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Chap7 EX ENONCES
Chap7 EX ENONCES
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Pricing strategies ‐ Price discrimination
#1 TRUE or FALSE: Price discrimination is always bad for all consumers.
a) Charging a higher price to the market segment with the more elastic demand
b) Equating the price‐minus‐cost margin across segments
c) Charging a price equal to marginal cost
d) Charging prices that equalizes marginal revenue in different segments
e) Selling only to the segment with less elastic demand
#3 True or False. A monopolist that price discriminates always produces less than if it
must set a unique price?
#4 Reconsider the block‐pricing example analyzed in the notes about the cell‐phone
market. Compute the surplus associated with the three plans for both types of
consumers.
#5 Suppose that a monopoly can price discriminate between two markets.
In market 1, the demand curve is given by Q1 = 2 – P1.
In market 2, the demand curve is given by Q2 = 4 – P2.
Assume that the monopolist has a marginal cost equal to 1.
a) Compute the profit‐maximizing output that the monopoly sells in each market.
What is the price in each market? What is the total profit of the monopolist?
b) Suppose now that consumers in each market are free to trade with one
another and can transfer the goods costlessly to the other market. The
monopoly can no longer price‐discriminate and has to charge a uniform price.
What would be this price? Hint: Compare the two scenarios, P ≤ 2 and P > 2.
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#6 “La Ronde” is a monopolist in the amusement park industry for the Montreal region.
Its owner ordered a market research in order to estimate the potential demand for the
amusement park, so as to set prices for the 2014 season.
The market research identified two distinct segments of the population:
‐ The student population, with an estimated demand of
P = 35 ‐ QE.
‐ The general public (i.e., everyone except the student population), with an estimated
demand given by:
P = 20 – 0.5QG,
where P is the ticket price in dollars, and Q the number of admissions.
The marginal cost of a La Ronde visitor is $5, regardless of which segment the visitor
belongs to. Assume there are no fixed costs (already amortized).
A) Suppose La Ronde decides to charge a single price to everyone.
What price would it charge in order to maximize its profits?
How many admission tickets would be sold to each consumer
segment?
What would be the total number of admissions?
What would be La Ronde’s profits under this single‐price policy?
B) Compute the price‐elasticity of demand for each consumer segment under
the single‐price policy established in A)
C) Given your answer to question B), can you predict which consumer segment
– students or the general public – would be charged a cheaper admission
price if La Ronde decided to engage in price discrimination so as to maximize
profits? Explain.
D) What is the logic behind charging different prices to the two consumer
segments?
E) Compute the prices La Ronde should charge each consumer segment in order
to maximize its profits.
How many tickets would be sold to each consumer segment?
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What would be the total number of admissions?
What would be La Ronde’s profits?
What is your conclusion concerning this pricing policy?
F) Do you think the pricing policy determined in E) can be effective in practice?
Why or why not? (Hint: As a student, what would be your behavior when
purchasing a ticket?)
#7 A yoga club offers yoga lessons at the following prices:
10 lessons for $150 ($120 for students);
20 lessons for $270 ($220 for students);
30 lessons for $360 ($300 for students).
A) What type(s) of price discrimination is this yoga club practicing? Explain why.
B) How is the yoga club’s pricing strategy useful for increasing its profits beyond
the traditional monopoly profits? What is the logic behind it?
C) Consider the case of a student who would like to take yoga lessons at this club.
Represent the price schedule (price line) this student faces on the graph below.
Clearly indicate on the axes the values necessary for the construction of the
price schedule.
D) The student decides to buy 20 lessons for $220. Given this information, draw on
the previous graph a plausible demand curve consistent with her choice.
Explain.
#8 A discriminating monopoly sells to two markets (no arbitrage is possible for
consumers).
Demand in market 1 is given by P1 = 100 – Q1/2.
Demand in market 2 is given by P2 = 100 – Q2.
The monopoly cost of production depends on total production Q = Q1 + Q2. The cost
function is given by C(Q) = Q2.
a) Compute the monopoly’s profit maximizing quantities in each market. What is
the profit of the monopoly?
b) Suppose the firm can decompose the plant into two smaller plants with cost
functions C(q1) = (q1)2 and C(q2) = (q2)2 for a cost F. Each plant serves only the
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local market. Calculate the profit maximizing quantities and the associated
profit.
c) Is it a good strategy? What is the economic logic of this reorganization of
production?
#9 Consider a firm that has a monopoly on bus transportation in a small community. It
serves two segments of consumers: students and non‐students.
Marginal cost is the same for both segments. Prices are Ps = $ 4 for students and Pn = $ 6
for non‐students. Price‐elasticities of demand are Es = 2.5 for students and En = 2 for
non‐students.
Is the monopoly maximizing its profits?
#10 Bundling as a pricing strategy
Consider the pricing strategy of the Montréal Opera. The Opera is planning two operas
(one by Mozart and one by Wagner) this fall and faces three types of consumers whose
taste for the two operas differ. Consumers’ valuation are given in the following table.
Valuation
Consumer type Wagner Mozart
A $50 $5
B $40 $40
C $5 $50
Suppose the Opera can only set a unique price per ticket. What would be the optimal
prices for each opera? What would be the profits of the Opera? (Assume that marginal
cost is equal to zero, that there is a fixed cost F, and that there are 100 consumers of
each type)
Suppose now that the Opera can offer a season pass for the two operas (a bundling
strategy) in addition to offering individual tickets for each show (as before).
What would be the optimal price for the season pass and the individual tickets?
Compare the profit of this new strategy. What type of price discrimination does the
Opera use in this example?
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