POLICE POWER
conditions in their contract.
*Public Morals
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
v. City Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. L24693, 31 July 1967
Facts:
The petitioner challenged the ordinance passed by the City of
Manila for being unconstitutional as it imposes higher license
fees, requires the petitioner to refrain from accepting customers
unless they fill up the form consisting of their personal
information, and allows the duly authorized gov’t representatives
to inspect their premises at all times. Petitioner alleged that the
ordinance is violative of due process and right to privacy.
In defense, respondents contended that the ordinance is
constitutional as it is a valid exercise of power created for the
purpose of suppressing certain practices that are hurtful to public
morals. The increase of rate of prostitution, fornication in Manila
traceable to the existence of the hotels, motels and lodging-
houses is alarming. Hence, the operation of such premises
needs to be regulated in the interest of public morals.
Issue:
WON the said ordinance is constitutional.
Ruling: Yes.
The ordinance is constitutional as it is a valid exercise of police
power aimed to safeguard public morals. In this case, it is shown
that the rate of prostitutions due to the existence of the said
premises is alarming. Exercise of police power is valid when its
purpose is to protect the welfare of the public, in this case,
protection from immorality. To hold otherwise would be unduly
restricting and narrowing the scope of the police power which
has been characterized as the most essential, insistent and the
least limitable of powers extending greatly for public needs.
Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Garcia, G.R. No. 115381,
December 23, 1994
*Public Utilities
Facts:
Petitioner is questioning the constitutionality of the orders and
memoranda issued by the DOTC and LTFRB delegating to
provincial bus and transport operators the authority to increase
or decrease the duly prescribed transportation fares and without
undergoing due process.
Issue:
WON the authority given by respondent LTFRB to the provincial
bus and transport operators is constitutional?
Ruling: No.
Although public utilities are privately owned, its services are
impressed with public interest and therefore can be regulated by
the State for the protection of the public by exercising police
power.
Under the law, the authority of fixing rates of transportation fares
was delegated to the LTFRB and no provision on the said law
stating that the latter can delegate such authority to the common
carrier, operators or other public service. Hence, the authority of
fixing fare rate delegated by the LTFRB to the provincial buses
and jeepney operators is unconstitutional as it is an invalid
delegation of police power.
Further, allowing such delegation would result in the transport
operators to increase their fares whenever they deem it
necessary and would defeat the duty of the State of protecting
the welfare of the general public.
BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No., 177508, August 7, 2009
*Superior to Non-Impairment Clause
Facts:
The petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the
recently passed law about election particularly Sec. 34
hereof which fixes the per diem of poll watchers of the
parties. The petitioners contended that Sec. 34 violates the
Sec. 10, Article 3 of the Constitution as it impairs the
freedom of the parties to set their preferred terms and
Issue:
WON Sec. 34 violates Sec. 10, Art. 3 of the Constitution.
Ruling: No.
1. The Non-impairment clause only applies to
PREVIOUSLY PERFECTED CONTRACT. In this
case, there is no perfected contract yet and therefore,
no contract has been impaired.
2. Assuming there is a PERFECTED CONTRACT, it
is still constitutional as it is a valid exercise of police
power of the State. It is settled that the role of poll
watchers is VESTED WITH PUBLIC INTEREST which
the State can be regulated by exercising police power.
In the interest of public health, safety, morals, and
general welfare, POLICE POWER IS SUPERIOR to
the constitutional guaranty of NON-IMPAIRMENT
CLAUSE.
POLICE POWER
US v Toribio
Calalang v Williams
GR NO 47800
Facts:
The National Traffic Commission recommended the
Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public
Works and Communication that animal-drawn vehicles be
prohibited from passing along Rosario St. extending from
Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas St. from 7:30
am to 12 pm and 1:30 pm to 5:30 pm and also along Rizal
Avenue from 7 am to 11 pm from a period of one year from
the date of the opening of Colgante Bridge to traffic. It was
subsequently passed and thereafter enforced by Manila
Mayor and the acting chief of police. Maximo Calalang then,
as a citizen and a taxpayer challenges its constitutionality.
ISSUE:
Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe
upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security
of all the people?
RULING:
No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism,
nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws
and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice
means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally,
through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of
all governments on the time-honored principles of salus
populi est suprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the
necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse
units of a society and of the protection that should be
equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined
force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of
bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association, Inc. v City of Manila
Ynot v IAC
G.R. No. 74457
Ferdinand Marcos amended EO 626 no carabao regardless
of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef
shall be transported from one province to another.
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat
from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac
Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure and sued
for the recovery of his carabaos. His claim is that the
penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according
the owner a right to be heard before a competent and
impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He
complains that the measure should not have been
presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional.
ISSUE: Whether EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being
violative of the due process clause.
YES EO 626A IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THERE IS NO
LAWFUL METHOD
The protection of the general welfare is the particular
function of the police power which both restraints and is
restrained by due process. The police power is simply
defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty
and property for the promotion of the general welfare.
To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following
must be present: (a) that the interests of the public,
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require such interference, and; (b) that the means
are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose
The reasonable connection between the means employed
and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned
measure is missing.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an
invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of
the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in
his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the
power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates
against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the
officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive
Order No. 626-A unconstitutional
Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 100152, March 31, 2000
 a charge to account for all forms of cross subsidies for a
Doctrine: It is within the authority of the City Mayor to grant
or revoke business permits; it is, however, beyond his
authority to impose conditions upon the practice of a
particular profession.
FACTS
Petitioner Acebedo Optical applied with the Office of the
City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. After
consideration of petitioner's application and the opposition
interposed thereto by local optometrists, respondent City
Mayor issued Business Permit No. 5342 subject to
conditions. (
Private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas
(SOPI) lodged a complaint against the petitioner alleging
that Acebedo had violated the conditions in the business
permit and its cancellation. Thereafter, the City Mayor sent
petitioner a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of
Business Permit.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the RTC, which was
subsequently dismissed. CA also dismissed petitioner,
ruling that the City Mayor acted beyond his authority
ISSUE
Whether the special conditions imposed by the City Mayor
is within his authority, as a valid exercise of police power,
in the grant of business permits
RULING
No. While the Court held that it is within the authority of the
City Mayor to grant or revoke business permits, it is,
however, beyond his authority to impose conditions upon
the practice of a particular profession.
It was held that authority of city mayors is essentially in the
exercise of the police power of the State within the
contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local
Government Code. However, the power to grant or issue
licenses or business permits must always be exercised in
accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights
of all concerned to due process and equal protection of the
law.
In assailing the conditions imposed, distinction must be
made between the grant of a license or permit to do
business and the issuance of a license to engage in the
practice of a particular profession. In the case at bar, what
is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a
permit to engage in the business of running an optical shop.
It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the
practice of optometry as a corporate body or entity,
although it does have in its employ, persons who are duly
licensed to practice optometry by the Board of Examiners
in Optometry.
A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the
conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot, through the
issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a
profession, like that of optometry. Such a function is within
the exclusive domain of the administrative agency
specifically empowered by law to supervise the profession.
Exec Secretary v CA
Gerochi v Department of Energy
FACTS:
The case is rooted on Republic Act 9136 or the EPIRA law
of 2001, in which petitioner assails the validity of the law on
the ground that it is an undue delegation of power of
taxation as it imposes a “UNIVERSAL CHARGE” to the end
users after a period of 1 year after the effectivity of the law
The universal charge to be collected would serve as
payment for government debts, missionary electrification,
equalization of taxes and royalties applied to renewable
energy and imported energy, environmental charge and for
period not exceeding three years. Petitioners contend that
the Universal Charge has the characteristics of a tax and is
collected to fund the operations of the NPC. Respondent
PSALM contends that unlike a tax which is imposed to
provide income for public purposes, such as support of the
government, administration of the law, or payment of public
expenses, the assailed Universal Charge is levied for a
specific regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability
of the country's electric power industry.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the universal charge imposed is an undue
delegation of power of taxation.
RULING:
NO. If generation of revenue is the primary
purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition
is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that
revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition
a tax. In exacting the assailed Universal Charge through
Sec. 34 of the EPIRA, the State's police power, particularly
its regulatory dimension, is invoked. Such can be deduced
from Sec. 34 which enumerates the purposes for which the
Universal Charge is imposed and which can be amply
discerned as regulatory in character. From the
aforementioned purposes, it can be gleaned that the
assailed Universal Charge is not a tax, but an exaction in
the exercise of the State's police power. Public welfare is
surely promoted.
Moreover, it is a well-established doctrine that the taxing
power may be used as an implement of police power.
Tawang Multi-Purpose v La Trinidad Water District
G.R. No. 166471
Facts:
TMPC is a cooperative which provides
domestic water services in Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad,
Benguet. La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water
utility created under PD 198, authorized to supply water for
domestic, industrial, and commercial purposes within La
Trinidad.
TMPC filed with the National Water Resources
Board (NWRB) an application for a Certificate of Public
Convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks
system in Barangay Tawang.
LTWD opposed and claimed that under section
47 of PD 198, its franchise is exclusive. The NWRB
approved the application of TMPC. NWRB held that
LTWD’s franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive
franchises are unconstitutional. The RTC reversed the
NWRB’s decision.
Issue: WON the RTC erred in holding that sec. 47 of PD
198 is valid.
Ruling: Yes. What cannot be legally done directly cannot
be done indirectly. The President, Congress, and the Court
cannot create direct franchises for the operation of a public
utility that are exclusive in character. It violates section 11
of Article XII of the constitution which states that “… nor
shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be
exclusive in character.”
The Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy is
applied, and PD 198 is declared unconstitutional.
Southern Luzon Drug Corp v DSWD
G.R. No. 199669
Facts:
President Gloria Arroyo passed RA 9257. The law retained
the 20% discount on the purchase of medicines and to all
establishments and removed the annual income ceiling
thereby qualifying all senior citizens to the privilege under
the law. Southern drug and other drug stores assail the
constitutionality of the said law. They contended that such
law affects their gross income net and their rights under
Article III section 9 of the constitution which provides that
“Private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation.”
DSWD contended that such discount affects the Taxable
income, the gross income that's actually subject to taxation
not the gross income net in total.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 9257 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner failed to present substantial evidence that
they are suffering losses upon the implementation of RA
9257. Such implementation is a valid exercise of police
power of the state by regulating the discount given to senior
citizens and PWDs. The said law is for promoting health
and welfare for the senior citizens and PWDs as the state
considers them integral part of the society.
PIMENTEL v. LEB
Facts
- RA 7762 was enacted by congress to uplift the
standard of legal education. RA 7662 created the
Legal Education Board.
- Petitioners seek that R.A. No. 7662 be declared
unconstitutional and that the creation of the LEB be
invalidated together with all its issuances, most
especially the PhiLSAT, for encroaching upon the rule-
making power of the Court concerning admissions to
the practice of law
Issue
- WON Supervision and regulation of legal
education as an exercise of police power
Ruling
- Philsat as an aptitude test is not unreasonable
but it should not be restrictive and should not encroach
upon institutional academic freedom. When the
PhiLSAT is used to exclude, qualify, and restrict
admissions to law schools, as its present design
mandates, the PhiLSAT goes beyond mere
supervision and regulation, violates institutional
academic freedom, becomes unreasonable and
therefore, unconstitutional.
MMDA V Bel-Air
MMDA v Garin
GR No 130230
Facts:
The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent
Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation
receipt (TVR) by MMDA and his driver's license confiscated
for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila,
on August 1995.
Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the
respondent addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman
Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license,
and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in
court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original
complaint with application for preliminary injunction,
contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules
and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the
MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of
their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the
validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process
clause of the Constitution.
The respondent further contended that the provision
violates the constitutional prohibition against undue
delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the
MMDA to fix and impose unspecified — and therefore
unlimited — fines and other penalties on erring motorists.
The trial court rendered the assailed decision in favor of
herein respondent.
Issue:
WON MMDA, through Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 could
validly exercise police power.
RULING:
Police Power, having been lodged primarily in the National
Legislature, cannot be exercised by any group or body of
individuals not possessing legislative power. The National
Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the
president and administrative boards as well as the
lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can
exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on
them by the national lawmaking body.
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the
Local Government Code of 1991. 15 A local government is
a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local
affairs." 16 Local government units are the provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays, which exercise police power
through their respective legislative bodies.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several
local government units. With the passage of Rep. Act No.
7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a
"special development and administrative region" and the
administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the
region placed under "a development authority" referred to
as the MMDA. Thus: The MMDA is, as termed in the charter
itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for
the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with
the various national government agencies, people's
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the
private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of
basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions
are administrative in nature and these are actually summed
up in the charter itself
* Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the "Functions
and Powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority."
The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner
shall "install and administer a single ticketing system, fix,
impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of
violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or
non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or
revoke drivers' licenses in the enforcement of such traffic
laws and regulations, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 4136
and P.D. No. 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding," and
that "(f)or this purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic
laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic
operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP,
traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed
security guards, or members of non-governmental
organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority,
subject to such conditions and requirements as the
Authority may impose."
MMDA v Viron
Facts
GMA declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 operational,
thereby creating the MMDA in February 10, 2003. Due to
traffic congestion.
Viron Transport Co. alleged that MMDA MMDA’s authority
does not include the power to direct provincial bus
operators to abandon their existing bus terminals to thus
deprive them of the use of their property, Viron asked the
court to construe the scope, extent and limitation of the
power of the MMDA to regulate traffic under R.A. No. 7924,
"An Act Creating the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority, Defining its Powers and Functions, Providing
Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes.
June 19, 2003, Mencorp. Terminal and Viron Transport Co.
Filed for Petition for declaratory relief before the RTC of
Manila.
The trial court held that the E.O. was a valid exercise of the
police power of the State as it satisfied the two tests of
lawful subject matter and lawful means, hence, Viron’s and
Mencorp’s property rights must yield to police power.
The plaintiffs filed for an MR and the on September 28,
2003 and the RTC reversed its previous decision, that the
EO 179 was “an unreasonable exercise of police power”
and that “ MMDA has no authority and the power to order
the closure of of existing bus terminals, not being included
in RA 7924”
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 179 issued by GMA is
unconstitutional ?
Held:
EO 179 Issued by GMA is unconstitutional as it exercise
unreasonable police power.
There is no authority stated in the RA 7924 that MMDA has
the power to order the closure of existing bus terminals. It
does not empower the MMDA the authority to do such
directives. Given that MMDA has been delegated with the
police power, it failed to exercise the following measure:
1.) The interest of the public welfare
2.) The means employed.
The police power legislation myst be firmly grounded on
public interest/welfare and a reasonable relation between
the purpose and the means.
Ortigas & Co. Limited Partnership v FEATI
G.R. L-24670
On March 4, 1952, Augusto Padilla and Natividad Angeles
entered into separate agreements of sale on installments
over two parcels of land.
The restrictions were that the parcel of land subject of this
deed of sale shall be used by the buyer exclusively for
residential purposes, and she shall not be entitled to take
or remove soil, stones or gravel from it or any other lots
belonging to the Selle and that all buildings and other
improvements (except the fence) which may be constructed
at any time in said lot must be, (a) of strong materials and
properly painted, (b) provided with modern sanitary
installations connected either to the public sewer or to an
approved septic tank, and (c) shall not be at a distance of
less than two (2) meters from its boundary line.
On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-appellee began laying
the foundation and commenced the construction of a
building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to banking
purposes and at the same time could also be devoted to,
and used exclusively for, residential purposes.
The following day, plaintiff-appellant demanded in writing
that defendant-appellee stop the construction of the
commerical building on the said lots. The latter refused to
comply with the demand, contending that the building was
being constructed in accordance with the zoning
regulations, defendant-appellee having filed building and
planning permit applications with the Municipality of
Mandaluyong, and it had accordingly obtained building and
planning permits to proceed with the construction.
Plaintiff Resolution No. 27, series of 1960 of the Municipal
Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal declared Lots Nos. 5 and 6,
among others, as part of the commercial and industrial
zone, is valid because it did so in the exercise of its police
power.
ISSUES:
(1) WON whether Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid
exercise of police power;and
(2) whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the
contractual obligations assumed by defendant-appellee.
RULING:
(1) YES. Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid
exercise of police power and (2) YES, Resolution
No. 27 must be held to be more superior than the
“non-impairment clause” of contracts.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local
Autonomy Act," empowers a Municipal Council "to adopt
zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations"; for the
municipality. While non-impairment of contracts is
constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since
it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of
police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations
to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety and general welfare of the people.
Resolution No. 27, s-1960 was obviously passed by the
Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of
police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety,
peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the
locality, as it would not be a conducive residential area
considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which
results in the surrounding industrial and commercial
establishments.
United BF Homeowners Association, Inc. v. City Mayor,
G.R. No. 141010, February 7, 2007
Doctrine: The ordinance to reclassify a part of BF Homes
as commercial is a valid exercise of police power and is an
exception to the non-impairment of contracts clause.
FACTS
The Municipal Council of Parañaque enacted an ordinance
reclassifying El Grande and Aguirre avenues in BF Homes
Parañaque from residential to commercial areas. Petitioner
United BF Homeowners questioned the constitutionality of
some sections in the ordinance because it amounts to
impairment of the contracts between the developer of BF
Homes Parañaque and the lot buyers. Petitioners cited the
annotation on the lot buyers’ titles, which provides that "the
property shall be used for residential purposes only and for
no other purpose."
Public respondents alleged that the passage of Municipal
Ordinance No. 97-08 is a valid exercise of police power by
the Municipal Council of Parañaque and that such
ordinance can nullify or supersede the contractual
obligations entered into by the petitioners and the
developer.
As found by the Court of Appeals, El Grande and Aguirre
Avenues are main thoroughfares in BF Homes Parañaque,
which have long been commercialized.
ISSUES
1. Whether Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a legitimate
exercise of police power;
2. Whether Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is constitutional
considering that it impairs a contractual obligation
annotated in homeowners’ titles and violates the doctrine of
separation of powers;
RULING
1. Yes. the Sangguniang Bayan or the Municipal
Council, as the legislative body of the municipality, has the
power to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants.
2. Yes. The constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health,
safety, morals and general welfare.
Reason: The reclassification of El Grande and Aguirre
Avenues in BF Homes Parañaque as commercial area was
reasonable and justified under the circumstances.
The increasing number of homeowners in BF Homes
Parañaque necessitated the addition of commercial areas
in the subdivision to service the needs of the homeowners.
In fact, several homeowners along El Grande and Aguirre
Avenues already converted their residences into business
establishments. Furthermore, as found by the Court of
Appeals, El Grande and Aguirre Avenues are main
thoroughfares in BF Homes Parañaque, which have long
been commercialized.
Barangay Association v COMELEC
Pryce Corporation v China Bank
FACTS: The case stems from the decision of the
regional trial court of Makati acting as rehabilitation
court finding the petition of PRYCE CORP for
rehabilitation, sufficient in form and substance and
issued a stay order. Gener T. Mendoza was appointed
as rehabilitation receiver and amended the
rehabilitation plan of petitioner, which the
rehabilitation court approved. However, respondent
herein, alleged that in approving the Amended
Rehabilitation Plan, the RTC impaired the obligations
of contracts, voided contractual... stipulation and
contravened the "avowed policy of the State" to
maintain a competitive financial system.
The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision granting
respondent's petition and reversing the assailed
Orders of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is indeed an impairment
of obligations between petitioner and respondent.
RULING: NO. Successful rehabilitation of a
distressed corporation will benefit its debtors,
creditors, employees, and the economy in general. The
court may approve a rehabilitation plan even over the
opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total
liabilities of the debtor if, in its judgment, the
rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the
opposition of the creditors is manifestly unreasonable.
The rehabilitation plan, once approved, is binding upon
the debtor and all persons who may be affected by it,
including the creditors, whether or not such persons
have participated in the proceedings or have opposed
the plan or whether or not their claims have been
scheduled.
The cram-down principle
adopted by the Interim Rules does, in effect,
dilute contracts. When it permits the approval
of a rehabilitation plan even over the
opposition of creditors,81 or when it imposes
a binding effect of the approved plan on all
parties including those who did not
participate in the proceedings, the burden of
loss is shifted to the creditors to allow the
corporation to rehabilitate itself from
insolvency.
 Rather than let struggling corporations slip
and vanish, the better option is to allow
commercial courts to come in and apply the
process for corporate rehabilitation.
Planters Products v Fertiphil Corp
Assoc of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers v GCC
Approved Medical Centers
SLDC v. DSWD
Facts
- SLDC assails the constitutionality of RA
9257 or the Expanded Seniors Citizen Act of 2003
and RA 9442 or the Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons, which amended RA 9257, granting a 20%
discount to senior citizens and PWDs when
buying medicines and other necessities. SLDC
contends that the law is confiscatory in the sense
that the State takes away a portion of its supposed
profits which could have gone into its coffers and
utilizes it for public purpose and that they should
be compensated for such taking. Both the RTC
and CA denies such contention
Issue
- Whether or not RA 9257 is a valid exercise
of police power
Ruling
- The court ruled that RA 9257 is a valid
exercise of police power and is opted as a tax
deduction rather than a tax credit that was being
contended by the petitioners. The court also
denied their contention with regard that the
discount is illegal and constitutes as taking
without just compensation. As to its nature and
effects, the 20% discount is a regulation affecting
the ability of private establishments to price their
products and services relative to a special class of
individuals, senior citizens, for which the
Constitution affords preferential concern.
Quezon City v Ericta
G.R. No. L-34915
Facts:
Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No.
6118 an “Ordinance regulating the establishments
maintenance and operation of private memorial type
cemetery or burial ground within the jurisdiction of Q.C. and
providing penalties thereof.” Section 9 states that 6% of the
total area of the memorial park cemetery be set aside for
charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers.
Q.C Engineers notified Himlayang Pilipino
Inc., of the enforcement of the said ordinance. HPI sought
to annul the ordinance because it is contrary to the
Constitution, Q.C. Charter, Local Autonomy Act, and the
Revised Administrative Code. Q.C. gov’t argue that the
taking is a valid and reasonable exercise of the police
power of the state. HPI contended that the ordinance
restricts the use of property such that it cannot be used for
any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all
beneficial use of his property.
Police Power defined by Freud as “the power
of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property.”
Issue: WON Ordinance No. 6118 is a valid exercise of
police power.
Ruling: No. The Court find that there’s no reasonable
relation between the setting aside of at least 6% of the total
area of a private cemeteries for charity and burial grounds
of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals,
good order, safety or the general welfare of the people.
The Ordinance is actually taking without
compensation of a certain area of a private cemetery to
benefit the paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead building or maintaining a public
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to
private cemeteries.
Carlos Superdrug v DSWD
OSG v Ayalaland
GR NO 177056
FACTS:
Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and Shangri-la
maintain and operate shopping malls in various locations in
Metro Manila. Respondent SM Prime constructs, operates,
and leases out commercial buildings and other structures,
among which, are SM City, Manila; SM Centerpoint,
Sta.Mesa, Manila; SM City, North Avenue, Quezon City;
and SM Southmall, Las Piñas.
The Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce found that
the collection of parking fees by shopping malls is contrary
to National Building Code and figuratively speaking, the
Code has “expropriated” the land for parking. Also,
Committee stated that the collection of parking fees would
be against Article II of RA 9734 (Consumer Act of the
Philippines) as to the State’s policy of protecting the interest
of consumers. Moreover, Section 201 of the National
Building Code gives the responsibility for the administration
and enforcement of the provisions of the Code, including
the imposition of penalties for administrative violations
thereof to the Secretary of Public Works. This is not being
strictly followed as the LGUs are tasked to discharge the
regulatory powers of DPWH instead of DPWH instead.
As such, Senate Committee recommended that: 1) Office
of Solicitor General should institute the action to enjoin the
collection of parking fees and enforce the sanctions for
violation of National Building Code; 2) DTI pursuant to RA
7394 should enforce the provisions of Code relative to
parking; and 3) Congress should amend and update the
National Building Code to prohibit the collection of parking
fees and its waiver of liability.
Respondent SM Prime assailed the recommendation of the
Committee and filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief under
Rule 63 of the Revised Rules of Court against DPWH and
local building officials, contending that: 1) Rule XIX of
Implementing Rules and Regulations of National Building
Code is unconstitutional and void; 2) respondent has the
legal right to lease parking spaces; and 3) National Building
Code IRR is ineffective as it was not published for 3
consecutive weeks in newspaper of general circulation as
mandated by Section 211 of PD 1096.
OSG then filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and
Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) to the RTC against
respondents, prohibiting them from collecting parking fees
and contending that their practice of charging parking fees
is violative of National Building Code.
The RTC held that: 1) OSG has the capacity to institute the
proceeding it being a controversy of public welfare; 2) a
petition for declaratory relief is proper since all the
requisites are present; 3) the Building Code with its IRR
does not necessarily impose that parking spaces shall be
free of charge and providing parking spaces for free can be
considered as unlawful taking of property right without just
compensation; and 4) there was no sufficient evidence to
justify any award for damages. They deemed that the
respondents are not obligated to provide parking spaces
free of charge.
OSG appealed the decision to CA, saying that RTC erred
in holding that the National Building Code did not intend the
parking spaces to be free of charge. On the otherhand,
respondent SM filed a separate appeal to the CA,
contending that: 1) RTC erred in failing to declare Rule XIX
of IRR as unconstitutional; 2) RTC erred in failing to declare
IRR ineffective for not having been published as required
by law; 3) RTC erred in dismissing the OSG’s petition for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and 4) RTC
erred in failing to declare that OSG has no legal standing
as it is not a real party-in-interest.
CA denied the appeals of both petitioners and respondents
on the following grounds: 1) OSG did not fail to exhaust
administrative remedies and that an administrative review
is not a condition precedent to judicial relief where the
question in dispute is purely a legal one and nothing of an
administrative nature is to be or can be done; 2) the validity
of National Building Code IRR cannot be proceeded as it
was not discussed in RTC and the controversy could be
settled on other grounds without touching the issue of
validity since the courts should refrain from passing upon
the constitutionality of a law; and 3) Section 803 of National
Building Code and Rule XIX of IRR are clear that they are
only intended to control the occupancy of areas and
structures, and in the absence of provision of law,
respondents could not be obliged to provide parking spaces
free of charge.
ISSUE:
WON the petition of OSG for prohibiting the collection of
parking fees is a valid exercise of the police power of State.
RULING:
No. The petition of OSG to prohibit collection of parking fees
is not a valid exercise of the police power of State.
It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that “the power to
regulate and control the use, occupancy, and maintenance
of buildings and structures carries with it the power to
impose fees and, conversely, to control, partially or, as in
this case, absolutely, the imposition of such fees.” Firstly,
the fees within the power of regulatory agencies to impose
are regulatory fees. It has been settled law in this
jurisdiction that this broad and all-compassing
governmental competence to restrict rights of liberty and
property carries with it the undeniable power to collect a
regulatory fee. It looks to the enactment of specific
measures that govern the relations not only as between
individuals but also as between private parties and the
political society. True, if the regulatory agencies have the
power to impose regulatory fees, then conversely, they also
have the power to remove the same. Even so, it is worthy
to note that the present case does not involve the imposition
by the DPWH Secretary and local building officials of
regulatory fees upon respondents; but the collection by
respondents of parking fees from persons who use the mall
parking facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo that the
DPWH Secretary and local building officials do have
regulatory powers over the collection of parking fees for the
use of privately owned parking facilities, they cannot allow
or prohibit such collection arbitrarily or whimsically.
Whether allowing or prohibiting the collection of such
parking fees, the action of the DPWH Secretary and local
building officials must pass the test of classic
reasonableness and propriety of the measures or means in
the promotion of the ends sought to be accomplished.
Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually
invoking police power to justify the regulation by the State,
through the DPWH Secretary and local building officials, of
privately owned parking facilities, including the collection by
the owners/operators of such facilities of parking fees from
the public for the use thereof. The Court finds, however, that
in totally prohibiting respondents from collecting parking
fees, the State would be acting beyond the bounds of police
power.
Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare
by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.
It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and
enjoyment of the property of the owner. The power to
regulate, however, does not include the power to prohibit.
A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power
to confiscate. Police power does not involve the taking or
confiscation of property, with the exception of a few cases
where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in
order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace and
order and of promoting the general welfare; for instance,
the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as
opium and firearms.
When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for
public use, the State is no longer exercising police power,
but another of its inherent powers, namely, eminent
domain. Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly
acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment
of just compensation to the owner.
Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of
the parking facilities remain/s with respondents, the
prohibition against their collection of parking fees from the
public, for the use of said facilities, is already tantamount to
a taking or confiscation of their properties. The State is not
only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the
latter’s properties for use as parking spaces, but is also
mandating that they give the public access to said parking
spaces for free. Such is already an excessive intrusion into
the property rights of respondents. Not only are they being
deprived of the right to use a portion of their properties as
they wish, they are further prohibited from profiting from its
use or even just recovering therefrom the expenses for the
maintenance and operation of the required parking
facilities.
In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by
respondents of parking fees from persons who use the mall
parking facilities has no basis in the National Building Code
or its IRR. The State also cannot impose the same
prohibition by generally invoking police power, since said
prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents’ property
without payment of just compensation.
Manila Memorial Park v Secretary of DSWD
GR 175356
Facts:

DSWD and Secretary of finance implemented a tax
provision RA 9257 granting senior citizens 20% discount
on certain establishments, amending the RA 7432.
MMP INC., the petitioners, assails the constitutionality of
the tax deduction scheme prescribed by RA 9257 and the
implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD.
Petitioners avers that the tax deduction scheme
contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution, which
provides that: "private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation." Respondents maintain that
the tax deduction scheme is a legitimate exercise of the
State’s police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the legally mandated 20% senior
citizen discount is an exercise of police power or eminent
domain.
Ruling: The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of
valid police power.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which,
similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare
for its object. For this reason, when the conditions so
demand as determined by the legislature, property rights
must bow to the primacy of police power because property
rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to
general welfare. Police power as an attribute to promote the
common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere
plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and
capital, the questioned provision is invalidated.
We, thus, found that the 20% discount as well as the tax
deduction scheme is a valid exercise of the police power of
the State. The 20% discount is intended to improve the
welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are less likely to
be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other
disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing
basic commodities.
Hermano Oil v Toll Regulatory Board
The petitioner in this case owned a parcel of land bounded
by an access fence along NLEX and requested that the Toll
Regulatory Board to grant an easement of right of way
contending that it had been deprived from the enjoyment of
its property.
The toll regulatory board denied its request as it was
inconsistent with Section 7.0 of Republic Act No. 2000, also
known as the Limited Access Highway Act. Moreover,
allowing easement of right-of-way may have
detrimental/adverse effect on the scheduled rehabilitation
and improvement of the North Luzon Expressway
Interchanges.
The petitioners then sued TRB and the case was dismissed
by the RTC and by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: WON may the petitioner be granted an easement
along NLEX
Ruling: NO.
First, TRB and DPWH cannot be sued by doctrine of state
immunity.
Second, the relief sought by the petitioner was an injuction
against an infrastructure project by the government which
could only be granted by the SC
Third, the establishment of the access fence of the NLEX
did not violate the petitioner's constitutional and legal rights.
RA 2000 or the Limited Access Highway Act authorized the
building of such fence as a toll way is not an ordinary road.
Public interest and safety require the imposition of certain
restrictions on toll ways that do not apply to ordinary roads.
The access fence was a reasonable exercise of police
power as the petitioner's property was at the right side of
Sta. Rita Exit of the NLEX
Lastly, the limited access imposed on the petitioner's
property did not partake of a compensable taking as the
property was only subject to restraint to secure the general
safety and welfare of the motorists using the NLEX.
Southern Luzon Drug v DSWD
FACTS
R.A. 7432 was enacted. Under said law, a senior citizen
may avail of the privileges in Section 4, which is the 20%
discount on the purchase of medicines. To recoup the
amount given as discount to qualified senior citizens,
covered establishments can claim an equal amount as tax
credit, which can be applied against the income tax due
from them. Carlos Superdrug filed a petition assailing the
constitutionality of the law. The petition is dismissed.
Thereafter, a Magna Carta for Disabled Persons was
enacted, and among its privileges of PWDs was the grant
of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines. Covered
establishments shall claim the discounts given to PWDs as
tax deductions from the gross income, based on the net
cost of goods sold or services rendered. Petitioner filed a
petition assailing its constitutionality.
ISSUE
Whether or not the law is a valid exercise of police power
RULING
Yes. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which,
similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare
for its object. However, the issue of just compensation finds
no relevance in the instant case because the power being
exercised by the State in the imposition of senior citizen
discount was its police power. Unlike in the exercise of the
power of eminent domain, just compensation is not required
in wielding police power. This is precisely because there is
no taking involved, but only an imposition of burden.
The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize
the contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to
grant benefits and privileges to them for their improvement
and well-being as the State considers them an integral part
of our society. In the same way, providing aid for the
disabled persons is an equally important State
responsibility. Thus, the State is obliged to give full support
to the improvement of the total well-being of disabled
persons and their integration into the mainstream of
society.
The duty to care for the elderly and the disabled lies not
only upon the State, but also on the community and even
private entities. In fulfilling this duty, the State may resort to
the exercise of its inherent powers: police power, eminent
domain and power of taxation.
Kilusang Mayo Uno v Garcia
Republic v Manila Electric Company
FACTS: The case is about the application of MERALCO
with the ERB an application for the revision of its rate
schedules which reflected an average increase of 21
centavos per kilowatthour (kwh) in its distribution charge.
The ERB issued an Order granting a provisional increase
of P0.184 per kwh, subject to conditions the COA thru its
audit report find MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase,
all excess amounts collected from the latter’s customers
shall either be refunded to them or correspondingly credited
in their favor. The COA report found that MERALCO is
entitled to a lesser increase, thus ERB ordered the refund
or crediting of the excess amounts. On appeal, the CA set
aside the ERB decision. The ERB held that income tax
should not be treated as operating expense as this should
be "borne by the stockholders who are recipients of the
income or profits realized from the operation of their
business" hence, should not be passed on to the
consumers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation of ERB as to the
adjustment of rates of MERALCO is valid.
RULING: YES. The regulation of rates to be
charged by public utilities is founded upon the police
powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the
control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise
thereof. When private property is used for a public purpose
and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris
privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The
regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to
regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing
use; but as long as use of the property is continued, the
same is subject to public regulation.9
In regulating rates charged by public utilities,
the State protects the public against arbitrary
and excessive rates while maintaining the
efficiency and quality of services rendered.
However, the power to regulate rates does
not give the State the right to prescribe rates
which are so low as to deprive the public
utility of a reasonable return on investment.
Thus, the rates prescribed by the State must
be one that yields a fair return on the public
utility upon the value of the property
performing the service and one that is
reasonable to the public for the services
rendered.
G.R. No. 207132 ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL CLINICS
FOR OVERSEAS WORKERS v. GCC APPROVED
MEDICAL CENTERS ASSOCIATION
FACTS: The case is about abolition of the
decking and referral system which does not
guarantee the migrant workers' right to safe
and quality health service. Republic Act (RA)
No. 10022 then lapsed into law without the
President's signature and under Section 16 of
RA No. 10022, the DOH, through its letter-
order, directed GAMCA to cease and desist
from implementing the referral decking
system and to wrap up their operations within
three (3) days from receipt thereof.
GAMCA asserts that implementing
the prohibition against the referral decking
system would amount to an undue taking of
property that violates Article II, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution.
AMCOW responded to these claims
with the argument that the DOH CDO letters
implementing RA No. 10022 are consistent
with the State's exercise of the police power
to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, safety, and general welfare of the
people. Public interest justifies the State's
interference in health matters, since the
welfare of migrant workers is a legitimate
public concern.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 16 Republic Act
No. 10022 violates Section 3, Article II of the
1987 Constitution for being an undue taking
of property.
RULING: NO. As defined, police
power includes (1) the imposition of restraint
on liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the
common good.[90] The exercise of police
power involves the "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare.”
By its very nature, the exercise of the State's
police power limits individual rights and
liberties, and subjects them to the "far more
overriding demands and requirements of the
greater number."[92] Though vast and plenary,
this State power also carries limitations,
specifically; it may not be exercised
arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, it
defeats the purpose for which it is exercised,
that is, the advancement of the public good.
To be considered reasonable, the
government's exercise of police power must
satisfy the "valid object and valid means"
method of analysis: first, the interest of the
public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, requires interference;
and second, the means employed are
reasonably necessary to attain the objective
sought and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
The guarantee under Section 16 for OFWs to
be given the option to choose a quality healthcare
service provider as expressed in Section 16 (c) [95] of
RA No. 10022 is guaranteed by the prohibition against
the decking practice and against monopoly practices
in OFW health examinations.[96]
Section 16 likewise requires employers to accept
health examinations from any DOH-accredited health
facility; a refusal could lead to their temporary
disqualification under pertinent rules to be formulated
by the Philippine Overseas Employment Authority
(POEA).
These rules are part of the larger legal framework to
ensure the Overseas Filipino Workers' (OFW) access to
quality healthcare services, and to curb existing
practices that limit their choices to specific clinics and
facilities.
Magtajas v Pryce
Ermita-Malate Hotels v City of Manila
City of Manila v Laguio
G.R. No. 118127
Facts:
Malate Tourist Development Corporation
(MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business operating
hotels, motels, hostels, and lodging houses. MTDC built
Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel
although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as
a hotel.
An Ordinance was enacted by the City
Council of Manila prohibiting person, partnership,
corporation, and entities to provide certain forms of
amusements, entertainments, services, and facilities where
women are used as tools.
MTDC argued that motel and Inns were not
establishments for “amusements” and “entertainments.”
Issue: WON the Ordinance is unconstitutional.
Ruling: Yes. A motel may be used as a venue for immoral
sexual activities, but it cannot for that reason alone be
punished. It is an invalid use of police power because it
seeks to regulate morality but fails to address the core
issues of immorality. Under Section 9 of Art. III of the 1987
Constitution, “private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation.”
WHITELIGHT v. CITY OF MANILA
Facts
- Petitioners assails the validity of the Ordinance
in Manila prohibiting short time admissions in hotels,
motels, and similar establishments and in violation of
which would result to paying of fines, imprisonment, or
cancellation of business license. Petitioner contends
that the Ordinance is invalid and unconstitutional on
the grounds that it violates the right to privacy and
freedom of movement, it is an invalid exercise of police
power, and it is unreasonable and oppressive
interference in their business. The respondents
contend that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of
police power to minimize and eliminate the use of the
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use,
and alike.
Issue
- Whether Ordinance 7774 is a valid exercise of
police power of the state
Ruling
- The Court ruled that Ordinance 7774 is
unconstitutional as it infringes one’s liberty, it violates
due process, and invades the private rights of the
customers of the hotels. It is not a valid exercise of
police power because although the goal of the
Ordinance is for the regulation of public morals, it does
not automatically justify any and all means and it still
must be aligned with the Constitution, the Bill of rights,
and due process.
Lorenzo v Director of Health
BELTRAN V. SECRETARY OF HEALTH
GR NO. 133640
Facts:
Aug. 23, 1994—National Blood Services Act (RA 7719)
took effect after approval by then President FVR and
publication in the Official Gazette, whose purpose: seeks to
provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting
voluntary blood donation by regulating blood banks in the
Philippines.
Apr. 28, 1995—DOH Secretary then promulgated
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) in Administrative
Order No. 9 (AO No. 9), which provides for the phasing out
of all commercial blood banks and that this will be effected
by the DOH Pursuant to this Act, all commercial banks
could operate only until May 28, 1998. Petitioners herein
were issued licenses until May 27, 1998. Before the
expiration, petitioners filed a petition for Certiorari with TRO
assailing the constitutionality of the Act and its IRR, which
was later, amended to include writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction.
Petitioners’ assertions:
· Violation of EPC
· Undue delegation of legislative power to the DOH
· Unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty (of blood
donors)
June 2, 1998—Court directed DOH to file a comment and
then issued a TRO to prevent implementation
DOH comment:
· Blood from commercial blood banks are unsafe and the
State can use police power to solve the problem
· Citing deliberations for Senate Bill 1101 which later
became the assailed law, the rationale of the law can be
found:
o In commercial blood banks, people sell their
blood—usually the poor or those in need of easy money.
So they will lie about their health conditions to pass off their
blood as viable, when they could in fact be infected with
AIDS or other serious diseases.
o Because of the outbreak of diseases such as AIDS and
malaria, blood must be tested first. If we leave blood testing
to commercial blood banks, they will cut corners because
they don’t want to bear the costs. It’s true that they are the
number 1 source of blood. But people’s lives cannot be
risked.
o The best way to collect viable blood is through voluntary
donation and commercial banks cannot be the leader of this
for the above stated reasons. The government must lead it.
May 5, 1999—petitioners file a motion to extend the TRO
and for the Court to order DOH to stop spreading
information (pamphlets, etc.) about the closing of
commercial blood banks and how people should get blood
from voluntary donors only because these prejudice their
business pending the case July 8, 1999—DOH Secretary
filed his comment to the above allegations averring that he
spread that information before the TRO was issued.
Furthermore, he was only doing his job as Secretary to
promote health and protect the people.
July 15, 1999—petitioners filed a petition to Show Cause
Why Public Respondent Should Not be Held in Contempt
of Court for willfully disobeying the TRO issued by it.
ISSUE:
WON there was deprivation of personal liberty and
property—NO
WON there was valid exercise of police power—YES
RULING:
The court finds that the National Blood Services Act is valid
exercise of the state’s police power. Police power is the
state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare. The promotion of public health is a fundamental
obligation of the state. The health of the people is a
primordial governmental concern. Basically, the national
blood services act was enacted in the exercise of the state’s
police power in order to promote and preserve public health
and safety.
The phasing out may seriously affect the business interests
of the owners and operators involved, but these individual
interests must give way to the higher interest of the public.
All contracts and rights are subject to regulation by the
State when they are affected with public interest. Even the
use of blood by blood donors—which are within the
commerce of man—must give way to public welfare.
EMINENT DOMAIN
*Just Compensation
City of Iloilo v. Contreras-Besana, G.R. No. 168976,
February 12, 2010
Facts:
On September 18, 1981, the petitioner filed a complaint of
eminent domain against the respondent. The complaint
sought to expropriate the property of the respondent for
public use and alleged that it had deposited the amount of
10% of the just compensation to the bank. Respondent filed
his answer, rejecting the said complaint. However, on May
17, 1983, the trial court issued an order which authorized
the petitioner to take immediate possession of the subject
property.
After 16 years, the respondent sought to withdraw the said
amount, but it turned out that there was no such deposit.
He tried to recover the possession of its property by alleging
that he had not been compensated hence he was entitled
to recover it. But he failed to recover it since the property
was already utilized for public use and what remains for him
to demand is the payment for just compensation.
Respondent then demanded payment of just compensation
based at the time the order for condemnation of property
was issued or on June 15, 2004. Petitioner opposed the
contention and alleged that the reckoning time to determine
the just compensation must be at the time of the filing of
expropriation or on September 18, 1981.
Issue:
What is the reckoning point for the determination of just
compensation?
Ruling:
The reckoning time for the determination of just
compensation must be either at the time of the taking or
filing of the complaint. When the expropriation proceeding
precedes entry of property, the just compensation is to be
ascertained at the time of the filing of the complaint. Here,
the petitioner is right on its claim that just compensation
must be based on September 18, 1981 or at the time the
complaint for expropriation was filed.
Bartolata v. Republic, G.R. No. 223334, June 7, 2017
Facts:
Petitioner had 400 sqm. parcel of land, 223 sqm hereof was
expropriated by the respondent for public use, remaining
him of 177 sqm. Subsequently, the respondent paid for the
initial amount of just compensation. However, the
respondent, despite various demands from the petitioner,
refused to pay the remaining balance and ask for the return
of the amount paid. Consequently, the petitioner filed a
case against the respondent for the recovery of the
remaining balance but the respondent answered that the
property was subject to legal easement of right of way
which the government is not entitled to pay except for the
existing improvements affected thereof.
Issue: WON respondent is liable to pay just compensation
to the petitioner.
Ruling:
No. It was shown that the 223 sqm acquired by the
respondent was subject to the legal easement of the right
way which the government has no liability to pay. On the
other hand, anent to the remainder 177 sqm, the petitioner
cannot still claim for just compensation. Two elements must
concur before the petitioner will be entitled for just
compensation:
1. That the remainder is not subject to the right of
way; and
2. That the enforcement of the right of way results
in the practical destruction or material impairment of the
value of the remaining property, or the owner is deprived of
the beneficial use of his property.
In this case, no proof that the remaining property is not
subject to right of way and that there was taking occurred
since the petitioner remains the owner hereof and no such
impairment or destruction incurred.
Forfom Development Corporation v. Philippine
National Railways, G.R. No. 124795, December 10, 2008
Facts:
In 1972, pursuant to the Presidential Mandate and to the
power of expropriation of PNR under its charter, the latter
implemented the San Pedro-Carmona Commuter Line
Project. The project involves construction of commuter
lines, and during its construction several privately owned
properties were traversed including the property of herein
petitioner.
In 1990, the petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC for
Recovery of Possession of Property alleging that the
property was taken without their consent and that portion of
its property was rented out to the squatters.
The RTC ruled that the petitioner was estopped already and
therefore cannot be recovered its possession of property.
What remained for the petitioner is the recovery of just
compensation. Unsatisfied, the petitioner appealed the
case to the Court of Appeals where the latter affirmed the
decision of the RTC.
Hence, the petitioner brought the case to the SC arguing
that:
1. Petitioner is entitled to recover possession of its
property because the respondent failed to file any
expropriation case and to pay just compensation.
2. The leasing out of portions of the property to 3rd
persons is beyond the scope of public use and thus
returned to it.
Issue:
1. WON petitioner can recover possession of its
property because the respondent failed to file any
expropriation case and to pay just compensation.
2. WON the act of leasing out portions of property
is beyond the scope of “public use”.
3. WON the value of the property at the time of
taking must be the basis for just compensation.
4. WON there is actual taking.
Ruling:
1. No. The non-filing of the expropriation case and
non-payment of just compensation will not necessarily lead
to the return of the property to the petitioner. It is shown that
the petitioner was estopped already from recovering the
property when it failed to question said taking and its
continued negotiation with respondent of just
compensation.
2. No. It is ruled that whatever is beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement
of public use.
3. Yes. Where actual taking was made without prior
filing of expropriation proceedings, the value of the property
at the time of taking must be the basis for just
compensation. In this case, just compensation should be
reckoned from the time of taking which is January 1973.
4. Yes. The requisites of actual taking are the
following: [EMA-POD]
(1) The expropriator must Enter a private property;
(2) The entrance into private property must be for
more than a Momentary period;
(3) The entry into the property should be under legal
Authority;
(4) The property must be devoted to a Public
purpose;
(5) The utilization of the property for public use must
be in such a way as to Oust the owner and Deprive him of
all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
All the requisites are present in this case, hence there is
taking.
*Agrarian Reform
Hospicio De San Jose De Barili, Cebu City v.
Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 140847,
September 23, 2005
Facts:
Hospicio is a charitable organization created by Act No.
3239. Under Sec. 4 hereof, it provides that said property
shall not sold under any consideration. However, pursuant
to PD No. 27 and R.A No. 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law, the DAR ordered certain lands of
Hospicio be placed under Operation Land Transfer in favor
of farmers. Petitioner opposed the said order citing Sec. 4
of Act No. 3239.
Issue:
WON the prohibition of selling the property “under any
consideration” stated in Sec. 4 of Act No. 3239 covers the
land transfers mandated under PD No. 27.
Ruling:
No. The sale contemplated in Sec. 4 is a conventional sale
under civil laws which requires meeting of the minds of the
parties. It does not cover the land transfers under PF No.
27 as it is a forced sale by operation of law. Agrarian reform
is justified under the State’s inherent power of eminent
domain that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands
intended for public use upon payment of just compensation.
*Taking
National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit
Sangkay, G.R. No. 165828, August 24, 2011
Facts:
Pursuant to legal mandate, petitioner implemented a
project which involves construction of several underground
tunnels. During the course of construction the property of
the defendant was traversed. Consequently, the defendant
filed a complaint alleging that their property was taken
without their consent, that they were deprived from the
beneficial use and enjoyment hereof as it became unsafe
due to the underground tunnel. Herein petitioner, in reply,
contended that respondent has no right for just
compensation as there is no taking happened because it is
a legal easement pursuant to RA No. 6395.
Issue:
WON there is no taking.
WON the basis of fixing just compensation must be at the
time of filing of the complaint.
Ruling:
1. There was a full taking notwithstanding that the
owners were not completely dispossessed the property. It
is settled that the taking of private property for public use,
to be compensable, need not necessary be actual physical
taking. Compensable taking includes destruction,
restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of
ownership and enjoyment of the property. In this case,
although the property is not actually dispossessed from the
respondent, the fact that they were deprived from the
beneficial use and enjoyment of their property constitutes
taking that requires just compensation.
2. Yes. The court ruled, in this case, that just
compensation must be based at the time of the filing of the
complaint, instead of reckoning from the time of the taking.
Bardillon vs Barangay Masili
Facts:
Petitioner acquired a lot by a deed of absolute sale with the
Makiling Consolidated Credit Corporation. The said lot is
located at Lot 4381-D Barangay Masili, Calamba, Laguna.
The said lot is 144 square meter parcel land.
The Barangay Masili first filed with MTC for the
expropriation of the parcel of land of Bardillon, but the MTC
dismissed the case for lack of merit. The Barangay Masili
filed a second complaint before the RTC, but petitioner, filed
for the Motion to Dismiss, Contending that the cause of
action is barred by prior judgment, pursuant to the doctrine
of res judicata.
The court denied the petitioner’s MTD on the ground that
MTC has no jurisdiction over expropriation proceeding.
Court of Appeals RULING:
The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, the
RTC’s denial of MTD is not a grave abuse of discretion. It
ruled that the second complaint for the eminent domain was
not barred by res judicata. The reason is that, MTC has no
jurisdiction over the action.
ISSUES: W/N The MTC had jurisdiction over the
expropriation case?
HELD:
Petitioner claims that the MTC's dismissal of the first
Complaint for eminent domain was with prejudice, since
there was no indication to the contrary in the Order of
dismissal. She contends that the filing of the second
Complaint before the RTC should therefore be dismissed
on account of res judicata. Res judicata literally means a
matter adjudged, judicially acted upon or decided, or settled
by judgment. It provides that a final judgment on the merits
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive
as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and
constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving
the same claim, demand or cause of action.
The following are the requisites of res judicata: (1) the
former judgment must be final; (2) the court that rendered it
had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3)
it is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is
between the first and the second actions and identity of
parties, subject matter of the action.
Since MTC had no jurisdiction over the expropriation
proceedings, The doctrine of Res Judicata finds no
application.
Republic- NIA v CA and Diaz
G.R. No. 146245
Manuel Diaz owned a property devoted to the planting of
palay, his son took over the administration of his property
after his death. In 1972, NIA two canals of occupying 10
hectares which were prone to flooding every year.
In 1980, NIA offered to buy portions of the property but the
sale did not push through and the deeds of sale were never
implemented.
Diaz filed an action for damages and just compensation
against NIA and the court order NIA to vacate and
surrender the Property to respondent, and to pay damages,
interest, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
ISSUE: WON respondent’s claim is barred by Laches
RULING:
NO.
Laches is principally a doctrine of equity. Courts apply
laches to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would
result in a clearly inequitable situation or in an injustice.
There is nothing inequitable in giving due course to
respondent’s claim for compensation. Both equity and the
law direct that a property owner should be compensated if
his property is taken for public use.
The power of eminent domain is not limitless. NIA cannot
exercise the power with wanton disregard for property
rights. Where private property is taken by the Government
for public use without first acquiring title thereto either
through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner’s action
to recover the land or the value thereof does not
prescribe.
Rule 67 states the steps on how proceedings regarding
cases of eminent domain. NIA exercised its right of eminent
domain by filing a complaint for that purpose before the
appropriate court. Judicial determination of the propriety of
the exercise of the power of eminent domain and the just
compensation for the subject property then follows.
When a government agency itself violates procedural
requirements, it waives the usual procedure prescribed
in Rule 67.
Jurisprudence clearly provides for the remedies available to
a landowner when his land is taken by the government for
public use. The owner may recover his property if its return
is feasible, or, if it is not, the aggrieved owner may demand
payment of just compensation for the land taken.
Just compensation is "the fair value of the property as
between one who receives, and one who desires to sell,
x x x fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
government." This rule holds true when the property is
taken before the filing of an expropriation suit, and even
if it is the property owner who brings the action for
compensation
THE ONLY EXEMPTION TO THIS RULE:
Garcia v. Court of Appeals, which provides an exception
to the rule. In Garcia, the Court held that when the
government takes property, not for the purpose of
eminent domain, and the government does not initiate
condemnation proceedings or other attempts to acquire
such property, just compensation should be reckoned not
at the time of taking but at the time the trial court made its
order of expropriation.
Manapat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110478, October
15, 2007
DOCTRINE:
General rule is that the determination of whether there is
genuine necessity in the exercise is a justiciable question.
However, when the power of eminent domain is exercised
by the Legislature, the question of necessity is a political
question.
FACTS
In the 1960’s, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
allowed a number of individuals to occupy the Grace Park
property on condition that they would vacate the premises
should the former push through with the plan to construct a
school in the area. The plan, however, did not materialize,
thus, the occupants offered to purchase the portions they
occupied. Later, as they could not afford RCAM’s proposed
price, the occupants petitioned the Government for the
acquisition of the said property, its subdivision into home
lots, and the resale of the subdivided lots to them at a low
price.
RCAM decided to effect the subdivision of its property and
sold the individual lots. Petitioner Manapat was among
those who purchase said lots. In 1977, the NHA filed
several expropriation proceedings over the lots for the
purpose of developing Grace Park under the Zonal
Improvement Program (ZIP) and subdividing it into small
lots for distribution and resale at a low cost to the residents
of the area
Manapat’s argument: As he is also a member of the tenant
association, the beneficiary of the expropriation, it would be
incongruous to take the land away from him only to give it
back to him as an intended beneficiary.
ISSUE
Whether the NHA may validly expropriate the subject lands
RULING
YES. The Court laid down the following requisites for the
valid exercise of the power of eminent domain to be
addressed in this case:
(1) the property taken must be private property;
(2) there must be genuine necessity to take the private
property;
(3) the taking must be for public use;
(4) there must be payment of just compensation; and
(5) the taking must comply with due process of law.
The first requisite is justified because the subject land is
private property. In the second req, it has also been
classified that there is genuine necessity, and that
necessity must be of a public character. The third requisite
of public use is also satisfied considering that the subject
property is expropriated for the purpose of improving and
upgrading the area by constructing roads and installing
facilities that could benefit around 510 families. As for the
fourth, the case is to be remanded to the trial court for
determination of just compensation. The final requisite had
also been complied with.
It has been held that the NHA validly complied with these
requirements; hence, they may validly expropriate the
subject parcels of land.
Forform v PNR
Republic v Samson-Tatad
FACTS: The case is about the expropriation
by DPWH of parcels of land belonging to
several defendants including the Genato
Spouses which is evidenced by a TCT.
Thereafter, a letter from DPWH
Engr. Gatan stated that the property claimed
by the Genato Spouses was government land
and that the TCT was of dubious origin as it
overlapped with government property As a
result, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint
seeking to limit the coverage of the
proceedings to an area conforming to the
findings of the DPWH.
While petitioner was presenting
evidence to show that the subject property
actually belonged to the Government, private
respondents interposed objections saying
that petitioner was barred from presenting
the evidence, as it constituted a collateral
attack on the validity of their TCT.
ISSUE: whether or not petitioner may be
barred from presenting evidence to assail the
validity of respondents’ title.
RULING: NO. Indeed, this Court first had the
occasion to interpret Section 9, Rule 67 in the
case of Republic. In addressing the issue of
"whether or not the court that hears the
expropriation case has also jurisdiction to
determine, in the same proceeding, the issue
 of ownership of the land sought to be
condemned," the Court answered in the
affirmative:
The sole issue in this
case, i.e., whether or not
the court that hears the
expropriation case has
also jurisdiction to
determine, in the same
proceeding, the issue of
ownership of the land
sought to be condemned,
must be resolved in the
affirmative. That the court
is empowered to entertain
the conflicting claims of
ownership of the
condemned or sought to
be condemned property
and adjudge the rightful
owner thereof, in the same
expropriation case, is
evident from Section 9 of
the Revised Rule 69,
which provides:
SEC. 9. Uncertain
ownership. Conflicting
claims. — If the ownership
of the property taken is
uncertain, or there are
conflicting claims to any
part thereof, the court may
order any sum or sums
awarded as compensation
for the property to be paid
to the clerk of court for the
benefit of the persons
adjudged in the same
proceeding to be entitled
thereto. But the judgment
shall require the payment
of the sum or sums
awarded to either the
defendant or the clerk
before the plaintiff can
enter upon the property,
or retain it for the public
use or purpose if entry
has already been made.
In fact, the existence of
doubt or obscurity in the
title of the person or
persons claiming
ownership of the
properties to be
expropriated would not
preclude the
commencement of the
action nor prevent the
court from assuming
jurisdiction thereof. The
Rules merely require, in
such eventuality, that the
entity exercising the right
of eminent domain should
state in the complaint that
the true ownership of the
property cannot be
ascertained or specified
with accuracy.
Republic v Heirs of Saturnino Borbon
NAPOCOR v. POSADA
Facts
- NPC instituted an expropriation proceeding
for the acquisition of a right-of-way easement over
parcels of land in Catanduanes owned by Posada
and 5 other persons. The expropriation was for the
construction and maintenance of its Substation
Island Grid Project. NPC offered P500/sqm in
which respondents objected and alleged that the
value of the properties was P2000/sqm. The RTC-
SAC fixed the value in the amount of 827,000
pesos based on the value determined by the
commissioners assigned and ordered NPC to
deposit additional amount of 262,000 but the NPC
failed to deposit such additional amount,
therefore, the RTC-SAC ordered for the
cancellation of the Writ of Possession of NPC.
Issue
- Whether the trial courts erred on relying on
the commissioner’s valuation
Ruling
- Yes. The court ruled that it should have
based the value of the improvements on
the property on the determination made
by NAPOCOR and not its commissioners
as required by Section 7 and 10 of RA
8974 According to the law, it is the
implementing agency, not the
commissioners, that determines the
proffered value of improvements and
structures. A Writ of Possession may be
issued once there is confirmation by the
trial court of the proffered value.
- The second error of the trial court
occurred when it issued a Writ of
Possession on the basis of NAPOCOR’s
deposit of the alleged provisional value
with Land Bank, not on its actual
payment to respondents. Even if the
deposit of P580, 769.93 was the correct
provisional value, it cannot be
considered as compliance with Section 4
of RA 8974 which plainly requires direct
payment to the property owner, not a
mere deposit with the authorized
government depositary. Without such
direct payment, no writ of possession
may be obtained, which, NAPOCOR
failed to do.
Municipality of Lucban v National waterworks
G.R. No. L-15525 October 11, 1961
Facts:
Petitioner assailed that the provisions
of section 1,8,and 9 of RA 1383 and those executive orders
and circulars providing for the transfer of the ownership and
operation of the waterworks of municipalities to (now
NAWASA) be declared unconstitutional.
Petitioner, conformably to section
2317 of the Revised Administrative Code, approved
Municipal Resolution No. 27 providing for the construction
of waterworks system. Petitioner has always managed and
controlled the operation of its waterworks system known as
Apolinario de la Cruz Waterworks System since 1920. They
controlled the appointment of personnel, operating income,
and expenses.
 In disregard of the M.S. 27, Isagana,
Municipal Treasurer of petitioner, transferred to NWSS all
the assets and equipment of petitioner’s water system.
Issue: Whether or not RA 1383 is constitutional.
Ruling: No. RA 1383 transfers said properties without just
compensation pursuant to Art III Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution. Payment not being in the form of money, the
requirements for a valid exercise of the right of eminent
domain were not complied with. The Court further stated
that the State's police power is never intended as a
substitute for just compensation in eminent domain
proceedings, because liability to the exercise of police
power rests entirely on different considerations, and the
power does not extend so far as to include the acquisition
of property without compensation.
LAND BANK v. EUSEBIO
Facts
- Eusebio owns a parcel of land in Masbate
and voluntarily offered to sell 790 hectares of it to
the DAR pursuant t RA 6657 for 19 million pesos.
The DAR chose to acquire only 783 hectares for 2
million pesos and subsequently increased its offer
to 3 million pesos in which Eusebio rejected the
valuation. The LBP opened a trust account under
the name of Eusebio in the amount of 3 million
pesos, then the DAR took the property and
distributed it to the farmer-beneficiaries.
Petitioners raised the matter to the DAR
Adjudication Board for summary determination of
just compensation in which the DARAB fixed the
value of the property at 4 million pesos. Eusebio
still found the determination of the DARAB
unacceptable and raised it again to the RTC-SAC
and prayed for just compensation in the amount of
20 million pesos plus damages and amended the
amount again to 25 million pesos. During trial,
separate valuation reports were submitted, with
the DAR and LBP using the guidelines/formula
under RA 6657 in their computation. In its
judgment, the RTC-SAC brushed aside the
valuations fixed by DAR and LBP and found
instead as considerable just compensation the
amount (P25 million) prayed for by respondent.
Both parties appealed, but CA affirmed the
judgment in toto.
Issue
- Whether RTC-SAC committed grave abuse
of discretion in the determination of just
compensation
Ruling
- Yes. Since the RTC-SAC is not granted
unlimited discretion in determining just
compensation, it must consider and apply the
factors in RA 6657 and the DAR formula, the Court
ruled that RTC-SAC committed a grave abuse of
discretion in the determination of just
compensation because it did not follow the
formula laid down in RA 6657 and failed to give an
explanation as to how and why it fixed the amount
of 25 million pesos.
Southern Luzon Drug v DSWD
Heirs of Pidacan v Air Transportation Office
ATO v Sps Ramos
FACTS:
The respondent spouses Ramos discovered that a portion
of their registered land in Baguio City was being used as
part of the runway at Loakan Airport owned by the Air
Transportation Office, The two parties agreed that the
portion of land owned by the spouses ramos and which is
affected by the ATO, will be sold to the latter for the amount
of Php 778,150. However, The ATO failed to comply with
the agreement despite of repeated verbal and written
demands.
The spouses respondent filed for the collection of payment
by the ATO before the RTC. ATO on the other had invoked
the Proclamation 1358 where parcels of land will be used
for the Loakan airport. The ATO contended that RTC had
jo jurisdiction over the matter.
The RTC ruled in favor of spouses Ramos, ordering ATO to
pay 778,150 to the former.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decisions of the RTC
without modification.
ISSUE: Could ATO be sued without the state’s consent?
HELD
An unincorporated government agency without any
separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity
from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of
sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the
agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is violated.
However, the need to distinguish between an
unincorporated government agency performing
governmental function and one performing proprietary
functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in
favor of the former because its function is governmental or
incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in favor
of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a
necessary function of government but was essentially a
business.
DOTC v Sps Abecina
The municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte,
donated a one thousand two hundred (1,200) square-meter
parcel of land to the DOTC for Regional
Telecommunications Development Project under Digitel.
The municipality by mistake included in their donation the
Sps Abecina’s lot areas and upon discovery, the Sps
demanded that they vacate the area and pay unpaid
rent/damages in the amount of one million two hundred
thousand pesos (₱1,200,000.00). the respondent spouses
and Digitel later executed a Compromise Agreement and
entered into a Contract of Lease.
RTC ruled in favor of the Sps and further held that DOTC
was a builder in badfaith and CA affirmed the same.

DOTC contends that the suit should be dismissed as it
claimed immunity from suit.
ISSUE: WON should DOTC pay for the property of the Sps.
Ruling: yes, DOTC cannot claim immunity from suit as it
cannot be invoked to perpetuate injustice among its
citizens. Here, DOTC was not a builder in bad faith as it was
the error of the municipality’s donation that gave rise to
DOTC’s encroachment among the Sps property.
The exercise of eminent domain requires a genuine
necessity to take the property for public use and the
consequent payment of just compensation. The property is
evidently being used for a public purpose. However, we
also note that the respondent spouses willingly entered into
a lease agreement with Digitel for the use of the subject
properties. If in the future the factual circumstances should
change and the respondents sps refuse to continue the
lease, then the DOTC may initiate expropriation
proceedings. But as matters now stand, the respondents
are clearly willing to lease the property. Therefore, we find
no genuine necessity for the DOTC to actually take the
property at this point.
Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
Hospicio De San Jose De Barili, Cebu City v.
Department of Agrarian Reform,
Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines
FACTS: The case is about the motion for
reconsideration filed by LBP to reverse the decision of
RTC setting the just compensation to be paid and fixing
the interest due on the balance of the compensation
due at 12% per annum for the acquisition of the land
owned AFC and HPI. On motion for reconsideration, the
third division deleted the 12% interest due on the
balance of the awarded just compensation.
Despite the entry of judgment, the present petitioners
filed a second motion for reconsideration that prayed
as well that the case be referred to the Court en banc.
However, the Court en banc denied the petitioners
second motion for reconsideration. Maintaining their
belief in their demand to be granted 12% interest, the
petitioners persisted in filing another motion for
reconsideration.
By a vote of 8 for and 4 against the petitioners motion
and awarded the 12% interests the petitioners prayed
for, thus affirming the interests the RTC originally
awarded. The Court subsequently denied the
respondents motion for reconsideration, giving rise to
the present 2nd motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the 12%
interest
RULING: YES. While we have equitably reduced the
amount of interest awarded in numerous cases in the
past, those cases involved interest that was essentially
consensual in nature, i.e., interest stipulated in signed
agreements between the contracting parties. In
contrast, the interest involved in the present case "runs
as a matter of law and follows as a matter of course
from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good
a position as money can accomplish, as of the date of
taking.
Furthermore, the allegedly
considerable payments made by the LBP to
the petitioners cannot be a proper premise in
denying the landowners the interest due them
under the law and established jurisprudence.
If the just compensation for the landholdings
is considerable, this compensation is not
undue because the landholdings the owners
gave up in exchange are also similarly
considerable – AFC gave up an aggregate
landholding of 640.3483 hectares, while HPI’s
gave up 805.5308 hectares. When the
petitioners surrendered these sizeable
landholdings to the government, the incomes
they gave up were likewise sizeable and
cannot in any way be considered miniscule.
The incomes due from these properties,
expressed as interest, are what the
government should return to the petitioners
after the government took over their lands
without full payment of just compensation. In
other words, the value of the landholdings
themselves should be equivalent to the
principal sum of the just compensation due;
interest is due and should be paid to
compensate for the unpaid balance of this
principal sum after taking has been
completed. This is the compensation
arrangement that should prevail if such
compensation is to satisfy the constitutional
standard of being "just."
Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidiential Agrarian Reform
Council, November 22, 2011
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms
Corporation, G.R. No. 169903, February 29, 2012
Doctrine: Just compensation is the fair and full equivalent
of the taken property and it cannot be lowered based on the
concept of social justice.
FACTS
Honeycomb farms was the registered owner of two parcels
of agricultural land. Honeycomb voluntarily offered these
parcels of land to the DAR. Landbank fixed the value of the
lands, but was rejected for being too low.
Honeycomb filed a case with the RTC against the DAR
Secretary and the LBP. RTC rendered a judgment and
made its own valuation. Both parties appealed to the CA.
CA rendered judgment affirming the RTC.
LBP’s argument: CA erred in the determination of just
compensation when they affirmed the RTC ruling despite
that its valuation was not based on the DAR AO No. 11. The
just compensation for land taken for agrarian reform should
be less than the just compensation given in the ordinary
exercise of eminent domain.
Honeycomb”s argument: DAR AOs are only served as
guidelines and is not mandatory for courts to use in fixing
just compensation.
ISSUE
Whether just compensation in the exercise of eminent
domain for the purposes of agrarian reform be less than the
market value of the property
RULING
No. The Court ruled that the exercise of eminent domain for
the purposes of agrarian reform is done in pursuance of
social justice. The phrase “just compensation” in agrarian
reform is no different in the “just compensation” in the
normal exercise of eminent domain. Nothing is inherently
contradictory in the public purpose of land reform and the
right of landowners to receive just compensation for the
expropriation by the State of their properties.

It is shown that just compensation is the fair and full price
of the taken property in the discussion of the framers of the
Constitution, where it is said that it is not the intention of the
Committee that the owner should receive less than the just
compensation.
Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council, April 24, 2012
G.R. No. 171101 July 5, 2011
Facts:
Hacienda Luisita owned by
Tabacalera, filed their land under Voluntary to Sell (VOS).
Tarlac Development Corp. (Tadeco) owned by Jose
Cojuanco Sr. Group Bought HL. Philippine Gov’t assisted
the transaction on the condition that the lots comprising the
HL shall be subdivided by the Tadeco and sold at cost to
the tenants, should there be any, and whenever condition
should exist warranting such action under the provisions of
the Land Tenure Act.
Manila RTC rendered judgment
ordering Tadeco to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR.
Therefrom, Tadeco appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved to withdraw the
government’s case against Tadeco, et al. By Resolution of
May 18, 1988. On June 15, 1988, the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law took effect, the Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council (PARC) was also created as its policy-
making body, thru RA 6657 giving a new process of land
classification, acquisition, and distribution.
A portion of HL was
expropriated by the government for the constructions of
SCTEX. In the exercise of the power of eminent domain,
the government must necessarily pay just compensation to
the owner. The FWBs, as owners at the time of the
expropriation because of the land’s prior compulsory
coverage under the CARP, should receive the full amount
that the government paid.
Issue: Whether or not the expropriated lands is under the
coverage of CARP.
Ruling: No. The Court stated that having been subjected to
expropriation by the government, the SCTEX land is now
invariably outside the scope of CARP coverage. However,
since the qualified FWBs became the valid landowners
before the said expropriation, the just compensation should
accrue to them.
The FWBs, as owners at the time of the
expropriation because of the land’s prior compulsory
coverage under the CARP, should receive the full amount
that the government paid.
SPOUSES MERCADO v. LBP
Facts
- The Provincial Agrarian Reform Office
(PARO) informed spouses Mercado that 5.2624
hectares of their property shall be placed under
CARP, for which they were offered 287,000 pesos
as just compensation. The spouses rejected the
valuation and prayed that the DAR and respondent
be ordered to pay them P250,000.00 per hectare as
just compensation for the subject portion and that
the farmer-beneficiaries of the subject portion who
had been enjoying the fruits of the property be
made to pay P200,000.00 as rentals. The RTC-SAC
fixed the just compensation at P25/sqm, but the
CA reversed the decision of RTC-SAC and said
that it must mandatorily apply the formula in DAR
AO No. 5 and if so applied, the amount of 287,000
would be correct
Issue
- How is just compensation computed?
Ruling
- The Court ruled that just compensation must
be arrived at pursuant to the guidelines laid down
in Section 17 of RA 6657 and the formula provided
for in DAR AO No. 5. If the RTC-SAC finds it
inapplicable, it may provide for a new computation
provided as to how it came up with such
valuations. However, in this case, the petitioners
and respondents failed to prove on how they both
came up with their respective computations on the
said land as well as the RTC-SAC failed to provide
the basis for arriving at P25/sqm valuation. The CA
also merely took into account the production or
income of the property without looking at other
factors. Therefore, the case was remanded to RTC-
SAC for the proper determination of just
compensation
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Omengan
Republic v. Vda. De Castellvi
GR NO L-20620
FACTS:
This case involves the expropriation of two properties one
owned by Respondent Castellvi and the other by
Respondent Toledo-Gozun. Both of the properties are
located near Basa Air Base in Pampanga. The Republic of
the Philippines through the Philippine Air Force entered into
a one year lease contract with respondent for the use of
their land. The lease started on July 1, 1947 (renewable on
a yearly basis). After the perfection of the lease contract,
the republic constructed improvements on said lots
amounting to approximately Php 500, 000. June 30, 1956
the Republic sought to renew the same but Castellvi
refused stating that they will be selling their property
already. After the expiration of the contract republic did not
vacate the property despite repeated demand by the
respondent prompting the latter to file a case for ejectment.
While the ejectment case was on-going, the republic started
expropriation proceeding on the respondent’s property. The
ejectment case was later withdrawn after a compromise
agreement was entered into by both party stating that the
republic will pay rent from June 30 1956 to 1959 when the
lower court granted possession of the land to petitioner.
Petitioner claims that according to the committee on
Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga the price that they
should pay should be Php 0.20 per square meters.
According to the petitioner, the prices of 1947 should be the
basis since it is the time when they entered and took
possession of the property. o They contend that it was their
intention to enter the property with which is supported by
their subsequent act of placing improvements worth half a
million pesos.
Respondent claims otherwise citing that their contract was
on year to year basis which is a characteristic of non-
permanency. Being so, she claims that the fair market value
should be Php 15.00 per square meters. On June 29, 1959
the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional value of
the lands at P259,669.10. The Republic was actually
placed in possession of the lands on August 10, 1959 after
the latter had deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of
Pampanga the amount of P259,669.10. Petitioner claims
that the land should be priced at Php 0.20 (probably market
value of agricultural land) according to the committee on
Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga. Respondent
Toledo-Gozun claim that their lots are residential already
thus the market price of Php 15.00 per square meters
should be paid as compensation.
Trial Court Decision: November 4, 1959, the trial court
authorized the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to pay
defendant Toledo-Gozun the sum of P107,609.00 as
provisional value of her lands. On May 16, 1960 the trial
Court authorized the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to
pay defendant Castellvi the amount of P151,859.80 as
provisional value of the land under her administration, and
ordered said defendant to deposit the amount with the
Philippine National Bank under the supervision of the
Deputy Clerk of Court. The trial Court appointed three
commissioners to determine the property value: Atty.
Amadeo Yuzon, Clerk of Court, as commissioner for the
court; Atty. Felicisimo G. Pamandanan, counsel of the
Philippine National Bank Branch at Floridablanca, for the
plaintiff; and Atty. Leonardo F. Lansangan, Filipino legal
counsel at Clark Air Base, for the defendants.The
commissioners recommended that the price of the lands in
issue should be no less than Php 10.00 per sq meter. The
lower court adopted the commission’s decision of Php10.00
per square meters and granted interest rate of 6% per
annum for the unpaid balance until full payment. Republic
filed for a new trial citing that there are new evidences that
was discovered. Lower Court denied citing that it was
irrelevant facts.
ISSUE:
WON in holding that the "taking" of the properties under
expropriation commenced with the filing of this action?
RULING:
SC affirmed Trial court’s ruling. Petitioner contends that
they took permanent possession in 1947 which should be
the basis.
REQUISITES: expropriator must enter a private
property.This circumstance is present in the instant case,
when by virtue of the lease agreement the Republic,
through the AFP, took possession of the property of
Castellvi; the entrance into private property must be for
more than a momentary period.The aforecited lease
contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year
to year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is
temporary, and considered transitory.The word
"momentary" when applied to possession or occupancy of
(real) property should be construed to mean "a limited
period" not indefinite or permanent. If the intention of the
lessee (Republic) in 1947 was really to occupy permanently
Castellvi's property, why was the contract of lease entered
into on year to year basis? Why was the lease agreement
renewed from year to year? Why did not the Republic
expropriate this land of Castellvi in 1949 when, according
to the Republic itself, it expropriated the other parcels of
land that it occupied at the same time as the Castellvi land,
for the purpose of converting them into a jet air base?
Intention cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of
the lease contract. Intent is to be deduced from the
language employed by the parties, and the terms 'of the
contract, when unambiguous, as in the instant case, are
conclusive in the absence of averment and proof of mistake
or fraud; the entry into the property should be under warrant
or color of legal authority. Yes, because the Republic
entered the Castellvi property as lessee; the property must
be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected. Devoted to public use
is present because the property was used by the air force
of the AFP. Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use
must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him
of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
No, Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously
recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the
renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the
provision in the lease contract whereby the Republic
undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease
was terminated. Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the
beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic
was bound to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the
agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed the
complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.
Republic v. Tagle
GR 129709
Republic vs. Tagle
Facts:
Private respondent Helena Benitez is the registered owner
of two (2) parcels of land located in barangay salawang,
Dasmariñas, Cavite, containing an area of 483,000 square
meters. The Philippine government through Philippine
Human Resources Development Center (PHRDC),
negotiated with the Japanese International Cooperation
Agency (JICA) the project of establishing the Construction
Manpower Development Center (CMDC)
Respondent Benitez signed a Memorandum of agreement
which among others that Benitez will lease/sell a portion of
her property (less than 10 hectares) for 20 years.
The Philippine Women’s University (PWU) and Benitez
permitted the PHRDC to occupy the said parcel of land and
to undertake the development agreed thereto. Pursuant to
the agreement, the CMDC took possession of the property
and erected buildings and other related facilities necessary
for its operations. The plaintiff made the deposit to the
defendant through Philippine National Bank, the value of
Php 708,990 which is equivalent to the assessed value of
the property subject matter hereof based on defendant’s
1990 tax declaration, was made.
In view of the foregoing agreement on the sale of land,
PHRDC prepared the deed of absolute sale with benitez as
vendor and the former and the CMDC as vendee. However,
Benitez did not sign the deed of absolute sale. Failing to
acquire the property of Benitez through a negotiated sale,
instituted a complaint for Eminent Domain in lieu of
provision s of Executive No. 1035
A Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession was granted by
the court but quashed it subsequently.
Issue: Whether or Not the respondent judge may quash a
writ of possession on the ground that the expropriating
government agency is already occupying the property
sought to be expropriated.
HELD:
No. Under Section 7 of EO 1035, when the government or
its authorized agent makes the required deposit, the trial
court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession.
The expropriation of real property does not include mere
physical entry or occupation of land. Although eminent
domain usually involves a taking of title, there may also be
compensable taking of only some, not all, of the property
interests in the bundle of rights that constitute ownership.
In the instant case, it is manifest that the petitioner, in
pursuit of an objective beneficial to public interest, seeks to
realize the same through its power of eminent domain. In
exercising this power, petitioner intended to acquire not
only physical possession but also the legal right to possess
and ultimately to own the subject property. Hence, its mere
physical entry and occupation of the property fall short of
the taking of title, which includes all the rights that may be
exercised by an owner over the subject property.
Didipio Earth-Savers Multi-Purpose Association v.
Gozun
The petitioners in this case assail the constitutionality of
Section 76 of Republic Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of
DAO 96-40.
Petitioners contend that Section 76 of Republic Act No.
7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 allow the unlawful and
unjust "taking" of private property for private purpose and
that DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into
a private property and allow taking of land without payment
of just compensation.They invoke the meaning of the word
“taking” in Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi that "taking" under
the concept of eminent domain as entering upon private
property for more than a momentary period, and, under the
warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use,
or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting
it in such a way as to substantially oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
where a property interest is merely restricted because the
continued use thereof would be injurious to public welfare,
or where property is destroyed because its continued
existence would be injurious to public interest, there is no
compensable taking (meaning the power exercised is
police power). However, when a property interest is
appropriated and applied to some public purpose, there is
compensable taking (meaning the power exercised is
eminent domain)
In Republic v. Castellvi, this Court had the occasion to spell
out the requisites of taking in eminent domain, to wit:
(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;
(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal
authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in
such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property.
A regulation which substantially deprives the owner of his
proprietary rights and restricts the beneficial use and
enjoyment for public use amounts to compensable taking.
ISSUE: WON Section 76 of Republic Act No. 7942 and
Section 107 of DAO 96-40 are unconstitutional
RULING: No. They are constitutional.
Public use as a requirement for the valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain is now synonymous with public
interest, public benefit, public welfare and public
convenience. It includes the broader notion of indirect
public benefit or advantage. Public use as traditionally
understood as "actual use by the public" has already been
abandoned (hello please note that this case was decided in
2006)
There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining Law and
its implementing rules and regulations do not provide for
just compensation in expropriating private properties.
Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO
96-40 provide for the payment of just compensation:
Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property
of the surface owner, occupant, or concessionaire as a
consequence of such operations shall be properly
compensated as may be provided for in the implementing
rules and regulations.
Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and
Occupant- Any damage done to the property of the surface
owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a
consequence of the mining operations or as a result of the
construction or installation of the infrastructure mentioned
in 104 above shall be properly and justly compensated.
Such compensation shall be based on the agreement
entered into between the holder of mining rights and the
surface owner, occupant or concessionaire thereof, where
appropriate, in accordance with P.D. No. 512.
With regards to the petitioners contention that Section 76 of
Republic Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 are
unconstitutional because they encroach on the power of
the trial courts to determine just compensation in eminent
domain cases, in accordance with PD 512, if there were
disagreements between the land owner and the contractor
regarding just compensation, it shall be brought to the
Panel arbitrator and to the Mines Adjudication Board, and
the latter’s decision may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
by filing a petition for review on certiorari. Clearly, no
indication that the courts are excluded from taking
cognizance of expropriation cases under the mining law.
Republic v. Andaya, G.R. No. 160656, June 15, 2007
DOCTRINE:
"Taking," in the exercise of the power of eminent domain,
occurs not only when the government actually deprives or
dispossesses the property owner of his property or of its
ordinary use, but also when there is a practical destruction
or material impairment of the value of his property.
FACTS
Respondent Ismael Andaya is the registered owner of two
parcels of land in Butuan City. These properties are subject
to a 60- meter wide perpetual easement for public
highways, irrigation ditches, and other similar works of the
government.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) negotiated
with Andaya to enforce the 60-meter easement of right-of-
way. The parties, however, failed to reach an agreement.
The Republic instituted an action before the RTC to enforce
the easement of right-of-way or eminent domain. A Board
of Commissioners were instituted to determine just
compensation. Eventually, the trial court issued an Order of
Expropriation upon payment of just compensation. The
Board sent a report with regards to the area and payment
of the properties.
Andaya objected to the report. The RTC, however
considered the report.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
Republic contested the awards of severance damages and
attorney’s fees while Andaya demanded just compensation
for his entire property minus the easement. Andaya alleged
that the easement would prevent ingress and egress to his
property and turn it into a catch basin for the floodwaters
coming from the Agusan River. This would render his
property unusable and uninhabitable.
CA modified the RTC decision.
ISSUE
Whether the Republic is liable for just compensation if in
enforcing the legal easement of right-of-way on a property,
the remaining area would be rendered unusable and
uninhabitable
RULING
Yes. The Court ruled that the Republic is liable for just
compensation. "Taking," in the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, occurs not only when the government
actually deprives or dispossesses the property owner of his
property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a
practical destruction or material impairment of the value of
his property. Using this standard, there was undoubtedly a
taking of the remaining area of Andaya’s property. True, no
burden was imposed thereon and Andaya still retained title
and possession of the property. But, as correctly observed
by the Board and affirmed by the courts a quo,
In this case, the nature and the effect of the floodwalls
would deprive Andaya of the normal use of the remaining
areas. It would prevent ingress and egress to the property
and turn it into a catch basin for the floodwaters coming
from the Agusan River.
National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit
Sangkay
Republic v. Spouses Regulto
FACTS: Respondents spouses Ildefonso B. Regulto
and Francia R. Regulto are the registered owners of the
property in controversy located at Mabel, Naga City,
Camarines Sur consisting of 300 square meters. The
DPWH Second Engineering District of Camarines Sur
apprised the Spouses Regulto of the construction of its
road project, the Naga City-Milaor Bypass Road, which
will traverse their property and other adjoining
properties. 5 The DPWH initially offered the spouses the
sum of P243, 000.00 or P1, 500.00 per square meter for
the 162 square-meter affected area as just
compensation.
The DPWH, through District Engr. Rolando P.
Valdez, withdrew the offer, and informed the Spouses
Regulto that they were not entitled to just
compensation since the title of their land originated
from a Free Patent title acquired under Commonwealth
Act (CA.) No. 141, known as the Public Land Act, which
contained a reservation in favor of the government of
an easement of right-of-way of twenty (20) meters,
which was subsequently increased to sixty (60) meters
by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 635, for public
highways and similar works that the government or any
public or quasi-public service enterprise may
reasonably require for carrying on their business, with
payment of damages for the improvements only.
The Spouses Regulto, in their letter
dated May 30, 2011, protested the findings of
the DPWH and ordered them to cease from
proceeding with the construction. They
alleged that since their property is already
covered by TCT No. 086-2010000231, it
ceased to be a public land.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are entitled to
compensation.
RULING: YES. It is undisputed that the subject property
originated from and was a part of a 7,759-square-meter
property covered by free patent registered under OCT
No. 235. Furthermore, the Spouses Regulto's transfer
certificate of title, which the RTC relied, contained the
reservation: "subject to the provisions of the Property
Registration Decree and the Public Land Act, as well as
to those of the Mining Law, if the land is mineral, and
subject, further, to such conditions contained in the
original title as may be subsisting."
Jurisprudence settles that one of the reservations and
conditions under the Original Certificate of Title of land
granted by free patent is that the said land is subject
"to all conditions and public easements and servitudes
recognized and prescribed by law especially those
mentioned in Sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.
In other words, lands granted by patent shall be subject
to a right-of-way not exceeding 60 meters in width for
public highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, and
other similar works of the government or any public
enterprise, free of charge, except only for the value of
the improvements existing thereon that may be
affected.
It is noted that the 162 square meters of the subject
property traversed by the bypass road project is well
within the limit provided by the law While this Court
concurs that the petitioners are not obliged to pay just
compensation in the enforcement of its easement of
right-of-way to lands which originated from public
lands granted by free patent, we, however, rule that
petitioners are not free from any qliability as to the
consequence of enforcing the said right-of-way
granted over the original q,759-square-meter property
to the 300-square-meter property belonging to the
Spouses Regulto.
There is "taking," in the context of the State's inherent
power of eminent domain, when the owner is actually
deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there
is a practical destruction or material impairment of the
value of his property or when he is deprived of the
ordinary use thereof.54 Using one of these standards, it
is apparent that there is taking of the remaining area of
the property of the Spouses Regulto. It is true that no
burden was imposed thereon, and that the spouses still
retained title and possession of the property. The fact
that more than half of the property shall be devoted to
the bypass road will undoubtedly result in material
impairment of the value of the property. It reduced the
subject property to an area of 138 square meters.
Thus, the petitioners are liable to pay just
compensation over the remaining area of the subject
property, with interest thereon at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of writ of possession or
the actual taking until full payment is made.
Heirs of Moreno v. Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authorit
Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 150640, March 22, 2007
DOCTRINE:
Requisite of public purpose in the exercise of the power of
eminent domain.
The number of people is not determinative of whether or not
it constitutes public use, provided the use is exercisable in
common and is not limited to particular individuals.
FACTS
Petitioner Brgy. Sindalan filed a complaint for eminent
domain against respondent spouses Sindayan. aPetitioner
sought to convert a portion of respondents’ land into the
barangay’s feeder road. Petitioner claimed q respondents’
property was the most practical and nearest way to the
municipal road.
Respondents alleged that the expropriation of their property
was for private use, and that it is for the benefit of the
homeowners of a subdivision and not for the residents of
the barangay.
ISSUE
Whether the taking of the land was for a public purpose or
use
RULING
No. The Court ruled that the expropriation of the land is for
private use. Based on the testimony of the witness, the
feeder road sought to serve only the residents of the
subdivision, and that the other residents of the Barangay
will not be benefitted. While the number of people who use
or can use the property is not determinative of whether or
not it constitutes public use or purpose, the facts of the case
reveals that the intended use of respondents’ lot is confined
solely to the subdivision residents.
Considering that the residents who need a feeder road are
all subdivision lot owners, it is the obligation of the
Subdivision owner to acquire a right-of-way for them,
pursuant to PD 957.
City of Manila v. Tan Te
National Power Corporation v. Posada
G.R. No. 169263 September 21, 2011
Facts:
Manila City Mayor Atienza approved
Ordinance 7951 authorizing him to acquire by negotiation
or expropriation certain pieces of real property along Maria
Clara and Governor Forbes where low-cost housing units
could be built and then awarded to the bona fide residents
therein. Records bear that respondent had acquired the
property from the heirs of Ermalinda Reyes. Respondent
sought from the MCTC the ejectment of the occupants.
Court issued a Writ of Demolition. The
City of Manila had instituted an expropriation case affecting
the same property. Respondent moved for the dismissal of
the expropriation. Respondent points out that Ordinance
No. 7951 is an invalid expropriation measure as it does not
even contain an appropriation funds in its implementation.
Respondent also contended that
Section 9 of RA 7279 does not apply to small landowners.
Petitioner invokes the power of eminent domain and is
thereby not bound by the requirements of RA 7279. The
term “public use” has acquired a more comprehensive
coverage. RA 7279 is passed to provide comprehensive
and continuing urban development and housing programs
as well as access to land and housing by the
underprivileged and homeless citizens.
Issue: Whether or not the “socialized housing” falls within
the confines of “public use.”
Ruling: Yes. The issues raised by the petitioners are
affirmative defenses. Respondent did not file an answer
instead assailed the validity of the Ordinance. Pursuant to
section 3 of Rule 67 which provides “that if a defendant has
any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the
complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of his
property, he should include them in his answer.”
Republic v. Heirs of Saturnino Borbon
Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v.
Municipality of Pasig
GR NO 152230
FACTS:
The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E.
R. Santos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig Public
Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to
70 houses, mostly made of light materials, were located.
The road had to be at least three meters in width, as
required by the Fire Code, so that fire trucks could pass
through in case of conflagration. Likewise, the residents in
the area needed the road for water and electrical outlets.
The municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters
out of the 1,791-square meter property of Lorenzo Ching
Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco
Kho covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT).
On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig
approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to
initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire the said
property and appropriate the fund therefor. The ordinance
stated that the property owners were notified of the
municipality’s intent to purchase the property for public use
as an access road but they rejected the offer.
On July 21, 1993, the municipality filed a complaint,
amended on August 6, 1993, against the Ching Cuancos
for the expropriation of the property under Section 19
ofRepublic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code. The plaintiff alleged therein that it
notified the defendants, by letter, of its intention to construct
an access road on a portion of the property but they refused
to sell the same portion. The plaintiff appended to the
complaint a photocopy of the letter addressed to defendant
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco.
The plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market
value of the property based on the latest tax declaration
covering the property. On plaintiff’s motion, the RTC issued
a writ of possession over the property sought to be
expropriated. On November 26, 1993, the plaintiff caused
the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal
portion of TCT No. PT-92579 under the name of the Jesus
Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Incorporated
(JILCSFI) which had purchased the property. Thereafter,
the plaintiff constructed therein a cemented road with a
width of three meters; the road was called Damayan Street.
In their answer, the defendants claimed that, as early as
February 1993, they had sold the said property to JILCSFI
as evidenced by a deed of sale bearing the signature of
defendant Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho and his wife.
When apprised about the complaint, JILCSFI filed a motion
for leave to intervene as defendant-in-intervention, which
motion the RTC granted on August 26, 1994.
In its answer-in-intervention, JILCSFI averred, by way of
special and affirmative defenses, that the plaintiff’s exercise
of eminent domain was only for a particular class and not
for the benefit of the poor and the landless. It alleged that
the property sought to be expropriated is not the best
portion for the road and the least burdensome to it. The
intervenor filed a crossclaim against its co-defendants for
reimbursement in case the subject property is expropriated.
In its amended answer, JILCSFI also averred that it has
been denied the use and enjoyment of its property because
the road was constructed in the middle portion and that the
plaintiff was not the real party-in-interest. The intervenor,
likewise, interposed counterclaims against the plaintiff for
moral damages and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE:
WON if the property is being used already for public
purpose, the same can still be expropriated. Because the
petitioner alleged that the land sought to be expropriated
was originally bought to construct a school and a church?
RULING:
YES. We reject the contention of the petitioner that its
property can no longer be expropriated by the respondent
because it is intended for the construction of a place for
religious worship and a school for its members. As aptly
explained by this Court in Manosca v. Court of Appeals,
thus: It has been explained as early as Seña v. Manila
Railroad Co., that: . . . A historical research discloses the
meaning of the term “public use” to be one of constant
growth. As society advances, its demands upon the
individual increases and each demand is a new use to
which the resources of the individual may be devoted. . . .
for “whatever is beneficially employed for the community is
a public use.” Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states:
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a
time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be
attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is
undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case
of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not
allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of
the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain
comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least
two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public
use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into
small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the
transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and
other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to
state then that at present whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirements
of public use.
Masikip v. City of Pasig
G.R NO. 136349
Lourdes De La Paz Masikip vs The City of Pasig
FACTS:
Sometime in 1994, The Municipality of Pasig sent a letter to
herein petitioners that the 4,521 sqm land of the latter will
be expropriated by the Municipality of Pasig for the benefit
of a small community in Barangay Pag-Asa and said land
of the petitioners will be used as recreational facility of the
community.
The RTC ruled that there be an appointment of
commissioners for the purpose of determining the just
compensation. Petitioner filed for the Motion to Dismiss the
complaint for the reason that: There be no genuine
necessity for the taking of the property sought to be
expropriated.
The Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil
action for certiorari. However, The CA affirmed dismissed
the petition for lack of merit, as well as the motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUES
1.) Whether or not there is a genuine necessity for
the taking of the property of petitioner
RULING
No. The right to take private property for public purposes
necessarily originates from “the necessity” and the taking
must be limited to such necessity. the court held that the
very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a
genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public
character. Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessity
must precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of
the land.
That “necessity within the rule that the particular property to
be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an
absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such
as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the
least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party
and the property owner consistent with such benefit.” That
respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is
a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s
Manapat v. Court of Appeals
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila allowed some
individuals to occupy the Grace Park property on condition
that they vacate the premises should RCAM push through
with the plan to construct a school in the area. The plan did
not push through so the occupants offered to purchase the
portions they occupied. They could not afford RCAM’s
proposed price, the occupants, organized themselves and
petitioned the Government for the acquisition of the said
property, its subdivision into home lots, and the resale of
the subdivided lots to them at a low price.
The govt failed to acquire the property because of RCAM’s
high asking price. RCAM later decided to sell the
subdivided lots to the public. In 1977, Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1072,8 appropriating
₱1.2M out of the President’s Special Operations Funds to
cover the additional amount needed for the expropriation of
Grace Park. National Housing Authority (NHA) filed
expropriation proceedings over the already subdivided lots.
Manapat argues that, as he is also a member of the tenant
association, the beneficiary of the expropriation, it would be
unsuited to take the land away from him only to give it back
to him as an intended beneficiary.
Lim, a non-member of the tenant association who bought
from RCAM/PRC four lots of the subdivided Grace Park
Subdivision argues as NHA may not re-group several
smaller lots into d consider and treat them as one again for
the purpose of subdividing it once more into still smaller lots
for distribution to its supposed or intended beneficiaries and
that There really was no genuine necessity for the
expropriation of the lots in question to satisfy the purpose
thereof as alleged in the complaint therefor
ISSUE: whether the NHA may validly expropriate the
parcels of land subject of these cases.
RULING:
yes.
The power of eminent domain is an inherent and
indispensable power of the State. Also called the power of
expropriation, it is described as "the highest and most exact
idea of property remaining in the government" that may be
acquired for some public purpose through a method "in the
nature of a compulsory sale to the State." By virtue of its
sovereign character, the exercise of the power prevails over
the non-impairment clause, and is clearly superior to the
final and executory judgment rendered by a court in an
ejectment case.
following requisites for the valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain:
(1) the property taken must be private property;
(2) there must be genuine necessity to take the private
property;
(3) the taking must be for public use;
(4) there must be payment of just compensation; and
(5) the taking must comply with due process of law.
The issue of necessity then assumed the nature of a
political question pursuant Presidential Decree No. 1072,
issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1977.
Specifically, urban renewal or redevelopment and the
construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public
purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of
public use but also because of specific provisions in the
Constitution. In the light of the foregoing, this Court is
satisfied that "socialized housing" falls within the confines
of "public use"
Manapat, and those similarly situated as he, cannot assert
any right to be awarded the very same lots they currently
occupy, nor be entitled to the same area of the land they
now have.
Lim and respondents Vega, Santos, Oracion, and Mercado,
who argue that the lots they own should not be expropriated
are already titled in their names and are very small in area,
being already the subdivided portions of the original Grace
Park Subdivision.
City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila
Doctrine: There should be conclusive proof that
expropriation of a land is a necessity of public character.
FACTS
Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain
lands be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a
public improvement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue,
Manila and claiming that such expropriation was necessary.
Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no
necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land
in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such
for many years, and was covered with sepulchres and
monuments, and that the same should not be converted
into a street for public purposes.
The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the
expropriation of the particular strip of land in question.
Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court
claiming that it (petitioner) has the authority to expropriate
any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in
such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in
question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land
can inquire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation
or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor;
that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in
expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land
is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a
judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.
ISSUE
Whether there is a genuine necessity for the expropriation
of the land.
RULING
No. The Court held that the records do not show
conclusively there exists a necessity for the appropriation
of the particular land described in the complaint. Even
granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street
in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of
opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows
that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the
city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the
plaintiff.
The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain
is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a
public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must
precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the
land.
SC upheld the ruling of the lower court.
City of Iloilo v. Contreras-Besana
HENRY Sy v. Local Government of Quezon City
FACTS: The case stems on the complaint for expropriation
filed in order to acquire a parcel of land, owned and
registered under the name of the petitioner to be used as a
multi-purpose barangay hall, day-care center, playground
and community activity center for the benefit of the
residents of Barangay Balingasa, Balintawak, Quezon City.
Pursuant to Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160),
otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991,"
the City deposited the amount of ₱241,090.00 with the
Office of the Clerk of Court, representing 15% of the fair
market value of the subject property based on its tax
declaration.
Sy did not question the City’s right to expropriate the subject
property. Thus, only the amount of just compensation
remained at issue.
Commissioners Ostaco and Alcantara, in a Report dated
February 11, 2008, recommended the payment of
₱5,500.00 per sq. m., to be computed from the date of the
filing of the expropriation complaint, or on November 7,
1996. On the other hand, Commissioner Salinas filed a
separate Report dated March 7, 2008, recommending the
higher amount of ₱13,500.00 per sq. m. as just
compensation. In which RTC held that the just
compensation for the subject property should be set at P5,
500.00 per sq. m. with six percent (6%) legal interest,
computed... until full payment of just compensation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the recommended payment is just
compensation.
RULING: NO. The constitutional limitation of "just
compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to
the market value of the property, broadly described to be
the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and
ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair
value of the property as between one who receives, and
one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual
taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for
public use before compensation is deposited with the court
having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation
must include interests on its just value to be computed from
the time the property is taken to the time when
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court.
In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual
payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner
in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he
was in before the taking occurred.
41
In many cases decided by this Court, it has
been repeated time and again that the award of 12%
interest is imposed in the nature of damages for delay in
payment which in effect makes the obligation on the part of
the government one of forbearance. This is to ensure
prompt payment of the value of the land and limit the
opportunity loss of the owner that can drag from days to
decades.
National Power Corporation v. Manalastas
National Transmission Corporation v. Oroville
Development Corporation
August 1, 2017 G.R. No. 223366
Facts:
 Reyes and Calingasan owns 2 parcels of land
covered by TCT and OCT. Reyes sold his land to
Navarette, who sold it to Oroville. Calingasan also sold her
land to Oroville. NTC constructed a power transmission line
on these properties known as the Tagoloan-Pulangi
Transmission line. Transco (NTC) offered to buy the
properties from Oroville. Upon negotiation, Transco refused
to re-route the proposed Abaga-Kirahon transmission line
parallel to Pulangi.
Oroville has not been paid just compensation for
the construction of Pulangi. RTC on its decision, lowered
the valuation amount of the land. RTC opined that the just
compensation should not be reckoned from 1983, the time
of taking, because it was established by the landowners
that the entry into their property was without their
knowledge.
Transco elevated it to CA. CA, in its decision,
stated that there was no actual taking of the subject
properties in 1983 when Transco proceeded with the
construction. The computation should be reckoned at the
time of the filing of the complaint in 2007.
Issue: Whether or not the computation of just compensation
for the expropriated property should be based on its value
at the time of the taking of the property.
Ruling: Yes. Under Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, it states that “… upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking
of the property of the filing of the complaint, whichever
comes first.”
In the case of DPWH v. Sps. Tecson, the court
ruled that it has uniformly ruled that the just compensation
is the value of the property at the time of the taking that is
controlling for the purpose of compensation.
The CA ruling was reversed. Interest shall be
compounded at the time judicial demand is made pursuant
to Article 2212 of the Civil Code.
EVERGREEN v. REPUBLIC
FACTS
- DPWH seeks to appropriate a portion of land of
Evergreen, in which, the latter declines. Evergreen
contends that the conditions for expropriation have not
been met and that it would impair the rights of
leaseholders in violation of the constitutional
proscription against impairment of the obligation of
contracts. On June 30, 2011, the RTC fixed the
amount of just compensation to P25,000/sqm but both
petitioner and respondent filed a motion to
reconsideration contending that RTC erred in fixing
the valuation. Evergreen further asked for the payment
of consequential damages as a result of its lost income
with its billboard lessee and decrease in value of the
Subject Property and legal interest on the amount of
just compensation. The CA, however, denied the claim
of consequential damages or interest by Evergreen
Issue
- Is the republic liable for interest
Ruling
- Yes. The payment of 100% of the value of
the Subject Premises based on the BIR zonal
valuation of the property for the account of
Evergreen alone and by itself does not constitute
just compensation. This is only the first of the two
payments the government must make. Section 4
of RA 8974 specifically provides that “when the
decision of the court becomes final and executory,
the implementing agency shall pay the owner the
difference between the amount already paid and
the just compensation as determined by the
court.” Thus, under RA 8974, there must be a
completion of two payments before just
compensation is deemed to have been made.
Absent full payment, interest on the balance would
necessarily be due on the unpaid amount.
National Power Corporation v. Marasigan
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Dalauta
GR NO 190004
FACTS:
Respondent was the registered owner of an agricultural
land in Butuan City with an area of 25.2160 hectares and
which was placed by DAR under compulsory acquisition of
CARP as reflected in the Notice of Coverage. Petitioner
LBP offered ₱192,782.59 as compensation for the land, but
Dalauta rejected such valuation for being too low.
The case was referred to the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB) through the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) of Butuan City, who affirmed the
valuation made by LBP, after a summary administrative
proceeding was conducted.
Respondent filed a petition for determination of just
compensation with the RTC, sitting as SAC. He alleged that
LBP’s valuation of the land was inconsistent with the rules
and regulations prescribed in DAR Administrative Order
(A.O.) No. 06, series of 1992, for determining the just
compensation of lands covered by CARP’s compulsory
acquisition scheme.
The Board of Commissioners constituted by SAC inspected
the land and recommended that the value of the land be
pegged at ₱100,000.00 per hectare in which both parties
objected.
Dalauta claimed that he had a net income of
Php350,000.00 in 1993 from sales of trees to one person,
Fonacier, thus the formula of LV = CNI x 0.9 + MV x 0.1
should be used, which yields a total value of ₱2,639,557.
LBP alleged that the land had no income and the corn
production found during the ocular inspection in 1994 was
only for family consumption. Thus they used the formula
LV= MVx 2 which yielded a total value of ₱192,782.59.
ISSUE:
WON respondent is considered the trial court correctly
computed the just compensation of the subject property.
RULING:
Upon an assiduous assessment of the different valuations
arrived at by the DAR, the SAC and the CA, the Court
agrees with the position of Justice Francis Jardeleza that
just compensation for respondent Dalauta’s land should be
computed based on the formula provided under DAR-LBP
Joint Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 2003 (JMC
No. 11 (2003)). This Memorandum Circular, which provides
for the specific guidelines for properties with standing
commercial trees, explains:
The Capitalized Net Income (CNI) approach to land
valuation assumes that there would be uniform streams of
future income that would be realized in perpetuity from the
seasonal/permanent crops planted to the land. In the case
of commercial trees (hardwood and soft wood species),
however, only a one-time income is realized when the trees
are due for harvest. The regular CNI approach in the
valuation of lands planted to commercial trees would
therefore not apply.
Dalauta’s sale of falcata trees indeed appears to be a one-
time transaction. He did not claim to have derived any other
income from the property prior to receiving the Notice of
Coverage from the DAR in February 1994. For this reason,
his property would be more appropriately covered by the
formula provided under JMC No. 11 (2003).
Dalauta alleges to have sold all the falcata trees in the
property to Fonacier in 1993. After Fonacier finished
harvesting in January 1994, he claims that, per advice of
his lawyer, he immediately caused the date of effectivity of
this Joint Memorandum Circular x x x.” It is submitted,
however, that applying the above formula to compute just
compensation for respondent’s land would be the most
equitable course of action under the circumstances.
Without JMC No. 11 (2003), Dalauta’s property would have
to be valued using the formula for idle lands, the CNI and
CS factors not being applicable. Following this formula, just
compensation for Dalauta’s property would only amount to
₱225,300.00.
Republic v. Larrazabal Sr. Potenciano, Victoria, Betty
(LARRAZABAL FAM)
FACTS:
Sometime in 1991, heavy rains in Ormoc city caused great
floods and overflows the rivers of Malbasag river. To avoid
the same tragedy, herein peritioners, DPWH, undertook a
massive flood mitigation at the said river which required a
right of way. Said three parcels of land of the three herein
respondents are about to expropriated.
Upon the filing of the petitioner before the RTC for the
expropriation of the three parcels of land, The DPWH
appraised the land only for 1,000 pesos for Commercial lots
and 800 pesos for Residential lots.
The RTC directed the petitioner to release the money they
deposited to the respondents and the RTC appointed
another commissioners to appraise the value of the land of
the three respondents. The three commissioners found that
the value of the land are as follows: Php 6,726 per sqm for
Potenciano, Php 10,000 per sqm for Victoria and Php 4,000
per sqm for betty.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The RTC ruled
that the respondents must be compensated with the proper
appraised value of their property and the CA contend that
the RTC is correct for disregarding the RA 8974, An act to
facilitate the acquisition of right if way.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in making decision for not
applying the RA 8974
HELD
No In affirming the CA, the Court ruled that RA No. 897 4
cannot be made to apply retroactively since it is a
substantive law; there is nothing in RA No. 8974 which
expressly provides for retroactive application; and
retroactivity could not necessarily be implied from RA No.
8974 or in any of its provisions.
Mateo v. Department of Agrarian Reform
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Lorenzo
Tanada, G.R. No. 170506, January 11, 2017
DOCTRINE:
In order to determine just compensation in agrarian reform
cases, the trial court acting as a SAC must take into
consideration the factors prescribed by Section 17 of
Republic Act No. 6657 and is obliged to apply the formula
crafted by the DAR.
FACTS
Respondents Heirs of Tañada are the owners of several
parcels of land in Bataan. Sometime in 1988, the subject
lands were placed under the land reform program of the
government. Petitioner Landbank valued the properties to
₱416,447.43, but the respondents were dissatisfied. They
instituted summary administrative proceedings for the
preliminary determination of just compensation with the
DARAB. The DARAB affirmed Landbank.
The respondents instituted separate petitions for
determination and payment of just compensation,
contending that the price fixed by petitioner was
unconscionably low. They presented a witness who
testified the purchase price when they have bought the
land. RTC-SAC ruled in favor of respondents. In an appeal,
the CA affirmed the RTC-SAC.
Hence, this petition for review was filed.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC-Special Agrarian Court utilized the
correct method in fixing the just compensation.
RULING
No. It is settled in jurisprudence that, in order to determine
just compensation, the trial court acting as a SAC must take
into consideration the factors prescribed by Section 17 of
Republic Act No. 6657 and is obliged to apply the formula
crafted by the DAR. The Court ruled that the RTC-SAC did
not apply this and solely based its conclusion on the alleged
selling price or market value of the land adjoining
respondents' properties.
The Court reiterated a doctrine, stating that “while the
determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial
function vested in the R C acting as a SAC, the judge
cannot abuse his discretion by not taking into full
consideration the factors specifically identified by law and
implementing rules. SACs are not at liberty to disregard the
formula given by the DAR, because unless an
administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no
option but to apply it. Courts cannot ignore, without violating
the agrarian reform law, the formula provided by the DAR
for the determination of just compensation.
Bartolata v. Republic
Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation
FACTS: The Municipality of Parañaque filed on
September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation against
Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two
parcels of land of 10,000 square meters. The city previously
negotiated for the sale of the property but VM didn’t accept.
The trial court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994,
authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject
property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount
equivalent to 15% of its fair market value based on its
current tax declaration.
According to the respondent, the complaint failed to state a
cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution
and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local
Government Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was
barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. Petitioner
claimed that res judicata was not applicable.
The trial court dismissed the case. The petitioner’s MFR
was denied. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not a resolution duly approved by the
municipal council has the same force and effect of an
ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a
valid cause of action.

RULING: NO. The power of eminent domain is lodged in

the legislative branch of government, which may delegate
the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and
public utilities. 25 An LGU may therefore exercise the power
to expropriate private property only when authorized by
Congress and subject to the latter's control and restraints,
imposed "through the law conferring the power or in other
legislations." 26 In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which
delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays
down the parameters for its exercise.

Thus, the following essential requisites must

concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent
domain:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council

authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU,
to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private
property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use,
purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required
under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other
pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to
the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but
said offer was not accepted. 27

In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to

exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a
resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no
compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be
authorized through an ordinance.

Republic, as represented by National Irrigation

Authority v. Court of Appeals

Municipality of Cordova, Province of Cebu v.

Pathfinder Development Corporation
TAXATION
And Police Power
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Edu, G.R. No. L- 41383,
August 15, 1988
Facts:
PAL, under its franchise was exempted from payment of
taxes. However, in 1971, Land Transportation issued a
regulation requiring all tax-exempt entities to pay MOTOR
VEHICLE REGISTRATION FEES pursuant to RA No.
4136. Petitioner paid said registration but demand for
refund eventually contending that such MVRF are taxes
which exempt PAL from paying under its franchise.
Defendant denied the said refund, contending that MVRF
are not revenue measures but regulatory exactions where
PAL is not exempted.
Issue: WON the motor vehicle registration fees are taxes?
Ruling: Yes. MVRF are taxes. Fees may be properly
regarded as taxes even though they also serve as
instrument of regulation. If the purpose of the exaction is
primarily revenue, or if revenue is at least one of the
substantial purposes, then the exaction is properly called
tax. In this case, the purpose behind the law requiring
owners of vehicles to pay their registration is mainly to raise
revenue for the construction and maintenance of highways.
Article VI, Section 28 (1) of the 1987 Constitution
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455,
August 25, 1994
Facts: Petitioner contended that RA No. 7716 is regressive
and violates Art. VI, Sec. 28, par. 1 of the 1987 Constitution
which states that “The rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system
of taxation.” The petitioner claims that as a result of the 10%
VAT uniformly implemented to all, the VAT payment by low-
income households will be a higher portion of their incomes
than the payments by higher-income households. Hence,
the VAT is regressive. The respondent on the other hand,
opposed the contention. The law is equitable as it in fact
distributes the tax burden to as many goods and services
as possible particularly to those which are within the reach
of higher-income groups, even as the law exempts basic
goods and services. The goods and properties subject to
the VAT are those used or consumed by higher-income
groups including real properties, industrial, commercial,
scientific equipment, hotels, restaurants and the like.
Issue: WON RA No. 7716 violates Art. VI, Sec. 28, par. 1
of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling: The court held that, claims that the law is
regressive is prematurely raised. However, regressivity is
not a negative standard for courts to enforce. What
Congress is required by the Constitution to do is to “evolve
a progressive system of taxation.”
National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan
G.R. No. 149110 April 9, 2003
Facts:
NPC sells electric power to the residents of
Cabanatuan City, posting a gross income of
107,814,187.86 PHP. Pursuant to Section 37 of Ordinance
No. 165-92, respondent assessed the petitioner a franchise
tax, representing 75% of 1% of the latter’s gross receipt for
the preceding year. Petitioner refused to pay the tax
assessment and argued that respondent has no authority
to impose tax on gov’t entities.
Petitioner also invoked Sec. 13 of RA 6395
contending that they are exempted from tax imposition.
Respondent filed a collection suit in the RTC demanding
that petitioner pay the assessed tax due. Respondent
alleged that petitioner’s exemption from local taxes has
been repealed by section 193 of RA 7160. RTC ruled in
favor of Petitioner.
RA 6395 is a special law and RA 7160 is a
general law. It is well-settled that special laws prevail over
general laws and that Local Gov’t have no power to tax
instrumentalities of the national gov’t. Court of Appeals
reversed RTC’s decision on the ground that Sec. 193, in
relation to sections 137 to 151 of the LGC, expressly
withdrew the exemptions granted to the petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not CA erred in holding that NPC’s
exemption from all forms of taxes has been repealed by the
provision of the LGC.
Ruling: No. The power to tax is no longer vested
exclusively to Congress, local legislative bodies are now
given direct authority to levy taxes, fees, and other changes
pursuant to Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution. It
is beyond dispute that respondent has the authority to issue
Ordinance No. 165-92 and impose an annual tax on
“business enjoying franchise,” pursuant to section 151 in
relation to section 137 of the LGC.
In the case at bar, Section 151 in relation to
section 137 of the LGC clearly authorizes respondent to
impose tax to petitioner the franchise tax. All other private
franchise holders receiving at least 60% of its electricity
requirement from the petitioner are likewise imposed the
cap od 12% on profits.
PLANTERS v. FERTIPHIL
Facts
- President Marcos issued LOI No. 1465 which
provided, among others, for the imposition of a
capital recovery component (CRC) on the
domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in the
Philippines. Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10
for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic
market to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority
(FPA). FPA then remitted the amount collected to
the Far East Bank and Trust Company, the
depositary bank of PPI. After the 1986 Edsa
Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the
imposition of the P10 levy. With the return of
democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund
of the amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465, but PPI
refused to accede to the demand. Fertiphil filed a
complaint for collection and damages against FPA
and PPI with the RTC in Makati. It questioned the
constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust,
unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful
imposition that amounted to a denial of due
process of law. Fertiphil alleged that the LOI solely
favored PPI, a privately owned corporation, which
used the proceeds to maintain its monopoly of the
fertilizer industry.
Issue
- Whether the imposition of the levy was an
exercise by the State of its taxation power.
Ruling
- The imposition of the levy was an exercise by
the State of its taxation power. While it is true that
the power of taxation can be used as an implement
of police power,the primary purpose of the levy is
revenue generation. If the purpose is primarily
revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real
and substantial purposes, then the exaction is
properly called a tax.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Enron Subic
Power Corporation
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Association, Inc.
v. Executive Secretary
GR NO 160756
FACTS:
Petitioner is an association of real estate developers and
builders in the Philippines. It assails the validity of the
imposition of minimum corporate income tax (MCIT) on
corporations and creditable withholding tax (CWT) on sales
of real properties classified as ordinary assets.
Petitioner argues that the MCIT violates the due process
clause because it levies income tax even if there is no
realized gain. Petitioner also asserts that the enumerated
provisions of the subject revenue regulations violate the
due process clause because, like the MCIT, the
government collects income tax even when the net income
has not yet been determined. They contravene the equal
protection clause as well because the CWT is being levied
upon real estate enterprises but not on other business
enterprises, more particularly those in the manufacturing
sector.
ISSUE:
WON the imposition of the MCIT on domestic corporations
and CWT on income from sales of real properties classified
as ordinary assets are unconstitutional?
RULING:
NO. MCIT is not violative of due process. The MCIT is
imposed on gross income which is arrived at by deducting
the capital spent by a corporation in the sale of its goods,
i.e., the cost of goods and other direct expenses from gross
sales. Clearly, the capital is not being taxed. Furthermore,
the MCIT is not an additional tax imposition. It is imposed
in lieu of the normal net income tax, and only if the normal
income tax is suspiciously low. The MCIT merely
approximates the amount of net income tax due from a
corporation, pegging the rate at a very much reduced 2%
and uses as the base the corporation’s gross income.
It is also stressed that the CWT is creditable against the tax
due from the seller of the property at the end of the taxable
year. The seller will be able to claim a tax refund if its net
income is less than the taxes withheld. Nothing is taken that
is not due so there is no confiscation of property repugnant
to the constitutional guarantee of due process. More
importantly, the due process requirement applies to the
power to tax. The CWT does not impose new taxes nor
does it increase taxes. It relates entirely to the method and
time of payment. Petitioner, in insisting that its industry
should be treated similarly as manufacturing enterprises,
fails to realize that what distinguishes the real estate
business from other manufacturing enterprises, for
purposes of the imposition of the CWT, is not their
production processes but the prices of their goods sold and
the number of transactions involved. The income from the
sale of a real property is bigger and its frequency of
transaction limited, making it less cumbersome for the
parties to comply with the withholding tax scheme.
Visayas Geothermal Power Company v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue
FACTS:
Petitioner is a company engaged in the business of power
generation through geothermal energy and the sale of
generated power to the Philippine National Oil Company.
Petitioner filed with the BIR its original quarterly VAT returns
for the first to fourth quarter of taxable year 2005. On 2006,
the petitioner filed refund of 14,160,807.95 with the BIR
District Office of Ormoc City, pursuant to RA 9136. Almost
one month later, while the claim was still pending, the
petitioner filed for judicial claim via a petition for review with
the CTA praying for a refund or the issuance of a tax credit
certificate covering the 4 quarters of taxable year 2005.
The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) found that only 7,699,366
was duly substantiated by the required evidence. Both
parties of this case appealed to the CTA En Banc, The CTA
En banc, reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA,
and dismissed the petition for review for having been filed
prematurely. The petitioner argued that the respondent
shouldhave been estopped questioning the jurisdiction of
the CTA.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CIR should have been estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the CTA.
RULING
No. It is a well-settled rule that the government cannot be
estopped by the mistakes, errors or omissions of its agents.
It has been specifically held that estoppel does not apply to
the government, especially on matters of taxation. Taxes
are the nation’s lifeblood through which government
agencies continue to operate and with which the State
discharges its functions for the welfare of its constituents.
Thus, the government cannot be estopped from collecting
taxes by the mistake, negligence, or omission of its agents.
Upon taxation depends the ability of the government to
serve the people for whose benefit taxes are collected. To
safeguard such interest, neglect or omission of government
officials entrusted with the collection of taxes should not be
allowed to bring harm or detriment to the people.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. United Salvage
and Towage Phils., Inc.,
Lutz v. Araneta, G.R. No. L-7859, December 22, 1955
Doctrine: The State may use the power of taxation as an
implement of its police power.
FACTS
Commonwealth Act No. 567 (Sugar Adjustment Act) was
enacted to provide for an increase in the existing tax on the
manufacture of sugar and levies the owners devoted to the
cultivation thereof.
Lutz seeks to recover from the CIR that was paid by the
estate as taxes alleging that such tax is unconstitutional and
void, being levied for the aid support of the sugar industry
exclusively, which in plaintiff’s opinion is not a public
purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. This
case was dismissed.
The Act is shown to impose tax that is levied with a
regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation
and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. It is
primarily an exercise of the police power.
ISSUE
Whether CA 567 is a taxing power of the State
RULING
Yes. The Court said that the protection and promotion of
the sugar industry is a matter of public concern, and hence
may levy taxes to raise funds for its attainment.
The protection of a large industry constituting one of the
great sources of the state's wealth and therefore directly or
indirectly affecting the welfare of so great a portion of the
population of the State is affected to such an extent by
public interests as to be within the police power of the
sovereign.
Taxation may be made the implementation of the state's
police power.
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Edu
Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Cement
Manufacturers Association of the Philippines
FACTS: The case is about the application of
PHILCEMCOR to impose a definitive safeguard
measures on the import of cement pursuant to the
SMA. Due to alleged increase in importation of gray
Portland cement in increased quantities has caused
declines in domestic production, capacity utilization,
market share, sales and employment; as well as
caused depressed local prices. However, this was
denied by the Tariff Commission recommending that
no definitive general safeguard measure be imposed
on the importation of gray Portland cement. The DTI
disagreed with the conclusions of the Tariff
Commission, but at the same time, ultimately denying
Philcemcors application for safeguard measures on
the ground that the he was bound to do so in light of
the Tariff Commissions negative findings.
Philcemcor challenged this Decision of the DTI
Secretary.
Southern Cross filed the present petition, arguing that
the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over
Philcemcors petition, as the proper remedy is a petition
for review with the CTA conformably with the SMA,
and; that the factual findings of the Tariff Commission
on the existence or non-existence of conditions
warranting the imposition of general safeguard
measures are binding upon the DTI Secretary.
Despite the fact that the Court of Appeals Decision had
not yet become final, its binding force was cited by the
DTI Secretary when he issued a new Decision on 25
June 2003, wherein he ruled that that in light of the
appellate court’s Decision, there was no longer any
legal impediment to his deciding Philcemcors
application for definitive safeguard measures. In which
the DTI Secretary issued a new Decision, ruling this
time that that in light of the appellate courts Decision
there was no longer any legal impediment to his
deciding Philcemcors application for definitive
safeguard measures. He made a determination that,
contrary to the findings of the Tariff Commission, the
local cement industry had suffered serious injury as a
result of the import surges
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of DTI Secretary,
to impose safeguard measures is valid.
RUING: NO. The SMA establishes a distinct allocation
of functions between the Tariff Commission and the
DTI Secretary. The plain meaning of Section 5 shows
that it is the Tariff Commission that has the power to
make a "positive final determination." This power,
which belongs to the Tariff Commission, must be
distinguished from the power to impose general
safeguard measure properly vested on the DTI
Secretary. The distinction is vital, as a "positive final
determination" clearly antecedes, as a condition
precedent, the imposition of a general safeguard
measure. At the same time, a positive final
determination does not necessarily result in the
imposition of a general safeguard measure. Under
Section 5, notwithstanding the positive final
determination of the Tariff Commission, the DTI
Secretary is tasked to decide whether or not that the
application of the safeguard measures is in the public
interest.
This delegation of the taxation power by the legislative
to the executive is authorized by the Constitution
itself.101 At the same time, the Constitution also grants
the delegating authority (Congress) the right to impose
restrictions and limitations on the taxation power
delegated to the President.102 The restrictions and
limitations imposed by Congress take on the mantle of
a constitutional command, which the executive branch
is obliged to observe
The SMA empowered the DTI Secretary, as alter ego of
the President,103 to impose definitive general
safeguard measures, which basically are tariff imposts
of the type spoken of in the Constitution. However, the
law did not grant him full, uninhibited discretion to
impose such measures. The DTI Secretary authority is
derived from the SMA; it does not flow from any
inherent executive power. Thus, the limitations
imposed by Section 5 are absolute, warranted as they
are by a constitutional fiat.
Planter’s Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation
Angeles University Foundation v. City of Angeles
Churchill v. Concepcion
G.R. No. 11572 September 22, 1916
Facts:
Section 100 of Act No. 2339
imposed an annual tax of P4 per square meter upon
"electric signs, billboards, and spaces used for posting
or displaying temporary signs, and all signs displayed
on premises not occupied by buildings." It was
amended by Act No. 2432 reducing the tax to P2 per
square meter. The taxes imposed by Act No. 2432 were
ratified by the Congress of the United States. Francis
A. Churchill and Stewart Tait, under the firm Mercantile
Advertising Agency, owners of a sign or billboard
containing an area of 52 square meters.
The tax was paid under protest
and the plaintiffs having exhausted all their
administrative remedies instituted under section 140 of
Act No. 2339 against the CIR to recover back the
amount they paid. Plaintiffs argued that said tax
increase would greatly affect the profit of their
business and that such tax is unconstitutional.
Plaintiffs added that complained law enacted was for
the sole purpose of destroying billboards and
advertising business depending on the use of signs or
billboards and that plaintiffs cannot raise their rates
because of the risk of bankruptcy.
Issue: WON Act No. 2339 is a valid exercise of the
taxing power of the State.
Ruling: Yes. Upon cross examination, that the
contention that the rates charged for advertising
cannot be raised is purely hypothetical. These are
based entirely upon the opinion of the plaintiffs,
unsupported by actual test. The Philippine Legislature
has the power to impose such taxes "the power to
impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so
searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to
declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever,
except such as rest in the discretion of the authority
which exercises it.”
It is not for the judiciary to say that the
classification upon which the tax is based "is mere
arbitrary selection and not based upon any reasonable
grounds." The Legislature selected signs and
billboards as a subject for taxation and it must be
presumed that it, in so doing, acted with a full
knowledge of the situation.
Rubio v. Collector of Internal Revenue
Facts
- Four new cases involving an identical
question (WON stock dividends are taxable) were
initiated in the Court of First Instance of Manila. All
of them had to do with the receipt by four
individuals of stock dividends from the Luzon
Stevedoring Co., Inc., and with the levy on these
stock dividends by the Collector of Internal
Revenue of the corresponding income tax. The
decisions in the lower court naturally respected
the decisions of this court, and so gave judgments
in favor of the respective plaintiffs. On appeal, the
submission of the four cases was suspended,
awaiting the pronouncements of the United States
Supreme Court in the Warner, Barners & Co., and
Menzi cases. The higher court having spoken in
those cases, the instant case and its companion
cases are ready for decision.
Issue
- Whether a stock dividend may lawfully be
taxed as income of the stockholder
Ruling
- YES. It cannot be gainsaid that the Philippine
Islands in its tax status is closely akin to the status
of Australia and of a state in the American Union.
Proceeding within the confines of express and
general authority, the Philippine Legislature
deemed it wise to classify stock dividends as
income. Whatever the true quality of stock
dividends may be, the local Legislature has made
its own definition of income, and has included in
that definition stock dividends. The Legislature
had that right. It is the sole judge of the propriety
of taxation and of the subjects of taxation. The
legislative classification should be respected. For
the purposes of the law, there is no sound basis
for distinguishing stock dividends from cash
dividends.
Manila Race Horse Trainers Association, Inc. v. De La
Fuente
Villanueva v. City of Iloilo
GR NO L-26521
FACTS:
On September 30, 1946 the municipal board of Iloilo City
enacted Ordinance 86, imposing license tax fees as
follows: (1) tenement house (casa de vecindad), P25.00
annually; (2) tenement house, partly or wholly engaged in
or dedicated to business in the streets of J.M. Basa, Iznart
and Aldeguer, P24.00 per apartment; (3) tenement house,
partly or wholly engaged in business in any other streets,
P12.00 per apartment. The validity and constitutionality of
this ordinance were challenged by the spouses Eusebio
Villanueva and Remedies Sian Villanueva, owners of four
tenement houses containing 34 apartments. On January
15, 1960 the municipal board of Iloilo City, believing,
obviously, that with the passage of Republic Act 2264,
otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, it had
acquired the authority or power to enact an ordinance
similar to that previously declared by this Court as ultra
vires, thus enacted an “Ordinance Imposing Municipal
License Tax on Persons Engaged in the Business of
Operating Tenement-Houses”.
ISSUE:
WON the tax imposed by the ordinance falls within any of
the exception provided in Section 2 of the Local Autonomy
Act, thus imposing a double taxation?
HELD:
It is necessary to determine the true nature of the tax. The
appellees strongly maintain that it is a “property tax” or “real
estate tax,” and not a “tax on persons engaged in any
occupation or business or exercising privileges,” or a
license tax, or a privilege tax, or an excise tax. The tax in
question is not a real estate tax. A real estate tax is a direct
tax on the ownership of lands and buildings or other
improvements thereon and is payable regardless of
whether the property is used or not. The tax is usually single
or indivisible, although the land and building or
improvements erected thereon are assessed separately,
except when the land and building or improvements belong
to separate owners. It is a fixed proportion of the assessed
value of the property taxed, and requires, therefore, the
intervention of assessors. It is collected or payable at
appointed times, and it constitutes a superior lien on and is
enforceable against the property subject to such taxation,
and not by imprisonment of the owner. The tax imposed by
the ordinance in question does not possess the afore stated
attributes. Clearly, therefore, the tax in question is not a real
estate tax. “The spirit, rather than the letter, or an ordinance
determines the construction thereof, and the court looks
less to its words and more to the context, subject-matter,
consequence, and effect. Accordingly, what is within the
spirit is within the ordinance although it is not within the
letter thereof, while that which is in the letter, although not
within the spirit, is not within the ordinance.” It is within
neither the letter nor the spirit of the ordinance that an
additional real estate tax is being imposed, otherwise, the
subject-matter would have been not merely tenement
houses. It is plain from the context of the ordinance that the
intention is to impose a license tax on the operation of
tenement houses, which is a form of business or calling.
Thus, there is no double taxation.
City of Cebu v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Reyes v. Almanzor
Tan v. Del Rosario
Doctrine: Uniformity of taxation merely requires that all
subjects or objects of taxation are to be treated alike both
in privileges and liabilities.
FACTS
Petitioner assails the validity of RA No. 7496 contending
that it violates the Constitution.
Petitioner contends that Republic Act No. 7496 violates the
constitutional requirement that taxation "shall be uniform
and equitable" in that the law would now attempt to tax
single proprietorships and professionals differently from the
manner it imposes the tax on corporations and
partnerships.
ISSUE
Whether RA 7496 violates Art VI Sec 28(1) of the
Constitution
RULING
No. The Court ruled that the contention of petitioner clearly
forgets that such a system of income taxation has long been
the prevailing rule even prior to Republic Act No. 7496.
Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal
protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of
taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in
privileges and liabilities. Uniformity does not forfend
classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used
therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the
categorization is germane to achieve the legislative
purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both
present and future conditions, and (4) the classification
applies equally well to all those belonging to the same
class.
What may instead be perceived to be apparent from the
amendatory law is the legislative intent to increasingly shift
the income tax system towards the schedular approach in
the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain,
by and large, the present global treatment on taxable
corporations.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
British American Tobacco v. Camacho
FACTS: RA 8240, entitled "An Act Amending Sections 138,
139, 140, and 142 of the NIRC, as Amended and For Other
Purposes," took effect on January 1, 1997. In the same
year, Congress passed RA 8424 or The Tax Reform Act of
1997, re-codifying the NIRC.
Petitioner British American Tobacco introduced and sold
Lucky Strike, Lucky Strike Lights and Lucky Strike Menthol
Lights cigarettes w/ SRP P 9.90/pack - Initial assessed
excise tax: P 8.96/pack (Sec. 145 [c])
February 17, 2003: RR 9-2003: Periodic review every 2
years or earlier of the current net retail price of new brands
and variants thereof for the purpose of the establishing and
updating their tax classification
March 11, 2003: RMO 6-2003: Guidelines and procedures
in establishing current net retail prices of new brands of
cigarettes and alcohol products
August 8, 2003: RR 22-2003: Implement the revised tax
classification of certain new brands introduced in the
market after January 1, 1997 based on the survey of their
current net retail prices. This increased the excise tax to
P13.44 since the average net retail price is above P
10/pack. This cause petitioner to file before the RTC of
Makati a petition for injunction with prayer for issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction sought to enjoin the implementation of Sec. 145
of the NIRC, RR No. 1-97, 9-2003, 22-2003 and 6-2003 on
the ground that they discriminate against new brands of
cigarettes in violation of the equal protection and uniformity
provisions of the Constitution
RTC: Dismissed
While petitioner's appeal was pending, RA 9334
amending Sec. 145 of the 1997 NIRC among other took
effect on January 1, 2005 which in effect increased
petitioners excise tax to P25/pack
Petitioner filed a Motion to Admit attached supplement and
a supplement to the petition for review assailing the
constitutionality of RA 9334 and praying a downward
classification of Lucky Strike products at the bracket taxable
at P 8.96/pack since existing brands are still taxed based
on their price as of October 1996 eventhough they are
equal or higher than petitioner's product price.
Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing Incorporated,
Fortune Tobacco Corp., Mighty Corp. and JT International
Intervened.
Fortune Tobacco claimed that the CTA should have the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the decision of the BIR
in tax disputes
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8240 of the classification freeze
provision is unconstitutional for violating the equal
protection and uniformity provisions of the Constitution
RULING: NO.The rule of uniformity does not call for perfect
uniformity or perfect equality, because this is hardly
attainable." The problem of classification did not present
itself in that case. It did not arise until nine years later, when
the Supreme Court held: "Equality and uniformity in taxation
means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the
same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing
power has the authority to make reasonable and natural
classifications for purposes of taxation"
Under the the rational basis test, a legislative classification,
to survive an equal protection challenge, must be shown to
rationally further a legitimate state interest . The
classifications must be reasonable and rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation.
A legislative classification that is reasonable does not
offend the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of
the laws. The classification is considered valid and
reasonable provided that: (1) it rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3)
it applies, all things being equal, to both present and future
conditions; and (4) it applies equally to all those belonging
to the same class.
Moreover, petitioner failed to clearly demonstrate the exact
extent of such impact as the price is not the only factor that
affects competition.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco
Corporation
City of Manila v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.,
FACTS:
Respondent paid the local business tax only as a
manufacturers as it was expressly exempted from the
business tax under a different section and which applied to
businesses subject to excise, VAT or percentage tax under
the Tax Code. The City of Manila subsequently amended
the ordinance by deleting the provision exempting
businesses under the latter section if they have already paid
taxes under a different section in the ordinance. This
amending ordinance was later declared by the Supreme
Court null and void. Respondent then filed a protest on the
ground of double taxation. RTC decided in favor of
Respondent and the decision was received by Petitioner on
April 20, 2007. On May 4, 2007, Petitioner filed with the
CTA a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Review asking for a 15-day extension or until May 20, 2007
within which to file its Petition. A second Motion for
Extension was filed on May 18, 2007, this time asking for a
10-day extension to file the Petition. Petitioner finally filed
the Petition on May 30, 2007 even if the CTA had earlier
issued a resolution dismissing the case for failure to timely
file the Petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Has Petitioner’s the right to appeal with the CTA lapsed?
(2) Does the enforcement of the latter section of the tax
ordinance constitute double taxation?
HELD:
(1) NO. Petitioner complied with the reglementary period for
filing the petition. From April 20, 2007, Petitioner had 30
days, or until May 20, 2007, within which to file their Petition
for Review with the CTA. The Motion for Extension filed by
the petitioners on May 18, 2007, prior to the lapse of the 30-
day period on 20 May 2007, in which they prayed for
another extended period of 10 days, or until 30 May 2007,
to file their Petition for Review was, in reality, only the first
Motion for Extension of petitioners. Thus, when Petitioner
filed their Petition via registered mail their Petition for
Review on 30 May 2007, they were able to comply with the
period for filing such a petition.
(2) YES. There is indeed double taxation if respondent is
subjected to the taxes under both Sections 14 and 21 of the
tax ordinance since these are being imposed: (1) on the
same subject matter — the privilege of doing business in
the City of Manila; (2) for the same purpose — to make
persons conducting business within the City of Manila
contribute to city revenues; (3) by the same taxing authority
— petitioner City of Manila; (4) within the same taxing
jurisdiction — within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of
Manila; (5) for the same taxing periods — per calendar
year; and (6) of the same kind or character — a local
business tax imposed on gross sales or receipts of the
business.
Nursery Care Corporation v. Acevedo G.R. No. 180651
July 30, 2014
Facts:
City of Manila assessed and collected taxes from
petitioners pursuant to Section 15 and Section 17 of the
Revenue Code of Manila and imposed additional taxes
upon the petitioners pursuant to Section 21 of the same
code. Petitioners formally requested the Office of the
City Treasurer for the tax credit or refund of the local
business taxes paid under protest. City Treasurer
Anthony Acevedo denied the request.
RTC rendered its decision that there is no double
taxation. The taxes imposed under Sec. 21 represent
additional amounts added by the business
establishment to the basic prices of its goods and
services ⁵which are paid by the end-users to the
businesses. It is actually not taxes on the business of
petitioners but on the consumers. Petitioners contend
that the proviso in Section 21 exempted all registered
businesses in the City of Manila from paying the tax
imposed under Section 21
The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the
petitioners due to their lack of jurisdiction on the case
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure which states:
"Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of
Appeals. – An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the
Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising
only questions of law shall be dismissed, issues purely
of law not being reviewable by said court. similarly, an
appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for
review from the appellate judgment of a Regional Trial
Court shall be dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in not ruling that the action
of the City Treasurer in imposing Section 21 of the
Revenue Code of Manila because it constitute double
taxation.
RULING:
Yes. the Court finds that there is double taxation.
Petitioner is liable to pay business taxes to the City of
Manila but considering that the petitioner has already
paid these taxes under Section 14 of the Manila
Revenue Code, it is exempt from the same payments
under Section 21 of the same code. The payments
made under Section 21 must be refunded to petitioner.
(explanation of double taxation by the court: Double
taxation means taxing the same property twice when it
should be taxed only once; that is, "taxing the same
person twice by the same jurisdiction for the same
thing." It is obnoxious when the taxpayer is taxed twice
when it should be but once. Otherwise described as
"direct duplicate taxation," the two taxes must be
imposed on the same subject matter, for the same
purpose, by the same taxing authority, within the same
jurisdiction, during the same taxing period; and the
taxes must be of the same kind or character.)
Air Canada v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Facts
- Air Canada is a foreign corporation
organized and existing under the laws of Canada.
On April 24, 2000, it was granted an authority to
operate as an offline carrier by the Civil
Aeronautics Board, subject to certain conditions,
which authority would expire on April 24, 2005. As
an off-line carrier, Air Canada does not have
flights originating from or coming to the
Philippines and does not operate any airplane in
the Philippines. For the period ranging from the
third quarter of 2000 to the second quarter of 2002,
Air Canada, through Aerotel, filed quarterly and
annual income tax returns and paid the income tax
on Gross Philippine Billings in the total amount of
₱5,185,676.77. On November 28, 2002, Air Canada
filed a written claim for refund of alleged
erroneously paid income taxes amounting to
₱5,185,676.77 before the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR). It’s basis was found in the revised
definition of Gross Philippine Billings under
Section 28(A)(3)(a) of the 1997 National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC)
- The CTA denied the petition. It found that
Air Canada was engaged in business in the
Philippines through a local agent that sells airline
tickets on its behalf. As such, it held that while Air
Canada was not liable for tax on its Gross
Philippine Billings under Section 28(A)(3), it was
nevertheless liable to pay the 32% corporate
income tax on income derived from the sale of
 airline tickets within the Philippines pursuant to
Section 28(A)(1). On appeal, the CTA En Banc
affirmed the ruling of the CTA First Division.
Issue
- Whether Air Canada can benefit from the
treaty's elimination of double taxation in favor of
Canada or the preferential rate of 1.5%
Ruling
- NO. Air Canada cannot avail of the
elimination of double taxation in favor of Canada
since the treaty expressly excludes Canadian
carriers with "permanent establishment." Through
the appointment of Aerotel as its local sales agent,
petitioner is deemed to have created a "permanent
establishment" in the Philippines as defined under
the Republic of the Philippines-Canada Tax Treaty.
This is especially true since Aerotel has no
"independent status" beacuse Air Canada
exercises comprehensive control and detailed
instructions over the means and results of the
activities of the former.
Asiatrust Development Bank, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue
Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Acting Commissioner of
Customs
GR NO L-21841
FACTS:
Petitioner, engaged in the industry of processing gasoline,
oils etc., claims for the refund of special import taxes paid
pursuant to the provision of RA 1394 which imposed a
special import tax "on all goods, articles or products
imported or brought into the Philippines." Exempt from this
tax, by express mandate of Section 6 of the same law are
"machinery, equipment, accessories, and spare parts, for
the use of industries, miners, mining enterprises, planters
and farmers". Petitioner argued that the importation it made
of gas pumps used by their gasoline station operators
should fall under such exemptions, being directly used in its
industry. The Collector of Customs of Manila rejected the
claim, and so as the Court on Tax Appeals. The CTA noted
that the pumps imported were not used in the processing of
gasoline and other oil products but by the gasoline stations,
owned by the petitioner, for pumping out, from underground
barrels, gasoline sold on retail to customers.
ISSUE:
WON the contention of the petitioner tenable? Does the
subject imports fall into the exemptions?
HELD:
No. The contention runs smack against the familiar rules
that exemption from taxation is not favored, and that
exemptions in tax statutes are never presumed. Which are
but statements in adherence to the ancient rule that
exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris
against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing
authority. Tested by this precept, we cannot indulge in
expansive construction and write into the law an exemption
not therein set forth. Rather, we go by the reasonable
assumption that where the State has granted in express
terms certain exemptions, those are the exemptions to be
considered, and no more. Since the law states that, to be
tax-exempt, equipment and spare parts should be "for the
use of industries", the coverage herein should not be
enlarged to include equipment and spare parts for use in
dispensing gasoline at retail.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Guerrero,
FACTS:
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue denied the claim for
refund in the sum of P2, 441.93 filed by the administrator of
the estate of Paul I. Gunn. The deceased operated an air
transportation business under the business name and style
of Philippine Aviation Development.61,048.19 liters of
gasoline was actually used in aviation during the period
from October 3, 1956 to May 31, 1957. The estate, as
claimed, was entitled to the same rights and privileges as
Filipino citizens operating public utilities including privileges
in the matter of taxation. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue disagreed. The matter was brought to the Court
of Tax Appeals and ordered the petitioner to refund to the
respondent the sum of P2, 441.93.Court of Tax Appeals
decision was reversed.
IISSUES: Whether or not Section 142 of the National
Internal Revenue Code allowing Filipinos a refund of 50
percentum of the specific tax paid on aviation oil, could be
availed by citizens of the United States and all forms of
business enterprises owned or controlled directly by them
in view of the privilege under the Ordinance to operate
public utilities in the same manner as to, and under the
same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines
or corporations or associations owned or controlled by
citizens of the Philippines.
HELD: No. The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is
reversed and the case is remanded to it, to grant
respondent Administrator the opportunity of proving
whether the estate could claim the benefits of Section 142
of the National Internal Revenue Code, allowing refund to
citizens of foreign countries on a showing of reciprocity
Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. v.
City of Bacolod
Doctrine: Grant of tax exemptions should be strictly
construed against the taxpayer. There should be a showing
of legislative intent for matters of tax exemption.
FACTS
PLDT is a holder of a legislative franchise to render local
and international telecommunications services. The terms
and conditions of its franchise were consolidated under
Republic Act No. 7082, Section 12 of which embodies the
so-called "in-lieu-of-all-taxes" clause.
The Local Government Code took effect. Section 193
thereof withdrawn all tax exemption privileges including
those taxes from which PLDT is exempted under the "in-
lieu-of-all-taxes" clause.
The City of Bacolod made an assessment on PLDT for the
payment of franchise tax due the City, to which PLDT
complied. The Department of Finance, through BLGF,
thereafter issued a ruling that telecommunication properties
including PLDT became exempt from local franchise tax
based on RA 7925.
PLDT filed a protest questioning the assessment and asked
for a refund of the local franchise taxes it paid. It was
denied. PLDT then filed a petition.
ISSUE any provision therein limiting the tax exemption of
Whether or not PLDT is exempted from paying franchise respondent to final withholding tax on interest income or
taxes. excluding from said exemption the OCT.

RULING
No. Section 23 of Rep. Act No. 7925 does not refer to tax
exemption but only to exemption from certain regulations
and requirements imposed by the National
Telecommunications Commission. There is nothing in the
language of Sec. 23 nor there is legislative intent in
enacting R.A. No. 7925 which shows that it contemplates
the grant of tax exemptions to all telecommunications
entities, including those whose exemptions had been
withdrawn by the LGC.
The Court also held that BLGF’s findings should not be
given weight because they do not possess the same
authority as the courts.
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. v.
Province of Laguna
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine
Airlines, Inc.,
FACTS: The case stems from the failure of Petitioner to act
on the request for refund of respondent, which prompted
respondent to file on 4 June 2003, with the CTA in Division,
a Petition for Review, docketed as CTA Case No. 6735.
Respondent sought the refund of the amount ₱127,138.92,
representing OCT, which PLDT erroneously collected from
respondent for the second, third and fourth quarters of
2001.8 The claim of respondent for the refund of the OCT
for the first quarter of 2001, amounting to ₱75,323.26, had
already prescribed after the passing of more than two years
since said amount was paid.
Tax Exemptions
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. v.
Province of Laguna, G.R. No. 151899 August 16, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint questioning the ruling of the
lower court denying their demand of tax refund and
rejecting their contention that they are exempted from
payment of franchise tax. Respondent, invoking its
authority under Local Government Code, impose payment
of franchise tax upon all businesses enjoying a franchise,
including PLDT. The petitioner claimed that pursuant to Sc.
23, RA No. 7925, they are exempted from paying franchise
tax.
Issue:
WON PLDT is exempted from paying franchise tax.
Ruling:
No. The right of taxation is inherent in the State. Anyone
who claims for exemption has a burden to justify his claim.
Tax exemption must be expressed in the statute in clear
language that leaves no doubt of interpretation of the
intention of the legislature to grant such exemption. In case
of doubt, it must always interpret against the taxpayer and
in favor of the taxing authority. Here, the word “exemption”
in Sec. 23 of RA No. 7925 does not contemplate the grant
of tax exemptions to all telecommunications entities,
including PLDT. It refers only to exemption from certain
regulations and requirements imposed by NTC.

That January to December 2001, the Philippine Long

Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) collected from
respondent the 10% OCT on the amount paid by the latter
for overseas telephone calls it had made through the former
amounting to ₱202,471.18, under Section 120 of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997.

The CTA First Division reasoned that under Section 13 of

Presidential Decree No. 1590, respondent had the option to
choose between two alternatives: the basic corporate
income tax and the franchise tax, whichever would result in
a lower amount of tax, and this would be in lieu of all other
taxes, with the exception only of tax on real property. In the
event that respondent incurred a net loss for the taxable
year resulting in zero basic corporate income tax liability,
respondent could not be required to pay the franchise tax
before it could avail itself of the exemption from all other
taxes under Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 1590.
The possibility that respondent would incur a net loss for a
given taxable period and, thus, have zero liability for basic
corporate income tax, was already anticipated by Section
13 of Presidential Decree No. 1590, the very same section
granting respondent tax exemption, since it authorized
respondent to carry over its excess net loss as a deduction
for the next five taxable years.

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent is exempt from paying

tax

RULING: NO. The language used in Section 13 of

Presidential Decree No. 1590, granting respondent tax
exemption, is clearly all-inclusive. The basic corporate
income tax or franchise tax paid by respondent shall be "in
lieu of all other taxes, duties, royalties, registration, license,
and other fees and charges of any kind, nature, or
description imposed, levied, established, assessed or
collected by any municipal, city, provincial, or national
authority or government agency, now or in the future x x x,"
except only real property tax. Even a meticulous
examination of Presidential Decree No. 1590 will not reveal
BILL OF RIGHTS
Preliminaries
People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 216439
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21,
2003 → See Separate Opinion, J. Puno
Facts:
Following the successful EDSA
Revolution, President Aquino issued EO No. 1 creating the
Presidential Commission on Good Government ("PCGG").
EO No. 1 tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth
of former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates. PCGG, through its then
Chairman Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board ("AFP
Board") tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth
and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the
active service or retired.
AFP Board issued a Resolution on its
findings on the reported unexplained wealth of Major
General Josephus Ramas. The value of his property in
Quezon City is estimated at ₱700,000.00. Aside from the
military equipment and communications equipment, the
raiding team was also confiscated money in the amount of
₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of
Elizabeth Dimaano.
Dimaano was a former secretary and
supported by the respondent and have no means of income
to acquire such items and money. PCGG contended that
Ramas violated RA 3019, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA 1379 otherwise known
as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired
Property." In his answer, Ramas stated that his property in
Q.C. valued at ₱700,000, is not out of proportion to his
salary and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of
any mansion in Cebu City and the cash, communications
equipment and other items confiscated from the house of
Dimaano.
Petitioner claims the properties confiscated
from Dimaano’s house as illegally seized and therefore
inadmissible in evidence.
Issue: Whether or not the search and seizure conducted by
the republic is illegal.
Ruling: Yes. Constabulary raiding team served at
Dimaano’s residence a search warrant captioned "Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition." The raiding team
seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt together with
other items not included in the search warrant. The raid
was conducted on 3 March 1986, or five days after the
successful EDSA revolution.
A revolutionary government was operative at that
time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were "taking
power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people."
the revolutionary government effectively withheld the
operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed
private respondents’ exclusionary right.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973
Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals
under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect
during the interregnum. The revolutionary government,
after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed
responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with the
Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also
a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that "[n]o one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his property." Although the
signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally
binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has
interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally
accepted principles of international law and binding on the
State.46 Thus, the revolutionary government was also
obligated under international law to observe the rights47 of
individuals under the Declaration.
A. Due Process
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Association, Inc. v.
Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. L-24693, 31 July 1967
FACTS
- Ordinance No. 4760 was promulgated by the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila.
However, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association filed a petition for
prohibition against such ordinance on the
ground that it is unconstitutional and void for
being unreasonable and violative of due
process because it increases the license fee
for the first and second class motels, guests
need to fill up personal information before
having an accommodation, the premises and
facilities of the hotel will be open for
inspection by the Mayor or Chief of Police
which are also violative of the right to privacy
and the guaranty against self-incrimination,
classifying motels into two classes, persons
below 18 yrs of age are not allowed to be
accommodated in such hotels, and the
owners are not allowed to lease or rent any
room for more than twice every 24 hours. Any
violation of the said ordinance would cause
for the automatic cancellation of license of
the hotel
- The Mayor of the City of Manila (res) prays for
the dismissal of such petition because such
petition fails to state its cause of action, the
said ordinance is a valid exercise of the
police power, and only the guests or
customers have the right to complain
regarding on the invasion of privacy and the
guaranty against self-incrimination.
ISSUE
- WON Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of
Manila is violative of the due process clause
RULING
- No. The said ordinance is not violative of the
due process clause
- The presumption of validity must prevail and
the judgment against the ordinance must be
set aside. In this case, there were only
pleadings and stipulation of facts and these
must not prevail over the presumption.
- Moreover, police power is an inherent and
plenary power of the State that enables it to
prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society. In this case, the
ordinance is a valid exercise of police power
 because it was enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals such as
prostitution. The ordinance was also
intended to curb illegitimate use of hotels.
Cornejo v. Gabriel, G.R. No. L-16887, November 17,
1920
FACTS: The petitioner in this case, the suspended
municipal president of Pasay, Rizal, seeks by these
proceedings in mandamus to have the provincial governor
and the provincial board of the Province of Rizal temporarily
restrained from going ahead with investigation of the
charges filed against him pending resolution of the case,
and to have an order issue directed to the provincial
governor commanding him to return the petitioner to his
position as municipal president of Pasay. The members of
the provincial board have interposed a demurrer based on
the ground that this court has no right to keep them from
complying with the provisions of the law. The provincial
governor has filed an answer to the petition, in which he
alleges as a special defense that numerous complaints
have been received by him against the conduct of Miguel
R. Cornejo, municipal president of Pasay; that these
complaints were investigated by him; that he came to the
conclusion that agreeable to the powers conferred upon
provincial governors, the municipal president should be
temporarily suspended, and that an investigation is now
being conducted by the provincial board.
Ruling: Due process of law is not necessarily judicial
process; much of the process by means of which the
Government is carried on, and the order of society
maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is
as much due process of law, as is judicial process. While a
day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in
administrative proceedings it is otherwise since they rest
upon different principles.
Macabingkil v. Judge Yatco, G.R. No. L-23174, 18
September 1967
Hildawa v. Minister of Defense, G.R. No. L-67766,
August 14, 1985
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 120095, 05 August 1996
Dole ordered that before entertainers and performing artists
can go abroad, they must first adhere to the Artist Record
Book (ARB) requirement, which could be processed only
after the artist could show proof of academic and skills
training and has passed the required tests.
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. Kary International,
Inc. assailing these department orders, principally
contending that said orders 1) violated the constitutional
right to travel; 2) abridged existing contracts for
employment; and 3) deprived individual artists of their
licenses without due process of law.
ISSUE: WON the assailed Department order are
unconstitutional
Ruling: NO. they are constitutional
First, it is a valid exercise of police power as history shows
that there has been alarming number of reports that a
significant number of Filipina performing artists ended up
as prostitutes abroad and with this the government began
instituting measures aimed at deploying only those
individuals who met set standards which would qualify them
as legitimate performing artists.
Licensing or accreditation requirements do not violate the
due process clause under the police power, of regulating
entry to the practice of various trades or professions.
The Department Order does not also violate the equal
protection clause
As the equal protection clause does not require absolute
equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under
like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
imposed
Chavez v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, 09 June 2004
Doctrine: A license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain
privilege is neither a property nor property right. Thus, it is
not protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
FACTS
President Arroyo delivered a speech before the members
of the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in
all public places to avert the rising crime incidents. She
directed the PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend
the issuance of permits to carry firearms outside of
residence. Respondent then issued guidelines.
Petitioner Chavez, a licensed gun owner with a permit,
requested for the DILG to reconsider the guidelines.
However, it was denied. He then filed a petition with the SC,
invoking the due process clause, asserting that the
revocation of his PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed
Guidelines deprived him of his "vested property right"
without due process of law and in violation of the equal
protection of law.
ISSUE
Whether the PNP guidelines violate the due process clause
of the Constitution.
RULING
No. In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost
consideration must be whether life, liberty or property
interest exists. A license authorizing a person to enjoy a
certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. All
licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive
action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region v. Olalia, G.R. No. 153657, 19 April 2007
Facts:
Petitioner filed a petition questioning the decision of
the respondent judge allowing the prospective
extradite to bail. The petitioner alleged that the
respondent judge erred in his decision as there is no
provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential
extradite as such right is limited solely to criminal
proceedings. Extradition case is not criminal
proceeding hence, right to bail cannot be extended.
Issue: WON right to bail is extended to a potential
extraditee.
Ruling: Yes. The Philippines in light of the various
treaty obligations are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such
remedies which their fundamental right to liberty.
These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.
Furthermore, while our extradition law does not
provide for the grant of bail to an extradite, however,
there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing
a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, should not be
the same as that in criminal, civil or administrative
proceedings. The standard in extradition case, even
the latter is administrative in character, must be “clear
and convincing evidence”. The potential extraditee
must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that he
is not a flight risk and will abide with all orders and
processes of extradition court before granting bail.
Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
FACTS: The case is about the enactment of the
Reproductive Health Law which provides Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, access and
information to the full range of modern family planning
methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for
the peoples’ right to reproductive health be achieved.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of said law on
account of being "void-for-vagueness" in violation of
the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing
the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any
violation," it is vague because it does not define the
type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH
Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not RH law violates due process
RULING: NO. A statute or act suffers from the defect of
vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle. Moreover, in determining whether the words
used in a statute are vague, words must not only be
taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but
also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule
that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be
construed together with the other parts and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are
prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or
private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the
dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide
incorrect information regarding programs and services
on reproductive health including the right to informed
choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-
safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here
denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with
established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree
with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety;
and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other
hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or
deliberateness that is intentional. 258 Used together in
relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of
malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the
public as to the nature and effect of programs and
services on reproductive health. Public health and
safety demand that health care service providers give
their honest and correct medical information in
accordance with what is acceptable in medical
practice. While health care service providers are not
barred from expressing their own personal opinions
regarding the programs and services on reproductive
health, their right must be tempered with the need to
provide public health and safety. The public deserves
no less.
Saunar v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 186502,
December 13, 2017
Smith Bell & Co. v. Natividad, G.R. No. 15574,
September 17, 1919
Facts:
Petitioner is a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippine
Islands, the majority of its stockholders are British
subjects. Petitioner applied with the Collector of
Customs for a certificate of Philippine registry for the
purpose of transporting plaintiff's merchandise
between ports in the Islands. The Collector refused to
issue the certificate, giving as his reason that all the
stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., were not
citizens either of the United States or of the Philippine
Islands.
Philippine Legislature enacted Act
No. 2761. The first section of this law amended section
1172 of the Administrative Code to read as follows:
SEC. 1172. Certificate of Philippine register. — Upon
registration of a vessel of domestic ownership, and of
more than fifteen tons gross, a certificate of Philippine
register shall be issued for it. If the vessel is of
domestic ownership and of fifteen tons gross or less,
the taking of the certificate of Philippine register shall
be optional with the owner.
"Domestic ownership," as used in this section, means
ownership vested in some one or more of the following
classes of persons: (a) Citizens or native inhabitants of
the Philippine Islands; (b) citizens of the United States
residing in the Philippine Islands; (c) any corporation
or company composed wholly of citizens of the
Philippine Islands or of the United States or of both,
created under the laws of the United States, or of any
State thereof, or of thereof, or the managing agent or
master of the vessel resides in the Philippine Islands.
Issue: Whether or not the Government of the
Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can deny
the registry of vessel in its coastwise trade to
corporations having alien stockholders.
Ruling: Yes. The Government has assumed to act for
the all-sufficient and benefit and protection of its own
citizens and of the self-preservation and integrity of its
dominion. For the reason of some evil-minded
foreigner might very easily take advantage of such
lavish hospitality to chart Philippine waters, to obtain
valuable information for unfriendly foreign powers, to
stir up insurrection, or to prejudice Filipino or
American commerce.
Common carriers which in the Philippines as
in the United States and other countries are, as Lord
Hale said, "affected with a public interest," can only be
permitted to use these public waters as a privilege and
under such conditions as to the representatives of the
people may seem wise.
Villegas v. Hiu Chiong, G.R. No. L-29646, November 10,
1978
 G.R. No. L-29646 November 10, 1978
Facts:
Ordinance No. 6537 was
passed by the Municipal Board of Manila entitled “An
Ordinance Making It Unlawful For Any Person Not A
Citizen Of The Philippines To Be Employed In Any
Place Of Employment Or To Be Engaged In Any Kind
Of Trade, Business Or Occupation Within The City Of
Manila Without First Securing An Employment Permit
From The Mayor Of Manila; And For Other Purposes.”
Section 1 prohibits aliens from being
employed or to engage or participate in any position or
occupation or business enumerated. Except persons
employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of
foreign countries, or in the technical assistance
programs of both the Philippine Government and any
foreign government, and those working in their
respective households, and members of religious
orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who
are not paid monetarily or in kind.
Respondent filed a petition for a
judgement declaring such ordinance null and void.
Respondent argued that It is arbitrary, oppressive and
unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are
thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property
and therefore, violates the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance is valid.
requested for copies of the request and that he be
given ample time to comment on the said request. The
petitioners denied the request pursuant to the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.
ISSUE
- Whether or not treaty stipulations must take
precedence over an individual’s due process rights
RULING
- The human rights of person and the rights
of the accused guaranteed in the
Constitution should take precedence over
treaty rights claimed by a contracting party,
the doctrine of incorporation is applied
whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with a situation where there is a
conflict between a rule of the international
law and the constitution. Efforts must first be
made in order to harmonize the provisions
so as to give effect to both but if the conflict
is irreconcilable, the municipal law must be
upheld. The fact that international law has
been made part of the law of the land does
not pertain to or imply the primacy of
international law over municipal law in the
municipal sphere. In states where the
constitution is the highest law of the land,
both statutes and treaties may be
invalidated if they are in conflict with the
constitution.

Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052, 13

Ruling: No. The Court stated that there is no logic or February 2008, 545 SCRA 92, 138
justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have
been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the
guise of regulation. The equal protection clause of the
FACTS:
Constitution does not forbid classification, it is
imperative that the classification should be based on
real and substantial differences having a reasonable In Houston, Texas, Harris County Police officers were
relation to the subject of the legislation. dispatched to a private home in response to a reported
weapons disturbance. They entered (the right to enter does
seem to have been questioned) the home where John
It has been held that where an ordinance of a
Geddes resided, and observed Lawrence and another man,
municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any
Tyron Garner, engaging in a sex act. The men were
standard to guide or limit the mayor's action,
arrested, held over night and charged with violating a Texas
expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a
statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex
permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or
to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. Specifically
refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring
the statute provided “A person commits and offense if he
upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to
engaged in deviate sexual intercourse with another
grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such
individual of the same sex” and goes on to define deviate
ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited
sexual intercourse as follows: “ any contact between any
delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per
part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of
se lawful. The ordinance in question violates the due
another person or the penetration of the genitals or the anus
process of law and equal protection rule of the
of another person with an object”. The two men were then
Constitution.
convicted before a Justice of the Peace.

Substantive and Procedural Due Process
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465,
January 18, 2000
FACTS
- The Department of Justice received from the
Department of Foreign Affairs a request from the
United States for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to
the United States pursuant to PD No. 1609 prescribing
the procedure for extradition of persons who have
committed a crime in a foreign country. Jimenez
ISSUE:
WON a statute prohibiting specific sex acts violates liberty
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
RULING:
Yes, intimate sexual conduct, between consenting adults,
is a liberty protected under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Scalia: He believes that since the court does not
find homosexual sodomy to be a fundamental right, and
merely describes it as an “exercise in liberty”, a rational
basis scrutiny should be applied, and in doing so, the law
would be upheld. In addition, the courts willingness to
overturn Bowers rather than use stare decicis, is
inconsistent with other case law such as Planned
Parenthood, and thus, feels the court should be consistent
and stable rather than being “manipulative in invoking the
doctrine”. Since all laws, by definition (as example,
prostitution, using heroin, etc) affect liberty, they would all
be unconstitutional under this court’s ruling.
Justice O’Connor: She does not join the court in overturning
Bowers, but rather, reaches her conclusion based on equal
protection, rather than any due process clause. She states
that even using a rational basis review “we have
consistently held that some objectives, such as a bare
desire to harm a politically unpopular group, are not
legitimate state interests”. She comes to this conclusion
based on the fact that sodomy is not prohibited between
opposite sex partners, thus unfairly targets same sex
partners and makes them unequal in the eyes of the law.
Since this law brands homosexuals as criminals, it makes
it more difficult for them to be treated like everyone else,
thus violating equal protection and legally sanctioning
discrimination.
(Written by Justice Kennedy) The court does not focus on
protecting sodomy specifically, but rather, personal
relationships. It explains that despite the fact that the
statutes in questions purport to only prohibit sex, “Their
penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching
consequences, touching upon the most private human
conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places,
the home.” The court found it alarming that the statute in
question sought to control a personal relationship, stating
that forming personal relationships is one of the liberties we
have, and should be able to choose such relationships
without fear of being punished or classified as criminals.
The court focuses on the fact that the laws should not target
relations between consenting adults in private, as this is
what liberty hinges on. The court states that adults are
entitled to respect for their private lives, and “Their right to
liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full
right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the
government”. The court ultimately applies a rational basis
review, stating that the Texas statute in question furthers
no legitimate state interest which can justify an intrusion into
a personal and private life of an individual.
Samalio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140079, March
31, 2005
White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, G.R. No.
122846, January 20, 2009
Mayor Alfredo Lim enacted Ordinance 7774 to protect the
best interest, health and welfare, and the morality of its
constituents in general and the youth in particular that
prohibits short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging
houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the
City of Manila.
(Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging
of room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given
time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a day)
White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC)
and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation
(STDC) filed a motion to intervene on the ground that the
Ordinance directly affects their business interests as
operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.
RTC: UNCONSTITUTIONAL strikes at the personal liberty
of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the
Constitution and further cited Ynot v IAC where the
legitimate purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of
carabaos was sought to be effected through an inter-
province ban on the transport of carabaos and carabeef.
CA: valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458
(4)(iv) of the Local Government Code to regulate the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,
restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments,
including tourist guides and transports
Issue: WON the petitioners have the locus standi to implead
the protection of their patrons' equal protection rights.
YES UNDER THE OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE.
Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of
speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute
needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed
rights.39 In this case, the petitioners claim that the
Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to
liberty of their clients. We can see that based on the
allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from
overbreadth.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is valid
No.
Tests to apply to know if an ordinance is valid or not:
1. rational basis test= mainly in analysis of equal protection
challenges. Using the rational basis examination, laws or
ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate
governmental interest
2. strict scrutiny= the focus is on the presence of
compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest
and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving
that interest.
3. intermediate review= governmental interest is
extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive
measures is considered
a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of
the measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to
private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police
measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights.
The Ordinance makes no distinction between places
frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and
patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents
legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or
even unheard of. it is apparent that the Ordinance can
easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate
without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities.
Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect
"wash rates" from their clientele by charging their
customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even
apartments.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact
already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by
applying existing laws.
Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Game Corporation,
G.R. No. 187854 November 12, 2013
Doctrine: There is no denial of procedural due process
where the opportunity to be heard either through oral
arguments or through pleadings is accorded.
FACTS
Petitioner was an employee of respondent PAGCOR. He
received a letter, advising that he was being
administratively charged for gross misconduct, among
others, and placed under preventive suspension.
He was subjected to attend an administrative inquiry and
appear before PAGCOR’s Corporate Investigation Unit.
The inquiry was conducted at his residence, where his
statement was taken and he was furnished with a
memorandum of his charges.
Petitioner received a letter informing him that he was
dismissed from the service. He appealed his dismissal to
the CSC where it ruled in his favor. PAGCOR elevated the
case to the CA, in which the court ruled that petitioner was
accorded procedural due process.
ISSUE
Whether petitioner’s right to due process was violated
RULING
No. The Court held that the petitioner was not denied due
process of law, for he was afforded the fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain his side.
In this case, the petitioner actively participated in the entire
course of the investigation and hearings conducted by
PAGCOR. He was also informed of his charges and his
dismissal. It is settled that there is no denial of procedural
due process where the opportunity to be heard either
through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded.
The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the
basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be
heard. In administrative proceedings, such as in the case at
bar, procedural due process simply means the opportunity
to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. "To be
heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one
may be heard also thru pleadings.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has
been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to
actual or constructive notice of the institution of
proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights;
(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence
in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal
vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to
afford a person charged administratively a reasonable
guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a
finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial
evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or
contained in the records or made known to the parties
affected.
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Universal
Rightfield Property Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 181381,
July 20, 2015
Facts:
Petitioner seeks to reverse and set aside the decision
of the CA. On July 27,2004, SEC suspended the
respondent’s Registration of Securities and Permit to
Sell Securities to the Public for failure to submit its
reportorial requirements despite the lapse of the
extension period, and due to lack of sufficient
justification for its inability to comply with the said
requirements. The respondent the filed a petition for
review with the CA, which the latter granted for the ff.
reasons:
-The CA set aside the SEC Order of revocation after
finding that respondent was not afforded due process
because no due notice was given and no hearing was
conducted before the said revocation.
-The hearing conducted was ONLY for the purpose of
determining whether the respondent’s registration
should be suspended and not whether said registration
should be revoked.
-Suspension and revocation of respondent’s
registration each requires separate notices and
hearings.
-CA rejected the SEC’s argument that the hearing
conducted for the suspension of registration can
already be considered as the hearing for revocation,
same applies with the notice for suspension.
Issue: WON respondent was given due process prior to
the revocation of its registration?
Ruling:
Yes. The court has consistently held that the essence
of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or
as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Any seeming defect in its observance is
cured by filing complained of a motion for
reconsideration, and denial of due process cannot be
successfully invoked by a party who has had the
opportunity to be heard on such motion. What the law
prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the
absolute absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to
be heard. In this case, there was a hearing conducted
and a notice was given. Hence, due process was
complied. The claim of the respondent that there must
be a separate notice of hearing to revoke is
unnecessary.
Fontanilla v. Commission Proper, G.R. No. 209714,
June 21, 2016
FACTS: The crux of the case is the claim of petitioner (the
Schools Division Superintendent of the Department of
Education) that he was denied of due process when the
Adjudication and Settlement Board ruled that Dr. Fontanilla
is jointly and solidarity liable with Falcis (Special Disbursing
Officer) under Section 104 of the Audit Code which makes
the head of the agency accountable because he did not
make any effort to correct the situation by closely
supervising Falcis, providing the needed guidelines,
transport, and escort for the lowly clerk to handle big
amounts of money.
Dr. Fontanilla maintains that his right to due process was
violated. The COA counters that his motion for intervention,
exclusion, and reconsideration effectively cured the defect
in the proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process
RULING: YES. The mere filing of a motion for
reconsideration cannot cure the due process defect,
especially if the motion was filed precisely to raise the issue
of violation of the right to due process and the lack of
opportunity to be heard on the merits remained.
We cannot tolerate this flippant view of administrative due
process in this case or in any other case
We stress that administrative due process also requires the
following: 1) A finding or decision by a competent tribunal
that is supported by substantial evidence, either presented
at the hearing or at least contained in the records or
disclosed to the parties affected; 2) The tribunal must act
on its own independent consideration of the law and facts
of the controversy and not simply accept the view of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision; and 3) The tribunal
should in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
the various issues involved and the reason for the decision
rendered.
In the present case, not only did the COA deny Dr.
Fontanilla's plea to be heard, it proceeded to confirm his
liability on reconsideration without hearing his possible
defense or defenses
Disciplinary Board v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 224395, July
3, 2017
Geotina v. Gonzales, G.R. No. L-26310, September 30,
1971
Mateo v. Villaluz, G.R. Nos. L-34756-59, March 31, 1973
G.R. Nos. L-34756-59 March 31, 1973
Facts:
Petitioners are tried by respondent for
the offense of robbery in band with homicide. Reyes had
executed an extra-judicial statement signed and sworn to
its truth before the Respondent Judge and that it was
executed because of a threat by a government agent.
Reyes’ repudiation would not sit well with respondent, who
had thus placed himself in a position of being unable to
pass on such question with that degree of objectivity
required by due process, such a move did not fall within one
of the specific grounds to inhibit judges.
Respondent Judge turned down this
plea for disqualification. Petitioners’ motion for suspension
of the respondent was granted. Petitioners’ plea was made
in a manner of highly persuasive and scholarly quality.
Issue: Whether or not respondent violated due process on
the litigation of the respondent.
Ruling: Yes. The Court stated that it is beyond dispute that
due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that
degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to
reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. According
to Justice Dizon, "It has been said, in fact, that due process
of law requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to
nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge."
Respondent could not be totally immune from
the assertion before him in such extrajudicial statement. it
is unlikely that respondent was not in the slightest bit
offended by the affiant's turnabout with Reyes’ later
declaration that there was intimidation by a government
agent exerted on the respondent. Respondent’s sense of
fairness under the circumstances could easily be blunted.
The absence of the requisite due process element is thus
noticeable.
People v. Opida, G.R. No. L-46272, June 13, 1986
FACTS
- Appellants were charged with murder.
During the trial, the judge conducted
interrogation of the appellants asking
adversarial and sometimes irrelevant
questions and belaboring their criminal
activities and tattoos, cross examined the
lone defense witness and took over the task
of impeaching appellants’ credibility
ISSUE
- Whether the judge was being impartial
RULING
- No. convictions are based not on the mere
appearance of the accused but on his actual
commission of crime, to be ascertained with
pure objectivity of the true judge who must
uphold the law for all without favor or malice
and always with justice. The accused are
admittedly notorious criminals who were
probably even proud of their membership in
a gang even as they flaunted their tattoos as
a badge. Nevertheless, they were entitled to
be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proven and had a right not to be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law
People v. Ong, G.R. Nos. 162130-39, May 5, 2006
People v. Mortera, G.R. No. 188104, April 28, 2010
FACTS:
Robelyn Mallari Rojas, 23 years old, single, was stabbed
and killed on August 25, 2002 at Cabato Lane, Gov.
Camins, Zamboanga City. Post mortem examination
conducted by Dr. Jamella Marbella, Medical Officer V of
Zamboanga City Health Office showed that Robelyn Rojas
sustained injuries. The cause of his death was cardio
pulmonary arrest probably secondary to hemorrhagic shock
secondary to stab wound, penetrating left back. on August
25, 2002, at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he together
with Jovel, Archie Saavedra, John Carpio, Plong Siano and
Alberto Rojas were drinking tuba at Cabato Lane, near
Acapulco Drive, Governor Camins, Zamboanga City. Four
of them were sitting on a chair leaning on a concrete wall
while two of their companions sat on the ground. They have
just started drinking when Benancio Mortera, Jr. arrived. He
wanted to hit Alberto Rojas with a Nescafe glass. Alberto
Rojas ran away. Mortera said, "Sayang." He listened while
the group of Ramil Gregorio were (sic) singing
accompanied by a guitar. Jomer Diaz, brother-in-law of
Alberto Diaz, arrived. He bought something from a store five
meters away from the place where Gregorio and his
companions were drinking. Mortera said, "Here comes
another Rojas." Gregorio and his companions told Jomer
Diaz to run away. Mortera hurled a stone at Diaz but the
latter was not hit. Mortera left but he said that he will return.
After a few minutes, Mortera came back. When Jomer Diaz
ran, Robelyn Rojas, brother of Alberto Rojas went to Jomer.
Mortera met Robelyn at a distance of about seven meters
from the place where Ramil Gregorio and his companions
were drinking. Mortera and Robelyn discussed with each
other. After their discussion, Mortera and Robelyn shook
hands. Robelyn turned his face and walked three steps.
Mortera suddenly stabbed Robelyn Rojas at the back with
a knife about 9 inches long. Robelyn was hit at the back.
After stabbing Robelyn, Mortera ran away. Robelyn Rojas
tried to chase Mortera but he was not able to catch up with
the latter. Robelyn fell down mortally wounded. He was
brought to the hospital by his brother Ricky but he was
[pronounced] dead on arrival at the hospital. The RTC
rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of murder.
The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the
issues of denial of due process of law and his right to an
impartial trial. He claimed that the trial court judge, Judge
Jesus Carbon, was hostile towards him and prejudged his
guilt as could be inferred from his "prosecutor-like" conduct.
The accused likewise reiterated his claim of self-defense.
The CA ruled that the trial judge did not transgress the
standard of "cold neutrality" required of a magistrate and
added that the questions he propounded were
"substantially clarificatory." The claim of self-defense was
rejected for failure to prove the element of unlawful
aggression by clear and convincing evidence.
stated in the summons, substituted service cannot be
resorted to.
The service of summons is a vital and indispensable
ingredient of a defendant's constitutional right to due
process. As a rule, if a defendant has not been validly
summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over his
person, and a judgment rendered against him is void.

ISSUE:
R Transport Corporation v. Philippine Hawk Transport
WON there was a denial of his right to due process and of Corporation, G.R. No. 155737, October 19, 2005
his right to have an impartial trial?
Doctrine: The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a
RULING: part of due process.

The accused contends that he was deprived of his FACTS

constitutional right to an impartial tribunal, quoting
extensively the sarcastic remarks that the trial court made
during the hearing. However, the Supreme Court stated
that although the trial judge might have made improper
remarks and comments, the same did not amount to a
denial of his right to due process or his right to an impartial
trial. A perusal of the transcript as a whole would show that
the remarks do not reflect any partiality on the trial court.
The remarks were not made out of context. Most probably,
the trial judge was peeved at the strategy adopted by the
accused. The trial judge cannot be faulted for having made
those remarks, notwithstanding the sarcastic tone it
impressed. Sarcasm alone cannot lead us to conclude that
the judge had taken the side of the prosecution.
RTC of Pasig rendered a decision against the petitioner. A
copy of the decision was sent to petitioner’s counsel but
was returned.
Respondents filed a motion for execution of judgment. The
trial court ordered for the petitioner to be furnished with a
copy of said motion. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal 20
days after. This was denied by the trial court. Thereafter,
petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari but it was
denied.
Petitioner argues that a timely appeal was made since the
counting of reglementary period started only when it was
received by petitioner’s counsel; and that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the
appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time.

Respondent’s argument: It is the fault of petitioner’s

Miranda v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006
counsel that they were not able to receive the decision
earlier since he had not filed any notice of change of
Express Padala v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 202505,
address.
September 6, 2017
ISSUE
BDO Remittance had a branch in Italu hired respondent
Whether the petitioner was denied due process
Ocampo as a remittance processor in September 2002 but
was dismissed in February 2004 for misappropriating the
RULING
sum of €24,035.60 by falsifying invoices of money
No. The Court held that if a party has appeared by counsel,
payments relating to customers' money transfer orders from
service upon him shall be made upon his counsel. The
February to December 2003. Ocampo pleaded guilty to the
general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even
offense and was sentenced in Italy. BDO filed a petition for
mistakes of his counsel. In the case at bar, petitioner,
recognition of foreign judgment with the RTC of
through counsel filed its Answer with Counterclaim and
Mandaluyong City.
Answer to Cross-claim. Likewise, petitioner was given
The Sheriff tried to locate Ocampo’s house but according to
several opportunities to present evidence in its defense.
Ocampo’s uncle, her family was already in Italy so the
The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity
sheriff served the summons to Ocampo’s uncle. Ocampo
to be heard and submit evidence one may have in support
failing to file a reply was defaulted and the RTC recognized
of one’s defense. Here, the Court finds no deprivation of
the ruling in the Court of Turin (Italy). Ocampo’s mother
due process.
received a copy of the Decision and forwarded it to Ocampo
after the time of appeal has lapsed.
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of
due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be
Ocampo then filed a motion for reconsideration with the CA
exercised only in the manner and strictly in accordance with
and the CA denied it.
the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to appeal
must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failure to
ISSUE: WON was Ocampo denied of procedural due
do so results in the loss of that right.
process.

RULING: YES.
Department of Agrarian Reform v. Samson, G.R. No.
161910, June 17, 2008
Substituted service is effected by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendant's residence with some person
Procedural Due Process
of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or by
Doctrine:
leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of
-The Court ruled that any seeming defect in the
business with some competent person in charge thereof.
observance of due process is cured by the filing of a
When the defendant's whereabouts are unknown, the rules
motion for reconsideration and that denial of due
allow service of summons by publication. service of
process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who
summons by publication may only be resorted to when the
has had the opportunity to be heard thereon.
whereabouts of the defendant are not only unknown, but
-The court ruled that where the party has the
cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.
opportunity to appeal or seek reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of, defects in procedural
Substituted service is improper under the facts of this case.
due process may be cured.
Substituted service presupposes that the place where the
summons is being served is thedefendant's current
residence or office/regular place of business. Thus, where
Catacutan v. People, G.R. No. 175991, August 31, 2011
the defendant neither resides nor holds office in the address
FACTS: Petitioner Jose Catacutan was held guilty before
the Sandiganbayan for the violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for his refusal to
implement the promotion and appointments of Georgito
Posesano and Magdalena A. Divinagracia as Vocational
Supervisors III despite the directive of CHED and the Civil
Service commission. Petitioner admitted that he did not
implement the promotional appointments of the private
complainants because of some procedural lapses or
infirmities attending the preparation of the appointment
papers. Catacutan questioned the judgment, contending
that he was denied due process when he was not allowed
to present the CA judgment, dismissing the adiminstrative
case against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied of due
process.
RULING: NO. “Due process simply demands an
opportunity to be heard." "Due process is satisfied when the
parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the controversy." "Where
an opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process."
Guided by these established jurisprudential
pronouncements, petitioner can hardly claim denial of his
fundamental right to due process. Records show that the
petitioner was able to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him, argue his case vigorously, and
explain the merits of his defense. To reiterate, as long as a
party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in
due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due
process of law for the opportunity to be heard is the better
accepted norm of procedural due process.
Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Game Corporation,
G.R. No. 187854, November 12, 2013
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 221636, July 11, 2016
FACTS
- The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
subjected the 71.4715 hectare land of private
respondents to the coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program. Petitioner Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) valued the property in the amount of
Pl,620,750.72. Private respondents rejected the
valuation, but petitioner still deposited the amount in
their favor. private respondents filed before RTC-SAC
a case for determination of just compensation. The
SAC ordered petitioner to re-value the property, which
it did, coming up with a new valuation of Pl.8 million.
Private respondents filed a notice of appeal before the
SAC, which gave the notice due course. Petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that private
respondents availed a wrong mode of appeal. The CA
denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss on grounds of
liberality in the construction of the Rules of Court
ISSUE
- Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion when it arbitrarily
disregarded the long-standing jurisprudence that
appeals from the decision of the SAC must be via a
petition for review under Rule 42 and not by ordinary
appeal.
RULING
- Yes. While it is true that we have applied a liberal
application of the rules of procedure in a number of
cases, we have stressed that this can be invoked only
in proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances. We agree with petitioner’s contention
that the CA and private respondents did not proffer a
reasonable cause to justify non-compliance with the
rules besides the exhortation of circumspect leniency
in order to give private respondents a day in court.
Private respondents failed to specifically cite any
justification as to how and why a normal application of
procedural rules would frustrate their quest for justice.
Indeed, private respondents have not been forthright
in explaining why they chose the wrong mode of
appeal. The bare invocation of “the interest of
substantial justice” line is not some magic wand that
will automatically compel us to suspend procedural
rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled, let alone
dismissed simply because their non-observance may
have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantial
rights. Utter disregard of the rules cannot be justly
rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal
construction.
Go v. East Oceanic Leasing, G.R. No. 206841, January
19, 2018
January 19, 2018 G.R. No. 206841
Facts:
Go obtained a loan from respondent as
evidenced by a Promissory Note. Go's loan application was
approved by recommendation of Theodore Sy. The
managing director of the respondent company specified
that the purpose of the loan was for the upgrading of the
bus fleet and replacement of old units of Oriental Bus Lines
owned by Go.
The 6 post-dated checks Go issued was
dishonored by the DBP by reason of "Account Under
Garnished." By reason of the dishonored checks, Go's loan
became due and demandable. East Oceanic filed a
Complaint against Go before the RTC for collection of a
sum of money. Go argued that the Promissory Note is void,
given that it had failed to comply with the mandatory
requirements.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent.
Go moved for reconsideration, arguing that the RTC
Decision is contrary to law because it failed to cite any
factual and legal basis as to his civil liability to East
Oceanic.
Issue: Whether or not RTC’s decision is void for having no
basis in fact and in law as regards his civil liability to
Oceanic.
Ruling: Yes. The Court stated that the Constitution
expressly provides that "'no decision shall be rendered by
any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for
review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
court shall be refused due course or denied without stating
the basis therefor.'' This constitutional mandate is reflected
in Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court.
 The case shows that the RTC had failed to clearly
and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it based
its ruling insofar as Go's civil liability to East Oceanic is
concerned. RTC failed to meet the standard set forth in
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, and in so doing,
deprived Go of his right to due process.
• Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Universal Rightfield Property Holdings, Inc., G.R. No.
181381, July 20, 2015
Facts:
Petitioner seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of the
CA. On July 27,2004, SEC suspended the respondent’s
Registration of Securities and Permit to Sell Securities to
the Public for failure to submit its reportorial requirements
despite the lapse of the extension period, and due to lack
of sufficient justification for its inability to comply with the
said requirements. The respondent the filed a petition for
review with the CA, which the latter granted for the ff.
reasons:
-The CA set aside the SEC Order of revocation after finding
that respondent was not afforded due process because no
due notice was given and no hearing was conducted before
the said revocation.
-The hearing conducted was ONLY for the purpose of
determining whether the respondent’s registration should
be suspended and not whether said registration should be
revoked.
-Suspension and revocation of respondent’s registration
each requires separate notices and hearings.
-CA rejected the SEC’s argument that the hearing
conducted for the suspension of registration can already be
considered as the hearing for revocation, same applies with
the notice for suspension.
Issue: WON respondent was given due process prior to the
revocation of its registration?
Ruling:
Yes. The court has consistently held that the essence of
due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Any
seeming defect in its observance is cured by filing
complained of a motion for reconsideration, and denial of
due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who
has had the opportunity to be heard on such motion. What
the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but
the absolute absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to
be heard. In this case, there was a hearing conducted and
a notice was given. Hence, due process was complied. The
claim of the respondent that there must be a separate
notice of hearing to revoke is unnecessary.
Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 88709, February 11, 1992
FACTS
- The order is assailed by the petitioners on the
principal ground that it violates the aforementioned
constitutional requirement of Article 8 Section 14 of
the Constitution. The petitioners claim that it is not
a reasoned decision and does not clearly
andistinctly explain how it was reached by the trial
court. Petitioners complain that there was no
analysis of their testimonial evidence or of their 21
exhibits, the trial court merely confining itself to the
pronouncement that the sheriff's sale was valid and
that it had no jurisdiction over the derivative suit.
There was therefore no adequate factual or legal basis
for the decision that could justify its review and
affirmance by the Court of Appeals. NICOS Industrial
Corporation obtained a loan of P2,000,000.00 from
private respondent United Coconut Planters Bank and
to secure payment thereof executed a real estate
mortgage on two parcels of land located at Marilao,
Bulacan. The mortgage was foreclosed for the
supposed non-payment of the loan, and the sheriff's
sale was held on July 11, 1983, without re-publication
of the required notices after the original date for the
auction was changed without the knowledge or
consent of the mortgagor.
ISSUE
- won the order granting demurrer to evidence
contained facts and law which it is based ruling
RULING
- No. It is not the normal function of this Court to
rule on a demurrer to the evidence in the first instance;
our task comes later, to review the ruling of the trial
court after it is examined by the Court of Appeals and,
when proper, its decision is elevated to us. In the
present case, we find that the respondent court did not
have an adequate basis for such examination because
of the insufficiency of the challenged order. It must
also be noted that we deal here only with property
rights and, although we do not mean to minimize them,
they do not require the same urgent action we took in
Escober, which involved the very life of the accused.
All things considered, we feel that the proper step is to
remand this case to the court a quo for a revision of
the challenged order in accordance with the
requirements of the Constitution.
Dela Pena v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 177828,
February 13, 2009
Republic v. Legaspi Sr., G.R. No. 177611, April 18, 2012
FACTS:
On 8 August 1991, petitioner, thru UPV, filed against
respondents the complaint for eminent domain docketed
before the RTC as Civil Case No. 19921. Petitioner alleged,
among other matters, that the subject parcel is within the
approved and delineated campus of the UPV which had
well-established its presence in the area by building its
laboratories, classrooms, faculty and student centers,
among other facilities; and, that it had been constrained to
resort to expropriation in view of the failure of its efforts to
negotiate with respondents for the retention of the property
on which it constructed considerable improvements already
being used for academic purposes. Maintaining that the fair
market value of the property at the time of its entry was
P49,298.00, UPV sought confirmation of its right of
condemnation as well as the fixing of the just compensation
for the property.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred on a question of law in denying the
petition for certiorari and affirming the order of the RTC
which did not state the facts and the law on which it is based
RULING:
We find the petition impressed with merit. Expropriation or
the exercise of the power of eminent domain is the inherent
right of the state and of those entities to which the power
has been lawfully delegated to condemn private property to
public use upon payment of just compensation. It cannot,
therefore, be gainsaid that the outcome of the first phase of
expropriation proceedings be it an order of expropriation or
an order of dismissal finally disposes of the case and is, for
said reason, final. The same is true of the second phase
that ends with an order determining the amount of just
compensation which, while essential for the transfer of
ownership in favor of the plaintiff, is but the last stage of the
expropriation proceedings and the outcome of the initial
finding by the court that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take
the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or
purpose described in the complaint.
Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, April
28, 2004
Administrative due process
Ang Tibay v. CIR, G.R. No. L-46496, February 27, 1940
Montoya v. Varilla, G.R. No. 180146, December 18, 2008
Doctrine: The right to substantive and procedural due
process is applicable to administrative proceedings.
FACTS
Montoya is a member of the PNP. He was dropped from the
rolls for failure to attend the Law Enforcement and
Enhancement Course (LEEC) and for being absent without
official leave (AWOL) for 67 days. Four months after, he
filed a motion for reconsideration, averring that his failure to
attend the LEEC was beyond his control since he was
suffering from arthritis and body pain. Thereafter, the order
issued to him was cancelled and Montoya was preventively
suspended pending summary proceedings of his
administrative liability.
However, he was dismissed from the police service after
the summary dismissal proceedings. He then filed an
appeal alleging lack of due process considering that he was
not even notified of any hearing by the Summary Hearing
Officer and was thus deprived of the opportunity to present
evidence in his defense. He was then ordered to be
reinstated in the police service.
Subsequently, the CSC set this aside and dismissed
Montoya from the police service. Montoya filed a petition to
the CA but it was denied. Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the right of petitioner to due process was
violated.
RULING
Yes. The Court held that the Summary Dismissal
Proceedings against Montoya were flawed from the very
beginning when these were conducted without due notice
to him. Without notice, Montoya was unable to attend the
hearings, present written or oral arguments, and submit
evidence in his favor; he was completely deprived of the
opportunity to be heard on the administrative charges
against him and was irrefragably denied due process.
Though procedural rules in administrative proceedings are
less stringent and often applied more liberally,
administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and
fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due
process in investigations and hearings. The right to
substantive and procedural due process is applicable to
administrative proceedings.
Due process in administrative proceedings has also been
recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or
constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which
may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity
to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to
present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to
defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent
jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well
as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is
supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records
or made known to the parties affected.
Hence, the PNP is ORDERED to reinstate Montoya to the
police service.
Ombudsman v. Reyes, G.R. No. 170512, October 5,
2011
Administrative Due Process
• Ombudsman v. Reyes, G.R. No. 170512,
October 5, 2011
Facts:
Respondent claims that his right to due process was
violated when he was not fully furnished of a copy of
affidavits against him which the petitioner renders it
decision. However, petitioner counters that Reyes was
afforded due process since he was given all the
opportunities to be heard, as well as the opportunity to
file a motion for reconsideration of petitioner’s adverse
decision.
Issue: WON respondent’s right to due process was
violated.
Ruling: Yes. The following must be complied in
administrative due process:
1. The respondent’s right to a hearing,
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence
presented,
3. The decision must have some basis to
support itself;
4. There must be substantial evidence;
5. The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or atleast contained
in the record and DISCLOSED to the parties affected;
6. In arriving at a decision, the tribunal must
have acted on its own consideration of the law and the
facts and must not simply accepted the views of the
subordinate;
7. The decision must be rendered in such a
manner that respondents would know the reasons for
it and issues involved.
In this case, the 5th requirement is not complied.
Respondent was not properly apprised of the evidence
offered against him, which were eventually made the
bases of petitioner’s decision that found him guilty of
grave misconduct.
PAGCOR v. Marquez, G.R. No. 191877, June 18, 2013
Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Game Corporation,
G.R. No. 187854 November 12, 2013
Estrada v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January
21, 2015
Quisumbing v. Rosales, G.R. No. 209283, March 11,
2015
Magcamit v. Internal Affairs Service-Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency, G.R. No. 198140, January 25,
2016
FACTS
 - On 2008, Delfin gave an information about an
alleged extortion done to his mother by Magcamit
and other PDEA agents. On May of the same
year, Magcamit and his coagents were charged
with Grave Misconduct for demanding and/or
obtaining P200,000.00 from Luciana M. Jaen
(Jaen) in exchange for her release after she was
apprehended in a buy-bust operation in Lipa City.
After they had submitted their Answer, their case
was submitted for recommendation and action.
SI Enriquez conducted an investigation on the
latter. Later, he issued a memo based on the
testimonies of Jaen on the alleged extortion, and
thereafter dismissing the accused officers from
service. On July 10, 2008, Magcamit filed his
motion for reconsideration arguing that the IAS-
PDEA committed errors of law and/or
irregularities prejudicial to his interest; its
decision, too, was not supported by the evidence
on record. This however was denied, prompting
petitioners to appeal to the CSC and CA which
both dismissed the case. Both bodies relied on
the ground that IAS-PDEA exercising
administrative powers are not bound by technical
rules on procedure, and that there was no denial
of due process to petitioners.
Issue
- Whether or not petitioners were denied of
due process
Ruling
- . No. Due process in administrative cases,
in essence, is simply an opportunity to
explain one’s side or to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling. For
as long as the parties were given fair and
reasonable opportunity to be heard before
judgment was rendered, the demands of
due process were sufficiently met. The first
of the enumerated rights pertains to the
substantive rights of a party at the hearing
stage of the proceedings. The second, third,
fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang
Tibay requirements are reinforcements of
the right to a hearing and are the inviolable
rights applicable at the deliberative stage,
as the decision maker decides on the
evidence presented during the hearing.
These standards set forth the guiding
considerations in deliberating on the case
and are the material and substantial
components of decision making. Finally, the
last requirement, relating to the form and
substance of the decision of a quasi-judicial
body, further complements the hearing and
decision-making due process rights and is
similar in substance to the constitutional
requirement that a decision of a court must
state distinctly the facts and the law upon
which it is based.
Agustin-Se v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 207355,
February 03, 2016
Saunar v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 186502,
December 13, 2017
FACTS:
Saunar was a former Regional Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), which he joined as an agent
in 1988. Through the years, he rose from the ranks and
eventually became the Chief of the Anti-Graft Division.
During his time as chief of the said division, Saunar
conducted an official investigation regarding the alleged
corruption relative to the tobacco excise taxes and involving
then Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson, former President
Joseph E. Estrada (President Estrada), and former Senator
Jinggoy Estrada. President Estrada's assailed involvement
in the tobacco excise tax issue became one of the predicate
crimes included in his indictment for plunder. Saunar
received a subpoena ad testificandum from the
Sandiganbayan requiring him to testify in the plunder case
against President Estrada. On 29 October 2004, then NBI
Director Reynaldo Wycoco (Wycoco) issued Special Order
No. 005033 informing Saunar that he was relieved from his
duties as regional director for Western Mindanao and was
ordered to report to the DDROS for further instructions.
Pursuant thereto, he reported to Bautista on the first week
of November 2004. Bautista informed Saunar that an
investigation was being conducted over his testimony
before the Sandiganbayan and that he should just wait for
the developments in the investigation. In the meantime,
Bautista did not assign him any duty and told him to be
available at any time whenever he would be needed. He
made himself accessible by staying in establishments near
the NBI. In addition, he also attended court hearings
whenever required. On 6 October 2006, Saunar received
an order from the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission
(PAGC) requiring him to answer the allegations against him
in the PAGC Formal Charge dated 3 October 2006. The
charge was based on a letter, dated 19 August 2005, from
Wycoco recommending an immediate appropriate action
against Saunar for his failure to report for work since 24
March 2005, without approved leave of absence for four (4)
months. On 23 October 2006, Saunar was reassigned as
regional director of the Bicol Regional Office. On 29
January 2007, he received a copy of the OP decision
dismissing him from service.
ISSUE:
WON the honorable court of appeals erred in ruling that
petitioner was not denied due process?
RULING:
The appellate court ruled that Saunar was not deprived of
due process because he was informed of the charges
against him and was given the opportunity to defend
himself. It expounded that the absence of formal hearings
in administrative proceedings is not anathema to due
process.
On the other hand, the CA agreed that Saunar was guilty of
Gross Neglect of Duty as manifested by his being on
Absence Without Leave (AWOL) for a long period of time.
The appellate court disregarded Saunar's explanation that
he stayed in establishments nearby and that he had
attended court hearings from time to time. In addition, the
CA found that Saunar violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 because public interest was prejudiced when he
continued to receive his salary in spite of his unjustified
absences.
Academic Disciplinary Proceedings
Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, G.R. No.
99327, May 27, 1993
University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 134625, August 31, 1999
Go v. Colegio de San Juan de Letran, G.R. No. 169391,
October 10, 2012
Doctrine: Due process in academic disciplinary
proceedings is different from those of the courts of justice.
FACTS
The petitioners claim that respondents Colegio de San
Juan de Letran (Letran), should be held liable for moral,
exemplary, and actual damages for unlawfully dismissing
petitioner Emerson Chester Kim B. Go (Kim) from the rolls
of the high school department of Letran. The respondents
claim that they lawfully suspended Kim for violating the
school’s rule against fraternity membership.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. However,
on appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision.
It held, among others, that the petitioners were not denied
due process as the petitioners had been given ample
opportunity to be heard in Kim’s disciplinary case. The
petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the decision,
but the CA denied the motion for lack of merit; hence, the
present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether petitioners are denied due process.
RULING
No. The findings of the Court show that the petitioners were
given due notice of the disciplinary case and that Kim had
been able to explain his side.
It was also held that due process in academic disciplinary
proceedings is different from those of the courts of justice.
The minimum standards to satisfy the procedural due
process are: (1) that the students must be informed in
writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3)
they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4)
they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case.
In the case at bar, it is found that all of these requisites have
been duly given by the respondents to the petitioners.
Hence, the Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the
CA.
Cudia v. Superintendent of the Philippine Military
Academy, G.R. No. 211362 February 24, 2015
Publication requirement
Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985
Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986
BPI Leasing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
127624, November 18, 2003
Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, G.R.
No. 173918, April 8, 2008
Hierarchy of Rights
Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization v.
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-31195,
June 5, 1973
FACTS
- Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass
demonstration at Malacañang in protest against
alleged abuses of the Pasig police and that they
informed the Philippine Blooming Mills Inc. (Company)
of their proposed demonstration.The company called
a meeting with the officers of PBMEO after learning
about the planned mass. During the meeting, the
planned demonstration was confirmed by the union
explaining further that the demonstration has nothing
to do with the Company because the union has no
quarrel or dispute with Management. It was stressed
out that the demonstration was not a strike against the
company but in protest against alleged abuses of the
Pasig police.
- petitioners claim that they did not violate the
existing CBA because they gave the respondent
Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on
March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was
a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of
speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig
policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not
a declaration of strike because it was not directed
against the respondent firm. The lower court found
herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad
faith and herein petitioners, as directly responsible for
perpetrating the said unfair labor practice were
considered to have lost their status as employees of
the respondent Company.
Issue
- Whether the respondents’ act of concluding that
the petitioners acted in bad faith for proceeding with
the demonstration and expelling them from the
company is unconstitutional.
RULING
- No. The pretension of their employer that it
would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence
of its employees is a plea for the preservation merely
of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or
damage would not spell the difference between the life
and death of the firm or its owners or its management.
There was a lack of human understanding or
compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the
request of the Union for excuse from work for the day
shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And
to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass
demonstration held against the Pasig police, not
against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the
part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is
unconstitutional.
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465,
January 18, 2000
Standards for Judicial Review
White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, G.R. No.
122846, January 20, 2009
GR NO 122846
FACTS:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed
into law and ordinance entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting
Short-time Admission, Short-time Admission Rates, and
Wash-up Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging
Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila.”
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and
Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for
declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9 and prayed
that the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light
Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta. Mesa Tourist
Development Corporation filed a motion to intervene, which
was granted by the RTC. MTDC moved to withdraw as
plaintiff which was also granted by the RTC. On January
14, 1993, the RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease
and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. On October 20,
1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance
null and void. The City then filed a petition for review on
certiorari with the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme
Court referred the same to the Court of Appeals. The City
asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power pursuant to Local government code and the Revised
Manila charter. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the
Ordinance.
ISSUE:
WON the ordinance is constitutional.
RULING:
NO. The ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes
upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process
clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against
arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades
private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and
hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene
purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to
“wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to
be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected
only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that
individual rights may be adversely affected only to the
extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands
of public interest or public welfare.
Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013
Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon
City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017
Facts
- President Duterte implemented a nationwide
curfew for minors. petitioners posit that the Curfew
Ordinances encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement as there are no clear provisions or detailed
standards on how law enforcers should apprehend and
properly determine the age of the alleged curfew violators.
They further argue that the law enforcer's apprehension
depends only on his physical assessment, and, thus,
subjective and based only on the law enforcer's visual
assessment of the alleged curfew violator.
Issue
- Whether the ordinance is unconstitutional
Ruling
- Petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness
doctrine is improper, considering that they do not properly
identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances,
which, because of its vague terminology, fails to provide fair
warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or
required so that one may act accordingly. The void for
vagueness doctrine is premised on due process
considerations, which are absent from this particular claim.
petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no
sufficient standards to identify suspected curfew violators.
While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly
state these parameters, law enforcement agents are still
bound to follow the prescribed measures found in statutory
law when implementing ordinances as provided by Sec. 7
of RA 9344, as amended. This provision should be read in
conjunction with the Curfew Ordinances because RA 10630
(the law that amended RA 9344) repeals all ordinances
inconsistent with statutory law.
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November
19, 2001
Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152259, July
29, 2004
Spouses Romuladez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 167011,
December 11, 2008
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v.
Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5,
2010
Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon
City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017
B. Equal Protection Clause
People v. Cayat, G.R. No. L-45987, May 5, 1939
Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, 22 SCRA
603
FACTS
- The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed a
municipal tax ordinance imposing on any and all
productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc
Sugar Company Inc. one (1%) percent per export sale
to the US and other foreign countries. In lieu, Ormoc
Sugar filed before the CFI of Leyte a complaint against
the City of Ormoc, its Treasurer, Municipal Board and
Mayor, alleging said ordinance is violative of the equal
protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation,
among other things. Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. was
the only sugar central in Ormoc City at the time.
Issue
- WON the ordinance is violative of the
constitutional provision on equal protection?
Ruling
- The taxing ordinance should not be singular and
exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established
sugar central, of the same class as the present
company, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now,
even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be
subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly
points only to the company as the entity to be levied
upon. EPC applies only to persons or things identically
situated and doesn’t bar a reasonable classification of
the subject of legislation.
- A classification is reasonable where: 1) it is
based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) the classification applies not only to
present conditions but also to future conditions which
are substantially identical to those of the present; (4)
the classification applies only to those who belong to
the same class.

Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957
People v. Solon, G.R. No. L-14864, November 23, 1960
FACTS:
Juanito Solon was convicted and fined (with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency) for having violated
Cebu City Ordinance No. 241 (the Ordinance). The
Ordinance required drivers of vehicle-drawing animals to
properly dispose of the waste discharged by their vehicle-
drawing animals while traveling City roads.
Solon challenged his conviction on the grounds that the
Ordinance was invalid. He argued that the Ordinance
violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution,
because it applied only to owners and drivers of vehicle-
drawing animals, rather than to all owners and possessors
of animals equally. He also argued that the penalty of
vehicle license suspension in the Ordinance constituted
deprivation of property without just compensation.
ISSUE:
WON the ordinance is constitutional.
RULING:
The Court held that Ordinance No. 241 of the Municipal
Board of Cebu City was constitutional. It considered that it
was well established that the limited application of a statute
did not necessarily violate the guarantee of equal protection
of the laws, if the limitation was based on reasonable and
not arbitrary or capricious criteria.
Here, the Ordinance was reasonable. It sought to promote
the health and well-being of City residents, by eliminating
animal waste in public areas. While the ordinance only
applied to vehicle-drawing animals, this classification was
reasonable because there were significantly more vehicle-
drawing animals than other animals, and vehicle-drawing
animals were therefore a greater health concern. Solon had
not satisfactorily proved that the application of the
Ordinance granted favors or imposed restrictions on
owners of vehicle-drawing animals which were not
accorded or enforced on others. As such, the Ordinance did
not violate the constitutional prohibition against
discriminatory legislation.
The Court also held that Solon could not bring a claim for
deprivation of property without just compensation, as he did
not own his vehicle and had not had his license suspended.
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. v. Gimenez,
G.R. No. L-23326, December 18, 1965
Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon,
G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988
Philippine Judges Assoc. v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, 11
November 1993
Doctrine: The equal protection clause requires equality
among equals as determined according to a valid
classification.
FACTS
This petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354
on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one
subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not
pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and
printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed
among the members before its passage; and (3) it is
discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the
Judiciary.
Petitioners alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory
because it withdraws the franking privilege from the
Judiciary but retains the same to the President, VP, et al.,
Respondents counter that there is no discrimination
because the law is based on a valid classification in
accordance with the equal protection clause.
ISSUE
Whether Sec. 35 RA 7354 violates the equal protection
clause.
RULING
Yes. The Court held that the repealing clause of RA 7354
is a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or
things similarly situated.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal
application of the laws on all persons or things without
distinction. What the clause requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. By
classification is meant the grouping of persons or things
similar to each other in certain particulars and different from
all others in these same particulars.
In the case at bar, Sec. 35 denies the Judiciary the franking
privilege. The data presented by respondents show that the
courts have the highest volume of frank mails, and from
there they concluded that the franking privilege must be
withdrawn. The respondents are in effect saying that the
franking privilege should be extended only to those who do
not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of former
Presidents) but not to those who need it badly (especially
the courts of justice).
Hence, the Court annulled Section 35 of the law as violative
of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no
person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."
Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995
Tiu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127410, 20 January
1999
People v. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76, 03 February
2000
Mirasol v. DPWH, G.R. No. 158793, 08 June 2006
White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, G.R. No.
122846, 20 January 2009
Quinto v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22,
2010
Facts
- Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce
and administer election laws, COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of
Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of
Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in
Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local
Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned
from their offices the moment they file their CoCs,
petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino,
Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government
and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the
instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking
the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of
Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also
contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of
the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two
 conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or
reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a
declaration that theyare not ipso facto resigned from
their positions upon the filing of their CoCs
Issue
Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and
- Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
are violative of the equal protection clause
Ruling
- Yes. In considering persons holding appointive
positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon
the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned
all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones,
the law unduly discriminates against the first class.
The fact alone that there is substantial distinction
between those who hold appointive positions and
those occupying elective posts, does not justify such
differential treatment
- in order that there can be valid classification so
that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the
constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary
that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be
complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class
- Applying the four requisites to the instant case,
the Court finds that the differential treatment of
persons holding appointive offices as opposed to
those holding elective ones is not germaneto the
purposes of the law.
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582,
April 8, 2010
Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,
G.R. Nos. 192935 and 193036, 07 December 2010
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President with the primary task to investigate reports of
graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers
and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and to
submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of
an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as
it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render
awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can
do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-
finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable
cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our
courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional
and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They
argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates
the power of the Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1
because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to
achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include
the power to create an entirely new public office which was
hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and
statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission” with quasi-
judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the
Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative
Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it
selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials
and personnel of the previous administration as if
corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes
those of the other administrations, past and present, who
may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing
of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress
because the President’s executive power and power of
control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct
investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed
and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as
amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence,
authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to
appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a
mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede
the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it
is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its
functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s
jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal
protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression
of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article
III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to
secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined

according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be
valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has
four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3)
It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the

members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to
rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative

of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration only. The intent to single
out the previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that

is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own.
Not to include past administrations similarly situated
constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations.

The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all
past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of

the nation to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights determined and all
public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to
the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive

Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds

Corporation, G.R. No. 179579, 01 February 2012

Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013