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Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances.


Mitigating circumstances are based on the diminution of either freedom of action, intelligence, or intent, or on the lesser
perversity of the offender.

 Classes of mitigating circumstances.


1. Ordinary mitigating — those enumerated in subsections l to 10 ofArticle 13. (art.69 not applicable)
2. Privileged mitigating — circumstances applicable only to particular crimes.
 Voluntary release of the person illegally detained within 3 days without the offender attaining his purpose and before the
institution of criminal action. (Art. 268, par. 3) The penalty is one degree lower.
 Abandonment without justification of the spouse who committed adultery. (Art. 333, par. 3) The penalty is one degree
lower.

Distinctions
1. Ordinary mitigating is susceptible of being offset by any aggravating circumstance; while privileged mitigating cannot be
offset by aggravating circumstance.
2. Ordinary mitigating, if not offset by an aggravating circumstance, produces only the effect of applying the penalty
provided by law for the crime in its minimum period, in case of divisible penalty; whereas, privileged mitigating produces
the effect of imposing upon the offender the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that provided by law for the crime.

Ordinary mitigating, lowers the penalty only to its minimum periods


Privileged mitigating, lowers the penalty by one or two degrees.

 The mitigating circumstance reduces the penalty provided by law but does not change the nature of the crime.

Par. 1. — Those mentioned in the preceding chapter when all the requisites necessary to justify the act or to exempt from
criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant. (applies only when unlawful aggression is present)

The circumstances of justification or exemption which may give place to mitigation, because not all the requisites necessary
to justify the act or to exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are attendant, are the following:
(1) Self-defense (Art. 11, par. 1)
(2) Defense of relatives (Art. 11, par. 2);
(3) Defense of stranger (Art. 11, par. 3);
(4) State of necessity (Art. 11, par. 4);
(5) Performance of duty (Art. 11, par. 5);
(6) Obedience to order of superior (Art. 11, par. 6);
(7) Minority over 9 and under 15 years of age (Art. 12, par. 3);
(8) Causing injury by mere accident (Art. 12, par. 4); and
(9) Uncontrollable fear. (Art. 12, par. 6)

 Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 12 cannot give place to mitigation, the mental condition of a person is indivisible; that is,
there is no middle ground between sanity and insanity, between presence and absence of intelligence.
 Incomplete self-defense, defense of relatives, and defense of stranger. Note that in these three classes of defense,
unlawful aggression must be present, it being an indispensable requisite. What is absent is either one or both of the last
two requisites. entitled only to privilege mitigating
 Incomplete justifying circumstance of avoidance of greater evil or injury. But if any of the last two requisites is absent,
there is only a mitigating circumstance.
 Incomplete justifying circumstance of performance of duty. Since the Supreme Court considered one of the two
requisites as constituting the majority, it seems that there is no ordinary mitigating circumstance under Art. 13, par. 1,
when the justifying or exempting circumstance has two requisites only.
 if the minor over 9 and under 15 years of age acted with discernment, he is entitled only to a mitigating circumstance,
because not all the requisites necessary to exempt from criminal liability are present.
 Incomplete exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear. If only one of these requisites is present, there is only a
mitigat- ing circumstance.

Par. 2. — That the offender is under eighteen years of age or over seventy years. In the case of the minor, he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Article 80 (now Art. 192, P.D. No. 603).
 That the offender is over 70 years of age is only a generic mitigating circumstance.

Par. 3. — That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.
 The intention, as an internal act, is judged not only by the pro- portion ofthe means employed by him to the evil
produced by his act, but also by the fact that the blow was or was not aimed at a vital part of the body.
 deduced from the proven facts that the accused had no intent to kill the victim, his design being only to maltreat him,
such that when he realized the fearful consequences of his felonious act, he allowed the victim to secure medical
treatment at the municipal dispensary
 Intention must be judged by considering the weapon used, the injury inflicted, and his attitude of the mind when the
accused attacked the deceased.

 Art. 13, par. 3, is not applicable when the offender employed brute force.
Art. 13, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code "addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular moment when he
executes or commits the criminal act; not to his intention during the planning stage." (pinatay dahil baka magsumbong kahit
ang plano lang magnakaw)
 Lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong mitigating in robbery with homicide (hindi sinadya)
 Appreciated in murder qualified by circumstances based on manner of commission, not on state of mind of accused.
(gulpihin lang sana kaso namatay sa hemorrhage)
 Not appreciated in murder qualified by treachery
 Lack of intent to kill not mitigating in physical injuries. (but Mitigating when the victim dies.)
 In unintentional abortion, where the abortion that resulted is not intended by the offender, the mitigating circumstance
that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed is not applicable.
 not appreciated in cases of defamation or slander. Applicable only to offenses resulting in physical injuries or material
harm.
 Not applicable to felonies by negligence. in felonies through negligence, there is no intent on the part of the offender
which may be considered as diminished.

Par. 4. — That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act.
Requisites:
1. That the provocation must be sufficient.
2. That it must originate from the offended party
3. That the provocation must be immediate to the act, i.e., to the commission of the crime by the person who is provoked.

 Provocation must originate from the offended party.


Where the alleged provocation did not come from the deceased but from the latter's mother, the same may not be appreciated
in favor of the accused.
 Sufficient provocation pertains to its presence on the part of the offended party
 The provocation by the deceased in the first stage of the fight is not a mitigating circumstance when the accused killed
him after he had fled.
 Between the provocation by the offended party and the commission of the crime by the person provoked, there should
not be any interval of time. Provocation must be immediate to the commission of the crime.
 Threat immediately preceded the act. (Vague threats not sufficient.)
Par. 5. — That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony
(delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within
the same degrees.
Requisites:
1. That there be a grave offense done to the one committing the felony, his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate,
natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees;
2. That the felony is committed in vindication of such grave offense. A lapse oftime is allowed between the vindication and
the doing of the grave offense.

 In vindication, the offended party must have done a grave of- fense to the offender or his relatives mentioned by the law;
in provocation, the cause that brought about the provocation need not be a grave offense.
 This greater leniency in the case of vindication is due undoubtedly to the fact that it concerns the honor of a person, an
offense which is more worthy of consideration than mere spite against the one giving the provocation or threat.
 Vindication of a grave offense and passion or obfuscation cannot be counted separately and independently.
 Grave offense must be directed to the accused. (hindi counted yung parinig)

Par. 6. — That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation.
This paragraph requires that —
1. The accused acted upon an impulse.
2. The impulse must be so powerful that it naturally produced passion or obfuscation in him.

 why passion or obfuscation is mitigating? When there are causes naturally producing in a person powerful excitement,
he loses his reason and self-control, thereby diminish- ing the exercise of his will power.

Passion or obfuscation may constitute a mitigating circumstance only when the same arose from lawful sentiments.
For this reason, even if there is actually passion or obfuscation on the part of the offender there is no mitigating circumstance,
when:
(1) The act is committed in a spirit of lawlessness; or
(2) The act is committed in a spirit of revenge

Requisites of the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation:


1. That there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce
such a condition of mind; and
2. That said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable
length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.

 The crime committed by the accused must be provoked by prior unjust or improper acts of the injured party.
 The mitigating circumstance of having acted under an impulse so powerful as to have produced passion and obfuscation
should be considered in favor of the owner who, upon seeing the person who stole his carabao, shoots the supposed
thief.
 Exercise of a right or fulfillment of duty is not proper source of passion or obfuscation. (killing an officer doing his duty
is not counted)
 The act must be sufficient to produce such a condition of mind.
 No passion or obfuscation after 24 hours, or several hours or half an hour. The defense must prove that the act which
produced passion or obfuscation took place at a time not far removed from the commission of the crime.
 The crime committed must be the result of a sudden impulse of natural and uncontrollable fury.
 Obfuscation cannot be mitigating in a crime which was planned and calmly meditated or ifthe impulse upon which the
accused acted was deliberately fomented by him for a considerable period of time.
 Passion or obfuscation must arise from lawful sentiments.
 In spirit of lawlessness. (rape is not counted in passions of lust)
 In a spirit of revenge.
 The offender must not act under the impulse of special motives.
 Obfuscation arising from jealousy in an illegitimate relationship is not mitigating.
 Where passion or obfuscation of the accused is not caused by the offended party but by the latter's relatives who mauled
the wife of the accused, the same may not be considered as a mitigating cir- cumstance in his favor.
 passion or obfuscation can lawfully arise from causes exist- ing only in the honest belief of the offender.
 Provocation and obfuscation arising from one and the same cause should be treated as only one mitigating circumstance.
 Vindication of grave offense cannot co-exist with passion and obfuscation. Exception — When there are other facts,
although closely connected.
 Passion or obfuscation compatible with lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong.
 Passion or obfuscation incompatible with treachery.
 Passion and obfuscation cannot co-exist with evident pre- meditation.

Par. 7. — That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agents, or that he had
voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution.

Two mitigating circumstances are provided in this paragraph.


1. Voluntary surrender to a person in authority or his agents.
2. Voluntary confession of guilt before the court prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution.

Requisites of voluntary surrender.


a. That the offender had not been actually arrested.
b. That the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent.
c. That the surrender was voluntary.

 There was no voluntary surrender if the warrant of arrest showed that the defendant was in fact arrested.
 The fact that the order of arrest had already been issued is no bar to the consideration of the circumstance because the
law does not require that the surrender be prior to the order of arrest.
 Surrender of weapons cannot be equated with voluntary surrender.
 Voluntary surrender to the chief clerk of a district engineer is not mitigating, because such chief clerk is neither a person
in authority nor his agent.
 What the law considers as mitigating is the voluntary surrender of an accused before his arrest, showing either
acknowledgment of his guilt or an intention to save the authorities from the trouble and expense that his search and
capture would require
 The surrender must be by reason of the commission of the crime for which defendant is prosecuted. (not counted ibang
case)
 The accused surrendered through the mediation of his father before any warrant of arrest had been issued. His surrender
was appreciated as mitigating.
 When is surrender not voluntary? motivated more by an intention to insure his safety, his arrest being inevitable, the
surrender is not spontaneous and therefore not voluntary.
 The surrender is not spontaneous where the accused took almost nine months after the issuance of the warrant of arrest
against him before he presented himself to the police authorities
Requisites of plea of guilty.
In order that the plea of guilty may be mitigating, the three requisites must be present:
1. That the offender spontaneously confessed his guilt;
2. That the confession of guilt was made in open court, that is, before the competent court that is to try the case; and
3. That the confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution.
 plea of guilty made after arraignment and after trial had begun does not entitle the accused to have such plea considered
as a mitigating circumstance.
 Plea of guilty on appeal, not mitigating. because the plea of guilty must be made at the first opportunity, that is, in the
Municipal Court
 The confession of guilt must be made prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution.
 an accused may not enter a conditional plea of guilty in the sense that he admits his guilt provided that a certain penalty
be imposed upon him.
 Plea of guilty to amended information pwede
 Plea of guilty to lesser offense than that charged, not mitigating, the plea of guilty must be to the offense charged.
 Plea of guilty to the offense charged in the amended information, lesser than that charged in the original information, is
mitigating.
 the plea of guilty to the lesser offense charged in the amended information is mitigating.

Reasons why plea of guilty is mitigating.


It is an act of repentance and respect for the law; it indicates a moral disposition in the accused, favorable to his reform.

Basis of paragraph 7.
The basis of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty is the lesser perversity of the offender.

Plea of guilty is not mitigating in culpable felonies


and in crimes punished by special laws.

Par. 8. — That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise suffering from some physical defect which thus restricts
his means of action, defense, or communication with his fellow beings.

 This paragraph does not distinguish between educated and uneducated deaf-mute or blind persons.

Basis of paragraph 8.
Paragraph 8 of Art. 13 considers the fact that one suffering from physical defect, which restricts one's means of action,
defense, or communication with one's fellow beings, does not have complete freedom of action and, therefore, there is a
diminution of that element of voluntariness.

Par. 9. — Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without however
depriving him of consciousness of his acts.

Requisites:
1. That the illness of the offender must diminish the exercise of his will-power.
2. That such illness should not deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts.

 When the offender completely lost the exercise of will-power, it may be an exempting circumstance.
 the foregoing legal provision refers only to diseases of pathological state that trouble the conscience or will
 illness of the mind is included. It would seem that a diseased mind, not amounting to insanity, may give place to
mitigation.
 One who was suffering from acute neurosis which made him ill-tempered and easily angered is entitled

Basis of paragraph 9.
The circumstance in paragraph 9 of Art. 13 is mitigating because there is a diminution of intelligence and intent.
Par. 10. — And, finally, any other circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned.

 Over 60 years old with failing sight, similar to over 70 years of age mentioned in paragraph 2.
 Outraged feeling of owner of animal taken for ransom analogous to vindication of a grave offense.
 Outraged feeling of creditor, similar to passion and obfuscation mentioned in paragraph 6.
 Impulse of jealous feeling, similar to passion and obfuscation.
 Manifestations of Battered Wife Syndrome, analogous to an illness that diminishes the exercise of will power.
 Esprit de corps, similar to passion and obfuscation.
 Voluntary restitution of stolen property, similar to voluntary surrender mentioned in paragraph 7.
 Extreme poverty and necessity, similar to incomplete justification based on state of necessity.
 Testifying for the prosecution, analogous to plea of guilty.
 Killing the wrong man is not mitigating.
 parricide and falsification are not mitigating.
 Not resisting arrest, not analogous to voluntary surrender.
 The condition of running amuck is not mitigating.

Mitigating circumstances which are personal to the offenders.


Mitigating circumstances which arise
(1) from the moral attributes of the offender, or
(2) from his private relations with the offended party, or
(3) from any other personal cause,
shall only serve to mitigate the liability of the principals, accomplices, and accessories as to whom such circumstances are
attendant.

Circumstances which are neither exempting nor mitigating.


.
1. Mistake in the blow or aberratio ictus is a complex crime committed. The penalty is even higher.
2. Mistake in the identity of the victim, for under Art. 4, par. 1, the accused is criminally liable even if the wrong done is
different from that which is intended. See Art. 49 as to its effect on the penalty.
3. Entrapment of the accused.
4. The accused is over 18 years of age. If the offender is over 18 years old, his age is neither exempting nor mitigating.
5. Performance of righteous action.
The performance of righteous action, no matter how meritorious it may be, is not justifying, exempting, or mitigating
circumstance in the commission of wrongs, and although the accused had saved the lives of a thousand and one persons, if he
caused the killing of a single human being, he is, nonetheless, criminally liable.

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