Ultimate Designer

PALGRAVE FRONTIERS IN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
The Teleological
and Kalam Cosmological
Arguments Revisited
Andrew Loke
Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion
Series Editors
Yujin Nagasawa
Department of Philosophy
University of Birmingham
Birmingham, UK
Erik J. Wielenberg
Department of Philosophy
DePauw University
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Andrew Loke
The Teleological and

Kalam Cosmological
Arguments Revisited
Andrew Loke
Department of Religion and Philosophy
Hong Kong Baptist University
Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
ISSN 2634-6176 ISSN 2634-6184 (electronic)

Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion
ISBN 978-3-030-94402-5 ISBN 978-3-030-94403-2 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94403-2
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To J.P. Moreland
For teaching me philosophy, and for being such an inspiration and
encouragement over the years
Acknowledgements
The main idea for this book first came when I was studying at Biola
University back in 2007. We were discussing the Teleological Argument
during a philosophy of religion class, and I began to ponder how might
one exclude all the alternative hypotheses to Design. An idea came to me
in the form of a logical syllogism which I develop in this book.
This book is also a follow-up to my previous book God and Ultimate
Origins (Springer Nature 2017). Since its publication I have had the priv-
ilege of debating philosophers Alex Malpass (2019) and Graham Oppy
(2020) on the Kalām Cosmological Argument, and interacting with
many people concerning the debates. My responses to their objections
constitute a significant part of this book. I am grateful to them for the
exchanges and have acknowledged their contributions in the footnotes of
this book.
I have also presented my arguments at the World Congress of
Philosophy (Peking University, 2018), the American Academy of Religion
Annual Conference (2020), and conferences and seminars held at Oxford
University, Birmingham University, National University of Singapore,
Nanyang Technological University, and National Taiwan University, and
I am grateful for the feedback I received.
The topics covered in this book are transdisciplinary in nature, and I
am grateful for the interactions with experts in various disciplines and for
the help I received. In particular, I would like to express my gratitude to
vii
viii Acknowledgements
scientists Aron Wall, Luke Barnes, Peter Bussey, Don Page, Chan Man
Ho, mathematician Tung Shi Ping, theologians Mark Harris and Alister
McGrath, and philosophers William Lane Craig, Graham Oppy, Wes
Morriston, Alex Malpass, Josh Rasmussen, Wesley Wildman, Bruce
Reichenbach, Garry DeWeese, Jacobus Erasmus, Andres Luco, Frederick
Choo, Lee Wang Yen, Jonathan Chan, Mark Boone, Kwan Kai Man,
Steve Palmquist, Andrew Brenner, Chan Kai Yan, Brian Wong, Rope
Kojonen, Tim Maness, Phil Goff, and Zhang Jiji for very helpful
correspondence.
I would like to thank Yujin Nagasawa for recommending my book
proposal, the team at Springer Nature/Palgrave—in particular Brendan
George, Rebecca Hinsley, and Md Saif—for their efficient assistance, and
the anonymous reviewer for his/her helpful comments and recommenda-
tions for publication. I would also like to thank my research assistant
Vincent Chan for his help with the bibliography.
The research for this book is funded by the Hong Kong Research
Grants Council Early Career Scheme (ECS): ‘A Reassessment of the
Cosmological and Teleological Arguments for the Existence of God’,
project number 22603119, and partially supported by a grant from the
Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, China (project no. EdUHK 18606721).
31 July 2021
Hong Kong
Contents
1 Introducing the Quest for an Explanation 1

1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 A Review of the Discussion 2
1.3 Problems with Scientism 8
1.4 Problems with Verificationism 12
1.5 In Defence of the Possibility of a Priori Metaphysical
Knowledge 13
1.6 Reply to the Evolutionary Objection Against
Metaphysical Knowledge 21
1.7 Reply to Empiricist Objections 22
1.8 Conclusion and Overview of Following Chapters 27
Bibliography 32
2 Causation and Laws of Nature 37

2.1 Introduction 37
2.2 Defining the Key Terms of the Causal Principle 39
2.3 Causation, Fundamental Physics, and Laws of Nature 46
2.4 Considerations of Quantum Indeterminancy 60
Bibliography 65
ix
x Contents
3 Arguments for the Causal Principle 71

3.1 Introduction 71
3.2 Objection: The Initial State of Reality (ISOR) is the
Only Thing That Begins Uncaused 76
3.3 Against 1.1.1. Brute Fact 80
3.4 Against 1.1.2. Abstract Entities 87
3.5 Against 1.1.3.1 S is a Property of x 93
3.6 Concerning 1.1.3.2.1 99
3.7 Concerning 1.1.3.2.2. S is a Property of y 99
3.8 Concerning 1.1.3.2.3. S is a Property of the
Circumstances of y 100
3.9 Objection Concerning the Distinction between Could
and Would 121
3.10 Objection: The Causal Principle is Inconsistent with
Libertarian Freedom 124
3.11 Objection Based on Lack of Directionality 125
3.12 Epistemological Objections 129
3.13 Conclusion 131
Bibliography136
4 Fine-Tuning and Order of our Universe141

4.1 Introduction 141
4.2 Fine-Tuning and Orderliness 142
4.3 A Logically Exhaustive List of Categories of Possibilities 153
4.4 Chance Hypothesis 165
4.5 Regularity 181
4.6 Combination of Regularity and Chance 183
4.7 Conclusion 185
Bibliography189
5 Arguments for a First Cause195

5.2 Scientific Issues 195
5.3 Introducing the Philosophical Arguments Against an
Infinite Regress of Causes and Events 204
5.4 Argument Against Traversing an Actual Infinite 206
Contents xi
5.5 The Argument from the Viciousness of Dependence

Regress224
5.6 Can a First Cause Be Avoided by a Causal Loop? 235
5.7 Conclusion 237
Bibliography240
6 What the First Cause Is247

6.2 The First Cause Is Uncaused, Beginningless, and
Initially Changeless 249
6.3 Transcendent and Immaterial 262
6.4 The First Cause Has Libertarian Freedom 265
6.5 The First Cause Has Tremendous Power 287
6.6 Conclusion 289
Bibliography291
7 Ultimate Design297
7.2 Against the ‘Uncaused’ Hypothesis 297
7.3 In defence of Design 302
7.4 Reply to Hume’s Classic Objections 315
7.5 Addressing an Objection to Argument by Exclusion 316
7.6 Response to Difficulties Concerning Determining the
Prior Probability that God Design the Universe 318
7.7 Reply to Objections Concerning the Range of
Explanatory Latitude 322
7.8 Conclusion 326
Bibliography329
8 Ultimate Designer333
8.1 Summary of Important Conclusions from Previous
Chapters333
8.2 Concerning the God-of-the-Gaps Objection 336
8.3 Limitations of the KCA-TA and responses 340
8.4 Significance of the Conclusion of KCA-TA 347
Bibliography350
xii Contents
Bibliography353
Index383
List of Figures
Fig. 5.1 Bounce Cosmology with entropy reversal 198

Fig. 5.2 A series of events being constituted 208
xiii
1
Introducing the Quest
for an Explanation
1.1 Introduction
Throughout history, many have embarked on the quest to discover the
answers to the fundamental mystery concerning the ultimate origins of
the universe and the purpose of our existence. Some of the most brilliant
thinkers in human history have contributed to this quest by formulating
their answers to these Big Questions in the form of the Cosmological
Argument—which attempts to demonstrate the existence of a Divine
First Cause or Necessary Being—and the Teleological Argument (TA)—
which attempts to demonstrate that our universe is the purposeful cre-
ation of a Divine Designer. Originating in Ancient Greece in the writings
of Plato (e.g. Laws, 893–96) and found in other ancient philosophical
traditions (e.g. the tenth-century Indian philosopher Udayana’s
Nyāyakusumāñjali I, 4), the Cosmological and Teleological Arguments
have also been developed by scholars of the Abrahamic religions, since
the ‘First Cause’ and Designer of the universe may be associated with
Judaism, Christianity, or Islam.
Given that these arguments have been around for thousands of years,
one might wonder what more can be said on behalf of them. Many have
© The Author(s) 2022 1

A. Loke, The Teleological and Kalam Cosmological Arguments Revisited, Palgrave
Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94403-2_1
2 A. Loke
thought that these arguments have been successfully rebutted by the

extensive criticisms of David Hume and Immanuel Kant in the eigh-
teenth century, and that they are now obsolete in light of modern science.
A review of the literature however shows that—even in our present scien-
tific period—these arguments are still being actively discussed in journals
and monographs published by the world’s leading academic publishers.
One reason is that modern science itself has developed theories (e.g. the
Big Bang theory, theories of fundamental physics) which seem to support
the premises of these arguments. Moreover, the objections by Hume and
Kant are answerable, as I shall explain in the rest of this book.
This book aims to expose the weaknesses in recent assessments of these
arguments by their proponents and opponents, to offer a more compel-
ling evaluation of alternative explanations, and to examine whether both
arguments can be integrated in such a way that both are strengthened. It
will move the discussion ahead in a new and significant way by providing
original arguments in response to objections, including those found in
leading academic publications within the last few years. These objections
include (among others) the problem of ensuring that all the alternative
hypotheses to Design have been considered and ruled out1 (Ratzsch and
Koperski 2019; see below), the problem of assigning prior probability for
Design (Sober 2019), and the objection to the applicability of the Causal
Principle to the beginning of the universe based on bounce cosmologies
and the apparent challenge of fundamental physics to the directionality
of causality and time (Linford 2020). Despite the huge amount of litera-
ture on the Cosmological Argument and Teleological Argument, I am
not aware of any other publication which has provided the original argu-
ments which I am going to offer in response to the objections, some of
which have remained outstanding despite many years of intense discus-
sions. To help the reader appreciate this point, I shall begin with a review
of the background of discussion on the Cosmological Argument and
Teleological Argument.
1.2 A Review of the Discussion

There are different versions of the Cosmological Argument (Craig 1980):
(1) The Leibnizian (named after Gottfried Leibniz 1646–1716; see

Monadology, §32), which attempts to ground the existence of the
contingent things of our universe in a Divine Necessary Being.
(2) The Thomist (named after Thomas Aquinas 1225–1274; see Summa
Theologica I,q.2,a.3 and Summa Contra Gentiles I,13,a), which
attempts to demonstrate that the universe is sustained in existence by
a Divine First Cause.
(3) The Kalām Cosmological Argument (KCA), which attempts to dem-
onstrate that the universe has a beginning of existence brought about
by a Divine First Cause. The roots of the KCA can be traced to Plato’s
Timaeus sections 27 and 28 and the writings of the Christian phi-
losopher John Philoponus (c.490–c.570), who argued against the
possibility of an actual infinite number of earlier events in Against
Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, frag. 132. Philoponus’ work
became an important source for Medieval Islamic and Jewish Proofs
of Creation (Davidson 1969; Adamson 2007, chapter 4), and the
KCA was developed by the Muslim philosopher al-Kindī’ (805–873)
and mutakallimūm (theologians who used argumentation to support
their beliefs) such as al-Ghāzāli (1058–1111).
In this book, I shall focus on the Kalām version of the Cosmological

Argument.
Concerning the KCA, the development of the Big Bang theory, which
seem, to indicate that our spacetime manifold has a beginning, has led to
renewed interest among philosophers and scientists concerning the ques-
tion of First Cause of the beginning of the universe. Nevertheless, while
the Big Bang is commonly understood as the beginning of spacetime,
many cosmologists are now discussing pre-Big Bang scenarios in which
the Big Bang is not the absolute beginning. While some cosmologists
have proposed that entities such as a quantum vacuum or another uni-
verse existed before the Big Bang, others have asked where these came
from. This question is related to whether everything that begins to exist
has a cause (the Causal Principle, CP) and whether an infinite regress of
causes and effects is possible. The KCA, as formulated by its most note-
worthy recent proponent William Lane Craig, is as follows:
4 A. Loke
( 1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause (Causal Principle).

(2) The universe began to exist.
(3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.
Craig argued that further analyses of the Cause of the universe show
that this Cause possesses various theistic properties, such as being
uncaused, beginningless, initially timeless and changeless, has libertarian
freedom. and is enormously powerful (Craig and Sinclair 2009). Writing
in The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, philosopher Quentin Smith
noted that ‘a count of the articles in the philosophy journals shows that
more articles have been published about Craig’s defence of KCA than
have been published about any other philosopher’s contemporary formu-
lation of an argument for God’s existence’ (Smith 2007, p. 183). While
many articles have argued in support of KCA, others have raised various
objections.
With regard to premise (1), some philosophers have objected that we
only have reason to suppose that the Causal Principle holds within our
universe, but not with respect to the beginning of the universe itself
(Oppy 2010, 2015).
With regard to premise (2) of KCA, Craig has defended two philo-
sophical arguments for time having a beginning: the argument from the
impossibility of concrete actual infinities and the argument from the
impossibility of traversing an actual infinite. The first argument claims
that the absurdities which result from paradoxes such as Hilbert’s Hotel
show that concrete infinities cannot exist, and since an infinite temporal
regress of events is a concrete infinity, it follows that an infinite temporal
regress of events cannot exist. The second argument claims that a collec-
tion formed by successive addition cannot be an actual infinite, and since
the temporal series of events is a collection formed by successive addition,
the temporal series of events cannot be an actual infinite. Others have
raised various objections, such as claiming that actual infinite sequences
are ‘traversed’ all the time in nature (e.g. whenever an object moves from
one location in space to another) (see discussion in Puryear 2014), and
arguing that Craig’s defence of KCA depends on the highly controversial
dynamic theory of time (according to which the members of a series of
events come to be one after another) and begs the question against an
actual infinite past (Oppy 2006). Stephen Hawking proposed that the
initial state of the universe consisted of a timeless (no boundary) state
(Hartle and Hawking 1983; Hawking 1988). This initial state can be
understood as a beginningless impersonal First Cause from which all
things came, and which avoids the need for a personal Creator.
I have addressed the objections noted above in my previous writings. For
example, with regard to the objections noted above concerning premise 1
of KCA, I have proposed a new philosophical argument in Loke (2012b,
2017, chapter 5) which addresses the objections by Oppy (2010, 2015)
and others, and which demonstrates that, if something (say, the universe)
begins to exist uncaused, then many other kinds of things/events which
begin to exist would also begin to exist uncaused, but the consequent is not
the case; therefore, the antecedent is not the case. In this book (Chaps. 2
and 3), I shall further develop this Modus Tollens argument in response to
more recent objections to the Causal Principle found in the writings of
Rasmussen (2018), Almeida (2018), Linford (2020), and others, and in
Chap. 6, I shall use it to respond to Hawking’s objections to a Creator
(including the objections found in his final book published in 2018).
With respect to the objections noted above concerning premise 2 of
KCA, I have shown in Loke (2012a, 2014b, 2017, chapter 2) that the
argument for a beginning of the universe based on the impossibility of
concrete actual infinities does not beg the question against the existence
of concrete actual infinities, by demonstrating that the argument can be
shown to be based on the independent metaphysical fact that numbers
are causally inert. With respect to the argument based on the impossibil-
ity of traversing an infinite, I have responded to the objection that actual
infinite sequences are ‘traversed’ all the time in nature, by defending the
view that time and space is a continuum with various parts but not hav-
ing an actual infinite number of parts or points (Loke 2016; Loke 2017,
chapter 2). Moreover, I have shown that this argument can be modified
such that it does not need to presuppose the controversial dynamic the-
ory of time (Loke 2014a, 2017, chapter 2; see further, chapter 5 of this
book). Additionally, I have developed a new argument against an infinite
causal regress which demonstrates that, if every prior entity in a causal
chain has a beginning, then given the Causal Principle nothing would
ever begin to exist; therefore, what is required is a beginningless First
6 A. Loke
Cause (Loke 2017, chapter 3). In this book (Chap. 5), I shall develop
these arguments further in engagement with various pre-Big Bang scien-
tific cosmologies and reply to the latest objections to these arguments
(e.g. Almeida 2018; Linford 2020).
With respect to Hawking’s conceptual challenge concerning the nature
of First Cause noted above, I have argued in Loke (2017, chapter 6) that
the First Cause is a libertarian free agent. Against this conclusion, it might
be objected that one should not attribute libertarian freedom to the First
Cause, because libertarian freedom is associated with a mind with the
capacity for decision making, but it has not yet been shown that the First
Cause has other properties of a mind with the capacity for decision mak-
ing. In Chaps. 6 and 7, I shall show that this objection fails, and I shall
also provide evidences that the First Cause has other properties of a mind
with the capacity for decision making. The latter will be accomplished by
developing the Teleological Argument and combine it with the KCA to
demonstrate that the First Cause is an intelligent designer of the universe.
Concerning the Teleological Argument, ‘according to many physicists,
the fact that the universe is able to support life depends delicately on vari-
ous of its fundamental characteristics, notably on the form of the laws of
nature, on the values of some constants of nature, and on aspects of the
universe’s conditions in its very early stages’ (Friederich 2018). Many sci-
entists and philosophers have argued that this ‘fine-tuning’ is evidence for
a Designer (Lewis and Barnes 2016). Others have cited the mathemati-
cally describable order of the universe (Polkinghorne 2011) as evidences
for a Designer. Critics object that there could be alternative hypotheses
which have yet to be considered. This problem beset various forms of
design inference. For example, concerning ‘inference to the best explana-
tion’ (IBE), which involves comparing explanations based on criteria
such as explanatory power, explanatory scope, and so on, Ratzsch and
Koperski (2019) state that substantive comparison between explanations
‘can only involve known alternatives, which at any point represent a van-
ishingly small fraction of the possible alternatives … being the best (as
humans see it) of the (humanly known) restricted group does not warrant
ascription of truth, or anything like it’. Others have mentioned the prob-
lem of assigning prior probability for Design given that our inferences of
intelligent design are based on our empirical knowledge of human
intelligence, which may not carry over to hypotheses involving non-

human designers (Sober 2003, p. 38). Additionally, many have insisted
that we should try to find a scientific explanation for the apparent fine-
tuning, for appealing to God can be used to solve any problem, so it is
not helpful (Penrose and Craig 2019). Against Swinburne’s (2004) for-
mulation of the Teleological Argument, critics have also objected that the
range of explanatory latitude is too wide: ‘whatever the laws of nature
turn out to be, the theist would explain these as brought about by God,
hence … the supposed evidences [i.e. the laws of nature] provide no
check on the validity of the explanatory premises’ (Grünbaum 2004,
p. 605).
This book will fill a gap in the literature by devising an original deduc-
tive argument (see Chap. 4) which demonstrates that the following are
the only possible categories of hypotheses concerning fine-tuning and
order: (i) Chance, (ii) Regularity, (iii) Combinations of Regularity and
Chance, (iv) Uncaused, and (v) Design (The Designer may [or may not]
use chancy, regular, or chancy + regular process; see the discussion on
theistic multiverse scenarios in Chap. 4; given this clarification, it should
be noted that (i)–(iv) are intended to be exclusive of Design).2 My book
collates a large variety of contemporary cosmological models and classi-
fies them within the five categories. It demonstrates that there are essen-
tial features of each category such that, while the alternatives to design are
unlikely, the Design hypothesis is not, and that one can thus argue for
Design by exclusion without having to first assign a prior probability for
Design. The exclusion of all the alternatives implies that the conclusion
of design follows logically rather than being merely appealed to solve a
problem; it also avoids Grünbaum’s objection concerning the range of
explanatory latitude. I shall show that KCA can be used to strengthen the
TA by answering the question ‘Who designed the Designer?’ through
demonstrating that there is a beginningless and hence un-designed First
Cause, and by demonstrating that the ultimate explanation cannot be a
scientific one, because the first event was brought about by a First Cause
with libertarian freedom (a First Cause with libertarian freedom implies
agent causation) and not by a mechanism describable by a law of nature
(see Chap. 6). On the other hand, the TA strengthens the KCA by
8 A. Loke
providing additional considerations for thinking that the First Cause is

an (intelligent) Creator (see Chap. 7).
Finally, this book will provide an up-to-date discussion of various the-
ories in scientific cosmology and fundamental physics that are relevant to
the philosophy of religion debates concerning the ultimate origins of the
universe. It responds to the God-of-the-gaps objection by demonstrating
that the KCA-TA is not based on gaps in our understanding which can
be filled by further progress in science, but is based on the analysis of the
necessary conditions (e.g. what is required for a First Cause to bring
about the first event) and follows from deduction and exclusion. It con-
tributes to contemporary theological discussions concerning the relation-
ship between God and time and the doctrine of creation, and responds to
the theological objections to fine-tuning by Halvorson (2018) et al. It
offers a superior form of design inference which avoids the problems that
beset alternative forms. Additionally, it contributes to the discussions on
issues of considerable philosophical interest such as time, causality, infin-
ity, and libertarian freedom, and demonstrates the relevance of philo-
sophical arguments for answering the question of ultimate origins against
the Scientism of Hawking et al. and the New Verificationism of Ladyman
et al. (2007). In these and other ways, this book promotes the dialogue
between philosophers, scientists, and theologians concerning the Big
Question of ultimate origins.
1.3 Problems with Scientism

Contemporary formulations of the Cosmological Argument and
Teleological Argument involve considerations of both philosophy and
modern scientific cosmology. Proponents of scientism have dismissed
philosophy when considering the question about the ultimate origins of
the cosmos, claiming that science is the only or the best way for under-
standing the nature of reality. Often an appeal is made to the predictive
successes and technological applications of science, which metaphysics
seems unable to offer. Against this sort of appeal, Feser (2017, p. 282)
observes:
A defender of scientism demands to know the predictive successes and

technological applications of metaphysics or theology, and supposes he has
won a great victory when his critic is unable to list any. This is about as
impressive as demanding a list of the metal-detecting successes of garden-
ing, cooking, and painting, and then concluding from the fact that no such
list is forthcoming that spades, spatulas, and paintbrushes are all useless
and ought to be discarded and replaced with metal detectors. The fallacy is
the same in both cases. That a method is especially useful for certain pur-
poses simply does not entail that there are no other purposes worth pursu-
ing nor other methods more suitable to those other purposes. In particular,
if a certain method affords us a high degree of predictive and technological
power, what that shows is that the method is useful for dealing with those
aspects of the world that are predictable and controllable. But it does not
show us that those aspects exhaust nature, that there is nothing more to the
natural world than what the method reveals.
On the other hand, scientism is susceptible to the objection that sci-

entism cannot be proven by science itself (Loke 2014c). Indeed, its advo-
cates ‘rely in their argument not merely on scientific but also on
philosophical premises’ (Stenmark 2003). Additionally, science itself can-
not answer the question ‘Why scientific results should be valued?’; the
answer to this question is philosophical rather than scientific. Likewise,
the question ‘Why is the testing of theories important for understanding
how the natural world works?’ cannot be answered by simply doing more
testing; rather, the answer would require a philosophical explanation of
how testing relates to our understanding of the workings of the natu-
ral world.
Moreover, philosophical conceptual analysis is evidently important for
science itself. Cosmologist Sean Carroll quips that ‘Physicists tend to
express bafflement that philosophers care so much about the words.
Philosophers, for their part, tend to express exasperation that physicists
can use words all the time without knowing what they actually mean’
(Carroll 2010, p. 396). The point here is that definitional issues are of
fundamental importance and they underlie all our knowledge, including
scientific knowledge. For example, if scientists do not define the terms in
their scientific hypothesis carefully, then they do not even know what
they are testing for, and their experiments would fail. It is a pity that some
10 A. Loke
physicists like Lawrence Krauss are not careful enough about the con-
cepts and words that they use, such as concerning ‘nothing’ (see Krauss
2012, cf. Bussey 2013).
Physicist Carlo Rovelli (2018) observes that philosophy has played an
essential role in the development of science (in particular scientific meth-
odology), and notes that
Philosophers have tools and skills that physics needs, but do not belong to
the physicists training: conceptual analysis, attention to ambiguity, accu-
racy of expression, the ability to detect gaps in standard arguments, to
devise radically new perspectives, to spot conceptual weak points, and to
seek out alternative conceptual explanations.
In his survey of the forms of reasoning and criteria of rationality that

have characterized the production of knowledge across culture and his-
tory, McGrath (2018) observes the emergence and significance of the
notion of multiple situated rationalities, which affirms the intellectual
legitimacy of transdisciplinary dialogue. Noting the notion of multiple
levels of reality, McGrath observes that the natural sciences themselves
adopt a plurality of methods and criteria of rationality, making use of a
range of conceptual tool-boxes that are adapted to specific tasks and situ-
ations, so as to give as complete an account as possible of our world
(p. 2). For example, with regard to the scientific study of a frog jumping
into a pond,
The physiologist explains that the frog’s leg muscles were stimulated by
impulses from its brain. The biochemist supplements this by pointing out
that the frog jumps because of the properties of fibrous proteins, which
enabled them to slide past each other, once stimulated by ATP. The devel-
opmental biologist locates the frog’s capacity to jump in the first place in
the ontogenetic process which gave rise to its nervous system and muscles.
The animal behaviourist locates the explanation for the frog’s jumping in
its attempt to escape from a lurking predatory snake. The evolutionary
biologist adds that the process of natural selection ensures that only those
ancestors of frogs which could detect and evade snakes would be able to
survive and breed.
McGrath concludes that ‘all five explanations are part of a bigger pic-
ture. All of them are right; they are, however, different’ (pp. 59–60). Just
as science itself brings together different explanations to help us see the
bigger picture, there is a need to bring together different disciplines that
would complement one other in our attempt to gain a fuller understand-
ing of reality.
Contrary to Hawking, who infamously declared that ‘philosophy is
dead’ (Hawking and Mlodinow 2010, pp. 1–2), cosmologist George Ellis
observed that philosophy has an important role to play in scientific cos-
mology. He noted, with respect to the criteria for a good scientific theory
(internal consistency, explanatory power, etc.), that ‘these criteria are
philosophical in nature in that they themselves cannot be proven to be
correct by any experiment. Rather, their choice is based on past experi-
ence combined with philosophical reflection’ (Ellis 2007, section 8.1). In
view of the importance of philosophical considerations, cosmologists
should not merely construct models of the universe without considering
the philosophical problems associated with certain models, such as prob-
lems concerning the traversing of an actual infinite and the violation of
Causal Principle, which have been highlighted by proponents of the
Cosmological Argument. Indeed, scientists who are well-informed about
the importance of philosophy have used philosophical arguments against
an actual infinite number of earlier events to argue against cosmological
models that postulate this. For example, cosmologists Ellis, Kirchner, and
Stoeger write in an article published in the Monthly Notices of the Royal
Astronomical Society: ‘a realized past infinity in time is not considered pos-
sible from this standpoint—because it involves an infinite set of com-
pleted events or moments. There is no way of constructing such a realized
set, or actualising it’ (Ellis et al. 2004, p. 927). The proofs for the impos-
sibility of a realized past infinity which Ellis et al. are referring to are two
of the five philosophical proofs which I mention in Chap. 5, namely, the
Hilbert Hotel Argument and the argument for the impossibility of tra-
versing an actual infinite. This indicates that philosophical arguments are
relevant for modern cosmology. This book will contribute to the discus-
sion by developing some of these arguments in engagement with modern
science.
12 A. Loke
1.4 Problems with Verificationism

Verificationism, which was popular in the early twentieth century, claims
that only statements that are analytic or verifiable are meaningful. It has
since been widely rejected, for the principle itself is neither analytic nor
verifiable (Creath 2017). While its proponents claim that the principle
could be regarded as a definition or axiom, this fails to meet the challenge
of why we should adopt such a definition or axiom. The principle cannot
meet its own demands (Trigg 1993, p. 20). Likewise, while confirmation
by observation and repeated experiments is one way of knowing certain
things, it would be wrong to think that this is the only way to know any-
thing, for the view that ‘confirmation by observation and repeated experi-
ments is the only way to know anything’ is a view which cannot be
confirmed by observation and repeated experiments (for other ways of
knowing, see below and Chap. 4). To equate factual (what is actually the
case) with empirical (what is verifiable by observation) would be to com-
mit the error of verificationism. Moreover, it begs the question against
the existence of an immaterial timeless Creator who cannot be verified by
observation given the limitation of the method (the method can only
apply to observable material entities which exist in time).
While acknowledging ‘we may no longer believe in the verificationist
theory of meaning’, Ladyman et al. (2007, p. 8) nevertheless propose a
pragmatist New Verificationism which consists in two claims:
First, no hypothesis that the approximately consensual current scientific

picture declares to be beyond our capacity to investigate should be taken
seriously. Second, any metaphysical hypothesis that is to be taken seriously
should have some identifiable bearing on the relationship between at least
two relatively specific hypotheses that are either regarded as confirmed by
institutionally bona fide current science or are regarded as motivated and
in principle confirmable by such science. (p. 29)
The main pragmatic motivation for adopting this principle is stated as

follows: ‘What we really want a verifiability criterion to capture is the
pointlessness of merely putative domains of inquiry’ (p. 308), such as
inquiry concerning whether God is the cause of the Big Bang (p. 29). The
reason why they think that such metaphysical inquiry is pointless is

because, first, they claim that armchair intuitions about the nature of the
universe ignore the fact that ‘science, especially physics, has shown us that
the universe is very strange to our inherited conception of what it is like’.
Second, they claim that such metaphysical inquiry ignores ‘central impli-
cations of evolutionary theory, and of the cognitive and behavioural sci-
ences, concerning the nature of our minds’ (p. 10). We shall now consider
these two claims in turn.
1.5 In Defence of the Possibility of a Priori

Metaphysical Knowledge
Concerning the first claim, Ladyman et al. state that ‘much of what peo-
ple find intuitive is not innate, but is rather a developmental and educa-
tional achievement. What counts as intuitive depends partly on our
ontogenetic cognitive makeup and partly on culturally specific learning’
(p. 10). Against the reliability of ‘our common-sense image of the world’
as an appropriate basis for metaphysical theorizing, they claim that ‘mod-
ern science has consistently shown us that extrapolating our pinched per-
spective across unfamiliar scales, magnitudes, and spatial and temporal
distances misleads us profoundly’ (p. 11). For example, ‘Casual inspec-
tion and measurement along scales we are used to suggest that we live in
a Euclidean space; General Relativity says that we do not’ (p. 11). Against
the ‘many examples of metaphysicians arguing against theories by point-
ing to unintuitive consequences’ (p. 13), they ask: ‘why should we think
that the products of this sort of activity reveal anything about the deep
structure of reality, rather than merely telling us about how some philoso-
phers, or perhaps some larger reference class of people, think about and
categorize reality?’ (p. 16).
The warning to exercise caution when discussing matters that are far
beyond our daily experiences is well taken. It is true that in the history of
philosophy there has been a cascade of unduly optimistic estimates of the
power of specifically philosophical reasoning, eventually corrected by
empirically grounded insights.3 Nevertheless, we need to distinguish
14 A. Loke
these failures as well as ‘common sense’ and ‘everyday intuitions’ from

philosophical principles of reasoning such as various forms of deductive
and inductive reasoning which underlie the construction of scientific
theories themselves, including General Relativity mentioned above. In
other words, we need to distinguish ‘common sense’ and ‘everyday intu-
itions’ from philosophical principles of reasoning by which we show
‘common sense’ and ‘everyday intuitions’ to be highly unreliable and
demonstrate those ‘optimistic estimates’ to be failures.
With regard to General Relativity, the idea that space itself can be
curved may seem strange, but it does not violate deductive and inductive
reasoning, properly understood. While quantum phenomena may appear
foreign to our ‘common sense’ and ‘everyday intuitions’, it does not vio-
late deductive reasoning4 which assumes the laws of logic and which
(together with inductive reasoning) is required for quantum physics itself.
To illustrate, quantum physics is often heralded as a scientific theory that
is well-confirmed by experiments, such as those that reveal quantum
entanglement (an example cited against ‘intuition’ by Ladyman et al. on
p. 19!). The confirmation would take the following form:
(1) If the experiment reveals quantum entanglement, then the prediction

of quantum physics is confirmed.
(2) The experiment reveals quantum entanglement.
(3) Therefore, the prediction of quantum physics is confirmed.
This form of valid reasoning is known as modus ponens (1. If A, then

B, 2. A. 3. Therefore, B), which is a form of deductive reasoning. Valid
deductive reasoning can give a false result if the premise is false, but if the
premise is true, then the conclusion which follows from valid deductive
reasoning would be true as well. While De Cruz and Smedt (2016,
p. 360) have complained that, unlike scientists who can often confirm or
disconfirm their theories, philosophers ‘do not have independent empiri-
cal techniques to confirm or disconfirm their intuitions’, the above illus-
tration shows that the confirmation or disconfirmation of scientific
theories or intuitions itself would require the laws of logic. Kojonen notes
that ‘at least some compatibility between the human mind and the cos-
mos is required in order for the cosmos to be at all amenable to scientific
discovery, and for human survival to have been possible in the first place’
(Kojonen 2021, p. 42). Ladyman et al. would agree that scientific theo-
ries—and by implication, deductive reasoning which is assumed by sci-
entific theories—is not ‘merely telling us about how some philosophers,
or perhaps some larger reference class of people, think about and catego-
rize reality’ (p. 16) but helping us understand ‘the deep structure of real-
ity’ (ibid.). They wrote:
Unlike Kant, we insist that science can discover fundamental structures of

reality that are in no way constructions of our own cognitive disposi-
tions …. As collective constructions, the institutional filters of science need
not mirror or just be extensions of individual cognitive capacities and orga-
nizing heuristics. They have shown themselves to have a truth-tracking
power—partly thanks to mathematics. (p. 300)
It is interesting to note that they acknowledge the role of mathematics

which, similar to the laws of logic that underlie deductive reasoning, is
both necessary for science and yet also knowable a priori. Ladyman et al.
would acknowledge that mathematical equations such as 2 + 2 = 4,
4 × 4 = 16, and so on are not merely ‘everyday intuitions’ or ‘common
sense’, but rather correspond with reality, such that they are able to confer
‘truth-tracking power’ to science. In the subsequent chapters, I will be
using mathematical equations such as finite + finite = finite,
0 + 0 + 0 … = 0 for some of my arguments.
Likewise, the laws of logic (e.g. A is A; it cannot be the case that A and
not-A; either A or not-A) are not merely ‘conceptual analysis’, human
psychology of reasoning, or human conventions. The laws of logic cor-
respond with the way things are; indeed, they are necessarily true because
a violation of the laws of logic would be non-existent. For example, con-
sider a ‘shapeless square’: such a thing cannot exist because the existence
of A implies it is not the case that not-A (the existence of a shape [e.g.
square] implies that it is not shapeless). The fact that such things which
violate the laws of logic cannot exist illustrates that the laws of logic are
necessarily true. They do not merely exist in the human mind but they
also apply to mind-independent concrete entities. For example, it remains
the case that there cannot be shapeless squares billions of years ago even
16 A. Loke
if there were no minds to think about them back then. While apparent
contradictions can exist, a true contradiction (e.g. a shapeless square)
cannot. Huemer (2018, p. 20) notes that
If you think there is a situation in which both A and ~A hold, then you’re
confused, because it is just part of the meaning of ‘not’ that not-A fails in
any case where A holds … Now, a contradiction is a statement of the form
(A & ~A). So, by definition, any contradiction is false.
The above definition of ‘not’ (given which contradictions are impossi-

ble and the laws of logic are necessarily true) will be used for my argu-
ments in this book. (One should not object to my arguments by using
alternative definitions of these terms. To do that would be similar to
someone objecting to ‘All humans are mortal, Socrates is a human, there-
fore, Socrates is mortal’ by using alternative definitions of human or
Socrates, which of course misses the point of the argument by talking
about something else. To rebut an argument one has to rebut the premise
or the validity rather than use an alternative definition of the terms.)
One might think that the principle of superposition in quantum phys-
ics violates the laws of logic which underlie these reasonings. However,
this is a misunderstanding. Superposition is the mathematical addition of
probability densities of all of the possible states of a quantum system, and
it is used to calculate the probability of observing the system in one of the
states (e.g. a particle going through one slit or the other in the double-slit
experiment). When the system is not being observed, it is not the case
that a particle existing in contradictory states. Rather (according to the
Copenhagen interpretation), the quantum of energy is spread across the
possible states as a wave. It remains in that state until an observation col-
lapses the wave to a particle. A wave has the potential to be observed at
slit A or slit B, but it cannot be observed at both slits at the same time
because an observation would cause it to be no longer be a wave, but a
particle. Having the potential to be one thing or another does not violate
the law of non-contradiction (Pratt 2012). (According to Bohm’s inter-
pretation, the system consists of a particle riding on a wave which follows
the Schrodinger equation, and which guides the particle to only one
position which is revealed when an observation is made. Again, there is

no violation of the laws of logic.)
While multiple non-classical logics have been developed to meet spe-
cific tasks in knowledge production (McGrath 2018, p. 31), their proven
utility has to do with definition, designation, proving, computability
problem solving, and so on, i.e., they are helpful in situations where (say)
the definitions are vague. On the other hand, classical logic applies to
what is actually the case or can be the case (regardless of whether one can
define it clearly, prove it, etc.). Thus, for example, it cannot be the case
that shapeless squares exist.
Gödel Incompleteness Theorems do not entail the violation of the laws
of logic, for there can be incomplete but consistent systems. Russell’s
paradox (which defines ‘the Russell set’ as the set of all things that are not
members of themselves) can be resolved by arguing that the Russell set
does not exist given that it has an inconsistent definition (Huemer 2018,
pp. 42–43). Likewise, the liar paradox (Is the sentence ‘this sentence is
false’ true or false?) does not entail the violation of the laws of logic, for
one can argue that the liar sentence fails to express a proposition because
the rules for interpreting the sentence are inconsistent; thus, it does not
have the property of truth or falsehood (Huemer 2018, p. 29). Priest
et al. (2018) mention the ‘strengthened’ liar paradox such as L: L is not
true, and argue that, if this sentence is neither true nor false, it is not true;
but this is precisely what it claims to be; therefore, it is true. Huemer
(2018, pp. 34–36) replies by denying that L makes any claim at all. L
does not make any claim because it fails to express a proposition. However,
one can say that N: L is not true. Huemer explains ‘N expresses the
proposition that L is not true; yet L does not express that proposition,
even though L is syntactically identical to N. Why is this? Because when
we read L, we are invited to accept an inconsistent story about the propo-
sition that it expresses; but when we read N, there is no inconsistent story
about what N expresses’ (p. 35).5 Moreover, the claim that contradictions
can exist in a self-referential paradox in linguistic games (which may be
due to inadequacies of language) is in any case irrelevant to the claim that
contradictions can exist in concrete entities such as the universe or ulti-
mate reality.
18 A. Loke
Some religious mystical traditions (e.g. certain forms of Chinese

Buddhism, Taoism, and apophatic theology) postulate a transcendent
realm in which the laws of logic are violated (Capra 2010). However, this
is impossible, for there cannot be shapeless squares in the transcendent
realm either. This conclusion is not based on our inability to imagine it
but based on what it would involve: the existence of A implies the non-
existence of not-A.
Some might think that a solution to the Paradox of the Stone (If an
omnipotent God exists, can He create a stone He cannot carry?) would
require the claim that God can violate the laws of logic. However, this is
not so. With regard to the Paradox, one can ask, ‘If God exists, can God
create a ‘shapeless square’? The answer is no, because there is no such
thing. Likewise, there is no such thing as ‘a stone which God cannot
carry’; thus, God cannot create such a stone. This does not mean that
God’s power is limited; rather, there is no such object (‘shapeless square’,
‘a stone which God cannot carry’) for God to bring about. Thus, the
person who asks God to create a stone He cannot carry is asking God to
do nothing, which poses no challenge to His power. Neither do the
Christian doctrines of Trinity, Incarnation, and divine foreknowledge
and freedom entail the violation of the laws of logic (see Moreland and
Craig 2003; Loke 2014d).
One should note the distinction between the laws of logic and the laws
of nature. There can be other universes with different properties and dif-
ferent laws of nature, but there cannot be other universes in which the
laws of logic do not apply (as illustrated by the fact that there cannot be
shapeless squares in other universes). As explained above, the laws of logic
are necessary true and inviolable, and the impossibility of their inviolabil-
ity can be known a priori with 100% epistemic certainty.
The 100% epistemic certainty concerning the inviolability of the laws
of logic contrasts with the lack of 100% epistemic certainty in science
because it is possible (no matter how improbable) that the observations
based on which scientists infer the laws of nature are mistaken. A law of
nature is derived from induction but—unlike deductive reasoning—
inductive reasoning cannot yield 100% certainty because we cannot be
100% sure that there are no counterexample. Moreover, scientific theo-
ries, in their attempts to explain a connected sequence of phenomena by
postulating an entity as a cause, face the difficulty that there may be other
underlying causes for these phenomena which have not yet been discov-
ered. While causes are necessary conditions for an event, many of them
are yet unknown to us, and it is quite impossible for us to state all of them
that would be sufficient for an event to obtain. In this way, scientific
theories are underdetermined by the observations that purportedly sup-
ported them, and other theories for these observations remain possible
(for classic discussions see Duhem 1954; Quine 1951; Laudan 1990).
Given that there may be undiscovered causes for the phenomena we
observe, science can never prove that the laws of logic can be violated or
that something began to exist uncaused; on the contrary, as explained
above, the laws of logic cannot be violated, and it will be shown in Chaps.
2 and 3 that the Causal Principle, that is, ‘whatever begins to exist has a
cause’ is true as well. Given the Problem of Underdetermination, we
should adopt an eclectic model of science whereby realist and anti-realist
interpretations of scientific theories are adopted on a case-by-case basis,
and adopt an anti-realist interpretation of a theory if a realist interpreta-
tion conflicts with well-established truths (Moreland and Craig 2003,
pp. 314–318). For example, we should adopt an anti-realist view of a
scientific theory if a realist interpretation would result in conflict with
well-established understanding of the laws of logic (see above) and Causal
Principle (see Chaps. 2 and 3).
While the laws of logic are limited in the sense that—by themselves—
they cannot show us what exist, they can show us what cannot exist (e.g.
a shapeless square cannot exist). Likewise, philosophical arguments (see
Chap. 5) can show that an actual infinite number of prior events cannot
exist, and therefore the universe (which we know does exist based on
observation) cannot have an actual infinite number of prior events.
Indeed, philosophical arguments are particular apt for proving negatives;
just as one can prove that there cannot be shapeless squares, I shall show
that there cannot be an infinite regress of events, and that it is not the case
that something begins to exist uncaused.
In conclusion, I have shown that, contrary to popular misconceptions,
quantum physics, Gödel Incompleteness Theorems, Russell’s paradox,
the liar paradox, and non-classical logics do not violate the laws of logic.
Against the worry that how we think about the world may be very
20 A. Loke
different from what the world itself really is, I have argued that the laws
of logic correspond with what the world itself really is, and we can there-
fore use them to formulate various arguments concerning the world.
The laws of logic imply that the conclusion of a deductively valid argu-
ment from true premises must be true. Physics itself requires deductive
and inductive reasoning the justification of which is philosophical, and
one needs to distinguish between ‘appearing weird’ (e.g. superposition)
from ‘impossible’ (e.g. it is impossible that 0 + 0 + 0 … be anything other
than 0), which is what I shall demonstrate an infinite regress to be in later
chapters. It should also be noted that, while what is mathematically
impossible is metaphysically impossible (e.g. it is impossible that 0 + 0 +
0 … be anything other than 0), what is mathematically possible is not
always metaphysically possible. For example, the quadratic equation
x2−4 = 0 can have two mathematically consistent and possible results for
x: 2 or −2, but if the question is ‘How many people carried the computer
home?’, the answer cannot be ‘−2’, for in the concrete world it is meta-
physically impossible that ‘−2 people’ carried a computer home. Thus, the
conclusion of ‘2 people’ rather than ‘−2 people’ is not derived from math-
ematical equations alone, but also from metaphysical considerations: ‘−2
people’ lack the causal powers to carry a computer home. The metaphysi-
cally impossibility of ‘−2 people carrying the computer’ would override
the mathematical possibility in the quadratic equation. This shows that
metaphysical considerations are more fundamental than mathematical
considerations. The arguments against an infinite regress and against the
violation of the Causal Principle which I discuss in the rest of this book
are based on similar metaphysical considerations which are derived from
understanding the nature of the world. This is not ‘insisting that the
physical world conform to some metaphysical principle’; rather, these
metaphysical principles are based on understanding the nature of the
world. The above conclusion implies that, even if a cosmological model
is mathematically possible, it cannot be a correct model of the cosmos if
it is metaphysically impossible.
It should be noted that the laws of logic would hold even at levels far
beyond our daily experiences, such as at the beginning of time (there can-
not be shapeless squares at such levels too). Likewise, we are able to know
truths concerning relevance which hold even at levels far beyond our
daily experiences. For example, the principle ‘differences between prime

numbers are irrelevant to the number’s inability to give birth to a kitten’
is clearly true, ‘even though it certainly reaches far beyond ordinary expe-
rience; after all, it applies to infinitely many distinct numbers and infi-
nitely many distinct ways to give birth to kittens’; we are able to recognize
that ‘the differences in the size of number make no categorical difference
with respect to the ability to give birth to kittens’ (Rasmussen and Leon
2018, p. 43).
As for the concern that causality and temporality may ‘break down’ at
the beginning of the universe (Drees 2016, p. 199), following the laws of
logic, the ‘breaking down’ of these would imply being uncaused and time-
less. It will be shown in subsequent chapters that, using the laws of logic
and undeniable experiences, one can formulate a Modus Tollens argu-
ment to show that the intuition ‘all events have a cause’ applies to the
universe at large (see Chap. 3, contra De Cruz and Smedt 2016, p. 360),
and that other arguments can be formulated to show that there is an
uncaused and (initially) timeless First Cause of the universe.
1.6 R
eply to the Evolutionary Objection
Against Metaphysical Knowledge
Concerning the second claim by Ladyman et al. (2007) regarding the
implication of evolutionary theory, they wrote:
proficiency in inferring the large-scale and small-scale structure of our

immediate environment, or any features of parts of the universe distant
from our ancestral stomping grounds, was of no relevance to our ancestors’
reproductive fitness. Hence, there is no reason to imagine that our habitual
intuitions and inferential responses are well designed for science or for
metaphysics. (2007, p. 2)
In their reply to why this would not undermine our scientific knowl-
edge, they wrote ‘even if one granted the tendentious claim that natural
selection cannot explain how natural scientific knowledge is possible, we
have plenty of good reasons for thinking that we do have such
22 A. Loke
knowledge. On the other hand, we have no good reasons for thinking

that a priori metaphysical knowledge is possible’ (p. 7).
However, as explained above, science itself requires the correctness of a
priori metaphysical knowledge of the laws of logic and mathematics;
hence, the success of science in yielding scientific knowledge—which
Ladyman et al. acknowledge despite our evolutionary history!—is one
good reason for thinking that a priori metaphysical knowledge is possi-
ble. Moreover, regardless of the success of science, we do know that
shapeless squares are not possible, and so on, which shows that we do
have a priori metaphysical knowledge, and this is true regardless of how
we might explain how we could have acquired such knowledge as well as
scientific knowledge given evolution. (Plantinga 2011 famously argued
that a theistically guided evolution would be able to explain this, whereas
naturalism would not, but my argument here does not depend on
Plantinga’s argument, although I do think that it has plausibility. I have
argued that evolution is compatible with Christian theism in Loke 2022.)
1.7 Reply to Empiricist Objections

Many who take a dismissive attitude towards metaphysics trace their view
back to Carnap’s influential paper ‘Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology’
(1950). Carnap claims that ‘If someone wishes to speak in his language
about a new kind of entities, he has to introduce a system of new ways of
speaking, subject to new rules; we shall call this procedure the construc-
tion of a linguistic framework for the new entities in question’ (p. 21). It
should be noted, however, that Carnap did not prove that there cannot
be ‘ways of speaking, subject to rules’ (i.e. a linguistic framework) applied
to speaking about a Creator of the universe which philosophers have been
doing for thousands of years since the predecessors of Plato, who formu-
lated the Cosmological Argument for a divine Creator. Carnap only
offered illustrations of linguistic frameworks involving mathematical
entities and material entities. However, these examples do not prove that
there cannot be other kinds of linguistic framework involving other kinds
of entities and following other rules. Bradley (2018, p. 2249) observes
that ‘Dismissivists have tended to assume that “Empiricism, Semantics
and Ontology” provides an argument, but when we look there is little to

be found’.
Bradley goes on to observe that the argument which Carnap had in
mind is based on the Verificationism of his earlier writings, and he notes
that Verificationism has long been rejected (see above). Bradley claims
that, nevertheless, there is a lack of justification for metaphysical conclu-
sions, but he fails to consider recent works on (say) the Cosmological
Argument which shows that a Creator exists. As explained in later chap-
ters, what deductively follows from the true premises of this valid argu-
ment is the existence of a Creator with libertarian freedom.
One might object that Carnap’s main point is that theists have not
specified under which conditions ‘God exists’ can be known to be true
or false.6 In reply, in this book, ‘God’ is understood to be referring to
the Creator who brought about the beginning of the universe. One can
specify the conditions under which the proposition ‘A Creator brought
about the beginning of the universe’ can be shown to be true or false as
follows: One can show this proposition to be false by proving that the
universe has no beginning; one can show this proposition to be true by
proving that the universe has a beginning and proving the Causal
Principle using the Modus Tollens argument (see Chap. 2). Since the
proposition ‘A Creator brought about the beginning of the universe’ is
meaningful, it can be the conclusion of an argument. Given that this
proposition follows as the conclusion of the Kalām Cosmological
Argument, and given that the premises of the Kalām Cosmological
Argument are true and that its deduction is valid (as argued in later
chapters), this proposition is true.
Following Kant, it might be objected that we cannot know that the
universe is an effect of God, for to know that A is causally related to B it
seems that I must have sensory experience of both A and B so as to estab-
lish that they are regularly connected, but we don’t have such sensory
experiences of God (Evans 2010, pp. 151–152; citing Kant 1965,
A603–14, B631–42).
To respond to this objection, it the distinction between affirming that
there is a cause and identifying the properties of the cause should first be
noted. Before scientists discover the cause of (say) an explosion of a cer-
tain chemical substance, did they think that the event has a cause? They
24 A. Loke
sure did on the basis of Causal Principle, even though they have not
specified the conditions or a universal law. Likewise, on the basis of
Causal Principle, the beginning of matter-energy would have a cause
understood as a necessary condition; how to identify the cause is a differ-
ent issue.
With regard to the identification of cause, the specification of regular
connection (‘universal law’) can be understood as one of the ways of iden-
tifying the properties of causes; this way is inductive. However, no proof
has been offered to think that it is the only way. On the other hand, other
than induction, deduction is also a method of inference. A deductive
argument has already been provided previously to show that the neces-
sary condition for the beginning of matter-energy is uncaused, begin-
ningless, possessing libertarian freedom, and enormously powerful, that
is, a transcendent Creator. Given this deductive argument, the inductive
method is not required in this case to identify the properties of the Cause.
Sceptics might object that there is no empirical evidence that the uni-
verse or the singularity is created by God. Ladyman et al. (2007, p. 29)
put it this way:
Suppose that the Big Bang is a singular boundary across which no informa-
tion can be recovered from the other side. Then, if someone were to say
that ‘The Big Bang was caused by Elvis’, this would count, according to our
principle, as a pointless speculation. There is no evidence against it—but
only for the trivial reason that no evidence could bear on it at all.
However, direct empirical evidence is not the only way to find out the
truth. On the contrary, for any evidence x to indicate that something else
y is true, the laws of logic and various forms of reasoning are required to
show how y follows from x or is supported by x. Scientists are able to
conclude that the Big Bang happened, even though none of them have
directly observed the Big Bang, because they are able to reason from the
evidences (e.g. red shift, cosmic microwave background radiation) to the
conclusion. Moreover, even though they do not have direct empirical
evidence concerning how everything within our universe is formed, they
can nevertheless deduce that that these things came from the Big Bang.
Likewise, as I show in the rest of this book, we can conclude that the
universe has a First Cause because there is evidence that there exists a
series of causes and effects and it can be shown that an infinite regress is
not possible, and it can be deduced that this First Cause has libertarian
freedom, that is, a Creator. Even though we do not have direct empirical
evidence concerning how the Big Bang singularity of the universe is
formed, we can nevertheless conclude that it came from a Creator given
that this Creator is the First Cause of the universe while the singularity
cannot be the first cause because the singularity does not have libertarian
freedom which (as I shall show in Chap. 6) the First Cause must have.
Many people today assume that for someone to claim that God created
the universe would be to pretend to know what we cannot possibly know.
This assumption is related to the Kantian assumption that we can only
know the phenomena and that we cannot know the causes beyond the
phenomena. However, on the one hand, the fact that something cannot
be directly experienced does not imply that we are unable to have any
knowledge of it. Experience is not the only source of knowledge.
Introspection, rational insight, and moral insight are some other sources
of knowledge. On the other hand, Oxford philosopher Richard Swinburne
(2005, p.39) notes that the atomic theory of chemistry has shown ‘in
precise detail some of the unobservable causes of phenomena—the atoms
whose combinations give rise to observable chemical phenomena’.
Sudduth (2009, p. 206) likewise observes that the evolution of modern
science and scientific methodology has made the Humean and Kantian
crude empiricism no longer sensible. He elaborates:
Neither Hume nor Kant envisioned the success of scientific reasoning from
observable states of affairs to unobservable entities and causal processes on
the grounds of the explanatory power of the latter. Extra-solar planetary
science infers the existence, estimated mass, size, and orbital paths of unob-
servable planets from observable wobbles in the planet’s parent star …
Boltzmann utilized the atomic model to explain the behavior of gases and
liquids. Eventually, the existence and behavior of atoms was explained in
terms of yet smaller particles—protons, neutrons, and electrons.
The above scientific findings indicate that the unobservable causes of

phenomena are not in principle unknowable; on the contrary, we can
26 A. Loke
know many details about these unobservable causes through deductive

and inductive reasoning. Starting from the phenomenon of the uni-
verse—an empirical premise!—one can likewise ask ‘what caused this
phenomenon?’, and use deductive reasoning to arrive at the knowledge
that there is a First Cause of the phenomenon which has the properties of
being a Creator, as demonstrated by the KCA, which Kant has failed to
refute (Craig 1979) and which I shall defend in the rest of this book.
One might object that the conclusion that unobserved causes such as
atoms exist is arrived at via verification by experimentation, but one can-
not use such a method to prove that an unobserved God exists. In reply,
the above examples are only meant to show that unobserved does not
imply unknowable. On the one hand, there is no argument which proves
that verification by experimentation is the only way to know unobserved
causes. On the other hand, as explained above using the example of quan-
tum entanglement, verification itself requires deductive reasoning (in
addition to inductive reasoning). As have been explained above, that the
laws of logic on which deductive reasoning is based are necessarily true.
This implies that the conclusion of a deductively valid argument from
true premises must be true, and I shall show in the rest of this book that
such an argument (viz. KCA) can be formulated to show that a Divine
First Cause exist.
It should be noted that, unlike the Ontological Argument, which is an
a priori argument that starts by defining God, the KCA does not start by
defining God, and neither is it dependent on the Ontological Argument.
Rather, as explained in the rest of this book, the KCA starts with the
observation that a series of causes and events exist in the world and then
demonstrates that an infinite regress of causes and events is impossible,
before reasoning deductively to an independently existing First Cause
with the capacities of libertarian freedom. The KCA is thus an a posteriori
argument, and it uses deductive reasoning, which science itself requires.
While the laws of logic cannot tell me that there is a square on my table
and I need observational evidence to know that there is a square, by using
the laws of logic I can know that the square on my table cannot be a
square and shapeless at the same time. Likewise, while the laws of logic
cannot tell me that there is a series of causes and effects and I need obser-
vational evidence to know that, by using the laws of logic I can know that
the series of causes leading to me cannot be finite and infinite. Thus, the
series either has a first member or it does not, and given the arguments
against an actual infinite regress (see Chap. 5), it can be deduced that the
series has a first member, that is, a first cause. Likewise, by using the laws
of logic I can know that this first cause cannot be caused and uncaused.
Thus, it is either caused or uncaused, and given that it is the first, it can
be deduced that it is uncaused and that it has caused an effect (i.e. it has
started a series of causes and effects resulting in my existence). The rest of
the properties of the First Cause, that is, beginningless, timeless, has lib-
ertarian freedom, enormously powerful, and so on, can likewise be
deduced similarly, as will be explained in Chap. 6.
A Kantian might object that ‘this is just your way of thinking, you are
thinking that that there is an actual object called a First Cause which cor-
responds with your idea’. However, it has been explained previously that
the laws of logic correspond to reality, and that the conclusion of a sound
argument (i.e. a deductively valid argument from true premises) must be
true, it is not just a way of thinking or perspective. My great grandfather
(a prior cause of my existence) is not just an idea; even though I have
never seen him, it can be inferred that he really existed, for otherwise I
would not have existed. Likewise, it will be argued in the rest of this book
that it can be inferred that the First Cause really existed, for otherwise I
would not have existed.
1.8 Conclusion and Overview

of Following Chapters
Contemporary formulations of KCA and TA involve considerations of
both philosophy and modern scientific cosmology. Contrary to Hawking,
who infamously declared that ‘philosophy is dead’ (Hawking and
Mlodinow 2010, pp. 1–2), cosmologist George Ellis observed that phi-
losophy has an important role to play in cosmology. He noted, with
respect to the criteria for a good scientific theory (internal consistency,
explanatory power, etc.), that ‘these criteria are philosophical in nature in
that they themselves cannot be proven to be correct by any experiment.
28 A. Loke
Rather, their choice is based on past experience combined with philo-

sophical reflection’ (Ellis 2007, section 8.1). In view of the importance of
philosophical considerations, cosmologists should not merely construct
models of the universe without considering the philosophical problems
associated with certain models, such as problems concerning the travers-
ing of an actual infinite and the violation of Causal Principle, which have
been highlighted by proponents of KCA (see below). Scientists who are
well-informed about the importance of philosophy have used philosophi-
cal arguments against an actual infinite number of earlier events to argue
against cosmological models that postulate this (Ellis et al. 2004, p. 927).
This indicates that philosophical arguments are relevant for modern cos-
mology. This book will contribute to the discussion by developing these
arguments in engagement with modern science
Against the New Verificationism proposed by Ladyman et al. (2007,
p. 29) which claims that we have no good reasons for thinking that a
priori metaphysical knowledge is possible (pp. 7, 29), I have shown that
mathematics and the laws of logic are both necessary for science and yet
also knowable a priori. I have also shown that the laws of logic are neces-
sarily true; they would hold even at levels far beyond our daily experi-
ences, such as at the beginning of time. I explain that, contrary to popular
misconceptions, quantum physics, Russell’s paradox, Gödel
Incompleteness Theorems, and non-classical logics do not entail the vio-
lation of the laws of logic. As for the concern that temporality and causal-
ity may ‘break down’ at the beginning of the universe (Drees 2016,
p. 199), following the laws of logic, the ‘breaking down’ of these would
imply being timeless and uncaused. It will be shown in subsequent chap-
ters that, using the laws of logic, various arguments lead to the conclusion
that there is an uncaused and initially timeless First Cause of the universe.
Against the worry that how we think about the world may be very differ-
ent from what the world itself really is, I have argued that the laws of logic
correspond with what the world itself really is, and we can therefore use
them to formulate various arguments concerning the world. I replied to
various empiricist and Kantian objections and note that the necessity of
the laws of logic implies that the conclusion of a deductively valid argu-
ment from true premises must be true.
It has been noted previously that the KCA is traditionally formulated

as follows:
(1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause.

(2) The universe began to exist.
(3) Therefore, the universe has a cause. (Craig and Sinclair 2009)
Craig argues that further analyses of the Cause of the universe show
that this Cause possesses various theistic properties.
To make the deduction of the theistic properties explicit, I shall refor-
mulate the KCA and combine it with the TA as follows (KCA-TA):
(1) There exists a series of causes and effects and changes (= events).
(2) The series either has an infinite regress that avoids a First Cause and
a first change, or its members are joined together like a closed loop
that avoids a First Cause and a first change, or its members are not
so joined together and the series has a First Cause and a first change.
(3) It is not the case that the series has an infinite regress.
(4) It is not the case that its members are joined together like a
closed loop.
(5) Therefore, the series has a First Cause and a first change (from 1 to 4).
(6) Since the First Cause is the first, it is uncaused.
(7) Since whatever begins to exist has a cause (Causal Principle), the
First Cause is beginningless.
(8) Since every change is an event which has a beginning as something/
part of a thing gains or loses a property, and since the first change
(= first event) does not begin uncaused (given the Causal Principle),
the first change (= first event) is caused by a First Cause which is
initially changeless (from 5 and 7; here, ‘initial’ refers to the first in
the series of states ordered causally, not first the series of changes/
events/temporal series).
(9) Since the First Cause is initially changeless, it is transcendent and
immaterial (i.e. it is distinct from the material universe and is the
cause of the universe).
(10) In order to cause an event (Big Bang or whatever) from an initial
changeless state, the First Cause must have
30 A. Loke
• the capacity to be the originator of the event in a way that is un-

determined by prior event, since the First Cause is the first, and
• the capacity to prevent itself from changing, for otherwise the First
Cause would not have been initially changeless and existing begin-
ninglessly without the event/change.
• 10.1 and 10.2 imply that the First Cause has libertarian freedom.
(2) In order to bring about the entire universe, the First Cause is enor-
mously powerful.
(3) (+ the Teleological Argument) In order to bring about a universe
with its fine-tuning and order, the First Cause is highly intelligent.
(4) A First Cause that is uncaused, beginningless, initially changeless,
transcendent, immaterial, has libertarian freedom, and is highly
intelligent and enormously powerful is a Creator of the Universe.
(5) Therefore, a Creator of the universe exists.
The above argument is deductively valid; the key question is whether

the premises are true. I shall defend premises 3 and 4 in Chap. 5, premise
7 in Chaps. 2 and 3, premises 8–11 in Chap. 6, and premise 12 in Chaps.
4 and 7. Here is an overview of the following chapters.
In Chaps. 2 and 3, I explain the notions of causality and the laws of
nature which are fundamental for KCA-TA, defend the Causal Principle
(premise 7 of KCA-TA) against various objections, and develop a Modus
Tollens argument which shows that the Causal Principle is true.
In Chap. 4, I explain another notion which is fundamental for
KCA-TA, namely, ‘design’. I note that various properties of the universe
have been suggested as indicative of the work of a designer. In this book,
I focus on two such properties: ‘fine-tuning’ and ‘order’. (The word ‘order’
refers to the arrangement of things in relation to each other [Oxford
English Dictionary], and in the scientific literature it can be used in vari-
ous ways such as ‘low entropy’, ‘non-chaotic’, or ‘governed by laws’. I use
the term to refer to patterns of events which can be described by advanced
mathematics and which are characterized as ‘laws of nature’; see Chap. 2.)
I defend these two notions against various objections, and note that,
while various forms of design inference have been suggested, the problem
of unconsidered alternative explanations besets all of them. I address this
concern by first devising an original deductive argument which demon-

strates that the following are the only possible categories of hypotheses
concerning ‘fine-tuning and order’: (i) Chance, (ii) Regularity, (iii)
Combinations of Regularity and Chance, (iv) Uncaused, and (v) Design.
I go on and demonstrate that there is an essential feature of (i), (ii), and
(iii) which renders them unlikely as an explanation for the fine-tuning
and order of the universe.
For categories (iv) and (v), I shall evaluate them by showing that an
actual infinite regress of causes and events is not possible. I undertake this
task in Chap. 5 and evaluate various cosmological models which postu-
late an actual infinite number of prior events. I note that these cosmolo-
gies face various scientific and philosophical problems. On the other
hand, there are at least five arguments which demonstrate that an actual
infinite regress of causes and events is not the case. I summarize some of
these arguments and explain why there are good reasons for thinking that
they are sound. I also explain that a closed causal loop involves a viciously
circular setup which would not work, and it is contradicted by the
Generalized Second Law of Thermodynamics (Wall 2013a, 2013b).
Given the refutations of a closed loop (premise 4 of KCA-TA) and an
actual infinite regress of causes and events (premise 3), there is a First
Cause and a first event (premise 5).
In Chap. 6, I explain and defend premises 6–11 of KCA-TA which
show that the First Cause is not part of the physical universe as postulated
by Hawking’s no-boundary proposal (which in any case has been shown
to be scientifically flawed by other cosmologists). Rather, premises 6–11
show that the First Cause is uncaused, beginningless, initially changeless,
has libertarian freedom, and is enormously powerful, that is, a transcen-
dent immaterial Creator of the Universe. The conclusion that the First
Cause is a Creator who brought about the first event purposefully rather
than accidentally can be further strengthened by considering the evi-
dences of fine-tuning and order of the universe.
In Chap. 7, I complete my comparison of categories (iv) Uncaused and
(v) Design concerning the fine-tuning and order of the universe. I offer
three considerations against (iv) and reply to various objections against
the likelihood of Design, and conclude that, while the alternatives to
design are unlikely, the Design hypothesis is not. I explain how my
32 A. Loke
argument from exclusion avoids the problems which beset other design
inferences, such as the difficulty of assigning prior probability for Design.
In the concluding chapter (Chap. 8), I summarize the conclusions and
contributions of my book and explain how science, philosophy, and reli-
gion can continue to work together in our understanding of the Ultimate
Designer.
Notes
1. In this book, ‘ruled out’ does not require ‘perfect’ elimination understood
as demonstrating that other possible hypotheses have zero probability. It
only requires showing that their probability is so low that they can be
eliminated as reasonable alternatives to Design even if we assign them very
generous probability estimates (see Sect. 7.5).
2. I thank Chan Man Ho for clarification of this point.
3. I thank Wesley Wildman for this point.
4. Concerning quantum superposition, see below.
5. While Huemer gives no model to serve as proof of consistency, this does
not invalidate his argument, which is simply intended to show that his
‘solution to the liar paradox holds that the liar sentence fails to express a
proposition due to an inconsistency built into our language’ (p. 29).
6. I thank Jonathan Chan for raising this objection.
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2
Causation and Laws of Nature
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter and the next, I shall explain the notions of causality and
the laws of nature which are fundamental for KCA-TA (Kalām
Cosmological Argument-Teleological Argument), and defend the Causal
Principle ‘whatever begins to exist has a cause’. The defence of the Causal
Principle is very important for philosophy of religion debates and science
and religion dialogues, as it provides the basis for a response to Hawking’s
claim that
You can’t get to a time before the Big Bang because there was no time
before the Big Bang. We have finally found something that doesn’t have a
cause, because there was no time for a cause to exist in. For me this means
that there is no possibility of a creator, because there is no time for a creator
to have existed in. (Hawking 2018, p. 38)
I shall respond to Hawking’s claim in Chap. 6 after establishing the

Causal Principle in Chaps. 2 and 3.

38 A. Loke
In his Inquiry and Essays, the eighteenth-century philosopher Thomas

Reid (1710–1796) declared ‘that neither existence, nor any mode of exis-
tence, can begin without an efficient cause, is a principle that appears
very early in the mind of man; and it is so universal, and so firmly rooted
in human nature, that the most determined scepticism cannot eradicate
it’ (Reid 1983, p. 330). His contemporary and well-known sceptic David
Hume had apparently raised an objection by claiming that the ideas of
cause and effect are distinct and we can conceive of an uncaused
beginning-to-be of an object (Hume 1739/1978, p. 79). However, Hume
confessed in a letter written in 1754 that ‘I never asserted so absurd a
Proposition as that anything might arise without a cause: I only maintain’d
that, our Certainty of the Falsehood of that Proposition proceeded nei-
ther from Intuition nor Demonstration; but from another Source’ (Hume
1932, i., p. 187). Thus, it seems that Hume himself would agree that the
mere conceivability of something beginning to exist uncaused does not
provide sufficient grounds for rejecting the principle stated by Reid
(Anscombe 1974). Others however have argued that (in the absence of
arguments to the contrary) conceivability does entail possibility, and phi-
losophers influenced by Hume have raised doubts about Reid’s principle.
For example, in the Preface to the Second Edition of his Critique of Pure
Reason, Immanuel Kant argued that, while the principle of causality is
valid for objects as phenomena, it may not be valid for objects as things
in themselves (the noumenal world). In more recent years, some scien-
tists and philosophers have claimed that quantum physics indicate that
uncaused events happen all the time (Grünbaum 2009, p. 15). It has also
been argued that, even if things do not begin to exist uncaused within our
universe, it might be the case that our universe itself begun to exist
uncaused (Oppy 2010, 2015; Almeida 2018).
The debate is fascinating and of importance to metaphysics, philoso-
phy of science, philosophy of religion, and science and religion dialogues.
In this book, instead of defending the stronger claim that ‘neither exis-
tence, nor any mode of existence, can begin without an efficient cause’
(Reid), I shall defend the weaker claim that ‘neither existence, nor any
mode of existence, begins without a cause’, that is, ‘whatever begins to
exist has a cause’ (here, the word ‘cause’ refers to either an efficient cause
or a material cause; I shall explain this point below). For convenience of
exposition, I shall henceforth refer to this weaker claim as the Causal

Principle. I shall first define the key terms of the Causal Principle in the
next section, and then respond to some objections to the Causal Principle.
In the next chapter, I shall defend an argument in support of the Causal
Principle. I shall show that the Causal Principle remains defensible not
only on the dynamic (A-) theory of time but also on the static (B-) theory
of time (which is widely accepted by cosmologists).
2.2 D
efining the Key Terms
of the Causal Principle
I shall begin by discussing the definitions of the key terms of the Causal
Principle ‘whatever begins to exist has a cause’ and the related terms
‘time’, ‘eternal’, ‘event’, ‘change’, ‘perdurantism’, and ‘uncaused’.
‘Whatever’ refers to all that exists (regardless of whether they are things,
events, substances, states of affairs, arrangements, etc.). Some have
objected to the Causal Principle by claiming that everything came from
pre-existent materials (e.g. my body came from pre-existent molecules)
and therefore there isn’t anything which begins to exist. Those who affirm
creatio ex nihilo (according to which God is the efficient cause who
brought about the universe without material cause) would dispute the
claim that everything came from pre-existent materials, but in any case
the objection is based on a misunderstanding, since ‘whatever’ refers to
events and arrangements as well. (Thus, for example, even though my
body came from pre-existent molecules, there was a beginning to the
event at which the molecules constituted the first cell of my body result-
ing in a new arrangement of the molecules. The event and new arrange-
ment were caused by the fertilization of my mother’s egg by my father’s
sperm.) Therefore, the Causal Principle does not require the demonstra-
tion of creatio ex nihilo (nor does it deny creatio ex nihilo; see below).
Rather, the Causal Principle is claiming that, regardless of whether some-
thing begins from pre-existing materials or not, it has a cause.
‘Begins to exist’: something has a beginning if it has a temporal exten-
sion, the extension is finite,1 and it has temporal edges/boundaries, that
40 A. Loke
is, it does not have a static closed loop (see Chap. 5) or a changeless/time-
less phase (see Chap. 6) that avoids an edge. Consider, for example,
Oppy’s defence of the claim (against Craig) that it is possible for the ini-
tial state of reality to come into existence uncaused out of nothing (Oppy
2015, section 4, italics mine). The terms in italics indicate a temporal
boundary, that is, a beginning. Whereas on Craig’s theistic hypothesis,
God (the First Cause) does not come into existence uncaused out of
nothing; rather, God is timeless sans creation and in time with creation
(Craig and Sinclair 2009, p. 189). On this view, God’s existence has a
timeless phase which avoids a boundary and is therefore beginningless.
In relation to the definition of ‘beginning’, there are different views of
time which need to be distinguished. A relational view of time defines
time as an extended series of changes/events ordered by ‘earlier than’ and
‘later than’ relations, whereas a substantival view of time affirms that time
can exist as an extended substance independently of change.
According to the dynamic (A-) theory of time, the members of a series
of changes/events come to be one after another. Whereas on the static
(B-) theory of time, our spacetime is a four-dimensional block and the
series of events is a tenselessly existing manifold all of whose members are
equally real and the ‘flow’ of time is regarded as illusory. By defining
‘beginning to exist’ in terms of ‘temporal extension’ and ‘boundary’, I am
using a definition that is compatible with both static and dynamic theo-
ries of time.
Against some philosophers who have doubted the existence of time
altogether (Pelczar 2015), Simon (2015) notes that ‘it would suffice if we
could know via a combination of introspection and memory that our
experience changes. But this is commonplace: I remember that I was
experiencing a sunrise, and I introspect that I no longer am.’ Moreover,
‘it would suffice if we could conclude that experiences take time … in the
words of Ray Cummings (1922), ‘time is what keeps everything from
happening all at once’ (ibid.). Thus, the fact that I do not hear all the
notes of a Beethoven symphony all at once is evidence that events do not
happen all at once; rather, there is a sequence. It has sometimes been
claimed that a massless particle travelling at the speed of light is ‘timeless’.
However, what this means is that according to Special Relativity, some-
thing travelling at the speed of light would not ‘experience’ time passing.
One needs to note the distinction between experience and reality. Even
though a massless particle travelling at the speed of light does not ‘experi-
ence’ time passing, in reality it still has a beginning in time at its point of
origin from where the particle is emitted. (For the discussion on timeless-
ness, see further, Chap. 6.)
There are also different uses of the word ‘eternal’ which need to be
distinguished. ‘Eternal’ can mean (1) having no beginning and no end;
however, ‘eternal’ has also been used in the literature to refer to (2) some-
thing that does not come into being or go out of being. On the static
theory of time, the universe can have a beginning (in the sense explained
above) and thus is not eternal in the first sense, and yet does not come
into being or go out of being, and thus is eternal in the second sense. In
line with the latter usage, ‘eternalism’ is used in the literature to refer to
the view that our spacetime is a four-dimensional block and the series of
events is a tenselessly existing manifold all of whose members are equally
real. However, one must be careful to note that this does not imply that
the universe has no beginning. (Moreover, ‘eternal’ has also been used to
refer to (3) something that has no end but has a beginning; for example,
Vilenkin affirms ‘eternal inflation’ and yet he argues that the universe has
a beginning; see Chap. 4.)
An event is understood as a change. The existence of changes is unde-
niable. It is true that according to the B-theory of time, the ‘moving pres-
ent’ (often called the ‘flow of time’) which we experience in our
consciousness is regarded as illusory. (Because of this, the static theory of
time is sometimes misleadingly regarded as timelessness or changeless-
ness. The key issue concerns the definition of time and change; see below.)
Nevertheless, no time-theorist (whether A- or B-theorist) would deny
(for example) that he/she has undergone numerous changes since he/she
was conceived (e.g. he/she has grown taller, heavier, etc.). Nathan
Oaklander (2004, p. 39) observes, ‘The rock-bottom feature of time that
must be accepted on all sides is that there is change, and the different
views concerning the nature of change constitute the difference between
A- and B- theories of time.’
A change is understood here as involving a thing or part of a thing2
gaining or losing one or more properties. On a dynamic (A) theory of
time, the gaining/losing of properties involves a coming to be/passing
42 A. Loke
away of properties. On a static (B) theory of time, the gaining/losing of

properties does not involve a coming to be/passing away of properties;
rather, it involves having different temporal parts at different times (per-
durantism). The different parts have boundaries and hence beginnings
(see the definition of ‘beginning’ above).
Thus, it is true that on a static theory, a four-dimensional block is
‘unchanging’ if this is understood as saying that there is no coming to be/
passing away of properties, and that there is no ‘earlier’ event if this is
understood as saying that there is no event that passes away before others.
However, as Oaklander observes, there are still changes in the sense that
the four-dimensional block has different temporal parts with different
properties at different times. Moreover, some parts (e.g. those temporal
parts in which there is water on earth) are posterior to (‘later’ in this
sense) and dependent on prior (‘earlier’ in this sense) temporal parts (e.g.
those temporal parts in which there is formation of hydrogen near the
beginning of the Big Bang; scientists would say that the formation of
water is dependent on the prior existence of hydrogen). In this sense later
events are dependent on earlier events, and this remains true on the block
theory. On a static theory of time, every event in the ‘block’ exists and is
equally real, but nevertheless ‘later’ events are still dependent on ‘earlier’
events. Indeed, any theory of time which denies such a basic scientific
fact as the formation of water in our universe is dependent on the prior
existence of hydrogen would have to be rejected, and no B-theorist of
time would deny that. (The dependence can be characterized using coun-
terfactuals as follows: ‘if there were no hydrogen formed earlier, there
would not be water formed later’; I shall argue below that this depen-
dence is causal.)
It might be objected that, while it makes sense to talk about things
‘beginning to exist’ within the spacetime block on B-theory of time, it
makes no sense whatsoever to talk about the block itself beginning to
exist.3 But this is not true; if the spacetime block is finite in temporal
extension etc. (‘etc.’ refers to ‘does not have a static closed loop or a
changeless phase that avoids an edge’), then that implies that the space-
time block has a beginning—the same sense of ‘beginning to exist’ is
used. While the spacetime block does not ‘come to be’ on this B-theory
view,4 it still has a beginning in the sense of being finite in temporal
extension etc., just as every part of it has a beginning in the sense of being
finite in temporal extension etc. Craig and Sinclair (2009, p. 183) note
that ‘For B-Theorists deny that in beginning to exist the universe came
into being or became actual’. Note that the concept of ‘beginning to
exist’ is not absent in B-theory; indeed, scientists who are B-theorists (e.g.
Carroll 2014) frequently speak about the beginning of universe. On
B-theory ‘beginning to exist’ is not understood as ‘came into being or
became actual’, but it is defined as ‘exists tenselessly as a four-dimensional
space-time block that is finitely extended’ (Craig and Sinclair 2009,
p. 184). The claim that ‘the block does not exist in time thus to talk about
a beginning is meaningless’ is therefore false; regardless of whether the
block exists in time or not, if it is finitely extended etc. then it has a
beginning according to the static theory’s definition of beginning. A
block by definition has extension and an extension can be finite etc. One
can say that the part of the spacetime block in which (say) Einstein exists
is finite in the sense that it did not consist of an actual infinite moments
but is finite etc. That is what it means to say that the block itself has a
beginning.
One might object that there is a difference between the part of the
block in which Einstein exists and the whole block itself, namely, the
whole block itself does not exist in another time block whereas Einstein
would exist in the time block. Nevertheless, I shall argue in Chap. 3 that,
if the whole block has a beginning, it would have a cause just as the part
of the block in which Einstein exists has a cause, the only difference is
that, if the cause of the block is initially timeless (see Chap. 6), then it is
not earlier than the block whereas the causes of Einstein (e.g. his parents)
are earlier than Einstein. Both would still have causes, however.
One might ask how can the block have a cause if (according to static
theory) it does not come into being or become actual, even though it has
a beginning. In reply, the part of the block in which Einstein exists also
does not come into being or become actual on the static theory, yet his
existence is still causally dependent on his parents’ existence in the sense
that, if his parents had not existed, Einstein would not begin to exist.
Likewise, I shall argue in Chap. 3 that the whole spacetime block has a
cause in the sense that, if the cause does not exist, the spacetime block
would not begin to exist.
44 A. Loke
Aristotle (Physics 2.3) famously identified four kinds of causes: efficient

cause (the source of change, for example, the sculptor’s act of bronze-
casting the statue), material cause (‘that out of which a thing comes to be
and which persists’, for example, the bronze of the statue), formal cause
(‘the form or the archetype’, for example, the structure of the statue), and
final cause (‘in the sense of end [telos] or that for the sake of which’, for
example, the sculptor sculpting the statue for aesthetic purposes) (Mackie
2005). In this book, unless otherwise stated, ‘cause’ refers to either an
efficient cause or a material cause, and which is either necessary or suffi-
cient5 for an effect,6 understood as a change.7 Weaver (2019, p. 261) notes
that causation is multigrade, asymmetric (although not always temporally
asymmetric), transitive, irreflexive and a dependence relation: ‘when event
x causes event y, y depends for its existence and contingent content on x.’8
Finally, there are two different senses of the phrase ‘begins uncaused’
which are often used in the literature and which should be distinguished:
(1) For any x, if x begins uncaused, then the beginning of x does not have
a causally necessary condition understood as either an efficient cause or
material cause. That is, either
(1.1) x begins without any causally necessary condition at all, or
(1.2) x begins without something that is known to be a causally neces-
sary condition (under certain circumstances) for the beginning of x. For
example, in the reality that we now inhabit, what is causally necessary for
an increase in strength of a pre-existent electric field under certain circum-
stances would include (for example) the switching on of an electric field
generator. If events such as the increase in strength of pre-existent electric
fields happen without the switching on of electric field generators under
the same circumstances, they would be regarded as uncaused and would
entail a chaotic world e.g. I would suffer from electric shock even though
nothing is switched on (see Chap. 3).
(2) Indeterministic events, such as (as many physicists would affirm)
quantum events and (as many libertarians would affirm) a genuinely free
act. It is controversial whether humans have libertarian freedom and
whether quantum events are genuinely indeterministic. In any case, it
should be noted that a libertarian free act does not imply that there is no
causally necessary condition for the making of it; the pre-existence of the
agent, for example, would be a causally necessary condition. Likewise, the
pre-existence of quantum field (for example) would be a causally necessary

condition for quantum fluctuation while the pre-existence of atomic nuclei
and the so-called weak nuclear force would be causally necessary condi-
tions for beta-decay, in the absence of which the beta-decay would not
occur (Bussey 2013, p. 20). The difference between supposed quantum
indeterminism and (say) the supposed uncaused increase in strength of a
pre-existent electric field in (1) above is that the former lacks a causally suf-
ficient condition whereas the latter lacks a causally necessary condition.
In this book, unless otherwise specified, ‘uncaused’ is understood in

the first sense, which is consistent with a key motivation for the Causal
Principle, namely, Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit (‘from nothing, nothing comes’). A
genuinely free act would not be ‘from nothing’; rather, it is from the
agent (see further, Chaps. 3 and 6).
The conviction that ‘from nothing, nothing comes’ led Aristotle to
insist that every state of the world must have come from a previous state
of the world and hence the world must be everlasting (Cogliati 2010,
p. 7)—this insistence resulted in the denial of the Christian doctrine of
creatio ex nihilo among many ancient philosophers. However, such an
insistence is unwarranted given the distinction between efficient cause
and material cause. Creatio ex nihilo only denies that the world has a
material cause; it does not deny that the world has an efficient cause. On
the contrary, ‘creatio’ implies that the Creator is the efficient cause who
brought about the universe; in this sense, the world is from God and not
from nothing.
Aristotle might object that ‘from nothing, nothing comes’ applies to
material cause as well, and insist that ‘from no material cause, nothing
comes’. He might appeal to our daily experiences, which seem to support
the inductive generalization that whatever begins to exist has a material
cause. Craig replies that such an inductive generalization can be treated
merely as an accidental generalization, ‘akin to human beings have always
lived on the Earth, which was true until 1968. The univocal concept of
“cause” is the concept of something which brings its effects, and whether
it involves transformation of already existing materials or creation out of
nothing is an incidental question’ (Craig and Sinclair 2009, pp. 188–9,
195). On the one hand, there has been no compelling argument offered
46 A. Loke
to show that causes must involve the transformation of already existing

materials. On the other hand, God as a causal agent could have causal
powers that other entities (e.g. humans) do not have. While humans, for
example, require pre-existing materials to work from in order to create
(say) a table, God does not require that.9 Moreover, there are indepen-
dent arguments for the Causal Principle (see Chap. 3). Note, in particu-
lar, that the Modus Tollens argument for this principle explained in
Chap. 3 is not dependent on inductive considerations, and because of
this additional argument, the Causal Principle enjoys greater support
than the principle that ‘whatever begins to exist has a material cause’,
which, in any case, can be regarded as an accidental generalization, as
Craig argues. In light of this, the affirmation that there is no physical
entity prior to t = 0 only implies that the universe was not created out of
pre-existent material; it does not imply that there cannot be an efficient
cause which has the power to bring about the universe without requiring
material cause. To insist otherwise would be to beg the question against
creatio ex nihilo (see further, Chap. 6).
2.3 C
ausation, Fundamental Physics,
and Laws of Nature
Causal eliminativists affirm that there are no obtaining causal relations in
the mind-independent world (Weaver 2019, p. 24), while causal reduc-
tionists affirm that causation reduces to something else such as a law-
governed physical history, where both the laws and physical history are
non-causal (Weaver 2019, p. 62).
In favour of causal eliminativism, it might be thought that causes are
merely human interpretations which involve concepts and modelling.
However, if one takes up a piece of wood and hit one’s head, one would
realize that, while the application of the concept of cause to the wood
may be a human interpretation, the wood does have real power to bring
about the event of pain, and the correlation is real. Weaver (2019, p. 90)
observes that instances of sensation and sense perception involve obtain-
ing causal relations (the environment impressing itself upon the senses).
Moreover, the formation of beliefs implies that there are obtaining causal
relations because formations are causal phenomena. ‘When a cognizer
forms a thought, they relate to the thought through causation. When a
cognizer forms a desire, they cause (perhaps together with other factors)
the desire’ (p. 93).
While Bertrand Russell (1918) had declared causation to be a scientifi-
cally obsolete notion and logical positivists had tried to build philosophi-
cal systems without any reference to cause and effect, Koons and
Pickavance (2015, p. 8) observe that
Since then, causation has reclaimed its status as a central notion in philo-
sophical theory. Edmund Gettier, in a famous article in 1963, challenged
the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief, leading to
new theories of knowledge that relied upon some kind of causal connec-
tion between states of knowledge and the world. Modern theories of sen-
sory perception and memory, in particular, require reference to appropriate
causal mechanisms. Work in the philosophy of language by Keith
Donnellan, Saul Kripke, and Gareth Evans, among others, introduced
causal theories of the meanings of words and the content of thought.
Finally, the philosopher of science Nancy Cartwright demonstrated that
causation is far from obsolete in the experimental sciences.
Causal reductionists such as cosmologist Sean Carroll (2014) claim

that ‘the notion of a “cause” isn’t part of an appropriate vocabulary to use
for discussing fundamental physics. Rather, modern physical models take
the form of unbreakable patterns—laws of Nature—that persist without
any external causes.’ Carroll thinks that our construction of causal expla-
nations for objects within the totality of physical reality is due to the fact
that the objects obey the laws of physics, and that there is a low-entropy
boundary condition in the past.10 However, there is no physical law and
no low-entropy boundary condition that apply to the totality of physical
reality itself; hence, we have no ‘right to demand some kind of external
cause’ (Carroll and Craig 2016, pp. 67–8).
In reply, it should be asked why the ‘patterns’ Carroll refers to are
‘unbreakable’. While Carroll appeals to the so-called laws of nature, one
48 A. Loke
should ask why the events described by fundamental physics follow

those laws.
Now Hume famously stated that the laws of nature are simply regulari-
ties of events; there is no relationship of necessity between these events,
nor are laws conceived of as something that govern the regularities. Hume
also claims that ‘we may define a cause to be an object, followed by
another, and where all the objects similar to the first, are followed by
objects similar to the second’, and that ‘all events seem entirely loose and
separate’ (An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding 1748, section
VII). Following Hume, Regularity Theorists of Causation have analysed
causation as regular patterns of succession and have regarded these regu-
larities as ‘brute facts’ rather than as something in need of an explanation.
Against this, others have argued that the question ‘Why is the world
regular (in the particular way that it is)?’ needs to be answered by a deeper
explanation, for otherwise the regularity of event P followed by event Q
(rather than, say, event R, or S, or T, etc.) is just due to chance, which is
highly improbable (Strawson 1989, pp. 205–6). I shall argue below that
the deeper explanation is provided by the properties of the things which
are involved in these regular patterns, and these properties can be called
‘causal properties’.11
Regularity Theorists might object that the question ‘What explains the
regularity?’ is merely pushed back on Strawson’s strategy. For example, if
the deeper explanation offered is ‘Because of the nature of matter’, they
may ask ‘what explains the nature of matter (or whatever)?’ Since there
must after all be some terminus of explanation, why not terminate with
the regularities themselves (Psillos 2009, pp. 134–135)?
In reply, I would argue that terminating with regularities does not get
rid of the problem of the improbability of one event following another
regularly by chance. On the other hand, terminating with an alternative
explanation such as ‘because of causal properties grounded in the nature
of matter’, which, one might argue, is determined by a beginningless and
uncaused First Cause (see Chap. 6) and therefore not the result of chance,
would resolve this problem.
Carroll might insist that in fundamental physics, ‘real patterns’
described by laws explain causal regularities, but the question is, why the
events described by fundamental physics follow those patterns/laws? A
pattern/law of nature is not a concrete thing but merely a description of

behaviour of concrete events/thing; thus, it is still the properties of those
concrete event/things which ground the behaviour/law, and those prop-
erties can be called causal properties. As Feser (2013, p. 254) observes,
the laws of nature are ‘mere abstractions and thus cannot by themselves
explain anything. What exist in the natural order are concrete material
substances with certain essences, and talk of “laws of nature” is merely
shorthand for the patterns of behavior they tend to exhibit given those
essences.’ Against Maudlin (2007), Dorato and Esfeld (2014) argue that
the view that laws are grounded in properties (global properties rather
than ‘intrinsic’ or local properties, in view of quantum entanglement)
makes intelligible how laws can ‘govern’ the behaviour of objects. This is
the decisive advantage of dispositionalism over primitivism (the view that
laws are primitive).
Carroll might object that the equations of fundamental physics do not
seem to specify which events are the causes and which events are the
effects. Ladyman et al. (2007, p. 160) claim that ‘matter has become
increasingly ephemeral in modern physics, losing its connection with the
impenetrable stuff that populates the everyday world … the ontology of
modern physics seems to be increasingly abstract and mathematical’.
Weaver (2019, p. 63) notes that the reason why causal eliminativism has
been so prevalent in philosophy of physics ‘is connected to a tendency in
that sub-discipline to associate the substantial content of physical theo-
ries with the mathematical formalisms of those theories … because for-
malisms do not contain any causal notions … physical theories should
not be understood causally’.
Nevertheless, Weaver also observes that many great physicists past and
present, including the discoverers of relativity and quantum mechanics,
‘adopted causal approaches to physics and conceived of their inquiry as a
searching evaluation of the world that should uncover causes’ (Weaver
2019, p. 71). The equations of fundamental physics do not specify cau-
sality because they do not provide an exhaustive description of reality.
Consider the following example which illustrates that mathematical
equations do not provide a complete account of the natural world and
that an interpretative framework involving causal considerations is
required: The quadratic equation x2 – 4 = 0 can have two mathematically
50 A. Loke
consistent results for ‘x’: 2 or −2. Both answers are mathematically pos-
sible. However, if the question is ‘How many people carried the com-
puter home?’, the answer cannot be ‘−2’, because in the concrete world it
is metaphysically impossible that ‘−2 people’ carry a computer home,
regardless of what the mathematical equation shows. The impossibility is
metaphysical, not mathematical, and it illustrates that metaphysical issues
are more fundamental than mathematics. The conclusion that ‘2 people’
rather than ‘−2 people’ carried the computer home is not derived from
mathematical equations, but from causal considerations: ‘−2 people’ lack
the causal powers to carry a computer home.
Feser (2017, pp. 45–46) observes that ‘since the equations of physics
are, by themselves, mere equations, mere abstractions, we know that
there must be something more to the world than what they describe.
There must be something that makes it the case that the world actually
operates in accordance with the equations, rather than some other equa-
tions or no equations at all.’ In other words, the equations of physics
merely provide an incomplete description of regularities without ruling
out efficient causation and causal properties which (as explained above)
operate at a more fundamental level as the ground of these regularities.
A number of concerns have been raised in the literature regarding the
temporal order of events. It has been claimed that the Delayed Choice
Quantum Eraser violates the notion that causes cannot be later than their
effects. To elaborate on one version of this Eraser, according to the so-
called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, the photon
either behaves as a wave or a particle when it passes through the double
slit, and if scientists quickly place a detection device, the device would
detect a particle, if not, a wave behaviour would be observed. Since the
placement of the detection device happens after the photon passed
through the double slit, it seems that the placement of the detection
device determined what happened earlier (whether the photon would
behave as wave or particle). However, this reasoning assumes the
Copenhagen interpretation. According to Bohm’s interpretation, the
photon is always a particle guided by wave (the particle follows one path,
while its associated wave goes through both paths); thus, the placement
of the detection device did not determine what happened earlier but
merely what happened to the photon at the moment of detection

(Bricmont 2017, p. 145).
It has also been claimed that recent experiments in quantum mechanics (a
photon prepared in a superposition with regard to its polarization hitting
point A before point B on one route while hitting B before A on the other
route; these two causal paths [A then B, or B then A] are in superposition)
has indicated that, at the fundamental level, temporal order is not fixed
(Indefinite Causal Order) (Qureshi-Hurst and Pearson 2020). However, the
problem is that such claim assumes the Copenhagen interpretation, which
(as explained previously) is unproven. Moreover, as explained previously in
Chap. 1, instead of thinking of the superposed state as a photon existing in
contradictory states, one can think of it as a quantum of energy spread across
the possible states as a wave. Some parts of the wave reach A before B, while
other (different) parts of the wave reach B before A; there is no contradiction
and no violation of temporal order (it should also be noted that the emission
of the photon happens before A or B: a definite temporal order!).
With regard to the so-called backward in time travelling positron in
QED, this may be interpreted (in accordance with Paul Dirac’s hole the-
ory) as spacetime locations in the Dirac sea (a theoretical model of the
vacuum as a sea of particles with negative energy) at which a negatively
charged electron comes into being carrying the negative energy imputed
to it by the Dirac sea (Greiner and Reinhardt 2009, p. 40), thus there is
no violation of temporal order.
In any case, as I explain in response to Linford below, even if backward
causation is possible and that it is the case that the future determines the
past, given the arguments that the future is finite and that a closed loop
is impossible (Chap. 5), the ‘last’ duration of the future would be the
first, and the rest of my argument would still follow. Thus, in any case,
the Cosmological Argument I defend is not affected by the above-
mentioned concerns regarding the temporal order of events.
Ladyman et al. (2007, p. 160) claim that causation is problematic in
the microscopic domain where, for example, ‘the singlet state in the
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (Bohm-EPR) experiment fails to screen off the
correlations between the results in the two wings of the apparatus, and
thus fails to satisfy the principle of the common cause’. In reply, Bohmian
mechanics and the Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (GRW) mass density
52 A. Loke
theory are able to offer a causal explanation of the correlated outcomes of

EPR-type experiments in terms of a non-local common cause (Egg and
Esfeld 2014).
It might be objected that, ‘from the point of view of microphysics,
given an individual event, there is no objective distinction between which
events make up that event’s past and which its future. Therefore, there is
no microphysical distinction between which are its causes and which its
effects. Thus, there are no facts about microphysical causation’ (Ney
2016, p. 146). Linford (2020) claims that ‘efficient causation is a time
asymmetric phenomenon’ (p. 8)’, but ‘the direction of time does not
appear in our best microphysical theories’ (p. 4). He states that ‘the dis-
tinction between the past and the future made in fundamental physics (if
fundamental physics really does distinguish the past from the future) are
unlikely to explain the distinction between causes and their effects or any
of the other macrophysically observable temporal asymmetries’ (n.4).
Linford notes that ‘the project of explaining all temporal asymmetry—
including the asymmetry of efficient causation—in terms of the
Mentaculus is ongoing’, and if successful, ‘efficient causation, qua macro-
physical time asymmetry, will be given a reductive explanation in terms
of the Mentaculus’ (p. 8). Linford explains that the ‘Mentaculus’ hypoth-
esis (which is part of what he calls the ‘Albert–Loewer–Papineau reduc-
tive programme’, or ALP) consists of the conjunction of three principles:
First, whatever the fundamental dynamical laws happen to be. Second, the
Past Hypothesis, that is, the hypothesis that the universe began in the low
entropy macrophysical state … third, the Statistical Postulate, that is, the
specification of a uniform probability measure over the portion of phase
space consistent with whatever information we happen to have about the
physical world. (pp. 7–8)
The implication of this project (if successful) is that
Even if the coming into being of E requires explanatorily prior, physically

necessary conditions C … the explanatorily prior, physically necessary con-
ditions need not fall in any particular temporal direction with respect to
E … the explanatorily prior and physically necessary conditions for the
universe’s ‘beginning’ can fall in the temporal direction away from the
beginning … entities do not require explanatorily prior or simultaneous

causes for their coming into being. (p. 11)
In reply, first, it does not follow from the fact that microphysics is not
able to distinguish between past and future events that there are no facts
about microphysical causation. The reason is that it might be the case
that microphysics does not provide a complete explanation of microphys-
ical reality, but only a certain aspect of it, and therefore what cannot be
discerned from physics does not imply it does not exist.
Second, the underlying assumption of the above arguments is the
Humean assumption that the direction of causation is parasitic on tem-
poral direction, but this assumption can be challenged (see further, below
and Chap. 3).
Third, an explicitly causal theory of quantum gravity has been pro-
posed (Wall 2013a, b). While the correct framework for a truly quantum
theory of gravity is far from settled, the current status of quantum gravity
studies suggests that ‘any case for the claim “quantum gravitational phys-
ics does not need causation” is at best uncertain and incomplete’ (Weaver
2019, p. 274).
Fourth, Frisch points out that descriptions in scientific literature sup-
port the thesis that ‘even at the level of fundamental research in physics,
our conception of the world is ineliminably causal’ (Frisch 2014, p. 66).
He cites as an example a report from the Large Hadron Collider study
group of CERN which mentions that
There are various places in the machine where beams can be ‘injected,’ that
other components allow ‘suppression’ of dispersion, and that others allow
for the ‘cleanup’ of the beam. Finally, there is the ‘beam dump’ where the
beam can be deposited with the help of ‘kickers.’ In the detector, when a
photon passes through matter, it ‘knocks out’ electrons from the atoms
‘disturbing the structure of the material’ and ‘creating’ loose electrons.
(Ibid., citing Pettersson and Lefèvre 1995)
Frisch rightly concludes that, although the word ‘cause’ is not used in
these descriptions, the terms he quoted all describe what Nancy
Cartwright would characterize as ‘concretely fitted out’ instances of
54 A. Loke
‘causings’ (Frisch 2014, p. 66). The fundamental particles described by

nuclear physics clearly have dispositional properties, that is, tendencies to
produce certain effects when they interact in certain ways (Martin
2008, p. 50).
Weaver (2019, p. 124) notes that ‘the word interaction in scientific
and physical research contexts is a causal term’, citing the Oxford
Dictionary of Physics, which gives the technical definition: An interaction
is ‘an effect involving a number of bodies, particles, or systems as a result
of which some physical or chemical change takes place to one or more of
them’. Weaver (2019, p. 234) observes that ‘There are four fundamental
types of interactions between fundamental entities in our best physical
theories, viz., the strong, weak, electromagnetic, and gravitational inter-
actions … No one (so far as I’m aware) in the physics literature denies
that all four types of physical phenomena are interactive phenomena.’
Weaver also notes that, if there is causation in the physical base, then
‘any attempt to reduce causal direction to the arrow of entropic increase,
for example, will fail, for already within microphysical evolutions driving
entropic increase are obtaining causal relations and therefore causal direc-
tion’ (p. 131). Hence, it has not been shown that causal direction reduces
to some direction in a non-causally interpreted physics given that what’s
fundamental in one of our currently best quantum theories should be
interpreted causally (p. 143).
One might worry that the view that time-reversal invariant12 entails
that there are naturally possible worlds at which the imagined micrody-
namical causes are the effects whereas the effects are transmuted into the
causes. In reply, Weaver (2019, p. 133) argues concerning the proposi-
tion ‘every purely contingent event has a causal explanation featuring an
obtaining irreflexive causal relation to back it’ that a binary relation being
necessarily asymmetric does not entail that the relation goes the same way
in all possible worlds. It does not rule out the possibility that, if a gluon’s
activity causes a quark to take on certain properties in our world, the
quark’s beginning to exemplify those properties is the cause of the gluon’s
activity in another possible world. In other words, while the relationship
between cause and effect is necessarily asymmetric, this does not imply
that the kind of thing x which is the cause for an effect y in this world
cannot be an effect y of cause x in another possible world. ‘If at an
arbitrary world w, the gluon’s activity causes a quark to take on certain

properties, then (at w) it is not the case that the quark’s taking on those
properties causes the gluon’s activity’ (ibid.). Additionally, there is a
deductive argument for Causal Principle which shows that whatever
begins to exist (this would include events at the level of fundamental
physics) has a cause (see Chap. 3); therefore, causality is fundamental.
Concerning Norton (2003)’s ‘mass on the dome’ thought experiment,
it does not pose a problem for my argument because the thought experi-
ment (even if successful; this has been challenged by other philosophers)
only goes to show that Newtonian mechanics is consistent with uncaused
events. It does not show that uncaused events do happen. One can legiti-
mately reply that, on the one hand, Newtonian mechanics is not a com-
plete description of physical world (indeed, given quantum physics and
relativity, we know it is not). On the other hand, given my Modus Tollens
argument (see Chap. 3), we know that events do not happen without
causally necessary condition(s). Additionally, Norton’s thought experi-
ment also assumes that time is composed of instants; but as Craig and
others have argued, this view should be rejected because it results in para-
doxes of motion (see Chap. 5).
Another problem with the Humean view of causation is that contin-
gent relations between events would not support counterfactuals and
warrant predictions in science (Mumford 2004, pp. 161–162). Thus, fol-
lowing Kripke (1980), who argues that there are metaphysical necessary
truths discovered a posteriori (e.g. water is H2O), many contemporary
philosophers of science have argued that there are causally necessary con-
nections between causal relata (such as events, substances, or states of
affairs). The laws of nature have been regarded by them to be at least
partly metaphysically necessary (necessitarian view; see, for example, Ellis
2001; Bird 2007), while other philosophers regard them as metaphysi-
cally contingent overall (contingentist view; see, for example, Fine 2002;
Lowe 2002). Alternatively, one might deny that the laws of nature obtain
with metaphysical necessity but argue that there is nevertheless a particu-
lar sense of necessity pertaining to natural laws (natural necessity)
(Linnemann 2020, pp. 1–2). Fine (2002), for example, argues that meta-
physical necessity is ‘the sense of necessity that obtains in virtue of the
identity of things’ (Fine 2002, p. 254), and that not all natural necessities
56 A. Loke
are metaphysical necessities. For example, ‘light has a maximum velocity’

is at most naturally necessary but not metaphysically necessary. Likewise,
even though it is arguably naturally necessary that mass attracts mass with
an inverse square law, this does not seem to render it metaphysically nec-
essary (one would think that an inverse cube law for the attraction
between masses is as such metaphysically possible). It might be objected
that if an inverse cube law (rather than inverse square law) holds, we
would not be dealing with ‘mass’ but with something else (e.g. ‘schmass’).
However, on the one hand, it is a natural necessity that there is no
schmass, on the other hand, the objector is assuming the existence of
schmass as a metaphysical possibility. This goes to underscore Fine’s point
that not all natural necessities are metaphysical necessities
(Linnemann 2020).
Lange (2009, p. 45) contrasts the putative necessity of the laws of
nature with other putative species of necessity, such as:
1. (Narrowly) logical necessity (e.g. either all emeralds are green or some
emerald is not green)
2. Conceptual necessity (all sisters are female)
3. Mathematical necessity (there is no largest prime number)
4. Metaphysical necessity (water is H2O)
5. Moral necessity (one ought not torture babies to death for fun)
6. Broadly logical necessity (as possessed by a truth in any of these
categories)
Lange (2009, pp. xi–xii) notes that, while the laws of nature have tra-
ditionally been thought to possess a distinctive species of necessity
(dubbed ‘natural’ necessity) an exception to which is (naturally) impos-
sible, yet many have also regarded the laws of nature to be contingent;
unlike the broadly logical truths listed above, the laws of nature could
have been different from the way they actually are. Essentialists disagree;
they characterize laws as possessing the same strong variety of necessity as
broadly logical truths do (Ellis 2001). While one can imagine these laws
to be false (e.g. one can imagine a different universe in which gravity does
not exist), Bird (2007, p. 207) replies by claiming that
imagination is a poor guide to the modality of laws, if one supposes that

the power of imagination evolved to allow us to think about the sort of
possibilities—concrete, perceptible states of affairs that we might actually
come across (predators in the bushes)—rather than esoteric possibilities (if
they really were such) we would never experience such as a world with dif-
ferent laws. It can be shown how Kripke’s explanation for the illusion of
contingency can be extended to laws.
While some have thought that the laws of nature break down at the
Big Bang, physicist Paul Davies explains that there are still other versions
of the laws of nature which hold at the Big Bang. Davies (2013) explains:
Physicists have discovered that the laws of physics familiar in the laboratory
may change form at very high temperatures, such as the ultra-hot environ-
ment of the Big Bang. As the universe expanded and cooled, various ‘effec-
tive laws’ crystallized out from the fundamental underlying laws, sometimes
manifesting random features. It is the high-temperature versions of the
laws, not their ordinary, lab-tested descendants, that are regarded as truly
fundamental.
Nevertheless, there could still be alternative universes in which differ-

ent properties and different laws of nature exist, whereas the laws of logic
exist in all possible universe. Lange (2009, p. 77) argues that it is in this
sense in which the contingency aspect of the laws of nature is to be under-
stood, noting that the range of counterfactual suppositions under which
the laws of nature must all be preserved, for the set of laws to qualify as
stable, is narrower than the range of counterfactual suppositions under
which the broadly logical truths must all be preserved, for the set of
broadly logical truths to qualify as stable.
According to the dispositionalist view, the necessity aspect of the laws
of nature is grounded in dispositional properties understood as natural
clusters of powers (Mumford 2004, pp. 161, 170). On the dispositional-
ist view, apples regularly fall towards the earth because both apples and
the earth have mass understood as a dispositional property, and the result-
ing regularities can be described by the abstract equations we call the laws
of nature (Dumsday 2019, pp. 10–11). Dorato and Esfeld (2014) argue
that the view that laws are grounded in properties (global properties
58 A. Loke
rather than ‘intrinsic’ or local properties, in view of quantum entangle-

ment) make intelligible how laws can ‘govern’ the behaviour of objects.
This is the decisive advantage of dispositionalism over primitivism (the
view that laws are primitive; see Maudlin 2007). According to the essen-
tialist view, the causally necessary connections are explications of the
essential properties of the natural kinds (Ellis 2001). Essentialists agree
that some properties are essentially dispositional, but they argue that oth-
ers (e.g. spatiotemporal properties) are not (Choi and Fara 2018; see fur-
ther, Section 3.8.3).
Dumsday (2019, p. 119) has defended dispositionalism against Lange’s
attempt to reduce dispositions to subjunctive facts, by situating disposi-
tionalism within robust natural-kind essentialism. ‘Although the disposi-
tions are real and irreducible (hence preserving dispositionalism), they
are not ungrounded, but instead are rooted in the kind. Consequently,
dispositions cannot be reducible to primitive subjunctives. And the kind
in its turn is not reducible to a primitive subjunctive fact, as its explana-
tory role goes beyond that of such a fact’ (p. 120). ‘A primitive subjunc-
tive fact is ordered to a possible future state of affairs, and cannot, in and
of itself, explain the present instantiation of a categorical property like
shape or size. By contrast, the kind-essence, as traditionally conceived,
does exactly that’ (ibid.; noting on p. 122 that kind-talk is utterly ubiq-
uitous across all the natural sciences and the efforts of many physicists
devoted to the classification of apparently fundamental types of particle
in terms of kinds).
It has been objected that there are some laws of nature that could not
be explained in terms of causal powers. For example, the law of conserva-
tion of energy indicates that interactions are constrained by the require-
ment of preserving the mass-energy, but that constraint does not seem to
be the manifestation of a disposition (Chalmers 1999, pp. 12–13).
Mumford (2004, p. 199) replies that what have been labelled as ‘laws of
nature’ are actually a very diverse bunch: ‘Some causal laws might be best
explained in terms of causal powers but others might be better explained
in terms of metaphysical connections between properties and others
might merely describe the structure of space–time or the nature and limit
of energy.’ I shall argue in Chap. 3 that the law of conservation of energy
should be explained in terms of the Causal Principle.
Mumford (2004) has gone further and argued that, given that the con-
cept of a governing law of nature is no longer plausible, ‘law of nature’
should be discarded. Bird (2007, pp. 189–190) disagrees by appealing to
the widespread usage and function of the term in science which indicate
that the governing role is not essential to the definition. Bird defines a law
of nature as follows: (L) The laws of a domain are the fundamental, gen-
eral explanatory relationships between kinds, quantities, and qualities of
that domain, that supervene upon the essential natures of those things
(p. 201).13
Dumsday (2019, chapter 2) has replied to Mumford that at least some
dispositions have CP clauses incorporating uninstantiated universals
(which CP clauses help to delimit the range of manifestations of those
dispositions), which imply that the laws of nature exist. Dumsday claims
that a Platonist may argue that, while the disposition instances do the
causal work, the Platonic universals set the rules by which they operate,
and the laws of nature can be understood as relations between universals
which govern the causal/dispositional roles that properties play as a mat-
ter of metaphysical necessity (Dumsday 2019, chapter 2). However, the
notion of ‘setting the rules’ and ‘govern’ is misleading, since abstract
objects do not have causal power to set or govern anything. As noted
above, abstract objects such as the equations of physics are merely descrip-
tive of behaviour; thus, there must be something concrete that ‘makes it
the case that the world actually operates in accordance with the equa-
tions, rather than some other equations or no equations at all’ (Feser
2013, pp. 45–46).
Traditionally, this concrete entity is God. Bird (2007, pp. 189) notes
the theologico-legal origins of the concept of the laws of nature as the
decrees of God. Historically, the use of the term ‘law of nature’ is related
to legislation by an intelligent deity (Brooke 1991, p. 26). Mumford
(2004, pp. 202–203) objects to the use of this terminology, arguing that,
while moral and legal laws are issued to conscious agents who can under-
standing them and decide whether to obey them or not, physical entities
cannot understand and choose, and they could not have behaved other
than the way they do because their behaviour are tied necessarily to their
properties understood to be clusters of causal powers. He denies the exis-
tence of laws imposed on any things, which they then govern.
60 A. Loke
In reply, it can still be argued that the regularities indicate a Governor

(God) who determined the properties of physical entities to be such that
they move regularly according to equations in a law-like manner noted by
Bird (see Chaps. 4 and 7). This conclusion does not require the views that
(1) God has created a perfect world fine-tuned to his ends, (2) there is a
universal and complete order in nature, and/or (3) what happens in
nature can be described in universal and exceptionless laws.14 On the
contrary, the new groundbreaking view of nature as not universally law-
governed (see above) fits well with the claim that, while God determined
the properties of physical entities, He also judiciously intervenes in nature
at key points to direct its ends (Gingerich 2006).
In any case, one still needs to ask where these ‘laws of nature’ come
from. One might think that the ‘laws of nature’ express abstract relations
between universals which physical things somehow ‘participate in’ (some-
thing like the way every tree participates in the Form of Tree; see
Armstrong 1983). However, we would still need to know how it comes
to be that there is a physical world that ‘participates in’ the laws in the
first place, why it participates in these laws rather than others, and so on,
and this indicates that the laws of nature cannot be ultimate explanations
(Feser 2017, pp. 279–280). As I argue in the rest of this book, the answers
to these questions are found in an intelligent First Cause.
In summary, fundamental physics does not provide a complete descrip-
tion of reality. It does not exclude efficient causation and causal proper-
ties which operate at a more fundamental level as the ground of the
regularities described by fundamental physics. The latter point is further
supported by the argument for the Causal Principle (see Chap. 3).
2.4 C
onsiderations of Quantum
Indeterminancy
The Causal Principle has been rejected in recent years by some philoso-
phers due to considerations from quantum-mechanical indeterminacy
(Grünbaum 2009, p. 15). However, others have responded that quantum
particles emerge from the quantum vacuum which is not non-being, but
something with vacuum fields (quantum particles are manifestations of

fields) and which can be acted on by the relevant laws of nature (Bussey
2013, p. 33). Given that the pre-existent quantum fields and the capaci-
ties to be acted on by the relevant laws of nature are the necessary condi-
tions for bringing about these quantum events, it is not the case that
these quantum events are uncaused (see the definition of uncaused in
Sect. 2.2).
It has sometimes been thought that Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle
violates the Causal Principle. This is a misunderstanding. The ‘uncer-
tainty’ in question does not imply it is possible that energy comes from
absolute nothing; it just means that the pre-existing energy (i.e. the vac-
uum energy which is already present) can (unpredictably) have a very
high value in a very short period of time, such that the uncertainty of the
energy measurement can be very large.
While some scientists have proposed theories according to which the
universe began to exist from ‘nothing’ (e.g. Vilenkin 2006; Krauss 2012),
cosmologist George Ellis objects that the efforts by these scientists cannot
truly ‘solve’ the issue of creation, ‘for they rely on some structures or other
(e.g. the elaborate framework of quantum field theory and much of the
standard model of particle physics) pre-existing the origin of the uni-
verse, and hence themselves requiring explanation’ (Ellis 2007, section
2.7). Ellis’ objection indicates that what these scientists mean by ‘noth-
ing’ cannot be the absence of anything; rather, there needs to be some-
thing that can behave according to physics in order for their physical
theories to work.
Moreover, it has already been explained in Chap. 1 that, in view of the
importance of philosophical considerations for evaluating scientific theo-
ries, cosmologists should not merely construct models of the universe
without considering the philosophical arguments against certain models.
If what these scientists mean by ‘nothing’ is truly the absence of anything,
then their theory would be refuted by philosophical arguments for the
Causal Principle (see Chap. 3) which they have not successfully rebutted.
Even if it is the case that the negative gravitational energy of our uni-
verse exactly cancels the positive energy represented by matter so that the
total energy of the universe is zero, as suggested by the Zero Energy
Universe Theory (see Chap. 5), this does not imply that the positive and
62 A. Loke
negative energy arose uncaused from zero energy. One can still ask what
is the efficient cause which made the positive and negative energy to be
the way they are. To conclude otherwise is to commit the logical fallacy
of thinking that ‘net zero imply no cause’. (This logical fallacy may be
illustrated using the following analogy: the fact that my company’s total
expenses cancel the total revenue, such that the net profit is zero, does not
imply that the expenses and revenue occurred without an efficient cause.
We still need to ask what made the expenses and revenue to be the way
they are.)
As for the radioactive disintegration of atomic nuclei, even if events
such as the decay of a given atom of 235U at this instant rather than (say)
two weeks from now do not have a sufficient cause, there is strong justi-
fication for maintaining that the phenomena (the decay and statistics
they exhibit) themselves have underlying proportionate causal explana-
tions, for they exhibit regularities that strongly indicate the existence of
more fundamental ordered causes (Stoeger 2001, p. 87). These funda-
mental ordered causes would be entities that are causally antecedent to
the radioactive disintegration of atomic nuclei. Physicist Peter Bussey
(2013, p. 20) notes that ‘beta-decay is due to the so-called “weak nuclear
force”, in whose absence the decay would not occur. So the cause of the
new nuclear state is the weak force acting on the previous nuclear state.’
Additionally, many different interpretations of quantum physics exist,
and some of them, such as Everett’s Many Worlds interpretation and
Bohm’s pilot-wave model, are perfectly deterministic. A number of scien-
tists and philosophers have argued that Bohm’s theory is superior to the
indeterministic Copenhagen interpretation (Towler 2009a, b; Goldstein
2013; I discuss this in Loke 2017, chapter 5), and that it can explain
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (Bricmont 2017, section 5.1.8).
Contrary to popular opinion, physicist John Bell has not demonstrated
the impossibility of hidden variables, but only the (apparent) inevitability
of non-locality of quantum physics;15 Bell himself defended Bohm’s hid-
den variable theory (Bell 1987). Likewise, Alain Aspect (2002), the noted
experimenter of quantum entanglement, agrees that his experiment does
not violate determinism but only the locality condition. While it has
been objected that Bohm’s theory is incompatible with theory of relativ-
ity (Lewis 2016, p. 180), others have replied that, if Bohmian mechanics
indeed cannot be made relativistic, it seems likely that quantum mechan-

ics can’t either (Dürr et al. 2014; Maudlin [2018] defends Bohmian
mechanics by arguing that fundamental Lorentz invariance can be vio-
lated, and that observational Lorentz invariance can be explained by
appealing to quantum equilibrium). With regard to quantum field the-
ory, Bricmont (2017, p. 170) proposes Bohm-like quantum field theories
in which dynamics are defined
for the fields rather than for the particles, and the guidance equation would
apply to the dynamics of field configurations. … One can also propose
other Bohm-like quantum field theories, including theories of particles and
their pair creation … all the predictions of the usual quantum field theories
are also obtained in those Bohmian-type models and, to the extent that
those models are rather ill-defined mathematically, the same thing is true
for ordinary quantum field theories, which is not the case for non-
relativistic quantum mechanics or the corresponding de Broglie–Bohm
theory for particles.
Now Bohm’s theory is not the only possible deterministic quantum

theory; other deterministic quantum theories that are better than Bohm’s
(as well as better than the indeterministic Copenhagen interpretation)
might well be discovered in the future. The inability to predict the appear-
ance of the quantum particles in quantum vacuum may be due to our
epistemological limitation and the incompleteness of current quantum
physics. As Einstein [1949, p. 666] remarks, ‘I am, in fact, firmly con-
vinced that the essentially statistical character of contemporary quantum
theory is solely to be ascribed to the fact that this (theory) operates with
an incomplete description of physical systems.’ Physicist John Wheeler
notes that our current understanding of quantum mechanics is provi-
sional, and that it is plausible to think that some deeper theory, waiting
to be discovered, would explain in a clear and rational way all the oddities
of the quantum world, and would, in turn, explain the apparent fuzziness
in the quantum classical boundary (Ford 2011, p. 263). Given that our
current understanding of the quantum world is provisional, it is false to
claim that quantum physics has shown that events can begin to exist
without necessary or sufficient conditions.
64 A. Loke
In conclusion, it has been argued that no compelling scientific evi-

dence against the Causal Principle has been offered. In the next chapter,
I shall discuss a number of arguments for the Causal Principle.
Notes
1. Something can have a beginning even if its temporal extension is an
actual infinite (e.g. if something begins to exist in the year 2020 and
exists endlessly in the later-than direction on the static theory of time).
However, if something is finite in temporal extension and has temporal
edges, it would have a beginning.
2. Here, part of a thing refers to a temporal part. See perdurantism, below.
3. I thank Oners for raising this objection and for the discussion below.
4. Strictly speaking, the purported evidence for the B theory does not prove
that the block never comes to be; see Chap. 6.
5. Proponents of probabilistic causation acknowledge that there are suffi-
cient causes and necessary conditions, and they regard sufficient causes
as constituting a limiting case of probabilistic causes, but they deny that
this limiting case includes all bona fide cause–effect relations (Williamson
2009, p. 192). It should be noted that a cause can be causally sufficient
but not causally necessary for an effect.
6. Weaver (2019, chapter 7) argues that there are no plausible metaphysical
theories of omissions understood as absences that are causal relata, and
that virtually all supposed cases of negative causation can be faithfully/
accurately re-described without omissions/absences.
7. Hence, by uncaused First Cause, I mean the First Cause of change, and
that this First Cause is not something that is brought into existence.
However, such a First Cause might be something that is sustained in
existence, and thus is caused in the sense of having a sustaining cause.
See further, Chaps. 6 and 8.
8. Weaver goes on to explain that he agrees with David Lewis (1986) that
causation should be understood in terms of causal dependence, but dis-
agrees with Lewis’ additional step of reducing causal dependence to
counterfactual dependence. He argues on page 261 that the heart of the
causal interpretation of General Theory of Relativity (GTR) is not a rela-
tion that is reducible to counterfactual dependence, probabilistic depen-
dence, the transfer of energy or momentum, or some other reductive
surrogate relation or process.
9. I thank Michael Dodds for this point.

10. Curiel (2019) notes that ‘the Second Law of thermodynamics has long
been connected to the seeming asymmetry of the arrow of time, that
time seems to flow, so to speak, in only one direction for all systems’.
11. See the discussion on dispositionalism and essentialism below.
12. Collins (2009, p. 270) notes that the laws of physics are not strictly
speaking time-reversal invariant—since time-reversal symmetry is bro-
ken in weak interactions, notably the decay of neutral kaons.
13. Cf. The Oxford Dictionary of Physics’ definition of a law in science as ‘a
descriptive principle of nature that holds in all circumstances covered by
the wording of the law’ (Issacs 2000, p. 260).
14. Cartwright (2016) states that since at least the Scientific Revolution
three theses have marched hand in hand.
15. Tim Mawson points out to me that Bell’s results do not even show that
non-locality is violated; this ‘loophole’ is sometimes discussed under the
name ‘Superdeterminism’.
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———. 2017. Five Proofs of the Existence of God. San Francisco: Ignatius Press.
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70 A. Loke
right holder.
3
Arguments for the Causal Principle
3.1 Introduction
As noted in Chap. 2, a number of scientists and philosophers have
expressed scepticism concerning the Causal Principle ‘whatever begins to
exist has a cause’. In particular, they have objected that, even if the Causal
Principle applies to things within the universe, it might not apply to the
universe itself. A number of arguments have been offered in the literature
in response to this objection. These include (1) an inductive argument,
(2) an argument from the concept of non-being, (3) a Modus Tollens
argument, (4) the rationality argument (if the universe began uncaused,
an absurd universe is as likely to begin uncaused as a normal universe is;
this generates serious scepticism about the reliability of our cognitive fac-
ulties, the truth of our sensory inputs, and our past knowledge, thus
creating a reductio ad absurdum against the objection [Miksa 2020]),
and (5) argument from fine-tuning and order. It should be noted that any
one of these arguments would be sufficient for the purposes of the
KCA. In other words, a proponent of the KCA does not have to rely on
any single one of these arguments. Therefore, even if the objector of the
KCA manage to find fallacies in one of these arguments, this does not

72 A. Loke
imply that the KCA has been rebutted. Rather, the objector would need
to rebut all five of these multiple independent arguments.
I have defended the first three arguments in my previous work (Loke
2012, 2017, chapter 5). In this book, I shall develop my defence of (3)
the Modus Tollens argument against objections which have been raised
more recently since the publication of my previous work (I shall also
respond to other relevant objections in older literature). In addition, I
shall defend (5) the fine-tuning argument at the end of this chapter.
The Modus Tollens argument can be traced to the American
philosopher-theologian Jonathan Edwards, who argues that ‘if there be
no absurdity or difficulty in supposing one thing to start out of non-
existence into being, of itself without a Cause; then there is no absurdity
or difficulty in supposing the same of millions of millions’ (Edwards
1830, p. 53). Likewise, Arthur Prior reasons that ‘if it is possible for
objects to start existing without a cause, then it is incredible that they
should all turn out to be objects of the same sort’ (Prior 1968, p. 65).
Craig and Sinclair explain the argument as follows:
If things really could come into being uncaused out of nothing, then it
becomes inexplicable why just anything or everything does not come into
existence uncaused from nothing. Why do bicycles and Beethoven and
root beer not pop into being from nothing? Why is it only universes that
can come into being from nothing? What makes nothingness so discrimi-
natory? There cannot be anything about nothingness that favors universes,
for nothingness does not have any properties. Nothingness is the absence
of anything whatsoever. As such, nothingness can have no properties, since
there literally is not anything to have any properties. Nor can anything
constrain nothingness, for there is not anything to be constrained. (Craig
and Sinclair 2009, p. 186)
Craig and Sinclair’s defence of this argument has been subjected to

criticisms (e.g. Oppy 2010, 2015). In response to these criticisms (see
below), I shall develop a version of the argument which can be formu-
lated as follows:
1. If x (e.g. physical reality) begins uncaused, then y which begins to exist

would also begin uncaused. (Here, y refers to event(s) or type of events
that occurs/occurred/would have occurred.)
2. It is not the case that y begins uncaused.
3. Therefore, it is not the case that x begins uncaused.
As a rough analogy, consider the following story which illustrates the

general principle that what begins to exist is brought about (and con-
strained by) the cause, and what would happen if this principle were
violated.
Think about why my newly built house is the way it is, rather than a
pile of rocks. The answer is simple: the house builder makes it that way;
what begins to exist is brought about and constrained by the cause; if the
cause were a huge explosion rather than a house builder, what began to
exist would be rubble rather than a house.
However, if my house begins to exist uncaused, then that means that
there is no cause, which makes it the case that only a house rather than
other things (e.g. a rubble) begins to exist uncaused. That is, there would
be no constraint on whatever begins to exist in the present circumstances
from beginning to exist uncaused, in which case we would expect to see
many other things (e.g. a rubble) begin to exist uncaused, but we do not.
I shall now elaborate on the argument.
Very briefly, the justification for premise 1 is that, (I) if something x
begins to exist uncaused, then this means that there would not be any
causally antecedent condition of x which would make it the case that x
(rather than y) begins to exist uncaused, (II) the properties of x and the
properties of y which differentiate between them would be had by them
in the actual concrete world only when they had already begun to exist,
and (III) the circumstance is compatible with the beginning of y. I shall
argue in the following sections that (I), (II), and (III) jointly imply that
there would be no difference between x and y where beginning to exist
uncaused is concerned. To deny the consequent in premise 1, I only have
to show that one event around me does not begin to exist uncaused. For
example, I do not experience an event such as y = ‘a rapid increasing in
strength of electric fields around me’ beginning to exist without causally
antecedent conditions such as (say) having to switch on the electric field
74 A. Loke
generator. Since the consequent in premise 1 is false, the antecedent is

false; that is, it is not the case that something begins to exist uncaused.
It should be noted that the Causal Principle I am defending is not
‘whatever begins to exist must have a cause’; but rather ‘whatever begins
to exist has a cause’. I shall not argue that there could be no exception, but
there is no exception. In other words, I am defending a causal principle
that is contingent, that is, true in the actual world, rather than in all pos-
sible worlds. The Modus Tollens argument I defend does not exclude
possible worlds which are utterly chaotic and in which the initial state of
reality (ISOR) begins uncaused, but such worlds are obviously not our
actual world. As we shall see later, an objector to my argument might
claim that ISOR begins uncaused and yet our world is not utterly chaotic
because other things do not begin uncaused. In reply to this claim, I will
not be arguing that it faces the problem of explaining how it could be the
case that a thing of a certain kind (a kind to which ISOR belongs) begins
to exist uncaused whereas things of other sorts do not. Rather, I will be
arguing that the objector’s claim faces the problem of explaining why (ex
hypothesi) ISOR does in fact begin to exist uncaused while other things
do not.1
The above clarifications address Almeida’s (2018, pp. 87–90) objec-
tions to the Causal Principle. Almeida appeals to the argument that law-
less possible worlds exist—one can imagine chaotic worlds in which
events such as a raging tiger suddenly come into existence in the room
uncaused happen often and unpredictably. While such events do not
happen often and unpredictably in our world, there is a small chance they
can happen. For example,
there is some small chance, further, that the particles that compose the
hand of the statue of David all move together upward and then downward
and ‘wave’ at you … for any actual object whatsoever, there is a small
chance that it spontaneously disappears and an intrinsic duplicate of the
object appears on Mars. (Ibid.)
My Modus Tollens argument is not susceptible to the above objection

because it does not deny that there are possible worlds which are chaotic,
or that some things can begin to exist uncaused. Rather, what the
argument would show is that, if something does begin to exist without

any causally necessary condition whatsoever, our actual world would be
very different because some uncaused events (e.g. electric fields increasing
in strength under certain circumstances uncaused) would happen all the
time in our world,2 which is not the case.
Almeida (2018) also suggests that, for all we know, ‘our world is one in
which what we believe are the causal laws are statistical generalizations
whose probabilities oscillate imperceptibly every 100 million years’
(p. 38), and we happen to live in an epoch in which we do not perceive
uncaused events, but this does not imply that the beginning of the uni-
verse is caused. However, given my argument, the statistical generaliza-
tions suggested by Almeida would not hold because, as I shall explain
below, if something begins to exist uncaused, some uncaused events
would happen all the time and such events would not have been
preventable.
Finally, it is important to remind the reader of the definition of the key
term ‘beginning’ which (as explained in Chap. 2) is understood as fol-
lows: something has a beginning if it has a temporal extension, the exten-
sion is finite, and it has temporal edges/boundaries (e.g. on the model of
spacetime which exists for all t > 0 but not at t = 0, t = 0 is a boundary).
The above definition for ‘beginning’ holds regardless of whether time is
emergent property of our universe or whether there may not be any defi-
nite time order to events when the universe is so small that quantum
gravity is important. The definition does not require ‘time earlier than the
universe’; it also does not require the universe to begin to exist in time. As
long as the universe has a temporal extension, the extension is finite, and
it has temporal edges/boundaries, it has a beginning (regardless of whether
the beginning is ‘in time’ or not), and therefore susceptible to my Modus
Tollens argument. In other words, my Modus Tollens argument does not
require the existence of time before the existence of the universe. One
must also be careful not to confound two distinct models of the world:
one with temporal boundary and one without temporal boundary. If one
thinks that the universe is timeless and has no temporal boundary (as
postulated by Hawking’s no boundary proposal), that would be a sepa-
rate issue which I address separately using other arguments explained in
Chap. 6.
76 A. Loke
In the following sections I shall explain the argument in greater detail

as I respond to various objections. I shall show that my argument would
work on a static theory of time as well. At this point it should be noted
that, even if the static theory of time is true, there is still something
unique about time which makes it different from spatial order. For exam-
ple, within the spacetime block, the durations next to each human,
including myself, are occupied by his/her parents such that, if they had
not existed, him/her would not exist. In this sense there is still a certain
dependence and ordering among things/events, which I shall call ‘causal
dependence’ and ‘causal order’. Whereas this is not so with spatial order:
if my parents do not stand on my left or right, I would still exist. This
indicates that time is different from space even if the static theory of time
is true, and that there is still causal order in any case. The argument of
this chapter is that, if the causal principle is false, we would not observe
the temporal/causal order which we do observe.
3.2 O
bjection: The Initial State of Reality
(ISOR) is the Only Thing That
Begins Uncaused
To begin, against premise 1, Oppy has suggested that the initial state of
reality (ISOR) is the only thing that begins uncaused, while later things/
events begins caused (Oppy 2010, 2015). Oppy claims that this view is
supported by a branching view of modality according to which all possi-
ble worlds share the initial state (the First Cause) of the history of the
actual world which is necessary (such an initial state exists given that [as
I shall argue in Chap. 5] an infinite causal regress and a causal loop is not
the case). Oppy explains:
My favourite theory of modality has the evident advantage of theoretical

frugality. On the one hand, if there are objective chances, then any theory
of modality is surely committed to the possibility of the outcomes that lie
in the relevant objective chance distributions. On the other hand, it is not
clear that we have good reason to commit ourselves to any possibilities
beyond those that are required by whatever objective chances there might
be; at the very least, any expansion of the range of possibilities clearly
requires some kind of justification. (Oppy 2013b, p. 47)
Oppy would also argue that, in comparison with theism which like-
wise affirms an uncaused and necessarily existent First Cause, his view has
the best trade-off between simplicity and explanatory power because he
thinks that it is able to explain everything that theism explains without
needing to posit an ‘extra’ entity, that is, God (Oppy 2013a).
In reply, it is trivially true that, if there is an initial state of reality and
that this state is the First Cause, then such a First Cause would be
uncaused. The key question is, what kind of thing is the initial state that
is uncaused? There are two possible answers:
1. A First Cause with a beginning

2. A First Cause without a beginning (I shall argue in Chap. 6 that such
a First Cause would also be transcendent, immaterial, has libertarian
freedom, that is, a Creator.)
Now both Oppy and I affirm that the First Cause is factually necessary
and also metaphysical necessary. A factually necessary being is one which
is not causally dependent on other things; in this sense, it is not contin-
gent (dependent on) anything else. A metaphysical necessary being is one
which exists in all metaphysically possible worlds. The difference between
our views is that on Oppy’s view the initial state (i.e. the First Cause) is
metaphysical necessary and has a beginning (whereas on my view the First
Cause is beginningless), and he thinks that this metaphysical necessity
would entail factual necessity, which he also affirms.
In the rest of this chapter, I shall argue against (1) using the Modus
Tollens argument; that is, I shall argue it is not the case that something
that begins to exist is factually necessary; thus, this Modus Tollens argu-
ment refutes Oppy’s view, which entails the opposite. While ultimately
there must be brute necessity where explanation stop, my Modus Tollens
argument implies that this brute necessity is not something that has a
beginning; therefore, a brute necessity is something that is beginningless.
At this point, I would just like to note that Oppy should not reply to my
Modus Tollens argument by claiming that the initial state begins to exist
78 A. Loke
as a brute necessity given his theory of modality, since this would be beg-
ging the question by assuming (1) instead of (2) (his theory of modality
by itself does not imply either (1) or (2)). Neither should Oppy reply by
claiming that ISOR would be uncaused if it begins to exist. The reason is
because it is trivially true that ISOR would be uncaused (since it is sup-
posed to be the initial state); whether it begins uncaused is precisely the
issue under dispute. Oppy might object by arguing that (1) is justified by
his claim that it has the best trade-off between simplicity and explanatory
power. He thinks that premises of arguments are evaluated based on the-
ories which are evaluated based on certain virtues (e.g. simplicity, explan-
atory power), and he claims that his view has equal explanatory power
and is simpler compared to theism (Oppy 2013b). However, a view that
entails a contradiction cannot be true, even if it is simpler. Thus, simplic-
ity cannot help his view since his view entails a contradiction as I shall
explain using the Modus Tollens argument. Basically, the argument shows
that, if ISOR begins uncaused, I should expect to see other things begin-
ning uncaused around me, but I do not; hence, the antecedent is false. I
shall elaborate on this argument and defend it against objections in the
rest of this chapter.
Let us begin by considering another scenario. Suppose someone postu-
lates that the circumstances are such that it is metaphysically possible for
x and y to begin to exist, and that only x begins to exist caused. If he/she
were asked ‘what makes it the case that it is x rather than y that begins to
exist caused’, the answer would be simple: in these circumstances, the
causally antecedent condition(s) makes it the case that it is x rather than
y that begins to exist.
Now suppose someone postulates that the circumstances are such that
it is metaphysically possible for x and y to begin to exist, and that only x
begins to exist uncaused. The important question to ask is, ‘What makes
it the case that it is x rather than y that begins to exist uncaused?’ (By
‘makes it the case’, I mean ‘provides metaphysical grounding’.)
Note that the term ‘metaphysical ground’ is standardly used in the
philosophical literature to mean something distinct from a cause
[although it can also be a cause]. ‘For instance, we might say that the
members of a set are prior to the set itself; the existence of the set is
grounded in its members. Or to take a more concrete example, the
existence of any given composite object is grounded in the existence of its

parts’ [Tahko and Lowe 2020, section 5].) Using the laws of logic (the
law of excluded middle), the following are the only possible answers:
1.1. If x rather than y begins to exist uncaused, then either

1.1.1. nothing makes this the case (brute fact) or
1.1.2. something abstract makes this the case, or
1.1.3. something concrete with property3 S makes this the case, in which
case either
1.1.3.1. S is a property of x which makes it different from y (i.e. S is a
property which x has but y does not have), or
1.1.3.2. S is a property of something other than x: either
1.1.3.2.1. S is a property of the circumstances of x, or
1.1.3.2.2. S is a property of y, or
1.1.3.2.3. S is a property of the circumstances of y.
(Note: circumstance is defined as ‘a fact or condition connected with or

relevant to an event’ [Oxford English Dictionary, OED]. Thus, anything
other than x, y, or their circumstance would be irrelevant).
In the rest of this chapter, I shall argue:
1.2. It is not the case that 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.3.1, 1.1.3.2.1, 1.1.3.2.2, or
1.1.3.2.3.
1.3. Therefore, it is not the case that x rather than y begins to exist uncaused.
In particular, it should be noted that, given (as I shall show later) that
the objector to my argument cannot appeal to ‘brute fact’ (1.1.1) or
‘abstract entities’ (1.1.2), it turns out that the objector has to affirm
(1.1.3) something concrete with property S makes it the case that x rather
than y begins to exist uncaused, in which case either 1.1.3.1, 1.1.3.2.1,
1.1.3.2.2, or 1.1.3.2.3.
As I shall explain later in this chapter,
• the falsity of 1.1.3.2.1 ‘S is a property of the circumstances of x’ is

entailed by (I) there would not be any causally antecedent condition
80 A. Loke
which would make it the case that x rather than y begins to

exist uncaused;
• the falsity of 1.1.3.1. ‘S is a property of x which makes it different from
y’ and 1.1.3.2.2. ‘S is a property of y’ is entailed by (II) the properties
of x and the properties of y which differentiate between them would be
had by them only when they had already begun to exist; and
• the falsity of 1.1.3.2.3 ‘S is a property of the circumstances of y’ is
entailed by (III) the circumstance is compatible with the beginning of y.
Therefore, (I), (II), and (III) jointly imply that there would be no
essential difference between x and y where beginning to exist uncaused is
concerned, and this implies that Oppy’s theory that ‘x (ISOR) begins
uncaused but y begins caused’ is false. Oppy should not respond by claim-
ing that theories determine whether arguments are sound and that given
his theory, (I), (II), and/or (III) is false.4 The reason is because (I), (II),
and (III) are implied by Oppy’s own theory. To elaborate, (I) Oppy’s
theory that x (ISOR) begins uncaused but y begins caused implies that no
cause making it the case that x (rather than y) begins uncaused. Moreover,
(II) x and y having a beginning implies that the properties of x and the
only when they had already begun to exist, and (III) y begins caused
implies that the circumstances are compatible with the beginning of y. In
other words, Oppy’s theory implies (I), (II), and (III), which imply that
his theory is false; that is, Oppy’s theory entails a contradiction.5
I shall now discuss 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.3.1, 1.1.3.2.1, 1.1.3.2.2, and
1.1.3.2.3 in detail.
3.3 Against 1.1.1. Brute Fact

Concerning 1.1.1, the objector to my argument might suggest it is a
brute fact that only ISOR (suppose x = ISOR) but not y begins to exist
uncaused (Rasmussen 2018). While there is a difference between x and y
(viz. that x begins uncaused but y begins caused), there is no difference
between x and y that explains why x begins uncaused but y begins caused.
In this case, x and y have a difference that has no further metaphysical
ground. The objector might argue that this is analogous to the situation
in which two carbon-14 atoms which are qualitatively identical with
respect to beta-decay and as a result have the same objective chance of
decay, and purely as a matter of chance, one but not the other decays in
the next moment as a brute fact (i.e. without a metaphysical ground that
differentiates between them with respect to decay). In this scenario, it is
stipulated that no relevant (hidden) variable is left out, such that the
chances in question are irreducible; that is, the event happened as a brute
fact without any further explanation. In this case of genuine indetermin-
ism, there is no difference between the atoms that explains why beta-
decay happens to one but not the other.6
Now the following two brute fact claims should be distinguished:
1. ‘x begins uncaused’ is a brute fact.

2. ‘x begins uncaused but y begins caused’ is a brute fact.
The possibility of (1) (see Sect. 3.1) does not imply the possibility or
actuality of (2). (2) is refuted by the following three independent argu-
ments (while (1) is refuted by the arguments in this chapter):
Argument 1
It is ad hoc and special pleading to claim that ‘unlike other things

which begins caused, x begins uncaused’ without any ground or justifica-
tion for claiming that. (For why the special pleading objection does not
apply to God, see Chap. 6.)
Argument 2
There is a difference between radioactive decay scenario and the

uncaused beginning (‘x begins uncaused but y begins caused’) scenario.
In the former there are two atoms which pre-exist before one of them
decays. Whereas in the latter nothing pre-exists the uncaused beginning
of x. This difference is significant in light of the following argument:
82 A. Loke
1. ‘The possession of the property of “beginning uncaused” by x’ requires

the existence of x, and ‘the possession of the property of “beginning
caused” by y’ requires the existence of y.
2. Therefore, the existence of x and y (with their numerical distinction)
is required for ‘x has the property of beginning uncaused and y has the
property of beginning caused’ (From 1).
Since ‘x begins uncaused but y begins caused’ requires (i.e. depends on)
the numerically distinct existence of x and y, it cannot just be a brute fact.
Therefore, 1.1.1 is false.
The difference between the radioactive decay scenario and the uncaused
beginning scenario is significant because, in the radioactive decay sce-
nario, the numerically distinct carbon-14 atoms x and y already exist
before the decay. Now the objector might claim that there is no meta-
physical ground for ‘why x but not y decays’. I argue against this under
the third argument below; but the point here is that, in any case, there is
still a metaphysical ground for ‘x but not y decays’; namely, x and y are
not numerically identical, even though they are supposed to be qualita-
tively identical with respect to beta-decay.7 Thus, it is the case that the
numerical distinction between x and y is possessed by x and y, which
concretely pre-exist ‘the radioactive decay of x but not y’. On the other
hand, I shall argue in Sects. 3.4 and 3.5 that the numerical distinction
between x and y (call this property S) cannot be a metaphysical ground
for ‘x begins uncaused but y begins caused’. The reason is because it is not
the case that S is possessed by x and y, which concretely pre-exist ‘the
uncaused beginning of x but not y’, and I shall argue in the rest of this
chapter that nothing else provides the required metaphysical ground.
Hence, this argument refutes uncaused beginning, but it is compatible
with indeterministic radioactive decay.
Argument 3
If ‘x begins uncaused but y begins caused’ is a brute fact, this implies

that there is no metaphysical ground which restricts uncaused beginnings
to only x or makes x different from other things/events such as y with
regard to uncaused beginnings; thus (contrary to the supposition), y
would also begin uncaused unrestricted. The argument can be formu-

lated as follows:
1. If ‘x begins uncaused but y begins caused’ is a brute fact, then there is

no metaphysical ground which makes it the case that only x (and not
y) begins uncaused.
2. If there is no metaphysical ground which makes it the case that only x
(and not y) begins uncaused, then there is no restriction of uncaused
beginnings to only x (and not y).
3. If there is no restriction of uncaused beginnings to only x (and not y),
then y would begin uncaused.
4. It is not the case that y begins uncaused. (From 1)
5. Therefore, it is not the case that ‘x begins uncaused but y begins
caused’ is a brute fact.
Against premise 3, it might be objected that ‘just because y could begin

uncaused does not imply that it would begin uncaused’.8 However, this
objection is based on a misunderstanding. I agree that ‘could’ does not
imply ‘would’. But I didn’t argue or assume otherwise. ‘Could’ concerns
possibility, but premise 3 is not referring to possible events. Rather, prem-
ise 3 is referring to (supposed) actual events. In other words, premise 3 is
not referring to what could happen but what does happen. It states that
the absence of restriction of ‘what does happen uncaused’ to only x
implies that other events (e.g. y) which do happen also happen uncaused.
For example, consider the scenario in which something (say) the universe
began to exist and there was also a rapid increasing in strength of electric
fields under certain circumstances around me. In this scenario these are
not just possible events (i.e. it is not merely the case that the universe
could begin to exist and electric field could increase in strength), but actual
events; that is, the universe did begin to exist and electric field did increase
in strength. Now suppose the former is x and the latter is y. Since prem-
ises 1 and 2 refer to what actually happens rather than merely what could
happen, what follows from premises 1 and 2 is ‘there is no restriction that
uncaused beginning would only occur for x and not for y’. This provides
the justification for concluding that y would begin uncaused.
84 A. Loke
It might be objected that ‘just because there is no restriction to prevent

a thing from behaving in a certain way does not entail that the thing
would behave in that way’. For example, there was no restriction to pre-
vent Peter from going for a walk today, but in fact Peter chose not to go.
In reply, there is a distinction between (A) ‘no restriction to prevent a
thing from behaving in a certain way’ and (B) ‘no restriction of a kind of
event (uncaused happening) to only one thing’. Concerning (A), I am
not claiming that ‘there is no restriction to prevent a thing from behaving
in a certain way’ entails that ‘the thing would behave in that way’. For in
this case the thing can have the capacity to behave otherwise; for exam-
ple, Peter has a capacity to choose not to go for a walk. Thus, the anteced-
ent condition does not entail that the thing will behave in that way.
The case is different concerning (B) ‘no restriction of a kind of event to
only one thing’. For example, if there is no restriction of ‘falling to the
ground’ to a particular thing, then falling would happen to other things
because of the nature of reality as described by the law of gravity. (The hot
air above a fire rises because its density is lower than the surrounding air;
in this case, its lower density serves as a restriction to prevent it from fall-
ing.) Likewise, the absence of metaphysical restriction in premise 3
implies that the nature of reality would be such that there is no limitation
of uncaused beginnings to only one particular thing x, which implies that
uncaused beginnings would be unlimited and would also happen to other
things such as y, which implies that y would also begin uncaused.
The third argument is different from the second argument because it is
arguably incompatible with indeterministic radioactive decay. To see this,
one can simply substitute ‘undergoes radioactive decay’ for ‘begins
uncaused’ and ‘does not undergo radioactive decay’ for ‘begins caused’
into the above argument, and one gets the conclusion ‘Therefore, it is not
the case that x undergoes radioactive decay but y does not undergo radio-
active decay is a brute fact’. This conclusion is compatible with scientific
evidence, for as noted in Chap. 2 that there is insufficient scientific evi-
dence for thinking that quantum events are genuinely indeterministic.
Concerning probabilistic causation, there is strong justification for main-
taining that the phenomena (the decay and statistics they exhibit) them-
selves have underlying proportionate causal explanations, for they exhibit
regularities that strongly indicate the existence of more fundamental

ordered causes (Stoeger 2001, p. 87).
The argument is compatible with indeterministic libertarian free
choice, according to which ‘A is chosen by person P but not-A is not-
chosen by P’ is a brute fact. It does not follow from this that there is no
metaphysical ground for only A (and not not-A) is chosen, because person
P is the metaphysical ground which makes it the case that only A is cho-
sen.9 The argument is also compatible with the uncaused existence of
God as a brute fact. It does not follow from this that ‘God exists uncaused
beginninglessly but y begins to exist caused’ is a brute fact, because God’s
existence having no beginning whereas y’s existence having a beginning is
the metaphysical ground in this case (see Sect. 3.5). Neither does it follow
from this that ‘God exists uncaused beginninglessly but an eternal
Quadrinity does not exist uncaused beginninglessly’ is a brute fact,
because there could be preventive conditions in the beginningless state
which makes such a state incompatible with a Quadrinity existing (see
Sect. 3.8.4).
Finally, even if the above three argument fail, one may offer a probabi-
listic version as follows: If there is no metaphysical grounding which
restricts uncaused beginnings to only x, then some other event would
occur uncaused at some point with an overwhelmingly high probability.
Consider the decay example again as an analogy. The chances being the
same entails that the other, yet undecayed atom would decay at some
point (during a sufficiently long time) with an overwhelmingly high
probability (or some other atom in a sufficiently big ensemble would also
decay in the next moment with an overwhelmingly high probability.)
Therefore, if only one carbon atom decayed after a sufficiently long time
(or in a sufficiently big ensemble), that would be overwhelming evidence
that the chance of that carbon atom decaying is after all different from
the chance for other carbon atoms, which would then require a special or
differentiating metaphysical ground with respect to decay. Likewise, if
only x began uncaused after a sufficiently long time (or in a sufficiently
big ensemble), that would be overwhelming evidence that the chance of
x beginning uncaused is after all different from the chance for other
events, which would then require a special or differentiating metaphysical
ground with respect to uncaused beginnings.10
86 A. Loke
In summary, the restriction to ‘only x’ (but not other things) begins

uncaused must be grounded in something such that there is a relevant
difference between x and other things—one should not simply say that it
is brute fact. For if there is no relevant difference between x and other
things (say) y, this would imply that x and y are the same where beginning
to exist uncaused is concerned. The argument can be formulated in
this way:
1.1.1.1. If it is not the case that there is a metaphysical ground which

differentiates between x and y with respect to uncaused begin-
ning, then x and y would be the same with respect to uncaused
beginning.
1.1.1.2. (According to the objector) x and y are not the same with respect
to uncaused beginning (given that the objector claims that x
begins uncaused but not y).
1.1.1.3. Therefore, (the objector would require the claim that) there is a
metaphysical ground which differentiates between x and y with
respect to uncaused beginning.
It should be noted that premise 1.1.1.1 is based on arguments 1, 2,

and 3 (either one of which is sufficient) and none of the premises of these
arguments assumes the truth of the Causal Principle, while premise
1.1.1.2 is what the objector claims. Thus, there is no circularity in my
argument; that is, my argument does not beg the question against the
objector by assuming the truth of the Causal Principle. What follows
from premises 1.1.1.1 and 1.1.1.2 is that the objector would require the
claim that there is a relevant difference between x and y. Since ‘x begins
uncaused but y begins caused’ requires a metaphysical ground which dif-
ferentiates between x and y in order for it to be possible that only x begins
uncaused (but y begins caused), it cannot just be a brute fact (a brute fact
by definition has no further metaphysical ground). Therefore, 1.1.1 is
false. The objector to my Modus Tollens argument would need to appeal
to metaphysical grounding in some form or another, and this will be
discussed below.
3.4 Against 1.1.2. Abstract Entities

A Platonist objector might modify Oppy’s objection by claiming that the
initial state of reality (ISOR) refers to the initial state of concrete reality.
The objector might then claim that this leaves open the possibility that
there could be beginningless abstract objects which exist timelessly. An
abstract object, by definition, cannot cause something. Nevertheless, a
Platonist objector to my argument by claim that abstract objects might
provide metaphysical grounding for why only ISOR begins to exist
uncaused. For example, the objector might say that the relevant differ-
ence between x (ISOR) and y is that ISOR and y are different logical
possibilities (call this Difference D), and that Difference D exists in the
abstract world. Alternatively, the objector might suggest that objects x
and y subsist in the abstract world before they begin to exist, the subsist-
ing objects already have haecceities before they begin to exist, and these
haecceities differentiate between x and y. Another alternative is:
A Platonist might suppose that there are brute necessary truths about unin-
stantiated properties, including truths about which properties can begin to
be instantiated uncaused. On this theory, perhaps (contra Loke) there are
things—abstract things—prior to an uncaused beginning that could
explain why that beginning has its particular properties. (Rasmussen 2018)
There are a number of problems with the Platonist objection.

First, the objector’s claim is that ‘x (ISOR) begins uncaused and y
begins caused’. This claim refers to concrete entities x and y, and requires
something concrete (whether qualitative or non-qualitative) to differenti-
ate between two different things x and y in the concrete world. Hence,
merely appealing to the haecceities of subsisting objects which exist in the
abstract world is inadequate. (Contrast with Scenario 1 in Sect. 3.3 in
which H is possessed by p, which concretely pre-exists the decay of p.)
Second, abstract objects (if they exist) merely describe relations (e.g.
mathematical relations such as 2 + 2 = 4; logical relations such as ‘if,
then’, relations between events) or possibilities/necessities (e.g. shapeless
square cannot exist but shaped square can exist), or are merely exemplifi-
able by things (e.g. the property of redness are exemplified by red things).
88 A. Loke
Abstract objects by themselves (i.e. apart from concrete objects) do not

make it the case that things/events happen in one way rather than the
other in the concrete world. Indeed, there are disputes concerning
whether abstract objects even exist (Gould 2014). But even if they do,
they do not make a difference to the concrete world.11 Thus, Difference
D in the abstract world would not make a difference concerning ISOR
beginning uncaused in the concrete world but y does not, and therefore
Difference D is not a relevant difference. It is a difference that makes no
difference, which means it is not a relevant difference.
Third, to claim that an abstract object X would make a difference in
the concrete world such that ‘only ISOR begins uncaused but y does not’
would be to think of X as something similar to a concrete entity which
exists prior to ISOR. In that case ‘ISOR’ would not be the initial state (of
reality) anymore; rather, X would be the initial state. In any case, even if
one insists that X is still an abstract entity, X would have to be beginning-
less, because if it has a beginning it would (like ‘ISOR’) require some-
thing to make it the case that only X begins uncaused but y does not. In
that case, one needs to ask how could a beginninglessly existing X make
a difference that has a beginning of existence (viz. the beginning of
‘ISOR’) rather than a difference that coexist beginninglessly with X. As
argued in Chap. 6, the answer to this question indicates that X has liber-
tarian freedom, which means that X is a Creator, which is the conclusion
of the Cosmological Argument! Hence, this objection to the Cosmological
Argument would fail.
Against my view that abstract entities do not make a difference to the
concrete world, an objector might insist that difference in possibilities
can make a difference in whether possibility x rather than possibility y is
realized in the concrete world without causing its realization, and that
instantiation of possibility does not have to be seen as an effect of some
cause.12 To illustrate, consider possibility x: It is possible that Peter exists,
and possibility y: it is possible that Peter does not exist. Given that Peter’s
parents chose to conceive, possibility x is realized but not possibility y.
Peter’s parents cause the realization of x. One might say that the differ-
ence in possibility x and possibility y makes a difference in whether pos-
sibility x rather than possibility y is realized in the sense that it explains
why Peter’s parents causing the realization of possibility x does not also
cause the realization of possibility y (answer: because possibility x and

possibility y are different and y is not realizable given that x is realized).
However, such an explanation is not really making a difference in the
concrete world, but merely explaining the difference made. In other
words, it is not the difference in possibilities that makes a difference in
the concrete world, but Peter’s parents (concrete entities) who make a
difference in the concrete world. This illustrates that differences in pos-
sibilities in the abstract world do not really make a difference in whether
possibility x rather than possibility y is realized in the concrete world; on
the contrary, the instantiation of possibility in the concrete world is made
by concrete entities.
Recall premise 1.1.1.1, which states:
1.1.1.1: If it is not the case that there is a metaphysical ground which dif-
ferentiates between x and y with respect to uncaused beginning, then x and
y would be the same with respect to uncaused beginning.
Premise 1.1.1.1 can be rephrased as:
1.1.1.1′: If there is no relevant difference between the possibility A that x

begins to exist uncaused and the possibility B that y begins to exist
uncaused, then both possibility A and possibility B would be instantiated
if possibility A or possibility B was instantiated.
This belongs to a more general principle:

If there is no relevant difference between a possibility A and a possibil-
ity B, then both possibility A and possibility B would be instantiated if
possibility A or possibility B is instantiated.
Premise 1.1.1.1 involves uncaused beginning and the general principle
may not involve that, and that is a difference between them. One might
object that this difference between them seems to contradict my earlier
conclusion that a difference in abstracta cannot be a relevant
difference.13
It is true that there is a difference between premise 1.1.1.1 and the
general principle, but that difference is not relevant to making a differ-
ence in the concrete world and hence does not contradict my earlier
90 A. Loke
conclusion. Rather, the difference is relevant in the sense that it merely

describes the different consequences that would follow if a difference is
made in the concrete world. By my reasoning, the difference between my
premise 1.1.1.1 and the general principle is a difference in abstracta and
can be a difference that is relevant for describing the different conse-
quences that would follow if a difference is made in the concrete world.
However, this difference is not relevant for making a difference in the
concrete world in the first place; in particular, it is not relevant for mak-
ing a difference such that ISOR begins uncaused in the concrete world
but y does not.
To be a relevant difference, the difference has to make a difference in
the concrete world, because making a difference in the concrete world
such that ISOR begins to exist uncaused in the concrete world but y does
not is what my sceptical opponent (not me!) is claiming here for the
abstract realm to do, but that is nonsensical since abstract realm does not
do this kind of thing. By saying this I am not assuming that concrete
instantiation of a possibility has to be causal (hence, I am not begging the
question); rather, I am merely explaining what my opponent is claiming
in order for his/her objection to work and why he/she has failed to meet
this claim; therefore, the objection fails.
The Platonist might attempt to support the objection by citing the
argument that at least some dispositions have ceteris paribus (CP) clauses
incorporating uninstantiated abstract universals, and that these CP
clauses help to delimit the range of manifestations of those dispositions
(Dumsday 2019, p. 22). To elaborate, Dumsday argues:
Take some value of mass, and a second value of mass, specify the distance
relation, and a physicist could tell us what the resulting attractive force
would be, ceteris paribus. We can then specify that the two masses belong
to two objects which have a particular value of positive charge actually
instantiated in our world, and a physicist could again calculate what the
attraction would be, or whether instead it would be trumped by the repul-
sive force between the two like charges. Now do so for a value of positive
charge that is not and has never been instantiated in our world. Once
again, a physicist could calculate the results. The uninstantiated value is
just as legitimate a part of the set of CP clauses of mass as are the instanti-
ated values. (p. 13)
Dumsday concludes that with the CP clauses
we have abstracta determining that certain events can or cannot take place
under particular circumstances. If an uninstantiated value of positive
charge were instantiated in entities possessing mass, then where those enti-
ties would normally undergo a gravitational attraction of a certain force,
they might instead be repelled … Even in their uninstantiated state, these
universals serve as truthmakers for counterfactuals involving actual, instan-
tiated dispositions. This counts as playing a governing role in the physical
universe. (p. 14)
Nevertheless, the above argument cannot be used to support the

Platonist’s objection to my argument14 because the uninstantiated
abstracta Dumsday mentions merely describes what would be the case if
certain things were to exist concretely alongside other pre-existing con-
crete things, as well as whether certain events can or cannot take place
under particular pre-existing concrete circumstances. For example, if a
positive charge of a certain value were to exist concretely, its repulsive
force would trump the attraction of the pre-existing concrete masses. The
uninstantiated abstracta do not make a difference as to which metaphysi-
cally possible set of properties are actually instantiated in the concrete
world. In the case of Mass1 attracting Mass2 with a force F (‘if no positive
charge P …’), the force F in the concrete world is determined by the
concrete entities (the masses and the distances between their centres).
The CP clause ‘if no positive charge P’ does not determine the force in
the concrete world but merely indicates that if P were to exist concretely,
F would be different in the concrete world.
In conclusion, abstract objects by themselves would not be able to
provide metaphysical grounding for x (ISOR) rather than y begins
uncaused. Hence, Oppy cannot simply claim that there are metaphysical
principles ‘initial thing begins uncaused’ and ‘everything non-initial
things have causes’ which explain why x begins uncaused but not y.15 The
reason is because metaphysical principles/laws of nature are not concrete
92 A. Loke
entities like tables or chairs; rather, they are supposed to be abstract enti-
ties. Thus, no abstract metaphysical principle/law of nature could (by
itself ) make it the case that only ISOR rather than other things begins
uncaused. What makes things happen one way or the other are concrete
entities and their properties, and I shall argue in the rest of this chapter
that no such concrete entities and their properties can make it the case
that only ISOR rather than other things begins uncaused.
Against my view that abstract entities by themselves do not make a
difference to the concrete world, Malpass cites the Archimedes principle
‘any object, totally or partially immersed in a fluid, is buoyed up by a
force equal to the weight of the fluid displaced by the object’. Given some
actual facts about a concrete entity and the Archimedes principle, it fol-
lows that the body would float.16
In reply, the Archimedes principle is abstract and it merely describes
the relation between the object and the fluid. What makes the body float
are the properties of the fluid and the body, and the Archimedes principle
merely describes the relation. As Feser (2013, p. 254) observes, the laws
of nature are ‘mere abstractions and thus cannot by themselves explain
anything. What exist in the natural order are concrete material substances
with certain essences, and talk of “laws of nature” is merely shorthand for
the patterns of behaviour they tend to exhibit given those essences.’
When we use the Archimedes principle as part of an explanation we are
only using it as a shorthand. In other words, a principle/law of nature is
part of the explanation only because of the essential properties of the
concrete entities. Likewise, in order to metaphysically ground ‘x (ISOR)
rather than y begins uncaused’, the properties of concrete entities are
required, but as I shall show in the rest of this chapter, there are no such
properties. Hence, Oppy’s theory fails.
It might be asked how would I answer the question ‘Why uncaused
events do not begin around us?’ Do I not appeal to the abstract causal
principle ‘whatever begins to exist has a cause?17
In response, I do affirm the Causal Principle, but this principle is just
the consequence of my view that, in our actual world, things happen one
way rather than the other as a result of concrete entities and their proper-
ties, which implies that without concrete causes doing the work nothing
would begin to exist. That is why uncaused events do not happen.
It might be objected that ‘in our actual world, things happen one way
rather than the other as a result of concrete entities and their properties’
is also an abstract principle.18 This is true. My view is that abstract prin-
ciple by themselves do not make a difference in the concrete world. In this
case, the abstract principle is not ‘by itself ’; rather, it involves concrete
entities. Moreover, in this case, ‘no event begins uncaused’ is merely
descriptive of the absence of a difference in the concrete world concerning
x and y where beginning uncaused is concerned; hence, it is consistent
with my claim that abstract principle by themselves do not make a differ-
ence in the concrete world.
In summary, the objector who affirms 1.1.2 is claiming that abstract
objects provide metaphysical grounding which differentiates between
concrete events x and y with respect to uncaused beginnings. I argue that
abstract objects by themselves do not ground a difference concerning
concrete events. Moreover, if abstract objects by themselves do ground a
difference with respect to concrete events such as x (but not y) begins
uncaused, given that abstract objects are beginningless (more specifically,
timeless) the uncaused event they ground should be timeless as well, but
that is not the case.
In the following sections, we shall consider 1.1.3 something concrete
with property S makes it the case that x (but not y) begins uncaused.
3.5 Against 1.1.3.1 S is a Property of x

Let us now consider 1.1.3.1. S is a property of x which makes it different
from y (i.e. S is a property which x has but y does not have). 1.1.3.1
implies that x (ISOR) has some special and unique property S which
makes it different from other things/events, and the possession of S by
ISOR would be required to do the work of providing the metaphysically
grounding which differentiates between ISOR and other things/events in
order for it to be possible that only ISOR (but not other things/events)
begins to exist uncaused.
However, the first time S is possessed by ISOR is at time tisor, where tisor
is the first time at which ISOR exists. Given that S is stipulated to be an
essential property of ISOR and possessed by ISOR only, and given that
94 A. Loke
ISOR only begins to exist at tisor, S would only begin to exist at tisor. It fol-
lows that ‘the possession of S by ISOR’ can make it the case that ‘it is only
ISOR that begins to exist uncaused’ only when ISOR has already begun
to exist at tisor. But what this means is that ‘the possession of S by ISOR’
cannot metaphysically ground the uncaused beginning of ISOR (but not
other things/events) in the first place, since it is required that ISOR has
already begun to exist in order that ‘the possession of S by ISOR’ can
metaphysically ground the uncaused beginning of ISOR (but not other
things/events).
Now there are causal account and non-causal account of something
existing (Bliss and Trogdon 2014), and the objector is referring to a non-
causal account here given that ISOR is supposed to be uncaused. But the
point here is that, regardless of whether the account referred to here is
causal or non-causal, any account/explanation/grounding in the form of
S’s possession by ISOR would only begin to exist when ISOR already
exists. Any such account/explanation/grounding would not exist without
ISOR having already begun its existence; thus, there is nothing for
accounting/explaining/grounding the uncaused beginning of ISOR (but
not other things/events). For a thing has to exist in order to have any
properties at all. And a thing that begins to exist must have begun to exist
in order to have any properties. Thus, no matter what S is, ISOR having
S cannot make it the case that ISOR begins to exist, make it the case that
ISOR begins to exist uncaused, and make it the case that nothing lacking
S begins to exist uncaused.19
Hence, ‘the property S is possessed by x only when x has already begun’
challenges ‘S grounds why only x begins uncaused’, not on account of a
temporal order, but on account of what needs to be grounded, namely,
the uncaused beginning of x (but not y). While non-causal ontological
dependence between simultaneous events is widely regarded as common-
place, in no case of such examples of non-causal metaphysical grounding
is there a case of making it the case why only something having some
properties begins to exist. (As I explained previously using the analogy of
a house and house builder, we know that the work of making it the case
that x rather than y begins to exist is usually done by causes, that is, causal
grounding.) On the other hand, any such property S of x would not be
able to metaphysically ground the uncaused beginning of x (but not y),
because the uncaused beginning of x (but not y) which supposedly needs

to be grounded by S needs to happen in order that S can ground its hap-
pening—this violates the irreflexivity of metaphysical grounding. The
uncaused beginning of existence of x is supposed to be explanatorily prior
to x’s possession of the property; something must exist in order to possess
a property.20 Thus, the conjunction of x’s uncaused beginning and x’s pos-
session of the property cannot provide metaphysical grounding for the
first conjunct (rather than the beginning of y).
Now I do not deny that there are some other unique (perhaps
unknown) properties possessed by ISOR—of course there must be such
properties, since ISOR is different from (say) a tiger, a dinosaur, and so
on! Rather, my argument is that there cannot be any unique property
(regardless of whether this unique property is known or unknown) which
can do the work of making it the case that only ISOR but not other things
begins to exist uncaused if ISOR began uncaused. As Oderberg (2002,
p. 330) notes,
it is no use saying that the nature or essence of some things (such as the
universe itself ) is to begin to exist uncaused, and of others not to, since
before anything begins to exist how can the essence of a thing regulate the
conditions under which it begins to exist? But since we know some things
begin to exist only if caused, the Causal Principle cannot be false since its
falsity would not allow of such a distinction.
More seriously, any attempt to provide such an account/grounding/

explanation would entail a contradiction. For:
1. the uncaused (or ‘uncorrelated’; likewise, below) beginning of ISOR

(instead of other entities) is supposed to require the possession of S by
ISOR in order to account/ground/explain only ISOR begins to exist
uncaused: this implies that the possession of S by ISOR is explanatory
prior to (i.e. metaphysically grounds) the uncaused beginning
of ISOR.
However,
96 A. Loke
2. the possession of S by ISOR is supposed to require the uncaused

beginning of ISOR (instead of other entities), for S would not be pos-
sessed by ISOR if ISOR does not already (begun to) exist: this implies
that the uncaused beginning of ISOR is explanatory prior to (i.e.
metaphysically grounds) the possession of S by ISOR.
(1) and (2) entail a contradiction and violate the irreflexivity of meta-
physical grounding.
The following points should be noted.
First, when philosophers talk about metaphysical ground, they are not
talking about their subjective mental states or their use of language.
Rather, they are talking about objective properties of the world. Just as
when we talk about the foundation of a house grounding the roof (at a
particular position instead of another), we are talking about grounding as
an objective property of the world.
Second, by ‘explanatorily prior’, I am not referring to ‘how humans
choose to explain things’. Rather, I am referring to the relationship
between things/properties in the actual world. Just as ‘x (e.g. foundation)
grounds y (e.g. the roof )’ implies that it is not the case that ‘the roof
grounds the foundation’ (this illustrates the irreflexivity of metaphysical
grounding), likewise ‘p is explanatory prior to q’ implies that it is not the
case that ‘q is explanatory prior to p’. To illustrate the notion of ‘priority’
and to explain the distinction between ‘require’ and ‘imply’: I require the
possession of money in order to pay for the house. The possession of
money is prior. To say that q requires p is to convey that p is prior to q.
However, to say that q implies p does not convey that p is prior to q.
Third, the above argument against 1.1.3.1 remains valid on a static
theory of time. On static theory of time, it remains the case that there are
also other events (e.g. y = increasing in strength of electric field) which
have the beginning of existence in the same sense as the supposed begin-
ning of ISOR, that is, being finite in temporal extent in whatever dimen-
sions and having ‘edges’ (i.e. does not have a static closed loop or a
changeless phase that avoids an edge). According to 1.1.3.1, S is sup-
posed to metaphysically ground why ISOR begins uncaused but y (which
lacks S) does not begin to exist uncaused. However, S is possessed when
ISOR already begins, which makes S unable to do this work of ground-

ing, as argued previously.
An objector might ask, ‘why couldn’t the property of necessary exis-
tence or being the initial state be the special property S that metaphysi-
cally ground the uncaused beginning of ISOR?’
In response, on the one hand, as noted previously in Sect. 3.2, whether
initial state begins necessarily (rather than existing beginninglessly neces-
sarily) is precisely the issue under dispute, and the objector should not
beg the question by assuming that this is the case. On the other hand,
there is an independent reason for thinking that there cannot be any spe-
cial property S which metaphysically grounds such an uncaused begin-
ning, namely, the demonstration (explained above) that any such property
would be unable to do the necessary work of metaphysical grounding. As
Malpass puts it, ‘the conjunction of x existing and x having a special
property cannot explain the conjunct that x exists. Conjunctions don’t
explain their own conjuncts.’21
The objector would ask how could a theist explain God’s uncaused
existence without falling into similar problems. After all, whatever special
property S that is used to explain why God is uncaused will already have
to be had by God.22
In reply, it should be noted that I am not claiming that anything that
exists requires a special property to explain why it exists. Such a principle
is obviously false. For example, my existence does not require a special
property to explain why I exist. Rather, my existence is (at least partly)
explained by my already-existing (i.e. pre-existing) parents who brought
me into existence and I am not required to have a special property
S. However, if instead of my already-existing parents I have already
existed and always-already existed at all earlier durations and that my
existence has no temporal boundary (i.e. beginningless) and supposing
that I am not being sustained in existence, then no already-existing par-
ents would be required and I am not required to have a special property.
In this case, my beginninglessness is not a special property that explains
why I exist; rather, my beginninglessness is merely a way of describing my
always-already existence that has no temporal boundary, which also
implies that no parents are required; that is, I would be uncaused (sup-
posing that I am also not being sustained in existence).
98 A. Loke
The same reasoning applies to God. God is supposed to have always-

already existed at all earlier durations and has no temporal boundary (i.e.
beginningless), and He is not being sustained in existence; hence (unlike
things with beginnings), no already-existing pre-existing causes are
required and He is not required to have a special property S. In this case,
His beginninglessness is not a special property that explains why He
exists. Rather, His beginninglessness is merely a way of describing His
always-already existence that has no temporal boundary (i.e. beginning-
less), which (together with the fact that He is not being sustained in
existence) also implies that no causes are required; that is, He would be
uncaused.
There are two distinct senses of explanation which need to be clarified:
(1) a statement or account that makes something clear (OED); (2) to
provide a metaphysical grounding for. In the case of ISOR beginning
uncaused, I was arguing that there needs to be a special property S that
not only makes something clear but also provides a metaphysical ground-
ing for why ISOR begins uncaused but B begins caused (but there cannot
be such an S). In the case of God existing beginninglessly, God’s begin-
ninglessness merely makes clear why is it the case that no cause or special
property is needed (it doesn’t provide any metaphysical grounding which
S is supposed to provide). In particular, by explicating the meaning of
beginninglessness, we can see why it implies that God would be uncaused
(assuming for the sake of parity that both God and Oppy’s ISOR are
unsustained). Thus, ‘beginningless’ itself is not a special property S.
Hence, God existing uncaused doesn’t need to be explained by
S. Whereas according to 1.1.3.1, Oppy’s view that ‘x (ISOR) but not y
begins uncaused’ needs to be explained by special property S, because (1)
ISOR does not always-already exist in the same sense as God, but is finite
in temporal extent and has a temporal edge, just like y (2) S is not sup-
posed to be merely a way of describing ISOR’s beginning of existence
(since y also begins to exist); rather, S is also supposed to ‘make a differ-
ence’ by explaining why ISOR begins uncaused but y does not begin
uncaused. But as argued previously, there cannot be any property S that
can do the required work of explaining why ISOR begins uncaused but y
begins caused. Therefore, 1.1.3.1 is false.
3.6 Concerning 1.1.3.2.1

Concerning 1.1.3.2.1, one cannot appeal to the concrete circumstance of
x making it the case that only x begins uncaused, since this would amount
to saying that the circumstances causes x and yet x is supposed to have
begun uncaused, that is, without causally antecedent conditions. Indeed,
on Oppy’s theory there isn’t any concrete circumstances in which x
(ISOR) begins uncaused, since ISOR is supposed to be the very initial
state which begins to exist.
3.7 Concerning 1.1.3.2.2. S is a Property of y

Oppy might suggest the possibility that, once ISOR begins uncaused,
ISOR brings about caused entities (e.g. y) with properties which would
make it the case that they would begin caused (rather than uncaused).
Thus, even though ISOR begins uncaused, this does not imply that later
entities would also begin uncaused, since later entities would be causally
dependent on earlier entities for their beginning.
The problem with this view is that the property of y which (according
to 1.1.3.2.2) is supposed to make it the case that ‘y would begin to exist
caused’ would be had by y when y has already begun to exist (caused).
This implies that (contrary to 1.1.3.2.2) this property is unable to ground
the caused beginning of y.
Therefore, the reason why y does not begin uncaused is not because of
the property of y. Rather, as explained previously in Sect. 3.4, it is just the
consequence of my view that what makes things happen are concrete
entities and their properties, which implies that without concrete causes
nothing would begin to exist. That is why uncaused events do not happen.
100 A. Loke
3.8 C
oncerning 1.1.3.2.3. S is a Property
of the Circumstances of y
3.8.1 O
bjection: Current Spatial Considerations
Prevent Things from Beginning to Exist
Uncaused Now
Oppy has offered another argument for why (say) a tiger does not begin
to exist uncaused now if the initial state of reality began to exist uncaused.
Focusing on the well-established features of the part of reality that we
now inhabit, Oppy argues that causally prior to some concrete object
occupying the space currently occupied by another concrete object, the
current occupant must vacate the space to make room for the new object.
Thus, the former occupant’s ceasing to occupy the space is a cause (but
not the sole cause) of the new object’s coming into being. Generalizing
this line of thought, Oppy writes,
Pick any tiger shaped space in the room. In order for a tiger to occupy that
space, that space must have appropriate internal and boundary properties:
there are after all, lots of ways that the boundary and interior of that space
could be that are simply inconsistent with the occupation of that space by
a tiger. But, if that’s right, then it seems to me that we should allow that …
the coming about of the consistency of the boundary and interior of the
space with occupation by a tiger—is a cause of the coming into existence
of the tiger. And as before, if this is a cause of the coming into existence of
the tiger, then it … isn’t true that the tiger ‘comes into existence uncaused
out of nothing. (p. 67)
Oppy then goes on to make a few remarks concerning possible objec-

tions to his argument, claiming, among other things, that even if there is
no cause of (say) a table ceasing to occupy the location that it currently
occupies, it will still be the case that the table’s ceasing to occupy the loca-
tion is a cause of the coming to existence of the tiger in that location.
Additionally, even if most of the universe consists of tiger-shaped spaces
the interior and boundary conditions of which are consistent with occu-
pation by a tiger, it would still be the case that the coming about of such
spaces would be a cause of the popping into existence of a tiger in that

space (pp. 66–67).
In summary, Oppy’s suggestion that, since in the reality that we now
inhabit, the spaces the interior and boundary conditions of which are
consistent with occupation by any entity y would be a causally necessary
condition for the beginning of y in that space, y could not begin uncaused
now. In a more recent paper, Oppy suggests the reason why it is impos-
sible for a raging tiger to ‘suddenly come into existence uncaused out of
nothing’ in the room in which you are reading this is that there is no
place in that room for a tiger to come to occupy uncaused. He writes:
In the causal order, the displacing activity of the displacing object—the

object ‘popping into existence’—would have to be both (causally) prior to
the displacement of the displaced object (in order to cause the displace-
ment) and (causally) posterior to the displacement of the displaced object
(in order that the displacing object exists and hence is able to bring about
the displacement). But that’s impossible. (Oppy 2015, p. 4)
He also argues that,
if—per impossible—something did ‘pop into existence’ at a particular

location, we would properly regard the vacation of the space now occupied
by the thing that comes into existence by the thing(s) that previously occu-
pied that space as a cause—i.e., a necessary causal condition—of the exis-
tence of the new occupant of that space. Thus, even in this case, we would
not have something popping into existence uncaused. (Ibid.)
An argument against Oppy’s objection based on spatial considerations

has been offered by Erasmus. Erasmus notes that spatial substantivalism
(the view that space is a substance that is able to exist by itself indepen-
dently of material objects) is a metaphysically possible view, and indeed
many scientists and philosophers hold to this view. Erasmus concludes
that, if the Causal Principle is false, then ‘a space is a thing that can itself
come into existence uncaused. Accordingly, we should observe empty
spaces, and objects of the related shape, constantly coming into being all
around us’ (Erasmus 2018, p. 166).
102 A. Loke
Even if the possibility of spatial substantivalism and Erasmus argu-

ment is rejected, Oppy’s objection can be replied to in various other ways.
For example, one can think of ‘uncaused beginnings’ which do not
involve displacement of objects or vacation of spaces, and hence are com-
patible with the fact that the spaces of our universe are occupied. An
example would be ‘a pre-existing electric field increasing in strength
uncaused under certain circumstances’, where ‘field’ is understood as a
region of space in which there is a force. It is observed that the space that
is occupied by the electric field is compatible with their existing and
increasing. Furthermore, it is observed that different strengths of electric
fields (as well as other fields) can occupy the same amount of space, unlike
Oppy’s example of tigers where an increased number of tigers would
require more space.
Moreover, our experiences indicate that in the reality that we inhabit,
pre-existent fields (e.g. electric and magnetic fields) and ‘spaces the inte-
rior and boundary conditions of which are consistent with an increasing
in strength of a pre-existent electric field’ are found around us. This can
be seen from the fact that, when we switch on an electric or magnetic
field generator around us, there will be an increase in strength in the rel-
evant field around it. Indeed, in our experiences we have observed many
instances of such events beginning to exist. This shows that our circum-
stances are compatible with such events beginning to exist around us, and
that such events do begin to exist (call one such event y).
Concerning y: an increase in strength of a pre-existent electric field,
Oppy would object that, since an increase in strength of a pre-existent
electric field requires spaces the interior and boundary conditions of
which are consistent with this increase, this event cannot begin uncaused.
In reply, in the reality that we now inhabit, what is causally necessary for
an increase in strength of a pre-existent electric field is not merely the
presence of such spaces. Rather, it would also include (for example) the
switching on of an electric field generator under certain circumstances. In
this situation, the switching on of the electric field generator would be a
cause. Recall that (I) x (ISOR) begins uncaused but y begins caused
implies that no cause making it the case that x (rather than y) begins
uncaused, (II) x and y having a beginning implies that the properties of x
and the properties of y which differentiate between them would be had
by them only when they had already begun to exist, and (III) the circum-
stances are compatible with the beginning of y. Now it has been explained
in Section 4 that (I), (II), and (III) jointly imply that there would be no
difference between x and y where beginning uncaused is concerned.
Hence, if x (ISOR) begins uncaused, there would be no difference
between ‘beginning of ISOR without cause’ and ‘beginning of increase in
strength of electric field without [having to switch on the generator as a]
cause’ (see the definition of ‘uncaused’ in Chap. 2). This implies y would
begin without having to switch on the generator. The consequent is not
the case; therefore, it is not the case that ISOR begins uncaused.
An objector might suggest reinforcing Oppy’s argument by developing
further hypotheses about how existing things might place causal condi-
tions with respect to any new state of affairs, such that only the first state
of reality could begin without a causal condition (Rasmussen 2018).
However, I have explained above that saying that ‘y begins to exist
uncaused’ would mean ‘y begins to exist without having to switch on the
electric field generator under certain circumstances’. The point is that
there can be no further hypotheses about how existing things would place
causal conditions with respect to increasing in strength in electric field in
this case, given that I define uncaused in this case as ‘without having to
switch on the electric field generator under certain circumstances’.
3.8.2 O
bjection Based on the Distinction between
Different Senses of Beginning to Exist
Against my argument using the case of electric field increasing in strength

under certain circumstances, it might be objected that there is a distinc-
tion between ‘there was no entity E and then there was an entity E with
property p’ (i.e. an entity beginning to exist)—such as the beginning of
existence of ISOR—and ‘an entity F which already exists coming to pos-
sess property q it did not previously have’ (i.e. an event beginning to
exist)—such as an electric field increasing in strength. One might then
claim that this distinction would be the relevant difference that explains
why ISOR begins uncaused but an electric field increasing in strength
under certain circumstances does not.
104 A. Loke
In response, both cases are compatible with the definition of beginning

of existence which I used for my argument; namely, x has a beginning of
existence if x has a temporal extension, the extension is finite, and it has
temporal edges. Here, the beginning of x can refer to ‘then there was an
entity E with property p’ (such as the beginning of existence of ISOR),
and the beginning of x can also refer to ‘an entity F which already exists
coming to possess property q it did not previously have’ (such as an elec-
tric field increasing in strength under certain circumstances). In both
cases there is a beginning of possession of a property, and my argument
would still apply. That is, if the event ‘then there was E with p’ begins to
exist uncaused, then
I. this event would not have any causally antecedent condition which
would make it the case that only this event rather than ‘F coming to
possess q’ begins to exist uncaused;
II. the properties of the events ‘then there was E with p’ and ‘F coming
to possess q’ would be had by them only when they had already
begun to exist; and
III. the circumstances are compatible with the beginning of existence of
these events.
As explained above, (I), (II), and (III) imply that there would be no
essential difference between these events where beginning to exist
uncaused is concerned. Thus, the distinction between different senses of
‘beginning to exist uncaused’ would not be a relevant difference that
accounts for why only ISOR begins to exist uncaused but an electric field
increasing in strength under certain circumstances does not begin to exist
uncaused.
Likewise, there is no relevant difference between ‘beginning to exist
within time’ and ‘beginning to exist with time’ simpliciter where my
Modus Tollens argument is concerned. The reason is because both cases
involve being finite in temporal extension and having temporal edges,
which is the definition of beginning of existence used in my argument,
and my argument would still apply to both cases, since they both fit the
definition. None of the premises nor the justification for the premises
requires the assumption that there is earlier time or no earlier time before
something begins to exist. Therefore, whether there is time or no time

before something begins to exist does not affect my Modus Tollens
argument.
In summary, the Modus Tollens argument applies equally well to
objects and events. For even though there is a distinction between events
beginning and objects beginning, yet both of them are finite in temporal
extension and have temporal edges; hence, my Modus Tollens argument
applies to both cases. To rebut my argument, the objector would have to
rebut the premises of my argument rather than merely redefining the
problem by saying that he/she is merely referring to objects, which is
merely dodging the problem facing his/her view.
3.8.3 O
bjection: Pre-existing Things Such
as a Pre-existent Law of Nature Might Prevent
Things from Beginning to Exist Uncaused Now
The objector might suggest that the relevant difference between x and y is
that there is nothing prior to x whereas there is something prior to y, and
that once x begins uncaused, x causes ‘the circumstances of y’ which
causes y. That is why (x begins uncaused but) y begins caused, that is,
because of the causal powers of ‘the circumstances of y’ which brought
about y.
In reply, the above answer is inadequate, because it does not answer
why doesn’t y begin without a cause. If y begins caused, y is caused by its
circumstances (circumstance is defined as ‘a fact or condition connected
with or relevant to an event or action’, OED). To claim that ‘y begins
caused because the circumstances of y causes y’ does not answer ‘why does
the beginning of y (but not the beginning of x) needs a cause’ but merely
restates the fact that ‘y begins caused (by the circumstances)’. It also fails
to answer why doesn’t y-type events begin uncaused but are observed to
be correlated in an orderly manner with (say) the switching on of the
electric field generator. While such circumstances as the switching on of
the electric field generator may causally explain those y-type events
brought about by them, these circumstances do not explain why y-type
106 A. Loke
events (but not x) do not also begin without such circumstances resulting
in a lack of orderly correlation.
The objector might suggest an alternative explanation that, once the
universe existed, the universe would be the antecedent condition which
makes it the case that other things do not begin to exist uncaused. For
example, once the universe began to exist uncaused, there would be laws
of nature which prevent other things from beginning to exist uncaused
and therefore we do not observe things beginning to exist uncaused now.
As Oppy (1991, p. 196) argues, perhaps just any and everything can
come into existence uncaused, but our universe is governed by certain
conservation laws which ensure that such events do not actually happen.
Perhaps there is a true subjunctive conditional to the effect that, were y to
come into existence uncaused, then y would possess some property P*,
and it is the truth of this subjunctive conditional which accounts for the
fact that y does not come into existence uncaused.23 One might say that
y would possess the property of violating the law of conservation of
energy if y begins uncaused, and y does not possess this property if y
begins caused, and that the consequence of violating the law of conserva-
tion of energy would prevent y from beginning uncaused. With regard to
my example of increasing in strength of electric field under certain cir-
cumstances, one might object that, since an uncaused change in electric
charge would create an unbalanced surplus of charge, the so-called
uncaused beginning of increase in strength of electric field has the prop-
erty of being susceptible to prevention by conservation laws.24
Alternatively, one might suggest that perhaps the Causal Principle only
began to exist with the beginning of existence of our universe.
Oderberg (2002, p. 331) replies that Oppy’s appeal to the laws of
nature begs the question. He writes:
On a regularity view of laws it is just a general description of what happens,

not an explanation. On a necessitarian view of laws, it still does not explain
why things require a cause of their existence, since the necessity inherent in
the law derives from the powers of existing things, and so appeal to the law
merely invokes their existence rather than explains it. Why should the laws
be as they are? Because of the powers of existing things. But why can’t those
things come into existence uncaused? Because that’s how the laws are.
Against Oderberg, some might object by claiming it has not been

shown that all the laws of nature derive from the powers of existing
things. Others have cited the law of conservation of energy as a counter-
example to dispositionalism, arguing that the law indicates that interac-
tions are constrained by the requirement of preserving the mass-energy,
but that constraint does not seem to be the manifestation of a disposition
(Chalmers 1999, pp. 12–13). It has been suggested that the law of con-
servation may derive from symmetries. For example, Lange (2016, p. 64)
proposes that
A conservation law … may have an explanation. In fact, one way for a

conservation law to be a constraint is for it to arise from a symmetry prin-
ciple … As is well known, various classical conservation laws follow from
various spacetime symmetries within a Hamiltonian dynamical frame-
work: energy conservation follows from the laws’ invariance under arbi-
trary temporal displacement, linear momentum conservation from their
invariance under arbitrary spatial displacement, and angular momentum
conservation from their invariance under arbitrary rotations. If these deri-
vations explain why the conservation laws hold (as they are often said to
do), then the conservation laws are constraints, not coincidences.
However, one should ask why the symmetries hold. Lange (2016,
p. 82) claims that a symmetry principle is ‘a ‘metalaw’: a law that governs
the laws that are expressed by subnomic claims (the ‘first-order’ laws).
But why should the metalaw hold? Bird (2007, pp. 213–214) states that
it is a mystery why symmetries and conservation laws hold, and suggests
that ‘the dispositional essentialist ought to regard symmetry principles as
pseudo-laws … it may be that symmetry principles and conservation laws
will be eliminated as being features of our form of representation rather
than features of the world requiring to be accommodated within our
metaphysics’. Lange (2016, p. 94) acknowledges that Bird may be proved
right, but objects that ‘in any event, a metaphysics that cannot do justice
to explanations by constraint is at a serious disadvantage’.
In reply, one can do justice to explanations by constraint by arguing
that the representation mentioned by Bird holds because of the Causal
Principle, such that if the Causal Principle is violated, the law of
108 A. Loke
conservation would be violated as well. It is interesting to note Chalmers’

(1999, pp. 12–13) observation that ‘a characteristic feature, and a major
strength, of thermodynamics is that it applies at the phenomenological
level whatever the details of the causal process. It is precisely this feature
of the laws of thermodynamics that makes it difficult to portray them as
causal laws.’ Similar to the law of conservation of energy, the Causal
Principle ‘whatever begins to exist has a cause’ also does not depend on
the details of the causal process. The hypothesis that the law of conserva-
tion of energy is based on the Causal Principle would explain this
observation.
More importantly, one should ask how would the existing universe,
law of nature, and so on be able to prevent other things from beginning
to exist uncaused if ISOR began to exist uncaused. Now Bigelow et al.
(1992) had postulated that
the world has an essence, and that essence requires that mass-energy,
charge, lepton number, etc. are conserved in all interactions … perhaps
there is a property corresponding to the kind, the property of being a
world, and this property has as its essence the disposition to conserve
energy, etc. in response to any event.
On the other hand, Fine argues that, while the proposition that elec-
trons have negative charge is metaphysically necessary in virtue of the
identity/definition of electrons, ‘energy is conserved’ is at most naturally
necessary but not metaphysically necessary, because it is hard to see how
it could be partly definitive of energy that it should be conserved (Fine
2002, p. 261).25 Wolff (2013) objects that a certain conservation law
closely tied to symmetry principles via Noether’s second theorem is an
instance of a metaphysically necessary physical law, because it supposedly
follows from the interdependence of matter and gauge fields, and this
interdependence can seem to look like the result of a mere mathematical
identity (p. 904). Against Wolff, Linnemann (2020, p. 7) argues that,
even in the derivation of the conserved current via Noether’s second theo-
rem, some particular equations of motion (which on Wolff’s view would
count as examples of physical laws that are naturally but not metaphysi-
cally necessary) were used. Linnemann claims instead that the
conservation of topological currents holds in virtue of the identity of the

fields, and thus, on Fine’s account of necessity, with metaphysical neces-
sity (p. 10). On the other hand, Wilson (2020) claims that the conserva-
tion laws are metaphysically necessary because it occurs in every branch
of the wavefunction.
However, given that multiple interpretations of the basic mathematical
formulation of quantum mechanics are possible, any metaphysical claim
of the form ‘quantum mechanics entails x’ is likely to be false (Lewis
2016, p. xi). Whether Linnemann’s or Wilson’s account can withstand
further scientific scrutiny remains to be seen. I shall now argue below
that, in any case, our world would have been very different if ISOR began
to exist uncaused, and that the subjunctive condition concerning y men-
tioned above would be false because the uncaused beginning of y would
not have been preventable if something begins to exist uncaused.
To begin, the problem with the view that once ISOR began it imposed
a metaphysical principle or natural law that ensures subsequent entities
begin caused is that (as argued previously) metaphysical principle or nat-
ural law is not concrete but abstract. Abstract objects do not make things
happen in one way rather than the other. Thus, no such principle or law
by itself could make it the case that only ISOR rather than other things
begins uncaused. What makes things happen one way or the other are
concrete entities and their properties. Thus, the objector should not sim-
ply suggest a principle or law of nature and say that suffices to explain
why things do not begin uncaused now if ISOR began uncaused. Neither
should the objector simply suggest that the Causal Principle only begins
to exist with the beginning of existence of our universe. These suggestions
would not work in the absence of concrete entities and their properties
doing the metaphysical work of grounding why x (ISOR) rather than y
begins uncaused. (As explained in previous sections, the abstract Causal
Principle is just the consequence of my view that what makes things hap-
pen are concrete entities and their properties, which implies that without
concrete causes doing the work nothing would begin to exist. For the
objector’s hypothesis that ‘the Causal Principle only begins to exist with
the beginning of existence of our universe’, there would need to be con-
crete entities and their properties doing the metaphysical work of ground-
ing the restriction of the Causal Principle to y but not x.)
110 A. Loke
Hence, one should ask how would the conservation law (or any other
law of nature) be able to prevent (say) the uncaused beginning of an
unbalanced surplus of charge if ISOR begins uncaused. Now in order for
x (e.g. law of conservation of energy) to prevent y from beginning to exist,
x would have to either remove the causally necessary conditions or act on
the circumstances to make them incompatible with y beginning to exist.
(For example, in order to prevent a moving battery-operated toy car from
entering a room, I would have to either remove the causally necessary
conditions, such as by removing the batteries, or act on the circumstance
to make it incompatible with the event occurring, such as by filling the
room with hard objects such that there is no space for the car to enter
into; see Sect. 3.8.1.) However, if ISOR began to exist uncaused, what
this implies is that
I. there is no causally necessary condition which makes it the case that

only ISOR rather than other things begins to exist. In particular, any
time t and any location l would not be such a causally necessary
condition.
II. Additionally, as explained previously, any difference between ISOR
and other things would be had by them only when they had already
begun to exist. (I) and (II) imply that there would be no difference
between them where the requirement for causally necessary condi-
tion is concerned. Moreover,
III. it has been explained previously that the circumstances around us
have been shown to be such that they are compatible with the begin-
ning of existence of an increase in strength of electric field under
certain circumstances.
(In addition to (I), (II), and (III), the three problems noted below are
relevant as well.)
Against the above, an objector might argue that once x (ISOR) begins
uncaused, x causes the concrete circumstance of y to have properties
which ground certain laws of nature and make it incompatible for events
to begin uncaused within it. As Carrier (2018) argues, ‘the very reason we
do not observe a violation of ex nihilo nihil is that those extant properties
and laws now prevent “just anything” from happening. The only nihil we
observe is actually a thing: propertied spacetime. And that thing, being

existent, now limits what can happen.’ For example, one might suggest
the possibility that some concrete substance (say, spacetime [this assumes
a substantival view of space and time])26 began to exist uncaused with the
beginning of the universe, and the properties of this concrete substance
determine (causes) the total mass-energy of the universe to remain con-
stant throughout time by making the circumstances incompatible with
increase in total mass-energy. Therefore, even if our present circumstances
are compatible with the beginning of increase in strength of electric field
under certain circumstances, we would not observe such events beginning
to exist uncaused, and the law of conservation of mass-energy would hold.
In this sense, y beginning in spacetime but x does not would be a differ-
entiator between y and x (ISOR), which explains why the former requires
a cause and the latter does not.27
However, there are at least three arguments against the above objec-
tion; these arguments are independent and any one of them would suffice
(I shall discuss the first two in this section and the third in the next
section).
First, consider the above-mentioned example of a moving battery-
operated toy car entering the room. One can make the circumstances
incompatible with this event by filling the room with hard objects,
because the car necessarily occupies space. However, an increase in
strength of electric field does not necessarily occupy more space; in fact,
the spaces around us are compatible with different levels of strengths of
electric fields. This indicates that there is in fact no existing thing which
makes it the case that the circumstances of our universe are such that it is
incompatible with increase in total level of strength of electric field and
hence increase in total mass-energy if something can begin uncaused.
Rather, as I have argued, the reason why the law of conservation holds is
because the causal principle (something does not begin to exist uncaused)
holds. My argument is that, if this principle is false, as the sceptic sug-
gests, then the law of conservation would not hold, but the consequent is
not the case.
Second, the law of conservation of energy would not prevent energy-
conserving events from beginning uncaused (e.g. without causal interac-
tion) if ISOR begins to exist uncaused. It should be noted that there is no
112 A. Loke
law or spatial considerations that now prevent energy-conserving changes

from beginning. Indeed, such events happen frequently in the present,
which indicates that the present circumstances are compatible with such
changes happening. For example, hydrogen is currently being fused into
helium in the sun, and in the process of the causal interaction some of the
mass of the hydrogen atoms is converted directly to energy according to
E = mc2. Now if ISOR begun to exist uncaused, then given (I) the begin-
ning of ISOR does not have causally necessary condition which makes it
the case that only the beginning of ISOR rather than certain other events
y begins uncaused, (II) any difference between the beginning of ISOR
and the beginning of y would be had by them only when they had already
begun to exist, and (III) the compatibility of the circumstances with the
beginning of y, we can likewise expect these energy-conserving events (let
these = y) to begin to exist uncaused now. These events would not be
preventable by the law of conservation of energy given that they are com-
patible with it. But we do not observe these energy-conserving events/
changes beginning uncaused now; on the contrary, scientists have
described the causal interactions that brought about events such as the
fusion of hydrogen into helium. Thus, the antecedent is false.
3.8.4 A Second Form of Modus Tollens Argument
Third, there is a second form of Modus Tollens argument which is

immune to the objection that after the initial state has begun uncaused,
some concrete substance would prevent things/events from beginning
uncaused. It is immune to the objection because it implies that these
would be other spacetime blocks which would begin uncaused initially
(not after the initial state has begun) and massively disrupt our universe
in an unconstrained manner, in which case our universe would have been
very different. The argument can be formulated as follows:
1. If x (ISOR) begins uncaused, then some other possible spacetime

blocks y and z would also begin uncaused.
2. It is not the case that y and z begin uncaused.
3. Therefore, it is not the case that x begins uncaused.
The justification for premise 1 is that,
I. if x (ISOR) begins uncaused, this implies that the beginning of x

would not have causally necessary condition which makes it the case
that only x (rather than other possible spacetime blocks y and z)
begins to exist.
II. Additionally, any difference between the possibilities x, y, and z
would be had by them in the concrete only when they had already
begun to exist. Moreover,
III. there would be no pre-existing entity that makes it incompatible for
y and z from beginning to exist initially.
(I), (II), and (III) jointly imply that there would be no difference
between the possibilities x, y, and z where beginning to exist uncaused is
concerned. Hence, if x begins uncaused, y and z—as well as other things
with other possible physical laws or metaphysical principles—would all
begin uncaused initially.
This consequence has surprisingly been accepted by atheist Richard
Carrier (2018) as a way to account for the fine-tuning of our universe.
His reasoning is that, since ‘nothing (other than what is logically neces-
sary) prevents anything from happening to that Nothing’ (ibid.), any-
thing that is logically possible—including an actual infinite multiverse
ensemble which includes our ‘fine-tuned’ universe—would begin to exist
uncaused from nothing. Carrier concludes:
This entails that the assertion ex nihilo nihil, ‘from nothing, comes [only]
nothing,’ is false. Because that is a rule, and Nothing contains no rules. No
such rule can therefore exist when there is Nothing, so as to govern that
Nothing. Therefore it cannot be the case that only nothing comes from
Nothing. In fact we cannot even establish that it is likely that only nothing
will come from Nothing. (Ibid.)
Nevertheless, there are several problems which Carrier fails to note.

First, Carrier’s hypothesis faces Mawson’s objection (2011) that on
such a hypothesis in which every possibility is actualized, the probability
of any universe in which we can more or less continually and consistently
114 A. Loke
understand through induction would have been infinitesimally small,

but that is not the case (see the discussion on multiverse in Chap. 4).
Second, for any spacetime block x, it is possible that there are y, z, …
and so on which expand and collide with x and leave behind detectable
effects. Cosmologists have been discussing the possibility of collision of
multiple universes. Some have claimed that there are ‘scars’ of the colli-
sion detected on the Cosmic Microwave Background Radiation (CMB)
as ‘cold spots’, while others have disputed the existence of the these ‘scars’
or argued that these ‘scars’ could have alternative explanations such as
inhomogeneous reheating associated with non-standard inflation
(Mackenzie et al. 2017). In any case, it is possible (though perhaps not
yet proven) that there had been collision of universes leaving behind scars
on the CMB. It has been objected that multiverses are brought about by
an early inflationary phase and the process of inflation would have pre-
vented the collision (Siegel 2018). However, if (instead of being caused
by inflation) our universe began to exist uncaused alongside an actual
infinite number of universes which also begun uncaused as Carrier sug-
gests, a huge number of universes would collide with one another and
with our universe in an unconstrained manner, and the huge number of
collisions would generate huge amounts of radiations and would leave
behind much more obvious traces rather than a few disputed ‘scars’ on
the CMB. (The fact that there could also be other possible spacetime
blocks that begin uncaused but do not affect our universe does not deny
this consequence.) It would not help to say that the universes could have
merged together, leading to the formation of our present universe, since
given the lack of a cause, the beginnings would be unconstrained. In this
case, not only ‘a small universe’ would begin uncaused, rather all kinds of
possible universes (including those as big as ours!) with opposing proper-
ties would begin uncaused, since there would be no difference between
them where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned, which implies that
there would be no constraint whatsoever and the CMB would be totally
disrupted. The opposing effects of the opposing properties would also
cancel one another and no order would emerge from it. In short, the
result would be totally disruptive rather than resulting in the fine-tuned
and highly mathematically ordered universe which we see. It would also
massively disrupt the spacetime substance of our universe, and our
universe would have been very different such that the law of conservation
of energy would not hold and would therefore not prevent events such as
the uncaused beginning of increase in strength of electric field under cer-
tain circumstances.
Against this second form of Modus Tollens argument, the objector
might utilize the branching view of modality affirmed by Oppy which
claims that all possible worlds share the initial state of the history of the
actual world (Oppy 2013b holds this view because he thinks it is more
parsimonious). Given this theory, the initial state of our spacetime block
is necessary and there is no other possible spacetime block at the initial
state. In other words, based on this branching theory of modality, there is
no other metaphysically possible alternatives concerning the initial state,
even though there are other logically possible alternatives such that we are
able to tell alternative logically consistent stories about the initial state.
Thus, when one asks, ‘Why is the initial state A rather than B (e.g. one
who is totally disrupted by other spacetime blocks)?’ Oppy could answer,
‘Because A is necessary, and it follows from my branching view on modal-
ity.’28 (It should be noted that the first form of Modus Tollens is not
affected by this theory of modality because it is not referring to possible
things or events, but to actual events such as increasing of electric field
strength under certain conditions. As argued previously, there would be
no difference between the beginning of ISOR and later actual events such
as increasing in strength of electric fields [which we know happens fre-
quently!] where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned, if it were actu-
ally the case that ISOR begins uncaused. However, this theory of modality
is relevant to the second form of Modus Tollens which concerns possible
initial states.)
In reply, I shall argue below that the branching theory of modality is
unproblematic if the initial state is a beginningless First Cause. However,
it is problematic if the initial state is a First Cause with beginning. In
other words, my argument below is perfectly consistent with the branch-
ing theory of modality and does not require a rejection of that theory of
modality; it only requires the rejection of the view that the First Cause
has a beginning which is contradicted by the Modus Tollens argument
and result in the unscientific denial of the fine-tuning problem.
116 A. Loke
To elaborate, empirical evidences show that it is metaphysically possi-

ble for physical entities with beginnings to have different arrangements.
For example, we know that the tables and chairs in this room can be
arranged differently; likewise, we know that atoms can be arranged differ-
ently. That is the reason why it is problematic to think (as Oppy claims)
that the physical things of Oppy’s ISOR could not be arranged differ-
ently, that the arrangement of physical entities at the beginning of the
initial state of our physical spacetime block is the only metaphysically
possible arrangement, and that there are no other metaphysically possible
arrangements or metaphysically possible spacetime blocks. Moreover, we
know that, even though physical entities with beginnings can have differ-
ent arrangements, the actual arrangement is usually dependent on the
cause. For example, in the newly built house analogy mentioned at the
beginning of this chapter, the house is the way it is (rather than a pile of
rocks) because the cause (i.e. the house builder) makes it that way; what
begins to exist is brought about and constrained by the cause. However,
if ISOR begins uncaused as Oppy suggests, then there would be no cause
and no pre-existing preventing conditions which constrain what begins
to exist. That is the reason for thinking that other spacetime blocks would
also begin uncaused initially, since any property which differentiate
between them and our spacetime block would be had by them only when
they had already begun to exist.
Oppy might raise a tu quoque style objection by claiming that the
theory that there is an immaterial, beginningless First Cause (call this
‘God’) would face the same problem. For example, if God exists uncaused
beginninglessly and initially timelessly (see Chap. 6), why wouldn’t other
timeless concrete entities exist uncaused alongside God? Alternatively,
why is God three persons (as Christians claim) rather than four persons
(a Quadrinity)?
In reply, since the objector raised the tu quoque objection by claiming
that an immaterial, beginningless First Cause suffer the same problem as
a First Cause with beginning, the burden of proof would be on the objec-
tor to justify his/her claim by showing that (say) multiple timeless con-
crete entities or a Quadrinity is metaphysically possible. The objector
might reply that it is possible because it is conceivable. However, what is
conceivable is not always metaphysically possible. To elaborate, I have
explained above that, on my view, what exists is constrained by pre-

existing conditions (e.g. the arrangement of the house is constrained by
the pre-existing material and house builder). If God exists uncaused
beginninglessly, then there would be a beginningless pre-existing condi-
tion which constrains what exists. This beginningless condition might
make the beginningless state incompatible with other timeless concrete
entities or a Quadrinity existing. In other words, it might be the case that
those circumstances are such that it is not metaphysically possible for
those entities to exist timelessly. In order for the objector’s objection to
work, the objector would have to bear the burden of proof to rule out this
possibility, but they have not done so; hence, their objection fails.
The objector might ask why cannot Oppy also appeal to preventive
conditions to explain why other spacetime blocks do not begin uncaused.
For if the static theory of time is true and the initial state of our spacetime
block is tenselessly existing at time t1, it might have some property located
at t1 which prevented any other blocks existing alongside it.
In reply, while a concrete entity existing at t1 might have properties
that are incompatible with some other things existing at t1 and hence
prevent their existence at t1, the problem is that on Oppy’s view there is
no entity or condition pre-existing t1 which can prevent or constrain
what begins to exist uncaused at t1 in the first place. For in order to con-
strain what begins at t1, condition C must act prior (in some sense of
prior, see below) to t1, for otherwise if (say) z has begun at t1 it would be
too late to constrain or prevent z’s beginning. However, on Oppy’s view,
there is no such condition. In particular, on his view, there is nothing
concrete that exist timelessly sans the initial state of the universe, since on
his view that initial state is supposed to be initial state of all reality and
has a beginning. If there were a timeless state, then that timeless state
would be beginningless and would be the initial state of reality in terms
of order of being (not temporal order) and hence would be prior to the
beginning of the spacetime block in that sense. Thus, on Oppy’s theory
there simply isn’t a state prior to the beginning of universe for any con-
straining or preventing condition to do the required work, not even a
timeless state of existence which exists sans ISOR (this contrasts with
Craig’s view according to which God exists timelessly sans the universe;
see Chap. 6).
118 A. Loke
Moreover, many physicists do think that the initial conditions at the

beginning of the universe could have been different. So why did our uni-
verse begin in such a ‘fine-tuned’ way which allowed life to exist? This is
related to fine-tuning problem which I shall elaborate in Chap. 4. At this
point it suffice to note that it is unreasonable to say, ‘Hey, there’s no fine-
tuning problem, the initial state begins necessarily!’ Most scientists would
rightly find this response implausible. For given the observation of our
universe with its highly ordered systems (quantum systems, biological
systems, solar systems, galactic systems, etc.) and highly ordered laws of
physics as well as ‘fine-tuning’, what is the best explanation for its begin-
ning? Something or nothing? It is unreasonable to think that our universe
with its billions of stars and highly ordered laws of physics ultimately
begun uncaused; that it just happened to be like that without anything
determining it to be like that. For why should the initial conditions of the
universe begin in such a way that the universe can allow for existence of
life if there was nothing that determines the conditions to begin that way
rather than other way and having other properties? As I shall explain
further in Chap. 4, the fundamental principles or laws of nature do not
uniquely determine a fine-tuned universe (and avoid the Boltzmann
Brain problem, etc.). ‘Physics is blind to what life needs. And yet, here we
are’ (Lewis and Barnes 2016, p. 181). That is one reason why many sci-
entists recognize that there is a ‘fine-tuning problem’ which cannot be
resolved simply by claiming that the initial state begins uncaused neces-
sarily and therefore there is no fine-tuning problem. To reply this way is
unscientific and irrational, that is, appealing to a magical event without a
magician.
Because many scientists recognize the implausibility of simply saying
that the universe began ‘fine-tuned’ and uncaused, they have proposed
the multiverse hypothesis in an attempt to address this implausibility.
However, as I shall explain in greater detail in Chap. 4, one problem with
the multiverse hypothesis is that, even if there are many universes, what-
ever led to their formation would itself require fine-tuning (i.e. must be
highly ordered) in order to generate so many different kinds of universes
(whether deterministically or indeterministically) such that eventually
one that is ‘fine-tuned’ is generated by chance. As Collins (2018, p. 90)
notes, ‘anything that produces such a multiverse itself appears to require
significant fine-tuning’. Thus, Oppy’s initial state would still need to be

fine-tuned—but to say that such a fine-tuned state begins uncaused is
precisely the problem that we started with!
Oppy objects that if the fine-tuning of the initial state is required for
naturalism, it would be required for theism as well (Oppy 2013b, p. 59).
He might therefore be motivated to raise a tu quoque style objection by
arguing that both theories (Oppy and mine) suffer the same problem in
the sense that, on both theories, there is no state prior to the initial state
at which it is possible for some property or condition to do the constrain-
ing or preventive work concerning the initial state.29
In response, my argument against uncaused beginning is not special
pleading because it is based on evidence. As explained earlier, we have
evidence based on observation and science that it is metaphysically pos-
sible for physical entities with beginnings to have different arrangements.
Given this, we should ask why the initial arrangement of the universe
began in such a way (rather than other ways) that allows for existence of
life (fine-tuning problem). On the other hand, the objector has not pro-
vided evidence that it is metaphysically possible for timeless things with-
out beginning to have different arrangements (e.g. a Quadrinity) in order
to substantiate the tu quoque objection that theism suffers from the fine-
tuning problem. Additionally, as explained earlier, we have evidence
based on observation and science that constraining/preventive work is
needed for things/events with beginning (e.g. so as to explain why is it
not the case that a rubble rather than a house begins to exist). On the
other hand, the objector has not provided evidence to substantiate the tu
quoque objection that a similar constraining/preventive work is also
needed for timeless things without beginning. Given the lack of evidence
that a beginningless state would suffer from the same problem, the tu-
quoque style objection fails.
Moreover, consider another analogy: Suppose that fire begins uncaused.
In that case the beginning of fire would be unconstrained; in particular,
the lack of oxygen would not constrain the beginning of fire. However,
suppose that oxygen is causally necessary for fire. If there is an eternal lack
of oxygen, then no fire can ever exist in that eternal state; such a state
would be incompatible with the existence of fire. This scenario is analo-
gous to my view according to which there is a beginningless state which
120 A. Loke
can do the work of prevention. In order to (say) prevent other timeless

entities/Quadrinity from existing uncaused beginninglessly alongside
God, the preventive conditions do not need to act in any sense prior, but
can be part of the beginningless state which makes such a state incompat-
ible with those other timeless entities/Quadrinity existing. Such a begin-
ningless state is not limited by a temporal edge, whereas ‘our spacetime
block begins at t1’ is limited by a temporal edge and hence comes too late
to constrain what begins to exist at the same edge, as explained above.
It might be objected that, on Oppy’s theory of modality, the lack of a
previous state to the beginning of the universe is precisely why it is meta-
physically necessary. For according to his theory, in order for something
to have been otherwise, it would have to be caused to be otherwise by a
previous state, yet there is no previous state to the beginning of the uni-
verse according to his view.
In reply, the point that ‘in order for it to have been otherwise, it would
have to be caused to be otherwise’ may be applicable to later events, but
the fact that on Oppy’s theory there is nothing prior to the initial state of
our spacetime block which has a beginning to constrain what begins to
exist is precisely the problem. For the lack of a previous state to the begin-
ning of universe on Oppy’s theory—which implies the lack of constrain-
ing and preventive conditions—is precisely one reason why he cannot say
what makes it metaphysically impossible from beginning in a different
way, and thus undermines his claim that the initial state of our universe
has a metaphysically necessary beginning. It would be fallacious to reply
to my argument that ‘without a prior state, other uncaused events cannot
be prevented’ by saying that this is not applicable to the initial part of
universe which is just necessary. For a theory of modality is merely
abstract, which merely describes what is necessary and possible. What
does the required metaphysical work are concrete things and their prop-
erties. However, the lack of a previous state to the beginning of the uni-
verse implies that there is no concrete previous state which can do the
required metaphysical work of constraining or prevention, that is pre-
cisely why it cannot be metaphysically necessary.
On the other hand, I have explained above that, while the branching
theory of modality is problematic for an initial state with a beginning, it
is unproblematic for initial state that is beginningless. Being
beginningless implies that the initial state would not face the problem
posed by my Modus Tollens argument, which only works against the
view of uncaused beginnings (such as that held by Oppy). Moreover,
something that is beginningless and unsustained will be initial, since
there cannot be another thing existing prior (whether temporally prior or
causally prior) to an entity that is beginningless and unsustained, and
given the branching theory of modality, such an initial entity would be
necessary. Therefore, his properties could not have been different.
Additionally, given the branching theory of modality which implies that
First Cause is metaphysically necessary, it isn’t the case that multiple
beginningless timeless concrete entities could have existed initially if
there is only one such entity initially, and it isn’t the case that the begin-
ningless First Cause could have been a Quadrinity if it is a Trinity. There
just isn’t any possible alternative initial state, since all possibilities share
that initial state. This conclusion provides another response to the tu-
quoque style objection.
3.9 O
bjection Concerning the Distinction
between Could and Would
Back to the first form of the Modus Tollens argument, sceptics might
object by claiming that my argument only shows that, if ISOR began to
exist uncaused, other entities could also begin to exist uncaused; it does
not show that they would also begin to exist uncaused.
In reply, ‘could’ concerns possibility, but I am not referring to possible
events here. Rather, I am referring to actual events, and arguing that there
would be no difference between them where beginning to exist uncaused
is concerned if one of them begins uncaused. For example, consider the
scenario in which something (say) the universe began to exist and there
was also a rapid increasing in strength of electric fields under certain cir-
cumstances around me. In this scenario these are not just possible events
(i.e. it is not merely the case that the universe could begin to exist and
electric field could increase in strength), but actual events; that is, the
universe did begin to exist and electric field did increase in strength. Since
122 A. Loke
(as explained above) there would be no difference between these events

where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned if the universe did begin
to exist uncaused, the increasing in strength of the electric field under
certain circumstances around me would also begin to exist uncaused (e.g.
without requiring the switching on of an electric field generator).
An objector might appeal to Oppy’s branching theory of modality
according to which what is possible for these later events will be set by the
causal powers of the previous event, and then argue that according to this
theory it is not possible for later events to begin uncaused.30
However, this objection misses the point of my argument which refers
to actual later events (and not possible events). That is, we know that
electric fields actually increase in strength from time to time, and given
what I have argued above concerning I, II, and III, there would be no
difference between the beginning of these actual events and the actual
beginning of our universe where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned
if (as Oppy says) our universe actually began uncaused, and that these
actual later events would have been uncaused rather than caused as
Oppy thinks.
Another objector might appeal to a different theory of modality
according to which it is conceivable and possible that many different pos-
sible strengths could begin to exist uncaused. He/she might then argue
that, since none of these possibilities is privileged over the other, none of
them would begin uncaused even if ISOR begins uncaused.31
There are two steps to my response.
First, in our actual world, increasing in strength of electric field hap-
pens often. For example, I just observed an event y: ‘an increased in
strength E under certain circumstances’ begins to exist at time ty after I
switched on a generator. My argument is that, if ISOR begins uncaused,
then given I, II, and III (explained above), there would be no difference
between beginning of ISOR and beginning of y where beginning to exist
uncaused is concerned. The fact that y could have been of different
strengths (e.g. 2E, 3E) does not deny either of I, II, and III, which jointly
imply my conclusion. That is, the fact that there is no privilege over
which strength begins does not imply that none would begin. On the
contrary, given I, II, and III, y would have begun uncaused, since there
would have been no difference between the beginning of ISOR and the
beginning of y where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned. Therefore,

the beginning of y at ty should have been uncaused, that is, without hav-
ing to switched on a generator. But that consequent was not the case.
Thus, it is not the case that ISOR began uncaused.
Second, what about the fact that y could have been of different
strengths and that there is no privilege over which strength begins? What
does this fact imply? One can argue that this fact implies that, not only
would the increasing in strength of the electric field under certain cir-
cumstances around me began to exist uncaused, the increasing in strength
would be of very different values as well. The reason is because,
I. since increasing in strength E would have begun to exist uncaused,

as shown under the first step, what this implies is that the beginning
of E would not have causally necessary condition which makes it the
case that only E (rather than other possible strengths, for example,
2E, 3E) begins to exist.
II. Additionally, as explained previously, any difference between the
possibilities E, 2E, 3E, and so on would be had by them only when
they had already begun to exist. Moreover,
III. the circumstances around us are compatible with different levels of
increasing in strengths of electric fields up to a certain physical limit.
Given (I), (II), and (III), there would be no relevant difference between
these different increasing in strengths where beginning to exist uncaused
is concerned. Hence, if increasing in strength E began uncaused, the
other possible strengths would all begin uncaused up to the physical limit
(e.g. suppose 6E is the limit; increasing in strengths of E, 2E, and 3E
would all begin to exist and they add up to 6E), and our universe would
have been very different.
With regard to the second step, one may argue more directly from the
uncaused beginning of our spacetime block (if that happens) to the
uncaused beginning of other possible strengths of electric field, as follows:
1. If possibility x (e.g. our spacetime block) is actualized and begins

uncaused, then some other possibilities (e.g. y: increasing in electric
124 A. Loke
field strength of E, 2E, and 3E) would also be actualized and begins
uncaused.
2. It is not the case that y is actualized and begins uncaused.
3. Therefore, it is not the case that x is actualized and begins uncaused.
The justification for premise 1 is that,
I. if possibility x is actualized and begins uncaused, this implies that the

beginning of x would not have causally necessary condition which
makes it the case that only possibility x (rather than some other pos-
sibilities, for example, y) begins to exist.
II. Additionally, any difference between the possibilities x and y would
be had by them in the concrete only when they had already begun to
exist. Moreover,

III. the circumstances are compatible with the beginning of y (as
explained under step two above).
I, II, and III jointly imply that there would be no difference between
possibility x and possibility y where being actualized and beginning
uncaused in the concrete world is concerned, which implies premise 1.
3.10 O
bjection: The Causal Principle is
Inconsistent with Libertarian Freedom
Almeida (2018, pp. 38–39) objects that the Causal Principle is inconsis-
tent with libertarian freedom, which he understood as implying that, in
the case whereby agent S freely chooses to do A, ‘the cause of A is S, and
there is nothing that causes S to cause A. S’s causing A is an event that
comes into existence uncaused. So according to source libertarianism it is
perfectly possible that some things come into existence uncaused.’
In reply, an agent causing some effect is not itself an event, but just a
way of describing an agent causing an event (Craig and Sinclair 2009
p. 194n. 101). My argument does not rule out libertarian free choice,
since one can understand libertarian free choices as indeterministic but
not uncaused (see further, Chap. 6).
3.11 O
bjection Based on Lack
of Directionality
Don Page has raised the concern that
We have learned that the laws of physics are CPT invariant (essentially the
same in each direction of time), so in a fundamental sense the future deter-
mines the past just as much as the past determines the future … the effec-
tive unidirectional causation we commonly experience is something just
within the universe and need not be extrapolated to a putative cause for the
universe as a whole.32
Page’s worry is related to Linford’s objection to the KCA that ‘the

explanatorily prior and physically necessary conditions for the universe’s
“beginning” can fall in the temporal direction away from the beginning’
(2020, p. 11).
In reply, it should first be noted that the above objection by Page and
Linford assumes the static theory of time according to which later events
already exist and hence (according to them) might be able to cause earlier
events. According to the static theory, our ordinary experience of time
flow and the present is regarded as illusory, and in the absence of these
one might have difficulty defining ‘earlier than’, ‘beginning’, and ‘first
moment’.33 The static theory of time is controversial (for objections to
the static theory and a defence of the dynamic theory of time, see, for
example, Craig 2000a, b). In any case, I shall explain below that my
Modus Tollens argument would work even if the static theory of time is
true and that the KCA can still be defended, even though time as it is
used in mathematical physics is a quantity without direction.
To begin, it should be noted that the static theory does not exclude
earlier than/later than relations; on the contrary, it is the presence of those
relations which makes the B-series a temporal series, rather than a
McTaggart C-series.34 It is true that on a B-theory there is difficulty pro-
viding an explanation for why one direction is earlier rather than later.
Nevertheless, even if Page’s speculation that earlier events actually depends
on later events is true, then what we call earlier (and beginning) would in
126 A. Loke
fact be later in my argument. Therefore, if an infinite causal regress and a

causal loop is impossible (see Chap. 5), there would still be a First Cause.
Second, it has been explained previously in Chap. 2 that the laws of
nature and equations of physics merely provide an incomplete descrip-
tion of physical reality without ruling out causation and causal properties
(and causal direction) which operate at a more fundamental level as the
ground of the regularities described by these laws and equations.
Moreover, it has also been noted in Sect. 3.1 that, even if the static theory
of time is true, there is still something unique about time which makes it
different from space. For example, within the spacetime block, the dura-
tions next to the duration I exists is occupied by my parents and that, if
they had not existed, I would not exist. (Whereas this is not so with spa-
tial order: if my parents do not stand on my left or right, I would still
exist.) Likewise, we know that hydrogen is causally necessary for the for-
mation of water, but water is not causally necessary for formation of
hydrogen. In short, there is still a certain dependence and an ordering of
things/events which indicate the dependence, and I shall call these ‘causal
dependence’ and ‘causal order’. (A causal sceptic would acknowledge that
we observe correlations between things/events, but doubt that there is
causation. In reply, the assumption of causation is justified in light of the
critique of the causal sceptic’s position which others [e.g. Weaver 2019]
have offered [e.g. ‘it is improbable that correlations exist without causa-
tion’] and which are summarized in Chap. 2. In any case, my argument
can easily be translated in terms of correlation, by substituting the term
‘causal order/cause’ with ‘correlations’, ‘causally ordered’ with ‘correlated’,
and ‘uncaused’ with ‘uncorrelated’: (1) If x begins uncorrelated, then y
would also begin uncorrelated. (2) It is not the case that y begins uncor-
related. (3) Therefore, it is not the case that x begins uncorrelated.35)
Third, as explained in Chap. 2, if something X has a temporal exten-
sion, the extension is finite, and it has temporal edges (that is, it does not
have a static closed loop or a changeless phase that avoids an edge), then
it has a beginning. The upshot is that a relevant defence of my argument
for the Causal Principle ‘whatever begins to exist has a cause’ (in the con-
text of defending the KCA) is independent of the temporal direction of
causality. If physical reality as a whole is finite in temporal extent in what-
ever dimensions and having temporal edges (i.e. without a static closed
loop or a changeless phase that avoids an edge), it would imply that phys-
ical reality has a beginning of existence.
Now the argument in Sect. 5.6 of this book refutes a static closed loop
by demonstrating that it is viciously circular, while the argument in Chap.
6 demonstrates that if there is a changeless phase that avoids an edge, this
(initially) changeless phase of reality must have libertarian freedom and
thus would be a Creator rather than an impersonal physical reality which
is constantly changing. Given that physical reality does not have a change-
less phase that avoids an edge, and given that a ‘change’ is an event that
has ‘edges’ at the state of having gained or having lost a property within a
finite duration of time, physical reality as a whole would be finite in tem-
poral extent if there is no infinite number of changes, and the latter is
demonstrated by the arguments in Chap. 5. Given these arguments,
physical reality as a whole would be finite in temporal extent in whatever
dimensions. We then ask whether such a physical reality with temporal
‘edges’ (i.e. with a beginning) exists without causally necessary conditions.
Now if the number of earlier and later events in the scenario described
by Linford and Page are finite and the series exists without a beginning-
less First Cause as a causally necessary condition, then the series of events
would violate reflexivity; that is, the earlier events would be dependent
on later events, which are dependent on earlier events.
Moreover, the two forms of Modus Tollens argument which I have
defended above would still apply. That is,
I. If our spacetime block is finite in temporal extent in whatever dimen-

sions and having ‘edges’ and uncaused, then there would not be any
cause which would make it the case that only our spacetime block
rather than other possible finite spacetime blocks as well as many
other actual things/events with finite temporal extension within our
block and having ‘edges’ exists without cause.
II. The properties of our spacetime block and the properties of those
other possible/actual spacetime blocks/things/events which differen-
tiate between them would be had by them in the concrete world only
when they had already existed in the concrete world.
III. The circumstances are compatible with those other spacetime blocks/
things/events existing.
128 A. Loke
As argued previously, (I), (II), and (III) jointly imply that there would
be no essential difference between them where existing uncaused is con-
cerned, and therefore those other spacetime blocks/things/events would
also be uncaused. But this is contrary to fact given the causal order we
observe. Therefore, it is not the case that our spacetime block is finite in
temporal extent in whatever dimensions and having ‘edges’ and uncaused.
It might be objected that, given that x (‘our spacetime block within
which events are causally ordered/correlated’) is logically possible, if y
(increasing in strength of electric field) is part of a causally ordered/cor-
related x and x begins uncaused, y would naturally have causal relations/
correlations with other parts of x.36
In reply, this objection begs the question by assuming that the events
within x (our spacetime block) would still be causally ordered/correlated
if x begins uncaused/uncorrelated. Whereas I am not begging the ques-
tion by arguing that the events within x would not be causally ordered/
correlated if x begins uncaused/uncorrelated, because the premises of my
argument (i.e. I, II, and III) do not assume this conclusion, but jointly
imply this conclusion. To elaborate, the following four claims should be
distinguished:
1. It is possible that x (‘a spacetime block within which events are caus-
ally ordered/correlated’).
2. It is possible that x (‘a chaotic spacetime block in which y begins
uncaused/uncorrelated’).
3. It is possible that x (a chaotic spacetime block in which y is uncaused/
uncorrelated) begins uncaused.
4. It is the case that x (‘a spacetime block within which events are causally
ordered/correlated’) begins uncaused.
While 1 is true and I grant that 2 and 3 are true for the sake of the
argument, (I), (II), and (III) jointly imply that 4 is false, since (I), (II),
and (III) jointly imply that there would be no difference between ‘x’ and
‘events within x’ (such as ‘y’) where beginning uncaused is concerned. In
other words, our spacetime block would have been very different (i.e. the
events within our spacetime block would have been causally disordered/
uncorrelated) if our spacetime block begins uncaused. Hence, it is not the

case that our spacetime blocks begins uncaused.
3.12 Epistemological Objections

It might be objected that, perhaps unknown to us, something did begin
to exist uncaused faraway a long time ago in another universe with very
different metaphysical principles/laws of nature.
However, ‘beginning long ago in a place far away’ by itself would not
be relevant consideration, because ‘begins to exist uncaused’ implies that
the time and location at which it begins (whether long ago or far away)
would not be a cause for its beginning rather than other things/events
(say, a rapid increasing in strength of electric fields under certain circum-
stances) around us where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned. The
metaphysical principles/laws of nature of that unknown universe cannot
be a cause for why things begin to exist uncaused in that world but not in
our universe, since beginning to exist uncaused implies that the laws or
principles are not the cause.
One might object that to argue that because we do not see things
beginning to exist uncaused around us therefore it didn’t happen long
ago is to commit the black swan fallacy. In reply, the black swan fallacy is
a fallacy concerning inductive reasoning (‘because a person X has observed
many white swans and no black swans, therefore X does not think that
black swans exist’—this is fallacious because X has not observed all
swans). Whereas my argument for the Causal Principle is deductive, not
inductive. My argument is not simply saying ‘because we do not see
things beginning to exist uncaused around us therefore it didn’t happen
long ago’. Rather, my argument is saying, ‘if something (say, the universe)
begins to exist uncaused long ago, then (because of I, II, and III) other
things would begin to exist uncaused around us, but they don’t; there-
fore, it is not the case that something begins to exist uncaused long ago’.
It has been objected that we cannot know whether the Causal Principle
applies to the universe itself because we cannot observe the universe as a
whole and confirm that the universe has a cause.37 One might also raise
the concern that the word cause gets its meaning from our use of language
130 A. Loke
involving our experiences, but it’s not clear whether it applies to the situ-
ation at the beginning of the universe, which is far beyond our experi-
ences. As Nagel (2004) notes in his review of Rundle’s (2004) book Why
There Is Something Rather Than Nothing, ‘the most difficult philosophical
question posed by Rundle’s critique is whether such efforts to use words
to indicate something that transcends the conditions of their ordinary
application make sense.’ Drees (2016, p. 199) raises the concern that ‘at
the boundaries of physical cosmology our notions of time and causality
break down’. It therefore is doubtful whether a ‘Big Bang’ as the limiting
event of standard cosmology provides a stable model for ‘the first event’.
He concludes that when the conceptuality of space and time changes,
possible answers to the question ‘Why is there something rather than
nothing?’ need not to be thought of in temporal or causal terms.
The assumption of the first objection is that we can only know by
direct observation, but this assumption is false. There are many events
which we have not directly observed, but which we can know did hap-
pened by inferring from what we observe. Moreover, there are ways of
knowing which are not dependent on observation. For example, I know
that the statement ‘there cannot be shapeless squares’ is true, and I can
know this without having to observe the entire universe to make sure that
there are no shapeless squares anywhere. I just need to understand that
the existence of a shape (e.g. square) implies that it is not shapeless. As
explained in Chap. 1, the laws of logic are necessarily true because a viola-
tion of the laws of logic would be non-existent. The laws of logic would
hold even in conditions far beyond our experiences, such as at the origin
of universes and of time, in the microphysical world and in Kant’s ‘nou-
menal world’—there cannot be shapeless squares in such conditions too.
The fact that the laws of logic are necessarily true implies that the con-
clusion of a deductively valid argument from true premises must be true,
and I have already explained that the Modus Tollens argument for the
Causal Principle is deductively valid, and that its premises are true. The
argument implies that the Causal Principle not only applies within the
universe, but to everything without restriction, including the universe
itself, the microphysical world, and the ‘noumenal world’.
Hence, with regard to Nagel’s and Drees’ concern, if ‘beginning’ does
not apply to the universe at its earlier stages, then following the laws of
logic (which as explained above cannot be violated even in conditions far

beyond our experiences) what that implies is that the universe would be
‘beginningless’. I discuss this possibility in Chaps. 5 and 6. If ‘beginning’
does apply but ‘cause’ does not apply to the beginning of the universe,
then following the laws of logic (which as explained above cannot be
violated even in conditions far beyond our experiences) what that implies
is that the beginning of the universe would be ‘uncaused’. If that is the
case, (1.1) there would not be any cause which would make it the case
that only universe rather than some other things (e.g. the beginning of a
rapid increasing in strength of electric fields under certain circumstances
around me) begins to exist uncaused. Moreover, (1.2) the properties of
the universe and the properties of those other things which differentiate
between them would be had by them only when they had already begun
to exist. Additionally, (1.3) the circumstances around us are compatible
with the beginning of existence of those other events. As explained previ-
ously, (1.1), (1.2), and (1.3) imply that there would be no essential differ-
ence between them where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned.
Thus, if the universe begins to exist uncaused, it cannot be the case that
only the universe begins to exist uncaused. In that case, the beginning of
those other things would also be uncaused. But this is contrary to my
experience. I (thankfully!) do not experience such events happening
without causes such as (say) having to switch on the electric field genera-
tor. Therefore, it is not the case that the universe begins to exist uncaused.
3.13 Conclusion
In Chaps. 2 and 3, I have defended the Causal Principle ‘whatever begins
to exist has a cause’ against objections and developed an argument which
demonstrates that the principle is true. Contrary to the claims of some
scientists and philosophers, fundamental physics does not exclude effi-
cient causation, and quantum physics has not shown that the Causal
Principle is violated given that (1) quantum events do not begin to exist
without causal antecedents, (2) our current understanding of physics is
limited, and (3) there are viable deterministic interpretations of quantum
phenomena. On the other hand, (1) an inductive argument, (2) an
132 A. Loke
argument from the concept of non-being, and (3) a Modus Tollens argu-
ment have been offered in the literature in support of the Causal Principle.
I developed the Modus Tollens argument in response to objections. The
argument states that, if x begins uncaused, then y which begins to exist
would also begin uncaused, which is not the case; therefore, the anteced-
ent is not the case. Against Oppy’s claim that only x (the initial state of
reality: ISOR) begins uncaused, I have shown that one cannot simply
claim that this is a brute fact, for if there is no relevant difference between
(say) ISOR and y, this would imply that they are the same where begin-
ning to exist uncaused is concerned. One also cannot appeal to abstract
objects to provide the necessary metaphysical grounding for Oppy’s
claim, because any such grounding would have to be concrete in order to
ground the difference between x and y in the concrete world. I go on and
demonstrate that there isn’t any concrete grounding because (I) there
would not be any causally antecedent condition which would make it the
case that x rather than y begins uncaused, (II) the properties of x and the
only when they had already begun to exist, and (III) the circumstance is
compatible with the beginning of y. In particular, against the appeal to
current spatial considerations, pre-existent things or laws of nature pre-
venting things/events from beginning uncaused around us, I have shown
that such considerations would not prevent events such as electric fields
increasing in strength and energy-conserving changes from beginning
uncaused, in which case our experiences would have been very different
from what they are. I have also defended a second form of Modus Tollens
argument which shows that, if our spacetime block begins uncaused,
then some other possible spacetime blocks would also begin uncaused
initially and collide with ours, causing massive disruption, which is not
the case; therefore, the antecedent is not the case. Although I have
defended two forms of Modus Tollens argument in this chapter, it should
be noted that any one of the two forms of Modus Tollens argument
would be sufficient to refute Oppy’s claim. Against the objection that the
first form of argument only shows that things could begin to exist
uncaused now, not that they would, I reply that I am referring to actual
events, and arguing that there would be no difference between them
where beginning to exist uncaused is concerned if one of them begins
uncaused. I also explained that my argument is consistent with libertar-

ian freedom. I conclude that the Causal Principle would hold even in
conditions that are far beyond our experiences, such as at the origin of
the universe, the microphysical world, and in Kant’s ‘noumenal world’,
for if it does not, our experiences would be very different from what
they are.38
In conclusion, the Modus Tollens argument demonstrates the absurd
consequences which would follow if something x begins without any
causally antecedent condition which makes it the case that x (rather than
other things) begins to exist. The conclusion of this argument implies
that whatever x begins to exist depends on the cause which makes it the
case that x (rather than other things) begins to exist.
Finally, in addition to the Modus Tollens argument defended above,
which is already sufficient for establishing the conclusion ‘if our universe
has a beginning, it has a cause’, another independent argument can be
offered for this conclusion (as explained in Sect. 3.1, any one of these
arguments is sufficient; thus, my case for the KCA does not depend on
the Modus Tollens argument or the following argument). I have explained
previously in Sect. 3.8.4 that it is unreasonable to think that our universe
with its billions of stars and highly ordered laws of physics (which indi-
cates that our universe is a huge, interconnected, highly ordered struc-
ture; see Chap. 4) fundamentally began uncaused; that it just happened
to be like that without anything determining it to be like that. Such a
conclusion is worse than magic—which at least has a magician—and it is
worse than chance, which is highly unlikely (see Chap. 4) but at least has
prior conditions which ground the probabilities. Most scientists recog-
nize the implausibility of simply saying that the universe is ‘fine-tuned’
by chance; thus, they have proposed the multiverse hypothesis in an
attempt to address this implausibility. In Chap. 4, I shall show that this
attempt fails, but the point here is that saying that the universe began
uncaused and was ‘fine-tuned’ is even more implausible than saying that
the universe began by chance and was ‘fine-tuned’. Thus, it is more rea-
sonable to conclude that, if our universe had a beginning, the highly
ordered systems of our fine-tuned universe, together with the highly
ordered laws of physics, fundamentally came from something—a Cause,
which is arguably highly powerful and intelligent. I shall present the
134 A. Loke
arguments for this conclusion in detail in the following chapters. In par-

ticular, I shall first discuss the evidences for the fine-tuning and order of
the universe in Chap. 4, and I shall demonstrate that the universe has an
ultimate beginning in Chaps. 5 and 6.
Notes
1. I thank Wes Morriston for helpful discussion.
2. Vilenkin states that quantum mechanics does not rule out the possibility
that a lump of matter can turn into a tiger but only indicate that the
probability of such events would be very low (https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=pGKe6YzHiME; 48:40). Such purported events would
not be uncaused because there are causally necessary conditions such as
the lump. Such events having a very low probability of happening is
disanalogous to uncaused events happening all the time, which is what
my argument predict would happen if something (e.g. our universe)
begin uncaused.
3. Rodriguez-Pereyra (2019) notes that the acceptance of properties is
compatible with being a nominalist. He explains, ‘Nominalism has
nothing against properties, numbers, propositions, possible worlds, etc.,
as such. What Nominalism finds uncongenial in entities like properties,
numbers, possible worlds and propositions is that they are supposed to
be universals or abstract objects … What is required of nominalists who
accept the existence of numbers, properties, possible worlds and proposi-
tions is that they think of them as particulars or concrete objects.’ Trope-
theorists may regard S as a trope.
4. As he did during our debate: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=a8NrTv-Durc&t=129s.
5. In our debate, Oppy did not grant (I), (II), and (III)—to grant it would
be suicidal for his case! However, not granting it does not imply he has
rebutted the reasons which I gave which show that (I), (II), and (III) are
in fact implied by Oppy’s theory.
6. I thank Zhang Jiji for helpful discussions on this point and in what
follows.
7. Pearce (2021a, b) argues that grounding necessitarianism rests on ques-
tionable assumptions and even full metaphysical grounding is compati-
ble with indeterminism.
8. I thank Don Page for discussing this objection.

9. For grounding indeterminism, see Pearce (2021a, b).
10. I thank Zhang Jiji for suggesting this line of argument.
11. Abstract objects may make a difference in the abstract world. For exam-
ple, ‘there is a possible world W in which Abel kills Cain (and not vice
versa as described in the Book of Genesis). Although possible worlds,
with their objects, are usually regarded as abstract objects, it may, never-
theless, be said that in W, Abel causes (or partly causes) the death of
Cain’ (Erasmus 2018, p. 95).
12. I thank Lee Wang Yen for helpful discussions on this point.
13. I thank Lee Wang Yen for raising this objection.
14. Indeed, Dumsday himself does not use it this way.
15. I thank Joe Schmid for suggesting this.
16. https://hughjidiette.wordpress.com/2020/12/09/graham-oppy-vs-andrew-
loke-on-the-kalam-my-critique-of-lokes-argument.
17. I thank Alex Malpass for asking this question.
18. I thank Zhang Jiji for raising this objection.
19. I thank Wes Morriston for putting the matter this way.
20. I thank Zhang Jiji for helpful discussion.
21. I thank Alex Malpass for this formulation.
22. I thank Hugh Jidiette for raising this question.
23. I thank Andrew Brenner for raising this objection.
24. I thank Andres Luco for raising this objection.
25. Wolff (2013, pp. 900–901) notes that Fine is not expressing a linguistic
truth but ‘real definitions’: the idea that what really makes a thing that
thing is not up to our linguistic or conceptual choices.
26. Dumsday (2019, p. 124) notes that ‘if substantivalism is true then in
principle intrinsic properties can be attributed to space. For instance,
space can rightly be spoken of as having a structure of its own, perhaps
even as having causal powers. Space can also be a subject of change, inso-
far as those intrinsic properties may be alterable; think for instance of the
idea in contemporary cosmology that space has been expanding contin-
ually since the big bang.’
27. I thank Nick Morris for raising this question.
28. I thank Hugh Jidiete for helpful discussion.
29. I thank Fox for raising this objection.
30. I thank Hugh Jidiette for raising this objection.
31. I thank Dion Jones for raising this objection.
136 A. Loke
32. Collins (2009, p. 270) notes that ‘the laws of physics are not strictly
speaking time-reversal invariant—since time-reversal symmetry is bro-
ken in weak interactions, notably the decay of neutral kaons’.
33. I thank Tim Maness for mentioning this point at the 2020 AAR
conference.
34. I thank William Lane Craig for this point.
35. I thank Don Page for helpful discussion.
36. I thank Don Page for helpful discussion concerning this objection.
37. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oD06eEbrzjs.
38. For replies to other objections against the Modus Tollens argument and
the Causal Principle, see also Loke (2017a, chapter 5).
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right holder.
4
Fine-Tuning and Order of our Universe
4.1 Introduction
Various properties of the physical world have been suggested as indicative
of the work of ‘a designer with the intellectual properties (knowledge,
purpose, understanding, foresight, wisdom, intention) necessary to
design the things exhibiting the special properties in question’ (Ratzsch
and Koperski 2019). These properties include the ‘fine-tuning’ of the
inorganic realm for supporting life, orderliness, uniformity, contrivance,
adjustment of means to ends, particularly exquisite complexity, particular
types of functionality, delicacy, integration of natural laws, improbability,
the intelligibility of nature, the directionality of evolutionary processes,
aesthetic characteristics (beauty, elegance, and the like), and apparent
purpose and value (including the aptness of our world for the existence of
moral value and practice) (Ratzsch and Koperski 2019). In this book, I
shall focus on two such properties: fine-tuning and orderliness, although
it should be noted that the other properties require explanation as well
and I shall discuss them occasionally in what follows.

142 A. Loke
4.2 Fine-Tuning and Orderliness

4.2.1 Fine-Tuning
Concerning the ‘fine-tuning’ of the universe, Robin Collins explains,
The fundamental structure of the universe is ‘balanced on a razor’s edge’ for

the existence of life …. This precise setting of the structure of the universe
for life is called the ‘fine-tuning of the cosmos’. This fine-tuning falls into
three major categories: that of the laws of nature, that of the constants of
physics, and that of the initial conditions of the universe. (Collins
2009, p. 202)
It has been objected that there could be other forms of life which do not
require a fine-tuned universe (Stenger 2013). In reply, what the calcula-
tions have shown is that universes with different laws, constants, and
boundary conditions would most likely give rise to much less structure
and complexity, which would be incompatible with any kind of life, not
merely life-as-we-know-it (Lewis and Barnes 2016, pp. 255–274). This is
illustrated by the following two examples of fine-tuning:
First, the cosmological constant characterizes the energy density of the
vacuum which is responsible for the acceleration of the universe’s expan-
sion. On theoretical grounds, one would expect it to be larger than its
actual value by an immense number of magnitudes (between 1050 and
10123), but only values a few order of magnitude larger than the actual
value are compatible with the formation of galaxies (Friederich 2018).
Lewis and Barnes (2016, p. 164) remark:
The (effective) cosmological constant is clearly fine-tuned. It’s just about

the best fine-tuning case around. There is no simpler way to make a uni-
verse lifeless than to make it devoid of any structure whatsoever. Make the
cosmological constant just a few orders of magnitude larger and the uni-
verse will be a thin, uniform hydrogen and helium soup, a diffuse gas where
the occasional particle collision is all that ever happens. Particles spend
their lives alone, drifting through emptying space, not seeing another
4 Fine-Tuning and Order of our Universe 143
article for trillions of years and even then, just glancing off and returning
p
to the void.
The fine-tuning of the cosmological constant has recently been chal-

lenged by physicist Fred Adams (2019), who argues that the life-
permitting variation of the constants is wider in some respects than
previously thought. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that ‘Even if the
parameters of physics and cosmology can deviate from their values in our
universe by orders of magnitude, “unnaturally small” ratios are still
required: For example, the cosmological constant can vary over a wide
range, but must be small compared to the Planck scale’ (pp. 141–2). In
other words, the range is still not wide in an absolute sense, and ‘fine-
tuning’ (at the level of the ratios) is still required.
Second, concerning entropy, the initial state of the Big Bang must be
extremely highly ordered (i.e. low entropy) with a very high amount of
usable energy. The probability that a universe chosen at random would
possess the necessary degree of order that ours does (and so possesses a
second law of thermodynamics according to which the universe is pro-
gressing from a state of order to states of increasing disorder) is 1 in
1010(123). If the universe were less ordered than this, the matter in it would
have collapsed through friction into black holes (which represent extreme
states of disorder and incompatible with any form of life), rather than
form stars (Holder 2004, pp. 38–39, citing Penrose 1989, pp. 339–345,
who notes that 1010(123) is a number so large that the noughts cannot be
written down in full even if each of the 1080 protons of our universe were
to be used to write down one nought).
Stenger (2013) objects that calculations of improbabilities often fail to
consider the consequences of varying more than one parameter at a time.
In reply, studies of the complete parameter space of (segments of ) the
Standard Model indicate that the life-permitting range in multidimen-
sional parameter space is likely very small (Barnes 2012, Sect. 4.2).
Without fine-tuning, the universe would have become a ‘rubble’ after the
Big Bang, in which case not only ‘life as we know it’ would not exist, any
organized matter with ability to reproduce would not exist. Against the
supposition that proponents of fine-tuning erroneously presuppose that
only carbon-based life is possible, Hawthorne and Isaacs (2018, p. 147)
144 A. Loke
note that ‘it would be very hard to have physical life in any form if an
inhospitable cosmological constant led to a universe that expanded so
rapidly that particles did not interact with one another or to a universe
that collapsed back in on itself only moments after its generation’.
Likewise, Rasmussen and Leon (2018, pp. 103-4) observe:
A universe with nothing but empty space has no ingredients for life … a
million motionless particles will never produce an amoeba … a universe
with only particles that constantly repel each other will produce an endless
scatter, with no complex unities, anywhere, ever … a universe with things
that only attract each other will only form a blob, forever.
4.2.2 Orderliness
4.2.2.1 Introduction
Concerning the Teleological Argument from orderliness, an example is

The Fifth Way of Aquinas’ famous five proofs for the existence of God
(Summa Theologica, Part I, Question 2, Article 3), in which Aquinas
argues from ‘things which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies … act-
ing always, or nearly always, in the same way’.1
It is an irresistible fact that the natural world appears to exhibit certain
regular patterns of behaviour. When one gazes into the night sky, one
cannot help but wonder why the stars and planets move according to a
certain order. Likewise, the alternation of seasons, the formation of clouds
and rain, the sustenance of life on earth, and so on are also in accordance
with a certain order. This order is characterized by law-like regularities
which are of a mathematical nature and are predictably the same every-
where in the universe.2
Cambridge physicist John Polkinghorne argues that those who work
in fundamental physics encounter a world in which large-scale structures
and small-scale processes are alike characterized by a wonderful order that
is expressible in concise and elegant mathematical terms, citing Paul
Dirac’s well-known belief that the laws of nature should be expressed in
beautiful equations (Polkinghorne 1998, p. 2).
Polkinghorne explains that mathematical beauty involves such quali-

ties as economy and elegance, and that extensive consequences are found
to flow from seemingly simple initial definitions, as when the endless
baroque complexities of the Mandelbrot set are seen to derive from a
specification that can be written down in a few lines. Polkinghorne writes,
300 years of enquiry have shown that it is just such mathematically beauti-
ful theories that prove to have the long-term fertility of explanation that
convinces us that they are indeed describing aspects of the way things are.
In other words, some of the most beautiful patterns that the mathemati-
cians can think about in their studies are found actually to be present in the
structure of the physical world around us. (Polkinghorne 2011, pp. 72-3)
Nevertheless, McGrath (2018, pp. 118-119) observes that ‘the concept of

“beauty” is subjective and contested, leading some to make the “emi-
nently rational decision” to pursue “indicators of truth in disregard of
beauty.” Properties of a theory that have at some point been considered
to be aesthetically attractive have at other times been considered neutral
or displeasing.’
Regardless of whether ‘beauty’ is present or not, the mathematical
describability of the order is indisputable. With regard to this order,
Oxford physicist Roger Penrose confesses that ‘it remains a deep puzzle
why mathematical laws should apply to the world with such phenomenal
precision … Moreover, it is not just the precision but also the subtle
sophistication and mathematical beauty of these successful theories that
is profoundly mysterious’ (Penrose 2004, pp. 20–21).
After surveying the discoveries of the laws of nature in over 1000 pages
of his magisterial book The Road to Reality, Penrose writes: ‘The most
important single insight that has emerged from our journey, of more than
two and one-half millennia, is that there is a deep unity between certain
areas of mathematics and the workings of the physical world’ (ibid.,
pp. 1033–1034). Citing the highly esteemed mathematical physicist
Eugene Wigner’s (1960) lecture on the effectiveness of mathematics in
the physical sciences, Penrose comments: ‘Not just the extraordinary pre-
cision, but also the subtlety and sophistication that we find in the math-
ematical laws operative at the foundations of physics seem to me to be
146 A. Loke
much more than the mere expression of an underlying ‘order’ in the

workings of the world’ (ibid., p. 1046n.34).
4.2.2.2 Objection: Human Creation
Some might think that, because we have invented the mathematics to

characterize the way our world operates, it is not surprising that the uni-
verse operates according to mathematical patterns. Carrier (2003) claims
that ‘any universe composed of conserved and discrete objects arranged
into patterns in a multidimensional space will always be describable by
mathematics. We invented mathematics just for that purpose: to describe
such things.’ On this view, some sort of mathematical order or another
has to apply to the universe, and one might claim that we just happen to
live in the one we observe. Likewise, Livio notes that some have objected
that mathematics is a human creation developed to characterize the oper-
ation of our world and to solve the problems our world presents. Nature,
if it is explicable at all, has to be explicable in some form of language or
model, and that mathematics is just that. Given this, it is hardly surpris-
ing that the universe operates according to mathematical patterns. Others
have objected that mathematics may not explain every situation, and that
to some extent scientists have cherry-picked what problems to work on
based on those problems being amenable to mathematical treatment
(Livio 2009, Chap. 9).
Wenmackers (2016) argues that our knowledge and use of mathemat-
ics may have arisen by the evolutionary process. For example, proto-
mathematical capacities might have been useful in earlier evolutionary
stages of our species; for example, being able to estimate and to compare
the number of fruits hanging from different trees contributes to efficient
foraging patterns. These capacities are therefore naturally selected and
developed into our current power to think abstractly and to act with
foresight. She concludes that the fact that our mathematical reasoning
can be applied successfully is precisely why the traits that enable us to
achieve this were selected in our biological evolution (p. 9).
Nevertheless, the above objections do not explain how physical entities
could be of such a nature that allows a large number of phenomena to be
mathematically describable and explicable in such a way that requires

highly advanced intellect to work it out. The mathematics involved in
describing our universe is not merely a few simple equations like 2+2=4,
but highly sophisticated ones, and (contra Carrier) not any universe
would be like this. Rather, the universe would have to be highly ordered,
as implied by its describability by advanced mathematics.
The above point holds even if (as some have suggested) mathematics
basically just describes conditionals of some sort or other, for the condi-
tionals would not be as simple as ‘if you were to have 2 things, and add
to them 2 more things, then you would have 4 things’. Rather, it would
be something like, ‘if you were to have m, and add m to another m to
another m … .90000000000000000 times, you will get a value for e,
which is related to time x power, which is related to … etc.’ This condi-
tional implies a huge, interconnected, highly ordered structure. A highly
ordered structure is far less likely to be explainable by chance compared
to a simply ordered one (see Sect. 4.4), and in order for a highly ordered
structure to arise from simple laws, a high degree of order must already
be in place in order for this ‘arising’ to happen (see Sects. 4.5 and 4.6).
My argument does not require an appeal to ‘why God would particularly
care about advanced mathematics’ (see Sect. 7.6); rather, it is based on
exclusion (Sect. 7.5).
The multitude of mathematical equations with numerous variables
reflect a highly ordered arrangement of the distinct objects which com-
posed the physical world described by these equations. The patterns of
order in multidimensional space and natural laws with systemic applica-
bility reflect a huge interconnected structure with multiple parts. It would
be unreasonable to explain away such a structure by saying that some sort
of order or another has to apply to the components, and we just happen
to discover the one we observe. Physicist Michael Heller remarks that the
mathematical equations in physics can be treated by physicists as express-
ing a kind of software of the universe (Heller 2013, p. 594), and one
would think that there cannot be a software without a software program-
mer. To establish the conclusion of design however requires ruling out
other alternative hypotheses, which I undertake in the rest of this book.
The point here is simply that, while the objections by Carrier et al. may
explain the applicability of simple calculations, they do not explain the
148 A. Loke
high degree of ordering of the physical world that is presupposed by the

applicability of high-level mathematics.
A Kantian might explain mathematical discovery by arguing that
mathematics is the conceptual framework through which we experience
the phenomenal universe, while claiming that we know nothing about
the noumenal universe. Nevertheless, in order for such highly sophisti-
cated mathematics to successfully characterize the way our world oper-
ates, the objective world, that is, the universe-in-itself, must have a high
degree of order. As Einstein observes, ‘even if man proposes the axioms of
the theory, the success of such a project presupposes a high degree of
ordering of the objective world, and this could not be expected a priori’
(Goldman 1997, p. 24).
Einstein’s argument is not based on the mere presence of order within
our universe; it is the high degree of rationality and intelligibility of the
order which the argument is based on. The particles of the universe are
related to one other and many particles behave similarly, and the question
that needs to be answered is, ‘Why are their relations and behaviour so
rational, intelligible, highly ordered and forming such a huge intercon-
nected structure, instead of being crude, simple and having an almost
featureless order?’
Even at the quantum level, where things are often regarded as messy
and counter-intuitive, various mathematical equations such as
Schrodinger’s still hold, and this, as well as the widespread effectiveness of
mathematics at the macro level, demands explanation.
Moreover, if ordering is an inevitable selection effect created by our act
of perception as the Kantian asserts, why do we still find some things
disordered or yet unintelligible and not see everything as a teleological
structure (Barrow and Tipler 1986, p. 91, citing Janet, Trendelenburg
and Herbart)? Holder (2004, p. 4) notes:
Kant’s position regarding the human imposition of order also does not
seem to square with how scientists see the world. For example, quantum
theory seems to be forced on us by the reality of the external world, which
exhibits such strange and startling phenomena at the micro-level, rather
than being a human creation imposed on the world.
In other words, contrary to the Kantian, the counter-intuitive nature of

quantum physics indicates that the mathematical equations that are used
to describe it are not merely the creation of our own minds, and those
seeking an understanding as completely as possible must therefore ask
what it could be that links together the reason within (mathematical
thinking) and the reason without (the structure of the physical world) in
this remarkable way (Polkinghorne 2011, pp. 72–73).
Additionally, as demonstrated in Chap. 1, the laws of logic is not
merely our way of thinking but reflect the way mind-independent reality
is (e.g. there cannot be a shapeless square in the mind-independent real-
ity), and therefore these laws can be used to formulate an argument by
exclusion for a Designer (see below).
4.2.2.3 Platonic Objection
It has been suggested that the reason why the ‘laws of physics’ are so well
explained by mathematical descriptions is related to the postulation that
the nature of the space of mathematical reality is Platonic (Penrose 2004,
p. 1029).
However, the postulated existence of a Platonic world with abstract
mathematical objects still does not explain why the Platonic world could
be mapped onto the physical world via the power of human mental activ-
ity, and how mindless physical entities could have this orderly behaviour
(Frederick 2013). Philosopher Roger Trigg (1993, pp. 186-187) observes
that mathematical theories can exist but still not be about anything. And
Stephen Hawking (1988, p. 126) had asked: ‘even if there is only one
possible unified theory, it is just a set of rules and equations. What is it
that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to
describe?’
Cosmologist Max Tegmark (2008) has replied with a radical proposal
that our physical universe is equivalent to an abstract mathematical struc-
ture.3 This looks like Pythagoreanism reborn, whereby physical objects
are somehow reduced to abstract mathematical structures (Dumsday
2019, p. 35). This proposal is related to a view known as Ontic Structural
150 A. Loke
Realism (OSR). Proponents of OSR claim support from our best current
theories in physics; for example, they claim that
traditional conceptions of individuality break down at the quantum level,

such that the notion of particles as fundamental individual ‘objects’ with
intrinsic identities should be abandoned in favour of fundamental rela-
tions; that the metaphysics of quantum field theory is best interpreted
along structuralist lines, insofar as symmetries are best seen there as onto-
logically prior to fields; that the metaphysics of quantum gravity is best
interpreted along structuralist lines, since particles are best seen there as
deriving their identities from their structural context; that structuralism
provides for a superior account of the metaphysics of spacetime; and that
structuralism allows for a novel way of defusing the traditional debate over
whether matter at the fundamental level is continuous or discrete, and,
relatedly, provides a plausible way of reconceiving wave-particle duality.
(Dumsday 2019, pp. 27-29)
However, not all proponents of OSR defend eliminativist OSR, which

claims that, at the fundamental level, relations exist but objects either do
not exist (‘There are no things. Structure is all there is’, Ladyman et al.
2007, p. 131)4 or they exist but are nothing over and above their place/
function in the relational structure which is ontological prior over them
and the bearers of any property. There are more moderate versions of
OSR which claim that objects and relations are symmetrically dependent
with no ontological priority obtaining between them, and that there are
objects which have ‘an intrinsic identity defined partly in terms of the
possession of intrinsic properties and partly in terms of their place/func-
tion in the structure. As such, their identity is not wholly reducible to
their structural role, yet they cannot exist independently of the structure’
(ibid., p. 30). These more moderate versions of OSR are compatible with
the arguments I defend in this book.
On the one hand, there is no conclusive argument that compels the
acceptance of the eliminativist version of OSR over the moderate version
because, as Ladyman et al. (2007, p. 9) themselves observe, ‘science, usu-
ally and perhaps always, underdetermines the metaphysical answers we
are seeking.’ They admit:
Of course, all the considerations from physics to which we have appealed

do not logically compel us to abandon the idea of a world of distinct onto-
logically subsistent individuals with intrinsic properties. As we noted, the
identity and individuality of quantum particles could be grounded in each
having a primitive thisness, and the same could be true of spacetime
points. (p. 154)
On the other hand, the more moderate versions ‘allow for the option of
explaining the concretization of structure by reference to the concretiza-
tion of its component objects, since on these versions of OSR the latter
have at least some intrinsic identity conditions of their own, which could
perhaps include whatever it is that provides for concretization’ (ibid.,
p. 36). Thus, objects are not ‘purely speculative philosophical toys’ (cf.
Ladyman et al. 2007, p. 154) but explain concretization.
Moreover, the eliminativist OSR of Tegmark collapses the distinction
between abstract and the concrete physical; this is metaphysically dubi-
ous, since unlike physical entities, abstract entities do not have causal
powers. Hence, Tegmark’s proposal that our universe is an abstract math-
ematical structure still does not explain how the entities in our universe
could causally interact in the orderly way noted above. Ladyman et al.,
who affirm eliminativist OSR, say, ‘What makes the structure physical
and not mathematical? That is a question that we refuse to answer. In our
view, there is nothing more to be said about this that doesn’t amount to
empty words’ (Tegmark 2008, p. 158), claiming that standard methods
of distinguishing the concrete from the abstract by appealing to causal
efficacy are unworkable for fundamental physics (pp. 159–161). However,
as I have argued in Chaps. 2 and 3, causation is necessary for and com-
patible with fundamental physics, and what grounds one event (change)
following another (i.e. what grounds their relation) are causal properties,
and the Modus Tollens argument for Causal Principle demonstrates that
events do not begin uncaused. While a naturalist Platonist might be able
to explain the permanence of mathematical truths by appealing to time-
less abstract objects, abstract objects by themselves cannot explain why
physical entities follow complicated mathematical truths, since abstract
objects have no causal power to make physical entities behave in
such a way.
152 A. Loke
Why then are the events in our physical universe like this? Why is it
the case that the sequence of events can be described by mathematical
equations which indicate a high degree of ordering? How could unthink-
ing mindless physical entities and forces have such an orderly behaviour?
As Danny Frederick asks, ‘What is to stop some bits of matter moving in
ways which are inconsistent with natural laws; or the same piece of mat-
ter moving at one time in a way which accords with natural laws but at
another time in a way which is inconsistent with them?’ (Frederick 2013,
p. 271).
Frederick argues that, while natural laws may be regarded as ceteris
paribus rather than exceptionless laws (i.e. they may be default regulari-
ties that hold in the absence of outside interference), and while natural
laws should be understood as descriptions of what is happening rather
than rules for natural objects to follow, nevertheless the question still
remains as to how the events in the universe could happen in such a man-
ner describable by natural laws. He notes that statements of natural law
are modal descriptions rather than mere descriptions: unlike mere
descriptions, modal descriptions describe the limits to what can happen
and can be used for prediction. He also observes that it would not help to
point out that microphysics shows that the fundamental laws of nature
are statistical, for one could then ask how the changes of unthinking
physical entities could so arrange themselves over time as to exhibit a
probability distribution (ibid.).
The pressing question, therefore, remains: The universe does not have
to be like this, but why is it like this? Throughout history, a number of
eminent scientists have come to the conclusion that the most plausible
explanation is that the universe is the work of a Supreme Intelligent Mind
who imposed a rational order onto the mindless physical entities. For
example, Einstein writes:
Certain it is that a conviction, akin to religious feeling, of the rationality or

intelligibility of the world lies behind all scientific work of a higher order …
This firm belief, a belief bound up with deep feeling, in a superior mind
that reveals itself in the world of experience, represents my concep-
tion of God.5
Paul Dirac, one of the pioneering geniuses of quantum theory and a

deeply avowed atheist in his younger days, came to acknowledge the
plausibility of a Designer after years of research in physics when he says:
It seems to be one of the fundamental features of nature that fundamental

physical laws are described in terms of a mathematical theory of great
beauty and power, needing quite a high standard of mathematics for one to
understand it … One could perhaps describe the situation by saying that
God is a mathematician of a very high order, and He used very advanced
mathematics in constructing the universe. (Dirac 1963)
4.2.3 Summary
To sum up the views of the scientists cited above, the following features
of our universe have been noted:
1. Fine-tuning
2. The existence of orderly patterns of events which can be described by
advanced mathematics (see also the discussion of laws of nature
in Chap. 2)
In what follows, we shall examine which hypothesis best explains both

of these features. It may be that some hypothesis or combinations of
hypotheses can explain (1) but not (2), or (2) but not (1), and therefore
fail because what needs to be explained are both of these features taken
together.
4.3 A
Logically Exhaustive List of Categories
of Possibilities
In his writings, Richard Dawkins has repeatedly warned of the danger of
jumping to the conclusion of design. He cites as example the argument
from the apparent design of living organisms, which he thinks is a God-
of-the-gaps argument (i.e. an argument based on gaps in our existing
154 A. Loke
knowledge). He argues that in the past it was thought that the improba-
bility of dragonfly’s wing or an eagle’s eye originating by chance implied
that these were designed, and that this conclusion resulted from a failure
to see the possibility of the alternative explanation of Darwinian evolu-
tion. He argues,
After Darwin, we all should feel, deep in our bones, suspicious of the very
idea of design. The illusion of design is a trap that has caught us before, and
Darwin should have immunized us by raising our consciousness … A full
understanding of natural selection encourages us to move boldly into other
fields. It arouses our suspicion, in those other fields, of the kind of false
alternatives that once, in pre-Darwinian days, beguiled biology. Who,
before Darwin, could have guessed that something so apparently designed
as a dragonfly’s wing or an eagle’s eye was really the end product of a long
sequence of non-random but purely natural causes? (Dawkins 2006,
pp. 139, 141)
Dawkins raises an important point. Nevertheless, one should also be

careful not to make the fallacious argument that, because many things
once thought to be divinely designed actually do have natural explana-
tions, therefore all things have natural explanations. The correct way to
proceed is to assess, on a case-by-case basis, which explanation is the best
for each case. To assess the case concerning the mathematical describable
order of physical entities and to address Dawkins’ concerns, I shall dem-
onstrate that a logically exhaustive list of categories of alternative hypoth-
eses can be devised, and that various objections can be given to rule out
each of these categories.
The failure to consider alternative hypotheses is evident in William
Dembski’s widely discussed book The Design Inference, in which Dembski
attempts to demonstrate that regularity, chance, and design are logically
exhaustive and competing modes of explanation. He writes:
Whenever explaining an event, we must choose from three competing

modes of explanation. These are regularity, chance, and design. To attribute
an event to a regularity is to say that the event will (almost) always happen.
To attribute an event to chance is to say that probabilities characterize the
occurrence of the event, but are also compatible with some other event
happening. To attribute an event to design is to say that it cannot reason-

ably be referred to either regularity or chance. Defining design as the set-
theoretic complement of the disjunction regularity-or-chance guarantees
that the three modes of explanation are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
(Dembski 2006, p. 36)
However, Dembski glosses over the possibility that regularity, chance,

and design can be combined in various ways, and his subsequent use of
his three competing modes of explanation for explaining biological struc-
tures has been criticized for ignoring various evolutionary pathways.6
Such a pathway has been proposed for cosmology as well (see the discus-
sion of Smolin’s proposal below), and regardless of the merits of this pro-
posal, it is important that this theoretical possibility be considered.
Moreover, Dembski fails to consider the option that the event may be
‘Uncaused’, as has been postulated by Hawking for the Big Bang (see
Chap. 6). Incomplete considerations of alternative explanations such as
Dembski’s serve as a warning that we should be more rigorous in our
assessment of alternative explanations with regard to the Teleological
Argument. Consider also Monton’s claim that ‘when people observe fea-
tures of the universe, they sometimes infer that the feature occurred as a
result of design, and they sometimes infer that the feature occurred some
other way—by chance, necessity, coincidence, unguided natural pro-
cesses, or what have you’ (Monton 2010, p. 208). The qualifying phrase
‘what have you’ is too slack and does not address the sort of concerns
raised by Dawkins.
Various forms of design arguments have been suggested in the litera-
ture, for example, significance testing (If E has a low probability and is
specified, it is due to intelligent design), inductive sampling, analogical,
Bayesian, likelihoodist, and abductive (IBE) (Sober 2019). The problem
of unconsidered alternative explanations besets all of them. For example,
concerning Bayesianism and Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE),
which are widely used by contemporary philosophers, Ratzsch and
Koperski (2019) observe,
substantive comparison can only involve known alternatives, which at any

point represent a vanishingly small fraction of the possible alternatives.
156 A. Loke
Choosing the best of the known may be the best we can do, but many
would insist that without some further suppressed and significant assump-
tions, being the best (as humans see it) of the (humanly known) restricted
group does not warrant ascription of truth, or anything like it.7
In response to Craig’s argument that an infinite mind can explain the

connections between abstract, physical, and mental which Penrose admits
are mysteries, Penrose replies he does not see why an infinite mind is the
only solution because there could be other possibilities which we still do
not know of and cannot verify. On the other hand, appealing to God can
be used to solve any problem, so it is not helpful.8
Now I am not claiming that the Teleological Argument must be able
to eliminate all the other alternative explanations in order to be of any
value. To require the elimination of all the possible alternatives may be
too demanding a requirement for reasonable belief, since such a criterion
is not fulfilled even by all rational inferences in the natural sciences or in
everyday life (Bird 2005, pp. 26–28). Nevertheless, the concerns noted in
the preceding paragraphs indicate that it would be desirable if the argu-
ment can be made more rigorous such that all the possible alternatives
can indeed be eliminated.
The above concerns can be addressed by devising a logical exhaustive
list of possible explanations and an exclusion of all the alternative catego-
ries of explanations such that the conclusion of design follows logically
rather than being merely appealed to solve a problem. Concerning the
Teleological argument defended here, the logically exhaustive list of cat-
egories of possibilities is demonstrated by the rigorous use of the Law of
Excluded Middle, and is as follows:
1. The fine-tuning and order of the universe is either fundamentally
Uncaused, or it is fundamentally due to either 1.1, 1.2, or 1.39:
1.1. random cause(s) (‘Chance’).
1.2. non-random cause(s), in which case either.
1.2.1. it is fundamentally due to non-intelligent, non-random cause(s)
(‘Regularity’), or
1.2.2. it is fundamentally due to intelligent, non-random cause(s)
(‘Design’).
1.3. a combination of random and non-random causes, in which

case either.
1.3.1. it is fundamentally due to a combination of non-intelligent,
non-random cause(s) + random cause(s) (‘Combinations of Regularity
and Chance’), or
1.3.2. it is fundamentally due to a combination of intelligent, non-
random cause(s) + random cause(s) +/− non-intelligent, non-random
cause(s) (e.g. Evolutionary Creationism: involves a Designer).
2. The fine-tuning and order of the universe is not10 fundamentally
due to Chance, Regularity, and Combinations of Regularity and Chance,
and it is not fundamentally Uncaused.
3. Therefore, the fine-tuning and order of the universe is fundamen-
tally due to Design.
It should be noted that my argument by exclusion does not require
‘perfect’ elimination (‘rule out’) understood as demonstrating that other
possible hypotheses have zero probability. It only requires showing that
their probability is so low that they can be eliminated as reasonable alter-
natives to Design even if we assign them very generous probability esti-
mates (see Sect. 7.5), and this is how the ‘not’ in the above syllogism should
be understood.
From the above syllogism, it can be seen that all possible hypotheses
belong to the following categories: (i) Chance, (ii) Regularity, (iii)
Combination of Regularity and Chance (e.g. natural selection + random
variation, as in the case of naturalistic evolution), (iv) Uncaused, and (v)
Design (the Designer may or may not have used processes such as
evolution).
Although each of these categories has been discussed before in the lit-
erature, a logical demonstration that these are the only possible categories
of hypotheses has not been published before, despite the huge amount of
literature on the Teleological Argument over the centuries, hence the
unique contribution of this book. It should be noted that such a list can
be used for other types of Teleological Argument with respect to other
cases of apparent design as well, by simply replacing ‘the existence of
mathematically describable order and fine-tuning of the universe’ with
158 A. Loke
other features of apparent design in question. Because of its utility, this

list contributes to the discussion of the Teleological Argument in general.
One might raise the worry that new, previously unconsidered hypoth-
eses could all be lumped together in the catch-all basket, and that ‘with-
out knowing the details of what specific unconsidered hypotheses might
look like, there is simply no plausible way to anticipate the apparent
likelihood of a novel new hypothesis’ (Ratzsch and Koperski 2019). In
reply, I shall show that there is an essential feature of each of the categories
alternative to design which renders it unworkable as an ultimate explana-
tion for the fine-tuning and order of the universe. As noted earlier, these
alternative categories are (i) Chance, (ii) Regularity, (iii) Combination of
Regularity and Chance (e.g. natural selection + random variation, as in
the case of naturalistic evolution), and (iv) Uncaused. Because the terms
chance, random, and the related notion of probability have multiple
meanings, I shall first clarify my usage of these terms before evaluating
the alternative categories in turn.
Broadly speaking, there are two main concepts of probability: (1) an
epistemic notion and (2) a non-epistemic notion, better known as physi-
cal probability (Eagle 2019).
(1) The epistemic notion of probability can be further subdivided into
objective and subjective interpretations (Holder 2004, p. 74):
(1.1) Objective interpretation of epistemic notion of probability (this
includes 1.1.1. classical and 1.1.2. logical/evidential probability). This
refers to objective evidential support relations (e.g. ‘in light of the rele-
vant seismological and geological data, California will probably experi-
ence a major earthquake this decade’) (Hájek 2019). It measures the
extent to which the evidence is entailed by the hypothesis (Holder 2004,
p. 74, citing Swinburne).
(1.1.1.) The classical interpretation ‘assigns probabilities in the absence
of any evidence, or in the presence of symmetrically balanced evidence.
The guiding idea is that in such circumstances, probability is shared
equally among all the possible outcomes, so that the classical probability
of an event is simply the fraction of the total number of possibilities in
which the event occurs … for example, the classical probability of a fair
die landing with an even number showing up is 3/6’ (Hájek 2019).
A related notion is the Principle of Indifference, which Collins (2009,

p. 234) states as follows:
When we have no reason to prefer any one value of a variable p over another
in some range R, we should assign equal epistemic probabilities to equal
ranges of p that are in R, given that p constitutes a ‘natural variable.’ A vari-
able is defined as ‘natural’ if it occurs within the simplest formulation of
the relevant area of physics.
Applying the principle to the argument from Fine-tuning, Collins (2009,

p. 234) writes:
Since the constants of physics used in the fine-tuning argument typically

occur within the simplest formulation of the relevant physics, the constants
themselves are natural variables. Thus, the restricted Principle of Indifference
entails that we should assign epistemic probability in proportion to the
width of the range of the constant we are considering.
The epistemic probability is argued to be very small, because for a fine-

tuned constant C, Wr/WR << 1, where Wr is the width of the life-
permitting range of C, and WR is the width of the set of values for which
we can make determinations of whether the values are life-permitting or
not (Collins 2009, pp. 244, 252). Likewise, Lewis and Barnes (2016,
pp. 286-7) reason that, if all we knew was that a certain universe obeyed
the laws of nature, without specifying the values of the constants of nature
and initial conditions, the probability that that universe would contain
life forms is extremely small.
Following Hume, it might be objected that our universe is the only
universe of which anyone had experience, invalidating it as the basis of an
inductive inference. However, while this universe is the only one we expe-
rienced, we can still think about how it could have been different. Ratzsch
and Koperski (2019) observe:
If we let C stand for a fine-tuned parameter with possible values in the

range [0, x], and if we assume that nature is not biased toward one value of
C rather than another such that each unit subinterval in this range should
be assigned equal probability, then fine-tuning is surprising insofar as the
160 A. Loke
life-permitting range of C is tiny compared to the full interval, which cor-

responds to a very small probability.
Critics accuse the Principle of Indifference of extracting information

from ignorance, and argue that in a state of ignorance, it is better to
assign imprecise probabilities or to eschew the assignment of probabilities
altogether (Hájek 2019).
In reply, concerning the problem of assigning prior probability of the
constants and initial conditions of a given theory (e.g. the probability of
a constant having a value in a certain small range, without any knowledge
about our universe), Lewis and Barnes (2016) note that ‘we cannot calcu-
late the posterior at all without some estimate of the prior probability’
(p. 287). However, this is not a big problem because ‘if our data are very
good, then our conclusions won’t depend much on the prior probability’
(p. 288). In fine-tuning cases, ‘the speed and severity with which disaster
strikes as one tiptoes through parameter space show that the probability
of a life-permitting universe, given the laws but not the constants, will be
very small for any honest (and non-fine-tuned!) prior probability’ (ibid.).
In other words, if there are some factors which we are ignorant of
which entail that the probability is not small (a concern raised in
Hossenfelder 2019), those factors would need to be ‘fine-tuned’.
(1.1.2) Logical theories of probability allow for the possibilities to be
assigned unequal probabilities depending on the evidence (Hájek 2019).
While the best beliefs to have are those that are logically probable on our
rightly basic beliefs, to the extent to which an investigator’s standards are
close to the correct ones, he/she will use rightly basic beliefs and logical
probability (Holder 2004, pp. 75–76).
(1.2.) Subjective interpretation of epistemic notion of probability
(subjective probability). This refers to an agent’s degree of confidence
referring to a graded belief (e.g. ‘I am not sure that it will rain in Canberra
this week, but it probably will’) (Hájek 2019).
(2) Non-epistemic notion of probability, also known as physical prob-
ability (this includes the frequentist, propensity, and best-system interpreta-
tions): this applies to various systems in the world, independently of what
anyone thinks (Hájek 2019). The frequentist interpretation relates to the
outcome of many trials of an experiment, such as many tosses of a fair

coin (Holder 2004, p. 73). Whereas the propensity interpretation refers to
the extent to which one or more events cause another event. The outcome
of my toss of a coin may be determined completely by the impulse I impart
to it, the angle at which my thumb strikes it, the atmospheric conditions at
the time, and so on; and so the coin may have a physical probability of 1 of
landing heads on a particular toss. Indeed, if determinism were true all
physical probabilities would be 0 or 1. Most physicists, however, believe
that quantum theory is ontologically indeterminate and so the physical
probability of a quantum event, such as the radioactive decay of an atom
within a certain time, has a physical probability between 0 and 1. (Ibid.)
An example of the best system interpretation is ‘the Mentaculus’, which

attempts to provide a complete probability map of the universe (see
Chap. 2).
Evaluation of different interpretations of probability:
As noted above, there are different interpretations of probability which are

suited for different contexts of discussions. Which of the above interpreta-
tions is suitable for discussing the probabilities of the hypotheses concern-
ing the fine-tuning and order of the universe in the context of the
argumentation of this book?
The non-epistemic notion of probability (physical probability) is not

appropriate, because according to the standard view of physical possibil-
ity, ‘alternative physical laws and constants trivially have physical proba-
bility zero, whereas the actual laws and constants have physical probability
one’ (Friederich 2018).11
The subjective epistemic notion is also not appropriate, because the
arguments in this book do not concern the psychological state of any
particular individual, but the state of the universe.
Therefore, an objective epistemic notion of probability is the only
appropriate one for the purposes of this book. I will be using both the
classical interpretation and the logical/evidential interpretation where
appropriate. In particular, by arguing that there are essential properties of
each of the alternative hypotheses to design which render it unlikely, I
162 A. Loke
will be attempting to construct logical probabilities concerning that

hypothesis and showing that the probability is low on the basis of
evidence.
Broadly speaking, there are two main concepts of ‘random’:
(1) An epistemic notion: referring to those processes whose outcomes
we cannot know in advance, that is, unpredictable (Eagle 2019).
(2) A non-epistemic notion: the non-epistemic notion may be subdi-
vided as follows:
(2.1) A non-epistemic notion used to characterize the disorder and
patternlessness of an entire collection of outcomes of a given repeated pro-
cess. On Eagle (2019)‘s conception,
randomness indicates a lack of pattern or repetition … randomness is fun-

damentally a product notion, applying in the first instance to sequences of
outcomes, while chance is a process notion, applying in the single case to
the process or chance setup which produces a token outcome … random-
ness is indifferent to history, while chance is not. Chance is
history-dependent.
On the basis of this conception, he argues that there are counterexamples

to the Commonplace Thesis (CT) ‘Something is random iff it happens by
chance.’ One interesting potential counterexample involves coin tossing.
‘Some have maintained that coin tossing is a deterministic process, and as
such entirely without chances, and yet which produces outcome sequences
we have been taking as paradigm of random sequences’ (ibid.). Eagle
(2019) also argues it is possible for a chancy and indeterministic process
to produce a non-random sequence of outcomes.
(2.2.) A non-epistemic notion used to characterize a process. Eagle
(2019) notes that some philosophers deliberately use ‘random’ to mean
‘chancy’ and acknowledges that this process conception of randomness is
perfectly legitimate, but complains that it makes the Commonplace
Thesis a triviality and does not cover all cases of randomness.
Eagle notes that some have defined randomness as indeterminism, but
this view
makes it difficult to understand many of the uses of randomness in sci-

ence … This view entails that random sampling, and random outcomes in
chaotic dynamics, and random mating in population genetics, etc., are not
in fact random if determinism is true, despite the plausibility of their being
so. It does not apparently require fundamental indeterminism to have a
randomized trial, and our confidence in the deliverances of such trials does
not depend on our confidence that the trial design involved radioactive
decay or some other fundamentally indeterministic process. Indeed, if
Bohmians or Everettians are right (an open epistemic possibility), and
quantum mechanics is deterministic, the view that randomness is indeter-
minism entails that nothing is actually random, not even the most intui-
tively compelling cases. (Ibid.)
Hence, Eagle concludes that the view that randomness is indeterminism

should be rejected (ibid.).
The term ‘chance’ also has a variety of meanings:
(1) Epistemic notion:
(1.1) Synonymous with an epistemic notion of random, that is, unpre-
dictable. ‘Something that happens unpredictably without discernible
human intention or observable cause, e.g. “Which cards you are dealt is
simply a matter of chance”’ (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, definition 1a)
(1.2) Synonymous with an epistemic notion of probability. ‘The pos-
sibility of a particular outcome in an uncertain situation … the degree of
likelihood of such an outcome e.g. a small chance of success’ (Merriam-
Webster Dictionary, definition 4)
(2) Non-epistemic notion: chance is often used synonymously with
physical probability (Eagle 2019). It is also used for the juxtaposition of
unrelated causal trajectories (e.g. car crashes, when two people meet by
accident) (Ellis 2018).
Evaluation of different interpretations of ‘random’ and ‘chance’.
As noted above, there are different interpretations of ‘random’ and
‘chance’ which are suited for different contexts of discussions. Which of
the above interpretations is suitable for the use of these terms in my syl-
logism demonstrating the logically exhaustive list of categories of possi-
bilities as explained above?
164 A. Loke
The epistemic notion is not appropriate: the syllogism is not referring

to what we can predict, but what is the case. The definition of random-
ness as indeterminism is also inappropriate, because of the reasons Eagle
explained (see above). Rather, by using the term ‘random causes’ in my
syllogism and labelling this as the ‘Chance hypothesis’, I intend to repre-
sent a common usage in the scientific literature relevant to certain forms
of hypotheses which have been postulated as possible explanations for
‘fine-tuning’, such as the inflationary cosmology and multiverse scenar-
ios. For example, cosmologist Andreas Albrecht writes,
One typically imagines some sort of chaotic primordial state, where the
inflation field is more or less randomly tossed about, until by sheer chance it
winds up in a very rare fluctuation that produces a potential-dominated
state … Inflation is best thought of as the ‘dominant channel’ from random
chaos into a big bang-like state. (Albrecht 2004, pp. 384-5; italics mine)
The above description by Albrecht uses the terms ‘random’ and ‘chance’
as a non-epistemic notion to characterize something that brought about
(i.e. caused) a fluctuation resulting in a bigbang-like state. In other words,
‘random’ and ‘chance’ is used in a non-epistemic sense to describe causes
that bring about a variety of outcomes with varying degree of order and/
or specificity. This definition of ‘random’ and ‘chance’ is compatible with
determinism (and indeterminism); if determinism is true, the varying
outcomes are determined to the varying conditions of the cause(s); if
indeteminism is true, a cause in the exact same condition may produce
different outcomes. To hypothesize that a causal process produced mul-
tiple universes such that one that is fine-tuned resulted by chance is anal-
ogous to saying that in a game a machine randomly tossed three fair dice
multiple times such that this process resulted in the winning ordered
combination of ‘triple six’ by chance.
By using the terms ‘random’ and ‘chance’ I am not attempting to dis-
cuss the Commonplace Thesis nor to cover all cases of randomness and
chance, nor am I using the term ‘chance’ as ‘physical probability’ in my
syllogism, as Eagle does in his article. Hence, my use of the term ‘Chance
hypothesis’ to label ‘random causes’ is not susceptible to Eagle’s objec-
tions to the process notion of randomness noted above.
In summary, I am using the term ‘random’ in ‘random causes’ (and

labelling this as the Chance hypothesis) in a non-epistemic sense to
describe causes that bring about a variety of outcomes with varying degree
of order and/or specificity. This contrasts with the ‘Regularity’ hypothe-
sis, whereby causes bring about outcomes that are not varied, and the
‘Design’ hypothesis, whereby causes have freedom to intentionally bring
about outcomes which may be varied or not varied and for a purpose (cf.
Dawes 2007, p. 73, who defines ‘design’ to mean ‘the work of some
intentional agent acting purposefully’). To evaluate whether each of the
five hypotheses—(i) Chance, (ii) Regularity, (iii) Combination of
Regularity and Chance, (iv) Uncaused, and (v) Design—is true on the
basis of evidence, I will be using probability in an epistemic objec-
tive sense.
I shall now proceed to evaluate the various categories of hypotheses,
starting with the Chance hypothesis.
4.4 Chance Hypothesis

4.4.1 The Argument from Selection Bias and Chaos
With regard to the mathematically describable order of our universe,

Wenmackers (2016, p. 10) objects that it may just be due to our selection
bias, for the majority of possible mathematical variations are not appli-
cable to our world in any way (p. 10). Moreover, we can never be sure
that the application of mathematics to the world is perfect, since empiri-
cal precision is always limited. Wenmackers note the objection that the
fact that there is some part of mathematics at all that works well requires
explanation, even if this does not constitute all or most of mathematics
(pp. 10–11). Wenmackers replies that the alternative case in which no
mathematics would describe anything in the universe and a world in
which processes cannot be summarized or approximated in a meaningful
way would not help us to have evolved in this world (Wenmackers 2016,
pp. 10–14).
166 A. Loke
However, the question is, why our world should be such that allows for
evolution? As Einstein argues,
A priori, one should expect a chaotic world, which cannot be grasped by

the mind in any way … Even if man proposes the axioms of the theory, the
success of such a project presupposes a high degree of ordering of the objec-
tive world, and this could not be expected a priori. That is the ‘miracle’
which is being constantly reinforced as our knowledge expands. There lies
the weakness of positivists and professional atheists. (Goldman 1997, p. 24)
Wenmackers (2016, p. 13) objects by claiming that
random processes are very well-behaved: they consist of events that may be
maximally unpredictable in isolation, but collectively they produce strong
regularities. It is no longer a mystery to us how order emerges from chaos.
In fact, we have entire fields of mathematics for that, called probability
theory and statistics, which are closely related to branches of physics, such
as statistical mechanics.
However, the randomness that she is referring to is epistemic (‘may be

maximally unpredictable’). In actuality, the so-called chaos has a high
degree of underlying order which is described by the complex equations
formulated by statisticians (Bishop 2017). Likewise, the so-called self-
organization process (e.g. crystallization) which describes overall order
arising from interactions between apparently disordered parts has a high
degree of underlying order involving the interactions. The question posed
by Einstein is, why should there be any high degree of ordering at all?
(One might reply that the high degree of ordering is explained by another
level of ordering; this possibility is discussed under the Regularity hypoth-
esis in Sect. 4.5, and also under the Uncaused hypothesis in Chap. 7)
Steiner (1998, pp. 24-26) observes that, in order for mathematics to be
applicable for predicting observations of physical entities, the properties
of physical entities must remain reasonably stable over time. For example,
there are four coins in my pocket, after removing two coins, I should have
two coins left, but if the coins are unstable such that they disintegrate
very quickly, I would not observe two coins when I check my pocket.
‘The number of coins in my pocket … stay constant long enough for
humans to count them … The coins in my pocket are usually the same
whether or not I walk around the house, put candies in my pocket, too,
and so forth’ (p. 26). What explains this stability over time? Various prop-
erties of a particle, for example, could have changed so quickly that makes
mathematical predictions impossible. While one might suggest that there
could have been various constraints that prevent the existence of the
alternative disordered schemes, the question remains as to why the con-
straints should exist in such a well-ordered way that resulted in the math-
ematically describable behaviour.
Genuine randomness is extremely improbable as a causal explanation
for the order noted above in view of the fact that one could conceive of a
potentially infinite12 number of alternative ways in which the behaviour
of mindless physical entities in the universe is disordered. A particle, for
example, could have moved in billions13 of alternative directions at every
moment, other than consistently in the direction describable by any form of
mathematical equation. As noted earlier, ‘random causes’ is supposed to
describe causes that bring about a variety of outcomes with varying
degrees of order and/or specificity, without favouring one rather than the
other alternatives. Thus, following the Principle of Indifference, if the
universe was fundamentally brought about by random causes, then each
one of the billions of possible ways of the behaviour of mindless physical
entities in the universe should be assigned equal probability. This means
the probability of any one of them—including the probability that it
moves consistently in the direction describable by any form of mathematical
equation—is extremely low. Against the criticism that the Principle of
Indifference extracts information from ignorance, it can be replied that,
if there are some factors which we are ignorant of which entail that the
probability for mathematically describable order is not small, those fac-
tors would need to be ‘fine-tuned’ (i.e. ordered by regularity, regularity
and chance, design, or combinations of these; see below); it would not be
purely random.
Finally, Wenmackers’ argument from selection bias and chaos does not
explain the fine-tuning of the universe (nor is it intended to).
168 A. Loke
4.4.2 Anthropic Principle
With regard to Fine-tuning, some scientists deny the conclusion of design

by arguing that, if these conditions were not ‘fine-tuned’, we won’t be
here to observe them; since we are here, we should not be surprised about
the fine-tuning.
However, this reply is too superficial. Philosopher John Leslie provides
the analogy of a criminal who was dragged before a firing squad of 100
trained marksmen, all of whom missed when the command to fire was
given and the criminal found himself alive. It would be ridiculous for the
criminal to think that ‘since I am still alive, I should not be surprised that
all of them missed!’ (Leslie 1982, p. 150). On the contrary, the observa-
tion that all the marksmen missed requires an explanation other than
chance. Perhaps the 100 marksmen had conspired to spare him, or per-
haps it was a miracle; in any case, it is unreasonable to attribute his sur-
vival to chance.
Sober (2019, p. 73) claims that the fine-tuning case and the firing
squad case differ by arguing that, in fine-tuning, the sequence is as fol-
lows: t1: constants are set, t2: you are alive, t3 you observe you are alive;
while in the firing squad case, t1: firing squad decides, t2: you are alive
(just before they fire), t3: you observe you are alive. Sober claims that, in
the case of fine-tuning, if you are alive at t2, the constants must be right
at t1, t2, and t3; thus, the probability of your observing at t3 that the con-
stants are right is the same regardless of whether it was God or chance
that set the values of the physical constants at t1. However, in the case of
the firing squad, if you are alive at t2, that leaves open what the firing
squad decided at t1 what it will do just after t2; thus, your observing at t3
that you are alive provides evidence about the squad’s decision at t1. Thus,
the fact that you are alive at t2 induces an Observation Selection Effect in
the fine-tuning case but not in the firing squad case. Nevertheless, this
still does not explain why are the constants right at t1. As argued previ-
ously, why the constants are right at t1 still requires a reasonable explana-
tion other than chance.
4.4.3 Improbable Event Happens
A sceptic might object that even though the apparent probability of a

fine-tuned and ordered universe occurring by chance is outrageously tiny,
it still could have happened by chance. After all, improbable events hap-
pen all the time. For example, the probability of someone winning a lot-
tery involving thousands of participants is outrageously tiny, but still it
happened. The probability of clouds, snowflakes, and so on taking the
particular beautiful forms that they do is outrageously tiny and these
forms may appear to be designed, but we know that they are the result of
natural forces.
In response, the cases cited above are disanalogous to the case concern-
ing order and fine-tuning. In a lottery all the participants are equally
qualified to win. Likewise, among the millions and millions of possible
forms which clouds, snowflakes, and so on can take, a large proportion of
them are ‘suitably qualified’ to appear beautiful or take a certain recogniz-
able pattern or another—this is called pareidolia: a common psychologi-
cal phenomenon. By contrast, it is not the case that all the values or a
large proportion of values among the billions of possible values14 which
(say) those physical constants can take would have ‘qualified’ to allow for
life after the Big Bang. On the contrary, the proportion of possible values
which would allow for life is extremely small; as explained above, the
overwhelming majority of possible values would not allow for any form
of life at all—indeed, they would be devoid of structure and pattern.
(Lewis and Barnes 2016, p. 164: ‘Particles spend their lives alone, drifting
through emptying space, not seeing another particle for trillions of years
and even then, just glancing off and returning to the void.’) As explained
earlier, an explosion such as the Big Bang would most likely have resulted
in disorder and debris, rather than a universe which expands for billions
of years and which allows life to originate and survive. Similar to the
scenario of the 100 marksmen who missed the criminal, survival in such
circumstances requires an explanation other than chance. Likewise, it is
not the case that each possible behaviour of particles among the billions
of possible behaviours would have resulted in a consistently
170 A. Loke
mathematically describable order. On the contrary, as explained earlier,

the proportion of such possible behaviours is extremely small.
The above observations illustrate the fact that we are not just talking
about improbable events, but an event which is improbable and has a
specificity, that is, a universe that is highly ordered and which has the
capacity for allowing the production of functional objects, in particular
embodied intelligent life. The idea of specificity can be illustrated by the
analogy of an archer who shoots arrows at a wall. After the event,
she could make herself appear to be a skilled archer by simply painting

bull’s-eyes around whatever places on the wall an arrow falls. But the pat-
tern thus created would not be a specification; it would be a fabrication. If
the bull’s-eye already exists, on the other hand, and she sets out to hit it and
succeeds, it represents a specification. (Dawes 2007, p. 71, citing Dembski)
The idea of painting a bull’s-eye around wherever the arrow falls is analo-
gous to whoever is the winner in the lottery case. In this case, any place
on the wall has equal chance of being the bull’s eye of an arrow shot ran-
domly, just as any participant in the lottery has equal chance of being the
winner. By contrast, it is not the case that any of the possible values of
those physical constants allows for life; on the contrary, the vast majority
of possible values do not allow for life, and the range of possible values
that allow for life is extremely small; a small deviation from the existing
values would result in a lifeless universe (thus, the values are highly speci-
fied in this sense). To fall within such a small range which (unlike the rest
of the range of possible values) allows for life would be analogous to fall-
ing within a small region of the wall which (unlike the rest of the wall)
has been marked out as the bull’s eye before the arrow is shot.
Moreover, the features of ‘being highly ordered and allowing for the
production of functional objects such as embodied intelligent life’ are
‘special’ because:
(1) Functionality is often associated with design (Ratzsch and Koperski
2019; although as noted at the end of this section I do not claim that this
type of specified complexity by itself is a reliable criterion for detecting
design). To illustrate, if one were to discover in the midst of a jungle a
structure which has the capacity for allowing the production of
motorcars, one would reasonably conclude that it was designed. The rea-
son is because it is unreasonable to think that the components of this
structure were fundamentally brought together and assembled by Chance,
Regularity, or Combinations of Regularity and Chance, or that the struc-
ture began to exist Uncaused, and (as shown above) the only remaining
explanation is Design. It is true that there are also other arrangements of
the components of the structure which are very unlikely. Nevertheless,
the overwhelming proportion of the possible arrangements of the com-
ponents (e.g. wiring not attached to assembly line, door panels not fitting
the vehicle frame, etc.) would not allow for the production of anything
functional. Therefore, the arrangement of the components which allow
for the production of motorcar is ‘special’ and warrants an explanation.
Likewise, as implied by the discussion in Sect. 4.1, the overwhelming
proportion of possible universes would not allow for the production of
functional objects such as living cells. Thus, the fact that our universe
allows for the production of living cells warrants an explanation.
It might be objected that, unlike the structure (factory?) which allows
for the production of motorcar, our universe does not seem to be orga-
nized towards producing life; indeed, most parts of our universe are
inhospitable to life, and hence are not specified or functional in the same
sense as the components of the structure. On the other hand, Carroll
objects that our universe is too fine-tuned for life. He writes,
If the reason why certain characteristics of the universe seem fine-tuned is

because life needs to exist, we would expect them to be sufficiently tuned
to allow for life, but there’s no reason for them to be much more tuned
than that. The entropy of the universe, for example [seems] much more
tuned than is necessary for life to exist …. [F]rom purely anthropic consid-
erations, there is no reason at all for God to have made it that small.
(Carroll 2016, p. 311)
I shall discuss the objection concerning inhospitality towards life in

greater detail in Sect. 7.3. At this point I would like to highlight the fact
that, while it is true that our universe is not fully analogous with the
factory-like structure, there is nevertheless a point of analogy, namely,
just as the overwhelming proportion of the possible arrangements of the
172 A. Loke
components would not allow for the production of anything functional,

the overwhelming proportion of possible universes would not allow for
the existence of functional objects such as living cells. The relevant sense
of specificity is that in both cases the extremely narrow range of possibili-
ties that allow for the existence of functionality is somehow actualized.
Contrary to Carroll, this relevant sense of specificity does not require
the fine-tuning to be solely for the existence of life, rather than (say) for
the existence of life and other features such as (for example) certain aes-
thetic features of our universe. Hence, Carroll’s objection is based on a
mistaken assumption. Barnes (2019) replies that
low entropy initial conditions over the observable universe (as opposed to
merely in our Solar System, for example) are necessary for our beautiful
night sky, from what we see with our naked eye to our biggest telescopes.
On a clear night, far away from city lights, try staring deeply into the Milky
Way for a while and see if you’re compelled to shout, ‘not worth it!’
(2) Embodied intelligent living things can have plenty of meaningful

physical interactions with one another and can be aware of God and can
‘communicate and establish a deep relation of love with God, if God
exists at all … Intelligent life can actualize moral values in the world’
(Chan and Chan 2020, p. 8).15 Thus, if a good God exists, ‘God would
have good reason to create intelligent lives (as well as a universe in which
intelligent lives can emerge and flourish’ (ibid.).
Sinhababu (2016) offers an objection to the fine-tuning argument for
God’s existence by suggesting the metaphysical possibility of alternative
psychophysical laws that permit a wider range of physical entities to have
minds, such that ‘Whenever two electrons were a prime number of cen-
timeters apart, they could have the mental states involved in heartfelt
communication about their histories. Every subsequent time they were a
whole number of meters apart, they could fondly remember each other’
(p. 425). He argues that such psychophysical laws are possible if a non-
physical God having a Mind is possible (pp. 426–427).
However, the point remains that, if the universe is not fine-tuned, the
universe would be deprived of physical interactions with particles ‘drift-
ing through emptying space, not seeing another particle for trillions of
years and even then, just glancing off and returning to the void’ (Lewis
and Barnes 2016, p. 164). While God can create alternative psychophysi-
cal laws or disembodied intelligent beings (e.g. angels), that still does not
answer the question ‘Why our physical universe is so special, that is,
allowing for so many physical interactions and highly ordered?’ In a simi-
lar vein, Hawthorne and Isaacs (2018, pp. 147-148) respond to the
objection that there is no special expectation that God would make phys-
ical life rather than non-physical life by arguing that this objection does
not actually make much of a difference to the fine-tuning argument,
because the fact is that there is physical life which is more likely given
theism than atheism.
Accepting the conclusion that specified events with extremely low
probability happened as a result of chance is unreasonable. Are we seri-
ously going to believe that the 100 marksmen missed by chance? Consider
also the case of suspected plagiarism in which two essays submitted to a
professor by two different students are word-for-word identical. It is very
improbable that such ‘specified’ events happen by chance. While there
are other arrangements of the words of the essays which are also very
unlikely, the overwhelming proportion of the possible arrangements of
the words would result in essays that are not identical, rather than two
essays that are word-for-word identical. Hence, most professors would
rightly insist on investigating for plagiarism.16 Yet the improbability of a
highly ordered and life-permitting universe is far greater than these exam-
ples! While we can imagine that specified events with extremely low
probability (e.g. the case of suspected plagiarism) happened as a result of
chance, we should regard such conclusions as belonging only to the imag-
ination but not to reality.
It should be noted that, while my argument here makes use of ‘speci-
fied complexity’ to argue against the Chance hypothesis, I do not claim
(as Dembski does) that specified complexity by itself is a reliable criterion
for detecting design (Dembski 2002, p. 24). One of the main criticisms
against Dembski’s use of the idea of specified complexity is that critics
object that counterexamples from evolutionary biology can be found.
However, my book does not make this claim. Indeed, I think that speci-
fied complexity by itself is not a reliable criterion for detecting design
because additional arguments need to be provided to rule out other
174 A. Loke
alternatives to design (such as the evolutionary alternative; see below),

and I provide such arguments in what follows. Thus, my book avoids the
criticism against Dembski.
4.4.4 The Problem of Normalizing Probabilities
Against conceptual probability, it has been objected that, from a logical

point of view, the full interval of the possible values of the fine-tuned
parameter is from 0 to ∞, and since the range is infinite, there is no sense
in which life-friendly universes are improbable; the probabilities are
mathematically undefined (McGrew, McGrew, and Vestrup 2001).
Lewis and Barnes (2016, p. 286) reply that ‘these kinds of “what to do
with infinity” problems are often encountered in the physical sciences,
especially in cosmology, and so these objections cannot succeed against
fine-tuning without paralyzing probabilistic reasoning in all of physics’.
Ratzsch and Koperski (2019) propose:
One solution to this problem is to truncate the interval of possible values.

Instead of allowing C to range from [0, ∞), one could form a finite interval
[0, N], where N is very large relative to the life-permitting range of C. A
probability distribution could then be defined over the truncated range …
The argument for fine-tuning can thus be recast such that almost all values
of C are outside of the life-permitting range. The fact that our universe is
life-permitting is therefore in need of explanation.17
It should be noted that the fine-tuning argument concerns the concrete

universe, not abstract logically possible worlds. Collins (2009, p. 249)
argues that, where our concrete physical universe is concerned, the range
of the possible values of the fine-tuned parameter is not infinite, noting
that ‘the so-called Plank scale is often assumed to be the cutoff for the
applicability of the strong, weak, and electromagnetic forces’ (see also the
argument against concrete infinities in Loke (2012b; 2017a, chapter 2)).
Therefore, ‘the limits of our current theories are most likely finite but very
large, since we know that our physics does work for an enormously wide
range of energies. Accordingly, if the life-permitting range for a constant
is very small in comparison, then … that there will be fine-tuning’

(Collins 2009, p. 249.).
4.4.5 Multiple Universes
4.4.5.1 Introducing Various Types of Multiverse Hypothesis
Many scientists have suggested that perhaps there are many universes
which have been formed, such that eventually one that is fine-tuned
would be formed by chance. Collins (2009, p. 257) explains: ‘Just as in a
lottery in which all the tickets are sold, one is bound to be the winning
number, so given a varied enough set of universes with regard to some
life-permitting feature F, it is no longer surprising that there exists a uni-
verse somewhere that has F.’ The multiverse hypothesis is often combined
with the anthropic principle to suggest that, given a large variety of uni-
verses, ‘it is neither surprising that there is at least one universe that is
hospitable to life nor—since we could not have found ourselves in a life-
hostile universe—that we find ourselves in a life-friendly one’ (Friederich
2018). Some have used the concept of infinity to postulate a spatially
infinite universe or an infinite number of universes, given which any-
thing that is possible would happen. Somewhere in such an infinite uni-
verse/infinite number of universes, there would be regions exhibiting
some degree of order, and since life cannot exist where there is no order,
we will find ourselves in one of those regions with order.
There are different types of multiple universes theories: some postulate
the simultaneous existence of many universes (spatial multiverse theo-
ries), others postulate one universe arising after another consecutively
(temporal multiverse theories) (Gale 1990). Various philosophical postu-
lations and scientific mechanisms have been proposed for various multi-
verse theories. For example, while most philosophers accept the use of the
language of possible worlds as a way to talk about necessity and possibil-
ity (modal logic), philosopher David Lewis speculates that all possible
worlds exist concretely (modal realism) (Lewis 1986). Hugh Everett’s
Many Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics has also been used to
176 A. Loke
postulate the existence of infinite branches of spacetime (parallel worlds)

resulting from quantum splitting; this interpretation of quantum theory
has been used by some cosmologists to explain the cosmic coincidences
(Holder 2004, pp. 52–53). Many physicists have suggested that the pro-
cess of inflation resulted in causally isolated spacetime regions (‘island
universes’), and that the process is ‘eternal’ in the sense that the formation
of island universes never ends, resulting in the production of an infinite
number of island universes (Vilenkin and Tegmark 2011, citing
Guth 2000).
It should be noted that the postulation of a multiverse per se is not
contrary to theism, for it is possible that God created a multiverse (call
this the ‘theistic multiverse hypothesis’). Thus, proving the existence of
more than one universes per se will not refute theism. However, the use
of the postulation of multiverse by atheists to explain away God/Designer
(i.e. claiming that the fine-tuning and order of our universe can be
explained by the multiverse such that there is no need for a designer; call
this the ‘atheistic multiverse hypothesis’) is beset with several problems,
which I shall explain below.
4.4.5.2 I nsufficient Evidence for the Atheistic

Multiverse Hypothesis
On the one hand, there is insufficient reason or evidence for thinking

that any of the atheist multiverse scenarios is true. Concerning Lewis’
modal realist hypothesis, by speculating that all possible worlds exist con-
cretely, Lewis is no longer talking about possible worlds as such; rather,
he is speculating that the actual world is far more extensive than we
thought. In other words, if we found out that his hypothesis is true, ‘we
would simply have learned that the actual world is richer than we
thought—that it contains all of these island universes’ (Pruss 2009, p. 36,
attributing to Van Inwagen). However, there is no good evidence which
shows that such concrete worlds really exist. As for Everett’s interpreta-
tion, it is not proven as well; there are other possible alternative determin-
istic interpretations of quantum physics such as Bohm’s pilot-wave model
(see Chap. 2). On the other hand, Everett’s interpretation (according to
which every possibility is actual) is beset with the so-called measure prob-
lem (see below).18
While some evidence for inflationary cosmology (which is claimed to

have brought about multiverses) has been proposed, this has been dis-
puted by other cosmologists, and the problem with testing multiverse
hypothesis remains (Friederich 2018). It should be noted that the so-
called Eternal Inflation Model explained by Vilenkin and Tegmark (2011)
does not mean eternal in the past without a beginning; rather, it is postu-
lated to be eternal in the future in the sense that it has no end. In fact,
Vilenkin (2015) himself argues for an ultimate beginning of the universe,
thus accepting premise 2 of Craig’s formulation of the Kalām Cosmological
Argument, namely, ‘The Universe began to exist.’ Given that an actual
infinite regress of events is impossible (see Chap. 5), it must still be finite
in the past in the sense of having a first event.
Moreover, the claims that ‘In an eternally inflating universe, anything
that can happen will happen; in fact, it will happen an infinite number of
times’ and ‘inevitably, an unlimited number of bubbles of all possible
types will be formed in the course of eternal inflation’ (Vilenkin and
Tegmark 2011) are based on the assumption that the future is an already
existing actual infinite rather than a potential infinite. However, the
assumption that it is an actual infinite is unproven and falsified by
Mawson’s argument and by other arguments discussed in Chap. 5; thus,
the future (if it is indeed infinite) should be regarded as a potential infi-
nite.19 Vilenkin and Tegmark (2011) state: ‘that’s how we test any scien-
tific theory: we assume that it’s true, work out the consequences, and
discard the theory if the predictions fail to match the observations.’
Mawson’s argument explained below does just that: it shows how the
prediction of ‘anything that can happen will happen’ fails to match the
observations. Claiming that inflation can stretch continuous space indef-
initely does not imply that an actual infinite is actually reached. As Ellis
et al. (2004, p. 927) note, ‘Future infinite time also is never realized;
rather, the situation is that whatever time we reach, there is always more
time available’ (see Chap. 5). Indeed, more recently, Tegmark himself has
advocated the rejection of the actual infinite because of the so-called mea-
sure problem (see Sect. 4.4.5.3 below).
Some purported evidence of multiple universes (e.g. claims of uni-
verses collisions leaving behind ‘scars’ on the CMB; this has been dis-
puted by other scientists, as noted in Chap. 2), even if confirmed, only
178 A. Loke
implies that there is more than one universe but does not imply that there
is an infinite number or a large number of them. It should be noted that,
in order for the multiverse hypothesis to explain the fine-tuning and
order of our universe, a huge number of varied universes would be
required, but there is no conclusive evidence that such a huge number of
varied universes exist. The evidence for inflation does not by itself imply
the evidence for an actual infinite number of universes, as illustrated by
cosmologist George Ellis’ (2007, Sect. 2.8) acceptance of the former but
rejection of the latter (see below).
4.4.5.3 Arguments against the Atheistic Multiverse Hypothesis
On the other hand, there are powerful scientific and philosophical objec-
tions against the atheistic multiverse hypothesis.
First, currently popular ‘multiverse’ scenarios which suggest the forma-
tion of baby universes that eventually become causally independent of
the mother universe are contrary to the Generalized Second Law of
Thermodynamics (Curiel 2019, citing Wall 2013a, 2013b).
Second, Ellis (2007, Sect. 9.3.2) observes that ‘the concept of infinity
is used with gay abandon in some multiverse discussions, without any
concern either for the philosophical problems associated with this state-
ment’ (Ellis 2007, Sect. 8.1). Recall the discussion on multiverse men-
tioned earlier whereby some have postulated an actual infinite number
(or a very large number) of universes to explain the fine-tuning of the
universe. Following philosopher Tim Mawson, one can object that, on
such a hypothesis in which every possibility (or very large number of pos-
sibilities) is actual, the probability of any universe in which we can more
or less continually and consistently understand through induction is infi-
nitely (or extremely) small. The reason is because at every moment there
would be (roughly speaking) an infinite (or very large) number of ways in
which things ‘go wrong’ with respect to our beliefs arrived at by induc-
tion and only one way in which things ‘go right’.20 Yet the mathemati-
cally describable order of our universe indicates that our universe is one
in which we can more or less continually and consistently understand
through induction.
One might reply by arguing that the probability of such a universe is

indeed infinitely (or extremely) small, but because an ordered universe is
necessary for the survival of life, we would still find ourselves in such a
universe due to the anthropic principle. However, the survival of life
would only require us to live in an ordered universe up to this present
moment. There are an infinite number of ways the next moment might
go wrong. But as I am typing this, the next moment has arrived and this
has gone right in spite of its infinitesimal small probability if there were
an infinite number of universes. Thus, it is far more likely that there isn’t
an infinite/large number of universes. As Holder (2004, p. 126) notes
regarding the problem concerning the persistence of order in this universe,
presumably in an infinite ensemble of possible universes, many will be

identical to ours up to, say, the present moment or midnight on 31 October
2008, and then dissolve into chaos … imagine a monkey sitting at a type-
writer for untold aeons. The animal is vastly more likely to produce ‘To be
or not to be’ at some stage and then sink into chaos than to produce the
whole of Hamlet. Similarly, random selection of universes from a vast
ensemble is far more likely to produce a solar system embedded in chaos,
or a finely-tuned epoch followed by chaos, than a universe with the order,
and persistence of that order, which our universe actually possesses.
Indeed, more recently, cosmologist Max Tegmark (who had earlier advo-
cated an actual infinite eternal universe scenario, as noted in Chap. 4) has
advocated the rejection of the infinite because of the so-called measure
problem, which he calls ‘the greatest crisis facing modern physics’. The
problem is that, if inflationary cosmology were to result in an actual infi-
nite number of universes, then ‘whatever experiment one makes … there
will be infinitely many copies of you … obtaining each physically possi-
ble outcome … So, strictly speaking, we physicists can no longer predict
anything at all!’ (Tegmark 2015). However, we do live in a universe in
which physicists can predict many events. Therefore, the antecedent
is false.
Third, the atheistic multiverse scenario faces the Boltzmann Brain
problem. Collins explains,
180 A. Loke
This is the problem that, under naturalistic views of the mind, it is enor-
mously more likely—on the order of 1010(123) times more likely—for
observers to exist in the smallest bubble of order required for observers,
than in a universe that is ordered throughout. (The order being referred to
here is measured by entropy—the lower the entropy, the higher the order.)
Yet, we do not exist in a bubble of low entropy, but in a universe with low
entropy throughout. (Collins 2018, pp. 90-91)
Craig (2012) notes that ‘appeal to an observer self-selection effect accom-

plishes nothing because … most observable worlds will be Boltzmann
Brain worlds’.
In other words,
1. If atheist multiverse scenario is true, it is overwhelmingly probable

that we would observe that we are isolated brains surrounded by ther-
mal equilibrium. (Prediction)
2. We do not observe that we are isolated brains surrounded by thermal
equilibrium.
3. Therefore, it is overwhelmingly probable that the atheist multiverse
scenario is false. (Adapted from Lewis and Barnes 2016, pp. 317–318)
Lewis and Barnes (2016, p. 322) note: ‘The multiverse has a tightrope
to walk. Too few varied universes, and it will probably fail to make a life-
permitting one at all. Too many non-fine-tuned universes, on the other
hand, could result in a universe filled with Boltzmann Brains.’ For the
multiverse to walk this tightrope, it would need to be fine-tuned (ibid.).
In other words, those life-permitting multiverse scenarios which are sup-
posedly able to avoid the Boltzmann Brain problem would themselves
require fine-tuning, and therefore they are not (by themselves) the ulti-
mate solution to the fine-tuning problem.
Fourth, even if there are many universes, the process which led to their
formation (whether involving string theory or not; see Sect. 4.5) would
itself require fine-tuning in order to stably generate so many different
kinds of universes (and ensure that they do not face other problems such
as colliding and destroying one another), such that eventually one that is
‘fine-tuned’ (and describable by highly sophisticated mathematical
equations) is generated by chance. As Collins (2018, p. 90) notes, ‘any-

thing that produces such a multiverse itself appears to require significant
fine-tuning.’
As an illustration, consider the ‘famous fine-tuning problem of infla-
tion’. Lewis and Barnes (2016, pp. 172-173, citing Neil Turok) explain
that in order for any form of life to exist in our universe, the universe
must have a very specific amount of lumpiness: a Q value between one
part in 1,000,000 and one part in 10,000. However, ‘inflation can pro-
duce practically any value of Q, from zero to very large values. If Q is
greater than one, the universe comes pre-loaded with black holes; this
really is not a good idea. The properties of the inflation must be fine-
tuned to produce the right value of Q, so again we replace one fine-
tuning with another.’ As Holder (2004, p. 136) observes, ‘the fine-tuning
required by inflationary models is a serious drawback since inflation was
meant to explain fine-tuning!’
Finally, even if there are many universes, there must still be a divine
First Cause, as shown by the arguments presented in Chaps. 5 and 6.
4.5 Regularity
It has been suggested that there could be fundamental general principles
in nature which determined the laws and constants of physics of our uni-
verse (Einstein 1949, p. 63).
For example, Bird (2007, p. 212) suggests: ‘If the law of gravitation is
not fundamental but is derived from deeper laws (as physicists indeed
believe) then it could well turn out that the value of G is constrained in a
way that we do not yet understand. In which case it might be, for all we
know, that the value of G is necessary.’
There are two problems with this kind of suggestion.
First, it does not solve the fine-tuning problem because the fundamen-
tal principles or laws do not uniquely determine a fine-tuned universe.
‘Physics is blind to what life needs. And yet, here we are’ (Lewis and
Barnes 2016, p. 181). For example, according to our present understand-
ing of string theory (the most promising candidate ‘theory of everything’),
182 A. Loke
string theory does not predict the state of our universe but allows for a
vast landscape of possible universes (Hawking 2003). Susskind notes:
The two concepts—Landscape and megaverse [i.e. multiverse]—should

not be confused. The Landscape is not a real place. Think of it as a list of
all the possible designs of hypothetical universes. Each valley represents
one such design …. The megaverse, by contrast, is quite real. The pocket
universes that fill it are actual existing places, not hypothetical possibilities.
(2005, p. 381)
Thus, the string theory does not uniquely determine the laws and con-
stants (Friederich 2018), nor does it determine the initial conditions such
as the initial low-entropy condition.
The landscape, which is a large set of possibilities, ‘can’t of itself solve
the fine-tuning problem; in fact, it’s part of the problem. As an illustra-
tion, the large number of possible lottery tickets is precisely what makes
winning unlikely’ (Lewis and Barnes 2016, p. 305).
Second, the ‘Regularity’ hypothesis only pushes the question one step
back: how could such mindless non-intelligent, non-random causes have
this orderly behaviour, and how could such mindless causes generate a
universe with such a high degree of mathematically describable order? As
Frederick observes:
It is obviously useless to point out that some laws can be explained in terms
of other laws, for example, that we may explain why matter accords with
Einstein’s quantitative law of gravitation (a modification of Newton’s
inverse-square law) by invoking the law that a body will pursue the easiest
course through undulating space-time. That just puts the puzzle back a
step. How can it be that everybody always pursues the easiest course? The
explanation of some laws in terms of others leaves unanswered the question
of how mindless matter, or forces, can behave in a way which accords with
a law. (Frederick 2013, p. 271)
(The hypothesis that this question can be pushed back ad infinitum
because there is an infinite regress of non-intelligent, non-random causes
is considered under the ‘Uncaused’ hypothesis, which is refuted by the
arguments presented in Chaps. 5–7.)
4.6 Combination of Regularity and Chance

Consider (iii) ‘Combination of Regularity and Chance’. Plato (the Laws,
Chap. 10) mentioned those who denied the gods’ existence had argued
that the order we perceive in the universe is merely the product of the
interaction of chance and regularity. A modern-day proponent would be
Stenger (2000), who argues that the laws of physics do not need fine-
tuning because they are based on a combination of symmetry and the
random breaking of it. However, Stenger fails to explain ‘why would ran-
domly broken symmetry give rise to precisely the right set of laws required
for life instead of the vast range of other possibilities?’ (Collins 2013,
pp. 37–38). This indicates that a fine-tuning of the breaking would be
required.
Cosmologist Lee Smolin (1997) has proposed a naturalistic evolution-
ary scenario for universes. He suggests that the singularities inside black
holes are the sources of new baby universe phases that resemble their
parents. As each black-hole singularity individually produces a different
universe phase and, in each case, there would be a slight readjustment to
the fundamental physical constants, there could be some form of ‘natural
selection’ of universes, where the fundamental constants slowly evolve to
obtain ‘fitter’ universes in which there are proliferation of black holes and
thus produce many ‘children’. With further generations, universes with
black holes and stars (including those which help support life) would
come to dominate the population of universes within the multiverse.
Smolin argues that there is some indication that the fundamental physi-
cal constants of our universe are indeed such as to favour a proliferation
of black holes.
Other physicists such as Roger Penrose have criticized Smolin’s pro-
posal for the speculative nature of the idea that the fundamental physical
constants are readjusted as new baby universes are formed from black-
hole singularities. Penrose also criticizes Smolin for the geometrical
implausibility of the idea that highly irregular singularities can magically
convert themselves into (or glue themselves to) the extraordinarily smooth
and uniform Big Bang that each new universe would need if it is to
acquire a respectable Second Law of the kind that we are familiar with
184 A. Loke
(Penrose 2004, pp. 761–762). Moreover, ‘it’s probably easier just to cre-

ate black holes directly in a lumpy Big Bang or by fluctuations in an
inflating universe rather than go to all the bother of creating stars’ (Lewis
and Barnes 2016, p. 355). Given this, the proliferation of universes with
stars that support life would not be likely.
Additionally, based on the discussion in the foregoing sections of this
chapter, it can be seen that, for an evolution of universes (or other kinds
of ‘Combination of Regularity and Chance’) to happen, a high degree of
order (such that particles do not move in billions of alternative direction
at each moment, etc.) and fine-tuning (in order to avoid the Boltzmann
Brain problem, etc.) must already be in place. The existence of such an
order and fine-tuning remains unexplained by the ‘Combination of
Regularity and Chance’ hypothesis. (As argued in Sect. 4.5, multiverse
theories do not provide a reasonable explanation for this initial order and
fine-tuning as well.)
One might object that Darwin’s work shows that the existence of order
is not necessarily proof of deliberate creation, and that what applies to
biology may well apply at other levels.
In reply, on the one hand, Darwin’s work only applies to a certain kind
of order, namely, ‘intermediate order’. This is the order which, once cer-
tain ordered regularities (e.g. natural selection) are in place, certain com-
plex systems may develop via a process over time. Indeed, as Kojonen
(2021) argues, given the possibility that a Designer could work through
secondary causes such as setting up these regularities and the initial con-
ditions and using these to bring about different living organisms, and
given that Darwinian explanations are actually compatible with the bio-
logical design argument in this sense, Darwinian evolution has not
refuted the biological design argument at all (I argue that evolution is
compatible with Christian theism in Loke 2022). Kojonen also notes, ‘In
the case of complex phenomena, it is often the case that there is not just
a single “best explanation,” but rather different facets of the phenomena
are explained by different explanations. Getting the full explanation may
require combining, rather than just contrasting explanations’ (ibid.,
p. 88). In other words, in the case of biology, there may well be evidence
of both evolution and design (at the deeper level of what makes evolution
possible) that warrants the combination of both explanations.21
On the other hand, the argument offered here concerns ‘order at a

more fundamental level’. That is, it concerns the regularities which are
required to be in place in order for ‘Combination of Regularity and
Chance’ to be possible. This kind of order cannot in principle be explained
by evolutionary theory, since the theory presupposes the existence of this
kind of order.22 As explained in the discussion on the Regularity hypoth-
esis above (see Sect. 4.5), the postulation of this order leaves unanswered
the question of how mindless matter can behave in a way which accords
with this order. (The objector might reply by hypothesizing that this
order is uncaused; he/she might suggest that the combination of chance
and regularity could cause design-like complexity, starting from simpler
uncaused elements.23 In reply, my arguments in Chaps. 6 and 7 against
the Uncaused hypothesis would rule out such a hypothesis.)
4.7 Conclusion
I have formulated an original deductive argument which demonstrates
that the following are the only possible categories of hypotheses concern-
ing ‘fine-tuning’ and ‘the existence of orderly patterns of events which
can be described by advanced mathematics’: (i) Chance, (ii) Regularity,
(iii) Combinations of Regularity and Chance, (iv) Uncaused, and (v)
Design. I have shown that there is an essential feature of (i) Chance, (ii)
Regularity, and (iii) Combinations of Regularity and Chance which ren-
ders them unworkable as the ultimate explanation for the fine-tuning
and order. The only remaining hypotheses are Uncaused and Design.
One key issue is whether physical reality has a beginning, for if it does,
then given the Causal Principle established in Chaps. 2 and 3 it is not
uncaused. To address the key issue, I shall first discuss whether an actual
infinite regress of events is possible and whether there is a First Cause in
the next chapter.
186 A. Loke
Notes
1. Aquinas also argues that natural bodies ‘act for an end’ and ‘obtain the
best result’. My argument does not require this aspect of his argument
concerning final causes and value. Evans (2018, pp. 112-113) comments
that Aquinas is directing our attention to two features of the natural
world, orderliness and value. It is the feature of orderliness which I shall
focus on in this book (I shall leave the discussion on value to another
occasion): We observe natural bodies ‘acting always, or nearly always, in
the same way’.
2. Ellis (2007, section.3.3 n.41) notes: ‘The effective laws may vary from
place to place because for example the vacuum state varies; but the fun-
damental laws that underlie this behaviour are themselves taken to be
invariant.’
3. Tegmark argues that his hypothesis is motivated by the assumption that
there exists an external physical reality completely independent of us
humans (External Reality hypothesis), which he thinks implies that a
‘theory of everything’ has no baggage; that is, it must be well-defined also
according to non-human sentient entities (say, aliens or future super-
computers) that lack the common understanding of concepts that we
humans have evolved, for example, ‘particle’, ‘observation’, or indeed any
other English words. But his argument begs the question against the pos-
sibility that entities denoted by words such as ‘particle’ truly exist in a
way that cannot be reduced to mathematics, and regardless of whether
aliens are able to understand them or not.
4. In answer to the objection that relations are impossible without relata,
they argue that the relata are other relations (pp. 154–155).
5. Einstein (1960, p. 262). While some have regarded Einstein as a panthe-
ist on account of his statement ‘I believe in Spinoza’s God who reveals
himself in the orderly harmony of what exists, not in a God who con-
cerns himself with the fates and actions of human being’ (The New York
Times, April 25, 1929), Einstein himself clearly denied being a pantheist
or atheist (‘I am not an atheist, and I don’t think I can call myself a panthe-
ist’, cited in Jammer 1999, p. 48, italics mine; Cf. Stanley (2009,
pp. 192-193), who neglected the phrase in italics. Einstein’s citation of
Spinoza should perhaps be understood as follows: like Spinoza, he does
not believe that there is a God who is concerned with human affairs.
Likewise, his statement ‘The word god is for me nothing more than the
expression and product of human weaknesses, the Bible a collection of

honorable, but still primitive legends which are nevertheless pretty child-
ish. No interpretation no matter how subtle can (for me) change this’ in
his letter to the philosopher Eric Gutkind on 3 January 1954 can be
understood in its context as an opposition to the God of religion rather
than God as a Designer of the cosmos. Given what is said above, one
should perhaps say that Einstein was a Deist.
6. Dembski does consider the combination of chance and regularity in his
other book No Free Lunch (Dembski 2002), but his so-called explana-
tory filter in The Design Inference does not do so; I cite the latter merely
to warn that we should be more rigorous in our assessment of alternative
explanations with regard to the Teleological Argument.
7. Against Swinburne, who makes extensive use of an appeal to simplicity
in support of theistic arguments, McGrath notes that ‘problems with the
use of the criterion of simplicity remain. It is difficult to define and
operationalize the notion, and to provide it with an independent epis-
temic foundation. Furthermore, it is by no means clear that simplicity is
a sign of truth, or even an indicator of the potential long-term success of
a theory. Perhaps unsurprisingly, many philosophers of science now tend
to see simplicity therefore as a desirable quality for theories, while recog-
nizing that many theories deemed to be valid or successful are not sim-
ple’ (McGrath 2018, p. 117).
8. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9wLtCqm72-Y
9. 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 involve causes which may or may not be uncaused. I
shall argue that there is an uncaused Designer in Chap. 7.
10. See the paragraph below the syllogism for how ‘not’ is to be understood.
11. Friederich (2018) goes on to note: ‘If the laws and constants that physics
has so far determined turned out to be merely effective laws and con-
stants fixed by some random process in the early universe which might
be governed by more fundamental physical laws, it would start to make
sense to apply the concept of physical probability to those effective laws
and constants…However, the fine-tuning considerations…do not seem
to be based on speculations about any such process, so they do not seem
to implicitly rely on the notion of physical probability in that sense.’ To
assume that random process is the case would be begging the question
against the other hypotheses.
12. Not an actual infinite; see Section 4.4.4.
13. Not an actual infinite; see Section 4.4.4.
188 A. Loke
14. Collins (2009, p. 247) warns against thinking in terms of possible uni-
verses which are actual infinite in number and susceptible to the criti-
cisms in McGrew, McGrew, and Vestrup (2001) (I argue in Chap. 5 that
actual infinities can only exist in the abstract but not in the concrete and
possible universes are abstract). Rather, one should think in terms of pos-
sible values within a concrete range; see Section 4.4.4.
15. Goff (2019, p. 114) overemphasized this point by stating that ‘unless
life/intelligent life is objectively of great value, the fine-tuning needs no
explanation’. I don’t think ‘value’ is a necessary condition. As argued
above, functional complexity by itself would require an explanation. To
use the analogy mentioned above, even if the structure is not valuable
and what it produces is not valuable, the discovery of such a structure
would still require an explanation.
16. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yto4jXOOen8
17. Ratzsch and Koperski (2019) note: ‘A more rigorous solution employs
measure theory. Measure is sometimes used in physics as a surrogate for
probability. For example, there are many more irrational numbers than
rational ones. In measure theoretic terms, almost all real numbers are
irrational, where ‘almost all’ means all but a set of zero measure. In phys-
ics, a property found for almost all of the solutions to an equation
requires no explanation; it’s what one should expect. It’s not unusual, for
instance, for a pin balancing on its tip to fall over. Falling over is to be
expected. In contrast, if a property that has zero measure in the relevant
space were actually observed to be the case, like the pin continuing to
balance on its tip, that would demand a special explanation. Assuming
one’s model for the system is correct, nature appears to be strongly biased
against such behavior.’
18. While some have claimed that our improbable existence itself is evidence
for multiverse, others have pointed out that the reasoning for this claim
commits the inverse gambler’s fallacy (Goff 2021).
19. The future cannot be potential infinite if static theory of time is true.
20. Modified from Mawson (2011). Mawson does not speak of very large
numbers, but the ‘maximal multiverse hypothesis’, which postulates
every possible universe being actual.
21. It is beyond the scope of this book to discuss the biological design argu-
ment in greater detail; see Kojonen (2021) for a well-balanced discus-
sion. For the purposes of the argument in this paragraph, it suffices to
note that evolution has not eliminated design.
22. For the arguments for this in the biological realm, see Glass (2012);
Kojonen (2021).
23. I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this objection.
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right holder.
5
Arguments for a First Cause
5.1 Introduction
An important issue in philosophy of religion debates concerns whether
there is a First Cause, and if so, what is the First Cause. I shall address the
first question in this chapter and the second question in the next. I shall
begin by considering some of the scientific cosmological models relevant
to addressing the first question, before presenting philosophical argu-
ments against an infinite regress of causes.
5.2 Scientific Issues

According to the so-called Standard Version of the Big Bang (also known
as the Friedmann–Lemaître–Robertson–Walker [FLRW] model), matter-
energy began to exist at the initial cosmological singularity of the Big
Bang. As cosmologists Barrow and Tipler explain, at the initial cosmo-
logical singularity, ‘space and time came into existence; literally nothing
existed before the singularity, so, if the universe originated at such a

196 A. Loke
singularity, we would truly have a creation ex nihilo’ (Barrow and Tipler

1986, p. 442).
Over the years a number of scientists have proposed alternative models
of the Big Bang, and these cosmological models may be classified under
the following types:
Type (1): Originates from a finite past ex nihilo: for example, Vilenkin’s
(1982) ‘Creation from Nothing’ model
Type (2): Originates from Closed Timelike Curves (CTCs) where the
universe ‘creates itself ’, for example, Gott and Li (1998)
Type (3): Originates from a timeless initial state, for example, the Hartle–
Hawking no-boundary proposal (1983)
Type (4): Originates from an actual infinite regress
Type (5): Involves a reversal of time
Type (1) has been discussed in Chaps. 2 and 3, while Type (3) will be
discussed in Chap. 6. I shall discuss Types (2), (4), and (5) in this chapter,
beginning with Type (4).
The following are examples of Type (4) cosmologies:
• Eternal Inflation model (Linde 1994; Aguirre 2007)

• Baum–Frampton (2007) phantom bounce cosmologies
• Veneziano and Gasperini’s (2003) ‘pre-Big Bang theory’ based on ana-
logues of the dualities of string theory
• ‘Ekyroptic universe’ initiated by a collision between pre-existing
‘branes’ in a higher dimensional spacetime (Steinhardt and Turok 2005)
• Conformal cyclic cosmology (CCC) model (Penrose 2010; see below)
• Static Quantum Multiverse model (Nomura 2012)
There are other proposals, such as the Loop Quantum Gravity model
(Bojowald et al. 2004) and Poplawski’s (2010) Black Hole model (which
proposes that our universe might have originated from a black hole that
lies within another universe), which are not committed to whether there
is an actual infinite temporal regress (e.g. whether that universe was born
from a black hole in another universe, which was born from a black hole
in another universe, and so on) or a finite past.
5 Arguments for a First Cause 197
To begin with our evaluation of Type (4) proposals, it should first be

noted that none of these proposals are proven given that we do not cur-
rently have a well-established theory of quantum gravity, without which
these proposals are, in the words of Ellis (2007, section 2.7), ‘strongly
speculative, none being based solidly in well-founded and tested physics’.
Ellis (2007, section 9.3.2) also argues that it is not possible for science to
prove that the universe is past infinite; ‘observations cannot do so, and
the physics required to guarantee this would happen … is untestable.’ It
has been explained in Chap. 4 that, while (1) there are evidences for infla-
tionary Big Bang cosmology and that multiverse is possible, this does not
imply (2) an infinite inflation and infinite multiverse in the past, as illus-
trated by Ellis’ acceptance of (1) but rejection of (2).
The conformal cyclic cosmology (CCC) model (Penrose) proposes
that the universe cycles from one aeon to the next, with each ‘aeon’
involves a big bang followed by an infinite future expansion that even-
tually results in the big bang of the next aeon. Penrose claims that
anomalous regions have been found in the CMB temperature maps
which results from the Hawking radiation from supermassive black
holes in a cosmic aeon prior to our own (An et al. 2020). Other scien-
tists are unconvinced by this purported evidence, objecting that there
is no statistically significant evidence for the presence of such Hawking
points in the CMB (Jow and Scott 2020). Moreover, even if there are
such points, there could be alternative explanations other than cycles
of aeons. In any case, such points do not prove that there are aeons
which are infinite in the past or that there are an infinite cycles of
prior aeons.
On the other hand, cosmological models which attempt to avoid a
beginning face various difficulties related to the Second Law of
Thermodynamics, the Borde–Guth–Vilenkin (BGV) theorem, acausal
fine-tuning, and/or having an unstable or a metastable state with a
finite lifetime (Craig and Sinclair 2009, pp. 179–182; Bussey 2013;
Wall 2013a, 2013b), as well as philosophical arguments against possi-
bility of an infinite regress (Ellis 2007, see section 5.3; it is a pity that
a number of cosmologists have continued to ignore these objections;
see, for example, Susskind 2012). For example, Vilenkin (2015) argues
that the BGV theorem contradicts eternal past inflation. One might
198 A. Loke
try to escape the BGV theorem by (1) postulating an earlier quantum

era in which the theorem does not apply. However, Wall’s work on the
Generalized Second Law of Thermodynamics (GSLT) indicates that
the GSLT would still apply on the quantum era and implies a begin-
ning. One might also try to escape the BGV theorem by (2) postulat-
ing a reversal to the arrow of time (Aguirre 2007). To elaborate, some
forms of bounce cosmologies which postulate that the universe was
born from an entropy-reducing phase in a previous universe and the
entropy reverses at the boundary condition (Linford 2020) have been
proposed to avoid some of these problems. While it has been objected
that such models which attempt to avoid a beginning by postulating a
reversal of the arrow of time nevertheless have a type of ‘thermody-
namic beginning’ which still requires an explanation (Wall 2014),
Carroll replies:
A thermodynamic beginning is not a beginning—it happens in the mid-

dle. It’s a moment in the history of the universe from which entropy is
higher in one direction of time and the other direction of time. There is no
room in such a conception for God to have brought the universe into exis-
tence at any one moment. (Craig and Carroll 2015)
Nevertheless, there is a deeper problem which Carroll neglected (this

neglect may be related to Carroll’s dismissal of the Causal Principle,
which I have responded to in Chap. 2), and that is the problem of causal
dependence (Fig. 5.1):
Fig. 5.1 Bounce Cosmology with entropy reversal

According to these types of bounce cosmologies, event x1 is the first

event of universe 1 (U1), while event y1 is the first event of universe 2
(U2). Events x1, x2, … and events y1, y2, … have a beginning (i.e. these
events are finite temporally and have ‘edges’; see Chaps. 2 and 3). Given
the Causal Principle that whatever begins to exist has a cause (see Chap. 3),
if the beginning of x2 is causally dependent on the beginning of x1, what
brought about x1 at the boundary condition? Likewise, given that the
beginning of y2 is causally dependent on the beginning of y1, what brought
about y1 at the boundary condition?
Linford suggests that the universes to either side of the interface might
be interpreted as the simultaneous causes of each other. He writes:
Supposing (as Craig argues) that there are no instants … Instead, there
exists an interval of time whose boundary is the interface between the two
universes. Consequently … for every existent temporal interval, U1 and
U2 co-exist. There is no need to introduce an independent cause for the
interface, and we can interpret U1 and U2 as the simultaneous causes of
each other. (p. 24)
However, the view that U1 and U2—or more precisely, x1 (the first
event of U1) and y1 (the first event of U2)—are simultaneous causes of
each other violate the irreflexivity of causation and amounts to a vicious
circularity: on this view the beginning of existence of U1 is dependent on
the beginning of existence of U2, which depends on the beginning of
existence U1 in order to begin to exist (see the critique of causal loop and
Gott and Li’s (1998) proposal below).
One might claim that causal dependency stops at the boundary condi-
tion (or moment of minimal entropy), and it is this condition that all later
events depend upon in either time direction.1 This implies that the bound-
ary condition is the First Cause that brought about x1 and y1. However,
the boundary condition is something that is temporally finite and has
‘edges’, and as argued in Chap. 2, such a thing would require a cause, and
thus cannot be the first cause. Moreover, as I shall explain in Chap. 6, the
independently existing First Cause must be something with (1) the capac-
ity to initiate the first event, and also (2) the capacity to prevent itself from
initiating the first event. These two capacities describe libertarian
200 A. Loke
freedom. Therefore, the First Cause has libertarian freedom and hence is
a Creator; it cannot be an impersonal boundary condition which Carrol
describes. It would be of no use for Carroll to argue that such bounce
cosmologies are mathematically possible, for it has already be explained in
Chap. 1 that, even if a cosmological model is mathematically possible, it
cannot be a correct model of the cosmos if it is metaphysically impossible.
Against Craig and Sinclair (2009, 2012), who have argued the low-
entropy interface between universes should be understood as the begin-
ning of two universes and this beginning requires an efficient cause
beyond either of the two universes, Linford (2020) attempts to present a
dilemma for them.
Linford argues that, on the one hand, if the direction of time is reduc-
ible, then efficient causation would most likely reducible as well given the
Mentaculus (see Chap. 2), and thus even if the interface should be inter-
preted as an absolute beginning for two universes, these universes would
probably not require a cause (p. 3). I have already argued in Chap. 2 why
this horn of the dilemma is false.
In any case, let us consider the second horn of the dilemma. Linford
argues that, on the other hand, if the direction of time is not reducible (as
Craig in fact argued),2 then ‘we are left without reason to think that the
direction of time aligns with the entropy gradient … then the direction of
time need not point away from the interface in two directions. So, Craig
and Sinclair’s interpretation of the interface as an absolute beginning is
unjustified’ (pp. 16–17), and ‘there’s no longer reason to suppose that the
direction of efficient causation would align with the entropy gradient’
(pp. 16–17). In that case, events in a cosmological epoch of higher entropy
could be the causes of events in an epoch of lower entropy. Linford writes:
the fact that geodesics can be extended through the interface provides some
reason to think that the interface should be interpreted as a transition from
one universe to another and not as an absolute beginning for two universes.
Again, we can imagine God—or the fictional agent occupying the view-from-
nowhere—watching as metaphysical time passes, the world unfurling through
ages of entropy decrease, until the entropy begins to increase once more.
(pp. 26–7; cf. Halper 2021, p. 161, who argues that on Loop Quantum
Cosmology [LQC], one has ‘two classical space-times joined by a quantum
bridge giving an hour-glass structure but with no reversal of the arrow of time’.)
However, if the direction of time does not point away from the inter-
face in different directions but in the same direction, this would imply
that the universe was born from an entropy-reducing phase in a previous
universe and would violate the Generalized Second Law of
Thermodynamics (see Wall 2013a, 2013b).
Linford (2020, pp. 18–19) claims that ‘we already know that the sec-
ond law of thermodynamics is a statistical regularity that admits of excep-
tions’ without engaging with Wall’s work on the general second law. In
the entry on ‘Singularities and Black Holes’ in The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, Curiel (2019) notes that the recent important work by Wall
(2013a, 2013b) indicates that the Generalized Second Law ‘seems to
admit of proof in ways much more mathematically rigorous than does
the ordinary Second Law … Indeed, the Generalized Second Law is the
only known physical law that unites the fields of general relativity, quan-
tum mechanics, and thermodynamics. As such, it seems currently to be
the most promising window we have into the most fundamental struc-
tures of the physical world.’
Halper (2021, p. 161) objects by arguing that Wall’s results may not
hold in full quantum gravity, concluding that ‘this really underlies the
view from cosmology today. Without a well-verified theory of quantum
gravity, we cannot meaningfully describe the origin of our expanding
universe and so we are in no position to say that cosmology implies a
beginning to the universe.’ Halper fails to note that the same problem
(i.e. the lack of a well-verified theory of quantum gravity) also besets the
cosmological models (which he cited) which affirms a beginningless
physical reality. Wall’s work is a good counterargument to those cosmolo-
gists who (despite the lack of a well-verified theory of quantum gravity)
have argued that a beginningless model of physical reality is physically
possible. Moreover, Halper also fails to note Wall’s (2013a) statement
that, since the (fine-grained) Generalized Second Law of Horizon
Thermodynamics is ‘widely believed to hold as a consequence of the sta-
tistical mechanical properties of quantum gravitational degrees of free-
dom, it is a good candidate for a physical law likely to hold even in a full
theory of quantum gravity’ (p. 2; italics mine). Wall also shows that the
Generalized Second Law implies a ‘quantum singularity theorem’, which
indicates that, even when quantum effects are taken into account,
202 A. Loke
spacetime will still be geodesically incomplete inside black holes and to

the past in cosmological models (like the currently most well supported
ones, which start with a Big Bang singularity) (Wall 2013a, 2013b).
Moreover, if (as Linford suggests) the direction of time point in the
same direction, then given that an infinite regress of events is impossible
(as indicated by the philosophical arguments below), which implies that
an infinite regress of transitions is impossible, there must still be a first
event which requires a First Cause given the Causal Principle defended in
Chap. 2. It should be noted that, while on such models time goes towards
infinity in both entropy directions, this does not imply that an actual
infinity can be obtained in both directions; rather, this can be understood
as potential infinite3 which is always finite at any time.
It might be thought that the law of conservation of energy which states
that the energy of a closed system must remain constant implies that
‘energy cannot be created’ and that the universe has no beginning and
end. However, what ‘energy cannot be created’ means is just that the total
energy of an isolated system is constant. The fact that this law does not
imply that the universe has no beginning can be seen by considering the
Zero Energy universe Theory. This theory postulates that, ‘in the case of
a universe that is approximately uniform in space, one can show that the
negative gravitational energy exactly cancels the positive energy repre-
sented by the matter. So the total energy of the universe is zero’ (Hawking
1988, p. 129).
When this is applied to the beginning of the universe, it indicates the
possibility that the Big Bang has no material cause. Hawking states that
‘When the Big Bang produced a massive amount of positive energy, it
simultaneously produced the same amount of negative energy. In this
way, the positive and the negative add up to zero, always. It’s another law
of nature’ (Hawking 2018, p. 32). Cosmologist Sean Carroll suggests
that this theory can be used to explain why the Big Bang is consistent
with the first law of thermodynamics, which states that the total energy
of an isolated system is constant. For if the positive energy and negative
energy of our universe balanced up to zero, then there is no violation of
the first law of thermodynamics if our universe began to exist from zero
energy.4 As explained in Chap. 2, while this response implies that our
universe has no material cause, it does not imply that our universe has no
efficient cause; indeed, it does not imply that there is no requirement for
a Creator to make the total energy of zero to be the way they are such that
galaxies and gravity are formed while the total energy remain constant at
zero. Given the deductive (Modus Tollens) argument for the Causal
Principle ‘whatever begins to exist has a cause’, where ‘cause’ is either an
efficient cause or a material cause (see Chap. 3), one should still ask what
is the efficient cause which made the positive and negative energy to be
the way they are (see Chap. 6). One can argue that God created the uni-
verse without using pre-existing material (i.e. ex nihilo), and this would
not be a violation of the first law of thermodynamics because the total
amount of energy of our universe after creation is still zero.5 In any case,
the determination of the equation of the law of conservation of energy
assumes a closed physical system; hence, it does not rule out a supernatu-
ral cause creating it supernaturally, unless we beg the question by assum-
ing that a closed physical system is all there is.6
Finally, the limitations of science with regard to the realism–anti-
realism debate in physics and cosmology should be noted. Moreland and
Craig (2003, p. 334) observes that, in the history of science, many theo-
ries (e.g. aether theory) have explained phenomena, generated fruitful
research and accurate predictions, yet were later abandoned as false.
Hawking recognizes this limitation when, in speaking of the reach of sci-
ence, he affirms anti-realism by stating that science consists only of mod-
els, but when he speaks of scientific results, he argues with inappropriate
confidence for a self-contained universe, thus contradicting himself
(Giberson and Artigas 2007, p. 118).
I do not wish to overstate the limitations of science by claiming that all
models should be interpreted in anti-realist terms. Rather, we should
decide on a case-by-case basis and do so if there are good philosophical
reasons to think so. The importance of philosophical considerations have
already been demonstrated in Chap. 1, in particular, it has been demon-
strated that metaphysical considerations are more fundamental than
mathematical considerations. Thus, ‘if we have good philosophical rea-
sons for believing that the spacetime universe had a beginning a finite
time ago, then if a “successful” scientific model runs counter to this belief,
it may be best to interpret the model in antirealist terms’ (Moreland and
Craig 2003, p. 344). The five arguments against an infinite regress which
204 A. Loke
I discuss below are based on similar metaphysical considerations which

are derived from understanding the nature of the world.
5.3 Introducing the Philosophical Arguments

Against an Infinite Regress of Causes
and Events
There are at least five arguments which have been offered to rule out an
actual infinite regress of causes and events:
1. The argument from the impossibility of concrete actual infinities

2. The argument from the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite
3. The argument from the viciousness of dependence regress
4. The argument from the Grim Reaper paradox (Pruss 2018;
Koons 2014)
5. The argument from Methuselah’s diary paradox (Waters 2013)
Each of these arguments is independent of the other, and any one of

these arguments would be sufficient to demonstrate that an actual infi-
nite regress is not the case. Therefore, it is not enough for the objector of
finite regress to rebut one of these arguments; rather, the objector would
need to rebut all five of them (and perhaps others). It is important to
emphasize this point, because it has often been wrongly assumed (e.g. by
Zarepour 2020, p. 17) that if one rebuts (say) the argument against con-
crete actual infinities (aka the Hilbert Hotel Argument), then one has
rebutted the KCA. (Zarepour fails to consider that, even if a concrete
actual infinite [e.g. an actual infinite number of stars] is possible, this
does not imply that an actual infinite can be traversed [e.g. finish count-
ing an actual infinite number of stars one after another], nor does it imply
that an infinite causal regress is not vicious, etc.) The argument against
concrete actual infinities has been subjected to numerous objections in
recent literature; I don’t think the objections are compelling and I have
replied to many of them elsewhere and developed a new version of the
argument (Loke 2012, 2014b, 2016b, 2016c, 2017b, 2021a). However,
to reply to the rest of them here would take up too much space, and is in
any case unnecessary for the main argument of this book, since (as I have
explained earlier) the KCA does not depend on this argument. Hence, I
shall reserve my reply for future publications.
Arguments 4 and 5 have been defended at length by others elsewhere
(Pruss 2018; Koons 2014; Waters 2013). A modified and easy-to-follow
version of argument 4 can be briefly stated as follows7:
A piece of paper is passed down from the past to the present, from
person to person. If it is blank, someone would write his unique name on
it; if it is not blank, it is simply passed on. Suppose the past is infinite.
When the paper reaches you, what is written? Something must have been
written by then, yet nothing could have been written because any name
that might have been written would have been a different name, that is,
the name of the person before. In other words,
1. If the past is infinite, then the paper being passed down from the past
to the present would have a name written on it.
2. If the past is infinite, then the paper being passed down from the past
to the present could not have any name written on it.
3. Anything that entails a contradiction cannot exist.
4. Therefore, the past cannot be infinite. (From 1, 2, and 3)
In addition, Pruss (2018) has argued that an actual infinite causal

chain results in a number of other paradoxes, and the simplest and most
elegant solution is to accept causal finitism, which implies an uncaused
First Cause (see also the Gong Peal paradox defended in Luna and
Erasmus 2020).
In what follows, I shall briefly discuss the argument from the impos-
sibility of traversing an actual infinite and the argument from the vicious-
ness of dependence regress.
206 A. Loke
5.4 A
rgument Against Traversing
an Actual Infinite
Think about a series of events (whether microscopic or macroscopic).
Suppose event1 begins at time t1, event1 causes event2 at t2, event2 causes
event3 at t3, and so on. The number of events can increase with time, but
there can never be an actual infinite number of events at any time, for no
matter how many events there are at any time, the number of events is
still finite: If there are 1000 events at t1000, 1000 events is still a finite
number; if there are 100,000 events at t100,000, 100,000 events is still a
finite number, and so on. This illustrates that an actual infinite is greater
than the number which can be traversed one after another at any time,
because finite (one) + finite (another) = finite.
Since it is impossible to traverse an actual infinite number of events
from event1, it is likewise impossible to traverse an actual infinite number
of earlier events to event1, given that the number of events required to be
traversed in both cases is the same. Thus, the number of events earlier
than event1 (and likewise, the number of earlier causes and durations)
cannot be an actual infinite. Therefore, there must be a first event. As
cosmologists Ellis et al. observe:
a realized past infinity in time is not considered possible from this stand-
point—because it involves an infinite set of completed events or moments.
There is no way of constructing such a realized set, or actualising it. (Ellis
et al. 2004, p. 927)
To illustrate, the set of earlier years is formed by a one-by-one process,

for example, one year (e.g. 2018) followed by one year (2019). ‘One’ year
is a finite number. Finite + finite = finite. Finite + finite cannot form an
actual infinite. Hence, it is impossible to form or complete an actual infi-
nite number of years. Thus, the number of earlier years cannot be actual
infinite.
As an example of a series of events, one can think of a person marking
a stroke each year. An argument against an actual infinite series of earlier
events can be formulated as follows:
1. If the series of earlier (yearly) events is an actual infinite, then a person

marking a stroke each year would have experienced8 the accumulation
of an actual infinite series of strokes by a one-by-one process.
2. It is not possible for a person marking a stroke each year to experience
the accumulation of an actual infinite series of strokes by a one-by-
one process.
3. Therefore, it is not possible that the series of earlier (yearly) events is
an actual infinite.
For premise 1, consider the series of years BCE. If the series is an actual
infinite, then the series of strokes would be actual infinite, and if the
series is finite, then the series of strokes would be finite. The phrase ‘expe-
rienced the accumulation of an actual infinite series of strokes by a one-
by-one process’ means that the person would experience the existence of
a series of strokes which is not given together all at once, but added one
at a time (i.e. she would have added one stroke at 1 BCE, added one
stroke at 2 BCE … etc.) and forming the series as they do so. The series
of strokes is supposed to have been made up by each stroke; none of the
strokes existed beginninglessly. Each of them was added at some finite
point earlier in time, one by one. At each point in time only a finite num-
ber is added to the series, which is formed as a result.
Now, if we suppose that there is no beginning to the process, then
there is no specific point in time at which the person would have the expe-
rience of the accumulation of an actual infinite number of strokes, for in
that case at every year (not any specific year) there is supposed to be a total-
ity of actual infinite. For example, the number would be actual infinite at
1 BCE (since she would have added one stroke at 2 BCE, one stroke at 3
BCE … etc.); likewise, it would be actual infinite at 2 BCE (since she
would have added one stroke at 3 BCE, one stroke at 4 BCE … etc.). In
other words, there would be no point in time at which there is a transi-
tion from having a finite number to having an actual infinite number of
strokes. Rather, at each year BCE a stroke would have been added to a
series of strokes that was already (supposedly) actually infinite.
Nevertheless, we still need to ask how is that series of strokes constituted
in the first place. Obviously, it is constituted by a one-by-one process,
that is, one (finite) stroke being added (e.g. at 3 BCE) followed by one
208 A. Loke
(finite) stroke being added (e.g. at 2 BCE). But can such a series be
infinite?
Premise 2 is based on the fact that a one-by-one process cannot consti-
tute an actual infinite series, because finite + finite = finite.
Objectors to the argument against traversing an actual infinite often
claim that the argument begs the question by assuming a starting point,
for if there is a beginningless series with an actual infinite number of
earlier events, then an actually infinite sequence has already been tra-
versed (Morriston 2013, pp. 26–27).
In reply, the argument against traversing an actual infinite is based on
the nature of a one-by-one process, that is, finite + finite = finite, it is not
based on starting at a point and therefore does not beg the question. To
elaborate, without begging the question by assuming a starting point or
by presupposing whether the number of events earlier than any time tp is
infinite or not, think of a series of events in the midst of being constituted
by a one-by-one process (Fig. 5.2):
There is one event P produced at time tp . (Note that I stated ‘there is
one event P produced at time tp’; I did not state or assume that a total of
one event has been produced by tp, which is false if there are events earlier
than tp.) There is event P followed by event Q produced at tp and tq and
together they constitute two events, there are events P, Q, and R pro-
duced at tp, tq, and tr, respectively, and together they constitute three
events, and so on. The series of events is constituted by each event. The
series is constituted by a finite number (e.g. ‘one’) of event/s and a finite
number (‘another’) of event/s, and together they constitute a finite num-
ber of events, not-possibly an actual infinite number of events.
The above conclusion is not based on presupposing ‘a particular time
as a starting point’ or that the number of earlier events is not actual infi-
nite; thus, it is not question begging. Rather, the conclusion is based on
the nature of the one-by-one sequential process (Finite + Finite = Finite),
and how any concrete series of events is constituted. For example, P could
time ------tn---------to---------tp--------- tq --------- tr----------ts----------
event ----->N -----> O ------> P--------> Q -------> R---------->S-------->….
Fig. 5.2 A series of events being constituted

be (say) marking a stroke on a piece of paper at a certain year and Q could

be adding a stroke the next year in the process of forming a series of
strokes. Consider the following demonstration by mathematical induc-
tion which, contrary to its name, is a deductive proof which shows that
the process would result in a natural number and hence finite number of
strokes: A set S is an inductive set if for every element x of S, the successor
of x is also in S. Let n be a natural number. Since the set of natural num-
bers is an inductive set, n + 1 is a natural number for all natural n. If
n + m is a natural number, then n + (m + 1) = (n + m) + 1 is also natural
number since the set of natural numbers is an inductive set. Therefore,
n + m is a natural number (which would be a finite number) for all n and
m by mathematical induction.9
A sceptic might object that the above argument only implies that the
series of events that happened between time tp and any time later than tp
is finite; it does not imply that the series of events prior to tp is finite, and
therefore does not exclude a beginningless series of events with an actual
infinite number of earlier events.
This objection however fails to note that the above argument is
intended to show how any series of events is constituted in the first place,
and that ‘any series of events’ would include the series of events prior to
tp which, following the above argument, would be finite as well. In other
words, the above argument is intended to illustrate how any series of
events constituted by a finite number (‘one’) of events being added fol-
lowed by another finite number (‘another’) of events being added would
result in only a finite series of events. Now the series of earlier events is
such a series of events. Thus, the number of earlier events must be finite.
Concerning the phrase ‘the accumulation of a series of strokes by a
one-by-one process’, a sceptic might object by citing Morriston, who
notes that, if the series of years is a beginningless series in which every
year BCE was preceded by another, then ‘each year BCE would have been
‘added to’ a running total of years that was already infinite’ (Morriston
2021, p. 8n.5). In other words, while it is impossible to start with fini-
tude and constitute an actual infinite, in the case of a beginningless series
of events one does not start with finitude; rather, an actual infinite is
already constituted at each moment. At each moment a finite number
(one) is added to an actual infinite (and not to a finite number). Thus, if
210 A. Loke
the number of earlier years is an actual infinite, then a person marking a

stroke each year would experience a finite number adding to an actual
infinite number of strokes at each year. Finite + infinite + = infinite
In reply, it should be noted that the point I am making is different
from Morriston’s. His point is that, if the series of earlier events is actually
infinite, then there already is an infinite series, to which a finite element
is added. In other words, Morriston is thinking in terms of adding a finite
element to the series of events which already exists. This does not answer
the more fundamental question of how the series is constituted by its
individual elements in the first place (and one must be careful not to beg
the question by assuming that a beginningless series can exist).
Whereas I am thinking of the more fundamental question of how any
series of events is constituted by its elements. I am thinking in terms of
what is being added (i.e. one finite element followed by one finite ele-
ment) to constitute the series (that is the meaning of the phrase ‘the accu-
mulation of a series of strokes by a one-by-one process’).
Finite + finite = finite thus refers to the (finite) elements that constitute
the series; it is more foundational than the series which they metaphysi-
cally ground. The series of events is constituted by one (finite) element
being added followed by one (finite) element being added. The essential
feature of this one-by-one sequential process is that the series of strokes is
supposed to have been made up by each stroke; none of the strokes existed
beginninglessly. Each of them was added at some finite point earlier in
time, one by one. This point is illustrated by Fig. 5.2 and the mathemati-
cal induction proof, which is about how each element which are added
into the series at each year constitute the whole, without begging the
question either way. That is, without assuming whether the total number
of elements in the series of earlier events is already infinite or not, the fact
remains that the series is constituted by its elements, and each element is
a finite quantity (i.e. ‘one’ event is a finite quantity), and together they
constitute a finite quantity because finite + finite = finite; therefore, the
series of earlier events cannot be actually infinite. This conclusion is
arrived at without first assuming that the total number of elements in the
series is not infinite, and hence the argument does not beg the question.
In other words, the problem with postulating a beginningless series of
events is that, even though it supposedly does not start with finitude but
already has an infinitude, nevertheless the infinitude is still supposed to

have been constituted by a one-by-one sequential process, which, as
shown above, is impossible. It is true that, if the number of earlier years
is an actual infinite, then a person marking a stroke each year would expe-
rience a finite number adding to an actual infinite number of strokes at
each year. However, the problem is that the actual infinite number of
strokes which supposedly already exist at each year is supposed to have
been experienced by the person to have been constituted by a one-by-one
process, which as shown above is impossible.
In summary, the objector claims that there is a distinction between
constituting a series of later events from a particular event (a beginning)
and constituting a series of earlier events to a particular event, and while
it is impossible to constitute an actual infinite in the former case, it has
not been shown to be impossible in the latter case. Contrary to this claim,
I have argued that the number of elements required to be constituted by
a one-by-one process is the same for both cases, and this implies the same
impossibility for both cases because finite + finite = finite. Thus, the
objection fails.
Against the explanation that ‘any finite quantity plus another finite
quantity is always a finite quantity’, Malpass (2019) objects that the ques-
tion is, ‘how long we have been doing it for. The lesson seems to be that if
you only count for a finite amount of time, then you cannot construct an
actual infinite by successive addition, but if you do it for an actually infi-
nite amount of time, then you can.’ In other words, if George has been
counting −1 at t − 1, −2 at t − 2 … he would have counted an actual infi-
nite and there would be no longer any more number of a negative infinite
series to count.
However, such an objection ignores how the series of counting is con-
stituted in the first place. It is constituted by one (finite) element being
added followed by one (finite) element being added, which (as explained
above) cannot constitute an infinite number. The set (an abstraction) of
earlier events is grounded in the existence of its concrete members (each
event), which constitute the set. Since the series of earlier events is consti-
tuted by individual (i.e. a finite number of ) event being added followed
by individual(finite) event being added, the series must be finite.
Moreover, the supposition that there is already an actual infinite time in
212 A. Loke
the past entails the possibility that finite + finite = infinite, but as explained

previously the consequent is impossible; hence, the antecedent is
impossible.
A sceptic might object that, if the process of one (finite) element being
added followed by one (finite) element being added has been happening
from an actual infinite past (i.e. if one repeats this process an infinite
number of times), then an actual infinite number of elements would have
been added to the series.
My reply is that an actual infinite number of elements is not supposed
to have been added all at once, but one after another. To repeat a process
actual infinite number of times, one needs to first proceed one time after
another, but the problem is that the result of that process is always finite
at any time, because ‘one time’ (‘finite’) after ‘another’ (‘finite’) implies
finite + finite which is equal finite. Thus, the result of that process is
always finite, because the number of each stroke is a finite number, and
finite+ finite cannot be infinite. Therefore, one cannot have been adding
from an actual infinite past since this entails the impossible consequence
that finite + finite can be infinite. This reply does not beg the question
because there is an independent proof that natural (finite) number + nat-
ural (finite) number = natural (finite) number using mathematical induc-
tion (see above).
In their defence of the argument against traversing an actual infinite,
Craig and Sinclair (2009, p. 124) state that this argument would not
work on a static theory of time because a series that was formed sequen-
tially, one event occurring after another such that the collection grows
with time, presupposes a dynamic theory of time. Whereas on the static
theory of time, a series of events is not formed by addition of later events
(which come-to-be) to earlier events; rather, the collection of events is a
collection whose members all tenselessly coexist and are equally real. It
would be like an infinitely long ruler with an infinite number of mark-
ings, with different features at each marking.
Craig himself has responded to this objection by providing a number
of arguments against the static theory of time and defending the dynamic
theory of time (Craig 2000a, 2000b). In what follows, I shall argue that,
even if the static theory of time is true, it remains the case that a series is
experienced to be forming over time by successive addition, and if the
number of earlier events is infinite, the formation of an infinite series by

successive addition would be experienced by someone living as long as
time exists, but, as argued above, this is not possible.
A sceptic would object that on the static theory of time our experience
of a series forming over time by successive addition is illusory, just as our
experiences of the flow of time and the ‘time arrow’ is illusory; on a static
theory there is no ‘progression’ and any specification of temporal points
is arbitrary.10
Nevertheless, even if the static theory of time is true, it remains the
case that our experience of ‘a series forming over time by successive addi-
tion’ exists, even if this experience is illusory. For example, we can obvi-
ously mark a stroke on a piece of paper at time tp, add another stroke at
tq and so on, hence forming a series of strokes. In other words, we can
still experience a series forming over time by the addition of a finite num-
ber of element(s) (e.g. ‘one event’) followed by the addition of a finite
number of element(s) (e.g. ‘another event’). This is different from the
infinite ruler case which does not involve the experiencing of adding one
element after another over time. Likewise, we have experiences of prog-
ress and of specifying each year, for example, marking each year with
(say) a stroke and adding another stroke the following year (finite +
finite). In other words, even if there is no progress (given the static the-
ory), yet it would seem to the person that there is progressive addition of
strokes in the sense explained above. These experiences exist even if they
are illusory. Illusory just means that our experience of the world is not
true of the world; nevertheless, it remains true of the world that we have
the experience. For example, it seems to me that I was in Hawaii last
night, but in fact I wasn’t at Hawaii; it was a dream. Nevertheless, it is
true of the world that I had a dream in which it seems to me that I was at
Hawaii. Now my seemings cannot involve a logical or mathematical
impossibility. For example, it is impossible that I dream about a shapeless
square or 2 + 2 = 5. Such impossibilities cannot exist anywhere, not even
in our illusions or dreams. Hence, anything that entails the possibility of
a person experience (whether as an illusion or not) such an impossibility
must be false. Now if there is a beginningless series of events in which the
number of earlier years is an actual infinite, this entails that a person
experiencing the marking of each year with (say) a stroke and adding
214 A. Loke
another stroke the following year (finite + finite) would experience the
series constituted by what is added, and what is added is not added all at
once, but one by one; that is, she would experience11 finite + finite = infi-
nite.12 (This point remains valid regardless of whether the static theory of
time is true.) The consequent is mathematically impossible. Hence, the
antecedent is impossible.
Against the argument for the impossibility of an infinite regress, Russell
(1969, p. 453) objects that there could be an actual infinite series of nega-
tive integers ending with minus one and having no first term. Likewise,
Graham Oppy asks us to consider the series …, −n, …, −3, −2, −1. He
writes: ‘In this series, each member is obtained from the preceding mem-
ber by the addition of a unit’ (Oppy 2006a, p. 117).
In response, it should be noted that a negative or positive cardinal
number series is a case of abstract actual infinite which exists timelessly
rather than constituted by a one-after-another temporal process. Thus, it
does not provide a counterexample to the claim that an actual infinite
cannot be constituted by a one-after-another process in the concrete
world. While each member of the abstract negative cardinal number
series …, −n, …, −3, −2, −1 is ‘obtained’ from the preceding member by
the addition of a unit, this ‘obtaining’ is in the form of timeless mathe-
matical ordering relation. It is not the case that the abstract number –2
(say) is brought about in time by the addition of a unit to –3. Rather, the
abstract numbers –2 and –3 have always existed timelessly, and this is
unlike a causal series of concrete entities existing in time (note that static
theory of time is not timeless, see Chap. 2). One can have an abstract
actual infinite number of negative numbers each of which is timelessly
separated from zero by a finite number of negative numbers. The exis-
tence of each of the number in the series is not causally dependent on any
previous number, nor is it dependent on the actual infinite number which
exists outside of the series. However, to constitute a series by a one-after-
another causal process is a different matter. In contrast with a series of
timeless numbers, a temporal series of causes and effects is constituted
over time by adding one element after another, and each effect in time is
causally dependent on a prior cause. The process proceeds one after
another, constituting a finite number at any time. While the number of
(say) cardinal numbers is an (abstract) actual infinite, the number of
future events that has been constituted is clearly not an actual infinite
because it is impossible to traverse an actual infinite as argued above, and
I have argued that likewise the number of earlier events cannot be actual
infinite as well.
In summary, a number series is a set the elements of which can be
ordered one after another; it is not a series which is constituted over time
by adding one element after another. Even if there could have been an
actual infinite number of elements (e.g. abstract numbers) each of which
is a finite quantity, this does not imply that there could have been an
actual infinite series formed by successive addition of elements each of
which is a finite quantity. On the contrary, a successive addition of ele-
ments each of which is a finite quantity cannot constitute an infinite
series, because finite + finite = finite. That is why no infinite series can be
formed by successive addition.
The point of the argument is that an actual infinite number of events
cannot be constituted at any time. The objector suggests the hypothesis
of a series of events that is infinitely long. However, in order to constitute
an actual infinite number of events in the first place, the process has to
proceed one event after another, and the problem is that the result of that
process is always finite at any time. One does not constitute an actual
infinite at any time, not at t1000, t100000, or t1000000. As noted earlier, actual
infinite stands outside of the series, timelessly and abstractly. As Copan
and Craig (2017, p. 309) observe: ‘Necessarily, given any finite number
n, n+1 equals a finite number. Hence, aleph0 has no immediate predeces-
sor; it is not the terminus of the natural number series but stands, as it
were, outside it and is the number of all the numbers in the series.’ But
here we are talking about what happens in a series of events in the con-
crete world, not timelessly and abstractly. The proponent of KCA is refer-
ring to what happens in the concrete world when he/she argues that an
actual infinite number of events cannot have been constituted at any time
t; therefore, the number of events earlier than t is finite and hence has a
first member (i.e. a first event) which (given the Causal Principle) has a
First Cause. If one wants to talk about the timelessly abstract which has
no causal powers, that would be irrelevant as an objection to the KCA
and does not block the conclusion of the argument that there is a
First Cause.
216 A. Loke
Morriston (2013, pp. 26–27) claims: ‘From the fact that we cannot—

beginning now—complete the task of enumerating all the events in a
beginningless series, it does not follow that the present event cannot
arrive or that a beginningless series of events that have already arrived is
impossible. To suppose otherwise would be to confuse the items to be
enumerated with the enumerating of them—it would be like arguing
that there must be finitely many natural numbers because we can’t finish
counting them.’
In reply, constituting a series to the present from a beginningless past
would require the number of events constituted to be actual infinite, but
an actual infinite is too large to be constituted by a one-after-another
process. The problem is not due to our ability to enumerate; rather, it is
due to the nature of an actual infinite which is too large to be constituted
by a one-after-another process. While there can be an infinite number of
natural numbers in the abstract, to constitute an actual infinite in the
concrete is a separate issue and the real issue here.
One might object that there could be an actual infinite number of
points between (say) time t0 and t1 (just as there is an actual infinite of real
numbers between 0 and 1) which is traversed in a manner similar to
Zeno’s supposed paradox of motion. In a similar vein, one might object
that there could be an actual infinite number of events between t0 and t1.
Where our universe is concerned, there might not be a first point of time
at t0 (Pitts 2008).
Three points can be made in response.
First, having a beginning does not require having a beginning point
(Craig and Sinclair 2012, p. 99). It has been explained in Chap. 2 that
something has a beginning if it has a temporal extension, the extension is
finite, and it does not have a static closed loop or a changeless phase that
avoids a boundary. Suppose t0–t1 is the first temporal interval. Even if
there were an actual infinite number of points/events between t0 and t1
and there is no first point of time at t0, the extension of t0–t1 is still finite
because the points/events sum up to a duration that is finite in magni-
tude. Therefore (if it does not have a static closed loop or a changeless
phase that avoids a boundary; see Sect. 5.6 and Chap. 6), the series of
points/events would still have a beginning, and hence (given the argu-
ment in Chap. 3) would still require a cause. (To elaborate, suppose an
increasing in strength of electric field occurred at time interval t8–t9. Even

if there were an actual infinite number of events between t8 and t9 and
there is no first point of time at t8, the extension of t0–t1 is still finite and
has temporal boundaries. We know from experience that such an increas-
ing in strength of electric field is caused when [say] I switched on an
electric field generator. Now, the Modus Tollens argument defended in
Chap. 3 implies that, if our universe begins uncaused at time interval
t0–t1, there would be no difference between that event and the increase in
strength of electric field at t8–t9 where beginning to exist uncaused is
concerned, and thus the latter would also begin uncaused, which is not
the case; hence, the antecedent is not the case.)
Second, the argument for the impossibility of traversing an actual infi-
nite has a crucial disanalogy with Zeno’s paradox of motion. In the case
of the argument, the events in a temporal series are actual. By contrast, in
the case of Zeno’s paradox, the interval traversed can be regarded as being
potentially infinitely divisible and not actually infinitely divided. In other
words, one can keep on dividing the interval by half without ever ending
up with an actual infinite number of divisions. The claim that Achilles
must pass through an infinite number of halfway points in order to cross
the stadium begs the question by assuming that the whole interval is a
composition of an infinite number of points which have been traversed
(Craig and Sinclair 2009, p. 119). (One might object, ‘but how could
one distinguish between those that are actual events and those that are
only potential events?’13 In reply, this is a question about epistemology
[How we distinguish?]. Whereas the arguments in this section concerns
ontology: they demonstrate that, ontologically, there cannot be a tra-
versal of an actual infinite in the concrete world. The epistemological
question [How we distinguish?] is irrelevant as an objection to the argu-
ment which concerns ontology, and therefore fails to rebut the conclu-
sion that there cannot be a traversal of an actual infinite in the concrete
world. In other words, even if we are not able to distinguish between
those that are actual events and those that are only potential events, it
remains the case that—ontologically—there are only a finite number of
events that are traversed.)
Third, I shall explain below that it is fallacious to think of time as a
continuum of points.
218 A. Loke
Against this, one might object that, at the level of fundamental phys-
ics, events may be analogous to points. In other words, events may not be
discrete entities in a causal chain; rather, causality could be continuous in
nature.14
In reply, on the one hand, it has not been proven that spacetime is a
continuum made up of actual infinite number of points. Cosmologist
George Ellis notes that ‘there is no experiment that can prove there is a
physical continuum in time or space; all we can do is test spacetime struc-
ture on smaller and smaller scales, but we cannot approach the Planck
scale.’ A distinction should be made between mathematical models of the
physical world and the physical world itself. Craig and Sinclair (2012,
p. 100) explain that it has not been proven that space and time really are
composed of an actual infinity of points rather than simply being mod-
elled as such in general relativity. While infinities are useful mathemati-
cally, that does not imply that concrete infinities exist, just as the fact that
imaginary numbers (e.g. √−1) are mathematically useful does not imply
that that they correspond to concrete entities (they obviously don’t!).
Infinities, like imaginary numbers, can be regarded as useful abstract
tools. Imaginary numbers work as a shorthand for mathematical opera-
tions involving real numbers. Likewise, infinities may work as approxi-
mations or generalizations. For example, the idea of infinities can be
understood as approximations which have proven to be useful in address-
ing problems concerning pendulums, chemical decay, coagulation kinet-
ics, diffusion, convection, economic equilibrium, and fluid and air flow.
Tegmark explains:
Consider, for example, the air in front of you. Keeping track of the posi-
tions and speeds of octillions of atoms would be hopelessly complicated.
But if you ignore the fact that air is made of atoms and instead approximate
it as a continuum—a smooth substance that has a density, pressure, and
velocity at each point—you’ll find that this idealized air obeys a beautifully
simple equation explaining almost everything we care about: how to build
airplanes, how we hear them with sound waves, how to make weather fore-
casts, and so forth. Yet despite all that convenience, air of course isn’t truly
continuous. I think it’s the same way for space, time, and all the other
building blocks of our physical world. (Tegmark 2015)
In some cases infinities can be understood abstractly as a limit concept,

or as generalizations as in a polygon circle. Regarding infinitesimal calcu-
lus, Oxford philosopher A.W. Moore points out that mathematicians
using calculus can uphold claims ostensibly about infinitesimals or about
infinite additions, knowing that they are only making disguised general-
izations about what are in fact finite quantities (Moore 2001, p. 73).
Various scientists and philosophers have also argued that time and space
could be a set of discrete entities of extended simples (i.e. a spatiotempo-
ral entity that has no proper parts and does not have the shape and size of
a point) (Van Bendegem 2011; Hagar 2014). Craig notes that ‘Since the
advent of quantum theory, philosophers, and physicists as well, have
exhibited much greater openness to taking time and space to be discrete
rather than dense. In fact, many think that the continuity of spacetime in
general relativity is what needs to go if we are to have a unified physical
theory of the world’ (citing Butterfield and Isham 1999, section 3.2;
Huggett and Wüthrich 2013). On the other hand, one might defend an
alternative view that time might be continuous yet divide into a finite
number of smallest parts of finite durations rather than divide into
instants/points (see my reply to Puryear in Loke 2016a and Loke 2017a,
chapter 2).
It has been explained above using the example from quadratic equa-
tion that, while what is mathematically impossible is metaphysically
impossible, what is mathematically possible is not always metaphysically
possible. Thus, the mathematical possibility of actual infinity does not
imply that there are metaphysically possible in the concrete world. Thus,
for example, while one can always decompose a real function in terms of
infinitely many sinusoidal functions (Fourier series) with countably infi-
nitely many coefficients (Pitts 2008), this can be regarded as true only for
mathematical modelling (Chan 2019; for other examples, see Loke
2017a, chapter 2). Likewise, the infinite number of points within the
intervals (0, 1) and (0, 2) and the one-to-one correspondences between
them merely refer to abstractions; it does not imply that they can be real-
ized as concrete entities. Likewise, while there is an abstract actual infinite
number of points between (say) t0 and t1 just as there are an actual infinite
number of real numbers between 0 and 1, this does not mean that they
220 A. Loke
can exist in the concrete, nor does it imply that such a series can be con-
stituted in the concrete.
While one might claim that it is possible to have a concrete point in
between any two points,15 it is logically invalid to infer from this to the
conclusion that there is an actual infinite number of concrete points
which can be traversed. This would be guilty of a fallacious modal opera-
tor shift, inferring from the true claim,
1. Possibly, there is some point at which x is divided.

To the disputed claim,
2. There is some point at which x is possibly divided. (Craig and Sinclair
2009, p. 114)
It would be like arguing ‘because a leaf could be any colour, therefore

it can be every colour’. A leaf obviously cannot be of every colour at the
same time because of metaphysical constraints. Likewise, there might be
metaphysical constraints such as those which I have explained using the
Christmas Present Scenario (Loke 2017a, Chapter 2) which prevent all
the points from existing together concretely, even though it is possible
that each of the points exists concretely.
On the other hand, Craig observes that the idea of spacetime being a
continuum made up of actual infinite number of points results in the
ancient Greek paradoxes of motion: Suppose time t is the last point in
time at which an object O is at rest, it would be impossible for O to begin
to move. To reply that t′ is the first point in time at which O is in motion
will not do, for t is supposed to be the last point in time at which O is at
rest, and one can always think of t* (where t < t* < t′) for any t or t′ (Craig
and Sinclair 2012, p. 100; thus, for example, suppose time 0.00 sec is the
last point in time at which an object O is at rest; to say that time 0.01 sec
is the first point in time at which O is in motion will not do, for 0.00 sec
is supposed to be the last point in time at which O is at rest, and therefore
O would have already been in motion at (say) 0.005 sec, that is, before
0.01 sec. The solution to this paradox is to reject the theory that time is
composed of an infinite number of points and to adopt the theory that
time is composed of durations. In that case, one can suppose time t is the
last duration in time at which an object O is at rest, and that t′ is the first
duration at which O is in motion, and that there is no duration t* in

between t and t′). Additionally, recent defences of the Grim Reaper
Paradox provide convincing reason to think that spatiotemporal intervals
are not composed of a dense infinity of points or instants (Craig 2018,
p. 398). Moreover, I have shown above that there cannot be a traversal of
an actual infinite of events because finite + finite = finite; therefore, this is
a proof that there isn’t an actual infinite number of point-events between
(say) time t0 and t1 which is traversed.
Sorabji (2006, pp. 221–222) objects that a beginningless sequence
does not face the same difficulties as an endless sequence because travers-
ing the former would involve only one terminus (e.g. the present
moment), whereas traversing the latter would involve two termini (e.g.
the present moment and some future moment). ‘And [having two ter-
mini] is what prevents the future series of traversed years from being
more than finite’ (Sorabji 2006, p. 222).
In reply, the cause of the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite
in my explanation above is not due to the number of termini, but the fact
that an actual infinite has greater number than the number which can be
traversed one after another in time, because finite + finite = finite. Sorabji
does not provide any solution to this difficulty.
One might object that the reason actual infinite is too large to be tra-
versed by a one-after-another process is because one cannot arrive at the
endpoint of that which has no end by beginning from a point (Leon
2011). Since there is no endpoint, one can always increase, and every
point that is arrived at is always smaller than an actual infinite, but this is
not the case if one does not begin from a point by arriving at the present
from an actual infinite number of earlier events. However, whether there
is an end or no end should not affect the number that can be traversed by
a process. The reason is because, regardless of whether there is an end or
not, the number traversed by a one-after-another process is finite, and
this is due to the nature of the process in which finite + finite= finite.16
Pruss (2018, p. 152) objects that ‘imagine someone who, according to
our external time, now exists and will always exist. But she lives her life
backwards. This person, thus, at this point can be said to have lived an
infinite life. And if this is her moment of death, then she has completed
that infinite life.’ This objection begs the question by assuming that it is
222 A. Loke
possible that someone now exists and will always exist and that the future
is concrete actual infinity. It begs the question against the view that some-
one will exist forever only if the future is potential infinite in dynamic
time. On the other hand, the argument against traversing an actual infi-
nite which I explained above would rule out such a scenario, regardless of
whether a person travels forwards or backwards in time.
One might object to KCA by suggesting that events should be under-
stood as ‘becoming’.17 In reply, becoming (with no end) assumes a poten-
tial infinite, but events that are causally prior have already happened and
therefore cannot be a potential infinite (Loke 2017a, chapter 2). Likewise,
recursive function (a function that calls itself during its execution) involv-
ing an infinite loop is a potential infinite in its actual execution (perpetu-
ally increasing towards abstract actual infinity as a limit but never actually
arriving at an actual infinite in time), and thus is inapplicable as well.
(Note that a potential infinite is a series which increases towards actual
infinity but does not arrive at actual infinity. The possibility of such a
series is not the possibility of completing the counting an actual [infinite]
series of past events. Rather, the possibility is the possibility of an abstract
actual infinite as a limit concept. It is important to distinguish between
abstract actual infinite and concrete actual infinite. The argument against
traversing an actual infinite concerns the concrete; that is, a concrete
actual infinite cannot be traversed. This is consistent with the existence of
an abstract actual infinite as a limit concept.)
It has been objected by Dretske (1965) that, if starting from a point
someone (e.g. George) does not stop counting, then George will count to
infinity ‘in the sense that he will count each and every one of the finite
numbers’. Oppy (2006a, p. 61) likewise argues that ‘one counts to infin-
ity just in case, for each finite number N, one counts past N. But unless
one stops counting, one will eventually reach any given finite N’ (see also
Malpass 2021).
However, the question that is relevant to the Kalām is not whether
George will count an actual infinite (since ‘will count’ concerns future
events rather than past events). Rather, the question is whether George
can be at any particular time t and counts an infinite number successively
by that time, and the answer is no: there is no time at which he could
have counted an actual infinite number of elements by counting one
element after another. Even if it is the case that George counts as long as
time exists, actual infinity will always be greater than the numbers to
which George has counted by time t. Thus, the fact is that there is no
time at which an actual infinite has been counted (Loke 2014a).
Whereas to have counted as long as time exist if time is beginningless
(e.g. George counts 0 at the year 2020, -1 last year [2019], -2 the year
before that [2018] … etc.) would have required an actual infinite to have
been counted at a particular time (say, the year 2020), which as explained
previously is impossible. In other words, Dretske, Oppy, and Malpass are
guilty of redefining ‘traversing an actual infinite’ without solving the
problem in the context of debating the cosmological argument. (Malpass
2021’s ‘fills the future’ argument is not relevant to the discussion con-
cerning the past: if the number of durations earlier than [say] the year
2020 is an actual infinite, then we could indeed look back [say, in the
year 2021] and say that the counting was completed in the year 2020,
and the consequent [an infinite set of completed events] is what propo-
nents of the Kalām are arguing against [i.e. via Modus Tollens] in the
context of discussing whether the universe began to exist.)
The same problem besets Almeida’s (2018, p. 52) objection that
‘Mathematical induction is valid. If 1 has the property of being a number,
and if for each finite n, if n is a number, then n + 1 is a number, then all
of the positive integers are numbers. Likewise, if n is traversed, and if for
each finite n, if n is traversed, then n + 1 is traversed, then all of the posi-
tive integers are traversed. Yes, the whole thing! No fallacy of composi-
tion is involved. The mistake is in believing that we would have to traverse
something other than finite numbers in order to traverse an infinite
series.’ Almeida (2018, p. 53) acknowledges: ‘it is also true that the clock
never reaches the infinite time tℵ0. But this is because no such time as tℵ0
exists. If the clock ticks off the finite times in each Sn—as we have proven
it does by mathematical induction – then the clock ticks off infinitely
many times.’
In response, the fact remains that an actual infinite cannot be consti-
tuted (as Almeida acknowledges, ‘the clock never reaches the infinite time
tℵ0’), whereas the constitution of a beginningless series of earlier events to
the year 2020 would have required an actual infinite to be constituted,
which as explained previously is impossible. In other words, Almeida is
224 A. Loke
guilty of redefining ‘traversing an actual infinite’ as ‘ticks off the finite

times in each Sn’ instead of ‘reaches the infinite time tℵ0’, without solving
the problem in the context of debating the cosmological argument. Now
I do agree that mathematical induction is valid, but Almeida has misap-
plied it by wrongly defining the problem.
It might be asked whether an omnipotent God could traverse an actual
infinite.18 Many philosophers and theologians throughout history (e.g.
Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Hoffman and Rosenkrantz) have explained
that divine omnipotence does not require God to do what is metaphysi-
cally impossible (e.g. God cannot make a shapeless square because there
cannot be any such thing for God to make; see further, Loke 2010,
p. 526). Since it has been shown above that traversing an actual infinite
is metaphysically impossible, there is no violation of divine omnipotence
to say that God cannot traverse an actual infinite because there cannot be
any such traversing for God to do.
5.5 T
he Argument from the Viciousness
of Dependence Regress
The argument against a dependence regress had a long history. While
Leibniz had argued against infinite regress by claiming that grounds can
never be found in this way (see Cameron 2008), Hume (1779/1993)
objected that if every item in a collection was causally explained by a
preceding item, the whole collection would be explained (Hume–
Edwards Principle). A Humean might therefore argue that, if there is an
infinite chain of events with each event being grounded by the prior
event that caused it, and the chain itself is grounded by another entity
which is grounded by another, and so on, then there is no problem with
an infinite regress (Cameron 2008, p. 11; Cameron eventually appeal to
intuition and explanatory utility to argue against such a regress). One
might reply that, if all we want is an account of why each thing exists,
then an infinite regress is benign because each thing is explained by its
cause; but if we want an account of why there are things at all, it is vicious
because we have not explained where existence comes from (Bliss 2013,
p. 414; Cameron 2018). However, the objector might say that, in an
infinite chain, there is always existence; thus, it is meaningless to ask
where existence comes from. I shall reply to this objection in what follows
by arguing that there is a problem of dependence and a need for the
capacity to begin to exist which is not met by an infinite regress.
My argument can be formulated as follows:
1. A dependence regress (i.e. a regress in which each item depends on the

prior one) is a vicious regress.
2. A causal regress is a dependence regress.
3. Therefore, a causal regress is a vicious regress.
While arguments based on dependence have often been used to argue

against an infinite causal regress in the case of an essentially ordered series
in the Thomistic Cosmological Argument, I have argued in Loke (2017a,
chapter 3) that they can be used for an accidentally ordered temporal
series as well. The Modus Tollens argument defended in Chap. 3 implies
that whatever begins to exist would depend on causally necessary
condition(s) (this also implies the transitivity of causal dependence
understood as dependence on causally necessary condition(s)19).
Moreover, since dependence is a kind of contingency (defined as a depen-
dence on circumstances), my argument can also be understood as a kind
of contingency argument which demonstrates that there is a necessary
being which (as explained below and in Chap. 6) is an uncaused First
Cause which is beginningless, initially changeless, and has libertarian
freedom.
To illustrate the viciousness of a causal dependence regress, think about
a series of train wagons in which each train wagon requires a preceding
one to pull it if it is to begin to move. Before the last train wagon begins
to move, the one before it has to begin to move, and before that train
wagon begins to move, the one before it has to begin to move, and so on.
No matter how many such train wagon there are, none of them would
begin to move, because no prior wagon escapes from the problem of
depending on a prior dependent member in order to begin movement
(vicious regress). What is required is an engine, a First Puller which does
226 A. Loke
not depend on another train wagon to pull it, and which has the inde-
pendent capacity to bring about the beginning of movement.
Likewise, before I begin to exist, my parents has to begin to exist, and
before they begin to exist, their parents have to begin to exist, and so on.
No matter how many prior dependent causes there are, none of them
would begin to exist, because no prior dependent cause escapes from the
problem of depending on a prior dependent member in order to begin to
exist (vicious regress). What is required is a First Cause which exists inde-
pendently (i.e. not dependent on a prior entity). Since whatever begins to
exist has a cause (as established in Chap. 3), this First Cause would be
beginningless.
One might object by claiming that the above argument only works
within a deterministic and reductionistic worldview, which neglects the
fact that different branches of the natural sciences talk about their own
causal explanations using different scientific theories (rather than uni-
formly as in the case of a series of wagons).20
In reply, first, it is not true that indeterminism has been proven; defen-
sible deterministic interpretation of quantum physics exists (see
Bricmont 2017).
Second and more importantly, in any case, the basic idea of causally
necessary condition is compatible with both determinism and indeter-
minism, and it is compatible with different descriptions by different sci-
entific theories in different branches of sciences. For example, quantum
particles do not begin to exist from non-being. Rather, they emerge from
the quantum vacuum with quantum field and which possesses ‘zero-
point energy (the energy remaining in a substance at the absolute zero of
temperature (0 K), which gives rise to vacuum fluctuations)’ (Daintith
2009). The fluctuation is therefore dependent on the quantum field and
the energy in the quantum vacuum, which is a causally necessary condi-
tion. Likewise, hydrogen is a causally necessary condition for the forma-
tion of water.
Even though the emergence of quantum particles may be indetermin-
istic while the formation of water is deterministic, and even though these
two events are explained by different theories, nevertheless both theories
(as well as other scientific theories) involve effects which are dependent
on necessary conditions (which is what I mean by a cause). Even though
the kinds of necessary conditions and the kinds of dependence might be

different for each theory, they all involve necessary conditions and depen-
dence nonetheless.
The train car analogy is only an analogy; the point of the analogy is
that a regress of causally necessary conditions is a vicious dependence
regress, and therefore requires an independently existing First Cause
which does not require causally necessary condition. This point does not
require the assumption that each effect is deterministically brought about
by the causes, nor does it require the causes are describable by the same
scientific theory. Even if each effect is not deterministically brought about
and are not describable by the same scientific theory, it remains the case
that the effects depend on causally necessary conditions and there cannot
be an infinite regress of dependence; thus, there must still be an indepen-
dent First Cause. Hence, the fact that different branches of the natural
sciences talk about their own causal explanations does not affect my argu-
ment. On the contrary, it has been explained in Chap. 2 (e.g. using the
observation that the causal term ‘interaction’ is fundamental to science)
that causation itself is fundamental to science, and it has been explained
in Chap. 3 that the Modus Tollens argument for the Causal Principle
implies that whatever begins to exist would depend on causally necessary
condition(s).
To speak of a causal chain is to speak of a chain of causally necessary
conditions describable by various theories of science. The above examples
show that we are able to say something in empirical/scientific terms about
the great chain of causes, that is, the quantum vacuum as a causally neces-
sary condition for quantum fluctuation and hydrogen as a causally neces-
sary condition for the formation of water. The Modus Tollens argument
in Chap. 3 shows that the causal principle is true and therefore each
entity in the chain would have a causally necessary condition except the
beginningless First Cause.
Consider another analogy (which I shall call the Debtors’ Scenario).
Suppose I have nothing and the only way for me to begin to have money
is to get it from Justin, Suppose Justin has nothing and the only way for
him to begin to have money is to get it from Alex. If everyone is like this,
no one would ever begin to have money. As Schaffer (2016, p. 95)
observes, ‘One cannot be rich merely by having a limitless supply of
228 A. Loke
debtors, each borrowing from the one before. There must actually be a
source of money somewhere.’21 Money would not simply emerged from
the chain.22 What is required is someone who does not need to get money
from others and is able to have money, that is, a First Source of money.
This is analogous to the real world in which I have no existence before
I begin to exist, and the only way for me to begin existing is to be brought
about by prior causes (my parents). However, they also have no existence
before they begin to exist, and the only way for them to begin existing is
to be brought about by prior causes (my grandparents). If everyone is like
this, no one would ever begin to exist just as no one would ever begin to
have money in a series of debtors. What is required is something which
does not need another thing to bring it about and is able to bring about
other things, that is, a First Cause.
To elaborate, suppose entity/event x has a beginning of existence and x
causally explains why y begins to exist. x can causally explain the begin-
ning of y only after x begins to exist, but the problem is the prior entity x
cannot explain why x itself begins to exist given the Causal Principle
(established in Chap. 3) that whatever begins to exist has a cause. Thus, x
cannot explain why there are entities (x, y) which begin to exist; that is, x
has 0 capacity for explaining the beginning of existence of entities (x, y).
If there is something w which begins to exist prior to x, then w can explain
why (x, y) begin to exist, but the problem is that w also cannot explain
why itself begins to exist. Thus, w cannot explain why there are entities
(w, x, y) which begin to exist, and relies on there being a prior entity v
which also has 0 capacity for explaining the beginning of existence of
entities (v, w, x, y) if v itself begins to exist. If every prior entity has a
beginning, then no prior entity escapes from the problem of having 0
capacity for explaining why there are entities which begin to exist; indeed,
every prior entity has 0 capacity for explaining the beginning of existence
of entities; thus, nothing could ever happen. What is required is an inde-
pendently existing and beginningless First Cause which is not being sus-
tained in existence, which does not need to depend on another thing to
bring it about and which has the independent capacity to bring about
other things by itself. Thus, given any change in reality whatsoever there
must be such an uncaused First Cause. This First Cause does not begin to
exist and hence does not face the problem of an infinite regress scenario
in which all members of the series have beginnings of existence without

anything having the capacity for explaining the beginning of existence of
entities. Such a First Cause would answer the question ‘Why is there
something rather than nothing?’; that is, there would be no causal expla-
nation for why the First Cause exists, since being beginninglessness and
not being sustained in existence implies that it was not brought about.
One might ask whether my argument ‘if every member of a causal
series has no capacity to begin to exist without prior cause, then all the
members would have no capacity to begin to exist without prior cause’
commits the fallacy of composition. In reply, as Reichenbach (2021)
observes, arguments of the part–whole type are not always guilty of this
fallacy; it depends on the content of the argument. Sometimes the total-
ity has the same quality as the parts because of the nature of the parts
invoked. For example, if every member of a set of entities has 0 mass,
then all the members (regardless of the number of members) would have
0 mass, because 0 + 0 + 0 … = 0. Likewise, if every member in a series of
debtors has 0 capacity for explaining the beginning of existence of money,
then all the members (regardless of the number of members) would have
0 capacity for explaining the beginning of existence of money, because
0 + 0 + 0 … = 0. Similarly, if every member of a causal series has 0 capac-
ity for explaining why there are entities which begin to exist, then all the
members (regardless of the number of members) would have 0 capacity
for explaining why there are entities which begin to exist, because 0 + 0 +
0 … = 0.
One might object that, in an actual infinite regress of events, the actual
infinite series itself does not begin to exist; thus, the whole series itself is
exempt from the Causal Principle that beginning of existence has a cause,
even though each part of the series (i.e. every event) has a cause.23 In this
case, the whole would have a property which the parts do not have. This
is the point of disanalogy with the Debtors’ Scenario: while the whole
series of infinite number of debtors would not avoid the problem that the
whole series has no money because each part has no money, the whole
series of an actual infinite regress of events would have no beginning even
though each part has a beginning.
In reply, it is trivially true that if an infinite regress causal series exist it
would not have a cause. However, my argument is that such a
230 A. Loke
beginningless series cannot exist in the first place because of the problem
of vicious regress; that is, no prior dependent cause escapes from the
problem of depending on a prior dependent member in order to begin to
exist. Every member in such a causal series suffers from the problem of
depending on prior member for beginning of existence, analogous to the
Wagon Scenario, where every member suffers from the problem of
depending on prior member for beginning of movement, without
any source.
In other words, such a beginningless series does not get rid of the prob-
lem that all its members have beginnings and are dependent in the similar
way that all the debtors are dependent, and this is the point of analogy
with the Debtors’ Scenario. It does not get rid of the problem that there
is 0 capacity for explaining the beginning of existence of entities/events.
Every member in such a causal series suffers from the problem of having
0 capacity for explaining the beginning of events, which is analogous to
the Debtors’ Scenario, where every member suffers from the problem of
having 0 capacity for explaining the beginning of money in the chain.
There needs to be a source somewhere. While on the infinite regress sce-
nario the whole does not have beginning, it remains the case that all the
members of the whole has a beginning (y has a beginning, x has a begin-
ning, w has a beginning …), and my argument concerns how to explain
the latter. One cannot avoid the latter by appealing to the former; one
can only appeal to the former if one postulates a beginningless changeless
(eventless) entity enduring through all durations, but such an entity
would not bring about the events of our universe which is what requires
explanation here. On the other hand, postulating an infinite number of
changes which are infinitesimally closely ordered within a duration of
time would not work as well (and in any case this postulation has been
ruled out by the arguments in Sect. 5.4). The reason is because an infinite
number of states each of which has 0 capacity for explaining why there
are entities which begin to exist still does not get rid of the problem that
there is 0 capacity for explaining the beginning of existence of entities
within the series.
It might be objected that, while none of the entities in the series has
capacity for causally explaining the beginning of existence of events, the
series as a whole has such a capacity.
However, this would not work because every entity in the series has 0
capacity for explaining the beginning of existence of entities; therefore,
collectively as a whole, 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 … = 0. (This is analogous to the
Debtors’ Scenario, where every member suffers from the problem of hav-
ing 0 capacity for explaining the beginning of money in the chain; there-
fore, collectively as a whole there is no such capacity. This does not
commit the fallacy of composition; see discussion above) This implies
that, collectively, the earlier (or causally prior) entities would not have the
capacity for explaining why there are later entities which begin to exist.
This means that there is 0 capacity for explaining the beginning of enti-
ties within the infinite regress series, which implies that the beginning of
my existence would not have occurred if the causal chain leading to my
beginning of existence was such an infinite regress. But I had begun to
exist. Therefore, there is no such infinite regress but rather there is a First
Cause. The above argument is not based on our common-sense intuitions
but on the meaning of causal dependence which is required by science
itself; for example, water has 0 capacity to begin to exist by itself and
depends on the formation of hydrogen at the earlier history of the
universe.
It might be objected that the series as a whole has the capacity for caus-
ally explaining the beginning of existence of its members because every
member would have a cause, and that the beginning of each entity is
adequately accounted for by a previously existing entity in an infinite
regress.24
However, the problem is that every cause of every member is depen-
dent on prior causes and every prior cause is dependent. The objector
might reply that this is not a problem because every prior cause has a
cause—which is dependent, yes, but it has a cause. In reply, every mem-
ber having a prior dependent cause is useless for solving the problem that
all the members are dependent, just like every wagon having a prior
dependent wagon is useless for solving the problem that all the members
are dependent. In order for a cause to bring about the next member the
cause has to begin to exist first, just as in order for a wagon to pull along
the next member the wagon has to begin to move first, but the problem
is that in both cases it is dependent on prior member all of which are
dependent. Moreover, as noted earlier, every cause of every member and
232 A. Loke
every previously existing entity in such a causal series suffers from the
problem of having 0 capacity for explaining the beginning of entities,
which is analogous to the Debtors’ Scenario, where every previous mem-
ber suffers from the problem of having 0 capacity for explaining the
beginning of money in the chain. There needs to be a source somewhere.
Sceptics might object by claiming that this is not a problem, given that
in an infinite regress ‘there is always at least one member in existence’ to
explain why there are subsequent entities which begin to exist. Sceptics
might argue that this is the point of disanalogy with the Debtors’ Scenario:
in an infinite regress of debtors, there is no one who has money, but in an
infinite regress of causes, there is always at least one member in existence.
In reply, it is trivially true that, if an infinite regress exists, then there is
always one member existing. However, such a series cannot exist because
the problem of vicious regress remains: how does any of its member begin
to exist in the first place? It is dependent on prior member every one of
which is dependent. In other words, the postulation that there is always
at least one member in existence relies on the assumption that that exis-
tent member(s) begins to exist (if none of the members begin to exist,
then it is not the case that there is always at least one member in exis-
tence), and I have explained that the problem with this assumption is
that none of the members prior to that existent member has the capacity
for explaining the beginning of entities. This is the point of analogy to
the problem that no one has the capacity for explaining the beginning of
money in a series of debtors. In order for there to be money in the series,
someone must begin to have money, but no one has the capacity for
explaining the beginning of money in the series. Likewise, in a series
whereby every member has a beginning of existence, in order for there to
be something in existence already, something must begin to exist, but the
problem is that no one has the capacity for explaining the beginning of
entities in the series.
One might object that the things we observe did not begin to exist;
rather, they are merely rearrangements of pre-existent matter-energy. For
example, the amino acids existed before they became a part of my body.
In response, the fact that my body involves a rearrangement of pre-
existing matter-energy does not deny the fact that various events such as
new arrangements of the pre-existent matter-energy did begin to exist
(e.g. the event of fertilization has a beginning), and that each event (an
event is something with a beginning) depends on prior causes (as shown
in Chap. 3). My argument does not require beginning to exist from noth-
ing; it only requires that an infinite regress of dependant events/changes
is not the case, and therefore there is a first change brought about by an
initially changeless and independently existing First Cause (which can
bring about the first change by having libertarian freedom, as explained
in Chap. 6).
One might object that according to the static theory of time it is always
the case that I began to exist (say) in 1975 and I always existed in 1975.25
However, even if the tenseless theory of time is true, it is still the case that
later events (say my existence in 1975) is dependent on earlier events (say,
the existence of my parents prior to 1975, because if they did not exist
prior to 1975 I would not have begun to exist in 1975). It should be
noted that there are two different senses of ‘always exist’: (1) existing for-
ever without beginning and therefore doesn’t require a cause (see the view
of the Oxford School in Chap. 6); (2) having a beginning but a tenseless
fact at a particular duration. To appeal to a static theory of time would be
to refer to the second sense, but according to the second sense, later
events are still dependent on earlier events. Hence, this does not remove
the problem with a series of dependent events all of which suffer the same
problem of dependence. The solution to this problem requires something
that has no beginning and therefore can be the uncaused First Cause.
One might object by suggesting that perhaps matter do not begin to
exist and atoms are in continuous motion bringing about water, myself,
and so on, in which case ‘beginning of existence’ is just our way of con-
ceptualizing this motion. According to the conservation of momentum
(momentum= mass × velocity), to keep something moving (i.e. changing
position), no external cause is needed; thus, one might think that this
implies it is false that every change/event has a cause. Carroll writes:
Aristotle’s argument for an unmoved mover rests on his idea that motions
require causes. Once we know about conservation of momentum, that idea
loses its steam … the new physics of Galileo and his friends implied an
entirely new ontology … ‘Causes’ didn’t have the central role that they
once did. The universe doesn’t need a push; it can just keep going. (Carroll
2016, p. 28)
234 A. Loke
The conservation of momentum implies that there is no need for

external cause; nevertheless, the momentum is itself the cause for the
continuing movement. Suppose a moving object M is at location x1 at
time t1 and x2 at t2. If M has zero momentum at x1 it would not move to
x2, but if M has a certain momentum it would move to x2; thus, the
momentum is the cause.26
Moreover, the beginning of the state at t2 is dependent on the begin-
ning of the state at t1 having momentum, which is dependent on the
beginning of a prior state having momentum. Given the viciousness of an
infinite regress of dependent states as explained earlier, there must still be
a beginningless and initially changeless First Cause with libertarian free-
dom. (If there is a changeless beginningless entity, that would not require
a cause, but that entity would be irrelevant for accounting for the events
we observe, unless [as explained in Chap. 6] that entity has libertarian
freedom to bring about the first event leading to the series of events we
observe; this implies that it would be a First Cause Creator who is ini-
tially changeless)
Finally, it should be noted that the argument from the viciousness of
dependence regress is compatible with time being a continuum of points
(which nevertheless has been demonstrated above to be false). Even if
there is an infinite number of points between t1 and t2, they sum up
together into an interval t1–t2 which is still finite in earlier than extension.
Therefore, an entity lasting this interval has a beginning, and hence
(according to the causal principle established in Chap. 3) would depend
on a cause. As argued above, there cannot be an actual infinite regress of
dependent entities with beginnings; therefore, there cannot be a begin-
ningless infinite regress of entities/events each of which has a beginning.
Rather, there must be a First Cause which is beginningless and not com-
posed of an infinite series of events/changes, but rather is beginningless
and initially eventless/changeless.
In conclusion, the above argument can be summarized as follows:
1. An infinite regress of dependent entities is a vicious regress.

2. An event/change is an entity that has a beginning at the state of having
gained or lost a property. (Definition)
3. Whatever begins to exist depends on a cause. (Chap. 3)

4. An event/change is a dependent entity. (From 2 and 3)
5. An infinite regress of events/changes is an infinite regress of dependent
entities. (From 4)
6. An infinite regress of events/changes is a vicious regress. (From 1 and 5)
What is required is a First Cause which is beginningless and (initially)

eventless/changeless and therefore can exist independently. (It will be
shown in Chap. 6 that this beginningless entity cannot be an impersonal
universe, since it must have libertarian freedom in order to cause the first
event from an initially eventless/changeless state. Thus, the impersonal
universe itself would have a beginning, which was freely brought about
by a beginningless personal First Cause.)
5.6 C
an a First Cause Be Avoided by
a Causal Loop?
Gott and Li (1998) proposed that a First Cause may be avoided by the
suggestion that the temporal series of events at the beginning of the
universe is a small time loop, thus allowing it to create itself similar to the
way a time traveller could travel to the past and become his/her
own mother.
However, such a closed causal loop is contrary to the Generalized
Second Law of Thermodynamics (Wall 2013a, 2013b) and faces the fol-
lowing problems.
For a causal loop in dynamic time, the members of a series of events
come to be one after another cycles after cycles. Given that an actual
infinite regress is not the case (as argued in previous sections), the num-
ber of earlier cycles would be finite, and thus there would still be a
first cycle with a first event and a First Cause.
A causal loop in static time—in which A requires B to bring about its
beginning, B requires C to bring about its beginning, and C requires A to
bring about its beginning—is viciously circular. It would be similar to a
236 A. Loke
scenario in which railway wagon A requires wagon B to bring about its

motion (i.e. by pulling it), wagon B requires wagon C to bring about its
motion, and wagon C requires wagon A to bring about its motion. It is
evident that such a viciously circular setup—in which the state of each of
the entities in a causal loop is supposed to be dependent on another
entity within the loop—would not work. Likewise, in a loop that is sup-
posed to avoid a first cause, the beginning of our universe is required to
provide causally necessary conditions for the beginning of existence of
other entities within a closed loop, while the beginning of our universe
itself requires the existence of these other entities. Such a vicious circular
setup would not work as well.27 It faces a similar problem with that of a
vicious dependence regress explained previously; that is, since every
member of such a causal series has 0 capacity for explaining why there are
entities which begin to exist, all the members would have 0 capacity for
explaining why there are entities which begin to exist, because 0 + 0 +
0 … = 0.
Against circles of causes, Oppy (2019a, p. 13) argues: ‘It is a funda-
mental causal principle that, if one thing is a cause of a second thing, and
that second thing is a cause of a third thing, then the first thing is a cause
of the third thing. However, if there could be a circle of causes … then it
could be that there are things that are causes of themselves.’ But nothing
can be a cause of itself, since causes by definition are causally prior to
their effects (ibid.; Oppy’s argument depends on the transitivity of causa-
tion, which I have defended above in Sect. 5.5).
Another objection has been raised by Rasmussen (2018) with refer-
ence to the possibility of a scenario which a static closed loop gives rise to.
This scenario involves a time traveller whose older self was able to go back
in time to teach his/her younger self how to build a time machine and
his/her older self knew how because his/her younger self had been told
(Lewis 1976, pp. 148–149) Rasmussen (2018) remarks:
Consider that there is no knowledge of how to build a time machine in our

world. That’s because no one figured it out (and we can assume for sake of
illustration that it could be figured out). Yet, the same is so in the above
scenarios: no one figured out how to build a time machine. Thus, no
causally relevant difference explains how such knowledge exists in the loop
and infinite regress scenarios but not ours. (For replies to objections, for
example, by David Lewis and others, see Loke 2017a, chapter 4).
5.7 Conclusion
While the ‘Standard’ Big Bang model affirms that matter-energy began to
exist at the initial cosmological singularity of the Big Bang, over the years,
alternative models of the Big Bang have been developed, and some of
them have tried to avoid postulating a first event. However, such models
face scientific objections related to the Generalized Second Law of
Thermodynamics, acausal fine-tuning, or having an unstable or a meta-
stable state with a finite lifetime (Craig and Sinclair 2009, pp. 179–182;
Bussey 2013; Wall 2013a, 2013b). Bounce cosmologies which postulate
that the universe was born from an entropy-reducing phase in a previous
universe and the entropy reverses at the boundary condition (Linford
2020) have been proposed to avoid some of these problems. However,
these cosmologies neglected the problem of causal dependence at the
interface. While it has been suggested that the universes to either side of
the interface might be interpreted as the simultaneous causes of each
other (Linford 2020, p. 24), this violates the irreflexivity of causation and
amounts to a vicious circularity.
Moreover, there are at least five philosophical arguments against an
infinite regress of causes and events which have been proposed in the lit-
erature, and any one of these would suffice to establish the conclusion:
1. The argument from the impossibility of concrete actual infinities

2. The argument from the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite
3. The argument from the viciousness of dependence regress
4. The argument from the Grim Reaper paradox
5. The argument from Methuselah’s diary paradox
I have defended some of the above-mentioned arguments in this chap-

ter, and demonstrated it is not the case that there is a causal loop which
avoids a First Cause. Therefore, there is a first event and a First Cause. In
the next two chapters, we shall discover what the First Cause is.
238 A. Loke
Notes
1. I thank Oners for suggesting this objection.
2. Linford notes that ‘Craig takes the alignment between the direction of
time and the entropic arrow to be nomologically necessary (i.e. necessary
relative to our world only) because of the second law of thermodynam-
ics. … On the account that Craig endorses, we may have empirically
discovered that the passage of time is correlated with entropy increase,
but this correlation does not reflect anything deep about the direction of
time, and situations can arise in which this correlation becomes broken’
(2020, pp. 18–19).
3. It should be noted that the number of events in the future cannot be a
potential infinite if the static theory of time is true. See Loke (2017a,
chapter 2).
4. Sean Carroll, ‘Did the Big Bang Break the Laws of Thermodynamics?’ https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=TGs4C60FR68. Accessed 30/3/2020.
5. Against the involvement of God, Hawking claims that, because there
was no time before the Big Bang, nothing caused the Big Bang, ‘because
there was no time for a cause to exist in’. For response, see Chap. 6.
6. For replies to other arguments for an infinite past which have been
offered by some scientists and refuted by others, see Loke (2017a,
chapter 2).
7. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0X6ism4-KKw; from 11 mins
onwards.
8. Concerning the significance of the term ‘experience’, see the discussion
on the static theory of time below.
9. I thank Tong Shih Ping for sketching this proof.
10. I thank Tim Maness for mentioning this point at the 2020 AAR
conference.
11. Supposing that he/she is wholly focused on the process of successive
addition rather than (say) daydreaming.
12. Concerning the objection that the person would instead experience infi-
nite + finite=infinite, this is based on a misunderstanding of the argu-
ment; see the discussion on Morriston (2021) above.
13. I thank Richard Swinburne for raising this question.
14. I thank Anthony66 for suggesting this objection.
15. There are objections to such a claim; see the citation from Craig below.
16. For replies to other points Leon (2011) made, see Loke (2014a).
17. I thank Oliver Davies for raising this point.

18. I thank Don Page for raising this question.
19. This does not imply that the necessity of a particular causally necessary
condition. It has been argued that there are counterexamples to transitiv-
ity of causation (McDonnell 2018). Those purported counterexamples
do not affect the novel argument, because they are disanalogous. For
example, there are cases whereby x causes y1 causes z but y1 is not required
in the sense that y2 can also cause z. Whereas my argument is saying that
z depends on a cause regardless of whether it is y1 or y2. Some other pur-
ported counterexamples understood causes as causally sufficient condi-
tions, whereas the concept of causation essential to my argument is
causally necessary conditions.
20. I thank Mark Harris for raising this concern.
21. Schaffer did not think that his analogy can be used for causal series, but
for grounding of ‘source of reality’, claiming that ‘But a caused entity
qua caused entity still has intrinsic reality unto itself. Caused entities do
not inherit their reality from their causes. Indeed, a caused entity may
also be fundamental, and thus ontologically subsistent in its own right’
(ibid.). In reply, my argument here shows that entities in a causal series
with beginning of existence are dependent on earlier entities just as debt-
ors are dependent on others to give them money, and thus the analogy
works. Trogdon (2018, p. 191) modified Shaffer’s argument to argue for
inheritance of causal capacity, but his argument does not show (as my
argument does) that there is a First Cause with divine properties.
22. Cf. Morganti (2015), who objects to Shaffer by claiming that, rather
than entities transferring reality to what they ground, it may be that real-
ity emerges from grounding chains instead. However, money would not
emerge when no entity has the capacity for explaining the beginning of
existence of money!
23. I thank Brian Wong for raising this objection.
24. I thank Nick Morris for raising this objection.
25. I thank Alex Malpass for suggesting this objection.
26. This is similar to the impetus theory discussed in Feser (2013,
pp. 249–250), in which an ‘impetus’ is imparted to an object by what-
ever initiated its inertial motion, and which continuously actualizes its
potencies with respect to spatial location. Feser notes two problems with
the impetus theory. First ‘a finite object (such as the baseball of our
example) can only have finite qualities. And yet, an impetus, in order to
240 A. Loke
have local motion ad infinitum as its effect, would at least in that respect
be an infinite quality.’ In reply, one can think of the effects the impetus
cause on future events as a potential infinite, which is finite at any
moment. The second problem is ‘an impetus would continually be
bringing about new effects and thus (as a finite cause) itself be undergo-
ing change; and in that case, we have only pushed the problem back a
stage, for we now need to ask what causes these changes in the impetus
itself.’ The answer is the previous state of the impetus.
27. One might ask whether there could be a causal loop with only one entity
causes itself to exist with no beginning point in the loop. In reply, such a
loop is incoherent: if there is no beginning point, nothing is actually
brought into existence; that is, nothing is caused.
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right holder.
6
What the First Cause Is
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I have shown that there exists a First Cause of our
existence. But what is this First Cause? Is it God, or part of the universe
as postulated by Hawking (see below)? A number of formulations of the
Cosmological Argument have arrived at the conclusion of an Ultimate
Ground (Deng 2019) or a Necessary Being (e.g. Weaver 2016) without
showing that the necessary being/ultimate ground is God. Others have
claimed that naturalistic accounts of ultimate origin fare at least as well as
theistic accounts (Oppy 2009, 2010, 2013a, b), and that
whatever causal structure for the universe is supposed by the theist can be
replicated by the naturalist … Thus if the free action of God is supposed to
be the indeterministic action of a necessary being, the naturalist is free to
propose that the universe had an initial state which was itself necessary and
indeterministically caused the organized cosmos we experience. (Pearce
2017; following Oppy 2013b)

248 A. Loke
I shall address these concerns by demonstrating that the First Cause of

the universe has the properties of being beginningless, initially changeless
(here, ‘initial’ refers to the first in the series of states [ordered causally],
not first the series of changes/events/temporal series), transcendent,
immaterial, has libertarian freedom, is enormously powerful and highly
intelligent, and therefore worthy of being called the Creator of the
Universe. The conclusion follows from premises 6–12 of the KCA-TA
and is as follows:
6. Since the First Cause is the first, it is uncaused.

7. Since whatever begins to exist has a cause (Causal Principle), the First
Cause is beginningless.
8. Since every change is an event which has a beginning as something/
part of a thing gains or loses a property, and since the first change (= first
event) does not begin uncaused (given the Causal Principle), the first
change (= first event) is caused by a First Cause which is initially change-
less. (From 5 and 7)
9. Since the First Cause is initially changeless, it is transcendent and
immaterial (i.e. it is distinct from the material universe and is the cause of
the universe).
10. In order to cause an event (Big Bang or whatever) from an initial
changeless state, the First Cause must have
10.1. the capacity to be the originator of the event in a way that is un-
determined by prior event, since the First Cause is the first, and
10.2. the capacity to prevent itself from changing, for otherwise the First
Cause would not have been initially changeless and existing beginning-
lessly without the event/change.
10.1 and 10.2 imply that the First Cause has libertarian freedom.
11. In order to bring about the entire universe, the First Cause is enor-
mously powerful.
12. (+ the Teleological Argument:) In order to bring about a universe
with its fine-tuning and order, the First Cause is highly intelligent.
13. A First Cause that is uncaused, beginningless, initially changeless,
transcendent, immaterial, has libertarian freedom, and is highly intelligent
and enormously powerful is a Creator of the Universe.
14. Therefore, a Creator of the universe exists.
6 What the First Cause Is 249
I shall now discuss each of the premises in turn. Among the important
contributions of this chapter is a reply to the objections posed by the
works of Stephen Hawking (including the objections found in his final
book published in 2018), which are of great interest in philosophy of
religion debates and science and religion dialogues, as well as the discus-
sion of the relationship between the KCA, the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo,
and various views and theories of time. The debate between the relational
view of time and the substantival view of time continues, just as the
debate between the dynamic theory of time and the static theory of time
continues. It is beyond the scope of this book to settle the debate. Suffice
to note that the KCA-TA defended in this book is compatible with any
of these views and theories. I shall explain this point further in what fol-
lows, focusing on the relational view and the static theory (because these
generate more issues for the KCA which need to be addressed) and com-
menting on the substantival view and dynamic theory whenever necessary.
6.2 T
he First Cause Is Uncaused,
Beginningless, and Initially Changeless
Premise 6 ‘since the First Cause is the first, it is uncaused’ follows by defi-
nition of the word ‘first’ and the word ‘cause’ and ‘uncaused’ as defined in
Chap. 2 (see further, Chap. 8). Premise 7 follows from the Causal
Principle ‘whatever begins to exist has a cause’ established in Chap. 3.
Concerning premise 8, a ‘change’ is understood as an event that has a
beginning at the state of having gained or having lost a property. Thus, a
beginningless change is impossible. Even if events are not discrete, they
are still distinct, otherwise they would be changeless. Now it has been
shown in Chap. 5 that an infinite regress of changes is not the case—and
this is true regardless of what dimensions of time there are. Therefore,
there is a first change. Given the Causal Principle and the fact that a
change is something that has a beginning as explained in Chap. 5, the
first change would have a cause. The cause (X) of the first change (Y) can-
not have been caused by another cause (W), for otherwise W causing X
would be a change that is prior to Y, in which case Y would not have been
250 A. Loke
the first change. Therefore, given that an infinite regress of changes is not
the case, there is a first change which is caused by an uncaused cause, and
this uncaused cause would be the first in the series of causes. Now this
First Cause cannot be a change prior to the first change (otherwise the
first change wouldn’t be the first!); thus, the First Cause must be change-
less initially. This implies that the First Cause is not an event such as the
Big Bang.
Quentin Smith (1996, p. 179) has raised an objection by claiming that
only events are causes, and therefore there cannot be a cause for the first
event. However, on the one hand, there has been no compelling argu-
ment offered to show that causes must be events; one can defend an
alternative ontological analysis according to which causality does not
have to be a relation between events; rather, the causes can be underlying
substances such as agents (Craig 2000c; see the discussion on agent cau-
sation in Chap. 3 and below).1 On the other hand, given the arguments
that an infinite regress of events is impossible (Chap. 5) and the argument
for the Causal Principle that whatever begins to exist has a cause (see
Chap. 3), there must be a first event which is caused by a non-event (e.g.
a substance). Given that an event is defined as a change and that the First
Cause is initially changeless, the uncaused First Cause is not an event
prior to another event. Rather, the First Cause was in an initially change-
less state causally prior to bringing about an event, and gained a property
(i.e. changed) as it brings about an event; that is, it changed simultane-
ously with the bringing about of a change. (Thus, there are two events X
and Y which happened simultaneously: the change (X) to the First Cause
as it brings about Y, and X is concomitant to Y.) This conclusion follows
from the previous premises which have shown that the First Cause is
beginningless whereas the first event has a beginning, which implies that
the beginningless First Cause exists initially without the first event.
It might be objected that, while this view makes sense on a dynamic
view of time (given which one can say that the first event ‘comes into
being’), it seems to be in conflict with the static [B-] theory of time given
which the first event does not come into being but exists tenselessly at the
first time t1 alongside God (suppose God is the First Cause). If that is the
case, how can God be initially changeless? How can God exist without
the first event of the universe? (Craig 2000b, p. 221).
There are three possible responses to this question, and I shall explain
that all three of them are defensible and any one of them would suffice to
answer this question.
Concerning the first possibility, even if we assume the static theory of
time, one can say that the timeline of events does not represent all of real-
ity. There is an aspect of reality that is without any event or time, and this
can be called the initial state of reality. An aspect of God’s being exists in
this eventless/changeless and timeless state (‘outside of the time line’)—
that is one way to understand the First Cause being initially changeless
and timeless—while another aspect of God’s being exists within the time-
line and causally interact with the events in the timeline (e.g. it is simul-
taneous with the first event and brought about the first event). Given the
Causal Principle, the beginning of the first entity of the spacetime block
would require a cause just like all the beginning of other later entities,
and one could say that there is an aspect of God’s being that exists at the
first moment of time and simultaneously brought about the first entity of
a block that exists at that time, even though there would be no earlier
time at which that first entity did not exist. On this view, to say that the
First Cause existed initially without the first event means that there is an
aspect of reality (an aspect of the First Cause) which is outside of the
timeline and is beginningless and without change/event. (One might
worry that this response contradicts strict Classical Theism, which affirms
the doctrine of divine simplicity; I shall explain below that Classical
Theism is unwarranted.) We know that distinctions of changes exist in
the present portion of reality, and if there is a prior aspect of reality in
which such distinctions are absent, that would be changeless state, which
I have shown the First Cause is initially in.
Craig objects that the above response concerning the creation of the
first event reduces the doctrine of creation to tenseless ontological depen-
dence and thereby emasculates creatio ex nihilo (Craig 2000b, p. 221).
However, if creatio ex nihilo is understood as affirming that the universe
has a beginning and does not have a material cause but has an efficient
cause (God), then the above response does not contradict this. The differ-
ence between the above response and the view that God merely sustains
the universe in being is that the latter view is compatible with the
252 A. Loke
universe not having a beginning (i.e. being a spacetime block that is an

actual infinite in earlier-than extension), but the above response
denies this.
The second possibility is ‘to posit a hyper-time in which God brings
into being the whole four-dimensional block universe at a moment of
hyper-time’ (Craig 2000b, p. 221; Craig objects that affirming this view
would be extravagant; however, my point here is that this possibility is
not excluded by the supposed evidences for B-theory). Such a hyper-time
would be an A-theoretical time, which implies that the A-theory is fun-
damentally correct. While this view is not what B-theorists usually affirm,
it is consistent with the evidences (e.g. based on the theory of relativity)
which B-theorists cite for their theory, for on this view it remains the case
that our spacetime is a four-dimensional block and that all the moments
within the block are equally real relative to one another. If valid,2 the
evidences they cite for their theory only imply that an event in the space-
time block does not come into being and go out of being relative to
another earlier or later event in the block, but it does not imply that the
block itself never comes into being (although this is usually assumed).
The third possibility is to affirm that God initially exists in a form of
time prior to the first moment of the block and is thus earlier than it, just
like hydrogen and oxygen exist prior to water inside the block and cause
it. Just as water is causally dependent on hydrogen and oxygen coming
together to form it, the block is dependent on God (the First Cause). This
view is proposed by the so-called Oxford School, which includes John
Lucas, Richard Swinburne and Alan Padgett. Padgett writes that ‘God is
in himself temporal in some ways’ (1992, p. 126); his view is ‘in harmony
with the Biblical witness about God and his eternity’ (ibid.), which
implies being without beginning, and that God is not in any measured
time (ibid.) because He is not subjected to the law-like regularities of
nature which allow for the periodic processes that underlie isochronic
clocks and hence are essential to the measurement of time (p. 127).
Applying Padgett’s view to the state before the first event of the spacetime
block, this would imply that God is in the dimension of time which is
not divisible by periodic processes involving events; it is non-metric and
unlimited in the earlier-than direction. This unlimited initial state itself
exists an earlier-than direction relative to the first event, and thus is prior
to the first event in that sense. This view assumes a substantival view of
time which affirms that time can exist independently of change. Given
this view, the First Cause could have been in an initially changeless state
with an actual infinite past extension (i.e. without an ‘edge’ in the earlier-
than direction), causally and temporally antecedent to the first change. In
this way, God (the First Cause) could have existed beginninglessly before
creation in an undifferentiated, non-metric time and God would not be
dependent on such a time because such a time would be a property of
God (Padgett 1992). This view does not face the problems with postulat-
ing an actual infinite number of earlier durations (see Chap. 5), since the
earlier extension of time is undifferentiated. The KCA does not rule out
an infinite past if this is understood according to the substantival view of
time and that the earlier extension of time is undifferentiated; it merely
rules out an infinite regress of causes and changes/events. Given the argu-
ments in the previous chapter there must still be a first event/change even
if substantival view of time is correct. Craig and Sinclair (2009,
p. 192n.100) note that ‘the Kalām argument strictly demonstrates only
that metric time had a beginning. Perhaps the cause exists changelessly in
an undifferentiated time in which temporal intervals cannot be distin-
guished.’ On this view, the First Cause existed literally and eventlessly
before creation, but there was no moment, say, 1 hour or 1 million years
before creation (ibid.). Even though, according to the substantival view,
in the absence of change, time would still exist as a substance (‘the con-
tainer’), in the absence of change there would be no metric. That is why
the Oxford School would say that God exists in unmetricated time prior
to His free act of creating the universe (Swinburne 1993, pp. 208–9).
With the act of creation ‘God freely creates a universe with intrinsic laws
of nature that serve as a metric for the physical time of that universe’
(Mullins 2015, p. 36).
By contrast, on a relational view of time which defines time as a series of
changes/events ordered by ‘earlier-than’ and ‘later-than’ relations, an initially
changeless First Cause would be initially timeless and hence does not exist
‘earlier’ than the first event.3 While the relational view of time is inconsistent
with the view of the Oxford School, it is consistent with the Hybrid view
according to which God (the First Cause) ‘exists timelessly sans creation and
temporally at and subsequent to the moment of creation’ (Craig and Sinclair
254 A. Loke
2009, p. 189). The coherence of this Hybrid view has been defended in
previous publications by William Lane Craig, and constitutes a major con-
tribution to the discussion on the relationship between God and time. It
should be noted that what Craig means is that the First Cause is timeless
without agent-causing the first event at t1, and temporal with agent-causing
the first event at t1. There is no contradiction with this view since ‘timeless’
and ‘temporal’ have different references on this view (see further, below).
According to this view, there is a first moment and a beginning where God’s
existence in time is concerned. However, this does not imply that ‘God’s
existence has a beginning’ simpliciter (contra Leftow 2005, p. 66; 2010,
p. 281), because God’s existence is not limited to existence in time only;
rather, God exists timelessly ‘sans creation’. God’s existence per se does not
have a temporal boundary, since He has a timeless phase which is absent
from (say) Oppy’s view of the initial state of the universe (see Chap. 3).
While Craig has defended this Hybrid view on the assumption of dynamic
and relational view of time, I have tried to show that it can also be defended
on the assumption of static and substantival view of time as well (see, for
example, the discussion on the ‘first possibility’ above).
One might object by claiming that timeless means existing for zero
seconds, which would imply non-existence. This is a misconception, for
timeless does not mean existing for zero seconds. A second is a measure-
ment of the temporal dimension; it has a beginning and is defined as a
sixtieth of a minute of time, and ‘zero seconds’ by definition implies being
shorter than one second within the measurement of the temporal series.
Whereas according to the Hybrid view the First Cause is without begin-
ning and initially changeless and timeless, that is, existing without the
temporal dimension initially; therefore, it is not appropriate to use ‘zero
seconds’ to refer to it.
It is also inappropriate to think of this view as involving some ‘causal
point’ prior to the beginning of time,4 because a point assumes a dimen-
sion whereas there was no dimension and hence no point at the initially
changeless state which was beginningless and does not require a cause. It
is wrong to think that something is changeless if and only if it remains
unchanging over an extended time interval. Changeless simply means the
absence of change, and since change requires extended time interval, the
absence of time interval would also imply the absence of change. Thus,
changelessness does not require a time interval; rather, changelessness is

also compatible with timelessness.
In his earlier works, Stephen Hawking proposed that the initial state
of the universe consisted of a timeless (no boundary) state (Hartle and
Hawking 1983; Hawking 1988). This initial state can be understood
as a beginningless impersonal First Cause from which all things came,
and which avoids the need for a Creator. (It is similar to Craig’s hybrid
view explained above, except that instead of God it is the universe
itself which has a first moment where its existence in time is concerned
and yet the universe is beginningless because it does not have a tempo-
ral boundary since it has a timeless phase.) Others have offered time-
less interpretations of quantum gravity (e.g. Barbour 1999; Deutsch
1997; Anderson 2012) and/or claimed that time and space could have
emerged from a timeless and spaceless natural state (e.g. Arkani-
Hamed and Trnka 2014; Oriti 2014; Cao et al. 2017; Carroll 2019;
Huggett and Wuthrich forthcoming).
However, none of the above can be regarded as established given the
lack of a well-established theory of quantum gravity and the problem of
underdetermination of scientific theories noted in Chap. 1. Thus, it is not
the case that the above scientists have shown that it is possible for the
universe to be initially changeless/timeless. On the contrary, Oriti (2014,
p. 187) notes ‘the ongoing, tentative work of theoretical physicists on
models that, most likely, will turn out to be incorrect or only partially
understood in the future’).
Moreover, most (if not all)5 of the above concern the measurement of
time and not time itself. They do not address the issue of a beginningless
and initially changeless/eventless state as it is defined in the context of the
Kalām Cosmological Argument (KCA). In other words, they are actually
addressing a different problem which does not rebut the conclusion that
follows from the premises of the KCA.
For example, regarding the Wheeler–DeWitt equation used by
Barbour, Hawking et al., physicist Aron Wall argues that the Wheeler–
DeWitt equation does not imply timelessness; rather, it concerns the
measurement of time. Wall (2014) writes: ‘when we say that the wave-
function doesn’t change with time, what this really means is that the
choice of time coordinate is arbitrary’, not that time is an illusion or that
256 A. Loke
it does not exist. “Time’ needs to be measured relative to some physical

clock. There is no absolute ‘t’ coordinate relative to which everything else
moves’ (ibid.).
Regarding Hawking’s use of the so-called imaginary time, while imagi-
nary numbers are used to represent the time coordinate in relativity the-
ory, this does not imply that the mathematical concept has a counterpart
in physical reality. As Craig (1990) observes citing Eddington, the use of
imaginary numbers for the time coordinate ‘can scarcely be regarded as
more than an analytical device’ (Eddington [1920], p. 48). Imaginary
time was merely an illustrative tool which ‘certainly do[es] not corre-
spond to any physical reality’ (Eddington [1920], p. 181). It has no con-
crete meaning (similar to an imaginary number such as √-1 which has no
concrete meaning) and therefore merely used by Hawking as a mathe-
matical trick for avoiding a singularity. As Erasmus (2018, p. 146)
explains,
Wick rotation ‘is little more than a convenient mathematical trick’ (Isham
1997, p. 399) and imaginary time ‘is introduced only for computational
convenience’ (Vilenkin 2006, p. 182). Consequently, we should not inter-
pret the tunnelling and no-boundary proposals realistically and, thus, the
quantum creation hypothesis cannot be a true description of reality.
Concerning using ‘imaginary time’ to ‘change time into (timeless)

space’, Barrow observes that
physicists have often carried out this ‘change time into space’ procedure as
a useful trick for doing certain problems in ordinary quantum mechanics,
although they did not imagine that time was really like space. At the end of
the calculation, they just swop [sic] back into the usual interpretation of
there being one dimension of time and three … dimensions of … space.
(Barrow 1991, pp. 66–7)
However, in the Hartle–Hawking model, ‘Hawking simply declines to

re-convert to real numbers. If we do, then the singularity re-appears’
(Craig 2000c, p. 228). Since the Hartle–Hawking model does not con-
vert imaginary numbers (which are used instrumentally rather than
realistically as explained above) back to real numbers, his model should

be understood instrumentally rather than realistically; that is, it does not
correspond to any concrete reality.
Indeed, Hawking himself confesses, ‘I … am a positivist who believes
that physical theories are just mathematical models we construct, and
that it is meaningless to ask if they correspond to reality, just whether
they predict observations’ (Hawking 1997, p. 169). Since the Hartle–
Hawking model is intended to be understood in an anti-realistic manner,
the model does not intend to describe what reality is or what reality pos-
sibly is—and indeed the model cannot do so because, as explained above,
imaginary time does not correspond to physical reality. In that case,
Hawking’s model would not achieve Hawking’s intended purpose of jus-
tifying the claim that—in reality—’the beginning of the universe …
doesn’t need to be set in motion by some god’ (Hawking and Mlodinow
2010, pp. 134–135). Moreover, it would not rebut the KCA which Craig,
myself, and others have presented, because the reasons we have offered in
support for the cosmological argument imply that the conclusion of the
argument (i.e. there is a Creator of the universe) should be taken in a
realist manner.
Additionally, Hawking’s proposal ignores the ‘zero-point energy’ which
entails that the initial state is metastable (Gott and Li 1998, p. 38). Craig
(2018, p. 401) observes that on Hawking’s model, the initial state of the
universe ‘cannot exist literally timelessly, akin to the way in which phi-
losophers consider abstract objects like numbers to be timeless or theolo-
gians take God to be timeless. For this region is in a state of constant flux,
which, given the Indiscernibility of Identicals, is sufficient for time.’
Boddy et al. (2016) note that vacuum fluctuations are a feature of all
quantum systems which ultimately arise as a consequence of the
Heisenberg uncertainty principle; even though such fluctuations are not
regarded as dynamical because they exist even in ‘stationary states’; nev-
ertheless, they give rise to phenomena such as the Lamb shift or Casimir
effect. (It should also be noted that the so-called stationary state is called
stationary because the probability density does not depend on time; nev-
ertheless, the wavefunction itself is not stationary but continually
changes.) What this implies is that there is gaining/losing of properties,
which is how change is defined in the context of KCA. Thus, quantum
258 A. Loke
system is not changeless/eventless/timeless as these terms are defined in

the context of KCA. To rebut the KCA, the objector has to rebut its
premises or its validity; the objector should not dodge the argument by
defining the key terms such as ‘change/time’ and ‘changelessness/time-
lessness’ differently. (As explained in Chap. 1, to object to an argument
by using an alternative definition would be to miss the point of the
argument.)
One might speculate that perhaps there is a spaceless void which has
been generating bubbles of universes by quantum fluctuations since eter-
nity. This speculation implies that there has been an actual infinite num-
ber of changes (each generation is a change), but I have shown in Chap.
5 that an infinite regress of changes is not possible; thus, this speculation
is refuted. (Even if Hawking is able to modify his model such that there
is no infinite regress of changes and that there is a first change, that is, a
first event, his model would still fail to explain the beginning of the first
event because, as explained in Sect. 6.4, the first event must have been
brought about by an initially changeless First Cause with libertarian free-
dom, that is, a Creator.)
In his final book Brief Answers to the Big Questions, published posthu-
mously after his death, Hawking tried to explain why he thought that
‘the simplest explanation is that there is no God. No one created the
universe and no one directs our fate. This leads me to a profound realisa-
tion: there is probably no heaven and afterlife either’ (Hawking
2018, p. 38).
He made the astonishing claim that ‘the laws of nature itself tell us that
not only could the universe have popped into existence without any assis-
tance, like a proton, and have required nothing in terms of energy, but
also that it is possible that nothing caused the Big Bang. Nothing’
(ibid., p. 35).
What made Hawking thought that the laws of nature tell us that it is
possible that nothing caused the Big Bang? He began by claiming that
‘When the Big Bang produced a massive amount of positive energy, it
simultaneously produced the same amount of negative energy. In this
way, the positive and the negative add up to zero, always. It’s another law
of nature’ (ibid., p. 32).
However, the claim that the positive and negative energy add up to
zero does not imply that the positive and negative energy began to exist
uncaused. As noted in Chap. 2, one can still ask what made the energy
and the laws of nature to be the way they are (indeed, given the Causal
Principle defended in Chap. 3, one should still ask this question;
see below).
Hawking also claimed that at the subatomic level ‘conjuring some-
thing out of nothing is possible. At least, for a short while. That’s because,
at this scale, particles such as protons behave according to the laws of
nature we call quantum mechanics. And they really can appear at ran-
dom, stick around for a while and then vanish again, to reappear some-
where else’ (Hawking 2018, p. 33).
However, he failed to mention that at the subatomic level quantum
particles do not come into existence from absolutely nothing; rather, as
noted in Chap. 2, quantum particles are manifestations of pre-existent
quantum fields which act according to pre-existent quantum laws.
Hawking seemed to have anticipated the above problems when he
asked, ‘but of course the critical question is raised again: did God create
the quantum laws that allowed the Big Bang to occur?’ (Hawking 2018,
p. 34). Hawking (2018, p. 37) goes on to say:
As we travel back in time towards the moment of the Big Bang, the uni-
verse gets smaller and smaller and smaller, until it finally comes to a point
where the whole universe is a space so small that it is in effect a single
infinitesimally small, infinitesimally dense black hole. And just as with
modern-day black holes, floating around in space, the laws of nature dic-
tate something quite extraordinary. They tell us that here too time itself
must come to a stop.
One might ask where the black hole and the laws of nature came from.
Hawking went on to claim that there cannot be a Creator who made
these, because
You can’t get to a time before the Big Bang because there was no time
before the Big Bang. We have finally found something that doesn’t have a
cause, because there was no time for a cause to exist in. For me this means
260 A. Loke
that there is no possibility of a creator, because there is no time for a creator

to have existed in. (Ibid., p. 38)
In response, first, even if there is no physical time before the universe,

this does not imply that there is no metaphysical time before the universe
in which the Creator could have existed in. As noted earlier, my argu-
ment is consistent with a substantival view of time according to which
God exists before creation in an undifferentiated, non-metric time, caus-
ally and temporally prior to the first event. Concerning the advantage of
this view (which is also known as ‘relative timelessness’), Craig (2011)
notes that it may be helpful for those people who stumble at the idea of
God’s creating the universe (or the Big Bang) because they assume (unjus-
tifiably in Craig’s view) that causes must be prior to their effects in time,
and there is no time prior to the Big Bang. Craig replies:
I’m inclined to say, with most philosophers, I think, that causes need not
exist temporally prior to their effects. But for those who are hung up on
this difficulty, relative timelessness provides a neat way out: God does exist
temporally prior to causing the Big Bang—not in physical time, to be sure,
but in His own time, the time in which God Himself endures. (Ibid.)
Second, even if one rejects the above response because one rejects the
substantival view of time and embraces a relational view of time instead,
there is an alternative response which works on a relational view of time.
This alternative response begins by questioning the assumption that
underlies Hawking’s claim ‘there is no time for a creator to have existed
in.’ One can ask, ‘why does God need to exist in time?’ Hawking’s state-
ment begs the question against a transcendent Timeless Creator who can
exist outside of time initially. Earlier on, Hawking (2018, p. 34) attempts
to provide a justification for his assumption by claiming that ‘our every-
day experience makes us think that everything that happens must be
caused by something that occurred earlier in time’. However, this claim
does not provide adequate justification for the assumption that a cause
must be in such a temporal relation with its effect. As Craig argues, the
notion that causes always stand in temporal relations with their effects
can be treated merely an accidental generalization of our daily
experiences, ‘akin to Human beings have always lived on the Earth, which
was true until 1968. There does not seem to be anything inherently tem-
poral about a causal relationship’ (Craig and Sinclair 2009, pp. 188–9).
Likewise, Reichenbach (2021) argues that one need not require that cau-
sation embody the Humean condition of temporal priority, but may treat
causation conditionally or as a relation of production. Hawking (2018,
p. 38) also argues: ‘time didn’t exist before the Big Bang so there is no
time for God to make the universe in.’ However, God does not need to
make the universe in time. Rather, God can be conceived of as being
timeless without the universe and in time with the universe, and He
brought about the universe together with time (Craig and Sinclair 2009).
Hawking might object that causes only exist within a time context, but
there is no time context prior to the Big Bang.
In reply, one should distinguish between the label with the entity
labelled. The entity which we call the First Cause is labelled as a ‘cause’
because it brought about the first event, but this does not mean that the
entity cannot have existed in an initially changeless state without bring-
ing about the first event, and entered into time as it brought about the
first event. Thus, the Cause of the universe can be initially timeless, and
in that initially timeless state it has the capacity (libertarian freedom) to
bring about the first event in time (see further, Sect. 6.4.3).
On the one hand, we must be careful not to beg the question against
the existence of such an initially timeless Cause, one that is causally but
not temporally prior to the universe. On the other hand, a Modus Tollens
argument has been offered for the Causal Principle ‘whatever begins to
exist has a cause’ in Chap. 3, and this argument implies that the Causal
Principle would hold regardless of whether time exists before the universe
began. Given Hawking’s claim that there was no time before the Big
Bang, this implies that the universe has an (initially) timeless Cause.
Following Morriston (2002b, p. 240), Hawking might object by
claiming that his principle ‘everything that happens must be caused by
something that occurred earlier in time’ seems to enjoy the same empiri-
cal support as the Causal Principle ‘everything that begins to exist has a
cause’, so why does one reject his principle as an accidental generalization
while accepting the Causal Principle?
262 A. Loke
Two points may be said in response. First, Craig explains that ‘the uni-
vocal concept of ‘cause’ is the concept of something which brings its
effects, and whether this involves causes standing in temporal relations is
an incidental question just as whether it involves transformation of
already existing materials or creation out of nothing is an incidental ques-
tion’ (Craig and Sinclair 2009, pp. 188–9, 195). Second, Hawking’s
principle is based on inductive generalization of ‘our everyday experience’
(Hawking 2018, p. 34), and inductive generalizations are susceptible to
the fallacy of accidental generalization. Whereas the Modus Tollens argu-
ment defended in Chap. 3 is a deductive argument and its premises are
not based on inductive generalization but are based on conceptual analy-
sis and denying a particular consequent. Hence, it is not susceptible to
the fallacy of accidental generalization.
6.3 Transcendent and Immaterial

By transcendent I mean ‘beyond or above the range of normal or physical
human experience’ (Oxford English Dictionary). By immaterial I mean
fundamentally unlike matter-energy as we know it. (One might imagine
a First Cause having spatial extension but is initially changeless; however,
this would still be different from matter-energy as we know it, which is
constantly changing, as explained below.)
Now is has been established previously that the First Cause is initially
changeless. Such a First Cause would be beyond the range of normal
human experiences of physical reality which is characterized by change,
and hence such a First Cause would be transcendent.
Moreover, it would also be distinct from the physical universe which is
constantly changing. For according to quantum field theory, the universe
is a continuous fluctuating field. Additionally, as noted previously, accord-
ing to quantum physics, physical entities constantly fluctuate at the
quantum level as described by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle
(Boddy et al. 2016).
By contrast, the First Cause is not a series of changes/events describ-
able by physical laws; rather, it is initially changeless (and beginningless)
and brought about the first event and these physical laws. To insist on
calling such a First Cause as a physical (or natural) entity would be to use
the word ‘physical’ to refer to something very different from what physics
tells us about the physical world, which is inappropriate. Thus, it is more
appropriate to call this entity non-physical or immaterial.
Moreover, physical entities do not have ‘the capacity to be the origina-
tor of an event in a way that is un-determined by prior event, and the
capacity to prevent itself from changing’ which a First Cause must have,
as explained below.
One might object that he/she cannot conceive of a First Cause that is
immaterial, spaceless, and timeless, that is, something that has no spatial
and no temporal extension, which seems to be non-existence. Three
points may be said in response.
First, the lack of extension does not imply non-existence. The key issue
is how existence should be understood. While Aristotelian substantival-
ism invokes the maxim ‘to exist is to exist in space and time’ (Earman
1995, p. 28), the problem with this view is that space and time are not
themselves located in space and time (Moreland and Craig 2003, p. 189).
Others may think that to exist is to be physical, but the problem with this
view is that disembodied existence is surely conceivable, and it begs the
question against an immaterial God (ibid., p. 190). Existence is better
defined as ‘either the belonging of some property or the being belonged
to by a property’ (ibid., p. 191). Moreland and Craig (ibid.) explain:
Things that exist have properties. When something such as Zeus fails to
exist, there is no object Zeus that actually has properties. Since unicorns
could have existed, this means that the property of being a unicorn could
have belonged to something. It would also account for existence itself exist-
ing because the belonging-to (exemplification, predication) relation is itself
exemplified (a nonfictional, real tiger named Tony and the property of
being a tiger both enter into this belonging relation) and the belonging-to
relation exemplifies other features (e.g., it has the property of being a rela-
tion that belongs to it). (Ibid., p. 191)
Second, one can conceive of immateriality, spaceless, and timeless as

the negations of materiality, space, and time. The negation of a meaning-
ful term is meaningful. Materiality is meaningful. Therefore, the
264 A. Loke
negation of materiality is meaningful, and that is what immateriality

means. Likewise, space and time are meaningful terms. Therefore, the
negation of space and the negation of time are meaningful terms, and
those are what spaceless and timeless mean.
One might object that either something is extended or not extended,
and if it is not extended it is a point. However, this reasoning neglected
the possibility of spacelessness. A point is something in space, whereas
spacelessness is not a point in space. Likewise, timelessness is not a point
in time. Rather, a timeless and spaceless First Cause would be something
that is not in a temporal or spatial dimension and does not have temporal
and spatial extension, and it is not non-existence because it has proper-
ties, such as the property of causal power which brought about the first
event. Having causal power means having the capacity to bring about
something; it does not mean/imply/require having spatial or temporal
extension.
Third, it has been explained earlier that my argument is consistent
with an alternative substantival view of time, according to which the First
Cause exists before creation in an initially changeless state in an undif-
ferentiated, non-metric time. According to this view, the First Cause may
be conceived of as being temporally (and perhaps also spatially) extended,
thus resolving the difficulty. Even though the First Cause may be con-
ceived as being extended in this sense, it remains the case that the First
Cause should not be regarded as the universe (understood as the totality
of physical reality) or as a part of the universe, for it remains the case that
the First Cause is initially changeless whereas physical things are in con-
stant change, as explained above. Moreover, as argued below, in order to
bring about the first event from an initially changeless and beginningless
state, the First Cause must have libertarian freedom, which is character-
istic of a personal Creator rather than an impersonal physical reality
behaving in accordance with natural laws.
6.4 The First Cause Has Libertarian Freedom

6.4.1 H
ow Could the First Cause Bring about the First
Event from an Initially Changeless State
It has been explained above that the First Cause was beginningless and
initially changeless; that is, it was in a state where it was not gaining or
losing any property. One should ask how such a First Cause could bring
about the first event from an initially changeless state.
It should be noted that there is a distinction between ‘not’ and ‘can-
not’; initially changeless does not mean ‘cannot change’; rather, it means
‘not-changing initially’. When the First Cause brings about a change, that
is, an event, the First Cause itself would undergo a change, that is, a
change from ‘existing without the event’ to ‘existing with the event’. But
how could that happen?
Could the First Cause be initially changeless due to necessity and initi-
ated the first change out of necessity, that is, in a deterministic, fixed,
law-like way? If that were the case, the necessity that initiated the first
change would have to overcome the necessity that imposed the initial
changelessness, and if it can do so, it would have done so necessarily and
the First Cause would not have been initially changeless and the first
change would have been coexistent with the First Cause. But this cannot
be the case because, as shown in previous sections of this chapter, the First
Cause is initially changeless and the first change has a beginning whereas
the First Cause does not; thus, they cannot be coexistent. Thus, it cannot
be the case that the First Cause was initially changeless due to necessity
and initiated the first change out of necessity.
Could the First Cause be a quantum system which initiated the first
change contingently? This would be similar to Bohr’s interpretation of
quantum fluctuation according to which, although the quantum field is
a necessary condition, the fluctuation of the field happened indetermin-
stically. Oppy (2009, Footnote 8) claims that there is no relevant differ-
ence between appealing to indeterminism in physical systems and
non-deterministic agent causation in this case. As an example, consider
the following scenario:
266 A. Loke
Suppose the laws of nature are such that a ‘primeval atom’ with no internal
structure might decay, generating a Big Bang and the universe as we know
it. Before it did decay nothing happened. We may suppose that the laws of
nature can be formulated to describe this primeval atom as having existed
for an infinite time with an unchanging infinitesimal probability of decay
per second.6
(In this scenario, infinite time without anything happening should be

understood in accordance with a substantival view of time which postu-
lates that time can exist without change.)
In reply, on the one hand, while many types of events have been
claimed to be subjected to quantum indeterminacy (e.g. radioactive
decay), it is not true that quantum physics has proven that an event can
begin to exist indeterministically and contingently, given the viability of
deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics such as Bohm’s
pilot-wave theory (see Chap. 2) and the possibility of other deterministic
theories. On the other hand, a quantum system is constantly changing as
explained previously, whereas the First Cause is initially changeless, as
argued previously. Therefore, a quantum system cannot be the First
Cause. (To elaborate, I shall explain below that the First Cause must not
only have the capacity for initiating the first event, but also the capacity
for preventing itself from changing. In the case of a quantum system, there
is no such preventive condition; that is why fluctuations are constantly
happening and therefore a quantum system cannot be in a state which is
beginningless and initially changeless.)
Concerning the scenario mentioned above, the postulation ‘with an
unchanging infinitesimal probability of decay per second’ is incoherent,
since if (according to the scenario) ‘nothing happened’ in that state before
decay, then there would be no measure of time and hence no ‘second’.
Additionally, while it has been argued that there are instances of time-
delayed causation which indicate that not all instances of causation are
simultaneous (Grünbaum 1994), in no instance is there a delay of infi-
nite time as the scenario postulates.
On the contrary, Aguirre and Kehayias note (2013): ‘It is very difficult
to devise a system—especially a quantum one—that does nothing “for-
ever”, then evolves. A truly stationary or periodic quantum state, which
would last forever, would never evolve, whereas one with any instability
will not endure for an indefinite time.’ (Even though Aguirre and
Kehayias are arguing against a particular model, namely, the Emergent
Universe Scenario, the point they are making is generalizable to those
models that postulate something doing nothing ‘forever’. Halper [2021,
p. 160] notes that Aguirre has argued elsewhere that the universe may be
eternal into the past [Aguirre 2007], but in that model, namely, the
Eternal Inflation Model, it is not the case that something ‘does nothing
forever’. Rather, that Eternal Inflation Model affirms a beginningless and
continuous changing scenario, that is, an inflation that continues forever
globally. This implies an actual infinite regress of changes and is refuted
by the arguments in Chap. 5.)
Concerning those models in which something ‘does nothing forever’,
Chan (2019, p. 251) explains the problem is that
In a stable state, the ‘decay life time’ would be infinite. Without any exter-
nal causes, this state would exist forever. However, in an unstable state, the
initial state would change to other state in a finite time and the ‘decay life
time’ is finite … If the initial state of our universe is a stable state, no Big
Bang would occur because this state would exist forever without the Big
Bang. Since we have the Big Bang based on observations, our initial state
must not be a stable state. If the initial state is an unstable state, Big Bang
would occur but the time for this initial state must be finite. This implies
that a beginning must exist in the initial state because of its finite life time.
One might ask, if time is composed of chronons with a smallest dura-

tion (say) of Planck time dimension—an extended simple—would it be
the case that particles are changeless within that dimension, and if that is
the case would that not imply that they are changeless and then changed
with the next duration? This case however is disanalogous to the First
Cause because the chronon has a beginning and these particles within the
chronon are caused to change with the next duration by prior events or
things and thus have prior causes, whereas the First Cause is beginning-
less and has no prior cause. Likewise, quantum states transition through
a zero point is from an event to another event, it is not the same as
268 A. Loke
initiating the first event from a beginningless and initially changeless (i.e.
eventless) state.
The objector might ask whether, even though the First Cause is not a
quantum system, could there be some other form of impersonal entity
(one might call it an ‘Initial Natural Thing’, Oppy 2019b, p. 229) which
exists necessarily, beginninglessly, and initial changelessly and initially
timelessly as the First Cause, from which the first event indeterministi-
cally arose. In this case, the first event could have begun to exist without
sufficient condition, that is, have a probabilistic cause (Rasmussen and
Leon 2018, p. 64; Pearce 2017; following Oppy 2013b).7 On this view,
the first event is explained by the initial state of the impersonal entity
which exists necessarily and which follows probabilistic natural laws.
In reply, first, I have argued previously that an initially changeless First
Cause would be immaterial and thus not describable by science, whereas
the ‘Initial Natural Thing’ is supposed to be natural and thus describable
by science. There is no scientific basis for such a natural thing. It is science
fiction.8
More seriously, the objector’s postulation is still plagued by the prob-
lem similar to what physicists Aguirre, Kehayias and Chan noted above.
Even though their point concerns infinite earlier durations rather than
timelessness, nevertheless both infinite earlier durations and timelessness
share a point of commonality, namely, both are beginningless, that is, not
having any limit in the earlier than direction. As I shall explain further
below, that is what is relevant for my argument, given which their point
is relevant for illustrating a problem which I shall go on and develop into
an argument below. My argument is not dependent on the current state
of cosmology but is based on the analysis of the necessary conditions for
an event to begin from a beginningless and initially changeless First Cause.
To elaborate, the beginning of the first event would imply a change to
the First Cause, as it brings about and exists in a new (causal) relation
with the first event. If the First Cause is an impersonal entity and the first
event arose indeterministically from it (or if the First Cause is a system of
tension of opposites)9, that is, if there is a (non-epistemic) probability
(between 0 and 1) of the first event arising from the initial state of such
an entity, this would imply that the initial state of such an entity is unsta-
ble. That is, it has a disposition for changing with the beginning of the
first event. An impersonal entity would not be able to ‘hold back’ its
disposition; this implies that it would exist in the initial state for only a
finite duration, rather than beginninglessly and (initially) changelessly/
timelessly. This is a problem because the premises of the KCA have shown
that the First Cause exists beginninglessly and (initially) changelessly/
timelessly. Thus, the impersonal unstable entity cannot in fact be the First
Cause, contrary to supposition.
One might ask, ‘suppose the indeterministic first cause has a 50%
probability of bringing about the first event. Would it not be the case that
in half of the possible worlds, the first cause would never change and
exists in a timeless state?’
In reply, we know that the First Cause did change in the actual world
to bring about the first event of our world. The point about impersonal
first cause being timeless in possible worlds is irrelevant because the KCA
only needs to prove that there is a personal First Cause in the actual world
by ruling out the First Cause being impersonal in the actual world.
Moreover, in order for such an impersonal first cause to remain unchang-
ing beginninglessly in some possible worlds, it would have to be unlimit-
edly stable, which means it would not have been able to change and bring
about the first event in the actual world. Thus, such an impersonal first
cause cannot be the cause of first effect in the actual world; this implies
that it cannot in fact be the First Cause, contrary to supposition.
It has also be explained previously that it is not the case that the First
Cause initiated the first change out of necessity, that is, in a deterministic,
fixed, law-like way with a probability of 1, for in that case the First Cause
would not have been initially changeless and the first change would have
been coexistent with the First Cause. On the other hand, if the First
Cause exist beginninglessly and changelessly and is impersonal, then it
would be unlimitedly stable. There would be no likelihood/propensity/
tendency/disposition for change. In other words, the probability of the
first event would be 0, which means it would not have happened. (I have
argued previously that quantum systems are not changeless; my point
here is that, even if a quantum system is initially changeless, it would not
change because in that case it would be eternally stable. I have also argued
in Chap. 3 that it is not the case that the first event began uncaused.)
270 A. Loke
The only solution to the above problem is a beginningless First Cause

with libertarian freedom, that is, a personal agent with control over its
action and hence having freedom to change from a beginningless and
initially changeless state. The objector might ask, ‘what is the probability
of such a First Cause bringing about the first event?’ In reply, an agent
free choice is evidently different from (say) coin throwing where there is
some definite objective probability of landing heads; it is open to propo-
nents of agent causation to deny that agent acts have objective probabili-
ties (Buchak 2013). It has been argued that control act is not a chance
event (Lowe 2008, p. 195). While others have argued that a finite, con-
ditioned agents such as mere humans are often affected by volitional ten-
dencies and preferences such that their free action is characterized by
objective probabilities (O’Connor 2016), there is no good reason to
think that the First Cause of the universe would be subjected to such
limitations and conditioning. On the contrary, the foregoing discussion
indicates that there is a First Cause with such absolute control that the
first event is not a probabilistic or deterministic event. In other words, the
First Cause is a personal agent with the power to control itself by having
the following two capacities:
1. The capacity to initiate the first change/event, for the first change can-
not be caused by another entity since the First Cause is the First.
2. The capacity to prevent itself from changing initially and hence main-
tain its stability in the initially changeless state, that is, the capacity to
prevent the capacity to initiate the first change from initiating it ini-
tially, for otherwise the First Cause would not have been initially
changeless and existing beginninglessly without the first change. (The
capacity to control itself and prevent itself from changing differenti-
ates indeterministic libertarian freedom from indeterministic quan-
tum system [suppose for the sake of the argument that quantum
physics is truly indeterministic; I offered an argument against this in
Sect. 3.3]; the latter lack this capacity and hence is constantly chang-
ing, although it is still indeterministic in the sense that the results can
be different even though the prior condition is the same.)
As I shall explain further below, having the above two capacities implies
that the First Cause has libertarian freedom, and hence is a personal
agent. The causation of the first event is therefore due to freedom rather
than the result of deterministic causation describable by an impersonal
law of nature. Moreover, it has been noted that the indeterministic theo-
ries of freedom which have been offered fall into three main groups: non-
causal theories, event-causal theories, and agent causal theories (Clarke
and Capes 2013). Now the cause of the first event cannot be a prior event
(since the first event is the first), and thus event-causal theories of liber-
tarian freedom are not relevant here. Non-causal theories are also not
relevant, given the causal principle defended in this book. The only rele-
vant theory of libertarian freedom is agent causal theory which affirms
that the agent is the ultimate source of the free event. Moreland (2017,
p. 302) notes that ‘advocates of libertarian agency employ a form of per-
sonal explanation that stands in contrast to a covering law model’.
Oppy (2009) objects that agent causation is controversial and ‘it is not
a secure foundation upon which to rest a convincing argument for the
existence of God’.
In reply, I do not posit agent causation as a foundation to rest my argu-
ment, nor did I build in the concept of libertarian freedom into the inde-
terminancy of the First Cause. Rather, the conclusion of Libertarian
freedom is deduced based on the kind of indeterminancy that is required
to bring about the first change from an initially changeless beginningless
state, and the conclusion of agent causation is arrived at deductively from
the preceding premises of my argument on which the argument rests. In
other words, the conclusion that the First Cause has libertarian freedom
is not assumed but deduced from the premises of the KCA; that is, the
KCA shows that the First Cause exists beginninglessly and the first effect
(first event) has a beginning, and in order for this to be the case the First
Cause must have libertarian freedom, as I have explained previously.
In response to the objection that the notion of a Divine agent cause of
the initial singularity is obscure, Moreland (2017, pp. 306–307) notes:
We understand exercises of power primarily from introspective awareness

of our own libertarian acts, and we use the concept of action so derived to
offer third-person explanations of the behaviour of other human persons.
272 A. Loke
There is nothing obscure about such explanations for the effects produced
by other finite persons … In fact, naturalists like John Searle, John Bishop
and Thomas Nagel all admit that our basic concept of action itself is a lib-
ertarian one.
The possession of libertarian freedom implies that the First Cause is

not an impersonal entity such as an initial singularity (contra Oppy
2019a, p. 22). Rather, the First Cause is a Creator God.
6.4.2 Should We Call It Libertarian Freedom?
It might be objected that one should not call the two capacities men-
tioned above libertarian freedom, because libertarian freedom is associ-
ated with a mind with the capacity for reasoning and decision making,
but it has not yet been shown that the First Cause has other properties of
a mind with the capacity for reasoning and decision making; in particu-
lar, it has not yet been shown that the First Cause brought about the first
event purposefully rather than accidentally. The two capacities could be
something else (call it Blark power) not involving agency or decision
making.10
To address this objection, one can argue that, to demonstrate that
something x has property y, one only needs to demonstrate that x has the
properties sufficient for y, one does not need to demonstrate that x has
the properties associated with y. For example, SETI (Search for Extra-
Terrestrial Intelligence) researchers can reasonably conclude that Extra-
Terrestrial Intelligence exists if they pick up a certain signal under certain
circumstances. Even if our understanding of the intelligence that is capa-
ble of producing that signal is associated with human intelligence, the
association with humans is not essential to the definition of intelligence.
Likewise, it can be argued that having the above mentioned two capac-
ities explained above are sufficient for having libertarian freedom. First, it
should be noted that the First Cause of the universe was not caused to
bring about the first event by some prior causes nor prevented from doing
so by outside forces; thus, it is truly free in this sense. Second, the only
notion of freedom which has those two capacities is libertarian freedom.
According to the other notion of freedom, that is, compatibilism, the

events are determined by prior events and there is nothing with (1) the
capacity to initiate change, and also (2) the capacity to prevent itself from
changing. Thus, compatibilist freedom is not what the First Cause has;
only libertarian freedom follows from the deduction of the KCA. Third,
as explained in Sect. 6.4.1, the only notion of causation we have which is
consistent with a first cause having the two capacities I mentioned is
agent causation having libertarian freedom; thus, it is not ad hoc to call
the First Cause an Agent. On the other hand, we have no prior notion of
what ‘Blark’ means; thus, it is ad hoc to use it.
It might be objected that simply having a notion of libertarian free-
dom in no way establishes its reality, just as having a notion of unicorns
does not establish its reality, and that it is still being disputed whether
human beings has libertarian freedom (which I am ascribing to the First
Cause).11 However, this objection is based on fallacious reasoning. No
one has yet demonstrated that a unicorn exists, but that does not imply
that no one can discover that a unicorn exists in the future. If one day
someone discovered a white horse-like beast with a single large, pointed,
spiralling horn projecting from its forehead, we would say a unicorn has
been discovered. One does not have to demonstrate that unicorns exist
first before they discover a real-world entity with the characteristics of
unicorns. Rather, having a pre-existing notion/concept of unicorn would
be sufficient. Likewise, to ascribe Libertarian freedom and agent causa-
tion to a First Cause with the relevant characteristics, having a pre-existing
notion/concept of Libertarian freedom and agent causation would be suf-
ficient. An instance of x does not need to exist first in order for us to
discover an instance of x; rather, having a pre-existing notion of x would
be sufficient. I have already shown using the KCA-TA that the First Cause
has the characteristics which fit our pre-existing notion of libertarian
freedom, thereby demonstrating that libertarian freedom does exist (in
the First Cause, at least).
It might be objected that agent causation is not a feature of physics. In
reply, that is because physics does not offer a complete explanation of all
reality; indeed, physics itself requires deductive and inductive reasoning
the justification of which is philosophical. On the one hand, there is no
proof that physics offers a complete explanation of all reality. On the
274 A. Loke
other hand, I have offered a proof that the First Cause brought about the
first event via libertarian freedom which is characteristic of agent causa-
tion. My argument is coherent and consistent with everything currently
known in science. The objection that my argument is not consistent with
science is based on the assumption that science offer a complete explana-
tion of everything at all moments, which is a philosophical assumption,
not a scientific one (i.e. it is the assumption of scientism, not science),
and it is a fallacious philosophical assumption as explained in Chap. 1.
It might be objected it is obscure how libertarian freedom works.
Nevertheless, as explained in Chap. 1, the conclusion of a sound argu-
ment (i.e. a deductively valid argument with true premises) must be true,
regardless of whether we know of other details like further explanations
concerning how it works, and I have already explained why my argument
for a First Cause with libertarian freedom is sound. It should be noted
that physics itself admits some of the lawful relationships among physical
entities are brute facts having no further explanations’ (Koons and Bealer
2010, p. xviii). Indeed, the impossibility of infinite regress of explana-
tions implies that on any worldview there would be brute facts, and I
have explained only a First Cause with libertarian freedom can be the
brute fact to terminate the causal regress.
In summary, given the three points mentioned above, it is justified to
conclude that the First Cause is an agent having libertarian freedom in
virtue of having those two capacities, and it is not necessary to demon-
strate that the First Cause has other properties of a mind with the capac-
ity for reasoning and decision making. Nevertheless, I shall provide
evidences for the latter as well by arguing that the First Cause brought
about the first event purposefully rather than accidentally in Chap. 7.
This will be accomplished by completing my defence of the Teleological
Argument and combining it with the KCA to demonstrate that the First
Cause is an intelligent designer of the universe.
6.4.3 Is the First Event Random?
A libertarian free act does not entail that the act is un-determined and
random. While such a free act is not determined by prior events (and
thus is indeterministic in this sense; see below), it is nevertheless deter-

mined by a personal agent who is the cause of the action, and the agent
freely willed the action rather than randomly, and the agent can will in
accordance with reason. On the other hand, calling the first event ran-
dom does not explain how the first event could have begun from an ini-
tially changeless first cause; as explained previously, only libertarian
freedom can explain this.
To elaborate, libertarian free acts are indeterministic but not uncaused.
As Randolph Clarke and Justin Capes explain, on agent-causal theories,
a free act (or some event internal to such an act) must be caused by the
agent; and it must not be the case that either what the agent causes or the
agent’s causing that event is causally determined by prior events. Thus, an
agent is in a strict and literal sense an originator of the free act. This com-
bination of indeterminism and cause (origination) is thought to capture
best the idea that, when we act freely, a plurality of alternatives is open to
us and we determine, ourselves, which of these we pursue. In response to
the objection that the explanatory role of reasons seems to be excluded,
Clarke and Capes (2013) suggest an account in which a free action is
caused by the agent and non-deterministically caused by agent’s recogniz-
ing certain reasons for which she acts. Acting for a reason does not mean
that the person has a reason which determined her choice for a reason
(contra Levy and McKenna 2009, p. 121). Rather, as Lowe (2008,
pp. 181–190) explains, acting for a reason means that the reason for
which the agent acted is simply the reason which the agent chose to act
upon. Being ‘responsive’ to a reason for acting in this manner is not being
determined to act in a certain way by that reason. Thus, indeterminism
and causality can both be affirmed, and it is not a random act given that
reason is involved.
One might object that, if every beginning has a cause, then the begin-
ning of the event which is ‘an agent’s causing an event’ has a cause (Rowe
2003, p. 73), which appears to generate an infinite regress of causes.
Craig replies that ‘Partisans of agent causation typically say that the
agent’s causing some effect is not an event requiring a cause, either because
it is not itself an event, but just a way of describing an agent’s causing an
event, or if it is an event, then it is not further caused’ (Craig and Sinclair
2009, p. 194n. 101, citing O’Connor 2000, Chap. 3). Libertarian
276 A. Loke
freedom does not posit an infinite regress or random creation without a

cause; rather, the agent is the First Cause of the free act (no regress) and
he/she acts for a reason (not random).
It might be objected that there cannot be deliberation in timelessness
and hence the decision would be random. In reply, the conclusion does
not follow, because the decision can still be made for a reason. For the
First Cause could be an omniscient Mind who is aware of all propositions
in an initially timeless changeless state and therefore does not need time
to think about those reasons. The word ‘thought’ essentially refers to
something X in the mind, and X can be ideas that one is aware of.
Moreover, there is no contradiction in saying that something M has a
changeless (i.e. timeless) awareness of ideas (i.e. thought) and their logical
relations. Therefore, it is not true to say that time must exist first in order
that the First Cause can have a thought.
One might object that, if God (suppose God is the First Cause) has
reasons for creation (e.g. bless creatures), then the decision to create is
made as a result of those reasons, and the decision would be determined
by those reasons and hence is not free but occurred by necessity.
The answer is that those reasons can be understood as a necessary con-
dition but not a sufficient condition for the decision, which can therefore
still be caused and free. The intention can be one which is freely chosen.
Thus, suppose (for example) God—because of His perfect goodness and
love—freely created a universe with humans who have significantly mor-
ally valuable freedom for His loving purpose of wanting to bless these
creatures with the knowledge of Himself who is the Good.12 In this case,
having reasons to bless creatures does not imply that He has to bless crea-
tures, neither does it imply that God could not have refrained from creat-
ing initially. The reasons for creation are not coercive, there might also be
reasons for not creating, there may well be goods (related to creating and
not-creating) which are incommensurable, and even among equal value
options, there may be variation (Pruss 2016). Hence, God did not create
out of necessity. According to the Christian tradition, God by definition
(ex hypothesi) is a free agent who is perfect and therefore has no need; a
perfect agent would not experience any insufficiency and hence would
have no need to express Himself in creative acts or self-glorification.
Rather, He created out of perfectly free love for creatures, and in this way
manifested His perfection, that is, His glory. The creation (which has
beginning) by a First Cause (which has no beginning) is therefore an
evidence of His perfection.
One might ask whether those reasons would be the First Cause(s)
given that those reasons are the necessary conditions of the decision. In
reply, against the idea that an action done on the basis of a reason is
caused by that reason, Pruss (2018, pp. 184–185) argues:
We can understand a reason as a mental content or a thinkable favoring an

action. A reason is thus something abstract. But in addition to the mental
contents or thinkables, there are the token thinkings that realize these con-
tents. It is not the reasons considered as abstract thinkables that are causes
of an agent’s actions. Rather, it is the token thinkings that realize these
thinkables that are the causes of an agent’s actions.
Pruss goes on to say that, while there are infinitely many reasons on the
basis of which God created as He did, this does not imply that there are
infinitely many concrete token thinkings in the mind of God given that
‘multiple thinkables can be realized in a single act of thinking … when
one believes the moon is round and gray, one thereby also believes that it
is round and that it is gray. Likewise, multiple reasons can be realized in
a single act of thinking’ (ibid.). The reasons are abstract, they do not
begin to arise in the Mind of God but are being aware of by the Mind in
the initially changeless and beginningless state. ‘For a reason’ is the aim of
the choice. The thinking of these reasons is a necessary condition but not
a sufficient condition for a rational free choice; thus, by itself it does not
determine the choice. Rather, the thinking of these reasons (the final
cause) and free will of the Agent (God) (the efficient cause) are what
brought about the first event, and ‘the exercise of God’s free will’ is merely
descriptive of this. God had thoughts in the sense of being aware of them
in the initially changeless state, but was not choosing to bring about the
first event initially. When He freely chose to bring about the first event,
time began.
278 A. Loke
6.4.4 Libertarian Freedom and Time
As noted earlier, being initially changeless does not mean it is not able to
change, just as someone not carrying out an action initially does not
mean he/she is unable to act. Here, ‘initial’ refers to the first in the series
of states (ordered causally), not first the series of changes/events/temporal
series. With regard to the Hybrid view, there is no contradiction in saying
that a First Cause is initially timeless, and then entered into time when it
acted. ‘Enter’ is a temporal concept, as the First Cause brought about the
first change (=first event) time also began to exist, and the First Cause
entered into time as it brought about the first event (temporal causation).
Therefore, in this case there is an initially atemporal cause with temporal
causation. On this view the First Cause does not come before all else in
time. Rather, the first state of the First Cause existed without time as
explained above. The First Cause can freely move out of the timeless state
and bring about time. On this view, the temporal event of the universe
beginning is not caused by the First Cause in its timeless phase, rather,
the First Cause is in time as it causes that event. Libertarian freedom is
not a temporal concept; it is a capacity. While ‘change’ necessarily involves
time, the ‘ability to change’ does not. A timeless agent with libertarian
freedom may be without change initially, but having the capacity to bring
about the first event, and when he does so, change and time would begin.
The First Cause changes and enters into time with the exercise of the
freedom to create the universe. Now Mullins (2020, p. 226) has raised
the following objection to Craig’s hybrid view:
A change is things’ being one way at a particular moment, and then being
different at the next moment. If time exists if and only if change exists,
then it would seem that time cannot exist without there being a series of
moments. This has a counterintuitive entailment—there is no time at the
first moment because there is no change at the first moment.
In reply, as noted in previous chapters, a change essentially involves a

thing or part of a thing gaining or losing one or more properties; it does
not have to involve ‘being one way at a particular moment, and then
being different at the next moment’, rather, it can involve ‘being one way
at a particular state without the dimension of time, and being different at

another state with the dimension of time’. Thus, the First Cause can be
in an initially changeless state in which it was not gaining or losing prop-
erty, and as it brings about the universe, there is a gain of a new property
and hence a change together with the first moment and time.
The claim that ‘to be able to change, one must exist within a time
matrix’ is inaccurate, for a timeless agent with libertarian freedom may be
initially without change but having the capacity to start changing, and
when he does so time would begin. To ask ‘how long was this cause
changeless for? a millisecond? five minutes? etc.’ would be to ask a mean-
ingless question given the relational view of time, according to which in
the absence of change there is no time, whereas ‘millisecond, five min-
utes, etc.’ involve a measurement of time. To claim that ‘time would still
pass’ is to assume change, since ‘pass’ is a change. Hence, time would not
pass if nothing else exist except something that is initially changeless.
Changeless means absence of change; there is nothing in the notion of
this absence itself that requires an extent (temporal or otherwise); the notion
of ‘no extent and no change (i.e. no gaining or losing of properties at the
initial state)’ is perfectly coherent. The problem is that many people are too
used to thinking in temporal terms and subconsciously asking ‘changeless
for how long’, which of course begs the question against the timeless-sans-
creation view by presupposing temporal extent (‘for how long’).
As an analogy for the Hybrid view, one may think of a situation (call
this Situation X) in which nothing else (e.g. no clock, no time dimen-
sion) exists except a motionless person who exists (initially) changelessly
without beginning: he has the ability to move, but as long as he does not
actually move there is no change and no time. (On this view, it is false to
say that the person is motionless at t = 0, for t = 0 implies a time dimen-
sion, but on this view there is no time dimension in that motionless
state.) When he moves and performs an act, that itself is a change, that is,
a temporal causation, and that is what bringing about temporality means.
When the person causes the effect he would no longer be motionless.
Thus, it is not the case that the man is both moving and motionless
simultaneously. There is therefore no contradiction.
Hence, it is wrong for Wielenberg (2020, p. 3) to state, ‘But Craig also
says that the first cause must be timeless; otherwise, how could it have the
280 A. Loke
power to create time itself?’ Actually, what Craig means is that the First
Cause is timeless without ‘agent-causing of B at t1’, and temporal with
‘agent-causing of B at t1’. There is no contradiction.
Concerning Craig’s illustration of ‘a man sitting changelessly from
eternity … could freely will to stand up’, Wielenberg (2020, p. 3) writes:
‘But now suppose that (i) the man causes the effect of standing up while
he is sitting.’
Craig can reply that when the man causes the effect he would no lon-
ger be sitting. Thus, it is not the case that the man is both seated and fully
upright simultaneously. There is therefore no impossibility. (Wielenberg
may be presupposing a beginning point. If so, see Chap. 5, where I dis-
cuss Craig and Sinclair’s [2012, p. 100] rejection of the idea that having
a beginning requires having a beginning point because it lands one in the
ancient Greek paradoxes of motion.)
Wielenberg (2020, p. 3) writes: ‘Similarly, on Craig’s view, the tempo-
ral event of the universe beginning is caused by God in His timeless
phase.’ But this is mistaken. On Craig’s view, the temporal event of the
universe beginning is not caused by God in His timeless phase; rather,
God is in time as He causes that event.
Contrary to Wielenberg (2020, p. 3), this view does not imply ‘the
causal inertness of God in His timeless phase’, for in that timeless phase
God possesses the causal power to bring about the first event which He
refrained from exercising in that timeless phase, and which was exercised
at the first duration of time. Having that power (which He refrained from
exercising) in that timeless phase distinguishes God from (say) abstract
objects which are timeless but have no such power—that is why we say
that abstract objects are causally inert. Neither is it accurate to character-
ize this view as saying that ‘a temporal being caused the universe’ (ibid.)
simpliciter. Rather, according to this view the universe is created by a
God who is timeless without creation and temporal with creation
Wielenberg also claims that the view that God caused the beginning of
time has the problem of implying that God’s exercise of causal power
(GA) is a temporal event ‘causally prior to the beginning of time, which
is impossible, since it would make the existence of time a prerequisite for
an event that is causally prior to the beginning of time and hence would
require time to be causally prior to itself ’ (2020, pp. 4–5).
In reply, instead of saying that ‘God’s exercise of causal power (GA) is

an event that caused the beginning of time’, one can say ‘God’s exercise
of causal power’ (GA) is just a way of describing an agent (God) causing
an event/change (the beginning of the universe in this case), and the
beginning of time (the first moment) is concomitant to the event (‘the
beginning of universe’). Hence, God’s act of creation does not depend on
the pre-existence of time (a moment at which He creates); rather, the
existence of time is dependent on God’s act of creation.
Wielenberg (ibid., p. 7) claims that the intrinsic change of God entailed
by GA implies that GA is an event which is both caused and uncaused.
However, this is a non-sequitur. As noted earlier, rather than saying that
GA is an event, GA can just be a way of describing God causing an event,
and this can entail an ‘intrinsic change’ as follows: The first state of not-
causing exists without change initially, and thus is timeless (on a rela-
tional view of time). As God causes the first change, this entails the
second state of causing which is concomitant to God causing the first
change, and the difference between the first and second state is an ‘intrin-
sic change’ which is not-uncaused but is concomitant to (and simultane-
ous with) God causing the first change. There is no uncaused event in the
above scenario.
Thus, one can coherently affirm:
1. God is initially timeless.

2. God’s exercise of causal powers brings about the initial state of
the universe.
3. As God exercises His causal power, time begins.
4. The universe is caused by God in His temporal state.
It might be asked, ‘since there is a succession of distinct states (initial

changelessness followed by change), would it be coherent to state that
God’s timeless state does not temporally precede the existence of the uni-
verse? How are we to make sense of the notion of the succession of states
not being a temporal sequence?’13
In reply, the First Cause being changeless-sans-first-event and changes
with the first event does not imply a temporal succession of two states,
because according to the Hybrid view the initial changeless state is not a
282 A. Loke
state in time but timeless, that is, without a temporal dimension which
only exists with the first event. Hence, this is not a case of succession of
two temporal states. One can make sense of the notion of the succession
of states not being a temporal sequence by thinking of time as involving
a dimension and/or change, and according to the Hybrid view in the
original state there is neither. In this way the First Cause can be causally
prior but not temporal prior to the first event.
One might ask, ‘if there is no time separating the timeless First Cause
and the first event, then the two must coexist. In that case, how can it be
that the First Cause is timeless sans (without) the first event?’
In response, on the Hybrid view, the difference in properties between
timelessness (which is beginningless) and time (which has a beginning)
implies that the timeless First Cause and the first event do not coexist,
and that the First Cause can be timeless without the first event. God was
(1) initially changeless without creation—there was no event in that state
and no universe as well; (2) God changed with the bringing about of the
beginning of the universe, in which state the universe existed alongside
God. There is distinction with a difference between (1) and (2), and it
shows that it is not the case that the universe and God coexisted.
One might object that for x to change is for x to have property p at tm
that x does not have at tn, and therefore it is impossible that timeless enti-
ties change. However, proponents of the Hybrid view can argue that ‘for
x to change is for x to have property p at tm that x does not have at tn, or
for x to have p in timelessness that x does not have at t’, and thus there is no
incoherence there.
It might be objected that, while it is easy to conceive of how the First
Cause can have libertarian freedom on a dynamic theory of time, it is
difficult to conceive this on a static theory of time. In reply, Craig argues
that static time is compatible with human libertarian freedom; if that is
so, it would be compatible with the Divine First Cause having libertarian
freedom as well. Craig (2015) explains that
the B-theory does not imply that events which lie in our future are causally
determined with respect to antecedent event. Indeed, some such event
could be wholly undetermined by antecedent causes. On any standard
definition of libertarian freedom, therefore, such an event could be a genu-

inely free choice.
He also argues that, ‘on a B-theory of time, although we cannot change

the future, we can act in such a way that if we were to act in that way, the
future would be different’ (ibid.).
Likewise, one can argue that, on a B-theory of time, God can refuse to
act in such a way that, if He were to refuse to act in that way, the universe
would not have existed at t1.
One might object: if God is initially changeless, then His willing of the
universe must be without beginning, in which case the universe should
also be without beginning, but this contradicts the KCA which argues
that the universe has a beginning (Morriston 2000).
Citing J.P. Moreland, Craig replies that it is insufficient for P to have
merely the intention and power to bring about R; rather, there must also
be a basic action on the part of P, a free undertaking which took place
simultaneously with the first effect in time. Craig concludes the failing of
Morriston’s objection is that in speaking of God’s willing that the uni-
verse exists, he does not differentiate between God’s timeless intention to
create a temporal world and God’s undertaking to create a temporal
world. Once we make the distinction, we see that creation ex nihilo is not
an instance of state–state causation (Craig 2002).
In short, one should note the distinction between God’s intending to
create a universe and His undertaking it, that is, His bringing about that
intention. Given this distinction, Craig argues that it’s possible for God
to eternally intend to bring about the universe, and then to freely and
spontaneously undertaking to create it a finite amount of time ago. Thus,
the universe was freely brought about by the Divine Agent who has liber-
tarian freedom, and the ‘undertaking’ is for the purpose of accomplishing
something; therefore, it is not random.
One might object that the distinction between God’s intending to cre-
ate a universe and His undertaking it does not exist if there are no actual
distinct differences intrinsic to God in the initially changeless state.14 This
objection confuses between conceptual distinction and distinction-in-
the-concrete. Conceptually, there is a distinction between God’s intend-
ing to create a universe and His undertaking it—these two mean different
284 A. Loke
things. However, concretely, such a distinction does not exist in the being
of God in His initially changeless state. Nevertheless, His capacity for the
exercise of libertarian freedom existed in that state, and when He exer-
cised this capacity He undertook the creation of the universe and the
distinction began to exist concretely.
Leon (in Rasmussen and Leon 2018, p. 63) objects that the distinction
between deciding and undertaking that decision arises ‘in three main
types of case: When you do not yet know what you will decide to do;
when a decision the time for carrying out your decision has not yet
arrived; and when you have weakness of will that (at least temporarily)
prevents you from carrying out your decision’, but none of these condi-
tions applies to an omniscient, timeless, omnipotent, and morally perfect
God. Likewise, Morriston argues that ‘An omnipotent being cannot suf-
fer from weakness of will. An omniscient being cannot change its mind.
And a timeless being cannot meaningfully be said to “delay” undertaking
to carry out its intentions. So it is very hard indeed to see how God's
eternal will to create can fail to be sufficient for His undertaking to do so’
(Morriston 2002a, p. 107).
However, the three main types of cases that Leon explained can be
regarded as accidental to humans but not essential to the distinction
between deciding and undertaking that decision. An omniscient, time-
less, omnipotent, and morally perfect God could have known what He
would decide to do with the beginning of time, while also willed to ini-
tially refrain from undertaking creation because it is consistent with
divine perfection to be initially changeless (the conclusion of initial
changelessness follows from the premises of the Kalām as argued previ-
ously). In that case there is no weakness of will that prevents God from
carrying out His decision to create; rather, God not carrying out His
decision is due to His will to initially refrain. There is no changing of
mind, since the divine mind has always planned to initially refrain and to
create at the first moment. This refraining is not a delay (since delay
involves time but there is no time in the state of refraining) but rather an
exercising of the capacity to prevent itself from changing initially, as
argued previously.
It might be objected that a decision seems to be an action that only
makes sense in time.15
In reply, the term ‘decide’ refers to the end result of consideration of

reasons. While humans require time to consider and make up their mind
because human mental capacity is limited, a superior Being who does not
suffer from this limitation would not have this requirement. There is no
contradiction in saying that a superior Being has an initially changeless
(i.e. initially timeless) awareness of ideas and reasons (i.e. thought), their
logical relations, and the resulting freely made decision. Therefore, it is
not true to say that time must exist first in order that the Superior Being
can have a thought. What is essential to the consideration of ideas and a
decision is logical sequence, not temporal sequence, which, although
necessary for humans, is unnecessary for a Superior Being who can be
aware of all logical sequences timelessly. God decides in an initially time-
less state (He does not require time to make up His mind) and acts with
the beginning of time; therefore, it is not the case that God decides and
acts at the same time. These two are not ‘at the same time’ because God
decides in an initially timeless state, not at the same time with the action.
6.4.5 Contradiction with Classical Theism
It might be objected that the conclusion that the Divine First Cause
changed with the exercise of libertarian freedom is inconsistent with the
doctrines of a strong notion of divine immutability, essential divine time-
lessness, and divine simplicity, which has been held by many Christian
theologians (e.g. Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas) and is known as
Classical Theism.
Classical Theism however has been rejected by many theologians today
for being contrary to the Scripture and philosophically untenable (Mullins
2015). I have argued in Loke (2014, 2018) that there is insufficient
philosophical, theological, or Scriptural justification for a strong notion
of divine immutability, essential divine timelessness, and divine simplic-
ity; that these views are not required for Perfect Being Theism; and that
these views face difficulties concerning the doctrine of the Incarnation,
which is of central importance for understanding the divine (and human)
in Christian Theology. Additionally, these views face difficulties concern-
ing the doctrine of creation. For in order for a universe with beginning to
286 A. Loke
be caused by a God without beginning, this would require God to refrain

from using His active powers in the beginningless-state-sans-the-uni-
verse, and use His powers at creation. This implies that God is not Pure
Act, since Pure Act entails intrinsic essential changeless-ness, whereas
refrain-use implies that the First Cause is not essentially changeless but
only initially changeless as explained in previous sections. By contrast,
a beginningless (first) cause which (as Aquinas claimed) is Pure Act would
(contrary to Aquinas) bring about a beginningless universe. However,
this consequence is contrary to orthodox Christian doctrine that the uni-
verse has a beginning, and this consequence is also contradicted by the
conclusion established previously that the First Cause brings about a first
event which has a beginning whereas the First Cause has no beginning.
Moreover, since God is the Creator and since creation involves God using
His powers, which He does not use in the initially changeless state, this
would imply that God’s internal properties do change with creation.
Through his argument from motion Aristotle had concluded that for
any motion to occur there must be some unmoved mover, that is, God,
who, being fully actual, cannot change because He has no potentiality
not already fully realized (Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.5–9). Thomists have
similarly argued that changes involve the actualization of potentials (Feser
2017, p. 26) and are explained by a hierarchical causal series (the cup of
coffee is held up by the desk, which is help up by the floor, which is held
up by the foundations, which is held up by the earth…) with a first mem-
ber ‘without any potential for existence requiring actualisation. This is
pure actuality … uncaused cause, Aristotle’s “Unmoved Mover” … unac-
tualized actualizer’ (ibid., p. 27). Concerning Aquinas’ Fifth Way, it has
also been argued that, since its purpose is to explain the teleological
potential that is present in all things, the explanation cannot have such a
potential in itself, but must be Pure Act (Newton 2014, p. 576).
In reply, while one can agree that changes involve the actualization of
potentials and that there is a First Cause of a hierarchical causal series, this
does not imply that such a First Cause must have no potentiality not
already fully realized (by ‘potential’ I am referring to ‘active power in the
state of not-being-used’, i.e., the state of refraining from using active power,
see above). Rather, a beginningless First Cause having libertarian freedom
to freely actualize its own potential (e.g., to use its active power to create
the universe, and hence is the first cause of this actualization and explains
why that potential is actualized rather than not-actualized) would termi-
nate the hierarchical causal series just as well. On this view, the First Cause
was initially changeless sans the first event, but it has the un-actualized
potential to bring about the first event, and as it actualizes its potential to
bring about the first event, it also actualizes its potential to sustain the
things that are brought about by the first event. (This does not mean that
the First Cause actualized all its potentials at the first event; rather, it is pos-
sible that the First Cause could have other potentials, such as [as Christian
theologians affirm] the potential for Incarnation [see Loke 2014], which
was actualized at a later time. The possibility of such a view implies that it
is not necessary the case that the First Cause must be a Pure Act.) While the
Thomist assumes that something cannot actualize its own potential, a lib-
ertarian agent who is a beginningless First Cause can do that, and this does
not involve something bringing about its own existence since the First
Cause is beginningless and eternally existed. On this view the change in
God’s properties was brought about by God Himself as He brought about
the first event and continues to freely choose to sustain the world in exis-
tence. God can change His initially state of changelessness given that that
state is not essential to divine nature (I argue for this in Loke 2014, chapter
5) and given that God has libertarian freedom. Affirming that God can
change properties that are non-essential to divine nature does not imply
that God can change properties essential to divine nature (such as proper-
ties of being uncaused, beginningless, omnipotent, etc.).
6.5 The First Cause Has Tremendous Power

The enormity of the power of the First Cause is indicated by the enormity
of the effect down the causal chain, namely, the entire universe. Scientists
have discovered that the sun which illuminates our earth is merely one of
the over 200 billion of stars in our galaxy. Even if we could travel at the
speed of light—about 300,000 kilometres per second—it would take
about 100,000 years to travel from one end of the galaxy to the other.
More astounding still is the fact that our galaxy is merely one of the over
100 billion galaxies in existence, many of which have hundreds of
288 A. Loke
millions of stars. And this is merely the currently observable universe; the
actual universe is much larger than this. The universe is truly awesome,
and as shown in previous chapters, these billions of stars and galaxies
ultimately came from a First Cause who is the Creator of the universe.
Against the First Cause having enormous power, one might object that
one cannot make such deduction of the degree of power from the effect.
For example, while we can infer from the effects that the atomic bomb
causing the destruction of Hiroshima in 1945 was tremendously power-
ful, it might be argued that the bomb was the end result of a process
leading from less powerful entities, such as the tiny elements of uranium
and the little ‘bullet-like’ mechanism shot in to the uranium to start the
reaction.16 Sceptics might object that the bullet, which has little energy, is
analogous to the First Cause.
Further reflection reveals that the above example is disanalogous to the
First Cause of the universe in the following way. The tremendous power
of the atomic bomb is due to the mass of the uranium, which contains a
lot of energy given the conversion of mass into energy in accordance to
E = mc2. While the bullet brought about the conversion of the mass of
the uranium into energy, the existence of the mass-energy of the uranium
was not brought about by the bullet. Whereas the existence of the entire
universe with its tremendous amount of mass-energy was ultimately
brought about by the First Cause, which therefore has tremendous power
to bring about all these.
As noted in Chap. 2, some cosmologists have proposed the Zero
Energy Universe theory according to which the net energy of the universe
is zero. One might think that, if that is true, then there is no reason to
think that the First Cause would be required to possess tremendous
power to bring about zero energy.
However, this is a misconception. I have explained in Chap. 2 that,
even if Zero Energy Universe theory is true, one still has to ask what
made the energy and the laws of nature to be the way they are. The First
Cause must still be enormously powerful in order to be able to make the
tremendous amount of positive and negative energy to be the way they
are—out of zero energy! While humans with limited powers require pre-
existing matter-energy to work from in order to create (say) an atomic
bomb and the feeble bullet trigger requires pre-existent uranium to start
the nuclear reaction, the First Cause does not require pre-existing matter-
energy in order to bring about a series of events that resulted in the bil-
lions of stars and galaxies as well as the negative energy of gravity and the
amazing laws of nature. This is an indication that the power of the First
Cause far surpasses ours; indeed, it far surpasses anything else we know.
6.6 Conclusion
I have defended premises 6–11 of KCA-TA and show that the First Cause
is not a series of changes (= events) describable by physical laws; rather, it
is initially changeless (premise 8) and brought about the first event with
the physical laws. It is also distinct from the physical universe which is
constantly changing according to quantum field theory, and which does
not have ‘the capacity to be the originator of an event in a way that is un-
determined by prior event, and the capacity to prevent itself from chang-
ing’, which a First Cause must have (premise 10). I have explained and
defended the claim that these two capacities imply that the First Cause
has libertarian freedom.17 Thus, the First Cause cannot be part of the
physical universe as postulated by Hawking’s no-boundary proposal,
which as explained above is unproven and scientifically flawed. Rather, as
shown by premises 6–11 of KCA-TA, the First Cause is uncaused, begin-
ningless, initially changeless, has libertarian freedom, and is enormously
powerful, that is, a transcendent immaterial Creator of the Universe.
With regard to the relationship between the First Cause and time, I have
shown that both the Hybrid view and the view of the Oxford School are
defensible; any one of them would be sufficient for the conclusion of this
book. I have also shown that the conclusion of KCA, as well as the doc-
trine of creatio ex nihilo, is consistent with the relational view of time and
the substantival view of time, and it is also consistent with the dynamic
theory of time and the static theory of time. Thus, for the purposes of this
book it is not necessary to settle the debates between these views and
theories. I personally think that there are other philosophical reasons for
thinking that the static theory of time is false, but the point here is that,
regardless of which of these view or theory is true, there must still be a
First Cause which is uncaused, beginningless, initially changeless, has
290 A. Loke
libertarian freedom, and is enormously powerful. The conclusion that the

First Cause is a Creator who brought about the first event purposefully
rather than accidentally can be further strengthened by considering the
evidences of fine-tuning and order of the universe, which have been
explained in Chap. 4. I shall complete my demonstration that the First
Cause is a Designer in the next chapter.
Notes
1. See also Alfred Freddoso’s comparison of Suarez’s analysis of causation
with contemporary theories in Freddoso’s Introduction to Suarez (2002).
2. A-theorists such as Craig deny that these purported evidences support
the B-theory; see Craig (2000a, 2000b).
3. Some philosophers have argued that time could continue to exist even if
all events were to cease (Shoemaker 1969). I think this argument can be
rebutted, but rebutting it will take us too far afield; in any case, Craig
and Sinclair (2009, p. 192) notes that the arguments of Shoemaker ‘are
inapplicable in the case at hand, where we are envisioning, not the cessa-
tion of events, but the utter absence of any events whatsoever’.
4. As Oppy did during the debate: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
a8NrTv-Durc&t=129s.
5. Except perhaps Oriti (2014), who proposes geometrogenesis, that is, the
coming of spacetime into being with the physical condensation of the
‘spacetime atoms’. As noted above, Oriti acknowledges that this view is
not well-established.
6. Koons (2014, pp. 261–262), attributing it to an anonymous referee.
Koons replies by pressing a dilemma: ‘either there is an intrinsic metric
to the pure passage of time, or not. If there is, then the infinite past is
actually divided into an infinite number of periods, contrary to the con-
clusion of the Reaper paradox. If there is no intrinsic measure of time,
then the imagined scenario is impossible, since it supposes an extended
period during which absolutely nothing happens’ (ibid.). However, the
second horn of the dilemma presupposes a relational view of time. The
opponent could deny this and hold to a substantival view of time,
according to which there can be time without change or process.
7. While Oppy has called it the Initial Singularity, he writes that ‘“Initial
Singularity” is just a convenient label for whatever it is that exists in the
initial state of natural reality. It would work equally well to use, instead,
the label “Initial Natural Thing”’ (Oppy 2019b, p. 229).
8. I thank William Lane Craig for helpful input here.
9. I thank Andres M for suggesting this.
10. I thank Vaal for raising this objection.
12. I discuss God’s reasons for creation in Evil, Sin and Christian Theism
(Loke 2022).
13. I thank John Pascal for raising this question.
14. I thank Mediator media for raising this objection.
15. I thank Louigi Verona for raising this objection.
17. This conclusion also provides a response to Kant’s First Antinomy; for
details and replies to other objections concerning the properties of the
First Cause, see Craig (1979); Loke (2017a, chapter 6).
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296 A. Loke
right holder.
7
Ultimate Design
7.1 Introduction
In Chap. 4, I have presented the evidences of fine-tuning and order of the
universe, demonstrated that the following are the only possible categories
of hypotheses concerning ‘fine-tuning and order’: (i) Chance, (ii)
Regularity, (iii) Combinations of Regularity and Chance, (iv) Uncaused,
and (v) Design, and ruled out (i), (ii), and (iii). In this chapter, I shall rule
out (iv) Uncaused, defend the conclusion of Design against scientific,
philosophical, and theological objections, and demonstrate the superior-
ity of the design inference used in this book compared with alternative
approaches.
7.2 Against the ‘Uncaused’ Hypothesis

It has been suggested that ‘fundamental laws might be brute facts, mean-
ing that they have no explanation at all’ (Sober 2019, p. 37). The Hartle–
Hawking model which has been discussed in Chap. 6 is an example of a
cosmological model in which the laws of nature (in this case, the laws of

298 A. Loke
quantum gravity) exist as an uncaused brute fact in an initially timeless

and beginningless state. Concerning fine-tuning, Oppy (2013) suggests
the possibility that the properties of the naturalistic initial state of the
initial singularity lay in certain appropriately narrow ranges, which guar-
anteed that it is metaphysically necessary that subsequent natural causal
reality would be life-permitting.1 To explain why the physical entities are
sustained in an orderly manner, one might appeal to a non-causal expla-
nation of some sort in terms of deeper metaphysical principles. For exam-
ple, Lange (2009) tries to explain why the laws are true by appealing to
the (purported) fact that no matter how things had started out, the laws
would still have been true, and then explaining why that counterfactual
is true, by saying that no matter how things had started out, that coun-
terfactual itself would still have been true, and so on ad infinitum (he calls
this ‘the lawmaker’s regress’) (p. 146). If it is a law that p, then various
subjunctive facts explain why p is the case, and for each of these subjunc-
tive facts, various further subjunctive facts explain why it is the case, and
so forth. All of those subjunctive facts help to make it a law that p (p. 149).
Each of the subjunctive facts that helps to constitute a law’s necessity is
itself metaphysically necessary, its necessity constituted by other subjunc-
tive facts that help to constitute the law’s necessity (p. 155). Others have
suggested what makes laws metaphysically necessary are essential proper-
ties of the natural kinds (Ellis 2001) or dispositional properties
(Mumford 2004).
There are at least two problems with such views.
First, all such models in which the laws of nature are brute fact cannot
work because, as explained in Chap. 6 while discussing the Hartle–
Hawking model, an infinite regress of events is not possible and in order
for the first event to begin, it must be caused by an initially changeless
First Cause with libertarian freedom. In other words, the first event must
have been brought about freely, and not in a law-like way which guaran-
teed that it is metaphysically necessary that subsequent natural causal
reality would be life-permitting (cf. Oppy 2013). Thus, the First Cause
which caused the first event cannot be part of the physical universe which
is constantly changing and does not have libertarian freedom, and there-
fore it cannot be a naturalistic initial state postulated by Oppy (2013).
Rather, as shown by premises 6–11 of the KCA-TA, the First Cause is
7 Ultimate Design 299
uncaused, beginningless, initially changeless, has libertarian freedom,

and is enormously powerful, that is, a transcendent immaterial Creator of
the Universe. This implies that the physical universe cannot be the
uncaused First Cause; rather, it has a first event, which implies it has a
beginning and therefore (according to Causal Principle) has a cause, and
hence its properties of being fine-tuned and highly ordered would also
have a cause. We need to ask why, after the First cause brought about first
event (regardless of whether this is the first event of our universe or the
first event of something else), it eventually resulted in a fine-tuned and
highly ordered universe.
Second, Frederick notes that, while the sceptic might claim that the
laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, this does not answer the
question of how it could be necessary that unthinking, mindless things
always accord with natural laws (Frederick 2013, pp. 272–273). While
Lange, Ellis, Mumford et al. attempt to provide a non-causal explanation
of what makes the laws metaphysically necessary, this does not answer the
question of how it could be necessary that unthinking, mindless laws
always accord with such an explanation, in such a way that the order
within the universe can be described by sophisticated mathematical equa-
tions which indicate a high degree of ordering. In other words, their
explanation does not answer how it could be necessary that the subjunc-
tive facts (Lange) or the physical entities have stable essences (Ellis) or
dispositions (Mumford) that persist throughout time which enable them
to behave in ways describable by such mathematical laws. Likewise, say-
ing that it is just the nature of physical entities to behave in such an
orderly manner does not answer how the nature of unthinking, mindless
things could be such that they (almost) always accord with natural laws
describable by mathematical equations (e.g. Schrodinger equation, Dirac
equation, etc.), such as the highly intricate order of quantum mechanics
which scientists observe from moment to moment.
Leslie (1989) asks us to consider a hypothetical scenario in which ‘par-
ticles regularly formed long chains which spelled out ‘GOD CREATED
THE UNIVERSE’, this then being shown to result inevitably from basic
physics’ (p. 109). It would be unconvincing to object that this is not evi-
dence of design by claiming that the laws of nature are metaphysically
necessary and are brute facts or that this is the only universe that we have
300 A. Loke
observed. The point of this hypothetical scenario is that it is likewise

unconvincing to object that our fine-tuned and highly ordered universe
is not evidence of design by claiming that the laws of nature are meta-
physically necessary and are brute facts or that this is the only universe
that we have observed.
Some physicists seem to have thought of the laws of physics as the
uncaused cause of the universe.2 The problem with this view is that, as
explained in Chap. 2, a law of physics is not a concrete thing but merely
a description of behaviour of concrete physical things, and descriptions
by themselves do not make things happen one way or another. Therefore,
the laws of physics cannot be the uncaused cause of the universe.
Something else is needed; that is, a concrete First Cause is required to
make the universe in accordance with the descriptions of the laws of
physics, and to be able to do that the First Cause would have to be intel-
ligent as well (like an architect making a house in accordance with the
description in the blueprint).
Leslie (1989) however has attempted to offer an alternative explana-
tion for the lawfulness of the universe by saying that it is a prerequisite for
having a good universe, and that there is a teleological explanatory prin-
ciple that favours goodness, a view which he traced back to Plato in which
reality is structured after the Form of the Good on which all existent
things owe their being. He claims that the abstract ethical requirement
that the good exist has ‘creative power’ partially to determine (or simply
constrain) which possible world exists. Leslie (2016, p. 51) states that
‘The Good is “what gives existence to things”’. In answer to the question
whether the abstract ethical requirement would be too purely abstract to
act creatively, Leslie (1989, p. 169) writes:
Well, if by ‘being purely abstract’ you just mean ‘having no practical power’
then you entirely beg the question against Neoplatonism when you classify
ethical requirements as always ‘purely abstract’. Surely requirements for the
existence of things are not at all clearly realities of the wrong sort for bring-
ing things into existence. (The abstract truth that two and two make four,
or the fact that quadratic equations cannot ride horses, would in contrast
be realities quite wrong for this task.)
In other words, what Leslie meant by abstract ethical requirement is

not what modern philosophers mean by abstract when they refer to (say)
2 + 2 = 4, that is, things with no causal power (see Chap. 3). Rather, what
Leslie meant by abstract ethical requirement is something that have causal
powers (indeed, he uses the term ‘creative power’). Thus, what he meant
by ‘abstract’ is really what modern philosophers would call ‘concrete’
causes. (Rosen 2020 notes that ‘Plato’s Forms were supposed to be causes
par excellence, whereas abstract objects are generally supposed to be caus-
ally inert in every sense.’) Hence, what Leslie calls an ‘ethical require-
ment’ is actually what modern philosophers would call a concrete
necessary existing First Cause that has creative power to bring about uni-
verses. However, as explained above, such a First Cause would have to
have libertarian freedom and intelligence in order to bring about the first
event resulting in a fine-tuned and ordered universe. Hence, such a First
Cause would be a Creator God.
Against calling this ethical requirement ‘God’, Leslie (2016) argues
that the ethical requirement is that which accounts for why a world-
creating deity exists (p. 54). While noting the strong tradition that God’s
existence is necessary because God is eternal, Leslie (1989, p. 168) objects
that ‘the eternal may not be necessary at all; it is logically possible that a
thing should simply happen to exist eternally.’ Leslie’s argument is similar
to the Leibnizian and Thomist Cosmological Arguments which claim
that, even if the universe is eternal in the sense of having no beginning, it
is not necessarily existent3 and would still require a Necessary Being or a
sustaining First Cause to explain its existence. Proponents of these argu-
ments would claim that being beginningless is a necessary condition but
not a sufficient condition for necessary existence.
The Leibnizian and Thomist Cosmological Arguments are controver-
sial and it is beyond the scope of this book to settle the controversies here.
The following points would suffice to address the issues that are rele-
vant here.
First, it has been explained in Chap. 6 that the Thomist idea of Pure
Act is not justified, for one can hold to the alternative view of a First
Cause having libertarian freedom to freely actualize its own potential and
this would terminate the hierarchical causal series. Second, the postula-
tion of a First Cause that is both beginningless and not being sustained in
302 A. Loke
existence would terminate both the temporal causal series and a hierar-
chical causal series. Given a First Cause (call this God) that is both begin-
ningless and not being sustained in existence, it is not it is logically
possible that God ‘happens to exist’ given that ‘happens’ (occurs, comes
into being)4 involves a beginning whereas God (the First Cause) is begin-
ningless. Existing without a beginning and not being sustained in exis-
tence implies that God was not brought about; that is, He is uncaused.
This is not a case of making its own quality justify its own existence. In
fact, it would be fallacious to think of something beginningless as being
dependent on its own property of beginningless for its existence, since
beginningless is merely a description of the way it has existed (see Chap.
3). The question ‘what makes the First Cause beginningless?’ is illogical,
since being beginningless and unsustained implies that it is uncaused and
that nothing makes it this way. Likewise, even if (as Leibniz argues) the
First Cause has other properties in addition to beginninglessness which
explains why it exists necessarily, it would be fallacious to think of the
First Cause as being dependent on that property, since that property
would merely be a description of the way it has existed. In any case it
should be noted that, as demonstrated above, what Leslie calls an ‘ethical
requirement’ with creative power is really ‘a Creator God’ rather than ‘a
property of God which explains why God exists necessarily’. However, if
by ethical requirement Leslie intends to refer to what modern philoso-
phers would call an abstract object, then as noted in Chap. 3, abstract
objects merely describe relations or possibilities, or are merely exemplifi-
able by things; they do not make things happen and have no creative
power to bring about the first event. Thus, in any case the conclusion that
a Creator God exists cannot be avoided.
7.3 In defence of Design

As shown by the logically exhaustive list in Chap. 4, the only remaining
category of hypotheses is (v) Design. In what follows, I shall reply to vari-
ous objections against the likelihood of Design.
Philosopher Willem Drees claims that introducing a god as an explan-

atory notion only shifts the locus of the question: Why would such a god
exist (Drees 1996, pp. 267–269)? Likewise, Dawkins has asked the infa-
mous question, namely, if the laws of nature are designed by a God, then
who designed this God (Dawkins 2006, p. 188)? Dawkins thinks that
consideration of this question renders the existence of God unlikely.
He writes:
The whole argument turns on the familiar question ‘Who made God?’,
which most thinking people discover for themselves. A designer God can-
not be used to explain organized complexity because any God capable of
designing anything would have to be complex enough to demand the same
kind of explanation in his own right. God presents an infinite regress from
which he cannot help us to escape. This argument … demonstrates that
God, though not technically disprovable, is very very improbable indeed.
(Dawkins 2006, p. 109)
In reply, the assumption that complexity by itself requires a designer

(‘any God capable of designing anything would have to be complex
enough to demand the same kind of explanation in his own right’) is
false. The reason is as follows: ‘Design’ is a causal notion; ‘x is designed’
means that x is caused to be what it is in accordance with the purposes of
a designer. Now it is important to note that the often-held assumption
that ‘everything has a cause’ is false.5 What the Modus Tollens argument
for the Causal Principle in Chap. 3 has shown is that everything that
begins to exist has a cause. However, if something is without beginning
and is not being sustained in existence, then it was not brought about by
a cause; it didn’t come from nothing nor from anything (since ‘brought
about’ either implies a beginning of existence or being sustained in exis-
tence). Such a thing is uncaused, which implies nothing designed it. As
explained in previous chapters, the KCA demonstrates that an infinite
causal regress is impossible and that there is a beginningless and uncaused
Divine First Cause of the universe. The word ‘God’ is used to refer to the
First Cause, which (as explained in Chaps. 3 and 6) is beginningless,
initially changeless,6 and exists uncaused and necessarily and hence un-
designed and not fine-tuned, regardless of whether God is complex or
304 A. Loke
simple. Whereas (as explained in Chaps. 3 and 6) physical entities have

beginnings and they change continually; therefore, they exist contin-
gently and require an explanation for why they behave in an ordered way.
To elaborate, note that what Dawkins means by organized complexity
is something that is composed of a variety of parts arranged in a highly
specific manner (Dawkins 1986, Chap. 1). The word ‘arranged’ implies a
beginning to the formation of the arrangement of the parts. It is evident
that our physical universe is composed of parts that can be separated
from one another, and that these parts can be arranged (e.g. separate
pieces of wood can be arranged to form a table). However, a First Cause
(God) which is beginningless and initially changeless is not formed by
the arrangement of parts, since arrangement implies a beginning and a
change whereas the First Cause is beginningless and initially changeless.
Therefore, even if Dawkins argues that the ideas in God’s mind are parts
of God’s mind and that God is complex in this manner, it would still
remain the case that God does not need a designer because His complex-
ity is of a different sort. That is, as Glass (2012, p. 50) observes, God’s
mind is not composed of a variety of parts that are arranged together to
form the mind of God. This view does not require the notion of divine
simplicity (the view that God has no part whatsoever); I have argued in
Loke (2014, 2018) that there is insufficient philosophical, theological, or
Scriptural justification for this notion. The word ‘part’ can simply mean
that which in some way falls short of being the whole of that entity; this
does not imply that the parts are caused or that the parts had been put
together to make up the whole. Neither does it imply that the parts are
independent and separable. I have argued elsewhere that God’s mind can
be conceived of as an undivided intuition (Loke, forthcoming).
Postulating that the being of God has parts does not violate divine aseity,
because one can deny that there is a dependence of the whole on the
parts, since the parts and the whole in this case are uncaused and the parts
are not prior to the whole.
On the other hand, physical entities have beginnings and they change
continually; therefore, they exist contingently and require an explanation
for why they behave in an ordered way. Consider the hypothetical sce-
nario by Leslie (1989) noted earlier: a scenario in which ‘particles regu-
larly formed long chains which spelled out “GOD CREATED THE
UNIVERSE,” this then being shown to result inevitably from basic phys-
ics’ (p. 109). One might ask whether a designer would not be required if
the basic physical laws in this case are beginningless, unsustained and
metaphysically necessary brute facts. In reply, as explained in Chap. 2, a
law of nature is not a concrete thing but merely a description of events.
However, each formation of the long chain as well as each event which
ground such a formation has a beginning, and thus (on the basis of the
Causal Principle) has a cause. Therefore, these events are not necessary
but contingent; that is, they are dependent on their causes, such that later
events would have been different if earlier events are different. Moreover,
as explained in Chap. 5, a series of events cannot be infinite in the earlier-
than direction; therefore, it cannot be beginningless. An atheist might
suggest that perhaps the series of events of our universe originated from a
physical entity (say) an initial singularity which has no parts and is ini-
tially changeless, rather than a Creator. However, as explained in Chap.
6, in order for an initially changeless entity to bring about the first event,
it must have libertarian freedom. Furthermore, for it to bring about a
series of events that result in a high degree of specified complexity such as
the mathematically describable order and fine-tuning, it would require
intelligence because other alternative explanations would not work as
argued in earlier chapters. Therefore, the initial entity has to be a Creator
and Designer.
Oppy has also objected that, since (according to proponents of the
KCA) God (the First Cause) could have freely chosen to make a physical
world in which it was not the case that highly ordered mathematical
theories apply, the existence of a physical world in which such theories
apply is a brute contingency on this theistic view just as it is on a particu-
lar naturalistic view. Thus, this theistic view does not provide a superior
explanation than naturalism for our highly ordered universe, for ‘when
we get to free choice, and you think, “Why this rather than that?”, there’s
no explanation now to be given of why you ended up with one rather
than the other’ (Oppy, in Craig 2020). Craig replies that ‘On theism, the
applicability of mathematics to the physical world is a contingency, but it
is not a brute contingency (a “happy coincidence”). It has an explanation
in the free decision of a transcendent, personal Designer’ (ibid.). Oppy
306 A. Loke
would object that ‘Why God freely chose X (our highly ordered universe)
rather than not-X’ is still a brute contingency.
In reply, first, while on the theistic view it is a brute contingency why
God freely chose X, it is not uncaused, because the choosing of X is
caused by God (see further, below); thus, it does not violate the Causal
Principle established in Chaps. 2 and 3. Whereas to postulate our highly
ordered universe began uncaused (which Oppy has suggested, see Chap.
3) would violate the Causal Principle.
Second, while it is a brute contingency why God freely chose X (our
highly ordered universe) rather than not-X, it is nevertheless chosen for a
reason (e.g. to manifest His wisdom) and involves design by a highly
intelligent designer who has the capacity to bring about and thus explain
the existence of our highly ordered universe. Whereas to postulate our
highly ordered universe began uncaused does not explain why our uni-
verse is highly ordered, since ‘began uncaused’ imply the denial of any
such capacity. In other words, on the Design hypothesis, the high degree
of ordering of our universe can be accounted for given a highly intelligent
Creator who has the capacity to bring about such a high degree of order-
ing, even if the reason for creation is not a sufficient condition and even
if ‘why create rather than not create’ is not fully accounted for by the
reason but is an act of free choice and brute contingency. Whereas on
Oppy’s hypothesis discussed in Chap. 3, there is no capacity for explain-
ing the high degree of ordering of our universe. (As an analogy, SETI
[Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence] researchers can reasonably con-
clude that Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence exists if they pick up a certain
signal under certain circumstances, given their knowledge that an
Intelligence with the relevant capacity is required to produce the signal.
This conclusion should be accepted even if we do not know why the ETI
choose to produce [rather than not-produce] the signal [for all we know,
this may be a brute contingency due to the libertarian free choice of the
ETI], and even if we do not yet have independent evidence for ETI pro-
ducing the signal.)
In response to the above two objections, Oppy might defend the alter-
native possibility that our highly ordered universe did not begin uncaused
but instead arose indeterministically from a metaphysically necessary,
impersonal, and highly ordered initial state of reality in accordance with

necessary natural laws which are indeterministic.
In reply, first, I have argued above in Sect. 6.4.1 that the problem with
this postulation is that the metaphysically necessary initial state of reality
is initially changeless, immaterial, and has libertarian freedom, and there-
fore it is not impersonal.
Second, the hypothesis of an uncaused and un-designed Mind as the
First Cause does not face the problem which besets the hypothesis of an
uncaused and un-designed universe. That is, the former hypothesis can
satisfactorily explain how mindless physical entities can consistently
behave in an orderly manner which can be described by mathematical
equations, and how it can consistently manifest a uniformity and ratio-
nality which human rationality can discern and systematize. Whereas the
latter hypothesis, being mindless, cannot explain these satisfactorily, as
argued previously. As Rasmussen and Leon (2018, pp. 104–105) elabo-
rate using the notion of intentionality:
Fundamental reality has intentional powers, which themselves do not

depend upon fine-tuned material conditions. Intentional powers allow the
foundation to aim for interesting ends, such as an evolution leading to a
complex creature who can make a princess drawing. With intentional pow-
ers at the foundation, we have a mechanism to explain why the world
unfolds toward something beyond merely dots of dust. This mechanism
provides a probability pump, which renders organized complexity far more
probable/expected. Of course, a mind that itself depends on material com-
plexity would only relocate the problem; its existence would then be just as
surprising (i.e., improbable) as the material complexity we are seeking to
explain. For this reason, a foundational mind would, by hypothesis, be a
mind that exists prior to material complexity. The foundational mind does
not depend on organized complexity; rather, it provides the ultimate expla-
nation of all organized forms.
Moreover, to postulate our universe arose indeterministically from a

metaphysically necessary, impersonal, and highly ordered initial state of
reality does not explain why our universe is fine-tuned. As argued in
Chap. 4, the fundamental principles or laws of nature do not uniquely
determine a fine-tuned universe (and avoid the Boltzmann Brain
308 A. Loke
problem, etc.), and ‘physics is blind to what life needs. And yet, here we
are’ (Lewis and Barnes 2016, p. 181).
Against the existence of an Immaterial Mind, it might be objected that
our experiences of human minds indicate that they do not exist apart
from the body. This claim has been challenged by other scholars using
various arguments for substance dualism, including the evidences of
near-death experiences (Loose et al. 2018). In any case, the claim is based
on a limited sampling of human minds on earth; it does not show that an
immaterial mind cannot exist anywhere else in the universe or apart from
the universe. The association of physical brains with minds can be
regarded as an accidental property akin to human beings have always
lived on the Earth, which was true until 1968. Out-of-body experiences
are intelligible notions, even if one does not believe them. Likewise, a
timeless immaterial mind is an intelligible notion and not self-
contradictory, and indeed most philosophers throughout history have no
problem conceiving it, and this is the reason for thinking that mind-
physical dependence is ‘accidental’ to the notion of a mind.
One might object that, given that the minds which we know of (e.g.
human minds) are in time, the view that there can be an initially timeless
Divine Mind is special pleading. In reply, special pleading is an informal
fallacy wherein one cites something as an exception without justifying the
special exception. Saying that God’s thoughts are initially timeless is not
a case of special pleading because there are at least two justifications for
it, namely:
1. The premises of the KCA-TA, from which it follows that an initially

timeless Creator and Designer exists.
2. God’s thoughts can be fundamentally similar to ours in the sense that
they involve intentionality, awareness of logical relations, and so on—
there is no need to be in time in order to possess these properties.
Likewise, having intelligence means having knowledge, understand-
ing, foresight, wisdom, purpose, and intention; it does not mean/
imply/require having spatial or temporal extension. One can think of
a Mind having an initially timeless awareness of truths (including
truths about highly ordered structures) and which has the capacity to
bring about something in accordance with these truths.
Against the conclusion of a Designer, Hume has objected that the

‘design’ seems to be less than perfect; for example, if the purpose of creat-
ing the universe was to allow for life, this universe shows examples of
‘imperfect design’, such as the presence of natural evil such as tsunamis,
hurricanes, and so on that destroy life (Hume 1779/1993, pp. 68–69,
71, 113).
Nevertheless, this objection does not show that the existence of a
Designer is unlikely—at least, not on my argument-by-exclusion formu-
lation of the design argument.7 To illustrate, if one were to discover in the
midst of a jungle a factory which has the capacity for making motorcars,
one would reasonably conclude that it was designed even if some of the
equipment in the factory were faulty and even if all the cars would be
destroyed eventually (e.g. due to corrosion of its parts). The reason is
because it is unreasonable to think that the components of the factory
were fundamentally brought together and assembled by Chance,
Regularity, or Combinations of Regularity and Chance, or that the fac-
tory began to exist Uncaused, and as explained previously the only
remaining explanation is Design. The fact that some of the equipment in
the factory were faulty or that the parts are corruptible does not refute
this conclusion and could be due to various other reasons. One might
think that it is due to an imperfect designer, but it could also be due to
another person who came and disrupted the factory after it was built, or
it may be due to a perfect designer who allows for these imperfections for
his other purposes which we are presently unaware of. Thus, on the one
hand, the conclusion that the designer is unlikely or the designer is
imperfect does not follow from the presence of imperfections in the fac-
tory, because there are alternative explanations which need to be consid-
ered and ruled out (and they have not been ruled out). On the other
hand, the conclusion that a Designer exists follows from the existence of
the factory given that we have ruled out the alternative explanations
to Design.
Likewise, even though there are imperfections within the universe, it
remains the case that the evidence of fine-tuning and the laws of the uni-
verse which are describable by sophisticated mathematical equations
indicate the existence of a Designer. The reason is because, as explained
in previous sections of this book, it is unreasonable to think that the
310 A. Loke
fine-tuning and order were brought about by Chance, Regularity, or

Combinations of Regularity and Chance, or that they are Uncaused, and
the only remaining explanation is Design. The fact that there are imper-
fections within the universe does not refute this conclusion and could be
due to various other reasons. One might think that it is due to an imper-
fect designer, but it could also be due to another person (e.g. fallen angelic
beings) who disrupted the designer’s creation (Peckham 2018), or it may
be due to a perfect designer who allows for these imperfections for his
other good purposes which we are presently unaware of.
Goff (2019, p. 107) notes that theists can try to come up with explana-
tions for why God would allow suffering, but he objects that this can
seem like special pleading or ad hoc alterations. However, this objection
would not work if the explanations given are justified on the basis of
reasons/evidences and/or follow from the postulation of theism itself. For
example, Goff (ibid.) complains that the observation that life had come
about through the gruesome process of natural selection falsified theism.
However, he fails to note that it has been argued that choosing to care for
the weak, lonely, and vulnerable is a harder thing for humans to do in a
Darwinian world, and this makes moral behaviour such as freely choos-
ing to care for those in need to be of great value, and hence God who
cares about such moral value chose to create a Darwinian world in which
moral behaviour that are of such great value can exist (Peels 2018).
Moreover, the wonders of nature, which include the incomprehensible
degree of fine-tuning and the ‘very advanced mathematics’ involved in
constructing the universe (Dirac 1963) explained in Chap. 4, indicate
that the Designer’s wisdom far exceeds ours. Given the evidence for the
existence of such a God, ‘we should not expect to grasp more than a small
fraction of either the goods which lead God to act as God acts (including
divine acts of allowing evil) or the constraints that make such divine
allowings needful’ (Perrine and Wykstra 2017, p. 86). Therefore, even
though we may not know the reason why God allows certain instances of
suffering, that does not mean there is no good reason which is
known to God.
Sober (2019, pp. 51, 67) objects that the last response to the problem
of evil, namely, that it is very hard for human beings to understand what
God’s goals are, would likewise undercut the Teleological Argument, for
how then could we know that God would want to create a world that
could support intelligent life?
In response, we can know that there exists a Designer who wanted to
create a world that could support intelligent life by ruling out all the pos-
sible alternative explanations for such a world (viz. (i) Chance, (ii)
Regularity, (iii) Combination of Regularity and Chance, and (iv)
Uncaused), and this has been accomplished in the earlier parts of this
book, but we have not ruled out all the possible good purposes which this
Designer (whom we call ‘God’) might have for allowing imperfections.
The Teleological Argument for the existence of God does not require
direct access to the purposes which the mind of the Designer (if such a
Designer exists) would have—indeed, we have no such access8—but only
direct access to the world of the phenomena by which we can discover the
phenomena of fine-tuning and order and infer that there is a Designer by
ruling out the alternative explanations (see further, Sect. 7.6). Whereas
the argument from evil against the existence of God requires the propo-
nent of the argument to rule out the purposes which the mind of the
Designer (if such a Designer exists) might have in order to rule out the
possibility that there might be good purposes for why the Designer (if He
exists) might allow suffering, but given the failure to do so, the argument
fails. (The literature on the problem of evil is huge and it is beyond the
scope of this book to discuss this issue further;9 for examples of other
responses, see Loke 2022a and the sources cited.)
Thus, on the one hand, the conclusion that the designer is unlikely or
the designer is imperfect does not follow from the presence of imperfec-
tions in the universe, because there are alternative explanations which
need to be considered and ruled out (and they have not been ruled out).
On the other hand, the conclusion that a Designer exists follows from the
existence of fine-tuning and order of the universe, given that we have
ruled out the alternative explanations to Design in previous sections of
this book. It might be objected that we have not established that the
Designer is indeed perfect or morally good, but a proponent of the
Teleological Argument can reply that it is not the purpose of the argu-
ment to do so (see further, Chap. 8).
It should also be noted that the Teleological Argument does not require
the premise that there is order everywhere. For example, think again of
312 A. Loke
the factory in a middle of a messy jungle. Even though there is disorder

everywhere around the factory, the presence of the factory would still
require an explanation—how did the parts of the factory (e.g. the parts of
the assembly line which install the engine, install the hood, install the
wheels, etc.) come together to form the factory? Likewise, even though
there are apparent chaos and disorder in various parts of the universe, the
presence of fine-tuning and mathematically describable order of the uni-
verse would still require an explanation, and I have argued that the best
explanation is design.
Against God being life-loving, it has been asked why is there so little of
life in the universe? ‘Why didn’t God choose laws that permit life to exist
across a much wider range of possible values for their constants?’ (Sober
2019, pp. 66–67), such that there is life (say) in Venus, Mars, and so on?
Why are most regions in the universe hostile to life?
In reply, on the one hand, we do not know how many living things
God actually created to conclude that there is only a little of it, given the
possibility that there could be many life forms in faraway regions of the
universe or in other spiritual dimensions (in which angelic beings, for
example, may dwell). On the other hand, it can be argued that God in
His foresight created laws such that there is no evidence of life in Venus,
Mars, and so on and then ‘suspended these probabilities’ by creating life
on earth so as to show that He cares for the earth and the living things on
it. In any case, even if there are no life anywhere else in the universe, the
fact remains that, if the universe is not fine-tuned, there would not be life
anywhere in the universe, including planet earth, and it has been argued
previously that the best explanation for this is design.
A theological objection to fine-tuning has been raised by Halvorson
(2018), who argues that, if God could be expected to create a nice uni-
verse, then God could also be expected to set favourable chances for a
nice universe, which He did not; therefore, the fine-tuning argument
defeats itself. In support of his main claim he writes:
Consider a sinister game of reverse Russian roulette: your captor hands you
a revolver with five chambers filled, and one empty. Now suppose that you
pull the trigger, and you hear ‘click’ … you’ve survived. What should you
conclude? Should you conclude that your captor rigged the game so that
you wouldn’t die? But then why would your captor begin the game by fill-
ing five of the six chambers? Why not fill only one … or, even better, don’t
fill any at all? … In application to the FTA, the analogy is as follows: God
created laws such that almost all physically possible universes are lifeless.
And yet, the fine-tuning advocate wants us to believe that God designed
this ‘game’ so that we would win. Wouldn’t this be a strange way for a deity
to operate? Why would God make things hard for himself? (p. 126)
Halvorson’s objection raises interesting theological issues concerning

fine-tuning. Is a universe fine-tuned for life also fine-tuned for death?
Nevertheless, there are at least two problems with Halvorson’s
objection.
First, Halvorson’s reverse Russian roulette analogy is not quite appro-
priate; according to his analogy, one out of six of the chambers of the
revolver was not filled, and 1/6 (= 0.166 …) is a non-negligible probabil-
ity. Thus, even though you survived, you might still wonder whether your
captor rigged the game because he wanted you to live, or did you survived
by chance. Against the former hypothesis, you might ask why would your
captor begin the game by filling the rest of the chambers in the first place,
and you might conclude that perhaps he just wanted to play the cruel
game with you for the fun of it without rigging the game (since there is a
non-negligible probability that you survived by chance). However, it has
been argued in Chap. 4 and this chapter that all the alternative hypoth-
eses to Design are extremely unlikely and thus have negligible probabili-
ties (far lower than 0.001; in cryptography, negligible probability is
typically assigned a value of less than 1/2128; as noted in Chap. 4, the
fine-tuning of entropy alone has been argued to be lesser than that). It
would be analogous to the resolver having zillions of chambers, all of
which except one was filled. In that case, the fact that you survived would
leave you in no doubt that your captor had rigged the game so that you
would live, regardless of why your captor began the game by filling the
rest of the chambers in the first place.
Second, Halvorson’s objection has similarities to the Deist Voltaire’s
(1764/1901, p. 273) objection against miracles when he claims that
ascribing miracles to God would indicate a lack of forethought:
314 A. Loke
It is impossible a being infinitely wise can have made laws to violate

them … if He saw that some imperfections would arise from the nature of
matter, He provided for that in the beginning; and, accordingly, He will
never change anything in it.
However, McGrew (2013) notes that Paley (1794/1859, p. 12) and
others have replied that God in His foresight would have wanted to set
up a universe with regularities that no mere human could abrogate and
then suspended them so as to authenticate a revelation.
Likewise, with regard to Halvorson’s objection, it can be argued that
God in His foresight determined the laws of nature such that almost all
physically possible universes are lifeless, and ‘suspended these probabili-
ties’ by creating a universe that is fine-tuned so as to authenticate a revela-
tion, namely, His General Revelation though His creation (for a
theological defence of General Revelation and Natural Theology, see
Sudduth 2009; Loke 2019). In other words, God wants life to be natu-
rally unlikely so that we would recognize His hand in designing a life-
permitting universe. Moreover, if God had created the natural laws such
that life is naturally likely, we might take it for granted that we are alive,
whereas the fact that it is naturally unlikely and yet we are alive would
make many people feel grateful to be alive. It is widely recognized that
gratitude is a virtue and thus it is plausible that God would want to foster
it. Concerning Halvorson’s question ‘Why would God make things hard
for Himself?’, as a professing Christian, Halvorson should have known
that, according to Christian theology, God is willing to make things hard
for Himself in order to accomplish His loving purposes for humankind,
even to the extent of enduring the suffering of the crucifixion for our sake
in order to redeem us.10
I shall now show how the logically exhaustive list of hypothesis devised
in Chap. 4 is useful for answering a number of objections against the
inference of the Teleological Argument.
7.4 Reply to Hume’s Classic Objections

Many have thought that the Teleological Argument has already been
dealt a death blow by philosopher David Hume. Historian of science
Jonathan Topham writes, ‘It has sometimes seemed inexplicable to histo-
rians that natural theology, and particularly the argument from design,
continued to be so prevalent in the anglophone world in the wake of
Hume’s assault’ (Topham 2010, p. 66).
Topham summarizes Hume’s assault as follows:
1. The central analogy between natural phenomena and human arte-

facts could not be used convincingly to infer the God of Christianity.
2. The universe was so unlike human productions that the analogy
between the two was extremely tenuous.
3. Such analogies were based on so limited a knowledge of the universe;
perhaps at other times and in other places nature was even less like
a machine.
4. This was the only universe of which anyone had experience, invali-
dating it as the basis of an inductive inference.
5. No one had had direct experience of the creation of a universe.
6. Even if one allowed that the universe was the product of an intelli-
gent designer, that would only lead to an infinite regress, since the
designer’s intelligence would require explanation.
7. Since the cause inferred must be proportionate to the effects, such a
designer could not be the infinite being of Christian theology.
8. One could not be sure whether there was one designer or many, or,
9. indeed, given the imperfections in nature, whether the designer(s)
was incompetent or malevolent.
10. There were other analogies that might be considered to be at least as
satisfactory as that between the universe and a machine, such as that
between the universe and a living organism. In this case, one might
argue that, since all animals were actuated by a soul, God must be the
soul of the world; or one might argue that, like a plant, the world had
grown from a seed.
316 A. Loke
11. The appearances of design in nature might reasonably be accounted

for as the fortuitous consequences of a chaotic system of matter in
motion (ibid.).
While the 11 objections represent an extensive critique of the

Teleological Argument, they are far from fatal. With respect to objections
1, 2, and 10, it has been shown in this book that the conclusion of the
Teleological Argument does not have to be based on analogy, but can be
shown to be based on argument by exclusion. With respect to objections
3, 4, 5, and 11, it has been shown that, even though our knowledge of the
universe is limited, that this was the only universe of which anyone had
experience, and that no one had had direct experience of the creation of
a universe; nevertheless, given the Causal Principle (see Chap. 3) and the
conclusion that our universe has a beginning (see Chaps. 5 and 6), the
order and fine-tuning that we observe would still require a causal expla-
nation and the best explanation is still design (the conclusion is arrived at
by exclusion and not inductively). With respect to objection 6, an infinite
regress has already been refuted in Chap. 5, and as explained above in
response to Dawkins, a beginningless, uncaused, and intelligent First
Cause would not require an explanation. With respect to objection 9, I
have argued above that the ‘imperfections’ do not imply the unlikelihood
of Design. With respect to objections 1, 7, and 8, the Teleological
Argument is never intended to be a sufficient argument for the Trinity
Monotheistic God of Christianity but part of a cumulative case which
includes (for example) the historical argument for the claims and resur-
rection of Jesus (Craig and Moreland ed. 2009; Loke 2017, 2020).
7.5 A
ddressing an Objection to Argument
by Exclusion
A sceptic might object that, even if each of the alternatives to Design is
improbable, their disjunction is not improbable. For example, consider
the outcome of rolling a fair die. Even if the probability of each of the
alternatives to 6 (i.e. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) is rather low (i.e. 1/6), their disjunction

is not improbable (i.e. 5/6).
In reply, first, the die example assumes that each outcome has a non-
negligible probability: 1/6 (= 0.166 …) is non-negligible and we often do
see the outcome of (say) 3 happening naturally. However, it has been
argued in previous chapters that each of the alternatives to Design is not
the case or extremely unlikely and thus has zero or negligible probability
(far lower than 0.001; in cryptography, negligible probability is typically
assigned a value of less than 1/2128).
Second, in the case of rolling a fair die, it can be shown that the out-
come of 6 has equal probability to each of the non-6 alternative out-
comes. However, it has been explained earlier that, while it has been
shown that each of the alternatives to Design has negligible probability, it
has not been shown that Design has equally negligible probability.
The die example however is analogous to the case for Design in this
sense: the probability of each of the logical alternatives must add up to 1
(1/6 + 1/6 + 1/6 + 1/6 + 1/6 + 1/6 = 1). Likewise, the epistemic probabil-
ity of each of the five possible categories of explanations— namely: (i)
Chance, (ii) Regularity, (iii) Combination of Regularity and Chance, (iv)
Uncaused, and (v) Design—must add up to 1. Since each of the four
alternatives to Design has negligible probability and that the probability
of the disjunction of four negligible probabilities is negligible, it can be
concluded that our universe is designed (i.e. the probability of Design has
negligible difference from the probability of 1). (It might be objected that
one could also reverse the direction of the argument from exclusion, so
that [according to the critic] the improbability of design as the explana-
tion should lead us to think that there is a higher probability of non-
design explanations than we had previously estimated.11 However, I have
already argued previously that, on the one hand, there is no good reason
to think that Design is improbable; on the other hand, the improbability
of non-design explanations is well-established.) Even if one disagrees
with my assessment that each of the naturalistic alternative hypotheses
has ‘negligible probability’, one can still say that each of these naturalistic
alternatives has been shown to be very improbable. For example, even if
one assigns to each of the four naturalistic alternatives a probability of
1 in 1000 (which is very generous given the arguments in previous
318 A. Loke
chapters), that still leaves Design with a high epistemic probability of

99.6%. This should warrant assent from a reasonable person.
7.6 R
esponse to Difficulties Concerning
Determining the Prior Probability that
God Design the Universe
My argument from exclusion avoids a difficulty often mentioned against
other approaches to inferring design, namely, the difficulty of assigning
prior probability for Design. Proponents of fine-tuning argument have
argued that, while the fine-tuning is improbable under atheism, it is not
improbable under theism: ‘[Since] God is an all good being, and it is
good for intelligent, conscious beings to exist, it is not surprising or
improbable that God would create a world that could support intelligent
life’ (Collins 1999, p. 54). It is good for embodied, intelligent, conscious
beings to exist because ‘intelligent conscious beings can actualize noble
values in the world, such as moral values, aesthetic values, and epistemic
values’ and they can be aware of God and ‘can communicate and establish
a deep relation of love with God, if God exists’ (Chan and Chan 2020,
pp. 6–8 citing Swinburne). Halvorson (2018, p. 129) notes that a
defender of the Fine-Tuning argument would argue that, while a life-
permitting universe is improbable conditional on God’s non-intervention,
it is probable conditional on God overriding the probabilistic laws of
physics, but he objects that ‘not many of us—even the theists among
us—have a prior probability for the claim that God will intervene in a
certain situation’. Sober claims that the likelihoodist formulation of the
design argument is the best formulation,12 but it is beset by the problem
of assigning prior probability for Design given the difficulties of knowing
the putative designer’s goals (pp. 29, 44–45, 62). Moreover, our ground
rules of inferring intelligent design are based on our empirical knowledge
of human intelligence, which may not carry over to hypotheses involving
non-human intelligent designers (Sober 2003, p. 38; see also Manson
2020, who argues that God’s mind is so different from ours that we can-
not judge what God would likely do; thus, the probability that there is a
life-permitting universe if God exists should be regarded as inscrutable).

Likewise, Grünbaum complains that we have no independent evidential
access to God’s choices and motives. He argues that this is unlike the case
of ordinary action-explanations, for example, an unreasonable reprimand
of an academic colleague by the department chairman, where we have
access to independent evidence as to the content of the agent’s motives
other than the action taken by the agent. He thinks that, absent such
evidence, we should reject the proffered action-explanation as viciously
circular (Grünbaum 2000, section 3). The problem of assigning prior
probability for Design is further accentuated by the presence of imperfect
design (see Sect. 7.5), which atheists argue are evidences against the good-
ness of the Creator assumed by Collins et al. While theists can reply that
this objection fails using the approach of sceptical theism, atheists might
reply that the sceptical theism approach highlight the difficulties of
knowing the putative designer’s goals mentioned by Sober.
Now Barnes (2019; citing Hawthorne and Isaacs 2017, 2018) has used
what he calls the Awesome Theistic Argument test (ATA) to argue that the
kind of inscrutable probability objection raised by Manson to the Fine-
Tuning Argument (FTA) fails, as follows:
Manson contends that the fine-tuning sceptic can limit the extent of their
judgement of inscrutability, so that while being unconvinced by the FTA,
they could agree that “there would be evidence of God’s existence if, for
example, the stars miraculously rearranged themselves to spell out the
Nicene Creed” (2018: 5). And yet a starry Nicene sceptic could block this
argument by claiming that the probability of “We believe in one God, the
Father Almighty, Maker of all things visible and invisible …” appearing in
the night sky if God exists is inscrutable. This, if anything, is more plausi-
ble than declaring that the probability of a life-permitting universe on the-
ism is inscrutable, and yet the conclusion is absurd. If the starry Nicene
sceptic would be irrational to block that argument by appealing to inscru-
tability, then the fine-tuning sceptic must also be irrational.
My argument-by-exclusion formulation of the design argument com-

plements the ATA by showing why the conclusion is absurd (see the anal-
ogy of ‘discovering a factory in the jungle’ mentioned in Sect. 7.3), while
320 A. Loke
also avoiding the above objections which beset the likelihoodist formula-
tion of the design argument.
To elaborate, given that the list of categories of hypotheses mentioned
previously (viz. (i) Chance, (ii) Regularity, (iii) Combination of Regularity
and Chance (iv) Uncaused, and (v) Design) is logically exhaustive, and
given that the laws of logic are necessarily true for all entities human or
non-human (see Chap. 1), we can argue for the Design hypothesis by
exclusion and without vicious circularity and without violating any
ground rules. This can be done by arguing that, while the alternatives to
design are unlikely, the Design hypothesis is not. Given that all the alter-
natives to design fail (as has been shown previously), it can be argued
using a Modus Tollens argument:
1. If there is no intelligent designer of the universe, the universe would

not be fine-tuned and highly ordered given the failure of all the alter-
native hypotheses (viz. Chance, Regularity, Combinations of Chance
and Regularity, Uncaused).
2. The universe is fine-tuned and highly ordered.
3. Therefore, there is an intelligent designer of the universe.
Therefore, we should accept the conclusion of design regardless of

whether we have access to independent evidence concerning the content
of the agent’s motives. Swinburne points out that we can often have
strong evidence for a hypothesis that a particular person committed the
crime, without having the slightest idea of his reasons for bringing it
about in the exact way that he did (Swinburne 2005, p. 924). Likewise,
we can have strong evidence for a hypothesis that an event—for example,
a magician pulling out a rabbit from the hat—happens as a result of
design without knowing how the designer (e.g. the magician) pulls it off.
Thus, objections based on our ignorance of the motives or mechanisms of
the process of divine creation (e.g. ‘we really do not know how God “pulls
it off”’) fail to rebut the conclusion that the laws of nature are designed.
In other words, ‘we often are able to tell that an intelligent designer made
an object even though we have no idea what that putative designer’s goals
were’ (Sober 2019, pp. 44–45).
Against this, Sober objects by claiming that this inference is an induc-

tive sampling reasoning which
focus exclusively on the causes we have actually observed; it ignores causes

that may have operated before human beings existed, or that may have
operated far away in space, or that may have occurred too slowly for human
beings to notice. The inductive sampling version of the design argument is
biased against theories that postulate unobservable processes. (ibid., p. 29)
In reply, my argument is not based on inductive sampling but based on

deduction using a logically exhaustive list of hypotheses which covers all
possible hypotheses, regardless of whether they involved entities that exist
long ago or far away or processes that are too slow or unobservable, and
the conclusion of Design is arrived at by exclusion of the alternative
hypotheses based on their essential characteristics. Hence, my argument
is not susceptible to Sober’s objection.
In summary, my argument by exclusion—based on the logically
exhaustive list of hypotheses formulated in Chap. 4—can lead to the
conclusion that the universe is designed without having to first assign a
prior probability for Design, thus avoiding the objections by critics on
this point entirely. In this aspect, my formulation of the design argument
is better than the likelihoodist formulation as well as other formulations
which are beset by those objections.
Concerning the prior probability of naturalism versus prior probabil-
ity of theism, I have argued above that, on the one hand, there is no good
reason to think that prior probability of theism is low and the prior prob-
ability of naturalism is high. While many atheists would subjectively
push up the prior probability of naturalism (due to simplicity), the crite-
rion of simplicity is only valid if all else is equal. The theist can use the
KCA to argue that all else is not equal and that theism has a higher prior
than atheism. Moreover and in any case, the observation by Lewis and
Barnes (noted in Chap. 4) that our conclusions would not depend much
on the prior probability of the theory if our data is very good implies that
the final probability of the constants being ‘fine-tuned’ by the ‘Chance
hypothesis’ would be very low, and I have argued in Chaps. 4, 5, and 6
that this problem cannot be avoided by all the other alternative
322 A. Loke
hypotheses to Design (Regularity, Combination of Regularity and

Chance, and Uncaused). Therefore, we can conclude that the final prob-
ability of the Design hypothesis is high.
7.7 R
eply to Objections Concerning
the Range of Explanatory Latitude
Against Swinburne’s defence of the Teleological Argument from the order
of the universe, Grünbaum (2004, p. 605) objects that, whatever the laws
of nature turn out to be, the theist would explain these as brought about
by God; hence, the range of the explanatory latitude of the theistic volitional
explanation is too permissive and the supposed evidences (i.e. the laws of
nature) provide no check on the validity of the explanatory premises.
Grünbaum complains that the proposed theistic explanation fails to
transform scientific brute facts into specifically explained regularities, for
contrary to Swinburne’s contention, the divine volitional explanation
provides no epistemically viable account of why the physical energy con-
servation law holds, let alone of why the magnitude of the total energy is
what it is (ibid., p. 562).
In reply, Grünbaum’s objection would only work against Swinburne’s
version of the argument, which claims that ‘The very same criteria which
scientists use to reach their own theories lead us to move beyond those
theories to a creator God who sustains everything in existence’ (Swinburne
1996, p. 2). This claim makes Swinburne vulnerable to the objection that
his theistic hypothesis does not make predictions in the same way as sci-
entific theories, and that it does not transform scientific brute facts into
specifically explained regularities the way Grünbaum demanded.
Likewise, an important reason why several authors have objected to
Dembski’s eliminative approach (see Chap. 4) by emphasizing the neces-
sity of providing some positive argument in favour of design is because
Dembski claims that his theory of Intelligent Design is scientific, and
according to these authors’ definition, a scientific theory would be
expected to make a range of testable predictions (Dawes 2007, pp. 71,
79; Fitelson et al. 1999, p. 487).
However, Grünbaum’s objection would not work against the argu-

ment from the mathematically describable order of the universe presented
in this book. For the argument defended here does not follow Swinburne
in claiming to use the very same criteria which scientists use to reach their
own theories. Contrary to Dembski, my book does not claim to defend
Design as a scientific theory. Instead, I argue in Chap. 1 that science is
not the only way to knowledge (contra scientism), that science itself
requires the laws of logic, that the laws of logic imply that the conclusion
of a deductively valid argument with true premises must be true (regard-
less of whether it makes testable predictions), and I have explained in the
rest of the book why my argument is deductively valid and why the
premises are true. Therefore, the conclusion of Design is true.
Additionally, the argument defended in this book is not based on the
premise that the laws of nature should be able to be described by one
mathematical form rather than the other, but that they should be able to
be described by any highly ordered mathematical form at all. It is true
that a range of possible laws of nature describable by a range of possible
mathematical equations is possible. Nevertheless, given that a particle,
for example, could have moved in billions of alternative directions other
than consistently in the direction described by any form of mathematical
equation (see Chap. 4), the explanatory latitude of the Design hypothesis
is still vastly more restricted than the hypothesis that there is no external
creative cause. Thus, the observations concerning whether particles do
move in the manner describable by mathematical equations would still
serve as a check with regard to the evidences for the Design hypothesis,
and these observations constantly confirm the evidences for the Design
hypothesis. It is true (as Grünbaum argues) that the hypothesis that God
exists entails nothing about the numerical value of the energy of the uni-
verse being of a certain value E (Grünbaum 2005, p. 935), given that
God could have assigned other values (Swinburne 2005, pp. 923–924).
Nevertheless, as explained in Chap. 4 and this chapter, the evidence that
particles do behave in the manner describable by mathematical equations
is still evidence for the conclusion that there is a Designer who, for what-
ever reason, causes them to behave in this manner, resulting in the
numerical value of the energy of the universe being of a certain value
E. Swinburne explains it thus,
324 A. Loke
But of course the probability that he would choose a particular disjunct is

low; and I am not appealing to there being just the amount of energy there
is (rather than some other slightly different amount) as confirmatory evi-
dence of the existence of God. But the evidence which I am adducing as
evidence of the existence of God confirms the claim that he brought about
just the amount there is … Analogously, footprints of a kind that the sus-
pect would have made if he had been at the scene of the crime confirm the
hypothesis that he was at the scene of the crime and so put his feet in the
exact position when the footprints were found, without it being the case
that the prints being at that exact position rather two millimetres to the
west has any confirming effect on the hypothesis. (ibid.)
One might complain that, just as the existence of God does not entail
that the numerical value of energy in the universe should be E rather than
other value, likewise, the existence of God does not entail that the uni-
verse exhibits very sophisticated mathematical order, given that God
could have chosen to create a universe without this order. Why then
should we think that the existence of sophisticated mathematical order is
evidence for God?
In reply, the reason why E is not evidence for God is not merely because
the existence God does not entail E, but also because there are alternative
plausible explanations for E that does not involve a designer. Whereas, in
the case of the existence of sophisticated mathematical order, we have
already ruled out the plausibility of alternative explanations, and there-
fore this should be regarded as an evidence for a Designer (God). To
elaborate, given the vast number of possible alternative disordered
schemes and given that the alternative categories of hypotheses in the
logically exhaustive list are unlikely (see Chap. 4), the probability that,
without an external intelligent cause, we should observe the ordered
scheme which we do observe is extremely low, and this is evidence against
the null hypothesis that no external intelligent cause is required (Cf.
Grünbaum 2004, p. 599).
Therefore, even though the existence of God does not entail the exis-
tence of a highly mathematically ordered physical reality, nevertheless the
existence of a highly mathematically ordered physical reality is evidence
for God because all the alternative explanations have been excluded.
Against appealing to God as the Creator of natural laws, Mumford

(2004, pp. 147–148) complains that how God’s decrees come to be man-
ifest in nature remains unexplained. He writes: ‘they are essentially super-
natural, so how do laws have effects in nature? This is not a compelling
model of how laws govern. This relation between laws and the world is a
paradigmatic deus ex machina.’ The latter is illustrated by the classic car-
toon of the scientist writing the elaborate theorem on the chalkboard
with ‘then a miracle occurs’ in step two to fill in for what he could not
work out. Others might object that accepting God as a conclusion opens
the floodgates to virtually any competing explanation where one can just
posit ‘the ability to do X’ to solve the problem, such as posit the intelli-
gence and power to create a universe to a Magic Beaver.13
In reply, my argument does not postulate a Designer as a deus ex
machina, nor is the conclusion of my argument based on ignorance (my
argument is not ‘because we don’t know how to explain the laws of nature,
therefore God’). Rather, the conclusion is based on the analysis of the
necessary conditions (e.g. what is required for an initially changeless First
Cause to bring about the first event) and follows from deduction and
exclusion (we know by deduction that there are only a few possibilities
and all the rest have been excluded, therefore God). My argument does
not posit a First Cause having libertarian freedom merely as a possible
solution among many alternative solutions. Rather, I have explained that
a First Cause having libertarian freedom and intelligence follows deduc-
tively from the premises I presented. Thus, there is no other possibilities
and no floodgates opened to a Magic Beaver for which we have no inde-
pendent reason or evidence to think is the case. The classic cartoon case
is disanalogous because the ‘miracle’ does not follow from the previous
steps of the theorem and is based on ignorance of what should follow
from those steps, and this ignorance is open to being filled by all kinds of
alternative explanations such as a Magic Beaver to be posited to solve the
problem. Whereas my conclusion follows deductively from my premises
and is not based on ignorance but on reasons and analysis of the neces-
sary conditions (e.g. what is required for an initially changeless First
Cause to bring about the first event). Thus, it is not open to being filled
by other explanations because there isn’t any other viable logical alterna-
tive and there is only one viable conclusion which follows deductively
326 A. Loke
from the premises, namely, the conclusion that the Creator and Designer
of the universe exists.
Not knowing how the supernatural affect the natural is not a compel-
ling objection, because our lack of understanding of a relation is not a
good reason to reject the existence of the relation. As Koons and Bealer
point out, physics itself admits lawful relationships among physical enti-
ties that are extraordinarily diverse in nature and, in turn, admits rela-
tions of causal influence and law-grounded explanation among these
entities. Physics allows, moreover, that some of these lawful relationships
are brute facts having no further explanations (Koons and Bealer 2010,
p. xviii). Likewise, the relationship between mind and body (and between
‘supernatural’ and ‘natural’) could well be a brute fact having no further
explanation. Kojonen (2021, p. 64) notes that
the problem of not being able to provide further details about the mecha-
nism is not necessarily unique to theism: as Dawes (2009, pp. 51–53)
notes, in all explanations there comes a point where we reach the level of
basic causal powers, and are unable to specify further intermediate mecha-
nisms. To insist on an explanation at such a truly basic level would just lead
to an infinite causal regress.
Moreover, SETI (Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence) researchers

can reasonably conclude that Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence exists if they
pick up a certain signal under certain circumstances, even if they do not
yet know the actual mechanism by which the Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence
created the signal.
7.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I complete my refutation of the alternative hypotheses to
design by offering two considerations against the hypothesis that the fine-
tuning and order of the physical universe is Uncaused (the other alterna-
tives have already been refuted in Chap. 4). First, all such models cannot
work because, as explained in previous chapters, the physical universe
cannot be the uncaused First Cause; rather, it is constantly changing and
has a first event, which implies it has a beginning and therefore (accord-
ing to Causal Principle) has a cause; hence, its properties of being fine-
tuned and highly ordered would have a cause.
Second, the ‘Uncaused’ hypothesis does not explain how it could be
the case that unthinking, mindless things consistently accord with natu-
ral laws.
I have defended the hypothesis that the best explanation for why
unthinking mindless physical entities consistently have such an orderly
behaviour is that there is a Mind who determined that they should be like
this, by replying to various arguments against the likelihood of Design.
For example, in answer to the infamous question ‘Who designed God?’
(Dawkins 2006, p. 188), I have explained that ‘God’ refers to the First
Cause which is beginningless, initially changeless, uncaused and neces-
sarily existent and hence is un-designed. In reply to the objection from
‘imperfections’ such as the presence of natural evil (Hume 1779/1993),
this objection, even if successful, does not imply that a designer is unlikely,
only that the designer is imperfect (moreover, as noted above, various
plausible theodicies concerning why a perfect Designer might allow evil
have already been offered by scholars; see Loke 2022a). Against the theo-
logical objection that, if the universe is fine-tuned, it should not be the
case that almost all physically possible universes are lifeless (Halvorson
2018) or that most regions in our universe are hostile to life (Sober 2019,
pp. 66–67), it can be argued that God wants life to be naturally unlikely
so that we would recognize His hand in designing life.
In conclusion, while the alternatives to design are unlikely, the Design
hypothesis is not. Since the list of hypothesis is logically exhaustive as
shown in Chap. 4, one can argue for the Design hypothesis by exclusion
without having to first assign a prior probability for Design, thus avoid-
ing the objections by critics on this point entirely.
Moreover, my argument does not postulate a Designer as a deus ex
machina, nor is the conclusion of my argument based on ignorance.
Rather, the conclusion is based on the analysis of the necessary condi-
tions (e.g. what is required for an initially changeless First Cause to bring
about the first event) and follows from deduction and exclusion. My
argument does not posit a First Cause having libertarian freedom merely
as a possible solution among many alternative solutions. Rather, I have
328 A. Loke
explained that a First Cause having libertarian freedom and intelligence

follows deductively from the premises I presented and that there is no
other viable possibility. Hence, there are no floodgates opened to be filled
by other explanations because there isn’t any other viable logical alterna-
tive and there is only one viable conclusion which follows from the prem-
ises, namely, the conclusion that the Designer of the universe exists.
Notes
1. Oppy (2013) also considered the alternative possibility that there are at
least some aspects of fine-tuning of natural causal reality that arise con-
tingently at non-initial stages of natural causal reality as the results of the
outplaying of objective chance. However, this possibility has been refuted
in Chap. 4 when considering the Chance hypothesis.
2. Cosmologist Don Page wrote to me about this in personal correspon-
dence, attributing it to Stephen Hawking.
3. Lewis and Barnes (2016, p. 328) argues that ‘The Universe is not a neces-
sary being because “there is nothing necessary about how it is, or that it
is, or how it behaves”, unlike (say) a triangle which necessarily has 3
vertices. This is why science needs observations; we can’t figure out the
Universe from our armchairs. We need to go outside and look.’
4. Merriam-Webster Dictionary.
5. Concerning the historical circumstances that led to the lamentable prev-
alence of this false assumption among atheist philosophers (Bertrand
Russell et al.), see Clarke (1970).
6. With regard to the concerns raised by the Thomistic Cosmological
Argument, the initial changelessness of the First Cause implies that the
First Cause does not require a sustaining cause; the subsequent changes
can be understood as being initiated and sustained by the libertarian
freedom of the First Cause (see Chap. 6).
7. This objection may affect other formulations, such as the likelihood for-
mulation. See Sect. 7.6.
8. Unless the Designer chooses to grant us such an access in some ways.
9. I discuss this issue in greater detail in Loke (2022).
10. Concerning the debate about divine impassibility and a defence of the
view that the Second Person of the Trinity suffered in his human nature,
see Loke (2014, chapter 4).
11. I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this objection.

12. He constructs a likelihoodist formulation of the design argument as
follows:
Pr (the value of physical constant x is in W | God set the value of x & W

is narrow) >
Pr (the value of physical constant x is in W | a mindless chance process
set the value of x & W is narrow) (p. 62).
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Theology 34 (4) https://doi.org/10.1111/moth.12435.
Perrine, Timothy, and Stephen Wykstra. 2017. Skeptical Theism. In The
Cambridge Companion to the Problem of Evil, ed. Chad Meister and Paul
Moser. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rosen, Gideon. 2020. Abstract Objects. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of
entries/abstract-objects/.
Sober, Elliot. 2003. The Argument from Design. In God and Design, ed.
N. Manson (pp. 25–53). Routledge. Reprinted in The Blackwell Guide to
Philosophy of Religion, 2004, ed. W. Mann (pp. 117–147).
———. 2019. The Design Argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Routledge.
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Swinburne, Richard. 1996. Is There a God? New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 2005. Second Reply to Grünbaum. The British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science 56: 923–924.
Topham, J. 2010. Natural Theology and the Sciences. In The Cambridge
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New York: E. R. DuMont.
right holder.
8
Ultimate Designer
8.1 S
ummary of Important Conclusions
from Previous Chapters
We have come to the end of our quest concerning the ultimate design of
our universe, a quest that has brought together the disciplines of philoso-
phy, science, and religion. The justification for using such a transdisci-
plinary approach for gaining a fuller understanding of reality has been
given in Chap. 1, where it has been shown that scientism, verificationism,
and empiricism are untenable. In particular, it has been demonstrated
that philosophical considerations are important for scientific theories,
and that what is mathematically possible is not concretely possible if it
violates certain metaphysical considerations (while what is mathemati-
cally impossible is concretely impossible as well). Hence, even if some-
thing is mathematically and/or logically possible but metaphysically
impossible, it would still be actually impossible. This is significant because
it implies that appealing to cosmological models which postulate an infi-
nite regress of events (e.g. Eternal Inflation Model) or logically consistent
closed causal loop are incapable of defeating the metaphysical arguments

334 A. Loke
against the possibilities of infinite regress of events and closed causal

loops presented in this book. Instead, those metaphysical arguments
stand as a defeater for these cosmological models.1 In view of the impor-
tance of philosophical considerations explained in Chap. 1‚ cosmologists
should not merely construct models of the universe without considering
the philosophical arguments against certain models. (The neglect of this
point has contributed to the lack of consensus in cosmology; it has been
said that one can come up with any theorem to prove that the universe
has a beginning or no beginning depending on the assumptions2; this
book has shown which assumptions should be rejected.)
This book has contributed to the discussion by developing these philo-
sophical arguments in engagement with modern science, and demon-
strating that whatever begins to exist has a cause (against recent objections
in Linford 2020 and others) and it is not the case that there is an actual
infinite regress of events or a causal loop which avoids a First Cause. This
implies that there is a first event and a First Cause.
It has often been objected that we cannot observationally confirmed
this First Cause caused the universe and that we cannot know the answer
concerning ultimate reality because that is far beyond our ordinary expe-
riences. I have replied to these objections by explaining in Chap. 1 that
the laws of logic are necessarily true, and that they would hold even at
levels of reality far beyond our ordinary experiences, such as at the begin-
ning of time or at the level of timelessness (there cannot be shapeless
squares at such levels too). Following the laws of logic, the conclusion of
a deductively valid argument from true premises must be true (regardless
of whatever realm of reality), and I have explained in previous chapters
that the Kalām Cosmological Argument is deductively valid and the
premises are true, and therefore the conclusion that there is a First Cause
with libertarian freedom is true.
Concerning the Teleological Argument, while many scientists and phi-
losophers have argued that there are evidences of design in fundamental
physics, others have objected that there could be alternative hypotheses
which have yet to be considered (Ratzsch and Koperski 2019). I have
addressed this problem by developing an original deductive argument
which demonstrates that the following are the only possible categories of
hypotheses: (i) Chance, (ii) Regularity, (iii) Combination of Regularity
8 Ultimate Designer 335
and Chance, (iv) Uncaused, and (v) Design. I have demonstrated that
there are essential features of each category such that, while the alterna-
tives to design are unlikely, the Design hypothesis is not. Since the list is
logically exhaustive, the epistemic probabilities of the five categories must
add up to 1. Even if one assigns to each of the four alternatives a probabil-
ity of 1 in 1000 (which is very generous given the arguments presented in
this book), that still leaves Design with a high epistemic probability of
99.6%. One can thus argue for Design by exclusion without having to
first assign a prior probability for Design (thus avoiding the objection in
Sober 2019), and I have shown that my argument avoids the problems
that beset alternative forms of design inference.
An objector might complain that the conclusion of the Teleological
Argument still falls short of 100 % epistemic certainty. Then again, there
isn’t 100 % epistemic certainty for most things in life either. For example,
there isn’t 100 % epistemic certainty that what you are reading now is
authored by a human being rather than a randomly typing monkey. The
latter hypothesis is logically possible, yet unlikely. The more probable
answer ought to be accepted as the true answer; that is, what you are read-
ing now ought to be regarded as the product of an intelligent author,
though certainly not as intelligent as the Creator who created such ele-
gant equations of physics and such astonishing degree of fine-tuning! The
fine-tuning and order of the universe is therefore a strong evidence for a
highly intelligent Creator, and given an epistemic probability of at least
99.6% this ought to be accepted as the true answer.
Thus, the Teleological Argument by itself—in particular, the undeni-
able evidence of the mathematically describable order of the universe by
itself (see for example Steiner’s point in Sect. 4.4.1)—is already sufficient
for concluding that the universe has a Creator. I have also explained pre-
viously that the KCA by itself is sufficient for concluding that the uni-
verse has a Creator. Therefore, even if one of these two arguments is
refuted, the conclusion that the universe has a Creator can still stand.
I have argued that both arguments are in fact defensible, and that the
Cosmological Argument can be used to strengthen the Teleological
Argument even further, by answering the question ‘Who designed the
Designer?’ through demonstrating that there is a beginningless and un-
designed First Cause with libertarian freedom. On the other hand, the
336 A. Loke
Teleological Argument can be used to strengthen the Cosmological

Argument by providing considerations for thinking that a First Cause
brought about the first event intelligently rather than accidentally or nat-
urally. In particular, it has been shown in Chaps. 4 and 7 that it is unlikely
that unintelligent cause(s) can bring about a universe in which mindless
unthinking physical entities constantly behave in ways that can be pre-
dicted by mathematical equations, which can be treated by physicists as
expressing a kind of software of the universe (Heller 2013, p. 594). It has
also been shown that it is unlikely that unintelligent cause(s) can generate
an ‘explosion’ such as the Big Bang that would bring about the creation
of ordered systems (solar system, quantum system, etc.) rather than dis-
order and debris. Thus, the best explanation is that the present universe
is the result of an intelligent Designer who programmed the ‘software’
and engineered the ‘explosion’.
8.2 Concerning the God-of-the-Gaps

Objection
It might be asked whether the arguments defended in this book are God-
of-the-gaps arguments and whether the conclusion that the Creator exists
is based on ignorance. When ancient people did not understand certain
natural phenomena (such as thunder), they thought that these are caused
by the gods (e.g. Thor). As scientific understanding progresses, such reli-
gious explanations are replaced by scientific ones. Haught (2004, p. 238)
notes that the problem with ‘God of the gaps’ explanations is that they
appeal to God ‘at a point in inquiry when there is still plenty of room for
further scientific elucidation’. Therefore, it might be objected that the
fine-tuning argument is based on current science which might be
explained away eventually by a naturalistic answer with the progress of
science (Loeb 2014). Carrier claims that ‘scientists have consistently
found physical explanations for every phenomenon they have been able
to thoroughly examine …. There is not a single instance on record of any
fact that has been thoroughly examined by scientists that turned out to
have no identifiable physical origin’ (Carrier 2003).
In reply, the conclusion of the KCA is not based on ignorance. Rather,

it is based on reasons. The argument is not ‘because we still do not know
how to explain the origin of the universe, therefore there is a Creator’.
Rather, the argument is, because there are reasons (discussed in previous
chapters) for thinking that an actual infinite causal regress and a closed
causal loop is not the case, therefore there is a First Cause. It is because
there are reasons for thinking that whatever begins to exist has a cause,
therefore this First Cause is beginningless. The rest of the properties of
this First Cause are likewise derived on the basis of reasons rather than
ignorance, as shown above. Moreover, as explained previously, each step
of the argument is strictly deductive in nature, for which no alternative
explanation is possible, whereas ‘a ‘god of the gaps’ explanation is one on
which it is at least possible in principle that some nondivine explanation
might be correct’ (Feser 2017, p. 271).
Contrary to Carrier, scientists have not found physical explanations
for the ultimate origin of our universe. While the progress of science
would generate newer understandings of the laws of nature as explana-
tions for the phenomena we observe, as shown by the KCA, the progress
of science would not replace a First Cause (Creator) as an explanation for
the existence of all things, including the laws of nature themselves which
must have come from this First Cause.
Concerning the Teleological Argument, one might attempt to explain
away design (using science or otherwise) by appealing to alternative
explanations. However, where the mathematical order and fine-tuning is
concerned, it has been shown in previous chapters that all the possible
alternative explanations (chance, regularity, combinations of chance and
regularity, uncaused) would fail as ultimate explanations for these phe-
nomena. Ratzsch and Koperski (2019) note that ‘evidence of design in
nature does not automatically imply gaps. Design built or “front-loaded”
into nature from the very beginning would require no further interven-
tions within the historical flow of nature and therefore no gaps.’ Hume
et al. have claimed that an infinite regress of causes/events is possible
given which there is no beginning for design to be front-loaded into.
However, it has been shown in this book that the KCA can be used to
strengthen the Teleological Argument by demonstrating that an infinite
regress of causes/events is not the case and thus there is a first event, and
338 A. Loke
that this first event cannot have been brought about by a regular/natural/
mechanistic/scientific process but by an act of libertarian freedom of the
First Cause. (See also the response by Frederick in Sect. 7.1 concerning
the mathematically describable order of the universe. As noted earlier, the
undeniable evidence of the mathematically describable order of the uni-
verse by itself is already sufficient for the Teleological Argument; the dis-
covery of the evidences for fine-tuning only makes the argument stronger.)
Therefore, while the science concerning fine-tuning will be updated in
the future, with regard to whatever scientists discover (e.g. a new law of
nature), it can still be asked where did that come from (e.g. where did
that law of nature come from). The basic logical form of my argument
would still remain, and no matter what scientists discover in the future,
there must still be a First Cause for that discovery. Even if scientists dis-
cover one day that our universe is a digital simulation (Bostrom 2003) or
it was created by intelligent being(s) living in another universe (Harrison
1995), we could still ask where did that digital simulation/intelligent
being(s) come from; that is, what caused it? If one claims that the intel-
ligent being or the cause of the digital simulation is uncaused, that would
imply that the intelligent being/cause of the simulation is the First Cause
of our universe and it would also have other properties which the First
Cause must have as deduced by the KCA-TA, namely, is beginningless,
initially changeless, has libertarian freedom, intelligence, and is enor-
mously powerful. In other words, the conclusion of the KCA-TA that a
Creator of the universe exists would still follow.
Even if we live in an illusory world (e.g. in a matrix), the conclusion
would still follow. In such a world, it remains the case that the existence
of changes and beginning of changes cannot be denied. As Craig (Copan
and Craig 2017 vol. 1, p. 67) notes, on the thesis of the mind-dependence
of becoming, there is at least the appearance of temporal becoming of the
physical world. An illusion or appearance of becoming involves becom-
ing, so that becoming cannot be mere illusion or appearance. Thus, even
the radical sceptic who doubts all of his/her perceptions of the world
external to his/her mind must still grant the existence of changes in his or
her own subjective mental states. While we observe changes through a
filter of perception, we cannot deny that changes exist. Given the impos-
sibility of an actual infinite regress of changes, as well as the truth of the
Causal Principle that whatever begins to exist has a cause (the violation of
which would entail that his/her subjective experiences would be very dif-
ferent from what they are), the conclusion that an initially changeless
First Cause with libertarian freedom and intelligence (i.e. Creator) exists
would still follow.
Contrary to Carrier (2003), who claims that all physicists would find
a non-naturalistic conclusion to be quite absurd, many of the greatest
physicists throughout history (e.g. Newton, Einstein [see Chap. 4, foot-
note 5) have recognized God as the ultimate explanation for the existence
and order of the universe. They do not regard this conclusion as anti-
scientific because they do not hold to the fallacious ideas of scientism (see
Chap. 1). They recognize that philosophy examines primary causes while
science examines secondary causes. Cosmologist William Stoeger offers
an account of how science, philosophy, and theology can complement
one other concerning ultimate origins:
Physics and cosmology as sciences are incapable of exploring or directly

accounting for the ultimate source of existence and order which philoso-
phy and theology, properly understood, provide. By the same token, phi-
losophy and theology are not equipped to investigate and describe the
processes and relationships which contributed to the expansion, cooling
and subsequent structuring of the universe on macroscopic and on micro-
scopic scales. Thus, philosophy and theology seek to provide an under-
standing of the origin and evolution of the universe which is complementary
to that which physics and cosmology contribute. (Stoeger 2010, p. 174)
Thus, philosophy can let us know about Divine First Cause while leav-
ing scientists (e.g. cosmologists) to find out the secondary causes con-
cerning mechanisms and to work on understanding the details of the
process. The fact that the latter is still unknown and there is no consensus
among cosmologists at this time does not contradict the conclusion that
the former can be known using philosophical arguments such as the
KCA-TA. With regard to the objection that we should always try to find
a scientific explanation, the KCA-TA demonstrates that the ultimate
explanation cannot be a scientific one, because the first event is brought
about by a First Cause with libertarian freedom (premise 8) and not by a
340 A. Loke
mechanism describable by a law of nature. The possession of libertarian

freedom by the First Cause implies agent causation and a personal expla-
nation. Moreover, being initially changeless, the First Cause is not a phys-
ical entity (such as the universe or multiverse) which is characterized by
constant changes. While the progress of science would generate new
theories to explain various aspects of the physical world, it would not
replace the First Cause (Creator) as the ultimate explanation for why the
physical world exists in the first place, as demonstrated by the
KCA-TA. Thus, the conclusion of the KCA-TA cannot in principle be
overturned by future scientific discoveries. Rather, future discoveries
would only enhance our understanding of the wisdom of the Creator
through understanding the laws which He had created.
8.3 Limitations of the KCA-TA and responses

One might object that that KCA does not rule out other timeless con-
crete entities existing alongside God, and neither does it prove that there
is only one First Cause.
In reply, one can speculate about other entities which may or may not
exist, but what needs explanation is the series of changes which we observe
within our universe, and I have already explained why an infinite regress
of changes is impossible and why this implies that there is an initially
changeless First Cause with libertarian freedom. The conclusion that
there is a single First Cause is more reasonable than multiple first causes
given the widely accepted scientific principle (Ockham’s razor) that causes
should not be multiplied beyond necessity (Craig and Sinclair 2009,
p. 192). This principle is widely used by atheists (e.g. Oppy 2013a), who
think that, since thunder (for example) can be sufficiently explained by
natural laws, there is no need to postulate a thunder god to explain it;
thus, the existence of a thunder god should be rejected. Likewise, theists
can argue that, since a single Creator is sufficient to explain the origin of
the universe, there is no need to postulate additional creators or other
timeless concrete entities.
The conclusion of a single Creator is further strengthened by Sudduth’s
(2009, p. 210) observation:
The unity of order throughout the cosmos is evidence for a single cause of
this order. If we postulate a single designer, then we would expect to find
the same fundamental physical laws governing the behavior of objects over
vast distances of space and time in the cosmos. We would also expect to
find different particular physical laws explicable in terms of these funda-
mental physical laws.
Concerning premise 6 ‘since the First Cause is the first, it is uncaused’,

it has been noted in Chap. 2 that I am referring to the First Cause of
change and that this First Cause is not something that is brought into
existence. One might object that such a First Cause might nevertheless be
something that is sustained in existence, and thus is caused in the sense
of having a sustaining cause. If that is the case, then given the impossibil-
ity of infinite regress of sustaining causes or a closed loop, the First
Sustaining Cause would be the true First Cause (here, the word ‘cause’ is
used in a different sense, not as a cause of change, but as something that
sustains another thing changelessly). Such a sustaining First Cause might
not be the entity which brought about the first event (cf. premise 10 of
KCA-TA), and it might be impersonal.
Two points may be said in response.
First, while Aquinas had famously argued for a First Sustaining Cause
and he was not a proponent of the KCA and did not think that a First
Cause of time can be demonstrated, he nevertheless affirmed that there is
such a First Cause of time on the basis of Christian tradition and that the
First Cause of time is also identical with the First Sustaining Cause. Now
there are disputes concerning whether the Thomistic Cosmological
Argument is sound, and I have argued in Sect. 6.4 that, if there is a First
Sustaining Cause, there is no good reason to think that it is a Pure Act
which is distinct from the First Cause of time. On the contrary, I have
argued that the First Cause of time can also be the One who sustains all
else in existence. Therefore, it would be simpler (following Ockham’s
razor) to regard the First Sustaining Cause to be identical with the First
Cause demonstrated by the Kalām.
Second, atheists who affirm a naturalistic First Cause (e.g. Oppy and
Hawking) typically assume that this First Cause is not being sustained in
existence by (say) a Thomistic First Cause. For the sake of parity, the
342 A. Loke
theistic proponent of the KCA may assume the same, given that (as
explained under the first point above) there is no good reason to think
that there is a First Sustaining Cause which is distinct from the First
Cause of time.
Another objector to the KCA might suggest the hypothesis that there
are two beginningless beings—God and primordial matter—and that
God (the First Cause with libertarian freedom) caused the primordial
matter to change, hence bringing about the first event of physical reality.
In this case, the primordial matter would be the material First Cause
without libertarian freedom but it might be enormously powerful (like a
powerful bomb waiting to be triggered), while the efficient First Cause
has libertarian freedom but may have little power (the trigger of a bomb
may have little power in itself ). In this way, the conclusion that there is
one First Cause with both libertarian freedom and enormous power may
be avoided.
Three points may be said in response.
First, the above scenario which is intended to avoid the conclusion of
this book faces the problem that the efficient First Cause with libertarian
freedom would still need to have enormous power and intelligence in
order to form a highly ordered and fine-tuned universe from the material
according to his intelligent plan.
Second, the so-called primordial matter would be initially changeless
and hence (as argued in Chap. 6) immaterial, given which it is problem-
atic to call it matter.
Third, there is no good reason to think that there are two beginningless
beings rather than one. Therefore, it would be simpler (following
Ockham’s razor) and—in light of points 1 and 2—less problematic to
think that there is one beginningless First Cause with both libertarian
freedom and enormous power.
Goff (2019, p. 106) objects that theism incurs a large cost in terms of
qualitative parsimony by postulating an immaterial and necessary being
which is an addition type of entity to the physical and contingent uni-
verse, and it violates the theoretical virtue of having a unified conception
of reality by postulating a supernatural God distinct from the natural
world.3 He propose an alternative view (constitutive comopsychism)
which postulates that the universe is a conscious subject with a ‘basic
disposition to form spontaneous mental representations of the complete

future consequences of all of the choices available to it’ (p. 112). He notes
that proponents of KCA have argued that the universe has a timeless,
necessarily existent, and personal cause, and argues that the agentive cos-
mopsychist can accept their conclusions by adopting the following
two theses:
• The entity E that is the physical universe exists necessarily and has its
spatiotemporal properties contingently (i.e. ‘physical universe’ is a
phase sortal of E as ‘adulthood’ is a phase sortal of a person), and
• E as a non-spatiotemporal entity caused the Big Bang (i.e. the non-
physical phase of E caused its physical phase) (p. 120).
He claims that ‘given that physical science tells us nothing of the

intrinsic nature of the universe, physical science can give us no grounds
for holding that something with such an intrinsic nature is essentially
spatiotemporal’ (ibid.).
In reply, although parsimony/simplicity is one of the considerations
for evaluating the prior probability of hypotheses, it can be defeated by
other considerations. Now Swinburne (2004, p. 53) has stated that
the prior probability of a theory depends on the degree of its fit with back-
ground knowledge (an a posteriori matter), and on its simplicity and scope
(features internal to the theory and so an a priori matter). A theory fits with
our general background knowledge of how the world works in so far as the
kinds of entities and laws that it postulates are similar to those that proba-
bly (on our evidence) exist and operate in other fields.4
The problem with Goff’s theory is that it doesn’t fit with ‘our general
background knowledge of how the world works’ (Swinburne) and it
requires ad hoc postulations in order to make it fit. To illustrate, SETI
[Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence] researchers can reasonably con-
clude that Extra-Terrestrial Intelligent Being exists if they pick up a cer-
tain signal under certain circumstances. Suppose someone postulates an
alternative hypothesis that the physical universe itself (without the ETI
beings) generated the signal. This would be a more parsimonious
344 A. Loke
hypothesis, but it would rightly be rejected because our background

knowledge indicates that the physical universe itself (apart from intelli-
gent beings) does not have the capacity to generate such a signal. Thus,
the alternative hypothesis has extremely low prior probability. To object
to this conclusion by postulating that the physical universe itself might
have the capacity to generate such a signal under special circumstances is
ad hoc. Likewise, to postulate that the physical universe itself might have
intelligence which can set up itself under special conditions is ad hoc.
Note that my objection is not question begging because it does not start
by assuming that Goff’s interpretation of our observation of the universe
is wrong. Rather, it starts by observing physical entities and inferring that
his postulation of those additional characteristics is ad hoc.
Now, it is not ad hoc to conclude that the universe has a First Cause
which is initially changeless, necessarily existent, personal (has libertarian
freedom), and intelligent, since this is justified by the reasons and evi-
dences presented in the earlier parts of this book. However, it is ad hoc to
postulate that the initial state of the universe is a First Cause which is
initially changeless, necessarily existent, personal (has libertarian free-
dom), and intelligent. The reason is there is no independent evidence
that the physical universe which we observe has such properties. On the
contrary, all the evidence we have of the universe shows that it does not
(for example) freely moves around the planets in ways other than that
described by the laws of nature. In other words, our observation of the
universe implies that Goff’s hypothesis has extremely low prior probabil-
ity. It is inadequate to respond by saying that our universe does have the
property of following the laws of nature which have teleological proper-
ties. The reason is because the problem concerning the origin of the uni-
verse and fine-tuning does not merely concern the present laws of nature
but also the arrangement of the initial conditions. It is like arranging
different parts of a factory together (before those parts run according to
programmed laws). When we observe the universe it is obvious that it
does not have the capacity to bring together different parts of the factory
to set up a factory; the laws of nature are unintelligent in that sense.
Likewise, it is implausible to think that it could have fine-tuned and set
up itself. Consider the analogy of discovering a car factory in a jungle
mentioned in Chap. 7. Even if the parts of the factory are faulty for
whatever reason (cf. problem of evil Goff mentioned), it is still reasonable

to conclude that the factory had an independent designer rather than to
think that it designed itself, since it is obvious that the factory is unintel-
ligent and does not have that capacity to set up itself.
Goff might reply by speculating that the universe has a mind and is
trying to maximize the good under certain limitations as expressed by the
laws of physics.5
However, scientific evidence has shown that (regardless of whether the
universe has a mind or not) the ‘limitations’ are very severe. That is, the
physical universe behaves in law-like regular ways rather than behaving in
ways which indicate that it is capable of arranging things together to
form something like a car factory which can set up different systems of an
automobile. Therefore, it is unlikely that the universe could have set up
itself, or fix its initial conditions in such a way that different systems (e.g.
quantum systems, solar systems, biological systems) would eventu-
ally form.
Goff might reply by postulating that, because the limitations were bro-
ken during the Planck epoch at the beginning of our universe where
physical laws break down, the universe might have the capacity to fine-
tune itself during that epoch. To illustrate the absurdity of his ad hoc
hypothesis, one can postulate that, because the limitations were broken
during the Planck epoch at the beginning of our universe where physical
laws break down, the universe might have the capacity to generate fine-
tuned special signals during that epoch, signals which (because of the
fine-tuning and the breaking down of physical laws) cannot be traced
back to the Planck epoch but which can be translated as intelligent mes-
sages later on. SETI scientists would reject the above hypothesis as ad
hoc. They would object that the fact that our current scientific models
break down during the Planck epoch does not mean we can postulate
anything we want to the universe during the epoch to explain anything
we want, even if the resultant hypothesis might be more parsimonious
than postulating a universe with aliens. Likewise, scientists ought to reject
Goff’s hypothesis by arguing that the fact that our current scientific mod-
els break down during the Planck epoch does not mean we can postulate
any kind of ‘theory of everything’ to the universe during the epoch to
explain anything we want (such as evidence of fine-tuning), even if the
346 A. Loke
resultant hypothesis might be more parsimonious than postulating a uni-

verse with the God of traditional theism.
Secondly, the conclusion (justified by the arguments in previous chap-
ters) that this First Cause (A) is initially changeless and (B) has libertarian
freedom to initiate or prevent itself from initiating the first event already
implies that the First Cause is utterly different from the physical world
and not describable by natural laws. Concerning (A), as noted previously,
according to quantum physics, physical entities constantly fluctuate (i.e.
change) at the quantum level as described by the Heisenberg uncertainty
principle (Boddy, Carroll & Pollack 2016). To suggest that our current
scientific model collapses in the Planck epoch to such an extent that even
the fundamental understanding of physics and of natural law that ‘physi-
cal entities change’ no longer applies seems to be equivalent to postulat-
ing a non-physical and ‘supernatural’ origin, rather than origination by
the physical universe itself. Goff might reply by postulating that the uni-
verse is not essentially physical, and that he is hypothesizing that a ‘non-
physical God became the universe’. But how is the change from
‘non-physical’ to ‘physical’ not supernatural? Moreover, Goff’s hypothesis
that ‘God became the universe’ requires that God must still have been
distinct from the universe before ‘becoming’ the universe. Additionally,
his hypothesis is as implausible as suggesting that ‘the alien which gener-
ated the signal message became the signal’. The ‘becoming’ involves an
(unnecessary) extra step which is less parsimonious. It is simpler to pos-
tulate that ‘the alien created the signal’ without postulating that ‘the alien
became the signal’. Likewise, it is simpler to postulate that ‘God created
the fine-tuned universe’ without postulating that ‘God became the uni-
verse and allowed the natural laws to limit himself after the Planck epoch’.
Concerning (B), our background knowledge of the scientific evidence
indicates that no causal relation found in the hard sciences resemble any-
thing like having the (libertarian) freedom to initiate or prevent itself
from initiating an event. Again, this indicates that Goff’s hypothesis has
extremely low prior probability, and that it is ad hoc for Goff to postulate
that the physical universe has this freedom which manifested under spe-
cial consideration. The point concerning the initial changelessness and
libertarian freedom of the First Cause is that we are warranted by the
evidence to conclude that there exists an entity with a nature which is
distinct from physicality as described by natural laws. The term super-

natural is usually used for such an entity. Goff might refuse to use this
term, but this does not deny the conclusion that such an entity exists. I
have argued above that the conclusion that such an entity is non-identical
with the universe is less ad hoc and more parsimonious than his hypoth-
esis that they are identical.
Hence, the First Cause should be regarded as something that is distinct
from the physical world. Given this, and given that properties such as
being (initially) changeless, necessarily existent, having libertarian free-
dom and intelligence are contrary to our observation of the physical uni-
verse but are what theists traditionally meant by ‘God’,, who is supposed
to be very different from the observed universe, the conclusion of theism
and the associated cost of violating qualitative parsimony and unified
conception of reality are warranted.
8.4 Significance of the Conclusion of KCA-TA

The conclusion that the First Cause is initially changeless as well as imma-
terial and has libertarian freedom indicates that the First Cause is onto-
logically distinct from the material universe; this is a hallmark of
traditional theism in distinction from pantheism (Forrest 2016). It
implies that events describable by physical law have a beginning; that is,
there is a first event, which implies that materiality has a beginning,
which is consistent with creatio ex nihilo.
It is true that the KCA-TA by itself does not prove that this First Cause
has other properties which many people associate with God, namely,
morally perfect, Triune, and so on. Nevertheless, we still need to consider
who is this First Cause of our universe who is immaterial, has libertarian
freedom (and hence personal), is intelligent, and enormously powerful
(and who might well be morally perfect, Trinity, etc.)? If we do not call
this First Cause God, then what shall we call Him? There are good rea-
sons for calling Him God, given that hardly any atheist (a person who
affirms that there is no God) would acknowledge that there is such a First
Cause and still remain an atheist.
348 A. Loke
Even if we do not call this First Cause God, we should at least call Him
the Creator, given that the First Cause has libertarian freedom and is the
designer of our universe. One might seek to find out whether there are
evidences which indicate that this Creator had revealed Himself in other
ways—for example, through the moral law in human conscience (Baggett
and Walls 2016) and His acts in history (Loke 2017, 2020, 2021)—to
provide us with additional reasons for thinking that He is indeed morally
perfect, and so on, and to reveal to us His ultimate purposes for creation
and His plan for our lives.
Robert Lawrence Kuhn (2020) has observed that the question ‘Why
there is something rather than nothing?’ is a question that supersedes all
other questions. Against this, Maudlin (2018) claims that this question is
‘a silly question which obviously has no satisfactory answer’, ‘for to
“explain” existence you either cite something that exists or you don’t. If
you do you have begged the question, and if you don’t then you haven’t
provided an explanation.’ However, Maudlin fails to note that it is not
question begging to cite something with properties which logically termi-
nate the question.
To elaborate, when one asks ‘why?’, one is looking for an explanation.
For example, when one asks ‘why is there something called Andrew Loke
rather than no Andrew Loke?’, the answer is his parents brought him into
existence and therefore explain why he exists. Since there cannot be an
infinite regress of explanations (see Chap. 5), the series of explanations
must terminate in an uncaused First Cause with libertarian freedom, that
is, a personal Creator God (Chap. 6). Such a First Cause does not need to
be explained, since it is beginningless, unsustained, and necessarily exis-
tent (Chap. 3). It would therefore be meaningless to ask why is there a
First Cause rather than nothing, because there cannot be an explanation
for this First Cause since this First Cause is the terminus to the series of
explanations. In other words, this First Cause (God) has properties which
logically terminate the question. Therefore, this First Cause is the answer
to the question ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ Contrary
to Maudlin, this question is not a silly question. Rather, it is one of the
most important questions humanity has ever asked, a question which
leads humanity to God.
Stephen Hawking (2018, p. 29) has observed that ‘it is hard to think
of a more important, or fundamental, mystery than what, or who, cre-
ated and controls the universe’. Albert Einstein has stated that ‘everyone
who is seriously engaged in the pursuit of science becomes convinced that
the laws of nature manifest the existence of a spirit vastly superior to that
of men, and one in the face of which we with our modest powers must
feel humble’ (Jammer 1999, p. 93). Richard Dawkins has acknowledged:
When I lie on my back and look up at the Milky Way on a clear night and
see the vast distances of space and reflect that these are also vast differences
of time as well, when I look at the Grand Canyon and see the strata going
down, down, down, through periods of time when the human mind can’t
comprehend, I’m overwhelmingly filled with a sense of, almost worship …
it’s a feeling of sort of an abstract gratitude that I am alive to appreciate
these wonders. When I look down a microscope it’s the same feeling: I am
grateful to be alive to appreciate these wonders. (Dawkins 2006)
The Teleological and Kalām Cosmological Arguments have shown

that there is indeed Someone to worship and to be grateful to, that the
universe with its astonishing fine-tuning, amazing mathematical laws of
nature, and billions of spectacular stars and galaxies is not the result of
‘blind pitiless indifference’ (Dawkins 1996, pp. 131–132). Rather, it is
the work of a transcendent Ultimate Designer and necessarily existent
First Cause who is the Source of these wonders and the ‘Maker and Father
of all’ (Plato, Laws 10.893b–899c). It is hard to think of a more impor-
tant, humbling, and joyful discovery than this, and a more important
quest in life than to know the God who created the universe.
Notes
1. I thank Lucas Giolas for emphasizing this point to me.
2. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pGKe6YzHiME.
3. Goff also claims that theism makes false prediction concerning the prob-
lem of evil (p. 107). For reply, see Sect. 7.3.
4. Now Swinburne also states that ‘a “Theory of Everything” will have no
contingent background evidence by which to determine prior probability.
350 A. Loke
Prior probability must then be determined by purely a priori consider-

ations’ (2004, p. 60). Swinburne’s statement might be explained by the
fact that, by the ‘theory of everything’, he is thinking of an entity (i.e. the
God of traditional theism) which is different from the contingent universe
and which explains the universe. In which case our contingent back-
ground evidence concerning our universe would obviously not apply to
such an entity since it only applies to the universe. However, Goff’s case is
different, since Goff’s ‘theory of everything’ is that the universe itself
explains its own fine-tuning. In which case our contingent background
evidence concerning our universe does apply. In any case, whether
Swinburne himself accepts my objection or not is irrelevant to the sound-
ness of my objection against Goff’s theory, which I explain below.
5. I thank Goff for helpful discussion in what follows.
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Index1
A 199, 203, 225–228, 232, 235,

Acausal fine-tuning, 197, 237 248–250, 261, 303, 334,
Actual infinite temporal regress 337, 339
definition, 4 Big Bang
See also Infinities singularity, 25, 202, 237
Agent causation, 7, 250, 265, 270, theories, 2, 3
271, 273–275, 340 Black Hole model, 196
Anthropic principle, 168, 175, 179 Bohmian mechanics, 51,
Atheism, 173, 318, 321 62, 63
Bounce Cosmologies, 2,
198–200, 237
B
Begins to exist, 3–5, 19, 29, 37–39,
45, 46, 55, 64n1, 71, 73–75, C
77–80, 85, 87, 89, 92–95, 98, Causal eliminativism, 46, 49
99, 103–105, 108, 109, 111, Causality, 2, 8, 21, 28, 30, 37, 38,
113, 116, 117, 119, 120, 49, 55, 126, 130, 218,
122–124, 126, 129, 131–133, 250, 275
Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94403-2
384 Index
Causal loop Closed Timelike Curves

closed, 31, 235, 333, 334, 337 (CTCS), 196
Causal Principle Combinations of Regularity and
conceptual argument, 71, 132 Chance, 7, 31, 157, 171, 185,
philosophical doubts, 40 297, 309, 310
reductio ab absurdum Smolin’s evolutionary hypothesis,
argument, 71 155, 183
scepticism, 71 Complexity
Causal priority, 96, 100, 101, 121 functional, 188n15
Causal reductionism, 46, 47 organised, 304
Causation specified, 170, 173, 305
counterfactual theory of, 42, 55, Conformal cyclic cosmology (CCC),
57, 64n8 196, 197
dispositionalism, 49, 58 Consistency paradoxes, 32n5
efficient, 38, 39, 44–46, 50, 60, Constitutive comopsychism, 342
62, 131, 200, 203, 251, 277 Cosmological Argument
essentialism, 58 Kalām, 3, 23, 37, 177, 255,
final, 44, 186n1, 277 284, 349
formal, 44 Leibnizian, 3, 301
material, 38, 39, 44–46, 202, Thomist, 3, 301
203, 251 Creatio ex nihilo, 39, 45, 46, 249,
regularity theory of, 48 251, 289, 347
singularist theory, 271, 272
Suarez’s analysis, 290n1
subjunctive facts, 58 D
theories of, 47 Delayed Choice Quantum Eraser, 50
Cause Design Hypothesis, 7, 31, 165, 306,
definition, 249, 250 320, 322, 323, 327, 335
timeless, 27, 43, 251, 253, 254, Design inference
261, 263, 278–280, 282 abductive, 155
Chance, 7, 31, 48, 74, 76, 81, 85, analogical, 155
118, 133, 147, 154, 155, 157, argument by exclusion, 32
158, 162–181, 183–185, Bayesian, 155
187n6, 270, 297, 309–313, likelihoodist, 155
317, 320, 321, 328n1, problem of prior probability, 6
329n12, 334, 335, 337 Determinism, 62, 161, 163,
Changes 164, 226
temporal series, 29, 278 Deus ex machina, 325, 327
Closed circular loop, 31, 127 Divine cause, 271
Index 385
E I
Ekyroptic model, 196 Infinite additions of zero, 219
Eternal inflation, 41, 177, 196, Infinities
267, 333 abstract, definition of, 214, 219, 222
Eternality, conceptions of, 41 actual, definition of, 3–5, 11, 19,
Event, definition of, 253 27, 28, 31, 43, 64n1, 113,
Evil, problem of, 310, 311, 114, 177–179, 185, 188n14,
345, 349n3 196, 202, 204–224, 229, 234,
Extended simples, 219, 267 235, 237, 252, 253, 258, 267,
334, 337, 338
arguments against concrete
F actual, 204
Fine-Tuning concrete, definition of, 4, 218
cosmological constant, 142, 143 the impossibility of traversing
entropy, 313 actual, 4, 11, 204, 205, 217,
Finite past, 196 221, 237
Friedmann-Lemaître-Robertson- metaphysical possibility, 172
Walker (FLRW) model, 195 paradoxes, 205
Fundamental physics, 2, 8, potential, definition of, 177,
46–60, 131, 144, 151, 188n19, 202, 222,
218, 334 238n3, 240n26
Initial singularity, 271, 272, 291n7,
298, 305
G
General Theory of Relativity, 13,
14, 201, 218, 219, K
252, 256 Kalām Cosmological Argument
God-of-the-gaps fallacy, 8, 336–340 (KCA), 3–7, 23, 26–29, 71,
Grim Reaper Paradox, 204, 72, 125, 126, 133, 177, 204,
221, 237 205, 215, 222, 249, 253, 255,
257, 258, 269, 271, 273, 274,
283, 289, 303, 305, 321, 334,
H 335, 337, 340–343, 349
Hartle-Hawking model, 256, 257,
297, 298
Hidden variable, 62, 81 L
Hilbert’s Hotel, 4 Laws of logic, 14–22, 24, 26–28, 57,
Hume-Edwards Principle, 224 79, 130–131, 149, 320, 334
386 Index
Laws of nature, 6, 7, 18, 30, 37–64, O

91, 92, 105–112, 118, 126, Omnipotence, 224
129, 132, 142, 144, 145, 152, Ontic Structural Realism (OSR),
153, 159, 202, 253, 258, 259, 150, 151
266, 271, 288, 289, 297–300, Ontological indeteminism, 44, 45,
303, 305, 307, 314, 320, 322, 60, 62, 63, 81, 82, 84, 85,
323, 325, 337, 338, 340, 124, 134n7
344, 349
Libertarian free choice, 85,
124, 306 P
Loop Quantum Gravity model, 196 Perdurantism, 39, 42
Phantom bounce cosmologies, 196
Philosophical reasoning, 13
M importance, 203
Mathematical beauty, 145 Pilot-wave theory, see Bohmian
Mathematical order, 146, 324, 337 mechanics
Metaphysical grounding, 78, 85, 86, Pre-Big Bang theory, 196
91, 93–98, 132, 134n7 Principle of Indifference, 159,
Metaphysical necessity, 55, 56, 160, 167
59, 77, 109 Probability, 2, 6, 7, 16, 32, 32n1, 52,
Modality, 57, 76, 78, 115, 75, 85, 113, 133, 134n2, 141,
120–122 143, 152, 154, 155, 157–165,
Modal realism view of possible 167–169, 173–175, 178, 179,
worlds, 175 187n11, 188n17, 257, 266,
Motion, 108, 220, 221, 233, 268–270, 307, 312–314,
236, 239–240n26, 257, 316–322, 324, 327, 335, 343,
286, 316 344, 346, 349–350n4
paradoxes of, 55, 216, 217,
220, 280
Multiple universe (multiverse Q
hypothesis), 114, Quantum gravity, 53, 75, 150, 197,
164, 175–176 201, 255, 298
Quantum physics, 14, 16, 19, 28,
38, 55, 62, 63, 131, 149,
N 176, 226, 262, 266,
Naturalism, 22, 119, 305, 321 270, 346
No boundary proposal, 31, 75, 196, Quantum vacuum, 3, 61, 63,
256, 289 226, 227
Index 387
R Temporal priority, 261

Radioactive decay, 81, 82, 84, 161, Theism, 22, 77, 78, 119, 173, 176,
163, 266 184, 285–287, 305, 310, 318,
Random, 57, 143, 157, 158, 319, 321, 326, 342, 346, 347,
162–167, 179, 183, 187n11, 349n3, 350n4
259, 274–277, 283 Theory of time
Reasoning dynamic (A-), 39, 40
deductive, 14, 15, 18, 20, 26, 273 static [B-], 250
inductive, 14, 18, 20, 26, Thomist Cosmological
129, 273 Argument, 301
Regularity, 7, 31, 48, 50, 57, 60, 62, Time
85, 106, 126, 144, 152, definition, 40
154–158, 165–167, 171, first cause of, 341, 342
181–185, 187n6, 201, 252, imaginary, 256, 257
297, 309–311, 314, 317, 320, travel of, 259
322, 334, 337
U
S Uncaused beginnings, 81–87, 89,
Science 93–97, 102, 106, 109, 110,
limitations of, 203 115, 119, 121, 123
Scientism Uncaused universe, 38
objections to, 9 Universe
Second Law of Thermodynamics, 31, initial timeless state, 261
65n10, 143, 197, 201, 238n2 quantum creation, 256
Spacetime continuum, 218, 220
Space-time manifold, 3
Special pleading, 81, 119, 308, 310 V
Standard model of particle Verificationism, 12–13, 23, 333
physics, 61 New Verificationism, 12, 28
String theory, 180–182
W
T Wheeler–DeWitt equation, 255
Teleological argument, 1, 6, 7, 30,
144, 155–158, 187n6, 248,
274, 310, 311, 314–316, 322, Z
334, 335, 337, 338 Zero-point energy, 226, 257

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PALGRAVE FRONTIERS IN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

More information about this series at

The Teleological and

ISSN 2634-6176 ISSN 2634-6184 (electronic)

Cover Illustration: Suchart Kuathan/Getty Images

1 Introducing the Quest for an Explanation 1

2 Causation and Laws of Nature 37

3 Arguments for the Causal Principle 71

4 Fine-Tuning and Order of our Universe141

5 Arguments for a First Cause195

5.5 The Argument from the Viciousness of Dependence

6 What the First Cause Is247

Fig. 5.1 Bounce Cosmology with entropy reversal 198

© The Author(s) 2022 1

thought that these arguments have been successfully rebutted by the

1.2 A Review of the Discussion

(1) The Leibnizian (named after Gottfried Leibniz 1646–1716; see

In this book, I shall focus on the Kalām version of the Cosmological

( 1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause (Causal Principle).

intelligence, which may not carry over to hypotheses involving non-­

providing additional considerations for thinking that the First Cause is

1.3 Problems with Scientism

A defender of scientism demands to know the predictive successes and

On the other hand, scientism is susceptible to the objection that sci-

In his survey of the forms of reasoning and criteria of rationality that

1.4 Problems with Verificationism

First, no hypothesis that the approximately consensual current scientific

The main pragmatic motivation for adopting this principle is stated as

reason why they think that such metaphysical inquiry is pointless is

1.5 In Defence of the Possibility of a Priori

these failures as well as ‘common sense’ and ‘everyday intuitions’ from

(1) If the experiment reveals quantum entanglement, then the prediction

This form of valid reasoning is known as modus ponens (1. If A, then

Unlike Kant, we insist that science can discover fundamental structures of

It is interesting to note that they acknowledge the role of mathematics

The above definition of ‘not’ (given which contradictions are impossi-

position which is revealed when an observation is made. Again, there is

Some religious mystical traditions (e.g. certain forms of Chinese

daily experiences. For example, the principle ‘differences between prime

proficiency in inferring the large-scale and small-scale structure of our

knowledge. On the other hand, we have no good reasons for thinking

1.7 Reply to Empiricist Objections

and Ontology” provides an argument, but when we look there is little to

The above scientific findings indicate that the unobservable causes of

know many details about these unobservable causes through deductive

1.8 Conclusion and Overview

Rather, their choice is based on past experience combined with philo-

It has been noted previously that the KCA is traditionally formulated

(1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause.

• the capacity to be the originator of the event in a way that is un-­

The above argument is deductively valid; the key question is whether

concern by first devising an original deductive argument which demon-

Huemer, Michael. 2018. Paradox Lost. Cham: Springer.

Oppy, Graham. 2006. Philosophical Perspectives on Infinity. Cambridge:

I shall respond to Hawking’s claim in Chap. 6 after establishing the

© The Author(s) 2022 37

In his Inquiry and Essays, the eighteenth-century philosopher Thomas

exposition, I shall henceforth refer to this weaker claim as the Causal

away of properties. On a static (B) theory of time, the gaining/losing of

Aristotle (Physics 2.3) famously identified four kinds of causes: efficient

pre-existence of quantum field (for example) would be a causally necessary

In this book, unless otherwise specified, ‘uncaused’ is understood in

to show that causes must involve the transformation of already existing

1 Introducing the Quest for an Explanation 1

2 Causation and Laws of Nature 37

3 Arguments for the Causal Principle 71

4 Fine-Tuning and Order of our Universe141

5 Arguments for a First Cause195

5.5 The Argument from the Viciousness of Dependence

6 What the First Cause Is247

Fig. 5.1 Bounce Cosmology with entropy reversal 198

1.2 A Review of the Discussion

intelligence, which may not carry over to hypotheses involving non-

1.3 Problems with Scientism

1.4 Problems with Verificationism

1.5 In Defence of the Possibility of a Priori

1.7 Reply to Empiricist Objections

1.8 Conclusion and Overview

• the capacity to be the originator of the event in a way that is un-

3.3 Against 1.1.1. Brute Fact

3.4 Against 1.1.2. Abstract Entities

3.5 Against 1.1.3.1 S is a Property of x

The same reasoning applies to God. God is supposed to have always-