Case Title: Social Justice Society v.

Cabigao
GR No. || G.R. No. 156052 (2008) || Ponente: CORONA, J. || Topic: ordinance

Facts:
Petitioners Social Justice Society, Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon, in an original
petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. This ordinance was
enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila, reclassified the area from industrial to commercial
and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed to cease and desist from operating their
businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated
in the area are the so-called “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron
Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.

However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that “the scaling down of the Pandacan
Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option.” In the MOU, the oil companies were required to
remove 28 tanks starting with the LPG spheres and to commence work for the creation of safety buffer
and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. In exchange, the City Mayor and the DOE will
enable the oil companies to continuously operate within the limited area resulting from joint operations
and the scale down program. The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.

Issue(s):

Whether or not respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the
removal of the Pandacan Terminals.

Ruling:
SC:
Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 because the Local
Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to “enforce all laws and ordinances
relative to the governance of the city.” As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. It is
his ministerial duty to do so.

It is a settled rule that an ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity and, as such, cannot be restrained
by injunction. Nevertheless, when the validity of the ordinance is assailed, the courts are not precluded
from issuing an injunctive writ against its enforcement. However, we have declared that the issuance of
said writ is proper only when:

... the petitioner assailing the ordinance has made out a case of unconstitutionality strong enough to
overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of validity, in addition to a showing of a clear legal
right to the remedy sought....

The oil companies argue that this presumption must be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness
appears on the face of the ordinance itself. We see no reason to set aside the presumption. The
ordinance, on its face, does not at all appear to be unconstitutional. It reclassified the subject area from
industrial to commercial. Prima facie, this power is within the power of municipal corporations:

The power of municipal corporations to divide their territory into industrial, commercial and residential
zones is recognized in almost all jurisdictions inasmuch as it is derived from the police power itself and is
exercised for the protection and benefit of their inhabitants.
There can be no doubt that the City of Manila has the power to divide its territory into residential and
industrial zones, and to prescribe that offensive and unwholesome trades and occupations are to be
established exclusively in the latter zone.
Likewise, it cannot be denied that the City of Manila has the authority, derived from the police power, of
forbidding the appellant to continue the manufacture of toyo in the zone where it is now situated, which
has been declared residential.

Courts will not invalidate an ordinance unless it clearly appears that it is unconstitutional. There is no such
showing here.

The Rule On Judicial Admissions Is Not Applicable Against Respondent

The oil companies assert that respondent judicially admitted that Ordinance No. 8027 was repealed by
Ordinance No. 8119 in civil case no. 03-106379 (where Petron assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance
No. 8027) when the parties in their joint motion to withdraw complaint and counterclaim stated that "the
issue ...has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the passage of [Ordinance No. 8119]."79
They contend that such admission worked as an estoppel against the respondent.

Respondent countered that this stipulation simply meant that Petron was recognizing the validity and
legality of Ordinance No. 8027 and that it had conceded the issue of said ordinance’s constitutionality,
opting instead to question the validity of Ordinance No. 8119.80 The oil companies deny this and further
argue that respondent, in his answer in civil case no. 06-115334 (where Chevron and Shell are asking for
the nullification of Ordinance No. 8119), expressly stated that Ordinance No. 8119 replaced Ordinance
No. 8027:81

... Under Ordinance No. 8027, businesses whose uses are not in accord with the reclassification were
given six months to cease [their] operation. Ordinance No. 8119, which in effect, replaced Ordinance [No.]
8027, merely took note of the time frame provided for in Ordinance No. 8119.... Ordinance No. 8119 thus
provided for an even longer term, that is[,] seven years;82 (Emphasis supplied)

Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Judicial admissions. ― An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (Emphasis
supplied)

While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot subsequently take a position contrary to or
inconsistent with what was pleaded, the aforestated rule is not applicable here. Respondent made the
statements regarding the ordinances in civil case nos. 03-106379 and 06-115334 which are not "the
same" as this case before us. To constitute a judicial admission, the admission must be made in the
same case in which it is offered.

Hence, respondent is not estopped from claiming that Ordinance No. 8119 did not supersede Ordinance
No. 8027. On the contrary, it is the oil companies which should be considered estopped. They rely on the
argument that Ordinance No. 8119 superseded Ordinance No. 8027 but, at the same time, also impugn
its (8119’s) validity. We frown on the adoption of inconsistent positions and distrust any attempt at clever
positioning under one or the other on the basis of what appears advantageous at the moment. Parties
cannot take vacillating or contrary positions regarding the validity of a statute or ordinance. Nonetheless,
we will look into the merits of the argument of implied repeal.

Doctrine:
Statutes and ordinances are presumed valid unless and until the courts declare the contrary in clear and
unequivocal terms.

Additional Notes:
The mere fact that the ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid will not entitle a party to have
its enforcement enjoined. The presumption is all in favor of validity. The reason for this is obvious:

The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must,
in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the
facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by
enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the
people . . . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion
of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.