noted, it was not impossible after the Cold War to imagine that NATO would gradually be supplanted by various European-based security schemes. Indeed, even after agreeing in the early 1990s that NATO
would remain the primary venue for European security discussions, efforts to construct semi-independent European security arrangements under EU auspices continued, ranging from the European Security and Defense Initiative to the more recent Permanent Structured Cooperation (NATO Review2000; DW2017). These designs have often failed to meet their stated operational
intentions.Footnote6 Nevertheless, given ongoing European efforts and the mismatch between desired ends and outcomes, how has NATO enlargement affected the intra-European debate over an independent European security identity and, alongside it, support for NATO?
The second consideration is the domestic political fallout of NATO enlargement. This is highly relevant for those Eastern European states that entered the alliance after the Cold War. When first broached, NATO enlargement was presented as a way of (1) fostering economic and political liberalism in former communist states and (2) helping these countries adjust their security and
foreign policies so as to diminish the risk of violence in the region (Asmus et al. 1993, inter alia). In furthering these goals, however, NATO enlargement plausibly created domestic political winners (e.g., political reformers, military reformers, and economically competitive industries) and losers (e.g., those seeking an independent Eastern Europe, traditional security sectors, etc.). Two
decades of peace and stability in and around Eastern Europe long seemed to validate the claims of enlargement’s proponents (Epstein 2005; Thies et al. 2006; Lanoszka 2020). However, democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland—and the risk of further backsliding in other NATO members—has reopened the debate (Wallander 2018; Burns and Lute 2019, 18–21). If nothing else,
recent changes highlight that the domestic political consequences of NATO membership have not been entirely resolved. It therefore remains an open issue whether NATO enlargement has truly delivered on the domestic transformations highlighted by expansion proponents. On balance, has NATO helped these countries transition to liberal democratic capitalism while managing the
domestic fallout from these changes, or is the post-Cold War status quo more fraught than proponents of enlargement would claim?
Organizational impact
Finally, and separate from the international and domestic repercussions of NATO enlargement, are enlargement’s consequences for the alliance as an organization. To be sure, NATO—like other institutions—only exists at the behest of its members; it does not exert independent agency in world politics (Mearsheimer 1994, 13–14). Still, to the extent that its members aggregate resources
via the alliance, it is worth investigating how NATO’s eastward move has affected the alliance’s ability to perform needed security functions. After all, NATO is first and foremost a military alliance. Hence, if the alliance is to meet its commitments and address the interests of its members, it must be able to conduct the military missions necessary to these ends (Waltz 2000, 32–34).
Assessing enlargement’s effects on the alliance as a military organization tasked with preparing for and deterring conflict is therefore as important as assessing its consequences internationally or domestically.
One set of issues concerns the coherence of the alliance. During the Cold War, NATO members invested significant time and energy erecting a plausible defense against the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies (Duffield 1995; Kugler 1991; Davis 2008). Battle lines were sorted out; competing military doctrines were tested, evaluated, and integrated; military equipment was
standardized so far as rival defense requirements and industrial bases allowed; command and control obligations were established; and military exercises allowed the alliance to train to fight as a more or less coherent unit. Faced with the prospect of NATO enlargement in the early to mid-1990s, critics argued that such tasks would be difficult to replicate if NATO moved eastward. By this
logic, the alliance might increase in breadth but sacrifice depth by taking in new member states with little experience in Western approaches to defense, at a time of falling military budgets and absent a pressing external threat to give impetus to sorting out the array of tasks modern militaries must undertake when fighting with partners (Clemens 1997, 353–357).
Hints of problems along these lines emerged in NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, where even longstanding allies faced interoperability problems, as well as difficulties in sharing intelligence and structuring rules of engagement (Giegerich and von Hlatky 2019; Auerswald and Saideman 2014; Frontline 2000; Department of Defense 1999). Still, so long as NATO did not face
the prospect of having conflict forced upon it, the risks seemed tolerable. Confronted, however, with resurgent tensions with Russia after the mid-2000s, the alliance has found itself working to accommodate the renewed possibility of high-intensity combat operations against a capable challenger (Binnendijk and Priebe 2019; Barrie et al. 2019, inter alia). Accordingly, analysts need an
accounting of the ways in which enlargement has shaped NATO’s ability to craft an effective response to the alliance’s contemporary military challenges, alongside its successes and failures in adjusting to post-Cold War military missions in Europe and beyond.
Related to the preceding is the question of NATO’s credibility along its eastern flank (Shlapak and Johnson 2016, 3–4; Simón 2014, 67). Once NATO added the Baltic states as members, it eliminated most of the geographic barriers separating NATO and Russian military forces that had obtained since the breakup of the Soviet Union. At the time, enlargement skeptics challenged the logic
of these moves, questioning whether NATO could meet its security obligations under such conditions (Hendrickson and Spohr 2004, 327–328). Proponents, however, emphasized that further expansion would reinforce Western security by helping to engage Russia, expand the alliance’s reach, and foster European contributions to collective security and military contingencies; although
unstated, it may also have been seen as a way of bolstering deterrence by increasing NATO’s ability to deter or dissuade challenges (US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations 2003). With the growth of NATO–Russian tensions over the last decade, these competing logics have been put to the test, with policymakers struggling to adapt the organization for deterrence along NATO’s
new eastern flank. The question thus becomes: To what extent has enlargement helped or hindered NATO’s ability to address post-Cold War European military scenarios, especially those involving states near Russia’s border?
Last, and perhaps most fundamental, are debates over enlargement’s effects on the alliance’s foundational purpose. Despite having been formed in large part to balance the Soviet Union, NATO—at least rhetorically—was presented after the Cold War as a collective security rather than a collective defense organization, with a general security purpose no longer oriented against Russia
(Yost 1998; Flanagan 1992, 142). In principle, this meant that the alliance would function as much to address the broader security concerns of NATO members (and, presumably other actors) as it would to defend them from attack from an outside country. How was the alliance repackaged for this task? As importantly, and given efforts such as the deployment of rotational military forces
to the Baltic States and creation of NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, to what extent is NATO adjusting itself to accommodate a new period of military tensions in Europe? Has the expanded alliance successfully refocused for today’s collective defense missions, or does collective security—and perhaps further enlargement—still generate a pull in NATO circles? Moreover,
in a period of renewed tensions with Russia, is refocusing on collective defense made more difficult with a geographically enlarged alliance that includes a diverse group of new member states? Evaluating NATO expansion, in short, requires understanding how enlargement has simultaneously reflected and affected the organization’s own understanding of its role in European security.
The role of counterfactual analysis and inference
As the preceding section implies, any consideration of the costs and benefits of NATO enlargement relies on at least one of the two methodological options. The first is counterfactual analysis (Van Evera 1997, 25–26, 48; George and Bennett 2005, 167–168; Tetlock and Belkin, 1996). Counterfactuals rely on comparing the outcomes of interest in the case(s) at hand with the outcomes in
a hypothetical case in which the independent variable in question (here, NATO enlargement) is absent or valued differently. As James Fearon describes the logic:
Suppose it is hypothesized that C was a cause of event E…. [W]hen experimental control and replication are not possible, analysts have available a choice between two and only two strategies for ‘empirically’ testing this hypothesis. Either they can imagine that C had been absent and ask whether E would have (or might have) occurred in that counterfactual case; or they can search for
other actual cases that resemble the case in question in significant respects, except that in some of these cases C is absent (or had a different value). (1991, 171)
Clearly, this method is difficult to execute and often yields contentious findings (George and Bennett 2005, 230–231). Indeed, the causal weight assigned to any independent variable is often subject to debate in any body of social science or work of history, thereby leaving counterfactual arguments contestable and the results potentially suspect. Nevertheless, we believe the approach
offers analytic utility in the NATO enlargement case.
On one level, the more analysts can offer a plausible explanation for why the case(s) observed occurred as they did—particularly one using general theoretical or historical arguments—the greater the ability to leverage counterfactual analysis by asking how a causal chain would have played out if a certain independent variable were valued differently. This is a viable option in the context
of NATO enlargement given the robust literatures describing the predicted and actual consequences of enlargement. Simply put, the alleged causal chains linked to enlargement (or the lack thereof) are often already specified or suggested in different literatures. This situation allows scholars to directly consider counterfactuals by leveraging the received wisdom while asking (1) whether
the outcome(s) in question are clearly related to the alleged causes, and (2) whether and to what degree alternative outcomes would have occurred had these causes been absent.
At the same time, we believe it is unnecessary to adopt a strict counterfactual approach—one that relies on varying as little as possible of the historical record to consider alternative outcomes—to detail and evaluate the overaching consequences of enlargement. As noted earlier in this piece and discussed in greater detail in several of the articles in this issue, a number of alternatives to
NATO enlargement have either been considered at various points, or are suggested by the history. Accordingly, a looser counterfactual approach—one that highlights plausible outcomes and processes that might have obtained if NATO enlargement had not occurred as it did while holding constant background conditions at the time—suffices to generate an informed judgment of NATO
enlargement’s results. This modified logic allows scholars to employ a historically grounded approach that leverages the arguments, expectations, and approaches of actors involved to investigate not only the role of NATO enlargement in the outcomes of interest, but also highlight potential alternate outcomes that might have come about had expansion not occurred or occurred in a
different form.Footnote7
Again, this is not the first project to leverage counterfactuals to engage the NATO enlargement debate (Marten 2018). Still, the articles in this issue build upon existing work by considering a broader set of issues affected by NATO expansion and, in many instances, discussing a range of alternative policies that were discussed at various points over the past quarter century. This expanded
set of counterfactuals helps to re-evaluate prominent issues such as whether the West might have avoided poor relations with Russia, alongside subtler concerns such as whether there were alternative ways of promoting democratic reform across Central and Eastern Europe or fostering European security after the Cold War. Put simply, counterfactual analysis in some form is critical both
for assessing whether a different policy would have produced a distinctly different result (e.g., a different outcome in US–Russian relations), and for weighing the costs and benefits of the policy chosen relative to its primary alternatives.
The second methodological option for evaluating the costs and benefits of NATO enlargement relies on the logic of process tracing, that is, rigorously assessing sequences of events within a single episode in order to determine the mechanisms through and conditions under which an outcome occurred (George and Bennett 2005, 205–232; Bennett and Checkel 2015). This approach is
especially useful in helping to determine the relative salience of NATO enlargement compared with other factors affecting the current state of European security affairs. At root, NATO enlargement is not the only variable shaping contemporary European security, be it on issues of East–West dynamics and the security of NATO’s eastern flank, or questions about alliance burden sharing,
doctrine, and command and control procedures. European politics have been influenced by domestic political debates in the USA and elsewhere, external events (e.g., conflicts in the Middle East), the growth of other security structures, changing leadership priorities, and other variables that are only loosely (if at all) connected with NATO’s expansion.
Thus, in addition to determining how NATO enlargement affected European security given plausible roads not taken, it is also important to investigate the degree to which NATO enlargement is responsible for the current state of European security affairs compared to the other factors that may be at work. Process tracing can assist in this task by providing a framework within which
analysts can assess whether, why, and how NATO enlargement and/or other variables shaped the range of outcomes (e.g., NATO operational difficulties, democratization in Eastern Europe) of interest in these studies. The key in doing so—as several studies in this issue highlight—is to carefully reconstruct the history and causal pathways involved while asking whether NATO’s
expansion played a necessary, sufficient, or contributing role.
Summarizing the results
What, then, do the scholars in this special issue find? In lieu of an overarching net assessment, the results of this study showcase that the consequences of NATO enlargement have varied by the actors involved even when counterfactuals are considered. Overall, the results for the USA have been decidedly mixed. Although reinforcing US influence and dominance in Europe, enlargement
has also obligated the USA to take on additional security commitments with less oversight of the issues involved, all while antagonizing Russia. Enlargement did not uniquely cause Russian aggrandizement or opposition toward the West, but NATO’s post-Cold War centrality and Washington’s growing ambivalence toward Russian concerns about continued NATO enlargement certainly
contributed to the downturn in East–West relations.
Enlargement had advantages and drawbacks for Western Europe as well. Although the region’s member states have been able to cheap ride on US security guarantees as part of the NATO enlargement deal, expansion has also undercut Western Europe’s push to craft a separate security apparatus and increased its dependence on the USA for hard security. NATO as an organization has
experienced similar dynamics. On the one hand, enlargement increased the reach of the organization. Nevertheless, it also hollowed out NATO’s military capabilities while increasing notional security commitments. Eastern European states, conversely, seem to have largely benefited from the alliance’s eastward drive. NATO expansion may not have been necessary for their liberalization
and reform, but it likely helped them obtain more security than they could have achieved on their own.
Previewing the analyses
From historian Timothy Andrews Sayle’s perspective (Sayle 2020), the age-old adage that NATO was there ‘to keep the Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in’ guided decision-making after the Cold War as it had earlier. Though some Western and Russian policymakers occasionally mused that Russia might eventually join NATO, Sayle highlights the pervasive concern
that letting the Russians into the Alliance would bring trouble. There was therefore a limit on how far Western engagers were willing to go with Russia even as NATO was repackaged as a collective security organization for post-Cold War Europe. Nor was mistrust of policymakers in Moscow the only continuity with the Cold War period, as German unification kept the German question
alive. In fact, Sayle writes, ‘By the end of the Cold War, Margaret Thatcher was keeping a map in her handbag that showed the expansion of German territory over the centuries.’ Meanwhile, the Americans, too, wanted to stay in—a call echoed by more than a few Western and European actors—and NATO was the way to that end. Given this trifecta, and given NATO’s Cold War era
expansion, Sayle argues that the strategic rationale for enlargement to Eastern Europe was strongly present even at the dawn of the post-Cold War era.
Still, even if the logic for NATO enlargement was present at the creation, it is nevertheless puzzling that enlargement has become a pervasive and durable theme in European security discussions given the alternatives available and opposition (at least early on) to the policy. To this end, Joshua Shifrinson examines the drivers of what he terms the ‘enlargement consensus’ in US foreign
policy and the consequences thereof (Shifrinson 2020a). Laying out a series of hypotheses drawn from international relations (IR) theory and policy discussions that might explain the sustained push for enlargement, he finds that each explains some aspect of US policy toward expansion without capturing the overarching trend. Instead, Shifrinson argues that the enlargement consensus
emerged because of a ‘perfect storm of systemic and domestic conditions’—including a US leadership seeking preeminence in Europe, Russian weakness, and a policymaking system that limited reconsideration of the roads taken—that swamped possible alternatives. Regardless, the process has generated mixed results at best for US national security. Although enlargement may have
helped pacify Eastern Europe and garnered US leverage over political and security affairs in Western Europe, it has come at the expense of limited flexibility with and tendency to overreact to Russia, alongside allied cheap riding.
If Shifrinson finds the results mixed, Rajan Menon and William Ruger (Menon and Ruger 2020) argue that enlargement has been a disaster for the USA. In their telling, enlargement has compromised US national security by antagonizing Russia, increasing the tendency of European allies to free ride, and requiring the USA to protect a series of weak and vulnerable states of questionable
relevance to US interests. Driving this dynamic—they argue—has been the USA’s post-Cold War primacist grand strategy and the tendency to use NATO as a tool of US power maximization. Their conclusion is simple and provocative: the best path forward for the USA is attempting to improve burden sharing within an expanded alliance, reengaging with Russia, and potentially
reducing US security commitments in Europe.
What, then, of Russia? Examining the West’s relations with Russia, Kimberly Marten observes that NATO enlargement is not ‘a discrete event in the panoply of Russia’s security relationships with the West’ (Marten 2020). Rather, Western policy after the Cold War provided plenty of fodder for Russian resentment. This included NATO’s 1995 NATO airstrikes against Serbia, the 1999
Kosovo War, the 2003 Iraq War, and Western backing for the ‘color revolutions’ in states around Russia’s periphery from 2003 to 2005. Given this, Marten proposes that the decline of Western–Russian relations was overdetermined and NATO enlargement hardly a decisive factor. Instead, to the extent that enlargement contributed to current tensions, it was not because NATO threatened
Russia, but because expansion highlighted Russia’s declining status. In the Russian assessment, the USA acted as if Russian interests were of limited importance and could be shaped by the West. Meanwhile, each side retained incompatible visions for the non-Baltic states of the former Soviet Union. The USA and its allies believed these countries were free to choose their own futures,
whereas Russia believed that they belonged to its privileged sphere of influence. NATO enlargement may thus have reinforced Russian opposition to Western policy, but it was simply one factor among many in the renewal of estrangement.
Like Marten, Andrey Sushentsov and William Wohlforth underscore that NATO enlargement did not cause Western relations with Moscow to plummet. Instead, the continued centrality of NATO—itself a cardinal point of US policy—as a security organization after the Cold War antagonized Russia by limiting its ability to shape European security developments (Sushentsov and
Wohlforth 2020). This, in conjunction with Russia’s desire to exert influence after the Cold War, primed European politics for Russian revisionism. Still, with the USA and its partners looking to use NATO to reshape European politics, revisionism was a two-way street. Just as the West responded to the threat of Russian revanchism, so too did Russia respond to Western revisionist
impulses. Sushentsov and Wohlforth therefore reach the powerful conclusion that the estrangement of NATO and Russia over the post-Cold War period ‘is best understood as an offensive-realist tragedy featuring two egoistic security seekers as opposed to a morality play with only one side in the bad guy role.’ At root, ‘both Russia and the USA were revisionists.’
Just as NATO enlargement affected the USA and Russia, so too has it affected NATO’s other members along with transatlantic and European politics (broadly defined). Several of the articles capture the range of internal and external consequences involved. Alexander Lanoszka argues that NATO enlargement has proved strongly beneficial for Europe and carried few negative
consequences (Lanoszka 2020). The prime benefit comes from an expanded NATO having offered a needed hedge against Russian attempts to reconstitute the former Soviet empire and more generally assert itself in its near abroad. By extension, had NATO not enlarged, one would not see the broadly stable Eastern Europe nor the comparatively geographically and strategically
constrained Russia of today. At the same time, the costs of expansion have been limited. In this assessment, not only can NATO successfully extend deterrence to eastern flank countries that might seem difficult to secure, but even ostensible limits and drawbacks to enlargement (e.g., the eroding relationship with Moscow and democratic backsliding in Eastern Europe) are difficult to link
to NATO expansion. Lanoszka thus concludes that, with costs low and benefits high, expansion has been a boon for Europe—or, as he pithily puts it, ‘thank goodness for NATO enlargement.’
Taking a different tack, Paul Poast and Alexandra Chinchilla challenge the idea that NATO expansion was, as many analysts and policymakers claim, responsible for democratic consolidation across Eastern Europe after 1991 (Poast and Chinchilla 2020). By looking at the timing of democratization in states in the region, comparing across cases, and leveraging the fact that different states
entered NATO at different times, they report that it was anticipation of membership in the European Union rather than NATO that primarily drove democratic development. In fact, Poast and Chinchilla even find that efforts to link democratization with NATO membership have been ‘inconsistently applied.’ Rather than being directly causal, NATO primarily affected the establishment of
civilian control over the military—certainly an important political development, but hardly supporting the claim that enlargement facilitated and ensured democracy. Although it may still be the case that NATO enlargement was necessary for EU engagement in Eastern Europe (Talbott 2019, 409), the result raises important questions surrounding the domestic consequences of expansion
for NATO’s newer member states.
Nor are the USA, Russia, and NATO’s European members the only states affected by enlargement. Importantly, Susan Colbourn reminds us that there is not one North American NATO member, but two (Colbourn 2020). Like the USA, Canada sought to remain involved in Europe after the Cold War and, to a degree seldom appreciated, helped push NATO’s expansion. Drawing on
recently declassified Canadian sources, Colbourn quotes Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in September 1991 describing his desire to ‘prod the Bush administration and our other allies into taking the necessary next step in the continuing evolution of East–West relations.’ Furthermore, when the Partnership for Peace was proposed, Canadian policymakers were eager that it provide Eastern
European states with a path to full membership in the alliance rather than offering a permanent waiting room. Driving this push was a mixture of memory and ambition. Ultimately, not only did Canadian leaders see NATO expansion as a way of retaining the alliance’s importance to post-Cold War security discussions, but doing so would ensure a Canadian voice in European security
debates—no small concern given Canada’s sacrifices in two world wars and the long struggle with the Soviet Union.
As for organizational consequences, Sara Moller examines the impact of NATO enlargement on its role as a regional defensive alliance (Moller 2020). Her conclusion is stark: ‘At both the strategic and military level,’ she writes, ‘NATO enlargement was poorly planned and implemented.’ Because security considerations were never at the root of the Western decisions to enlarge the
alliance, the USA and its allies did not engage the implications of expansion for NATO’s core military functions. Indeed, at the start of enlargement in the early to mid-1990s, planners assumed that the military environment would remain broadly hospitable for the indefinite future (irrespective of talk of possibly needing to hedge against Russian revisionism). ‘Officially,’ Moller offers,
‘NATO declared that it would invite candidates for membership using the criteria identified in the so-called Perry Principles—collective defense, democracy, consensus, and collective security.… In practice, the allies agreed to overlook the first principle in favor of the other three in order to implement NATO enlargement quickly.’ This tendency to overlook defense issues continued into
the 2000s as NATO spread across the continent. With the return of military tensions with Russia, the enlarged alliance thereby faces real difficulties in generating consensus about the scope of extant military problems, as well as allocating appropriate attention and resources.
In addition to imperiling NATO’s collective defense functions, enlargement also undercut European military capabilities. Here, as Paul van Hooft’s article shows, the US’ single-minded focus on making NATO the primary security venue in continental Europe and retaining US oversight of the alliance stifled European efforts to build independent capabilities (Van Hooft 2020). This
manifested collectively (e.g., contributing to the limited success of different European Union military security arrangements) and individually (e.g., encouraging European member states to underinvest in their own military forces). Needless to say, this process has left both the organization and the USA (as NATO’s main security patron) overexposed. As van Hooft writes, ‘By insisting
that NATO was the only game in town, and then using it as an all-purpose tool for US foreign policy interests, the United States increased the demand on its resources and left itself with few opportunities to share costs.’ Collectively, van Hooft’s findings amount to a strong argument that NATO enlargement, at least in the form practiced since the 1990s, has left European defenses less
robust than might have otherwise been the case.
In the end, as Stéfanie von Hlatky and Michael Fortmann show, NATO has been torn between two conflicting impulses (von Hlatky and Fortmann, 2020). Prior to enlargement, many NATO members sought to move NATO away from its Cold War era collective defense mission toward serving as a cooperative security institution that would limit interstate tensions and conflict before
they began. With enlargement, however, this impulse was challenged and eventually undermined by NATO’s new Eastern European members, which, despite paying lip service to cooperative security, primarily saw NATO as an insurance policy against Russia. These impulses were clearly in conflict, yet were not—indeed, could not—be reconciled. As a consequence, whereas the
demands for collective defense went up thanks to enlargement (and Russia’s eventual reaction), the will and ability of all NATO members to provide for that defense languished for much of the post-Cold War period. It may well be the case that Russia is deterred by the prospect of NATO collective action in defense of its Eastern European member states, but, at the military level, the
organization is now hurriedly trying to make up for lost time.
Conclusion: toward a research agenda

The articles in this special issue are designed to accelerate the process of evaluating the legacy of NATO
enlargement at a time when the alliance’s future remains uncertain. Insofar as further enlargement remains a possibility, this effort can
help policymakers and scholars alike assess the merits and drawbacks of expanding
NATO’s commitments still further. Conversely, it may also help identify the opportunities, risks, and limitations of capping
or even curtailing NATO’s existing obligations. Ultimately, the more enlargement is linked to outcomes believed to promote a positive security
environment for NATO member states, the stronger the case for expansion; the looser that connection, or the more expansion is found to have
rigorously
contributed to problematic security results, the stronger the case for capping or walking back NATO’s presence. Baldly stated,

evaluating NATO’s post-Cold War history can provide insight into NATO’s future.
This special issue is not meant to be the last word on NATO expansion’s legacy—future work is needed to build on the results reported here.
Four areas of research seem especially fruitful. First, future research may wish to further explore the themes discussed in this volume as new
evidence comes to light. As an initial exercise in advancing a research agenda that speaks to contemporary policy concerns, the articles in this
volume are necessarily limited in the data and evidence at their disposal. Particularly as archives open, interviews accumulate, and evidence on
military, political, and economic trends clarifies, analysts should subject the findings in this project to further scrutiny, and grapple with the topics
raised in this forum using new tools and sources.
additional research may fruitfully explore the interaction between individual states’
Second,

strategies and the consequences of NATO enlargement. NATO enlargement did not
happen in a vacuum . As the process enlargement rolled forward, different states within and outside of the alliance adjusted their
policies to respond to the rush of events; by the same token, the enlargement process likely accounted for such developments as NATO itself
Future work may wish to explore these dynamics and assess the
accommodated new facts on the ground.

mechanisms by which (1) individual states’ strategies affected the course and conduct of
NATO enlargement and (2) NATO enlargement influenced individual state foreign and
security policies , as well as assessing the successes and failures witnessed along the
way.
Third, more work is needed to analyze the drivers of NATO enlargement both historically and in the contemporary world. To be sure, there is no
dearth of discussion on the ostensible reasons the alliance has gone east and continues to do so. Still, scholars and analysts alike need to probe
whether these match the empirical record, as well as whether the stated reasons are true drivers of the phenomena, or simply rationales used to
combining historical research and social science
justify a policy arrived at for other reasons. This issue is one where
techniques may yield particularly valuable insights. It may also allow scholars to fruitfully
engage in policy debates , given the tendency for policymakers to craft narratives surrounding the course and conduct of NATO
expansion thus far in support of the alliance’s ongoing (and potentially growing) role throughout Europe.
Finally, it is worth considering how to weigh the salience of the successes and failures wrought by enlargement. The decision may stem from
individual analysts’ preferences. For instance, two individuals could agree that US–Russian relations would have been more stable while Central
and Eastern European states would have been worse off economically and politically absent enlargement, yet still disagree over the merits of this
outcome. Those who prioritize relations between major powers, believe the absence of NATO’s expansion could have led to better US–Russian
relations, and/or believe that other routes might have contributed to a stable Eastern Europe may be inclined to oppose enlargement; in contrast,
those who emphasize the spread of liberal democracy, believe NATO was the only option for stability across Eastern Europe, and question
whether the US–Russian relationship would have been markedly different without enlargement may favor expansion. We ourselves, for example,
agree on how to go about evaluating the costs and benefits of enlargement but somewhat disagree on the merits of the policy because we place
different weights and assign different probabilities to those different factors.
our purpose here is not to decide once and for all whether NATO
In the final analysis,

enlargement was the right policy , but rather to improve the quality of the discussion
surrounding the policy. Accordingly, additional research that tracks how individual analysts
weigh the merits of particular outcomes, and/or identifies outcomes that individuals
holding different preferences would still accept as salient, may help move the NATO
enlargement debate forward . Likewise, by engaging research in IR theory, additional work
may be able to link the outcomes associated with enlargement to broader insights about
the factors and conditions that—ceteris paribus—contribute to peace , economic growth, political influence, and
other broadly positive results . Needless to say, this provides another path toward weighing the salience of enlargement while
connecting NATO expansion to more general IR theory discussions.
3
 1NC—OFF
NATO Innovation DA

The aff rejects NATO innovation.

The resolution is caught in a milieu of media, rhetoric, and aesthetic representations that paint China as
peril to prepare westerners, to rationalize massacring millions of Asian people, and to justify paranoid
persecution of Asian people living in the west. Attitudes like the need for NATO to develop new gadgets
like Bond to counter Chinese tech is symptomatic of Techno-Orientalism – the perception of the East
through the Western imaginary as an unknowable peril that aims to steal both Western tech and already
possesses superior tech of its own. Political discourse about emerging China is tainted with anxieties
about the Orient’s rising technological dominance over the West

NATO innovation centers to ensure effective countering of disinformation.

Dr. Chris Dolan 22, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Masters of Science Program in
Intelligence and Security Studies at Lebanon Valley College, two-time Fulbright U.S. Scholar in
international security in North Macedonia and Kosovo, Ph.D. in International Relations and National
Security Studies from the University of South Carolina, 2/15/2022, "NATO Must Boost Hybrid Warfare
Defenses," https://www.justsecurity.org/80176/nato-must-boost-hybrid-warfare-defenses/, RMax
Russia’s Hybrid Warfare Strategy
Russia’s strategy is centered on promoting a narrative of grievances. Russia believes the United States is using Ukraine and promoting NATO expansion to contain
Russian national security interests and encroach on its traditional spheres of influence. It also contends that Ukraine should return to the Minsk Agreements and end its
attempt to win back Donbas. These are false narratives because sovereign and independent states have the freedom to determine their own path and seek membership
Russian
in any alliance. And it would be madness for the Ukrainian government to retake Donbas given the Russian military presence there. The

rhetoric is a trojan horse created by the Kremlin to renegotiate the end of the Cold War and redraw
European borders the same way Russia did when it illegally annexed Crimea in 2014.
The effectiveness of the Russian narrative depends on combining conventional military positioning with

hybrid tactics or “active measures.” Hybrid actions taken in the so-called “gray-zone” typically consist of measures short of conventional warfare such as
limited strikes, special operations forces, raids, cyber attacks, and covert influence operations. Hybrid warfare is a central element of

Russia’s military strategy, in which operatives remain just below the radar and work with proxies to stage false flags to justify an invasion. To crush the
Prague Spring in 1968, Soviet operatives in Czechoslovakia planted weapons in packages labeled “Made in the USA,” which were published in Soviet state-controlled
outlets as signs of a U.S.-led plot. The KGB ran active measures during the Soviet war in Afghanistan in the 1980’s, often using “false bands” of Afghan units posing
as CIA-backed guerillas to justify Soviet military operations.

disinformation are quickly and efficiently distributed through news channels and
Misinformation and

social media to influence public opinion. Russian state-owned outlets Russia Today (RT), Tass, and Sputnik have a strong
presence on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Telegram, echoing the Kremlin’s position and portraying NATO and the United States as
aggressors . In 2013-2014, Russian state media framed the Maidan protests that toppled Ukrainian President Viktor
Yanukovych as “ fomented by the U.S. in cooperation with fascist Ukrainian nationalists” that were used as a pretext for Russia’s little green
men to seize Crimea.
One Russian-backed channel on YouTube is НАШ or NASH TV, which has been promoting Russia’s narrative until it was banned in Ukraine. Founded by former
pro-Russia Ukraine parliament member Yevheniy Murayev, NASH TV is a Kremlin mouth piece flooding viewers with anti-American and anti-NATO falsehoods.
Last month, the United Kingdom accused Russia of attempting to overthrow Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and replace him with Murayev. This is the
same approach used by Russia when it seized Crimea and installed Sergey Aksyonov as the so-called Prime Minister of Crimea.

Sustained Russian i nformation operations reinforce specific elements in Moscow’s narrative of

grievances . First, NATO’s eastward expansion since the end of the Cold War is the real threat , not Russia.
Second, Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO would threaten the European security order. Third, the

annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in Donbas are liberations of Russian-speaking
communities.

Troll factories and bots spread large volumes of fake news stories, making it almost impossible to counter the
steady deluge of disinformation. On January 31, it Western media reported that Russia planted fake stories about bomb threats against Ukrainian schools and shopping
 officials uncovered a plot by Russian intelligence to
malls, forcing children to online learning and closing businesses. Just last week, U.S.

fabricate a propaganda video portraying fake explosions , corpses, and grieving women designed
to legitimate a Russian invasion to protect civilians in Ukraine .
Russia supplements information operations with cyber attacks. Russian hackers recently breached Ukrainian networks, replacing publicly facing websites with
messages in Ukrainian and Polish designed to look like a Polish cyber operation. Russian cyber attacks targeted Georgian networks during the 2008 South Ossetia
War and again in 2015 when Sandworm, a hacking group linked with Russian intelligence, took down Ukraine’s power grid.

Russian state-sponsored cyber attacks targeting Ukraine can devastate U.S. and NATO networks . The 2017
Notpetya and WannaCry attacks spread throughout the world soon after hitting their targets. In the 2020 Solar Winds hack, cyber criminals directed by Russian
intelligence inserted malicious code into updates in Orion software that infected servers used by the U.S. Treasury, Energy, and Defense Departments, as well as

U.S. C ybersecurity and I nfrastructure S ecurity A gency recently warned

Microsoft, Intel, and Cisco. The

U.S. networks are vulnerable to more Russian cyber attacks .

Russia also uses blended cyber operations , in which governments tolerate cyber criminals and ransomware groups operating in their
countries. For example, the 2021 cyber attacks against Colonial Pipeline, which controls much of the fuel along the U.S. East Coast, were launched by criminal group
Darkside operating in Russia. Darkside locked up Colonial Pipeline’s networks and held data hostage until it paid a ransom of $5 million.
Steps NATO Should Take

NATO must get serious about building resilience against

Information warfare and cyber attacks demonstrate that

hybrid war tactics . This means prioritizing counter-hybrid measures in NATO’s next Strategic Concept, which will be
developed in June. NATO should take the following steps to counter Russian i nformation o perations:
1. NATO’s next Strategic Concept should update Article V of the North Atlantic Charter, which commits NATO members to defend one another, to include
hybrid war tactics in addition to conventional military actions. While the range of gray-zone operations makes it difficult to know when and how to

NATO members should engage in deterrence in the

trigger the collective defense mechanism,

contemporary battlespace .
2. NATO must establish a network of innovation centers to expand on its existing
centers of excellence. NATO developed the Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Latvia to
identify disinformation and the Cooperative Cyber Center of Excellence in Estonia to monitor cyber operations. NATO
also approved the NATO-Industry Cyber Partnership to improve the alliance’s relationship with private firms and coordinate cyber defense efforts.

3. New NATO innovation centers could engage in cutting-edge r esearch and

d evelopment on a rtificial i ntelligence, quantum computing, autonomous machines, hypersonic technologies, and
info rmation and tech nology literacy . Innovation centers could be modeled on the European Union’s East Stratcom Task
Force, which is staffed with experts specializing in Russian propaganda through its EUDisinfo site. Innovation centers funded through NATO’s Science
centers could also
for Peace and Security program could partner with NATO’s Joint Intelligence and Security Division (JISD).These

develop public-private partnerships with commercial firms, academic institutions, and

civil society groups to build resilience through training centers , research institutes, and
information technology programming.
4. Governance and rule of law among alliance members must be improved as weak institutions provide maligned external actors avenues to interfere. For

an innovation center can improve North Macedonia’s ability to combat disinformation and cyberattacks, it must
example, while

also improve domestic governance, combat corruption, strengthen judicial practices, and enhance economic opportunities.
President Biden’s executive actions targeting corruption in the Western Balkans is a significant step to promote accountability.

Info warfare is the linchpin of Russia’s hybrid proxy conflict strategy

Tomáš Čižik 17, is a director of Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA), a Bratislava
based international relations and security policy think-tank. Tomáš holds a PhD in Theory of Politics
from Faculty of Political Science and International Relations at the Matej Bel University, May 2017, "
Information Warfare - New Security Challenge for Europe.," Center for European and North Atlantic
Affairs, Information_Warfare___cover.pdf //AShah

Russia's main kinetic HW tool against Ukraine, was instigated and backed by
Armed insurgency,

massive information warfare since it's inception. The rebels, who are mostly mobilized, trained, and armed by
the Russian special services, and further supported by the Russian armed forces, have been destabilizing Donetsk and Luhansk regions since
February 2014. The crisis started to unfold after the pro-Russian former president Yanukovich was forced to flee to Russia as a result of the
revolutionary rally in Kiev over his decision to hinder Ukraine's association with the EU. The mass protests in Kiev's Maidan Square, which
brought the new pro-European government to power, demonstrated the unequivocal support of the vast majority - 90% according to some polls -
of the Western Ukrainians for European integration (IRI, 2014). In response to the undesired change of the government in Ukraine (GoU),
Russia launched an aggressive information campaign blaming the government for alleged
violations of the rights of the Russian speaking minorities in the country. Using this
narrative, predominantly Russian-speaking Crimea was officially annexed by Russia ,
and Russian special services started to organize separatist outbreaks in Donbas. For these
purposes, Russia used the dissatisfaction of the Russian speaking Ukrainians with the new government's attempt to drop the law making Russian
the official second language of Ukraine.
Notably, the linguistic divide between the population of the western and eastern regions of Ukraine is reflected in political preferences on the part
of the population. According to the opinion polls conducted by the Kiev's International Institute of Sociology, 72.5% of the population of
Donetsk region are in favor of integration of Ukraine into the Russian-led Customs Union as opposed to the 9.4% supporting EU integration (Zn.
ua, 2014). The regional differences with regard to foreign policy orientation, also stimulated and well exploited by Russian propaganda, can be
As a result of effective
seen as the main source of the political disagreement between eastern and western Ukraine.
information warfare conducted by Russia and the pro-Russian separatists on the ground,
they were able to manipulate with the divides among the population against Ukraine's
integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures by provoking violent conflict
in Donbas without even having mass support .
Remarkably, unlike Ukraine, there has never been a significant Russian native speaking or ethnic minority in Georgia. According to the 2002
census published by the European Center for Minority Issues, there is a total of 1.5% Russians living on the territory of Georgia (EUMM, 2014).
Therefore, to rationalize the narrative of protecting Russians abroad,' Moscow has since 2002 mass distributed Russian passports in both occupied
regions of Georgia. According to various media sources, accepting Russian citizenship was mandatory for permanent residents in the occupied
territories and was forcefully executed by local police units. In other words, as opposed to Ukrainian case, where Russia used existing linguistic
divides to instigate separatism, in Georgia it created artificial citizens through an illegal “passportization' process in order to justify the 2008
invasion of Georgia. The narrative that was used by Kremlin to justify the aggression after the 5 days war was blaming Georgia for initiating the
conflict by using force against Russian citizens in Tskhinvaly region, thus compelling Russia to respond with the “peace enforcement" operation.
This analysis is very important to once again underscore that smaller and weaker states
failed to deter realization of obvious patterns of Kremlin's HW and counter its strategic
narratives, such as the right to protect interests of Russians abroad. As evidenced in both Ukraine and
Georgia, Russia is using a new type of H ybrid W arfare to achieve its goals through

controlling proxies on the ground supported by the massive information warfare. In both
cases Russia, without having solid grounds, succeeded to materialize aggression through engineering
new realities, which constitute dangerous precedents that can be repeatedly used against
Georgia and other vulnerable countries in future.
It’ll trigger invasion of the Baltics – escalates quickly.
Brent Eastwood 22, Now serving as 1945s New Defense and National Security Editor, Brent M.
Eastwood, PhD, is the author of Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare. He is an
Emerging Threats expert and former U.S. Army Infantry officer, January 2022, "Forget Ukraine: Could
Russia Invade And Conquer The Baltic States?" https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/01/forget-ukraine-
could-russia-invade-and-conquer-the-baltic-states/ //AShah
We’re Focused on Ukraine But Look Out For the Russian Threat to the Baltics : It was a shot
heard around the world in the Russian military analysis community. A RAND Corporation simulated wargame in 2016 concluded that the
Russian military could reach the suburbs of the Estonian and Latvian capitals of Tallinn and Riga in less than 60 hours. In the iterations of the
exercise, the Estonians and Latvians would need at least seven brigades of troops that include at least three armored brigades to potentially fight
the Russians to a standstill.
But it gets worse from here. In another RAND wargame in 2019, the players examined if NATO and Russia would use tactical nuclear weapons
during a simulated war in the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). The scenario also had Russian conventional forces over-running
capitals in the Balkans and NATO having the last fail-safe option to use non-strategic nuclear weapons.
What Type of Warfare Could the Russians Use Against the Baltics?
the Kremlin could use hybrid warfare (conventional and unconventional aspects of power
A widespread fear is that
projection) again to annex parts of the Baltics, which would trigger Article V with NATO
allies and would require a military response against the Russians from NATO members. A glance at a map will tell you that St. Petersburg is
dangerously close to Tallinn, Estonia and Riga, Latvia. But according to General Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed
Forces of Russia, the distinctions between offensive aspects of war and defensive aspects of war
are blurring.
Under this Gerasimov Doctrine, the Kremlin then could engineer a Russian hybrid incursion of cyber

and information warfare attacks against the Baltics, and these tactics could be made to
be seen as a defensive operation. Since the Baltics have ethnic Russians as part of the population, Moscow could
employ special operations forces as peacekeepers to protect compatriots. This could
happen with an information warfare campaign that would increase the chances for
protest and other domestic unrest with ethnic Russians as victims in the Baltics. Then
a hybrid operation would ensue to protect ethnic Russians.
According to the two RAND sets of wargames, the Russians would then bring in the heavy armored and
mechanized infantry units to “ teach the Baltics a lesson .”

Baltic invasion goes nuclear.

Hal Brands 19, Hal Brands is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he studies US
foreign policy and defense strategy. Concurrently, Dr. Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished
Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He is
also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion, November 2019, "How Russia Could Force a Nuclear War in
the Baltics," https://www.aei.org/op-eds/how-russia-could-force-a-nuclear-war-in-the-baltics/ //AShah
Would the US fight a nuclear war to save Estonia? The question would probably strike most Americans as absurd. Certainly, almost no one was thinking about such a
prospect when NATO expanded to include the Baltic states back in 2004.

the possibility of nuclear escalation in a conflict

Yet a series of reports by the nonpartisan RAND Corporation shows that

between the N orth A tlantic T reaty O rganization and Russia over the Baltic region is
high er than one might imagine. The best way of averting it? Invest more in the alliance’s conventional defense.
There was a time when it seemed quite normal to risk nuclear war over the sanctity of European frontiers. During the Cold War, NATO was
From the
outnumbered by Warsaw Pact forces, and it would have had great difficulty stopping a Soviet attack with conventional weapons.
moment it was formed, NATO relied on the threat of nuclear escalation — whether rapid
and spasmodic, or gradual and controlled — to maintain deterrence. American thinkers developed
elaborate models and theories of deterrence. US and NATO forces regularly carried out exercises
simulating the resort to nuclear weapons to make this strategy credible.
After the Cold War ended, the US and its allies had the luxury of thinking less about
nuclear deterrence and war-fighting. Tensions with Russia receded and nuclear strategy came to seem like a relic of a
bygone era. Yet today, with Russia rising again as a military threat, the grim logic of nuclear

statecraft is returning.
The spike in tensions between Russia and the West over the past half-decade has revealed a basic problem: NATO doesn’t have

the capability to prevent Russian forces from quickly overrunning Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania. Russian invaders would be at the gates of the Baltic capitals in two to three
days; existing NATO forces in the region would be destroyed or swept aside. NATO
could respond by mobilizing for a longer war to liberate the Baltic countries, but this
would require a bloody, dangerous military campaign. Critically, that campaign would
require striking targets — such as air defense systems — located within Russia itself, as
well as suppressing Russian artillery, short-range missiles and other capabilities within
the Kaliningrad enclave, which is situated behind NATO’s front lines.
Moreover, this sort of NATO counteroffensive is precisely the situation Russian nuclear doctrine seems meant to avert. Russian
officials understand that their country would lose a long war against NATO. They are particularly
alarmed at the possibility of NATO using its unmatched military capabilities to conduct conventional strikes within Russian borders. So the
Kremlin has signaled that it might carry out limited nuclear strikes — perhaps a “demonstration strike”
somewhere in the Atlantic, or against NATO forces in the theater — to force the alliance to make peace on
Moscow’s terms. This concept is known as “escalate to de-escalate,” and there is a growing body of evidence that the Russians are
serious about it.
A NATO-Russia war could thus go nuclear if Russia “escalates” to preserve the gains it
has won early in the conflict. It could also go nuclear in a second, if somewhat less likely, way: If the
U.S. and NATO initiate their own limited nuclear strikes against Russian forces to
prevent Moscow from overrunning the Baltic allies in the first place. And even the limited use of nuclear weapons
raises the question of further escalation: Would crossing the nuclear threshold lead, through deliberate choice

or miscalculation, to a general nuclear war involving i nter c ontinental b allistic m issile s ,

strategic bombers and apocalyptic destruction?
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Asian Negation DA

Forcing Asians to negate this aff is a voter—

[1] Psychic Violence – forcing us to negate our identity creates ressentiment – turns
the affs solvency.
[2] Community Fragmentation – making Asians negate makes community building
impossible.
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NATO DA

A strong NATO is key to deter a revisionist China.

Ben Hodges 18, Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies at the Center for European Policy Analysis, “Why
the United States Needs a Cohesive NATO,” https://www.gmfus.org/news/why-united-states-needs-
cohesive-nato/micahw
If a conflict with China arises, the U nited S tates will need a strong, cohesive NATO , as well as other partnerships
maintain order and security in Europe’s neighborhood, and perhaps even beyond. The U nited S tates
around the world to

remains committed to Europe’s security and stability. But it also expects its European allies to pick up their share of the
burden for collective security so as to help maintain order in the continent and around the globe. It
is of vital importance to the
U nited S tates that its defense and security relationship with European countries, especially within NATO , not only
remains healthy but is correctly oriented to current and likely future challenges.
Several things remain to be achieved if Europe and the United States in this regard. First, they must build a common approach not only in
defense, but across economic, information, and political domains. Second, they must solve the continued inequity in burden sharing that
hinders a stronger relationship between them and erodes the confidence of many Americans in the efficacy of NATO. Third, it is necessary to
achieve greater coherence on NATO’s eastern flank, particularly in the Black Sea region. Fourth, NATO must continue its efforts to improve its
deterrence capability against Russia’s aggressive behavior.
The interests and responsibilities of the U nited S tates are global , with freedom of navigation on the seas
and preservation of the global commons being prime examples. Its allies and partners benefit from these
freedoms as well, but these have now come under threat , most notably in the S outh C hina S ea and with
China’s growing control over much of the infrastructure of the world, particularly in Europe and Africa . The
threat from China is real and growing , and if it materializes the U nited S tates will need a strong,
cohesive NATO , as well as other partnerships around the world to maintain order and security in Europe’s neighborhood,
and perhaps even beyond, while the majority of its forces and capabilities, particularly air and naval ones, are operating in the Pacific theater.
The stability , security , and economic prosperity of the U nited S tates are directly linked to that of
Europe. The bulk of its global economic relationships are in North America and the European Union, and the majority of its most reliable
allies and partners are in Europe. To give but one example, the shared intelligence obtained from Europe is essential to

the implementation of the recently published U . S . N ational D efense S trategy. In this context, it is of vital
importance to the U nited S tates that its defense and security relationship with European countries, especially
within NATO , not only remains healthy but is correctly oriented to current and likely future challenges.

Extinction.
Wang ’19 [Fei-Ling; October 24; Professor at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Ph.D. from
the University of Pennsylvania; The Cipher Brief, “The China Order: A Challenge for the U.S. and the
World,” https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/the-china-order-a-challenge-for-the-u-s-and-
the-world]
the rising power and the mounting pugnaciousness of the P eople’s R epublic of C hina (PRC)
It is no longer hard to see that

have become a comprehensive challenge for the U nited S tates. China’s Machiavellian policies and
actions at home and abroad have turned an otherwise naturally complementary Sino-American economic

relationship into a near zero-sum , if not already a zero-sum, competition for market, jobs, technology, and financial
primacy . Beijing now openly flexes its new muscles in its neighborhood and beyond to resist,
reduce, and replace American leadership and presence everywhere possible, seeking to

undermine the U.S.-led international economic order and American-anchored collective

security arrangements. The PRC has been burning billions, for example, hoping to replace the U.S. dollar with the over-printed
Chinese Renminbi (RMB). Extraordinarily heavy extraction of its own economy, the world’s second largest, and its enormous foreign currency
reserve resulting from the gross imbalance in U.S.-China trade have enabled the PRC to massively expand its military. That military is already
the world’s second largest; its navy, for example, is projected to soon surpass the U.S. Navy in fleet tonnage. At the same time, massive but
opaque spending sprees has allowed the PRC to actively procure power and proxies even inside the United States, positioning Beijing to
reshape international opinions and norms more easily than ever.
What is less known, perhaps, is that the rising PRC state also seeks an overhaul of the very world order
that has enabled the greatest advances of human civilization over the past few centuries – the
Westphalian system of nation-states . This world order was codified in the 17th century, expanded to a global scale in
the 20th century, and now is in its post-World War II and post-Cold War iteration — the so-called America-led L iberal

I nternational O rder (LIO). The rise of Chinese power, under the autocracy of the C hinese C ommunist
P arty (CCP), is not just contesting U.S. national security and American global leadership but also the
existing world order . Never since the heyday of the Cold War has the world seen such a
full challenge to the U nited S tates and to the Westphalian system.
The CCP is leading the PRC toward a Chinese Dream of a world order in its own image, which I call the China Order .
The China Order is a millennia-old political tradition and ideology that mandates a unitary, authoritarian (often totalitarian),

omnipotent and omnipresent government for the whole known world . This alternative world order has
had a variety of euphemisms in the long history of China: from tinaxia yitong (unification of all under heaven) and shijie datong (world’s grand
harmony) in the imperial past, to Mao Zedong’s world solidarity for Communist revolution only forty years ago, to now Xi Jinping’s community
of common human destiny. The China Order has powerfully revived to guide rising PRC power, under the banner of a Chinese version of
global governance to address
globalization, ingeniously taking advantage of the various calls in our time for

transnational issues such as climate change , inequality , epidemics , and terrorism .

This China Order is normatively and practically at fundamental odds with the LIO version of the Westphalia
system that enshrines comparison and competition among nations coexisting with equal sovereignty. The
China Order has been widely addictive to the powerful and ambitious in history, whether they have been ethnically Han or not. It has been
highly effective in practice, in great part because it became deeply legitimized and internalized in elite Chinese culture over many centuries. The
China Order is now the sole acceptable model of the world under the authoritarianism known as the Qin-Han polity that the PRC now practices.
The China Order (#ad), human civilization is socio-economically very
But under this world order, as documented by

suboptimal and hopelessly stagnant , inevitably shortchanging the lives of just about everyone, especially nonelites, as
the tragic and often catastrophic history of Eastern Eurasia under the China Order before the nineteenth century amply demonstrates.
the CCP has been
Since 1949, when the PRC restored traditional Chinese autocracy under the guise of imported Marxism-Leninism,

ceaselessly and callously fighting its own people internally and the U nited S tates and American
allies externally to preserve its monopoly over power . Only sheer exhaustion and near collapse
could force the CCP to slow down and retreat , at home and abroad. External powers have influenced and
facilitated the rise of PRC power, but have so far failed to transform the Qin-Han autocracy and its China Order ideal, thus remaining unable to
rationalizations have justified the continuation of
change Beijing’s world views and global pursuits. Various, often false,

American/Western engagement with the PRC, which has greatly enriched and enabled the CCP to
persist in its consolidation of power . Beijing’s push for power is nothing personal; it is a brand of
authoritarianism just happens to be anchored in the remarkably persistent belief that failing to achieve
 control over the whole known world would spell the loss of the “mandate of heaven” and
political extinction . Thus, the CCP is driven (or doomed) to methodically and opportunistically seek ever greater influence.
The rise of China , or more precisely the ever-greater power of the PRC state, represents a shift of the
distribution and concentration of power in the international system (conceptually known as power transition)
and an effort to reorder the units in the system and change the system’s governing norms .
Chinese leaders have already openly claimed that they are now moving to the center of the world
stage, leading a revolutionary change in the world order, upending the Peace of
Westphalia established “four hundred years ago,” in the words of PRC leaders This points to a systemic change of
world politics and a choice for all of us at the grandest possible scale: a scale that could reshape nations and
redirect the path of human civilization . The PRC’s challenge is therefore greater than the struggle between the two
European ideologies of Capitalism and Communism. The confrontation between the U.S.-led LIO and the

PRC-dreamed China Order transcends these often vaguely defined civilizational clashes.
If the PRC challenge, the rise of an unscrupulous, ever more resourceful and determined PRC state, is not managed well and promptly, the

U nited S tates will have to face a much worse choice in the not too distant future between tragic capitulation and a
desperate war for its national security and world leadership and for the way in which humankind is
organized worldwide. In the age of many kinds of w eapons of m ass d estruction, this will be a harrowing decision.
Of course, one may argue that the grandiose China Dream of a China Order may be just another pretentious way for the CCP to invoke
traditional, nationalist, and populist ideals to justify its autocratic governance of the Chinese people forever, similar to the splendid slogans and
missions fabricated by many other dictators. Perhaps the highly insecure CCP leadership is fighting for its survival, not world domination.
However, words have consequences. Propaganda and dilution often greatly mesmerize and mislead the pretenders themselves. More
importantly, the CCP has been steadily following up its words with action and money for years (basically
nonstop since 1949); it has just pledged over 10 times the total sum of the Marshall Plan (in today’s dollars) for its Belt and Road Initiative
alone, for instance.
the rising Chinese power will not stop short of unseating the
As the logic of the China Order dictates,

U nited S tates and reordering the world , unless Beijing’s Qin-Han polity is transformed and/or the ever richer and
more powerful PRC is checked. The alternatives, American capitulation or world war , are horrific to

contemplate, but not necessarily impossible. Unlike in Hollywood, the “good” guys do not always win necessarily in the real world. A
mighty autocracy that tightly controls one-fifth of humankind, willfully spends a disproportionately larger portion of the fruits of the world’s
second largest economy, and vows (even if only hypocritically) to reform and reorder the world under its leadership, is and will always be a
America’s global position and way of life, world
mortal challenge to the national security of the United States.

peace , and the overall world order all rest on how the PRC challenge is managed—soon.
6
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Bodies PIC

We affirm the aff absence their use of the word “bodies” and “body”.
The aff’s claims of the body ignores that these are individual units that create the
illusion of an idealized identity---this approach is coopted by ableist imperialism.
Rivera 10 “Unsettling Bodies” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion Volume 26, Number 2, Fall
2010. Mayra Rivera Rivera (Assistant Professor of Theology and Latina/o Studies at Harvard Divinity
School.) AJM.
Sharon Betcher's essay offers feminists an invitation and a challenge to rethink the implications of body-talk.
Betcher suggests that " body " fosters an illusion of completeness and wholeness easily naturalized,
normalized, and deployed as part of cultural systems of representation and capitalist production . In
such systems, bodies are defined as visible, individual units , thus excluding from "normal " all
those who do not conform to its increasingly narrow aesthetic and productivity standards. Such
standards clearly jeopardize persons living with disabilities. But the stakes are high for everyone,
because the fear of falling outside the limits of the normalized body—an ever-present possibility for
all human beings—shapes our experiences of corporeality. This anxiety is evidenced by the scarcity of cultural
discourses about and practices to deal with pain and mortality, as well as by the proliferation of discourses and practices aimed at shaping the
body to fit accepted standards. Betcher suggests, in my reading, that if "body" names a coherent unit amenable to
representation and normalization, feminist challenges to the idealist foundation of kyriarchy are better served
by embracing "flesh" rather than "body." Flesh here names a " lived capaciousness "; it
is dynamic and fluid , exposed to others in its irreducible vulnerability. Having engaged in a fair amount of
theological body-talk, I recognize the conceptual difficulties of holding together the critique of the cultural and political production of the
normalized body, on the one hand, and the articulation of alternative discourses of corporeality, on the other; and I welcome the opportunity to
think about these in relation to body and flesh, respectively. I offer here an initial attempt to build on Betcher's suggestions, by revisiting some
aspects of my previous explorations of Latina theorizations of corporeality as a way to ponder the implications and possibilities of the proposed
approach. In the variegated intellectual traditions that constitute Latina studies, theorizations of
corporeality commonly emerge in tandem with explorations of the [End Page 119] legacies of
colonialism in the Americas. There are very concrete reasons for this: colonial-sexual violence against African
and indigenous women indelibly marked the bodies of many of their descendents. Greed, violence, and enslavement literally
became incarnate. They have left " memories in the flesh " that seek theoretical articulation .1 The
corporeal effects of colonial histories cannot be separated neatly into physical and cognitive
elements. For the genealogical traces of colonial-sexual violence are experienced in conjunction with the materialization of gender
arrangements also introduced by colonial power. These new structures served as tools for "the organization of relations of production, of property
rights, of cosmologies and ways of knowing," all of which would have lasting effects in local and global understandings and experiences of
embodiment.2 The justification of colonial power arrangements depended on complicated physiognomic scales
—depicted in charts of scientific/aesthetic representations of "types of bodies"—purporting to make character legible from
visible bodily traits. In those regions of Latin America where it was hard to locate physiognomic traits within one of the defined "races," the
number of categories in such scales of being multiplied to absurdity, attributing great significance to barely noticeable differences.3 The
colonial obsession for classifying body-types intensified colonized people's vigilance of their own
appearance in an effort to hide those physical traits related to lower rungs of the social/ontological
ladder. We can see, then, the aesthetic representation of bodily norms and the anxieties thus produced as precursors of contemporary
globalized systems—where technologies offer more effective ways to represent physiognomic scales as well as to bolster illusions of conformity
by offering means to hide markers of perceived deviance. The images of bodies thus produced are never simply
external to ourselves ; their very power depends on their capacity to shape our desires and
compel us to see ourselves through and conform to them—to incarnate the ideal body. The vitality
of flesh is thus harnessed and disciplined—even when flesh itself provides the raw power for such discipline, as it does in "fitness" regimes, for
instance. In response to the codification and the organization of humanity based on [End Page 120] bodily traits, feminist theology shall continue
to uncover the ideological character of body-talk, historicizing how one becomes a woman (Simone de Beauvoir), not only in relation to
patriarchy or sexual politics but also to broader networks of power, including, as Betcher points out, globalized capitalism and its politics of
health. This analysis entails attending to the ways these lines of power reinforce one another, inflecting "body" as a category of analysis and as a
cultural ideal. But the aim is not simply to describe the configurations of power that have affected bodies,
but more significantly to seek new possibilities for corporeal becomings. For Latina theorists,
developing alternative visions of corporeality entails challenging models that occlude the
complexities revealed by the analysis of colonial history . Critiques of the myth of the stable, whole
body, of illusions of racial or cultural purity, and of the assumed reducibility of people to their
visual identity are all part of this effort to think beyond the normalized body toward an
evolving constitutive multiplicity .4 To be sure, corporeal multiplicity is not simply a harmonious combination of discrete traits
or types—as it is often represented in celebrations of postmodern culture—but rather the always-unfinished confluence of difference within the
self, fraught with conflict and pain.
7
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Invisibility K

The 1AC’s research never should have been published—proliferating it only allows
the state to crack down on Asian movements.
Ruzicka 16 (Michal Ruzicka; Forschungszentrum Menschenrechte, Universität Wien, Hörlgasse; 2016;
“Unveiling what should remain hidden: ethics and politics of researching marginal people;”
Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie volume 41, 147–164)
A gradual turning point in my research came after I realized that our relationship based on mutual trust became deeper, allowing Koloman to
Koloman had no trouble
openly discuss with me the details of his and his family’s social and economic life. From one point,
providing me with details about his past (how he got to prison etc.) and present
experience, especially with regard to how he managed his family’s finances; by that time,
he had already lost eligibility to receive State unemployment benefits. I acquired a new
perspective on how people like Koloman do things in order to manage their lives on a
day-to-day basis, especially by utilizing marginal economic resources available to them
either directly on the street or via social networks, mostly in the context of the
underground economy. Koloman often openly explained to me how things work on the
street, how one has to behave in order to utilize the most viable resources . Along with
strategies to make the “right impression” in the eyes of the State – a police officer or a
social worker most commonly in this case – I learned about the tactical role which
certain strategies (which would be seen by the dominant society as false promises, overt
lies, theft, threat or even open violence) played in managing the insecure, rare and
constantly fleeting resources in the shadow areas of the underground economy. Koloman
never got involved in organized crime, preserving his pride as a lone wolf who is really good in what he does: exploiting economic resources,
. I came to feel that I started to better understand
often at the expense of other actors in the social game

Koloman’s own perspective on the world which led me, among other things, to stop
perceiving his actions as resulting from his cultural membership, but rather as his
own practical strategies and tactics that he himself had learned to utilize in order to be
successful in the street economy. Based on my extensive experience with Koloman’s family, I realized that there is a
certain “core” of informal practices and tactics that not only give a new meaning to what Koloman did on an everyday basis, but that would give
New data and new forms of understanding
me a new understanding of what it is like to live on the margins.
motivated me to reconsider the complex relationship that existed between my method and
data, and between ethical and political considerations. For instance, I was struggling
between my ethnographic curiosity (“wow – amazing data!”) and my own ethical beliefs (“I just
cannot publish this data”). My biggest fear was to unwittingly become an informant to
the disciplining State apparatus, providing an informational base that could
potentially be used against the interests of my informants. Besides that, I was personally reluctant to being
over-involved in the underground economy. I understood that there was a multiplicity of perspectives and
ethical considerations that perhaps should be taken into account if I decided to continue
my research: 1. Koloman’s own moral convictions of what is right and wrong. 2. My
own moral convictions of what is right and wrong. 3. The wider society’s moral
convictions of what is right and wrong, together with hegemonic stereotypes used to
justify Roma marginalization. 4. The scientific community demanding research results
to be reported, allowing data to be available for peer review. At first, I did not find the
fact that these perspectives exist in mutual conflict to be problematic. Only later did I
realize that I have a problem: what to do with the data that at the same time served to
“explain” a social phenomenon, yet their nature was that they must remain hidden to the
observer, especially to the agents of the State. The problem was that, in a sense, I also was the State’s
agent: a professional scientist paid by the State to provide and publish “data” on what it
means to live on the margins as a poor Roma under post-socialismFootnote1. Not only my
research, but also my data turned political. I knew that the data – if disclosed openly –
could serve as a fuel for the anti-Roma discourse by conforming the general
stereotype of Gypsies as “smart liars”, “cunning pretenders” or “thieves”. I became obsessed
with imaginary scenarios of how my data could possibly be politically used against those who have trusted me most, my informants. How to say
enough without saying too much? The tension between the scientific imperative to “do research and present your results” and the ethical
imperative “never cause harm to your informants” was clearly not easily resolved at this point. As I was thinking my way through the plethora of
moral dilemmas and ethical considerations stemming from recent developments in my research, I came to realize that my
research was not only about the relationship between my informants and myself. Rather,
other powerful actors were to be included into how I perceived the issue: the dominant
society (with its pre-constructed notions and stereotypes about the Roma) as well as the
State with its primary agenda to preserve the social and political status quo by means of
disciplining those who are perceived as a threat to the symbolic order of the dominant
society (Sibley 1995). This consideration eventually led me to integrate the relationship between the marginal (marginalized Roma in my
case) and the central (the State and its institutions) into my research on conditions that make the enduring Roma marginality possible.

The alternative is to embrace the aff through Invisibility as a tactical choice to

prevent discursive cooption by hegemonic forces—like debate.
Ruzicka 16 (Michal Ruzicka; Forschungszentrum Menschenrechte, Universität Wien, Hörlgasse; 2016;
“Unveiling what should remain hidden: ethics and politics of researching marginal people;”
Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie volume 41, 147–164)//Garfield-Ben
Marginal people navigate their everyday lives on the fringes of the dominant socio-
economic system, often having to deal with the stigma attached to their social (and/or
ethnic) status. Being deprived of full access to resources which are otherwise accessible
to members of the society at large, lacking skills and knowledge to be perceived by the
distributors of social recognition, as well as having limited access to social services,
marginal people have to rely on irregular, precarious and often unpredictable sources of
income. The economic strategies of marginal people can be seen as “open” in the sense
that these people must be ready to make use of such opportunities and resources (both
material, social and informational) as soon as they emerge (Day et al. 1999). Life on the margins consists
mainly of waiting and waiting again for the right opportunity. Koloman’s life may appear to the outside observer as slow, if not ‘boring’ (it is he
himself who describes his life as boring). In fact, ‘not much has happened, you know’ is the most common answer I received at any time when
asking what has changed since our last encounter. Such a statement reflects the nature of things most of the time: ‘nothing has happened’ in the
sense that no big changes have occurred in Koloman’s family’s life. Often, however, I was quite surprised to find rather dramatic changes taking
place rather suddenly: Koloman finding a new apartment to rent for his family, or his unexpectedly leaving the city for an expedient job that ‘you
know, just suddenly appeared’ … To put it in another words: in his life, Koloman usually waits. Unhappy with his and his family’s current living
situation, Koloman waits for an opportunity: an opportunity that is unpredictable, since it often pops up suddenly, unannounced and
unanticipated. In this sense, Koloman relies not on the limited amount of recognized forms of capital (money, education or skills utilizable in the
labor market), but rather on resources embedded in social capital that he is not aware of yet: a friend offering a part-time job at a construction site,
an acquaintance suggesting a risky but relatively profitable ‘deal’, or another random resource which could be utilized to make Koloman’s
family’s life more bearable.Koloman’s case corroborates the observation that life on the margins
operates by means of “isolated actions, blow by blow …,” leading marginal people to
“vigilantly make use of the cracks that particular conjunctions open in the
surveillance of the proprietary powers” (de Certeau 1984, p. 37). After I turned my attention to how Koloman
manages the unpredictable resources and opportunities, I realized the importance of “impression

management” for his relative success not only in the underground economy. I have no
objective way to assess Koloman’s craft to induce the right impression in the right
people, yet this skill has astonished me so many times: making a great impression in the
eyes of the landowner, his children’s schoolteacher, the social worker responsible for
assessing the needs of his mother-in-law, the judge in his eldest son’s court case … and
the list could go on. Not only Koloman, but also other Roma families living on the margins whom I have come to know, often
unemployed and thus depending on irregular and unpredictable sources of income, are forced to rely on irregular sources of income: from
actively searching for materials to be collected, recycled (and/or repaired) and then sold, to exchanging services for cash (mostly by providing
cheap unskilled labor, or more informal services), to passively waiting for the “right moment” to utilize their personal skills to effectively act and
The craft of impression management and the art of becoming
then disappear without being noticed.

“invisible” come hand in hand. These forms of economic strategies remain relatively
under-researched, perhaps due to the fact that they have been morally condemned by
both the dominant society and the State apparatus (along with those researchers who,
fearing that their research could contribute to their informants’ bad reputation, simply
“ignore” such practices). This includes such arts and crafts as “impression management”
in the presence of utilizable resources, beggary, or even thievery (Horváthová 1964, p. 330; Sutherland
1975, p. 28). Having their lives relatively determined by their disadvantaged position with regard to social and economic resources embedded
within the dominant social and economic system, marginal people are nevertheless still a part of it and are never completely “excluded”.
Stigmatized by both their ethnicity and economic strategies, these people never find
themselves completely “outside” the socio-economic system. Living on the margins of a
system means not to live outside of it, but on its fringes – in the shadow area where
formal social control is relatively weaker. Limited access to the recognized forms of
capital does not rule out having access to irregular and “morally questionable” resources
(i. e. those which are “morally questionable” from the perspective of the members of the dominant society). The relational perspective on the
State and its marginals (i. e. the mutual relationship between the center and its periphery) allows us to recognize that marginal people are never
totally “excluded”; their life is possible only by means of utilizing marginal and often stigmatized (but never fully “excluded”) resources. In other
marginal people can be fully understood only once we recognize how they are
words,
actually embedded within the dominant system, albeit marginally. That is exactly why the Roma “cannot
be understood in isolation from the wider society of which they have always formed a part” (Bloch 1997, p. xiv). People without a fixed and
secure position in society, such as the Roma, “maintain their autonomy by adapting to the dominant culture” in the sense that they “have
successfully stayed apart from the larger society because that society provides their economic base” (Sibley 1981, p. 14; see also Sway 1984). In
other words, there is a “paradox of Gypsy ethnicity” to be explained: “how Gypsies keep themselves distinct while appearing to assimilate”
Marginal people who are economically dependent on
(Silverman 1988, p. 273; see also Okely [1983] 1992).

the dominant society which at the same time excludes them must make sure to give the
“right impression” in the eyes of the beholder. Koloman is very keen on how he and his
actions appear to the people “who have power” (by “people in power”, he means State
agents such as policemen, social workers and other state bureaucrats, teachers, landlords,
doctors and – perhaps – also ethnographers). Koloman recognizes that his family depends to a certain degree on the
impression they produce in these agents. People who are almost constantly subjected to the controlling

and disciplining gaze of the State are simply forced to develop methods of “impression
management” (Gmelch 1986, p. 313–314; Silverman 1982; for an analytic frame of studying strategies of impression management, see
Goffman 1969), enabling themselves always to wear the proper “mask” when on “stage” (Goffman 1959). People selling “street newspapers”
develop techniques to make themselves more visible without “annoying” the by-walkers too much, so do beggars who have mastered techniques
to arouse compassion in bystanders. Koloman also has particular strategies and techniques that “work” in the sense that they deliver positive
Making the right impression, or having
results: making the right impression and thus actualizing potential resources.

the process of impression management under control, is a solution to the problem of

how to appear in the eyes of the (always possibly exclusionary) beholder. Another
solution would be to “become invisible”, i. e. to produce a discontinuity between
appearance on the outside, and autonomy and sense of identity on the inside. Because of their
marginal status, “the Rom have developed one set of rules for behaviour in obtaining economic and political gain from the gaje and another set of
the State (especially when
rules for the same behaviour with their own people” (Sutherland 1975, p. 20). Both the gadje and
they meet in the figure of the policeman, the teacher, the social worker, the journalist or
the landlord) are always potentially threatening forces. In minatorial situations, and in
those in which “impression management” is out of the question, marginal people can
resort to “becoming invisible” as an ultimate means of deflecting the gaze of the
State’s disciplinary agents. With regard to “becoming invisible” as the everyday strategy
of marginalized people, a particular case might help to illustrate the main point here.
Academic interest has for some time focused on researching Roma migrations, especially
those from the East to the countries of Western Europe (Guy 2003; Lee 2000; Matras 2000; Guy et al. 2004).
Recent Roma migration has generally been perceived and researched as “a way of
solving the economic problems” (Uherek 2004, p. 91), or as a means of escaping socio-economic
and political problems, such as discrimination, or as an escape from serious interpersonal
conflict (Weinerová 2004, p. 114). Vašečka and Vašečka (2003) mainly regard modern Roma migration as a result of disillusionment and the
degradation of the socio-economic status of the “Romani socialist-style middle class” (Vašečka and Vašečka 2003, p. 37), which are again
basically economic motives. Prónai in his article on Gypsy migration in Hungary (2004) states that the motivation for migration among the
Hungarian Gypsies has been economic, but often with some political considerations as well (Prónai 2004, p. 126). Matras’ conclusions on the
overall motives and causes of recent Roma migrations are in accord with those of the above-mentioned authors, as he sees such migrations to be
motivated by reasons of economic or personal security (Matras 2000, p. 37–38).Without questioning the importance or
validity of such claims, my own ethnographic experience led me to a slightly different
conclusion regarding the possible causes of contemporary flows of Roma migration (see
Ruzicka 2009). I refused to “fit” my research experience and my data into the pre-established
categories of economically and politically motivated migration, as I realized that it is
perhaps impossible to generalize Roma migrations under one analytical umbrella (Grill 2011,
p. 81). To avoid the pitfall of pre-established categories, I proposed another category: that of “invisible

migration.” Current research, I argue, has focused mostly on the “visible” forms of
Roma migrations – receiving the highest level of media coverage, they become visible
on account of the strongest social and political interest (Clark and Campbell 2000). Not only does
such a perspective conform to the image of the overall Gypsy history as a history of “forced
migration” – a history of “exodus” (Kendrick 2004; Clébert 1967, p. 46). It also presents Roma migration as being
caused by some exogenous forces. In my own ethnographic research, I observed forms of migration that did not fit into the
category of labor or political migration, nor was I able to see any exogenous forces that would limit the choices of my informants. Due to the
particular political development in former Czechoslovakia, and due to the State’s policy of “liquidation of Gypsy settlements” in the 1960 s and
1970 s, parts of Roma families from the Gypsy settlements in Eastern Slovakia moved to Czech industrial cities to seek better housing and
employment opportunities (Jurová 1996). Other parts of these families sometimes refused to be moved, remaining in their settlements. Kin-based
social networks, now stretching between the Czech and Slovak states, have often been maintained for decades and presently serve as a kin
infrastructure facilitating forms of Roma migration. Applied to migration such kin-based networks have also been used for such “endogenous”
 Due to the fact that
reasons as gathering and maintaining resources or identifying suitable spouses (for details, see Ruzicka 2009).
these forms of Roma migration have been going unnoticed by the dominant society (i. e.
not arousing anti-Gypsy sentiments, nor stimulating any form of media coverage, not to
speak of academic research), I referred to them in terms of “invisible migration.” A
further interpretation might be that such “invisibility” has been a conscious strategy
of the marginalized people who at once need to gather resources available through
their kin networks, while remaining hidden from the gaze of the outsider (Williams 1982).
There are forms of migration that go unnoticed by the State and by “outsiders”, i. e. by
members of the dominant society (bureaucrats, policemen, ethnographers etc.) who are
always seen as possessing the power to endanger one’s security or chances for success.
Marginal people navigate their everyday lives with limited resources, constantly being scrutinized and subjected to the omnipresent gaze of the
Being subjected to various forms of formal and
state institutions and members of the dominant societies.

informal social control, these people must maintain the right impression by subjecting
themselves to the formal and informal demands, while at the same time keeping
distance from them in order to preserve their own identity, sense of self-worth, and
cultural autonomy. A certain compromise between submission to those in power and keeping distance from them is thus a crucial
determinant of the craft of living on the margins. Marginal people apply contextual tactics rather than explicitly and deliberately planned
strategies to navigate their lives through the space of limited resources, constantly being observed by agents of social control. In other words,
. The art
these tactics are used to “maneuver ’within the enemy’s field of vision’ … and within enemy territory” (de Certeau 1984, p. 36–37)
of “correct” impression management, along with the craft of going unnoticed, invisible,
and remaining hidden, is one of the most important forms of the “art of the weak” (de
Certeau 1984, p. 37). The problem arises when these smart tactics, these “weapons of the
weak” (Scott 1985), seen as the last resort in their own terms, suddenly become
transparent, visible and unveiled, exposed to the panoptical eye of the State and its’
servants.
8
 1NC—OFF
Their framing of identity allows for the intensification of capitalism—its remaking
of social relations only offers an opportunity for experimentation by market forces
Dean 05
(Jodi, chair department of Poly Sci Hobart and Williams colleges, Zizek Against Democracy
http://jdeanicite.typepad.com/i_cite/files/zizek_against_democracy_new_version.doc [accessed 07/14/8])

Unlike most critical thinkers identified with the Left, Zizek rejects the current emphasis on multicultural
tolerance. He has three primary reasons for rejecting multiculturalism as it is currently understood in
cultural studies and democratic theory. First, agreeing with Wendy Brown, he argues that
multiculturalism today rests on an acceptance of global capital. Insofar as Capital’s
deterritorializations create the conditions for the proliferation of multiple, fluid, political
subjectivities, new social movements and identity politics rely on a political terrain
established by global capital. Multiculturalism thus ultimately accepts and depends on the
depoliticization of the economy: “the way the economy functions (the need to cut social
welfare, etc.) is accepted as a simple insight into the objective state of things .” We might think
here of feminist struggles over the right to an abortion, political work toward marriage benefits for same
sex couples, and energies in behalf of movies and television networks that target black audiences. In
efforts such as these, political energy focuses on culture and leaves the economy as a kind
of unquestioned, taken-for-granted basis of the way things are. This is not to say that
identity politics are trivial. On the contrary, Zizek fully acknowledges the way these new forms
of political subjectivization “thoroughly reshaped our entire political and cultural
landscape.” Rather, the problem is that capital has adapted to these new political forms,
incorporating previously transgressive urges and turning culture itself into its central
component. Zizek’s argument would be stronger were he to think of new social movements as
vanishing mediators. Identity politics opened up new spaces and opportunities for
capitalist intensification. As new social movements transformed the lifeworld into something to be
questioned and changed, they disrupted fixed identities and created opportunities for
experimentation. The market entered as provider of these opportunities. We might think here
of gay media. As Joshua Gamson argues, while gay portal sites initially promised to offer safe and
friendly spaces for gay community building, they now function primarily “to deliver a market share to
corporations.” In this gay media, “community needs are conflated with consumption desires, and
community equated with market.” My point, then, is that social victories paved the way for market
incursions into and the commodification of ever more aspects of experience. And once
cultural politics morphed into capitalist culture, identity politics lost its radical edge. For
example, the Republican Right in the U.S. regularly accuses the Left of playing the race card whenever
there is opposition to a non-Anglo political appointee.

Capitalism is unsustainable and causes war, violence, environmental destruction,

and extinction
Robinson 14, William I. Robinson is professor of sociology, global and international studies, and Latin
American studies, at the University of California-Santa Barbara. Among his many books are Promoting
Polyarchy (1996), Transnational Conflicts (2003), A Theory of Global Capitalism (2004), Latin America
and Global Capitalism (2008), and Global Capitalism and the Crisis of Humanity (2014), “Global
Capitalism: Crisis of Humanity and the Specter of 21st Century Fascism,” The World Financial Review

Cyclical, Structural, and Systemic Crises ¶ Most commentators on the contemporary crisis refer to the
“Great Recession” of 2008 and its aftermath. Yet the causal origins of global crisis are to be found
in over-accumulation and also in contradictions of state power , or in what Marxists call the
internal contradictions of the capitalist system. Moreover, because the system is now global, crisis
in any one place tends to represent crisis for the system as a whole . The system cannot expand
because the marginalisation of a significant portion of humanity from direct productive participation, the
downward pressure on wages and popular consumption worldwide, and the polarisation of income, has
reduced the ability of the world market to absorb world output. At the same time, given the particular
configuration of social and class forces and the correlation of these forces worldwide, national states are
hard-pressed to regulate transnational circuits of accumulation and offset the explosive contradictions
built into the system. ¶ Is this crisis cyclical, structural, or systemic? Cyclical crises are recurrent to
capitalism about once every 10 years and involve recessions that act as self-correcting
mechanisms without any major restructuring of the system. The recessions of the early 1980s,
the early 1990s, and of 2001 were cyclical crises. In contrast, the 2008 crisis signaled the slide into a
structural crisis. Structural crises reflect deeper contra- dictions that can only be resolved by a major
restructuring of the system. The structural crisis of the 1970s was resolved through capitalist
globalisation. Prior to that, the structural crisis of the 1930s was resolved through the creation of a new
model of redistributive capitalism, and prior to that the struc- tural crisis of the 1870s resulted in the
development of corpo- rate capitalism. A systemic crisis involves the replacement of a system by an
entirely new system or by an outright collapse. A structural crisis opens up the possibility for a systemic
crisis. But if it actually snowballs into a systemic crisis – in this case, if it gives way either to capitalism
being superseded or to a breakdown of global civilisation – is not predetermined and depends entirely on
the response of social and political forces to the crisis and on historical contingencies that are not easy to
forecast. This is an historic moment of extreme uncertainty, in which collective responses from distinct
social and class forces to the crisis are in great flux. ¶ Hence my concept of global crisis is broader than
financial. There are multiple and mutually constitutive dimensions – economic, social, political, cultural,
ideological and ecological, not to mention the existential crisis of our consciousness, values and very
being. There is a crisis of social polarisation, that is, of social reproduction. The system cannot meet
the needs or assure the survival of millions of people, perhaps a majority of humanity . There
are crises of state legitimacy and political authority, or of hegemony and domination. National states face
spiraling crises of legitimacy as they fail to meet the social grievances of local working and popular
classes experiencing downward mobility, unemployment, heightened insecurity and greater hardships.
The legitimacy of the system has increasingly been called into question by millions, perhaps even
billions, of people around the world, and is facing expanded counter-hegemonic challenges. Global elites
have been unable counter this erosion of the system’s authority in the face of worldwide pressures for a
global moral economy. And a canopy that envelops all these dimensions is a crisis of
sustainability rooted in an ecological holocaust that has already begun, expressed in climate
change and the impending collapse of centralised agricultural systems in several regions of
the world, among other indicators. By a crisis of humanity I mean a crisis that is approaching
systemic proportions, threatening the ability of billions of people to survive, and raising the
specter of a collapse of world civilisation and degeneration into a new “Dark Ages.”2 ¶ This crisis
of humanity shares a number of aspects with earlier structural crises but there are also several features
unique to the present: ¶ 1. The system is fast reaching the ecological limits of its reproduction.
Global capitalism now couples human and natural history in such a way as to threaten to bring about
what would be the sixth mass extinction in the known history of life on earth.3 This mass extinction
would be caused not by a natural catastrophe such as a meteor impact or by evolutionary changes such
as the end of an ice age but by purposive human activity. According to leading environmental scientists
there are nine “planetary boundaries” crucial to maintaining an earth system environment in
which humans can exist, four of which are experiencing at this time the onset of irreversible
environmental degradation and three of which (climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and
biodiversity loss) are at “tipping points,” meaning that these processes have already crossed their
planetary boundaries. ¶ 2. The magnitude of the means of violence and social control is
unprecedented, as is the concentration of the means of global communication and symbolic production
and circulation in the hands of a very few powerful groups. Computerised wars, drones, bunker-buster
bombs, star wars, and so forth, have changed the face of warfare. Warfare has become normalised and
sanitised for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. At the same time we have arrived
at the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control by those who control global flows of
communication, images and symbolic production. The world of Edward Snowden is the world of George
Orwell; 1984 has arrived; ¶ 3. Capitalism is reaching apparent limits to its extensive expansion. There
are no longer any new territories of significance that can be integrated into world capitalism,
de-ruralisation is now well advanced, and the commodification of the countryside and of pre- and non-
capitalist spaces has intensified, that is, converted in hot-house fashion into spaces of capital, so that
intensive expansion is reaching depths never before seen. Capitalism must continually expand or collapse.
How or where will it now expand? ¶ 4. There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a
“planet of slums,”4 alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins, and subject to
sophisticated systems of social control and to destruction - to a mortal cycle of dispossession-
exploitation-exclusion. This includes prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes, omnipresent
policing, militarised gentrification, and so on; ¶ 5. There is a disjuncture between a globalising economy
and a nation-state based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and
have not been able to play the role of what social scientists refer to as a “hegemon,” or a leading nation-
state that has enough power and authority to organise and stabilise the system. The spread of weapons of
mass destruction and the unprecedented militarisation of social life and conflict across the globe makes it
hard to imagine that the system can come under any stable political authority that assures its reproduction.

The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of organizing towards the Party---that’s
the best way to create accountability mechanisms, educate and mobilize, and
connect local struggles towards international liberation
Escalante 18, Alyson---Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist (“Party
Organizing In The 21st Century,” Forge News, September 21, 2018, accessed November 20, 2019,
https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/)

I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this
trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement.
My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best
forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging
movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United
States.
One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the
left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible . There
exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda
has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism
has nothing to offer them.
The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building
institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that
communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base
building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does
infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist
candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about
proving that we have something to offer the oppressed .
The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do
next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create
sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base?
Put simply: in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have
already done the work of building a communist party . It is not enough to simply meet peoples
needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We
must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party .
When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects,
we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and
are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be
clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt
party organizing.
By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model .
Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified
around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making . The party
model creates internal methods for holding party members accountable , unifying
party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party
members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model
works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to
serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for
revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local
communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to
literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work
together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism.
Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified
party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified
national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on
particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a
material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The
formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice
in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus.
Furthermore, party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be
held accountable for their actions . It allows criticism to function not as one
independent group criticizing another independent group , but rather as comrades with
a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and
to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions . In the context of the socialist movement within the
United States, such accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler
colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing.
Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas
allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing.
Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the
local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs , but to pull them
into the membership of the party as organizers themselves . The party model creates a
means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for
skills , strategies , and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows
community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role
in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of
base building strategy . It ensures that there are formal processes for educating
communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize
in accordance with their own local conditions.
We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of
such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a
number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these
organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately
undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in
which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring.
What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual
power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring
towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth . The
movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the
right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be
recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the
possibility of unification , and to maintain unification through a party model as a long
term goal .
In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for
their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside
recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist
theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of
defending dual power institutions from state terror . Dual power institutions must be
unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as
more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also
educating and propagandizing . It means radicalizing , recruiting , and organizing . The
party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends .
The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most
importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the
construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself.
It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a
national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local
organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that a unified national party will have to be
the long term goal of the base building movement.
Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according
to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to
be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between
dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building
movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism , but is pursuing
a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism .
The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the
conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution
to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in
order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation. The finer details
of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for
public discussion.
I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will
succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a
conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a
loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions
and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed .
Case
 1NC – Presumption
Vote neg on presumption –
[1] Past Rounds and multiple readings of the 1AC prove – they haven’t encouraged
people’s attitudes to change – NO debate key warrant. Movements and research have
already been done.
[2] Materiality– no reason why a W in tabroom changes material structures in
anyway. Aff just lays out problems with the current political and economic
environment, nothing else.
That’s bad.
Rigakos and Law, 9—Assistant Professor of Law at Carleton University AND PhD, Legal Studies,
Carleton University (George and Alexandra “Risk, Realism and the Politics of Resistance,” Critical
Sociology 35(1) 79-103, dml)
the ‘justification for treating everyday practices as
McCann and March (1996: 244) next set out

significant’ suggested by the above literature. First, the works studied are concerned with proving people are
not ‘ duped ’ by their surroundings. At the level of consciousness,  subjects ‘are ironic ,
critical , realistic , even sophisticated ’ (1996: 225). But McCann and March remind us that earlier radical or
Left theorists have made similar arguments without resorting to stories of everyday

resistance  in order to do so. Second, everyday resistance on a discursive level is said to

reaffirm the subject’s dignity . But this too causes a problem for the authors because they:
query why subversive ‘ assertions of self ’ should bring dignity and psychological empowerment
when they produce no  greater  material  benefits or  changes  in relational power  … By
standards of ‘realism’, … subjects given to avoidance and ‘lumping it’ may be the most sophisticated of all. (1996: 227)
everyday resistance  fails to tell us any
Thus, their criticism boils down to two main points. First, 

more about so-called  false consciousness  than was already known  among earlier Left theorists;
and second, that a focus on discursive resistance  ignores  the role of  material conditions  in helping to
shape identity.
Indeed, absent a broader political struggle  or chance at effective resistance it would seem to the

authors that ‘ powerlessness is learned out of the accumulated experiences of futility and

entrapment ’ (1996: 228). A lamentable prospect, but nonetheless a source of closure for the governmentality theorist. In his own
meta-analysis of studies on resistance, Rubin (1996: 242) finds that ‘discursive practices that neither

alter  material  conditions nor  directly  challenge  broad  structures  are nevertheless’
considered by the authors he examined ‘the stuff out of which power is made  and remade ’. If this
sounds familiar, it is because the authors studied by McCann, March and Rubin found their claims about everyday resistance on the same
Arguing against celebrating forms
understanding of power and government employed by postmodern theorists of risk. 

of resistance that fail to alter broader power relations or material conditions is, in
part,  recognizing the continued ‘ real ’ existence of identifiable , powerful groups  (classes). In
downplaying the worth of everyday forms of resistance (arguing that these acts are not as worthy of the
label as those acts which bring about lasting social change ), Rubin appears to be taking issue with a
locally focused vision of power and identity that denies the possibility of opposing
domination at the level of ‘ constructs ’ such as class.
Rubin (1996: 242) makes another argument about celebratory accounts of everyday resistance that bears
consideration:
do not differentiate between practices that reproduce power and
[T]hese authors generally 

those that alter power. [The former] might involve pressing that power to become
more adept at domination or to dominate differently , or it might mean precluding
alternative acts that would more successfully challenge power . … [I]t is necessary to do
more  than show that such discursive acts speak to , or engage with , power. It must
also be demonstrated that such acts add up to or engender broader changes .
In other words, some of the acts of everyday resistance may  in the real world , through their

absorption into mechanisms of power ,  reinforce  the  localized domination  that they
supposedly oppose . The implications of this argument can be further clarified when we study the way ‘resistance’ is dealt with in a
risk society.
Risk theorists already understand that every administrative system has holes which can be exploited by those who learn about them. That is
what makes governmentality work : the supposed governor is in turn governed – in part through the
noncompliance of subjects (Foucault, 1991a; Rose and Miller, 1992). For example, where employees demonstrate
unwillingness to embrace technological changes in the workplace, management consultants can create:
a point of entry, but also a ‘problem’ that their ‘packages’ are designed to resolve. … In short, consultants readily constitute certain forms of
conduct as ‘resistance to technology’ as this gives them some purchase on its reform by identifying a space in which expertise can be brought to
Resistance consequently plays the role of continuously provoking
bear in the exercise of power.

extensions , revisions and refinements of those same practices which it confronts. (Knights
and Vurdubakis, 1994: 80)
This appears to be a very different kind of resistance from that contemplated by Rubin, but perhaps not so different from that of the authors
critique: those whose analysis ends at the discursive production of
whom he and McCann and March

noncompliance . Instead, the above account is of a resistance that almost invariably helps power to
work better . A conclusion in the present day that ominously foreshadows the futuristic, dystopic risk assemblage described by Bogard
(1996).
Another example of the ‘resolution’ of resistance proposed above is the institution of a tool library described by Shearing (2001: 204–5). In this
parable, a business deals with the issue of tool theft on the part of workers by installing a ‘lending library’ of tools instead of engaging in
vigorous prosecution and jeopardizing worker morale. While the parable is meant to indicate a difference between actuarial and more
an act that may be considered ‘ resistant ’ is
traditional (moral) forms of justice, it also demonstrates how

incorporated without conflict into the workplace loss-prevention scheme – an eminently preferable ,
‘ forward-looking ’ solution within the logic of risk management. The same is possible in the case of
more discursive forms of resistance. If I do not see myself as a Guinness man, for example, market researchers will do their best to adapt
Guinness to the way I do see myself (Miller and Rose, 1997). The end result, of course, is that I purchase the beer. As manifested in a form of
justice (Shearing and Johnston, 2005), it always consolidates, tempers emotions, cools the analysis, reconciles factions, and always relentlessly
moves forward, assimilating as it grows. In this sense, therefore, Bogard’s ‘social science fiction’ actually pre-supposes and logically extends
In this context of governmentality theory – as self-
Shearing’s (2001) rather cheery and benevolent rendering of risk thinking.

described and lauded for its political non-prescription by its own pundits – the acts or attitudes

described as resistant are, in the end , absorbed by those who govern . Resistance as an
oppositional force – that pushes against or has the potential to take power – is
theoretically and politically neutralized . In the neutralization process, power is
reproduced .
So, along with McCann and March’s observations that everyday resistance adds little to our understanding of false consciousness
and that it denies the role of material factors in shaping identity, we can add Rubin’s two main criticisms of everyday resistance: it relies

on an inaccurate understanding of power, and acts of resistance which supposedly

emancipate actually may reinforce domination . All four of these criticisms demand the same
thing : to know what is really going on , to get an adequate grasp of the social.

The politics of academic refusal are a disaster

Reed ‘16 (Adolph, Jr., Prof. of Political Science @ Penn., “Splendors and Miseries of the Antiracist
“Left”” Nonsite, http://nonsite.org/editorial/splendors-and-miseries-of-the-antiracist-left-2)
pre-
More than a decade and a half ago I criticized similar formulations of a notion of “infrapolitics,” understood as the domain of

political acts of everyday “resistance” undertaken by subordinated populations , which

was then all the rage in cultural studies programs . Proponents of the political importance of this domain
insisted that, because insurgent movements emerge within such cultures of quotidian
resistance , a) examining them could help in understanding the processes through which insurgencies develop and/or b) they
therefore ought to be considered as expressions of an insurgent politics themselves.
Several factors accounted for the popularity of that version of the argument, which mainly had to do to with the political

economy of academic life , including the self-propulsion of academic trendiness and the
atrophy of the left outside the academy, which encouraged flights into fantasy for the sake of
optimism. The infrapolitics idea also resonated with the substantive but generally unadmitted group essentialism underlying claims that
esoteric, insider knowledge is necessary to decipher the “hidden transcripts” of the subordinate populations; put more bluntly, elevating

infrapolitics to the domain on which the oppressed express their politics most authentically increased its interpreters’
academic capital. 8
I discussed those factors in my critique. However, the point in that argument most pertinent for evaluating Birch and Heideman’s confidence
that the contradictions they acknowledge in BLM should be seen only as growing pains of a “new movement” is the following:
At best, those who romanticize “everyday resistance” or “cultural politics” read the evolution of political movements teleologically; they
presume that those conditions necessarily , or even typically, lead to political action. They
don’t. Not any more than the presence of carbon and water necessarily leads to the
evolution of Homo sapiens. Think about it: infrapolitics is ubiquitous, developed political
movements are rare. 9
Ballots fail to transform the community’s practices.
Michael Ritter 13, JD from the University of Texas, September 2013, “Overcoming the Fiction of
‘Social Change Through Debate’: What’s to Learn From 2PAC’s Changes?” National Journal of Speech
& Debate, II(1),
https://www.theforensicsfiles.com/_files/ugd/9896ec_8b2b993ec42440ecaab1b07645385db5.pdf
Although some "competition" is part of any debate, this part is more accurately described as the presence of seemingly conflicting positions, which is discussed above

and exemplified by the Tarantino hypothetical. In social movements or public debate, there are two (or more) apparently conflicting positions. Competitive
interscholastic debate is uniquely different because there is not a possibility for compromise on the ultimate
question of who did the better debating; most tournaments prohibit double wins , and no debaters would
agree to a double loss. The competition is absolute; one side must win and one side must lose . This is
radically different from the ability of individuals to be persuaded by the other side of a social movement. The switching of sides outside of the debate context comes
from a person's willingness to be persuaded by a particular position; it is not forced by tournament rules. Thus, the competitive structures of competitive
interscholastic debate render the applicability of philosophical or rhetorical theory inapplicable to the extent that it does not account for particular competitive
interscholastic debate context.
The unique structures of debate rounds rob all arguments or positions therein (or in a series of rounds) of any persuasive value beyond the very narrow issue of "which
side did the better debating." The competitive element and tournament structure of competitive interscholastic debate taint all positions
proffered in a debate round to create social change with a stench of "I am actually lying about my goals; I am clearly just

using this argument to win the ballot ." Even debates about how debates should proceed (i.e. theory arguments

or arguments about the practices in debate , or "meta-debate" (debates about debate)) are not proffered for the truth of the
proposition, but to win the debate . The audience—only the judge—is solely concerned with the ultimate question: "Which side did the better debating?"

Competitive interscholastic debate is certainly a venue in which students can become aware of societal issues and topics of concern. But

the persuasive value of arguments presented in a debate round to convince debaters of the truth of either side on a
topic is virtually nil .28
[Footnote]
28 Theory debates provide a great non-"critical" example of how arguments in debate do not persuade the
audience the particular position but only about who did the better debating . Judges frequently vote for a team based on winning
positions contradictory to each other round after round; for example, voting for cond iti o nality good then cond iti o nality bad . Competitive

interscholastic debate judges decide these theory debates not on the soundness of the theory that a team could be

" abused " by an argument, but rather through the standard, technical practice of " extensions" and "drops ." That
some sort of theory argument is now run as a stock argument in almost every single debate round , and ran in the

converse (e.g. running agent specification good if there is no agent specified, and running agent specification bad if the agent is specified), further proves
that meta-debates occurring within a competitive interscholastic debate do not actually persuade of the preferred practices of

debate but are considered by judges only to the extent that they are relevant to determining the narrow issue of who did
the better debating .
[Article Continues]
Students will generally form opinions about issues they learn about in a debate round outside of their debate
rounds. The issues debaters become aware of include issues external to debate (e.g. affirmative action, foreign policy) and issues internal to debate (e.g. theory,
community issues). When debaters choose to bring those issues into a debate round , they necessarily use those issues as

a competitive means to the ultimate end of convincing the judge that they did the better debating . This requires
the opposing team to adopt a competitive counter -strategy to that position; it forecloses the option of the opposing
team being fully persuaded by the other team's position . Even an attempt to "compromise" via a permutation (as a competitive strategy
rather than a persuasive position) will meet vigorous, usually pre-scripted opposition. As a result, any in-round action (whether a speech act or the judge

have no out-of-round effect consistent with or contemplated by any cited authors or postulated
voting for one team or the other) will

by the high school or college student making the assertion.

Even arguments about competitive interscholastic debate—primarily theory and issues about inequalities in the debate community
—will necessarily lose all persuasive value about those particular issues when they are raised in a debate round. Although more specific to competitive interscholastic
loses its power to convince anyone in the round because the
debate and not general theories about academic debate, meta-debate

audience—only the judge—is solely concerned with the question of " which team did the better

debating ." Theory and arguments about "social issues in debate" made in a debate inherently reek of
disingenuousness . Most debaters and judges do not even consider adopting a position on the meta-debate until after the round in reflective discussion and
thought about the issue, thought that never incorporates the truthfulness of an argument because "it was dropped" in a debate round. In the particular debate, the result
is always based on who, in the judge's opinion, did the better debating. It is not based on who convinced the judge of some proposition irrelevant to deciding which
team did the better debating.
because "it was dropped" in a debate round. In the particular debate, the result is always based on who, in the judge's opinion, did the better debating. It is not based on
who convinced the judge of some proposition irrelevant to deciding which team did the better debating.
 1NC – AT: Ontology
[1] Contingency – Hierarchies are malleable and the result of specific policy choices
with material incentives
Harari 15 [Yuval Noah Harari, Israeli historian and a tenured professor in the Department of History at
the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, specializing in World History, Doctorate in Philosophy from Oxford
University, and an acclaimed author whose first book, Sapiens, was an international bestseller that
received lavish praise by figures ranging from Barack Obama to Bill Gates, Sapiens: A Brief History of
Humankind, tr. by Yuval Harari with help from John Purcell and Haim Watzman, HarperCollins:
Broadway, NY, 2015, p. 133-144]
UNDERSTANDING HUMAN HISTORY IN THE millennia following the Agricultural Revolution boils down to a single question : how did
humans organise themselves in mass-cooperation networks, when they lacked the biological instincts
necessary to sustain such networks? The short answer is that humans created imagined orders and devised
scripts. These two inventions filled the gaps left by our biological inheritance.
However, the appearance of these networks was, for many, a dubious blessing. The imagined orders
sustaining these networks were neither neutral nor fair. They divided people into make-believe groups,
arranged in a hierarchy. The upper levels enjoyed privileges and power, while the lower ones suffered
from discrimination and oppression . Hammurabi’s Code, for example, established a pecking order of superiors,
commoners and slaves. Superiors got all the good things in life. Commoners got what was left. Slaves got
a beating if they complained.
Despite its proclamation of the equality of all men, the imagined order established by the Americans in 1776 also
established a hierarchy. It created a hierarchy between men , who benefited from it, and women, whom it left disempowered.
It created a hierarchy between whites, who enjoyed liberty, and blacks and American Indians, who were considered humans of
a lesser type and therefore did not share in the equal rights of men. Many of those who signed the Declaration of Independence were
slaveholders. They did not release their slaves upon signing the Declaration, nor did they consider themselves hypocrites. In their view, the
rights of men had little to do with Negroes.
The American order also consecrated the hierarchy between rich and poor. Most Americans at that time had little problem with the inequality
caused by wealthy parents passing their money and businesses on to their children. In their view, equality meant simply that the same laws
applied to rich and poor. It had nothing to do with unemployment benefits, integrated education or health insurance.
Liberty, too, carried very different connotations than it does today . In 1776, it did not mean that the
disempowered (certainly not blacks or Indians or, God forbid, women) could gain and exercise power. It
meant simply that the state could not , except in unusual circumstances, confiscate a citizen’s private property or
tell him what to do with it. The American order thereby upheld the hierarchy of wealth , which some thought
was mandated by God and others viewed as representing the immutable laws of nature. Nature, it was claimed, rewarded merit with wealth
while penalising indolence.
All the above-mentioned distinctions – between free persons and slaves, between whites and blacks, between rich and poor – are rooted in
every imagined hierarchy
fictions. (The hierarchy of men and women will be discussed later.) Yet it is an iron rule of history that

disavows its fictional origins and claims to be natural and inevitable. For instance, many
people who have viewed the hierarchy of free persons and slaves as natural and correct
have argued that slavery is not a human invention. Hammurabi saw it as ordained by the gods. Aristotle argued
that slaves have a ‘slavish nature’ whereas free people have a ‘free nature’. Their status in society is merely a reflection of their innate nature.
Ask white supremacists about the racial hierarchy, and you are in for a pseudoscientific
lecture concerning the biological differences between the races. You are likely to be told that there is
something in Caucasian blood or genes that makes whites naturally more intelligent, moral and hardworking. Ask a diehard
capitalist about the hierarchy of wealth, and you are likely to hear that it is the inevitable
outcome of objective differences in abilities. The rich have more money, in this view, because they are more capable and
diligent. No one should be bothered, then, if the wealthy get better health care, better education and better nutrition. The rich richly deserve
every perk they enjoy.
People with lighter skin colour are typically more in danger of sunburn than people with darker skin. Yet there was no biological logic behind
the division of South African beaches. Beaches reserved for people with lighter skin were not characterised by lower levels of ultraviolet
radiation.
Hindus who adhere to the caste system believe that cosmic forces have made one caste superior to
another. According to a famous Hindu creation myth, the gods fashioned the world out of the body of a primeval being, the Purusa. The sun
was created from the Purusa’s eye, the moon from the Purusa’s brain, the Brahmins (priests) from its mouth, the Kshatriyas (warriors) from its
arms, the Vaishyas (peasants and merchants) from its thighs, and the Shudras (servants) from its legs. Accept this explanation and the
sociopolitical differences between Brahmins and Shudras are as natural and eternal as the differences between the sun and the moon.1 The
ancient Chinese believed that when the goddess Nü Wa created humans from earth, she kneaded aristocrats from fine yellow soil, whereas
commoners were formed from brown mud.2
Yet, to the best of our understanding, these hierarchies are all the product of human imagination .
Brahmins and Shudras were not really created by the gods from different body parts of a primeval being .
Instead, the distinction between the two castes was created by laws and norms invented by humans in
northern India about 3,000 years ago. Contrary to Aristotle, there is no known biological difference between slaves and free
people. Human laws and norms have turned some people into slaves and others into masters. Between blacks and whites there are
some objective biological differences, such as skin colour and hair type, but there is no evidence that the differences extend
to intelligence or morality.
Most people claim that their social hierarchy is natural and just, while those of other societies are based
on false and ridiculous criteria. Modern Westerners are taught to scoff at the idea of racial hierarchy. They are shocked by laws
prohibiting blacks to live in white neighbourhoods, or to study in white schools, or to be treated in white hospitals. But the hierarchy of rich and
poor – which mandates that rich people live in separate and more luxurious neighbourhoods, study in separate and more prestigious schools,
and receive medical treatment in separate and better-equipped facilities – seems perfectly sensible to many Americans and Europeans. Yet it’s
a proven fact that most rich people are rich for the simple reason that they were born into a rich family, while most poor people will remain
poor throughout their lives simply because they were born into a poor family.
Unfortunately, complex
human societies seem to require imagined hierarchies and unjust discrimination. Of
course not all hierarchies are morally identical, and some societies suffered from more extreme types of
discrimination than others, yet scholars know of no large society that has been able to dispense with discrimination altogether. Time
and again people have created order in their societies by classifying the population into imagined categories, such as superiors, commoners and
slaves; whites and blacks; patricians and plebeians; Brahmins and Shudras; or rich and poor. These categories have regulated relations between
millions of humans by making some people legally, politically or socially superior to others.
Hierarchies serve an important function. They enable complete strangers to know how to treat one another without wasting the time and
energy needed to become personally acquainted. In George Bernard Shaw’s Pygmalion, Henry Higgins doesn’t need to establish an intimate
acquaintance with Eliza Doolittle in order to understand how he should relate to her. Just hearing her talk tells him that she is a member of the
underclass with whom he can do as he wishes – for example, using her as a pawn in his bet to pass off a jower girl as a duchess. A modern Eliza
working at a jorist’s needs to know how much effort to put into selling roses and gladioli to the dozens of people who enter the shop each day.
She can’t make a detailed enquiry into the tastes and wallets of each individual.
Instead, she uses social cues – the way the person is dressed, his or her age, and if she’s not politically correct his skin colour. That is how she
immediately distinguishes between the accounting-firm partner who’s likely to place a large order for expensive roses, and a messenger boy
who can only afford a bunch of daisies.
Of course, differences in natural abilities also play a role in the formation of social distinctions. But such diversities of aptitudes and character
are usually mediated through imagined hierarchies. This happens in two important ways. First and foremost, most abilities have to be nurtured
and developed. Even if somebody is born with a particular talent, that talent will usually remain latent if it is not fostered, honed and exercised.
Not all people get the same chance to cultivate and refine their abilities. Whether or not they have such an opportunity will usually depend on
their place within their society’s imagined hierarchy. Harry Potter is a good example. Removed from his distinguished wizard family and brought
up by ignorant muggles, he arrives at Hogwarts without any experience in magic. It takes him seven books to gain a firm command of his
powers and knowledge of his unique abilities.
Second, even if people belonging to different classes develop exactly the same abilities,
they are unlikely to enjoy equal success because they will have to play the game by
different rules. If, in British-ruled India, an Untouchable, a Brahmin, a Catholic Irishman and a Protestant Englishman had somehow
developed exactly the same business acumen, they still would not have had the same chance of becoming rich. The economic game was rigged
by legal restrictions and unoɽcial glass ceilings.
The Vicious Circle
All societies are based on imagined hierarchies, but not necessarily on the same
hierarchies. What accounts for the differences? Why did traditional Indian society
classify people according to caste, Ottoman society according to religion, and American
society according to race? In most cases the hierarchy originated as the result of a set of accidental
historical circumstances and was then perpetuated and refined over many generations as different groups developed vested interests
in it.
For instance, many scholars surmise that the Hindu caste system took shape when Indo-Aryan people invaded the Indian subcontinent about
3,000 years ago, subjugating the local population. The invaders established a stratified society, in which they – of course – occupied the leading
positions (priests and warriors), leaving the natives to live as servants and slaves. The invaders, who were few in number, feared losing their
privileged status and unique identity. To forestall this danger, they divided the population into castes, each of which was required to pursue a
specific occupation or perform a specific role in society. Each had different legal status, privileges and duties. Mixing of castes – social
interaction, marriage, even the sharing of meals – was prohibited. And the distinctions were not just legal – they became an inherent part of
religious mythology and practice.
The rulers argued that the caste system rejected an eternal cosmic reality rather than a chance historical development. Concepts of purity and
impurity were essential elements in Hindu religion, and they were harnessed to buttress the social pyramid. Pious Hindus were taught that
contact with members of a different caste could pollute not only them personally, but society as a whole, and should therefore be abhorred.
Such ideas are hardly unique to Hindus. Throughout history, and in almost all societies, concepts of pollution and purity have played a leading
role in enforcing social and political divisions and have been exploited by numerous ruling classes to maintain their privileges. The fear of
pollution is not a complete fabrication of priests and princes, however. It probably has its roots in biological survival mechanisms that make
humans feel an instinctive revulsion towards potential disease carriers, such as sick persons and dead bodies. If you want to keep any human
group isolated – women, Jews, Roma, gays, blacks – the best way to do it is convince everyone that these people are a source of pollution.
The Hindu caste system and its attendant laws of purity became deeply embedded in
Indian culture . Long after the Indo-Aryan invasion was forgotten, Indians continued to
believe in the caste system and to abhor the pollution caused by caste mixing . Castes were not
immune to change. In fact, as time went by, large castes were divided into sub-castes. Eventually the original four castes
turned into 3,000 different groupings called jati (literally ‘birth’). But this proliferation of castes
did not change the basic principle of the system, according to which every person is
born into a particular rank, and any infringement of its rules pollutes the person and society as a whole. A persons jati
determines her profession, the food she can eat, her place of residence and her eligible marriage partners. Usually a person can marry only
within his or her caste, and the resulting children inherit that status.
Whenever a new profession developed or a new group of people appeared on the
scene, they had to be recognised as a caste in order to receive a legitimate place within
Hindu society. Groups that failed to win recognition as a caste were, literally, outcasts – in this stratified society, they did not even
occupy the lowest rung. They became known as Untouchables. They had to live apart from all other people and scrape together a living in
humiliating and disgusting ways, such as sifting through garbage dumps for scrap material. Even members of the lowest caste avoided mingling
In modern India, matters of marriage and
with them, eating with them, touching them and certainly marrying them.
work are still heavily influenced by the caste system, despite all attempts by the
democratic government of India to break down such distinctions and convince Hindus
that there is nothing polluting in caste mixing .3
Purity in America
A similar vicious circle perpetuated the racial hierarchy in modern America . From the
sixteenth to the eighteenth century, the European conquerors imported millions of
African slaves to work the mines and plantations of America. They chose to import slaves
from Africa rather than from Europe or East Asia due to three circumstantial factors.
Firstly, Africa was closer, so it was cheaper to import slaves from Senegal than from
Vietnam.
Secondly, in Africa there already existed a well-developed slave trade (exporting slaves

mainly to the Middle East), whereas in Europe slavery was very rare . It was obviously
far easier to buy slaves in an existing market than to create a new one from scratch.
Thirdly, and most importantly, American plantations in places such as Virginia, Haiti and Brazil were plagued

by malaria and yellow fever, which had originated in Africa. Africans had acquired over
the generations a partial genetic immunity to these diseases, whereas Europeans
were totally defenceless and died in droves .
It was consequently wiser for a plantation owner to invest his money in an African slave
than in a European slave or indentured labourer. Paradoxically, genetic superiority (in terms of immunity)
translated into social inferiority: precisely because Africans were fitter in tropical
climates than Europeans, they ended up as the slaves of European masters ! Due to
these circumstantial factors , the burgeoning new societies of America were to be
divided into a ruling caste of white Europeans and a subjugated caste of black Africans .
But people don’t like to say that they keep slaves of a certain race or origin simply because it’s economically expedient. Like the

Aryan conquerors of India, white Europeans in the Americas wanted to be seen not only as
economically successful but also as pious, just and objective . Religious and scientific myths were

pressed into service to justify this division. Theologians argued that Africans descend
from Ham, son of Noah, saddled by his father with a curse that his offspring would be slaves. Biologists argued that
blacks are less intelligent than whites and their moral sense less developed . Doctors alleged that
blacks live in filth and spread diseases – in other words, they are a source of pollution.
These myths struck a chord in American culture, and in Western culture generally. They
continued to exert their influence long after the conditions that created slavery had
disappeared. In the early nineteenth century imperial Britain outlawed slavery and stopped the Atlantic slave trade, and in the decades
that followed slavery was gradually outlawed throughout the American continent.
Notably, this was the first and only time in history that slaveholding societies voluntarily abolished slavery. But, even though the slaves were
freed, the racist myths that justified slavery persisted. Separation of the races was maintained by racist
legislation and social custom .
The result was a self-reinforcing cycle of cause and effect , a vicious circle.
Consider, for example, the southern United States immediately after the Civil War. In 1865 the Thirteenth Amendment to the US Constitution
outlawed slavery and the Fourteenth Amendment mandated that citizenship and the equal protection of the law could not be denied on the
basis of race. However, two centuries of slavery meant that most black families were far poorer and far less educated than most white families.
A black person born in Alabama in 1865 thus had much less chance of getting a good education and a well-paid job than did his white
neighbours. His children, born in the 1880S and 1890s, started life with the same disadvantage – they, too, were born to an uneducated, poor
family.
But economic disadvantage was not the whole story . Alabama was also home to many
poor whites who lacked the opportunities available to their better-off racial brothers
and sisters. In addition, the Industrial Revolution and the waves of immigration made the United States an extremely fluid society, where
rags could quickly turn into riches. If money was all that mattered, the sharp divide between the races
should soon have blurred, not least through intermarriage.
But that did not happen. By 1865 whites, as well as many blacks, took it to be a simple matter of fact
that blacks were less intelligent, more violent and sexually dissolute, lazier and less concerned about personal cleanliness
than whites. They were thus the agents of violence, theft, rape and disease – in other words, pollution. If a black Alabaman in 1895 miraculously
managed to get a good education and then applied for a respectable job such as a bank teller, his odds of being accepted were far worse than
The stigma that labelled blacks as, by nature, unreliable,
those of an equally qualified white candidate.
lazy and less intelligent conspired against him.
You might think that people would gradually understand that these stigmas were myth rather than fact and that blacks would be able, over
these prejudices
time, to prove themselves just as competent, law-abiding and clean as whites. In fact, the opposite happened –

became more and more entrenched as time went by . Since all the best jobs were held
by whites, it became easier to believe that blacks really are inferior . ‘Look,’ said the
average white citizen, ‘blacks have been free for generations, yet there are almost no
black professors, lawyers, doctors or even bank tellers. Isn’t that proof that blacks are
simply less intelligent and hard-working?’ Trapped in this vicious circle, blacks were not
hired for whitecollar jobs because they were deemed unintelligent, and the proof of
their inferiority was the paucity of blacks in white-collar jobs.
The vicious circle did not stop there. As anti-black stigmas grew stronger, they were translated into

a system of ‘Jim Crow’ laws and norms that were meant to safeguard the racial order.
Blacks were forbidden to vote in elections, to study in white schools, to buy in white
stores, to eat in white restaurants, to sleep in white hotels. The justification for all of this was that blacks
were foul, slothful and vicious, so whites had to be protected from them. Whites did not want to sleep in the same hotel as blacks or to eat in
the same restaurant, for fear of diseases. They did not want their children learning in the same school as black children, for fear of brutality and
bad influences. They did not want blacks voting in elections, since blacks were ignorant and immoral. These fears were substantiated by
scientific studies that ‘proved’ that blacks were indeed less educated, that various diseases were more common among them, and that their
crime rate was far higher (the studies ignored the fact that these ‘facts’ resulted from discrimination against blacks).
By the mid-twentieth century, segregation in the former Confederate states was probably worse than in
the late nineteenth century. Clennon King, a black student who applied to the University of Mississippi in 1958, was forcefully
committed to a mental asylum. The presiding judge ruled that a black person must surely be insane to think that he could be admitted to the
University of Mississippi.
The vicious circle: a chance historical situation is translated into a rigid social system.
Nothing was as revolting to American southerners (and many northerners) as sexual relations and marriage between black men and white
women. Sex between the races became the greatest taboo and any violation, or suspected violation, was viewed as deserving immediate and
summary punishment in the form of lynching. The Ku Klux Klan, a white supremacist secret society, perpetrated many such killings. They could
have taught the Hindu Brahmins a thing or two about purity laws.
With time, the racism spread to more and more cultural arenas . American aesthetic culture was
built around white standards of beauty . The physical attributes of the white race – for example light skin, fair and
straight hair, a small upturned nose – came to be identified as beautiful. Typical black features – dark skin, dark and bushy hair, a flattened nose
– were deemed ugly. These preconceptions ingrained the imagined hierarchy at an even deeper level of human consciousness.
Such vicious circles can go on for centuries and even millennia , perpetuating an imagined
hierarchy that sprang from a chance historical occurrence . Unjust discrimination often gets worse, not
better, with time. Money comes to money, and poverty to poverty. Education comes to
education, and ignorance to ignorance. Those once victimised by history are likely to be
victimised yet again. And those whom history has privileged are more likely to be
privileged again.
Most sociopolitical hierarchies lack a logical or biological basis – they are nothing but

the perpetuation of chance events supported by myths . That is one good reason to
study history . If the division into blacks and whites or Brahmins and Shudras was grounded in
biological realities – that is, if Brahmins really had better brains than Shudras – biology would be sufficient for understanding human
society. Since the biological distinctions between different groups of Homo sapiens are, in fact, negligible, biology can’t explain the intricacies of
We can only understand those phenomena by studying the
Indian society or American racial dynamics.

events, circumstances, and power relations that transformed figments of imagination

into cruel – and very real – social structures .
[2] Progress is Possible –
[a] Muslim Ban was reversed --
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/27/biden-reversed-trumps-muslim-ban-americans-
support-that-decision/

[b] Wages – they are higher than average and have consistently increased
Agrahari 20 [Amit Agrahari, February, 2020, Reverse Colonization? Indians contributed to UK's
economy, now they are managing it too, with Sunak as Finance Minister, TFIPOST,
https://tfipost.com/2020/02/reverse-colonization-indians-contributed-to-uks-economy-now-they-are-
managing-it-too-with-sunak-as-finance-minister/] Eric
Indian businesses are highly concentrated in the metropolis of London and they
dominated particularly the hospitality, healthcare and pharmaceuticals, and retail sectors. 
As per data from the UK’s Office for National Statistics, only Indians are Chinese are among the Ethnic groups

which have higher than average earning . The data under the report titled ‘Ethnicity Pay Gaps in Great Britain: 2018′
revealed that minorities earn 3.8 per cent less than white ethnic groups but Indian and Chinese buck
this trend. 
“Overall, employees from certain ethnic groups such as Indian and Chinese, have higher average

earnings than their white British counterparts,” said Hugh Stickland, senior ONS analyst.
In 2015, the then India’s High commissioner to the United Kingdom, Navtej Sarna said that Indian diaspora is an asset for India-UK relations. He
that Indian punch at least three times above their weight , and contribute 6 per
also argued

cent to the UK’s GDP with 1.8 per cent of the population. “The India diaspora in the UK is one of the largest ethnic minority
communities in the country equating to around 1.8 per cent of the population and contributing 6 per cent of the country’s GDP,” Sarna said. 

[c] The TAPAH Act.

Meng 21 [Congresswoman Grace Meng, 5-4-2021, "Meng Introduces Legislation to Promote the
Teaching of Asian Pacific American History in Schools; Measure Seeks to Help Combat Bigotry and
Discrimination Against Asian Americans", https://meng.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/meng-
introduces-legislation-to-promote-the-teaching-of-asian-pacific-0, DOA: 11-19-2022 //ArchanSen]
to help combat continued bigotry and hate against Asian Americans, U.S. Rep. Grace Meng (D-
In an effort
NY) announced today that she reintroduced legislation to promote the teaching and learning of Asian
Pacific American history in schools across the United States.
The Teaching Asian Pacific American History Act (H.R. 2283) seeks to provide an understanding
of the history, contributions and experiences of Asian Pacific Americans to help eliminate the
discrimination and prejudice that the Asian American community has been forced to
endure not just over the past year, but for decades. These teachings include the many critical achievements and vast contributions that
those of Asian and Pacific Islander descent have made to the U.S., and the struggles and racism that has long been directed towards Asian Pacific
Americans.
Asian Pacific American history has been poorly represented or excluded from
“For generations,
our K-12 education system and social studies textbooks, and it’s time for that to change as we work to
combat the current rise in anti-Asian attacks related to COVID-19,” said Congresswoman Meng.
“Asian Pacific American history is an integral part of American history , and this must be reflected in
what our children learn in school. Asian Americans have always been seen as invisible or as foreigners. We have grown up with people
questioning whether we’re American enough, and we’ve endured slurs and jokes about our appearance and our food. And even if we were raised
or born here, many still tell us to ‘go back to our country,’ and make ignorant and xenophobic remarks such as telling us that we speak English
well. These types of biases against Asian Americans need to be addressed at its roots, and teaching the future generation about our past, and how
those of Asian and Pacific Islander descent helped make America the greatest country on the planet, would help breakdown the stereotypes and
negative perceptions that sadly still exist about Asian Pacific Americans.”
“But this effort should not be limited to the Asian Pacific American community,” added Meng. “All communities of color must be better
represented in the history lessons taught to our students, and with much of our nation focused on tackling the increase in anti-Asian sentiment and
racial injustice, we must use this moment to put forward this long-term solution of expanding school curriculums. Whether it’s learning about the
Chinese laborers who helped build the Transcontinental Railroad, the incarceration of Japanese Americans following the attack on Pearl Harbor,
slaves building the U.S. Capitol or the many other important chapters from our nation’s past – whether good, bad or ugly – our classrooms must
include ALL of America’s history. Our nation cannot move forward in healing, until we learn from and correct the mistakes of our past. We can’t
focus on tearing down the walls of biases and discrimination until our kids have a full teaching of what American history truly is.”
The Teaching Asian Pacific American History Act would require grant applications from
Presidential and Congressional Academies to include Asian Pacific American history as part of their
American history and civics programs offered to students and teachers . Every year, hundreds of
teachers and students attend these academies, which are funded by the U.S. Department of Education, for an in-depth study in American history
and civics. Presidential Academies are designed for teachers seeking to strengthen their knowledge of American history, and Congressional
Academies for students who aim to enrich their understanding of the subject.
The Congresswoman’s legislation would also encourage the inclusion of Asian Pacific
American history in national and state tests administered through the National Assessment of
Educational Progress, and promote collaboration with the Smithsonian Institution’s Asian Pacific American Center to develop
innovative programming regarding Asian Pacific American history. Meng’s bill is pending before the House Committee on Education and Labor.

[3] Psycho is false – neurophysiological phobias and philias are malleable through
habit forming.
Cikara & Van Bavel ’15 [Mina and Jay; June 2nd; Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of
the Intergroup Neuroscience Lab at Harvard University; Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director
of the Social Perception and Evaluation Laboratory at New York University; Scientific American, “The
Flexibility of Racial Bias: Research suggests that racism is not hard wired, offering hope on one of
America’s enduring problems,” https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-flexibility-of-racial-
bias/; GR]
It would be easy to see in all this powerful evidence that racism is a permanent fixture in
America’s social fabric and even, perhaps, an inevitable aspect of human nature. Indeed, the mere act of labeling others according to
their age, gender, or race is a reflexive habit of the human mind. Social categories, like race, impact our thinking quickly, often outside of our
awareness. Extensive research has found that these implicit racial biases—negative thoughts and feelings about people from other races—are
Neuroscientists have also explored racial prejudice by
automatic, pervasive, and difficult to suppress.

exposing people to images of faces while scanning their brains in fMRI machines . Early studies found that when people
viewed faces of another race, the amount of activity in the amygdala—a small brain structure associated with experiencing emotions, including
fear—was associated with individual differences on implicit measures of racial bias. This work has led many to conclude that racial biases might
be part of a primitive—and possibly hard-wired—neural fear response to racial out-groups.
There is little question that categories such as race, gender, and age play a major role in shaping the biases and stereotypes that people bring to
bear in their judgments of others. However, research has shown that how people categorize themselves may be just as fundamental to
understanding prejudice as how they categorize others. When people categorize themselves as part of a group, their self-concept shifts from
the individual (“I”) to the collective level (“us”). People form groups rapidly and favor members of their own group even when groups are
formed on arbitrary grounds, such as the simple flip of a coin. These findings highlight the remarkable ease with which humans form coalitions.
Recent research confirms that coalition-based preferences trump race-based preferences .
For example, both Democrats and Republicans favor the resumes of those affiliated with their political

party much more than they favor those who share their race . These coalition-based preferences remain powerful
even in the absence of the animosity present in electoral politics. Our research has shown that the simple act of placing people on a mixed-race
team can diminish their automatic racial bias. In a series of experiments, White participants who were randomly placed on a mixed-race team—
the Tigers or Lions—showed little evidence of implicit racial bias. Merely belonging to a mixed-race team
trigged positive automatic associations with all of the members of their own group, irrespective of race. Being a part
of one of these seemingly trivial mixed-race groups produced similar effects on brain activity— the amygdala responded to

team membership rather than race . Taken together, these studies indicate that momentary changes in group
membership can override the influence of race on the way we see, think about, and feel toward people who are different from ourselves.
Although these coalition-based distinctions might be the most basic building block of bias, they say little about the other factors that cause
group conflict. Why do some groups get ignored while others get attacked? Whenever we encounter a new person or group we are motivated
to answer two questions as quickly as possible: “is this person a friend or foe?” and “are they capable of enacting their intentions toward me?”
In other words, once we have determined that someone is a member of an out-group, we need to determine what kind? The nature of the
relations between groups—are we cooperative, competitive, or neither?—and their relative status—do you have access to resources?—largely
determine the course of intergroup interactions.
Groups that are seen as competitive with one’s interests, and capable of enacting their nasty intentions, are much more likely to be targets of
hostility than more benevolent (e.g., elderly) or powerless (e.g., homeless) groups. This is one reason why sports rivalries have such
psychological potency. For instance, fans of the Boston Red Sox are more likely to feel pleasure, and exhibit reward-related neural responses, at
the misfortunes of the archrival New York Yankees than other baseball teams (and vice versa)—especially in the midst of a tight playoff race.
(How much fans take pleasure in the misfortunes of their rivals is also linked to how likely they would be to harm fans from the other team.)
Just as a particular person’s group membership can be flexible, so too are the relations between groups. Groups that have previously had
cordial relations may become rivals (and vice versa). Indeed, psychological and biological responses to out-
group members can change , depending on whether or not that out-group is perceived as threatening. For example, people
exhibit greater pleasure—they smile—in response to the misfortunes of stereotypically competitive groups (e.g., investment bankers);
however, this malicious pleasure is reduced when you provide participants with counter-stereotypic information (e.g., “investment bankers are
working with small companies to help them weather the economic downturn). Competition between “us” and “them” can even distort our
judgments of distance, making threatening out-groups seem much closer than they really are. These distorted perceptions can serve to amplify
intergroup discrimination: the more different and distant “they” are, the easier it is to disrespect and harm them.
Thus, not all out-groups are treated the same: some elicit indifference whereas others become targets of antipathy. Stereotypically threatening
stereotypes can be tempered with other
groups are especially likely to be targeted with violence, but those

information . If perceptions of intergroup relations can be changed, individuals may overcome hostility
toward perceived foes and become more responsive to one another’s grievances.
The flexible nature of both group membership and intergroup relations offers reason to be cautiously
optimistic about the potential for greater cooperation among groups in conflict (be they black versus white or citizens
versus police). One strategy is to bring multiple groups together around a common goal. For example, during the fiercely contested 2008
Democratic presidential primary process, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama supporters gave more money to strangers who supported the same
primary candidate (compared to the rival candidate). Two months later, after the Democratic National Convention, the supporters of both
candidates coalesced around the party nominee—Barack Obama—and this bias disappeared. In fact, merely creating a sense of
cohesion between two competitive groups can increase empathy for the suffering of our rivals. These
sorts of strategies can help reduce aggression toward hostile out-groups, which is critical for creating

more opportunities for constructive dialogue addressing greater social injustices .

Of course, instilling a sense of common identity and cooperation is extremely difficult in entrenched intergroup conflicts, but when it happens,
the benefits are obvious. Consider how the community leaders in New York City and Ferguson responded differently to protests against police
brutality—in NYC political leaders expressed grief and concern over police brutality and moved quickly to make policy changes in policing,
whereas the leaders and police in Ferguson responded with high-tech military vehicles and riot gear. In the first case, multiple groups came
together with a common goal—to increase the safety of everyone in the community; in the latter case, the actions of the police likely reinforced
the “us” and “them” distinctions.
Tragically, these types of conflicts continue to roil the country. Understanding the psychology and neuroscience of social identity and intergroup
relations cannot undo the effects of systemic racism and discriminatory practices; however, it can offer insights into the psychological processes
responsible for escalating the tension between, for example, civilians and police officers.
Even in cases where it isn’t possible to create a common identity among groups in conflict, it may be possible to blur the boundaries between
groups. In one recent experiment, we sorted participants into groups—red versus blue team—competing for a cash prize. Half of the
participants were randomly assigned to see a picture of a segregated social network of all the players, in which red dots clustered together,
blue dots clustered together, and the two clusters were separated by white space. The other half of the participants saw an integrated social
network in which the red and blue dots were mixed together in one large cluster. Participants who thought the two teams were interconnected
with one another reported greater empathy for the out-group players compared to those who had seen the segregated network. Thus,
reminding people that individuals could be connected to one another despite being from different groups may be another way to build trust
and understanding among them.
A mere month before Freddie Gray died in police custody, President Obama addressed the nation on the 50th anniversary of Bloody Sunday in
Selma: “We do a disservice to the cause of justice by intimating that bias and discrimination are immutable, or that racial division is inherent to
America. To deny…progress -- our progress -- would be to rob us of our own agency; our responsibility to do what we can to make America
better."
The president was saying that we, as a society, have a responsibility to reduce prejudice and discrimination. These recent findings from
psychology and neuroscience indicate that we, as individuals, possess this capacity. Of course, this capacity is not sufficient to usher in racial
equality or peace. Even when the level of prejudice against particular out-groups decreases, it does not imply that the level of institutional
 only collective action and
discrimination against these or other groups will necessarily improve. Ultimately,

institutional evolution can address systemic racism . The science is clear on one thing, though:
individual bias and discrimination are changeable. Race-based prejudice and discrimination, in particular, are

created and reinforced by many social factors, but they are not inevitable consequences of
our biology . Perhaps understanding how coalitional thinking impacts intergroup relations will make it easier for us to affect real social
change going forward.
 1NC – IR Good
Debating IR is key to challenge its excesses---IR is reflexive but will be co-opted by the
right absent debate over policy details.
Reiter 15, PhD, Professor of Political Science at Emory University (Dan Reiter, August 2015, “Scholars
Help Policymakers Know Their Tools,” War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/scholars-
help-policymakers-know-their-tools/)
This critique is both narrowly true and narrow in perspective. Context is of course important, but foreign policy
choices are not sui generis , there are patterns across space and time that inform
decision-making . Policymakers recognize this and routinely draw lessons from history
when making foreign policy decisions. As noted below, policymakers in other areas such as development and public
health routinely rely on broader, more general studies to craft policy. And, broader scholarship can improve foreign

policy performance, as evidenced by the ability of IR academics to build on their own

work to predict outcomes , including for example forecasting the lengths of the
conventional and insurgency phases of the U.S.–Iraq conflict in the 2000s . But, even if one were to
accept the limits of general work, there is a growing body of academic work that evaluates foreign policy tools as applied to a specific country
or region. These studies ask questions such as whether: Development projects reduced insurgent violence in Afghanistan; Drone strikes
reduced insurgent violence in Pakistan; Development programs increased civic participation and social capital in Sudan; Building cell phone
towers in Iraq reduced insurgent violence; Attempts to reintegrate combatants into society in Burundi succeeded; Security sector reform in
Liberia increased the legitimacy of the government there; Road projects in India reduced insurgent violence; We can understand
peacekeeping’s failure in Congo; Israel’s targeted assassinations reduced violent attacks from militants. This is not by any means a dismissal of
professional intelligence work. Academics are not intelligence analysts: They do not have access to contemporary intelligence data, nor are they
generally trained to do things like examine the latest satellite photos of North Korean nuclear activities and make judgments about North
Korea’s current plutonium production. And certainly, academic IR work can never replace professional intelligence work. But the best policy
decisions marry timely, specific intelligence with academic work that has a more general perspective. A third critique is that much of this
academic work on foreign policy tools is unusable by policymakers because it is too quantitative and technically complex. Here, echoing a point
there is a danger in not appreciating the importance of rigorous research
made by Erik Voeten,

design, including sophisticated quantitative techniques , for crafting effective policy .

Sophisticated research design is not the enemy of effective policy, it is critically
necessary for it. Certainly, the current academic focus on building research designs that
permit causal inference speaks exactly to what policymakers care about the most: if
implementing a certain policy will cause the desired outcome. Or, put differently, bad research
designs make for bad public policy . A classic example is school busing. In the 1960s and early 1970s, some cities adopted
voluntary integration programs for public schools, in which families could volunteer to bus their children to schools in neighborhoods with
different racial majorities. Policymakers used the favorable results for the voluntary programs to make the improper inference that mandatory
Sophisticated technical
busing policies would also work. The result was bad public policy and violence in the streets.

methods can improve our ability to make causal inferences , and can help solve other
empirical problems . Consider that the heart of successful counterinsurgency is, according to U.S. military doctrine, winning the
support of the population. Assessing whether certain policies do win public support requires
collecting opinion data. A conventional method for measuring popular opinion is the survey, but of course, individuals in
insurgency-stricken areas may be unwilling to reveal their true opinions to a survey-taker out of fear for their personal safety.
Methodologists have crafted sophisticated techniques for addressing this issue,
improving our ability to measure public support for the government in these areas . These
techniques have been used to assess better the determinants of public support in insurgency-affected countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan,
 Going forward, we will continue to need advanced methodologies to address
and India.

pressing policy questions . Consider the U.S. military’s commitment to gender integration. The implementation of this
commitment will be best informed if it rests on rigorous social science that address outstanding questions. Is there a Sacagawea effect, in which
mixed gender units engaged in counterinsurgency are more effective than male-only units? How might mixed gender affect small unit cohesion
in combat? How might mixed gender units reduce the incidence of sexual assault, both within the military and of assault committed by troops
Certainly, other areas of public policy understand the importance of
against civilians?

rigorous research design . Economic and development policy communities read the
work of and employ economics Ph.D.s. Policymakers incorporate the findings of
sophisticated studies on policy areas such as microfinance , gender empowerment , and
foreign aid , knowing the best policy decisions must incorporate these studies’ findings .
Or consider public health policy. Lives are literally on the line as decision-makers must make

decisions about issues such as vaccinations , nutritional recommendations , and air

quality .

Policymakers know they must use sophisticated technical studies executed by

epidemiologists and other public health academics to craft the best policies . Critics will argue
that some U.S. policymakers remain alienated from contemporary academic IR work, with the suggestion that if IR academics let go of an
obsession with technique, they will then be better able to connect with policymakers and help them craft better policy. I agree that IR
the tech nical components of
academics need to find ways to communicate their results in clear, non-technical language. But

the work need to be there . Stripping them out directly undermines the ability of the
research to give the right kinds of policy recommendations . Let me conclude by noting that I am
sympathetic to the concern that IR academics should think about the big picture as well as smaller questions, the forest of grand strategy as
well as the trees of foreign policy tools. IR academics have the potential to make real contributions to
big picture debates , to think hard about the essence of grand strategy by assembling a framework that effectively integrates
foreign policy means and ends. The nature of the IR subfield and its integration of political economy

and security, and its ability to think about structure as well as units, make it especially
well positioned to consider these broad questions . The ability of IR academics to contribute to
contemporary foreign policy debates is one of many reasons why political science should retain the
subfield of IR and resist the temptation to replace the traditional empirical subfields of IR,
comparative, and American with new subfields of conflict, political economy, behavior, and
institutions. Like good carpenters, foreign policymakers need to know their tools. Rigorous IR
research is the only way to evaluate them effectively .

Rejecting IR scholarship as praxis creates openings for far-right cooption. There is no

single disciplinary impulse within IR.
Michelsen, 21—Department of War Studies, School of Security, King’s College London (Nicholas,
“What is a minor international theory? On the limits of ‘Critical International Relations’,” Journal of
International Political Theory, Vol 17, Issue 3, 2021, dml)
The problem of synthesis stalks all self-defining Critical approaches to IR. Defining the
terms of reference for intellectual dissidence in relation to IR’s ‘disciplinary crisis’, as the
 created conditions ripe for viewing
poststructuralists did in viewing critique as a function of disciplinary marginality,

any competitor theory as problematic to the degree that they can be deemed
insufficiently minor (Whitehall, 2016). The idea that critique necessitates moving ‘ beyond IR’ as
an inherently majoritarian project has become a widely expressed trope . The result is that Critical IR theorists now
engage in increasingly virulent disagreements over the political and ethical implications of disciplinarity itself. In perpetual abeyance,
claimants to Critical IR become hostages to a continuous risk of being exposed as
insufficiently pure of the (modernist, racist, colonial, patriarchal, heteronormative,
positivist, capitalist) traces of ‘the major literature/discipline’. At the same time, Critical IR scholars who advocate for a
disciplinary exit in search of ‘more Critical’ inter-disciplines have found themselves wrestling with the charge of pre-judgement: Since
they appear to know what ‘Being Critical’ will look like after de-disciplinarisation, critique takes the
form of testing whether other scholars meet these pre-given criteria (Holden, 2006; Howell
and Richter-Montpetit , 2020).
This stream in contemporary IR scholarship ignores the manners in which minor theories, far from
tending towards alliances , are often set to contradictory political and ethical
purposes . And that the visions of world politics created by scholars ‘moving beyond’
disciplinary IR can be just as problematic as visions already settled within the
discipline. Contemporary political and social movements borrow intellectual resources
from various (once or still) minor theoretical traditions in IR to think against a ‘Globalist’
world order , incorporating the Gramscian position that ‘politics is downstream from culture’, the ideal of a
transgressive emancipatory identity , and the critique of neo-colonialism (Love, 2017; Nagle
2017). The philosopher Alain De Benoist wrote his manifesto for the New Right in the year 2000 with the aim of challenging the oppressive
implications of major international theories, especially Liberalism, borrowing widely from resources of minor intellectual critique (de Benoist
and Champetier, 1999). This theory is marginal in disciplinary IR, but influential amongst populist politicians like
Putin, Trump, Orban, Salvini and Le Pen, as well as online communities of Race Realists , western

chauvinists , and white nationalists . It proposes that Liberalism destroys the autonomy
of ethnicities and cultures, and that the history of the west has been one of ongoing
cultural as well as political colonialism . De Benoist’s argument is that the project of decolonisation is incomplete, and
continues through international aid and UN-led Liberal paternalism.
The answer proposed by the New Right is to restore a truly independent status to
diverse cultures and indigenous world-views in International Relations, and suggest that
people belonging to these ‘birth-cultures’ must actively work towards their national
and cognitive emancipation from all the baggage of Liberal modernity, if necessary, through
violently closing borders . The New Right claims its intellectual marginality vis-à-vis Liberalism or Globalism (understood as the
ideological representative of modernism in international thought) is a marker of its virtue. The New Right is not, however, widely viewed as a
‘Critical ally’ of Decolonial IR theory.
A claim to minor theoretical status is also visible amongst reactionary theorists of gender, including online groups of men’s rights activists,
western chauvinist militias like the Proud Boys, or traditionalist ‘family values’ movements (Nagle, 2017). These groups develop an operative
concept of the radical intellectual margins as central to their understandings of critique, and of the emancipatory relationship which their
critique has to hegemonic theoretical frameworks that they perceive as oppressing them: Liberalism or ‘Cultural Marxism’ (Nagle, 2017). These
actors see their critiques of what they term ‘gender ideology’ as part of a necessary escape from the straightjacket of modernist categories,
currently hegemonic in contemporary academia. In other words, the belief that transgressive or marginal theory is emancipatory has diverse
advocates, whose antimodernism or anti-hegemonism comes with divergent attitudes to gender, race, culture, economics, social, political and
international organisation.
The sociological implications of this point were anticipated, but not fully developed, by Katz (1996: 488), who noted that:
‘ talk of exclusion can lead to an unsavory hierarchy of marginalization – a kind of
competitive victimology – and even to the cul-de-sac of an essentialist identity politics .
Notions of exclusion are all about, one might even say tautologically about, position, and if we are
not careful they can lead to relativist accounts that offer little of practical value . And
they can be disingenuous – proclamations of exclusion by scholars who are quite
included ’.
The historical moment facing critique calls us to recognise that minor theories infer no allied ethics or politics .

There is no cohesive and abiding sovereign ‘ logic of modernity ’ that forms the
superstructure of disciplinary IR , and gives assurance that the postdisciplinary avant-
guard will share an understanding of virtue . The romanticism characteristic of self-describing Critical intellectual
cultures that arose in IR in the immediate Post-Cold War context must now be reconsidered. Many of the same intellectual

tools are now being effectively mobilised by reactionaries , racists and gender
absolutists . Contemporary reactionaries have read their Deleuze, their Gramsci, their Derrida and Foucault (see Land,
2012), and they are cognisant of the discursive logic and rhetorical power of , for example, concepts

of exclusion , identity , precarity , marginality , hegemony , the avant-guard ,

victimhood and indigeneity (see Michelsen and De Orellana, 2019).
The challenge facing scholars in IR who seek to write in the service of vulnerable groups ,
like migrants lacking a safe home state, those who do not fit with heteronormative gender roles, or the victims of racism, is that their

reactionary theoretical interlocutors have recognised the power in claiming to be

uniquely reflexive critics, intellectually marginal vis-à-vis dominant theoretical
assumptions about IR. The category ‘Critical IR’ provides no tools by which to counter these
relativistic arguments. In this context, the belief that ‘Being Critical’ requires a minoritarian exit
from disciplinary IR may be a distraction from developing methodologically and
epistemologically rigorous critiques , that can be communicated as such. Faith in the
emancipatory intellectual margins brings to mind Latour’s (2004: 225) worry that self-describing
‘Critical’ scholars today are like ‘ those mechanical toys that endlessly make the same
gesture when everything else has changed around them’.
 1NC – AT: AI Reps
Military applications of AI are inevitable, so de-securitizing isn’t an option. The risks
are real and pretending they aren’t risks undermining effective governance strategies.
Gill 19 – Executive Director of the Secretariat of the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Digital
Cooperation, Project Director and CEO of the International Digital Health & AI Research Collaborative
Amandeep Singh Gill, Artificial Intelligence and International Security: The Long View, 2019, Ethics &
International Affairs, Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs,
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ethics-and-international-affairs/article/abs/artificial-
intelligence-and-international-security-the-long-view/4AB181EAF648501422257934982A4DD5
An Agenda For Ensuring Security and Stability in the Age of AI
The starting point for dealing with the international security implications of AI must be the
acknowledgment that we are in it for the long haul. There will be no quick fixes. The economic, political, and
security drivers for mainstreaming this suite of technologies into security functions are simply too
powerful to be rolled back . There will be plenty of persuasive national security applications—
minimizing casualties and collateral damage through better discrimination of targets, fighting crime, defeating
terrorist threats, saving on defense spending, and protecting soldiers and their bases—to provide counterarguments against concerns about
runaway robots or accidental war caused by machine error.
This acknowledgment must be accompanied by an intensification of crossdomain literacy. AI cannot be the business of coders and cognitive
scientists alone; nor can its security implications be the province only of diplomats, generals, and lawyers. Given the broad impact that AI
businesses can have on society, the business of AI has to be everyone’s business. Governance of AI can only be based on a correct
understanding of the power and limits of the technology, and such governance can only be effective globally if it is part of a tiered approach
that includes actors at the intergovernmental, national, and industry levels.
Currently, though military investmentsin AI are being acknowledged, no state admits to the existence of lethal
autonomous weapon systems in its inventory. Thus, if we want to build mutual confidence and trust, we are left
either to add discussions on such systems to existing dialogues on cybersecurity and arms control more broadly or to begin
with new dialogues on approaches to repurposable civilian capabilities. The latter might be a more productive venue for engaging the private
sector, which is wary of being stigmatized by civil society as the maker or facilitator of “killer robots.” Tagging on discussions of AI to
cybersecurity or traditional arms control would also be unhelpful because of the risk of false analogies.
Thus, new innovatively structured dialogues in the track setting (involving both government and nongovernmental parties) or the track
setting (involving artificial intelligence and international security only informal nongovernmental parties) are required .

The first objective should be to enhance mutual understanding through in-depth discussions on
national approaches to AI development, testing and validation, deployment, and use. Another objective
should be to allow some sharing of best practices or cautionary experiences. A third potential objective would be to
shift thinking from zerosum competitive approaches to collaborative problem-solving using data and algorithmic insights pooled by the
participants themselves or put in escrow with a trusted third party.
Agreement on norms to govern the military use of AI could take time, but influencing the direction of such use
by other means brooks no delay. One important channel for shaping AI use globally is guiding principles short of binding law. At a
time when there are trust deficits among nations and multilateral negotiations are at best seen as
opportunities for “lawfare,” it makes sense to rally around shared values and ethical principles. In the context of emerging
technologies, such an approach also permits more of an impact early on in the innovation cycle, when
national or international regulatory reach is absent or ambiguous. Consistent with this logic, the EU High-Level Expert Group on Artificial
Intelligence has identified five principles—beneficence, nonmaleficence, autonomy of humans, justice, and explicability—for the trustworthy
and ethical development of AI.
More specifically, in the context of military
use, in the Group of Governmental Experts of the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weaponson emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems ( LAWS),
comprised of states and including all countries thought to be pursuing national security applications of AI,
identified ten guiding principles on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS. These principles cover aspects related to the applicability of
international humanitarian law, human responsibility, accountability, risk assessment and mitigation, and the need to take a
nonanthropomorphic view of such systems. The guiding principles are accompanied by building blocks of common understandings on
definitions and the nature of human intervention required throughout the various stages of technology development and deployment to
uphold compliance with international law, in particular international humanitarian law.
Another channel for the soft governance of AI could be engineering standards and codes. At a minimum, a common vocabulary for assessing
risks and aligning design with safety and reliability considerations is needed. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers’ Global
Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems has started building a shared, multidisciplinary, and evolving resource of terms.
There is further scope for constructing common standards that can progressively align practices around the globe to responsible principles.
Last Word
There is a growing concern over the repurposing of AI technologies for warfare. As with cyber weapons, LAWS
could have indiscriminate effects and be turned around to attack the attackers.They can create challenges for the application of
international humanitarian law principles, such as distinction, proportionality, and precaution, all of which presuppose a degree of human
reflection and control. Their
international security implications are still unfolding but could be as significant as
the nuclear revolution in warfare, if not more so. Innovative and agile ways of governing the use of AI are
needed urgently to head off risks to international peace and security.
 1NC – AT: China Reps
CCP threat reps are important to not abandon millions of Asian people under the heal
of authoritarian fascism and expands anti-Asian violence domestically
Smith 21 (Noah, Bloomberg Opinion columnist. He was an assistant professor of finance at Stony
Brook University. “How to Criticize China Without Abetting Racism”
https://noahpinion.substack.com/p/how-to-criticize-china-without-abetting?
fbclid=IwAR32Z5FThD916DQzkRYun746d6LkpjDmtcKEgpMDMDSLq15NXbrktPmN3OM)
There is definitely a wave of racist hate against Asian Americans,
I take these worries extremely seriously.

much of it violent. Though I don’t think that this hate is primarily due to rising geopolitical
tensions between the U.S. and China, I do think those tensions, and the reaction to them, have the potential to
exacerbate things going forward .
On the other hand, geopolitical conflict is not going to stop on account of these worries . The U.S.

has real national interests that directly conflict with the goals of China’s rulers —
freedom of the seas, protecting Taiwan and India, and so on. As those interests come into conflict, there will
inevitably be friction between the two countries. The folks who think they can stop a
new Cold War by calling it racist are simply mistaken . For example, this kind of thing is just not going to work:
Twitter avatar for @attackerman
Spencer Ackerman
@attackerman

Your “Great Power Competition” with China, the new Cold War that you think will mean some
fantasy national renewal or the Great Struggle for Freedom in The 21st Century or whatever will get your
Asian-American neighbors murdered and you will deny the connection.
March 17th 2021
644 Retweets2,734 Likes

Even if U.S. leaders tried to go easy on China out of fear of stirring up racism at home , U.S.
leaders are simply not in control of the situation the way they were back in the days of
the Iraq War. China has power and agency here, and its spokespeople are out there
beating the war drums even as its neighbors — including U.S. allies — grow more and more alarmed. If you actually think the
U.S. is going to abandon its commitments, its allies, its principles , and its interests because
some guy with a moustache yelled that great power competition is racist, you should
probably think again .
In addition, people who identify any news story that reflects badly on the CCP as inherently

anti-Asian are not helping the cause of combatting anti-Asian hate. If the lab leak
theory turns out to be true, then it turns out to be true. And if that happens, the people who tried to denounce it
as racist are going to look like they tried to cover up the truth . And the backlash to that
will be worse than whatever harm those people think they prevented by denouncing
the lab leak theory .
And as Matt Yglesias rightly argues in a recent post, criticism of countries — in addition to being inevitable — is

morally legitimate . China’s government is engaged in atrocities at home and increasing

aggression abroad, and we have a right, if not a duty , to call that out. Morally , we should not
equate criticism of the CCP with anti-Asian racism any more than we should equate
criticism of Israel with antisemitism.
But that’s a moral argument. In a practical sense, we should work very hard to make sure that criticism of China doesn’t rebound onto Asian Americans. Though it’s

probably not possible to completely suppress the backlash — this is a big country, and it
has many racist and violent people who don’t listen to anything we say — I think there are some things we
can do to minimize it.
Rhetoric matters: Lessons from the War on Terror

we can learn a valuable lesson by looking back to the last big outbreak of international tensions — the War on Terror. Folk history
I think

holds that the days following 9/11 were dark days of violence and hatred against Muslim Americans.
But in fact, the peak of Islamophobic violence in America was not in 2001, but in 2016 :
There were two deadly attacks on Muslims (or South Asians mistaken for Muslims) in the five years following 9/11 — one in Arizona, one in Texas, both in late 2001. From 2014 through 2017,
there were eight, plus a number of attacks that thankfully didn’t result in deaths.

At first blush, this difference makes no sense at all. 9/11 killed thousands of people and threw our nation into absolute chaos. In
2016, in contrast, not much was happening in terms of a “clash of civilizations” — we were mopping up ISIS, but it
was a relatively minor and distant threat compared to al Qaeda, and our crushing of it involved very few U.S. deaths. If there was ever a time we’d

expect an Islamophobic backlash, it was 2001-2002, not 2016!

The difference, it seems to me, was rhetoric. For all his bad deeds, George W. Bush got up after 9/11 and told the nation this:
[T]he American people were appalled and outraged at last Tuesday's attacks, and so were Muslims all across the world.
Both Americans, our Muslim friends and citizens, taxpaying citizens, and Muslims in nations were just appalled and could not believe what we saw on our TV screens. These acts of violence
against innocents violate the fundamental tenets of the Islamic faith, and it's important for my fellow Americans to understand that.
The English translation is not as eloquent as the original Arabic, but let me quote from the Koran itself. ‘In the long run, evil in the extreme will be the end of those who do evil, for that they
rejected the signs of Allah and held them up to ridicule.’
The face of terror is not the true faith of Islam. That's not what Islam is all about. Islam is peace. These terrorists don't represent peace, they represent evil and war.
When we think of Islam, we think of a faith that brings comfort to a billion people around the world. Billions of people find comfort and solace and peace. And that's made brothers and sisters
out of every race, out of every race.
America counts millions of Muslims amongst our citizens, and Muslims make an incredibly valuable contribution to our country.
The Muslims are doctors, lawyers, law professors, members of the military, entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, moms and dads, and they need to be treated with respect.
In our anger and emotion our fellow Americans must treat each other with respect. Women who cover their heads in this country must feel comfortable going outside their homes. Moms who
wear covering must not be intimidated in America…
I've been told that some fear to leave; some don't want to go shopping for their families; some don't want to go about their ordinary daily routines because, by wearing cover, they're afraid
they'll be intimidated. That should not and that will not stand in America.
Those who feel like they can intimidate our fellow citizens to take out their anger don't represent the best of America. They represent the worst of humankind. And they should be ashamed of
that kind of behavior.
Some conservatives were outraged at this speech, but there was nothing they could do. This was their President.

Contrast this with Trump’s rhetoric in the years in 2015 and 2016 . It was a constant
drumbeat of fearmongering and collective demonization, including an accusation that Muslim Americans cheered as the twin
towers came down. Trump floated the idea of creating a database of all Muslims in the U.S. He cited a specious poll

claiming that a quarter of Muslims living in America supported violence against Americans in the name of jihad. He characterized Muslims as “a sick

people”, declared that “Islam hates us”, and said Muslim immigrants were “not assimilating”. He stated that “The
children of Muslim American parents [are] responsible for a growing number…of
terrorist attacks.” And one of his signature policies was a ban on travel from many Muslim countries, popularly known as the Muslim Ban.
Once you see the difference in presidential rhetoric, it’s easy to understand why 2016,
not 2001, was the peak of anti-Islamic violence in America.
Rhetoric matters! Trump’s rhetoric about China was extremely xenophobic, while Biden is striking

all the right notes. It would be nice if some Republican leaders could get up and say
things similar to what Bush said after 9/11 — that Asian Americans are Americans and must be protected as such, and that racism and
violence against them are utterly unacceptable. But in lieu of that, it’s basically incumbent on everyone in the

country to do their part to speak up on behalf of Asian Americans and denounce hatred,
violence, and discrimination against them. And the bigger your platform, the more responsibility you have.

Rhetoric of this kind can help break the link between China-U.S. conflict and anti-Asian
racism.
Focus on allies and dissidents
A 1942 poster issued by the U.S. government

Trump painted China as a country that’s constantly menacing America (and by implication, mostly menacing
White Americans, whom Trump sees as the “real” Americans). This included his framing of COVID as a Chinese attack on

the U.S., which is what made liberals react so strongly against the lab leak theory in the first place.
But it’s important to understand that the vast majority of people under the greatest
threat from China’s government’s newfound aggression are Asian people , not White
people in America.
Uyghurs, currently being put in camps and possibly mass-sterilized by the Chinese
government, are Asian. Hong Kong dissidents being thrown in prison are Asian. Taiwanese people,
menaced by China’s increasing threats, are Asian. The Philippines, which is seeing its maritime
territory slowly sliced away by Chinese irregular forces, is Asian. Vietnam, which rightfully fears the increasing
power of a neighbor who invaded it in 1979, is Asian. And the vast number of dissidents,
reporters, thinkers, labor leaders, religious people, and activists of all kinds who are
regularly suppressed by the authoritarian Chinese state are pretty much all Asian.
Highlighting and talking about all these Asian people who are being oppressed or
threatened by the CCP will make it clear that the new Cold War, such as it is, is not some sort
of “clash of civilizations ” — a race war between Asians and Whites for mastery of the
planet, or any such nonsense. Instead, it’s almost entirely a story of some Asian people in Asia trying
to exert dominance and power over other Asian people in Asia.
If Americans hear this over and over, I predict that their perspective will shift. Some of the people Trump taught to think “China is

attacking us” will instead start to think “ China is threatening our Asian allies ”. The
conflict will be reframed as a struggle between the free people of Asia — and those who want to be free —
against the forces that would put them in bondage. It will reframe U.S.-China conflict as
protection of Asian people rather than as protection against Asian people.

Chinese government is revisionist – not its people

Sakshi Tiwari 22, MA Defence and National Security, 5-4-22, With ‘Resources, Capability & Intent’,
China Remains The Biggest, Long-Time Threat To US Than Russia — USAF,
https://eurasiantimes.com/china-remains-the-biggest-long-time-threat-to-us-than-russia/, jy
China’s Quest For ‘Worldwide Influence’

One reason why China could be seen as a bigger challenger than Russia is because of its GDP . Nitin J
Ticku, a defense expert and managing editor of the EurAsian Times says — forget Russia , even the USSR was never as rich

as China is today. Chinese military spending is roughly four times that of Russia and could
bypass the overall American economy in a decade. These are ominous signs for the US.
The major difference between the two US adversaries is — Russia is interested in territorial gains that would allow it

to secure its frontiers from an expansionist NATO and, China, on the other hand, seeks to
dominate the international landscape and wrest the hegemony that has been held by
the US since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
China has been marching towards regions that have traditionally been the American
sphere of influence and threatening the status quo , which is often seen as a threat to the
security of the regional US allies.

Closer home, China has territorial disputes with several South-East Asian countries in the

South China Sea. Beijing claims practically the entire region and has used intimidation as a tactic to corner the smaller
states (aligned with the US) that it has disputes with — including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and

Brunei. It has built artificial islands to further secure its ownership and militarized them, against warnings.
A controversy had erupted when a US admiral revealed in March that Chi na had fully militarized three islands in the region with

anti-ship and anti-missile systems – understood as an attempt to bolster its A2/AD capability .

In its neighborhood, China remains marred in a border conflict with the strategic partner of the United States and the

cornerstone of the Indo-Pacific policy, India .

Both nations fought a brief but bitter war in 1962 and recently were involved in a bloody confrontation along the disputed Himalayan border.

China is also arming India’s bitter enemy, Pakistan with cutting-edge equipment to challenge
Besides,

India’s influence in the region, cultivating Islamabad’s Navy to function as a PLA proxy until Beijing can exponentially enhance its presence in the
Indian Ocean region (IOR).

China has also constructed a military base in Africa on Djibouti Island and is expanding far and wide into
the African continent through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Africa has traditionally been in the British, French, and American spheres of influence.

Though Indo-Pacific rivals led by the US have come up with a counter-initiative called the Blue Dot Network, they are still years

away from reaching the scale of investment and trade that Beijing currently enjoys. Its (Chinese) massive capital and military power have been instrumental in
its quest to Africa.

However, the most significant flashpoint between the US and China goes through the Taiwan Strait. China has vowed to reunite
Taiwan with the Chinese mainland , with force if necessary.
Despite accepting the One-China policy, the US has extended military support to Taipei and remains the biggest obstacle
for China to gobble Taiwan.

Another major stakeholder in the Taiwan issue is a staunch US ally, Japan . By its location close to Taiwan, any aggression
against the island state is expected to draw Japan into the conflict which could risk a direct

military confrontation between China and the US.

According to Pacific Commander in the US Air Force, Kenneth Wilsbach, China has very sophisticated Anti-Access/Area-

Denial capabilities along its coast to repel any possible attack on itself. If an armed confrontation was to take
place between the US and China, the latter would have a homeland advantage against
the US.

Another region where China’s growing influence is threatening the US and its ally, Australia , is the Pacific region. China recently
concluded a security pact with the Solomon Islands which has raised concerns about a
potential military base just about 2,000 kilometers from Australia .
China’s growing influence among the Pacific Island Countries (PIC) also threatens the existing
regional order where Canberra is the first responder.
Further, China has also stationed missiles like the DF-26 that threaten American assets as far as Guam, which hosts a critical American military base in the region.
The heat has been felt by Australia which is now in the process of developing its nuke submarine equipped with nuclear propulsion technology sourced from the US
and the UK under the AUKUS agreement. The three partners will also cooperate on the development of hypersonic missiles as was announced recently.
China has also made inroads into the Latin American region , riding on the plank of the
Belt and Road Initiative. The region is the United States’ backyard where it has historically
exerted influence and on several occasions, even by suppressing popular movements.
Chinese investment and its growing influence in the Caribbean region is a clear red
line given that Venezuela and Cuba already favor Russia.
In a surprising turn of events, China has also now reached as far as Siberia in Europe. In a semi-secret mission that
took place earlier, Chinese transport aircraft YJ-20 delivered surface to air missile system to Siberia passing through Turkish and the airspace of other European
nations.

the Chinese ambition of dismantling the existing world order

A common pattern among all these regions is

to slowly make space for itself next to the US and then gradually assuming the role of a
global hegemon – a reputation that has so far only been enjoyed by the United States.
On top of that, the fact that China is a close ally of Russia is also detrimental to the interests of

the US. It has issued several warnings to China against supplementing Russia or helping
it circumvent global sanctions but doubts persist.
China has not only refused to condemn Russia for the invasion of Ukraine but also reinforced its relationship with
Moscow.
China’s Robust Military Advancement

China’s stupendous military rise has unsettled the United States whose military prowess
is being constantly challenged by the People’s Liberation Army.
A US Congressional report had earlier mentioned that the Chinese Navy has the largest naval fleet by size. China, according to US

Navy Chief Admiral Michael Gilday, is a formidable military enemy that is constantly developing and achieving its

goals years ahead of schedule , putting pressure on the US Navy.

The US Air Force has also accepted China’s air prowess. US Air Force Chief Charles Brown had earlier said that China would be able to surpass the US Air dominance

by 2035. He had said that the PLA had “the largest aviation forces in the Pacific ” and had created them “underneath
our nose”.

the US trails behind not just China but also Russia is the hypersonic weapons program .
A domain where

Both China and Russia have operational hypersonic missiles, with Russia even using its missile in the Ukrainian
invasion.

However, the US is still some time away from fielding a weapon. However, efforts are on to achieve that objective in full earnest and the
HAWC test conducted by the US secretly in the recent past was hailed as a success.

The US faces a serious challenge from China, even in space . After the International Space Station retires sometime
around 2030, China could be the only country to operate a space station, that too single-handedly.

the US is having to dole out significant resources for Ukraine, it recognizes the threat from Russia will not
So while

last forever and that the Chinese dragon is only going to get bigger and bigger .
 1NC – AT: Russian Reps
Putin Threat Reps Good – he is using the Kremlin to repress the Russian people and his
wet dream is to bring back imperial empire.
Hartnett 22 [Lynne Hartnett; associate professor of Russian history at Villanova University; 3-2-2022;
"The long history of Russian imperialism shaping Putin’s war"; Washington Post;
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/02/long-history-russian-imperialism-shaping-
putins-war/; KL]
The world is trying to make sense of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s violent invasion of Ukraine. But his attack is not rooted in any rational
calculation of costs and benefits.
Putin is making an ill-conceived gambit to reclaim his nation’s stature as an
Instead,

imperial power and assert Russia’s prestige, authority and will on the world stage. Putin has positioned himself as a frustrated
representative of an aggrieved fallen empire — for example, lamenting “the paralysis of power and will” that led to the complete “degradation
and oblivion” of the Soviet Union in 1991. Though this grievance seems situated within what Putin has called the tragedy of the Soviet collapse,
As Putin described it in a 2012 speech , the
his imperial inspiration extends even deeper into the country’s past.

revival of Russian national consciousness necessitates that Russians connect to their

past and realize that they have “a common , continuous history spanning over 1,000
years .”
Putin understands the post-Soviet global order through the prism of Russia’s long
history . And that history is inextricably tied to Russia’s dynamic imperial mission both in the
past and today.
The first “Russian” state was established in present-day Kyiv in the 9th century. But Kievan Rus’ fell into ruin with the Mongol conquest of the
13th century, becoming a decentralized group of principalities that each owed fealty and tribute to the Mongol khans.
By the late 15th century, though, the principality of Moscow, led by Grand Prince Ivan III, turned the tables of fortune on the Mongols. Ivan,
known to history as Ivan the Great, renounced his land’s subordination to the Mongols and declared the sovereignty of Russia. Ivan then
subdued his neighbors, annexed their territory and centralized Moscow’s authority.
Ivan the Great came to power less than a decade after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453. Cultivating his imperial standing with
his marriage to the niece of the last Byzantine emperor, Ivan claimed Byzantium’s legacy for Muscovite Russia and adopted the title of czar for
himself. As czar, he asserted Russia’s international influence and stature by establishing diplomatic relations with foreign powers and building
the Kremlin to serve as an architectural manifestation of Russia’s new imperial power.
By the start of the 16th century, the Russian czars firmly conceived of their land as a great
empire . For them, Moscow was the Third Rome — the heir to the Roman and Byzantine empires. Though their imperial predecessors’
empires had fallen, the Russian czars resolved to hold absolute power to ensure the dynamic and

continued expansion of theirs.

In the 1550s, the czar known later as Ivan the Terrible extended his country’s territory along the southern Volga down to the Caspian Sea.
Twenty-five years later, Ivan sponsored expeditions that initiated several decades of conquest and colonization of Siberia and large swaths of
Central Asia.
By 1648, Russia had moved across a continent and reached the Pacific coast to become an enormous state with an unrivaled land mass. It was a
full-fledged colonial enterprise.
In 1654, Czar Alexis seized the territory that lay between Russia and the Dnieper River. This included much of present-day Ukraine, including
Kyiv. While the dominions around Moscow were known as Great Russia or simply Russia, much of what is present-day Ukraine was deemed
Little Russia in a clear reflection of its peripheral, colonized status.
Alexis’s son Peter the Great took Russia’s imperialist mission to new heights. With a revamped army and newly founded navy, Peter the Great
defeated Sweden and expanded his empire in every direction. In recognition of his military victories and territorial conquests, Peter in 1721
declared Russia to be an empire and he, its emperor.
Several decades later, another great, the Empress Catherine, pushed the empire’s boundaries farther west through the partitions of Poland.
Catherine also took advantage of the weakening power of the Ottoman Empire to expand Russia southward and create the region of
Novorossiya, which included the southern sections of present-day Ukraine. She then solidified Russia’s position on the Black Sea by annexing
Crimea in 1783.
Many of Russia’s imperial conquests were hard-won. In 1818, when Russian forces attempted to conquer the Northern Caucasus, they
encountered a population that refused to be subdued. In answer to the guerrilla warfare that the indigenous population unleashed against the
invaders, Russia burned villages to the ground, incinerated forests and took civilians as hostages. Although by 1864 Russia had incorporated the
region into its empire, ethnic and religious tensions percolated and would erupt in a new wave of violence over a century later with the
Chechen Wars in the 1990s.
Convinced that Russia’s status as a global power depended on its expansive empire ,
Russian czars — safe and secure in their St. Petersburg palaces — expended vast sums of money and the
lives of young Russian soldiers to maintain imperial glory . Territory was purchased with
the lives of both conquering armies and their resisters while Russian rulers transformed
the cities of the metropole with monuments erected to honor imperial victories and
expansion .
When Russia erupted in revolution in 1917, the empire collapsed. Initially, the Bolsheviks expressed antipathy toward imperialism. Indeed, they
contended that regions like Ukraine that declared their independence would be free from the weight of empire. But the dislocation that came
with the end of World War I did not bring the worldwide socialist revolution that Vladimir Lenin expected. As a socialist island in a sea of global
capitalism, the Russian Empire was resurrected by Lenin and the Bolsheviks within the federal structure of the Soviet Union. For the next 70
years, Russia’s traditional imperial mission became entangled with the expansionist aims of communism.
To meet the surging economic and military power of the United States, the Soviet Union in the late 1940s established satellite states
throughout Eastern Europe, with communist governments overseen by Moscow. Using tanks, artillery and repression, the Soviets kept the
communist bloc until the 1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev could no longer use military force to retain power. The Soviets’ imperial project was
in peril.
These liberatory impulses unleashed a ripple effect within the Soviet Union itself, with the Baltic States and the Caucasus calling for
independence from Moscow. By the end of 1991, nationalist sentiments within the assortment of nations that the Soviet Union had inherited
from the czarist imperialist state led to demands for autonomy and spelled the end of the U.S.S.R.
When Putin succeeded Boris Yeltsin as president of the Russian Federation in 1999 , he claimed that his
country was entitled to exert a privileged influence over the post-Soviet states . Yet many of
these nations balked at the local cronyism and corruption that seemed to come with Moscow’s continued influence. In the early 2000s, popular
uprisings in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan — collectively deemed the Color Revolutions — demonstrated these countries’ spirit of
independence and, thereby, the limits of Russia’s and Putin’s control of the region.
For Putin, this equated to an inglorious lack of prestige and power. Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity that overthrew Putin’s supporter, President
The Russian president’s decision to move into
Viktor Yanukovych, in 2014 only intensified this perception.

eastern Ukraine and annex Crimea was the opening salvo to reclaim the power that
imperial failure had eroded.
Beyond economic sanctions, Putin faced little consequence for this 2014 power play, and his
geopolitical machinations surged. Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and Donald Trump’s
subsequent derision of NATO probably convinced Putin of his ability to extend Russia’s global sway without substantial obstacles.
Putin has increasingly constricted Russian civil society , limited his
Over the past several years, as

country’s independent media and news sources , and imprisoned domestic opposition
leaders, he has enhanced his ability to pursue his aims unencumbered. Reviving the imperialist dreams of his
czarist forebears , Putin moved to reclaim the empire that he believes was unjustly pilfered from Russia.
But the determined resistance of the Ukrainian people to Russian aggression has shown the folly

of Putin’s vision of renewed imperial grandeur. Having found independence from Moscow in the years since 1991,
Ukrainians have no desire to return to their previous colonial status . Despite Russia’s superior
military might, the Ukrainian people have made a stand for their sovereignty and their freedom, earning support and respect around the world.
Conquest and glory have thus far eluded Putin and his forces. Instead of finding renewed prestige through the global order, Putin finds himself
isolated and condemned, and his 21st-century version of Russian imperialism vilified and reviled rather than championed.

Putin quotes prove – he shows no remorse.

Kovensky 22 [Josh Kovensky is an investigative reporter for Talking Points Memo, based in New York.
He previously worked for the Kyiv Post in Ukraine, covering politics, business, and corruption there, 1-7-
2020, Putin Suggests Russia Is Entering A Period Of Indefinite Expansion, TPM,
https://talkingpointsmemo.com/news/putin-suggests-russia-is-entering-a-period-of-indefinite-
expansion] Eric
“It’s the same in the Western direction, with Narva, his first campaigns,” Putin said. “Why did he go that way? He
was returning and fortifying [this land] — that’s what he did.”
Putin added that Russia’s destiny today is the same: returning and fortifying lost slavic
lands.
“Judging from everything, it’s fallen to us to also return and strengthen ,” he added. “And if we start from
these basic values forming the foundation of our existence, we will unconditionally succeed in
solving the tasks that stand before us.”
 1NC – Legal Solutions
Systemic solution oriented policy is key to effective activism to counter anti-Asian
violence – it solves material harms and helps build broader multi-racial coalitions that
empower movements, but detail and theoretical nuance are key
Kohli & Belcore 21 [AARTI KOHLI Aarti Kohli is the executive director of Asian Americans Advancing
Justice–Asian Law Caucus, the organization that convenes the Asian American Leaders Table. More by
Aarti Kohli BECKY BELCORE Becky Belcore is executive director of the National Korean American Service
and Education Consortium (NAKASEC), a progressive grassroots organization and a member of the Asian
American Leaders Table. More by Becky Belcore "Coalitions and solidarity with others are vital to Asian
American activism." https://prismreports.org/2021/06/10/coalitions-and-solidarity-with-others-are-
vital-to-asian-american-activism/]
For many Asian Americans, it can feel as if we live surrounded by absolutism and
extremes , with little room for nuance. But we often occupy “in-between” spaces and identities, and
nuance is necessary in order to understand our work with Asian American and Pacific Islander ( AAPI )
communities. It’s also essential when it comes to understanding ourselves as immigrants
from colonized nations, and as Indigenous people , multi-racial people, undocumented people, or

trans-racial adoptees. It may be uncomfortable, but we must persist in the complex work of making
progress toward racial solidarity so that we can create a more just future for our
communities.
In the wake of increased violence targeting Asian Americans, a new network of 100+ organizations serving AAPI communities was convened.
Its goal is to coalesce and leverage our power toward policy change , solidarity , and
shifting the public narrative. The “Asian American Leaders Table” provides a ray of hope in the type of coalition building and
mutual support that can buoy us during hard times.
Our work broadens our understanding of our own communities, revealing layers that influence how we uplift and support each other, or step
aside when necessary. For example, we acknowledge that Pacific Islanders were deliberately combined together with Asian Americans by
government systems that have no knowledge or interest in our distinct histories and needs. We know Southeast Asians face higher risks when it
comes to criminalization and deportation. We see that East Asians are more likely to be targeted for street harassment and assault due to racist
COVID-19 narratives. We know that our Indian American colleagues are feeling high levels of stress with families in the homeland who are
struggling with a raging pandemic. Sikh American communities were severely targeted post-9/11, and were the target of a mass shooting in
Indianapolis. And our Muslim siblings need our solidarity and support amidst the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Our coalition work doesn’t shy away from these complicated aspects of Asian American and Pacific Islander identities. We cleave deeper into
the histories, identities, and stories that make us different from one another, and back up our intentions with actions.
Our vision is to shift the narrative around heritage and solidarity . For example, portraying
Asian Americans solely as victims does a disservice to the many examples of Asian
American resistance, solidarity , organizing, and community development that has
benefited our society. Our campaign, “Resistance is our Heritage,” tells stories to inspire current
generations of people to change their actions, to effect change within our systems , and
catalyze a better future for new generations of Asian American and Pacific Islander communities.
In addition to stories of resistance, it’s also important to share stories of solidarity in order to counteract stereotypes that pit Asian Americans
against other marginalized groups and paint Asian Americans as disengaged in politics and activism. That’s why we’ve launched a new series of
videos with stories and educational guides that we hope will spark discussions around solidarity in service of transformative change, including
stories like:
How Indo-Caribbean populations have organized around economic justice, resulting in new budgetary earmarks for exploited workers affected
by COVID-19 in the New York state budget.
Efforts to build a broad multi-racial coalition to end the surveillance of Muslim, South Asian, and Arab community members by local law
enforcement and federal authorities.
Using the experience of Japanese American internment to end detention sites and support immigrant and refugee communities targeted by
racism, state violence, injustice, and oppression in the United States.
Resistance as heritage carries us through our day-to-day work as well. We owe so much to the work of Black activists and civil rights
movements that influences the ethics, values, and strategies that allow us to meet the diverse needs of all communities of color, and enact
necessary changes that ultimately make for a stronger U.S.
This includes work like advocating for language access

at the polls —not just Asian languages, but Spanish and African languages, too, so that a
greater and more diverse cross-section of our citizenry can engage in free , fair , and
accessible elections .
We advocate for justice for those whose citizenship , legal status, and livelihood hang in
the balance due to outdated immigration laws that hurt families in the U.S. and
internationally.
For generations, the model minority myth painted Asian Americans as a successful monolith

and stymied policymakers’ understanding of the widening Asian American wealth gap —
neglecting the fact that Asian Americans are the most economically unequal racial group in the U.S. Our work channels the voices of millions of
Asian Americans calling for good jobs, union rights, affordable housing, strong public education, and reliable health care, not just for us but for
all of the groups who depend on these rights. We remember the lessons of the 1982 garment workers’ strike in New York’s Chinatown and the
As COVID -19 cases drop, the number of
impact Asian American coalition building had on workers’ rights.

vaccinated people grows, and we “return to normal,” workers need to be paid fair
wages and get basic safety and health protections . Without those at minimum, the
economic divide will only keep growing .
The benefits of cross-racial solidarity work are clear. The hard part is figuring out how to

do it. We are inspired by the stories of our predecessors because it’s helpful to remind ourselves that the idea of co-liberation is not a new one.
The history of Asian American and Pacific Islander coalitions with other oppressed groups includes the Filipino and Mexican farmworkers who
organized the Delano grape strike, the civil rights collaboration between Grace Lee Boggs and Malcom X, Japanese Americans first protesting
the anti-Muslim and xenophobic violence that followed 9/11, and later the inhumane treatment of migrants and immigrants at the U.S.
Solidarity and co-liberation isn’t a rarity for Asian Americans; it’s a vital part
southern borders.

of our activism .

Failure to connect critique of Asian violence to legal change is alchemy, not activism
SAITO 09 (Natsu Taylor, Professor Law at Georgia State University College of Law, “INTERNMENTS,
THEN AND NOW: CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN POST-9/11 AMERICA”
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/
&httpsredir=1&article=1011&context=dflsc)
The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee called for the removal of Civil Rights
Commissioner Kirsanow following his defense of internment in 2002.210 He was not removed, although
apparently he did apologize, insisting that his remarks had been taken out of context.211 In January 2006, while Congress was in recess,
President Bush appointed Kirsanow to the National Labor Relations Board.212 Congressman Coble expressed his “regret” that “many Japanese
and Arab Americans found my choice of words offensive,” but ignored calls for his resignation as chair of the subcommittee on terrorism.213
Leon Panetta announced at his confirmation hearing that CIA agents that
CIA Director “
engaged in torture, including waterboarding, in the early phases of the war against terrorism, would not be criminally
prosecuted.”214 In fact, attorneys in the Obama administration have continued to rely “on the

state secret doctrine and thus seem prepared to confer de facto immunity on the CIA
for constitutional wrongs as gross as those entailed in extraordinary rendition.”215 According to Attorney General Eric Holder,
“It would be unfair to prosecute dedicated men and women working to protect America for conduct that was sanctioned in advance by the
Justice Department.”216
It appears unlikely that those who sanctioned the illegal or unconstitutional programs
will be prosecuted. As Jordon Paust observed in 2007, the administration of George W. Bush had “furthered a
general policy of impunity by refusing to prosecute any person of any nationality under the War Crimes Act or
alternative legislation, the torture statute, genocide legislation, and legislation permitting prosecution of certain civilians employed by or
accompanying U.S. military forces abroad.”217 Shortly after Jay Bybee issued his torture memorandum in August 2002, President Bush
John Yoo, who drafted the
appointed him to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and he was confirmed in March 2003.218

torture memos, has returned to his law professorship at Boalt Hall.219 The Obama Justice Department
has rejected recommendations of ethics investigators concerning violations of professional standards by Bybee and Yoo.220 Although President
Obama’s January 22 Executive Order “prohibits reliance on any Department of Justice or other legal advice concerning interrogation that was
issued between September 11, 2001 and January 20, 2009,”221 when questioned about possible prosecutions for torture, he has only
As things stand, then, there is no reasonable
emphasized the importance of looking forward, not backward.222
prospect of legal remedies for any of the wrongs associated with the so-called War on
Terror.
I believe we, as lawyers and legal scholars , have responsibilities distinct from those
of documentary historians or moral theorists. It is a central tenet of the rule
of law that legal rights without remedies are meaningless.223 If the legal system has
permitted or facilitated legal wrongs, we have an obligation to ensure that effective
remedies are implemented . In other words, it is necessary to address the question of
accountability for injustice and, where there are consistent patterns replicating
injustices, we must acknowledge that the remedies thus far employed have been
inadequate. Otherwise, we are engaging not in legal analysis but
alchemy.
The injustices of the Japanese American internment were belatedly acknowledged and
partial redress provided to some of its victims, but even these measures were couched in terms which

exonerated the institutional and individual actors responsible for the wrongs at issue. This left
the door open for the dangers posed by the internment to be replicated in the current
our failure to hold those accountable for
War on Terror, and
contemporaneous wrongs will ensure that they, too, will be repeated
in the future.