Terrorism in historical

perspective
1. Session on October 10th

 First part: Terrorism in Historical Perspective

 Second part: Terrorism in Italy from the 60s to the 80s
 4000-word paper (Deadline: 28 December), written mid-term exam (22 November):
open essay of 4 pages
 Now: 50% mid-term exam, 50% paper
 Books: global terrorism by Weinberg, Terrorism by Randall D. Law
 Only uploads a selection of the slides (not all)
 Mail: Giovannimario.ceci@uniroma3.it, office hours: Tuesday: 10-13, Thursday: 09:50-
10:50

MID-TERM:

2. Session on October 11th

Data

 Starting point of analysis: 1970

 There were two peaks of terrorism during the last five decades
- First age of terrorism: early 1970s  steady increase till 1992 (first peak)
- Second age of terrorism: starting in the mid-2000s (Afghanistan and Iraq war) till
now, peak in 2014 (Civil war in Syria, Arab spring, ISIS emerged)
 9/11 Theory is wrong (it is just a reception of the events)
- Aftermath: steady decline of terrorist attacks
 The attacks on the US homeland actually declined from the 1970s to the present
- Highest number: 1970
- Lowest number in the years after 09/11
 More than 50% of terror attacks in the last four decades occurred only in four regions:
South America, Eastern Europe, Middle East & North Africa, South Asia
 distribution of terrorism was highly contributed in only some regions
 perception that terrorism is happening everywhere is not correct
 20 countries account for more than 70% of all countries in terms of terrorist attacks
 distribution is definitely not homogeneous
 One third of all attacks have taken place in just five countries
 Distribution of terrorist attacks changed dramatically over time
- 1970s: almost 50% of all terrorist attacks in western Europe, second-most: North
America (mostly domestic terrorism)
 Northern Ireland, United States, Italy, Spain, Turkey
- 1980s: radical shift: Latin America accounted for almost 60% of worldwide terrorist
attacks but still mostly domestic terrorism)
 Peru, El Salvador, Colombia, Chile, Guatemala
- 1990s: decade of transition and of the most homogenous spread of terrorism
  rise of two new regions: North Africa and South Asia
 Colombia, India, Peru, Turkey, Pakistan
- 2000s: Trend of the 90s went on with North Africa and South Asia as the most
important regions
 Iraq, Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Thailand
 Until today the countries with the most attacks are mainly located in North Africa and
South Asia

Conclusions:

1. Terrorist attacks are highly concentrated in relatively few locations: major regions
differ enormously in terms of how common terrorism has been and the lethality of its
impacts
2. The regional distribution of terrorism has changed a good deal over the past four
decades
3. It is simplistic as well to consider the United States and Western Europe as an
especially likely target for terrorist attacks
4. It is overly simplistic to see terrorism as a problem that is especially tied to the Middle
East/North Africa
5. It is overly simplistic as well to see terrorism as a phenomenon that is essentially
related to religious terrorism

Recent wave of terrorism in the US

 Since 9/11 white supremacists and other far-right extremists have been responsible
for almost three times as many attacks on US soil as Islamic terrorists
 From 2009-2018 the far right has been responsible for 73% of domestic extremist-
related fatalities
 From 2012-2017 the number of far-right extremist attacks more than doubled
 Correlation between right wing terrorist attacks and trumps election

Right-Wing Extremism and attacks as global phenomenon

 From 2016-2017, far-right attacks in Europe leapt by 43%

3. Session on 13th of October

What is terrorism?

 The word terror/Terrorism was introduced during the french revolution

- In particular: Jacobin rule under Robespierre, known as the “Reign of Terror”
 Finding a definition is very complex topic
 The word terrorism seems to have lost any meaning
 no generally accepted definition of terrorism
 Very important study in the 1980s: authors identified 109 possible definitions
 UN never succeed to identify a consensual definition, even after 9/11
 Many scholars think that it’s impossible to reach a common definition
 - Scientific perspective: dangerous especially in terms of combatting terrorism
Why is it so difficult to define a consensus?
1) Because the meaning (and the usage) of the term has changed so frequently over the last
two hundred years
 different countries and different contexts, different goals and proposals

2) The problem of value-neutrality in defining terrorism (and, therefore, relativism): Terrorism

is generally considered:

a) not a neutral word, not an objective concept, not a scientific (or merely descriptive) word

b) but a subjective category

 the point of view, the perspective of the various actors involved would be decisive: the use
of term would always imply a moral judgement

 A “double-standard” approach (with a strongly negative, pejorative connotation)

 Terrorism is the “violence of which we do not approve” (It would always be the violence of
“the others”)

 the decision to call someone or label some organizations “terrorist” would depend
largely on whether one sympathizes with or opposes the person/group/cause
concerned
 A “war of words” (One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter):
- If one identifies with the victim of the violence: then the act is terrorism
- If one identifies with the perpetrator (or their cause), the violent act is
regarded in a more sympathetic, if not positive light: and it’s not terrorism
3) It is understandable, given the negative connotation of the term, that governments,
groups, or individuals reject the label “terrorist”
 Few exceptions:
- Russian nineteenth-century anarchists proudly proclaimed themselves to be
terrorists
 Since then (almost) no terrorist has ever acknowledged that he/she is a
terrorist

Three steps to overcome the obstacles:

1) A radical change of perspective (in order to reach value-neutrality)
 From social actors to acts (not people but acts)
- Terrorism is something someone “does”
- In this sense, terrorism is strategy (a strategy that “makes use of certain
tactics”)
 Terrorism is a (neutral) strategy (should be considered as one)
- terrorism can be used for what can be judged as either good or bad
purposes
- any moral/ethical evaluation on an act and on a tactic (or on who is the
actor carrying it on) can’t change or obliterate at all the eventual terroristic
nature of that act or tacti (in this sense, also violence we potentially
approve or judge as moral has to be considered, in case, as a form of
terrorism)
  the main problem (one man’s terrorist is. Another man’s freedom fighter) could
be solved in this way
 clearly one person can be both: “There is in principle no reason why this tactic
cannot be used by groups seeking to achieve any number of goals and
objectives, including a fight for freedom or national liberation” (Weinberg)
2) “Minimal” definition
 would only include the core elements shared by all different cases of terrorism,
excluding the variable and contingent characteristics in this way: ‘one-size-fits-
all’ definition
3) Identify core elements
 identify (and reflect on) the most frequent elements and used words (also in
the literature in general and in other Codes)
- violence or force
- political objectives
 Definition: “Terrorism is a strategy or a tactic that employs violence or force in
order to reach political objectives (Anne Schwenbenbecher) THROUGH FEAR.”
 As defined in this way, terrorism is a peculiar, distinct phenomenon (this is the
goal of any definition) – what terrorism is and what terrorism is not
 “Normal political violence” or political murder
- Audience is the real target: “terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a
lot of people dead” (B.J. Jenkins)
- Killing is not the primary goal

Slide 1
Not:
Not every political act of violence is terrorism- the difference between political murder
and terrorism is that they aim to instil fear- fear and audience is the real target
Slide 2
War is not terrorism because:
Requires two sides- while terrorism only requires one
War is a military strategy; terrorism is a psychological strategy (fear);
Slide 3
Mafia and mass shootings- mafias goal is business and personal interests, these attacks
are not politically motivated

Concept of terrorism debated topics

The identity of the targets: not only civilians or non-combatants
Innocents- moral issue, debatable if someone is innocent or not
Terrorist organizations operate only on a clandestine basis? There are several types of
organizations, some of which operate openly
Terrorism is committed by non-state actors only? Strategy can be employed by any
social actor
States cary out acts of violence and are generally more lethal than the ones from non-
national actors
Many states have engaged in terroristic violence
The original term from terrorism emerged from state terror acts

State as an actor- most debated concept

A typology of terrorism: motivations, purposes, and goals

Purposes and motivations
Thesis:
Always political nature and goals (dif. Than ordinary crimes)
Essential element of the strategy: create a generalized sense of anxiety and fear
among the public (the real target) (difference between ‘normal political violence or
political murder or war)
WHY (motivations/purposes/goals)?
“terrorism is a tatic not a goal in and of itself” (Weinberg)
Necessary distinction
More immediate purposes (in order to reach the final goals)
Long-term/ultimate/broarder goals/purposes (sourses of terrorism):
(looking at history) four main types

Immediate Purposes and motivations

1- Useful for advertising a cause, gaining publicity, recognition, and attention-
they believe that only by terrorist attacks they can draw attention to their
cause
2- Undermine the authority of the government they oppose, try to show (also in
order to disorient the population9 that the state is unable to fulfil primary
security functions for its subjects- that is the provision of safety and order- and
 cannot even protect its own security forces (it also can degrade the
governments international reputation)
3- Provoke an over-reaction by the authorities- the state reacts to a series of
terrorist attacks by lashing out indiscriminately against people belonging to the
segment of the population (students, workers, ethnic minorities, etc) on whose
behalf the terrorists claim to act;
This over-reaction may glamorize the terrorist group and help it win new
recruits
Moreover, forcing the government to lash out blindly could create a backlash
that would increase popular support.
4- (Related to 3) Polarize and radicalize the political sphere (the myth of civil war)
In a consensual atmosphere they have no room to act, therefore by polarizing
sides they have more chances to spread their message and practice their
strategy
5- Set the political agenda in a conflict, especially…
6- by radicalizing and polarizing the situation and make a compromise settlement
between 2 (or more) sides harder to achieve (ex: the recent history of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict after 1993 oslo agreement)
7- compel the withdrawal of occupying powers (states or int. org.)
8- May serve internal organizational functions of control, discipline, and morale
building within the terrorist group and even become an instrument of rivalry
among factions in a social movement (crenshaw); winning the competition by
escalating their movement (even within the same movement) competition
favours the escalation of violence

General purposes and motivations

Long-term/ultimate/broader goals/purposes (sources of terrorism)

(looking at history) four main (and overlapping9 types
Two warnings
1- Common (and general) features (next classes different waves)
2- The “categories are not as clean-cut as it may seen at first”
-for ex., many national-separatist terrorist groups have

IDEOLOGY

Two main types of ideological terrorism

1- Left-wing (anarchists or revolutionary) terrorism

Why?
Groups and individuals that use terrorism to bring about revolutionary
social, economic, and political change
-very common: opposition to capitalism (and imperialism)
-they have been “diverging views on who would be the most important
revolutionary actors (e.g. workers, peasants or underclass) and how exactly
to make that revolution happen” (L. Malkki, in RHTC); as well on the
“future” .

When?
Especially: 1) end of XIXth century.
2) In the 1960’s-1980’s (but some groups, like Peru’s shining Path or the
17N in Greece had been active also in the first decade of the 21 st century)

Where?
1) Russia and western Europe;
2) Japan, north America and, above all, Latin America and Western Europe
(German and Italy).

2- Right-wing- or (neo) Fascist, (neo) Nazi, reactionary

Why? (Sometimes overlapping motives…and several enemies…)

*To promote the establishment or re-establishment of a right-wing
dictatorship in the name of fascist or nazi ideas (e.g. Italy)
*Death squads who supported dictatorship and promoted campaigns
against land reformers, union organizers and others identified with
promoting the interests of the poor (e.g. Latin America)
*To maintain or restore systems of racial supremacy (e.g. ku klux klan in
the USA)- recently: “great replacement”, anti-immigrant sentiments,
white/western suprematism
*Antisemitism (and/ or anti-Islam)

NATIONALISM AND SEPARATISM

+ In general: “if nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds

that the political and national unit should be congruent” (and in
particular “in the form of a state which matches the nation”), then
“terrorism has historically often been perceived…as the best way of
bringing about such congruence”(R. English)

Two different kinds

1) Nationalists fighting against foreign occupiers seeking independence

(e.g. the anticolonial struggles)
2) Minority separatists combatting indigenous regimes
-ETA (Euskadi Ta Aa
 SOURCE OF TERRRORISM- Religion

*Thesis: “Religion is Problematic”8ism) Politicization

(my thesis) radicalization- ideologization
+ transformation religion (due to a process of radicalization) from a metaphysical
worldview into

WHO ARE THE TERRORISTS?

 According to the most important scholars, it’s impossible to provide an overall

profile of the terrorist;
 Main reason: too many differences (place, time, sources, goals)

Psychological/cultural traits
1) Terrorists are not madmen
 On the contrary, research has clearly shown that terrorists, in general, are
normal people, neither psychopaths nor mentally deranged (“the outstanding
common characteristic of terrorists is their normality”-crenshaw)
2) A common trait. In particular, there “is a nearly universal element

*True believer 8Us army’s command and general staff College, in whittaker)
-integralistic/absolutist approach, no mediation/compromise
-terrorists don’t even consider that they may be wrong and that aothers views may
have some merit
*Group/cause is more important that the individual itself
*polarized “us versus them” (black and white) outlook (They aattribute only evil
motives to anyone outside their own group)
*And this enables them to dehumanize their victims
Some common (social) patterns
1) Terrosrists tend to be young people (under the age of thirty)
2) Any generalization about the social composition of the terrorist groups is
impossible
 *Poverty and economic deprivation are the most important causes of
terrorism? - CAUSES OF TERRORISM
*Nevertheless, it could be possible to say that generally those who assume
leathership roles within terrosrist groups (as well as in “normal” political
organizations) tend to be drawn from the educated middle classes
*Russian People’s will in the 1870s-1880s
*European terrorists in the 1970s or Palestinian organizations (PLO or Hamas)
*But also, AlQaeda
-those young men who received training at al qaeda bases in Afghanistan may
have come from poor areas in various parts of the Muslim World;
-But this was certainly not true of al Qaeda founders and leaders : Bin Laden
and al-Zawahiri came from exceptionally prosperous family backgrounds
-the perpetrators of September 11th, 2001, atrocity in the United States were
middle class and well educated
3) And the role of women?
*three (crucial) preminary remarks:
A) Overcome the following de-historicized conventional wisdom (widespread up to
recent years9: “it is highly unusual for a woman to engage in a form of violence (i.e.
terrorism) that instead has to be associated almost exclusively with men”
*Actually, if we look at history, “women have been involved with the violence labbled
as terrorism for over a century, at minimum”
B) Overcome (de-historized) “gendered understandings of women’s involvement” in
terrorist activities, reified by parts of the media and by scholars: “terrorist women are
emotional and obsessive, not rational”, driven much more by personal cause rather
than political motivations or global motives, or terrorist women just nurture the men
*Actually, if we look at history, it is far more helpful

 A significant percentage of militants in left-wing revolutionary organizations in

Russia in the 1800s or Westtern Europe/ USA in the 1960s and 1970s were
Women
*A number of these cases were not merely foot soldiers, but played crucial
leadership roles
*In the Narodnaya Volya (The Peoples will): significant role in the formation
and leadership as well as making substantial contributions to the groups
ideology
*RAF: Triumvirate leadership 8and founders)

C) Women’s participation in Islamist- based jihad groups (for example AQ and ISIS)
(although organizations active in Chechnya and in Israel’s occupied territories have
been willing to employ females as suicide bombers)
*In that case, “conservative gender roles” (support)- ISIS
CONCLUSION.

 “the social composition if (terrorist) groups is not random but bears a

relationship to their ideas about the world and their objectives” (weinberg)

THE CAUSES OF TERRORISM

In search of the causes

Question:
*What social, political, cultural, economic conditions give rise to terrorism?
*Lessons from history, historical experience, and perspective (not a “theoretical
approach”)

1) Avoid two simplistic approaches:

- Understanding the causes is useless…not even worse…. “Understanding
comes dangerously close to authorising, sanctioning and approving”
- Understanding the causes is everything…
By identifying the ‘causes’ of terrorism, and then by removing or
reducing these causes, it’s possible to dimmish or even eliminate the
source of terrorism

While explaining terrorism by causality alone is too simplistic, entirely abandoning

efforts to understand the causes is “unscientific” and politically/socially “deeply
irresponsible”
2) No single or general explanation is possible, no single cause (and a single
definitive solution) can be identified
-terrorism is an equation with many unknowns
-A complex range of factors...can be involved…a complexity which adds to
the difficulty of reliably identifying the impact of any one factor.

3) Distinction between
-preconditions/conditions
More ‘structural’ causes that provide fertile ground for the emergence of
terrorism
-precipitants/trigger events

4) Distinction between macro factors and micro factors (and the boundaries
are not sharp)
-Paying attention to subjective perceptions as well as objective conditions

So: no determinism, no automatic response

 There is an enormous disproportion between the number of people who
hold similar beliefs or who

CAUSES- The Context

1) Poverty and economic deprivation are the most important causes of

terrorism?
Much more complex…
 There is a widely held assumption that poverty is a strong key root cause of
terrorism, but most studies have identified only weak or ambivalent
connections between poverty and terrorism.
 The general consensus is that while poverty might play a role in causing
terrorism, it is a much weaker one than most would expect, and in fact other
factors seem to play a much more significant
 Relevant factor (especially for foot soldiers)but…

 If poverty was a direct cause, then A) surely terrorism itself should be more
common in poorer regions and B)most terrorists could reasonably be expected
to come from poor backgrounds?
 History reveals that… neither of these claims, however, are true
A) The poorest countries in the world, currently and in the past, (those in some
parts of Africa for example) suffer from a myriad of problems (also violent
crime, guerrilla or inter-tribal warfare) but terrorist violence is rarely on of
them.
- If we look at the list with th 10 countries which suffered the highest
levels of casualities as a result of terrorism during the years of

B) Further, it uis “widely recognised that relatively few terrorists come from the
most deprived backgrounds of their own communities”
- On the contrary, they are 2much more likely” to come from what
constitutes the “middle and upper classes of their communities”
- Groups as diverse as Hamas, Hizballah, ETA, the red army faction in
Germany, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and Al-Qaeda “all share this
characteristic: that is, organizers and militants are likely to be recruited
from the better-educated and more advantaged members of their
respective group”
- Ex: Italian terrorism in the 70’s: the most important groups were based
and conducted most of their operations in the prosperous northern
cities and not in the mezzogiorno, the poorest area in the country
 - Krueger and maleckova’s (2003) survey of 1,357 Palestinian adults in the
west bank and gaza found that support for terrorism against Israeli
civilians was stronger
Rather than considering “objective porverty” as a “direct cause” and the most
important single factor….
The perception of inequality/socioeconomic marginalization and /or relative
deprivation/impoverishment can be considered as “more important than poverty as a
source of terrorism”

2) Is terrorism encouraged by the absence of democracy? Or is terrorism

encouraged by democracy?
-also in this case: picture (and the research evidence) is mixed
- Yes… in Russia at the end of XIX century…but…
Soviet Union (significantly it exploded after its fall)
Spain- ETA (only after Franco’s death)
Indonesia: under the military dictatorship of general Suharto, for many
years Indonesia experienced… relatively little terrorism. After Suharto
was forced to resign his office and Indonesia underwent a tentative
transition to parliamentary democracy, the Islamic terrorism…appeared

3) The spreading of ideologies that justify violence or of the idea that

violence works (religions included)

4) The existence (or better: The perception of that) of a support, of a

constituency, of a large audience

5) And…

6) the rise (and the decline) of a mass movement- and how government
deals with it (both actions/inactions):

- In the advanced industrialized democracies of western Europe and

north America left-wing revolutionary terrorism emerged as mass
protest movements declined
- Arab spring

7) The fear of modification of the status quo (right wing terrorism)

 If the government involved favors or is perceived as favoring the
groups seeking to improve their situation and modify the status
quo, the neo-fascist, racist, anti-semitic, neo-nazi will come to
regard it as an enemy and to return or maintain the status quo
 8) Competition between different groups aiming at the same goal and the
same audience:
 Ex: Palestinian groups: During the first Palestinian uprising or
intifada against Israeli rule of the west bank and gaza strip which
began in December 1987 new religiously grounded organizations
emerged. Especially leaders of hamas decided that the use of
terrorism was the best way to attack Israel and to challenge the
substantially secular plo

9) Discrimination based on thnic or religious origin (and a perception of

social injustice)

10) The role of the state

11) Foreign invasion/occupation, war or civil war

- The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 put in motion a series of events
that led to a formation of Hezbollah
- The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003
- Civil war in Syria

The History of terrorism

Two schools of thought
1) Terrorism as eternal phenomenon, as old as the ill; terrorism is “always”
existed, and has appeared since time immemorial
Terrorists before terrorism.
- “the fact that the label 2terrorism” was first applied to an activity at the
end of the eighteenth century does not mean that the activity itself only
began at that poin” (Weinberg)
2) (my thesis) terrorism is a phenomenon related to the modernity;
- Among some factors: the advent of the doctrine of popular sovereignty
and the spread of (modern) democratic ideas; the rise of ideological
politics, of ‘isms’; the development of public opinion;
- Not by chance, the world entered the political vocabulary for the first
time…
In any case most scholars agree…
1) “French revolutionaries introduced the language and purpose of modern
terrorism in the late eighteenth century”
2) Systematically, “terrorism first appeared fully in its modern guise in Russia” in
the second half of the XIX century and immediately after in other parts of the
world;
 The waves of terrorism (Rapport)

o Its possible to identify four main waves within the course of

modern terrorism, since the last decades of XIXth century:
 The anarchist wave;
 The anticolonial wave;
 The new left wave;
 The religious wave;
+ wave: a cycle of activity in a given time period
A crucial feature: international character, that is similar activities occur in several
countries, driven by a common predominant energy.
Each wave’s name reflects its dominant but not its only feature (i.e.: nationalists in all
waves)
Each wave lasts generally about a generation each, but occasionally an organization
survives its original wave;
ex.: the Palestine liberation org. PLO was founded in 1964 and became active in 1967
IRA emerged in 1916 (though not as a terrorist organization) and it fought several
campaigns in two successive waves
THE FIRST WAVE: The Anarchist wave
When: 1880’s- first decades of the 20th century
-“era of the attempts”
-Public opinion and counterterrorism
Several separate strands of terrorist violence:
-nationalists;
-right-wing terrorists
-above all: Revolutionaries&anarchists (especially Russian Revolutionaries&anarchists)
Facilitating and peculiar factors:
1) Transformation in communication and transportation patterns (telegraph, daily
mass newspapers, railroads)

2) The dynamite (alfred nobel)

 Prior to the invention of the explosive, terrorists had to resort to
guns or knives which require closer proximity to the targets.
“dynamite, on the other hand, was a stable compound that
could be used at some distance from the intended target”
(Weinberg)
 3) The “creation” of a doctrine: especially Russian writers created a strategy for
terror (both in terms of the theory&organization), which became an
inheritance for successors to use, improve, and transmit;

Russian revolutionary terrorism

“If any country can claim to be the birthplace of modern terrorism, it is…Russia.
There, beginning in the 1860’s, three generations of radicals introduced the
language, justifications, means, and strategies that shaped the use of modern
political violence”
“the concept of systematic terrorism and its use in revolutionary strategy first
appeared between 1869

Why Russia?

During the second ½ of the 19th century, Russia was surely the “most backward
of the great states of Europe”
 There were no elections, no representative assemblies, no legal
political parties or trade unions, and virtually no recognized civil
rights. The government relied on nobles, the army, the police
and censorship to preserve the status quo (Law).
Organized opposition fell into different categories:

 Liberalism, populism, nihilism, Marxism, and anarchism.

Common objective (bring down the tzarist autocracy) and some common
elements

 Propaganda by deed (the oppressed masses will be inspired to

seize power based on the exemplary actions of
individuals/groups)
they believed the word propaganda used before was ineffective

But… different ultimate goals and dif. Ideas about how to reach it

 Some thought the peasants should be the root of the revolution,

others by workers;
 Some thought no authority should exist during the process of
revolution, others believed there should be an intermediate
balance;
 Some thought the main strategy had to be a peacefull one,
others believed resorting to violence was necessary;
Above all, rupture over… Revolution, Violence and terrorism
Out of this rupture  First organizations (People’s will PW; Socialist Revolutionary SRs
party and in particular

 The “Terrorist Doctrine” (the leading figure: Sergei Nechaev)

A) How to be a genuine revolutionary
The neachaev’s Catechism of the Revolutionary called for “ the
2-hours-a-day, seven days a week revolutionary, someone
willing to abandon his personal life in exchange for an all-
consuming commitment to revolutionary violence”
“The revolutionary is a doomed man”
B) The importance of the organization (in contrast to the
anarchists)
The PW’s division of labor was impressive: there were specialists
in target surveillance, forging documents, and counter-
espionage against the police;
Furthermore, the group divided
C) The “terrorist doctrine”… and C1) Legitimizing terrorism
(violence both effective and just)
Morozove composed The terrorist Struggle: “the essay’s very
title signaled the revival of the term “terrorism” with a new
twist: instead of using it as an appeal for state violence, as
Robespierre had, Morozov against the tzarist regime,
reminiscent of karl Heinzen’s earlier manifesto”
D) Strategies
D1) For Nechaev and others, targets had to be chosen on the
basis of determining the extent to which their deaths will
inspire the greatest fear in the government” and “paralyze
its power”
D2) “The killing of key figures in the autocracy would
represent a new form of revolutionary struggle, a more
scientific means of winning power” killing to create a
completely new political order, not as before when killing
power figures was meant to restore the previous order;
Not only doctrine…
The birth of PW, “the modern era’s first professional conspiratorial terrorist org.” (law)
-After some previous assassinations against Russian officialdom (and after a lively
debate), on March 1, 1881, PW killed Alexander II
The SRs formed in 1901
-The “party’s combat organization engaged in a far more extensive series of
assassinations than the PW” (terror as a form of warfare: Benigno)
-By the end of 1907, 4,500 officials of the state were killed (and 2180 non directly
working for the government but implicated in its policies)

“Russian revolutionary terrorists never succeeded in inspiring a popular revolution”

(law)
Nonetheless… an extraordinary heritage…
a) In the short-term, the so called “Russian method” immediately inspired
terrorists worldwide;
b) In the long-therm, Russian revolutionary terrorism from the 1860’s to

Terrorism becomes global for the first time

 1890s- (begging) 1900s: peak of anarchist-revolutionary

terrorism worldwide (especially: France; Italy, Spain; to a certain
extent, the USA)
 Perception (and ‘self-promotion-identification’): global
“anarcho-terrorism”
 “Era of the attempts”
Terrorists (and in particular anarchists) assassinated (

Some differences with the Russian revolutionaries

Elements absent in Russia, but in these cases more relevant:
-Individual terrorism
-Desire for revenge
-the idea of objective or group responsibility
*if you belong to a category in the population identified with the enemy, then you
become fair game for terrorist attack; no more specific targets- symbolic targets start
to become more relevant;
As intended, the wave of anarchist terrorism created widespread fear throughout the
western world- media such as newspapers, relatively new phenomenon, sounded the
alarm, spreading fear throughout the world.
At the same time, governments in Europe and north america were quick to enact new
legislation against anarchist activity and shought international cooperation to fight this
plague

For an assessment…
1) On one hand, to the extent the anarchists wanted to show widespread fear to
the point of hysteria, they have “achieved their objective”
2) On the other hand, “none of this terrorist violence incited the masses to
revolution, and no governments collapsed as a result of the attempts”
Even before the turn of the century…
Right-wing (racist and anti-semitic) terrorism…
In the USA: After the Civil War, ku klux klan kkk, waged a terrorist campaign
throughout the south aimed at preventing newly freed slaves from exercising the right
to vote and the normal liberties available to U.S. citizens
In Imperial Russia: the ‘Black hundered’, a lossely linked group of anti-semites
(helped by the police), blamed the country’s jewish population for popular discontent
and for fomenting revolution: pogroms and killings
*
*

Left-wing terrorism in the heart of Europe

The German experience
-the broader cultural context, the cultural origins, and the ideology
1) Some general crucial elements
America’s war in Vietnam and the liberation struggles of third world peoples
Unorthodox readings/variations of Marxism and new left theories
An anti-capitalist leitmotiv and the rejection of consumer society
2) A general disillusionment with th constitutional left (SPD)
Too conservative and betrayment of the revolutionary fervour and ideals
Co- responsible of the re-fascistisation of the state
3) The burden of the past…the weight of Nazism (even though there were no cases of
right-wing terrorism)
A) conflict generation sharpened (their parents had to be blamed for what they had
done during the nazi regime, completely guilty)
B) strong anti-autoritism, “hypersensitivism” (against any type of authority- perceived
as a type of Nazism)
C) The feeling that Nazism had not died, and was still existing in Germany 
Perception of the established political german authorities as…
-merely a formal democracy, and, a crypto-facist, or closeted nazi, state- in spite of
having democratic elections and majority support
The “Nazi heritage” (and capitalism), but also…
-Cold war (and anti-comunism)
-SPD and grand coalition with the CDU
Ralling cry: a new Resistance
Belief (and strategy):
-The german state would inevitably reveal its true Nazi nature upon provocation
*The strategy of urban guerrilla terrorism
D) The german republic was a fascist system deeply involved with the fascist
imperialism of the USA
-For the terrorists, direct links/analogy between:
*Vietman war or/and the RAF prisoners fear of being murdered in jail
And… Auchwitz

A brief histoty…
Two martyr events as triggering events…
The killing of benno ohnesorg on 2 june 1967
The nearly fatal attempt on rudy dutschke on April 11th 1968

PHASE ONE: the escalating phase (1970-1972) by the founders

-Bombings in the spring of 1972 targeting the United States military presence in west
Germany. Four us soldiers died, and dozens were wounded
Within months, baader, ensslin, meinhof were arrested and soon held
It seemed the RAF was finished…instead….
PHASE TWO: the struggle for the liberation of the political prisoners (1972-1977)
August 1975: an RAF squad seized the west german embassy in stockolm demanding
the release
PHASE THREE: The german autumn of 1977
-sheleyer is held hostage, and later killed by the terrorists
-Landhust id held hostage by cooperating with Palestinian terrorists
-Baader, Raspe and ensslin commit suicide in their cells
PHASE FOUR: The long winter (1977-1990’s)
Within a year of shleyers murder, most of the RAF’s second generation of terrorists
were arrested. But the RAF restocked its ranks again
This was a pattern that would repeat itself into the 1990s, with the RAF destroyed and
reconstituted several times
However…the following generations
-identified only with the myth and name of the RAF, but….
-Not in harmony with the goals and ideals of the original RAF
Four further crucial features:
1) Did the student movement directly and logically lead to terrorist excesses?
Actually…. By-product of disintegration of a social movement
A) Not only terrorism… but many and varied consequences:
Political apathy and depression; a return to the major parties; the womens
movement, and peace or/and ecological movements: all of them rather
nonviolent;

B) As the mighty student movement died, following its most activist, even
violent peak, it spun off small but intensely violent movements

2) International links and material support from international terrorist contacts,

notably the Palestinians:
-various leaders have at times received guerrilla training in the middle east
(Jordan 1970)
-Palestinian terrorists have sometimes played a central part in german activities
 3) Social composition (based on 227 left-wing terrorists charged or sentenced by
the end of 1978, most of them RAF and June 2nd members)
A) Unlike the terrorists of the german radical right, the 227 had four times the
number of the parents in the higher occupational categories as the
population average
B) Workers abd farmers were distinctly underrepresented among the 227
C) About one-third of the left-wing terrorists of the seventies were women
Women were at least as likely as men to have attained leading positions
among the terrorists

4) Sympathisers (active or passive)

-A poll revealed that 20 percent of the population had a certain sympathy for
the baader-meinhof group (in law)

AL QAEDA, ISIS AND THE NEW AGE OF TERROR

The new age of terrorism

Thesis: Not an isolated phenomenon, not out of nowhere

-its origins must be traced in some crucial events of the past;
-part of the fourth wave of terrorism (Rapoport)

The religious wave

Two events are exceptionally imp. In helping us to understand the appearance of the
new wave of the terrorism from the 1980’s to the present;
Crucial role. The Iranian revolution of 1979
For much of the cold war period the west (and the US especially) regarded Iran as a
crucial ally:
-quite modern and industrialized country and largely secular; anti-communist bastion;
An island of stability in an otherwise turbulent Middle East. (also perceived as a wall
against the possible spread of the soviet union influence to the middle east)
The Iranian revolution
-Revolution in 1979;
-An Islamic Republic was established with Ayotollah Khomeini as its “supreme guide”
Why so relevant to terrorism?
-Process of radicalization: The new clerical and religious regime (strongly against the
USA, “the great satan”) excited the admiration of millions of Shiites throughout the
middle east, there was an extraordinary religious and political excitement (not only
among the Shiites)
-Not only a model but also a crucial support (the ideia was to export/spread their
module)- Accordingly, Teheran sent revolutionary guards to train local Shiites and
transform them into an effective paramilitary force (ex. Lebanon)
Not only iran….
The second development that contributed to the onset of the new wave of terrorism
involved;
The soviet invasion of Afghanistan in december 1979;
Invasion of Afghanistan: why is it so relevant?
Protagonists of the struggle against the invasion:
o Afghanistans religiously devout tribal leaders (who saw the Marxists in Kabul as
engaged in the installation of atheism in a stronglyn Muslim country)
They were not alone:

 Muslim leaders throughout afg., Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere in the
muslim world called for a holy war aimed at expelling the Russian infidels from
the house of islam;
 Thousands of young men throughout the arab world flocked to Afghanistan to
wage a guerrilla-style holy war (and with government blessing, young Muslim
immigrants were even recruited from American cities)
 Both the USA and the Saudis provided help
The Afghan resistance was successful, but…. With an unexpected consequence
-Thousands of Arab veterans (so called “afghans”) returned to Algeria, Egypt, Saudi
arabia and the other middle eastern countries

 Imbued with a sense of mission;

 And intent on keeping on their holy war on behalf of muslims suffering
throughout the world;
…One such “Afghan” was the young Saudi millionaire Osama Bin Laden
o Al Qaeda was a new org. bin laden (and others) formed in the late 1980’s with a
central task, to achieve a specific goal:
 Once the Soviets departed from afg., they want to provide fighters and render
material assistance (with the money they had collected previously) to muslims
wherever they were visctims of oppression,
o In other words,

AL QAEDA – (brief history)

Turning point (and crucial factor for AQ):
o Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in august 1990;
o Saudi Arabia (where Bin Laden lived and where he was treated with the respect
due a leader in the successful struggle against the communists) itself was widely
seen as threatened by this act of aggression;
o Bin laden approached the Saudi Government with an offer to use the mujahidin
(the “holy warriors”)
o
o Taliban rule provided a near ideal setting for al qaeda’s extensive activities
o And for creating a better organization,
-many bases and other training facilities for preparing thousands of young
mujahidin from around the muslim world to wage struggle against a variety of
enemies

A new age of terrorism?

Some eventsor series of events:
-In 1993, an islamist with ties to al Qaeda led the first effort to blow uo World trade
Center
ISIS and the “new” Middle east
Crucial condition
-context: the new (destabilized) middle east;
Because of… 1) if the first war in Iraq had been crucial for the AQ, the Second War in
Iraq was crucial for ISIS (whose beginnings are strongly intertwined with al Qaedas
history in Iraq)
2)Tunisian Revolution- rapidly spread through the m. east, goal- improve and protect
civil rights  Arab Springs…. Failed (was only successful in Tunisia)
a) Further destabilization;
b) failing (or weakening of) states;
c) new struggles between states: exc: aiming at a political change in Syria, several Arab
states (above all Saudi Arabia) strongly supported many organizations fighting against
assad’s regime
d) civil war in Syria
-decisive for ISIS as well as war in Iraq
-and here… differences between IS and AQ…
AL QAEDA AND ISIS- GOALS
The most far reaching of IS and AQ objectives:
o The re-establishment of the caliphate (Islamic state led by a supreme religious and
political leader known as a caliph- i.e. “successor”- to Muhammad), i.e. the form of
muslim rule that was founded by the prophet mohammed and that existed in the
centuries following the death of the prophet Mohammed in 632 CE8it was only
formally abolished after wwI (1924), with the end of the ottoman
caliphate/empire)
o It is recalled by muslims as a golden age of islam
o The goal of AQ (as well as of IS) is immutable. To “unite all muslims and establish a
government that follows the rule of the caliph”, not only a restoration but also to
apply this model in a whole new modern era
Bin laden, AQ and IS leaders believe
1) That the former, “original”, Islamic state (caliphate) is the perfect (ideal)
society, in accordance with gods will, ruled by god’s rules
2) And that division of the muslim world into small countries is an artificial
consequence of western imperialism
In light of this multiple goal, some further (immediate) purposes
 1) Expelling Western (culturale and political) influence from the house of islam:
-First and foremost (especially for AQ)
IDEOLOGY & GOALS
2) Antisemitism
A) Israel must be destroyed and B) “the Jews” are identified as engaged in a vast
conspiracy to undermine muslim institutions on a worldwide basis

3) (But huge dif. Between ISIS and AQ: next slide…) Struggle against the “false”
Muslim regimes (especially those in Saudi Arabia and in Egypt, and now Iraq
and Syria);
Replace these corrupt regimes with authentically Islamic ones
COMPARING AQ AND ISIS: different goals, different targets
Common traits, but a huge difference…
AQ “far enemy” strategy:

 AQ primary enemy is the US, which it sees as the rrot cause of the
middle easts problems. By targeting the US, AQ believes it will
eventually induce the US to end support for these Muslim state regimes
and withdraw from the region altogether, thus leaving the regimes
vulnerable to attack them from within
ISIS “near enemy” strategy:

 The Islamic state does not follow AQ “far enemy” strategy, preferring
instead the “near enemy” strategy, albeit on a regional level. As such,
the primary target of the Islamic state has not been the US, but rather
(more than AQ)- in order to purify the islam community
a) “apostate” regimes in the Arab world (esp. Iraq and Syria)

AQ: Tactics and strategies  Al Qaeda has long used a mix of strategies to achieve its
objectives. To fight the US, AQ plots terrorism spectaculars to electrify the muslim
world (and get it to follow AQ’s banner) and to retreat from the muslim world
-AQ as long favored large-scale, dramatic attacks against strategic or symbolic targets
IS: tactics and strategies The Islamic states strategy is to control territory, steadily
consolidating and expanding its position;

ISIS- HISTORY: 1) The explosion and 2) the peak (2014-2015)

The origins…
Civil war in Syria
1) The “explosion” of ISIS: June 29, 2014
- The leader of the IS in Iraq and greater Syria (ISIS), abu Bakr al-baghdadi,
declared that he stood at the head of a caliphate and was “leader for muslims
everywhere”
2) The peak

3) A complex picture, “ups&downs” (2015-2016)

A phenomenon in crisis? Since the (may 2015), ISIS began to lose territory (in Syria and
in Iraq) and fighters…
But… yet even while ISIS lost territory and lost fighters at home, it was able to boost
arenewable supply of fighters and territories abroad

 Expansion: the group has staked its flag in parts of Afghanistan,

Pakistan, Saudi arabia, and especially

4) The beginning of the end? (2017-2019)

Relevant decline, full retreat
-march 2018 the us-lead coalition against so-called Islamic state (is) says 98% of
territory once claimed by the jihadist group across iraq and Syria has been
recaptured
-ISIS as a “territorial” (centralized) phenomenon: dramatic crisis, towards
dissolution

Nevertheless… ISIS as “terrorist strategy abroad” phenomenon even more

threatening…

Why? OK Global jihadism, but also a local dimension

-why Paris, Manchester/London, and brussels?

The presence and the radicalization of second-generation immigrants against

social conditions (marginalization), against westernization (cultural factors):
Conversion: not religious at the beginning, religion as an instrument to re-
discovery their own identity, roots (even against their parents who had
betrayed it, not by chance familiar ties)
No connection with recent immigration
Danger: vicious cycle (repression/anti-immigrant rhetoric/ radicalization)

Reacting to terrorism & the end of terrorism

Dealing with terrorism

 How did/do respond to the challenges posed by terrorist violence?

Adopting an historical perspective… two main issues…

 How to defea, neutralize, eradicate terrorism in a effective way?

Main counterterrorism strategies…which may be divided into
- Carrots
- Sticks
The problem of the effectiveness – CARROTS (Weinberg)
- “Carrots” have received far less attention than “sticks”;
- But, in some cases, carrots have proved beneficial in reducing or even
eliminating terrorist activity;
- Rewards come in two forms:
1) One provided to terrorists themselves (Italian case)
Legislation offers terrorists opportunities to defect from their group in
exchange for reduced setences or even in some cases no punishment at all;
In some cases, legislation extends these offers contingent on the terrorists
willingness to disclose information about their former confederates and the
organizations to which they belonged;
2) The other provided to terrorists presuimed constituents:
In cases involving nationalists/separatists issues (spain, Ireland), reform that
stress greater local autonomy or power sharing may undercut popular
support for terrorism;
Some of the most common responses- STICKS (Weinberg)
Sanctions, measures aimed at preventing attacks before they occur and punishing
those responsible if they do.
Just a possible list from history (and lesson from history: there is no magic bullet, no
single successful solution to be found and applied):
- Hardening targets and strengthening security. Airport, monuments,
public buildings, embassies, public gatherings such as sporting events,
concerts, ecc.
- Increasing the size and the powers of the security forces, but at the
same time…
- …unity of efforts (coordinating and integrating the actions of the various
and multiple agencies dealing with public order).
- Intelligence is extraordinarily important,
- Money: draining terrorists’ resources
 - Introduction of special 8and emergency) anti-terrorist legislation and
measures (terrorism can’t be dealt with by normal legal programmes):
- Establish (special) military/police force to cope with terrorist attacks
- Introduction of some measures outside the normal legal ordinary
process
- Introduction of capital +punishment (death penalty)
- Impose (cultural, political, economic) sanctions on states identified as
sponsoring or supporting terrorist groups
- Promote international cooperation and institutions against terrorism
Second issue…not only efficancy…
When you are faced with terrorirsm, the immediate inclination is likely to
want to get rid of the problem, without taking into consideration other
issues
o Effectiveness/safety is not the only issue…
o Rightness, justness, legitimacy, fairness (limits of the
response)
o Clearly, a problem only for the democratic countries:

-Authoritarian states ruled by the military or some civili

Not only efficiency…

+ Crucial questions, dilemmas (even before 9/11)
Is it true that we can trade human rights and international agreements for safety to
fight terrorism effectively?
How can democracies defend themselves against terrorist attack without losing the
very qualities that distinguish them from police states?
In the name of the terrorist emergency, can a democracy derogate, suspend the rule of
the law (meaning that the government cannot do whatever it wants whenever it feels
like doing it)? Can it act not in accordance with constitutional limitations and legal
restrictions, departing from the ordinary legal arrangements?
-torture and more in general the suspension of the rights of those suspected of
involvement in terrorist activity (i.e. internment, also for a long period, without trial)
-the creation of special security forces, outside the normal chain of command or not
responsible to “normal” democratic authorities

Is terrorism endless?
A synoptic analysis of the devbate would reveal a widespread myth
Terrorism is endless- definitely not true
1) Terrorist campaigns do end
2) The average lifespan of a group that
How and why terrorism ends?
Some crucial “lessons from history”
1) Very often more than one element is at play:
-in fact, very often a combination of causes- even an intersection between
them- results

2) Pathways for decline have been (and can be) influenced by factors both
internal and external to campaign
Historical cases are remarkably consistent in demonstrating that:
-some of these processes of decline are set in motion by the state
-some by the group itself
-some by the audience
3) ffff
Examining how terrorist campaign have ended
+ although there are natural variations in the way specific groups/campaign end, its
possible to identify some common factors:
 Defeat, repression, force
 Decapitation (eliminating the leader) can be counterproductive- a source of
insp. For the next generations
 Backlash, loss of support
Org own error (miscalculations in targeting, excessive violence, etc.)
Also governements can accelerate backlash…
 A terrorist group ends because it uindergoes a strategic shift away to terrorism
 The disappearance of some cultural/ social/ideological/economic conditions
and causes
Ex: Third wave (1960s-1980s)

The individual- How do people stop being terrorists?

How do people stop being terrorists?
1) Terrorists stop being terrorists when the authorities make them stop
2) Terrorists can be killed (by the authorities or by other actors)
 3) Terrorists can kill themselves
4) Terrorists may seek to withdraw from the organization- exit process (several
reasons)
PAPER
Paper review and grades: January 16th
Handing in the paper: 28 of December (by email) 4000 words
1) Some information about the author and his/her approach/field of research
(field of study, other books they’ve wrote, “understanding the field of study
of the author and where they’re perspective comes from”)
2) Description of the main elements/interpretations of the book, identify the
core elements of the book and explain
3) On the book (and its interpretations), not about the actual subject (not just a
synthesis)
4) Your comments and evaluations on the book, also highlighting the links
between its contents and the topics discussed in class (small part at the end)
5) No “external” influences
Scientific approach
-use a LOT of quotations from the book (using quoting marks –“”)(if you’re
mentioning this book a foot note is not necessary, but the pages, in parentheses, are)

ITALIAN TERRORISM
A relevant case
Us in the 70s: according to some scholars, between July 1977 and July 1979 evening
news of the main US networks (ABC,CBS and NBC) dedicated to the most important
Italian terrorist group (BR: leftwing) 141 stories
-They were the 50% of the news from or about Italy
-In the same period, the stories dedicated to the IRA were only 42
Italian terrorism was extremely…virulent
What makes the Italian case so relevant?
Long: lasted for almost 20 years- 1969 to 1988 (but some attacks even later)
Frequent: according to an analysis, in 1978 italy had a terrorist attack of some form
once every four hours (“a world record”)
Vast:
-657 denominations used by dozens of underground organizations (484: left-wing)
-thousands of militants involved in the “armed struggle”
-several areas of the country involved
Able to realize relevant attacks and to target relevant actors
(almost) unique:
-The terrorist challenge came from the entire spectrum of extreme ideological dissent:
from the right-wing terrorist (neofascists) and from revolutionary ones (Red Brigades,
above all)- and each of them…
Italian Terrorism- Three main phases
The black phase (1969-74)
The red phase (1974-79)
The final phase (1979-88): both (if red predominant…)
Dies irae- December 12, 1969
The (first) Black phase… (1969-1974)
-83% of all violent episodes (1969-1975)
Why: fear of communists and social protest (and mistrust of traditional anti-
communist political parties)
Fear of Détente
Goal: instil fear in order to weaken the institutions, overthrow
(in the light of this goal) Strategy and Tactics: not specific targets & massacres
No claim for the attacks: anonymous and tried to blame on the left (“faise flag”):
“strategy of tension”
External supports?