54) People V Sandiganbayan (4th Div.)

You might also like

Download as docx, pdf, or txt
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 2

People v Sandiganbayan (4th Div)

GR Nos. 185729-32, 26 June 2013


Abad, J.:

FACTS
Two Informations for violation of RA 3019 and Art. 171 of the RPC were filed by the
Ombudsman with the Sandiganbayan (“Sandigan”): the first alleged that DOF officials 1
approved and issued Tax Credit Cert. No. 771 2 in favor of JAM Liner, Inc. for domestic
capital equipment although it did not qualify for such tax credit; the second alleged that
the DOF officials illegally issued Tax Credit Cert No. 7708 3 in favor of the same
company covering its purchase of 6 Mitsubishi buses.

The Ombudsman filed a motion to discharge Homero Mercado 4 from the information
due to the fact that an Immunity Agreement was made granting immunity from suit to
Mercado, who was previously placed by the DOJ in its witness protection program,
who in turn will produce all relevant documents in his possession and testify against
the accused DOF officials in all the cases that may be filed against them.

However, Sandigan denied the Ombudsman’s motion to discharge Mercado.


According to the Sandigan, the Ombdusman failed to establish the conditions required
under Sec. 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court 5 for the discharge of an accused as a state
witness.6 The Ombudsman’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was also dismissed
by the Sandigan, hence this petition.

ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in refusing to recognize the
immunity from criminal prosecution that the Ombudsman granted to Mercado and, as
a result, declining to discharge him from the information as a state witness.

1
Antonio Belicena, Uldarico Andutan, Jr., Raul De Vera, and Rosanna Diala. All were formerly assigned at
the DOF’s One-Stop Shop.
2
Amounting to P7,350,440.00.
3
Amounting to P4,410,265.50.
4
President of JAM Liner, Inc.
5
(A) there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
(B) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(C) the testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(D) said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(E) said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
6
It was ruled by the Sandigan that Mercado’s testimony is not absolutely necessary because the state has
other direct evidence that may prove the offense charged. His testimony would only help identify numerous
documents and disclose matters that are essentially already contained in such documents.
HELD
Yes, the Sandiganbayan committed an error in holding that Mercado dis not satisfy all
the requirements to be a state witness under the Rules of Court.

It was held by the Court that filing of the criminal action against an accused in court
does not prevent the Ombudsman from exercising the power that the Congress has
granted him, such as Sec. 17 of RA 6770 which provides for the Ombudsman’s power to
grant immunity from suit to an accused. This authority enables the Ombudsman to
carry out his constitutional mandate to ensure accountability in the public service. It
gives the Ombudsman wide latitude in using an accused discharged from the
information to increase the chances of conviction of the other accused and attain a
higher prosecutorial goal. Immunity statutes seek to provide a balance between the
state’s interests and individual’s rights against self-incrimination.

The authority to grant immunity is not an inherent judicial function. The Congress has
vested such power in the Ombudsman as well as in the Secretary of Justice. The
decision to employ an accused as a state witness must necessarily originate from the
public prosecutors whose mission is to obtain a successful prosecution of the several
accused before the courts. Consequently, unless made in clear violation of the Rules of
Court, this determination should be given great weight by the courts. Moreover, “the
Rules do not require absolute certainty in determining [the] conditions [under Sec. 17,
Rule 119, RoC]. Perforce, the judge has to rely in a large part upon the suggestions and
the consideration presented by the prosecuting officer.” 7

7
People v CA, 209 SCRA 277 [1983]

You might also like