INTRODUCTION

Many people find Nietzsche and morality to be an unusual pair. He was undoubtedly
absent from conventional philosophy courses on ethics until very recently because of all his
controversial views—or perhaps because they proved to be all too demanding. Whoever inquires,
"What is the essence of good? He doesn't have anything to say other than the fact that they're
asking the incorrect thing. Nietzsche is an anti-realist when it comes to values; in his view, there
are no moral realities and nothing in nature that is valuable in and of itself. Speaking of good or
evil instead is speaking about human delusions, of lies that we feel are vital to living by. "A man
has to augment reality with an ideal world of his fabrication," he says in his statement.

That is to say, even though the universe is neither good nor bad in and of itself, we are
forced by our biological natures to view it through moral lenses and judge it accordingly. While
moral codes might be seen as means for attaining certain goals, no moral code sees itself in that
sense, which is part of what Nietzsche objected to about them earlier. According to this
intrinsicist use of the term "morality," Rand would also be rejecting Nietzsche's usage of the
term, which he defined as "a rule which considers itself as demanding something absolutely, and
not as a means to some other aim."

EXPOSITTION OF NIETZSCHE’S IDEA

According to Caldwell (2001), Nietzsche is a naturalist and a determinist first and

foremost, much like Spinoza before him. Whereas other authors talk of the freedom of the
human will, Nietzsche teaches us that the will is not free nor unfree, but rather powerful or weak.
We are not privileged over other creatures; rather, like them, we are part of "a causal web that
embraces the whole cosmos." In several other key works, Nietzsche embraces science as offering
access to what he sees as the real world of nature - whereas our religious, moral, and aesthetic
sentiments belong only to the surface of things. Nietzsche's The Genealogy of Morals is an
exercise in 'animal psychology,' studying "the physiology and evolutionary history of organisms
and concepts."
 To what extent we can live in truth and not an error is another matter, of course; in some
moods, Nietzsche praises the value of art precisely because it shields us from reality. Nietzsche
believed that the need to see the universe as existing for the sake of humans results in the
creation of a merely apparent world, which he called "the value-laden world as an error." He
challenges us not to be in vain. However, a major goal of his books is to dispel our illusions, not
the least of which is the false belief that we are logical beings.

In this regard, Potts’ particularly insightful passage from Nietzsche's Twilight of the
Idols, "The 'Improvers' of Mankind," is worth examining. The passage discusses a master
morality that Nietzsche finds objectionable, which is something I wouldn't have thought was
possible. As described in the Manu text, this is the Hindu moral code. When the higher echelons
impose a caste system on the lower ones, it is master morality. However, this specific rule seeks
to nurture the four castes as distinct races, and as such, abhors any intercaste mating. Nietzsche
considers this awful, but I'm not sure why he thinks it's bad that "chandalas," the offspring of
such interbreeding, are treated horribly in an effort to drive them out of society. Thus, Nietzsche
only rejects one part of this master morality—its breeding program—and it is intriguing to see
him categorically reject the idea of "pure blood” (Potts, 2011).

ARGUEMENTS

According to Leiter (2020), In order to demonstrate that we are not causa sui, Nietzsche
presents two different types of arguements. He says little about the first point, other than to assert
that "the concept of a causa sui is something fundamentally absurd" and that it is "the best self-
contradiction that has been conceived so far...a sort of rape and perversion of logic," such that
this desire for "freedom of the will" in the superlative metaphysical sense, nothing less than
becoming this causa sui and pulling oneself up by the hair out of the marshes of nothingness is
required to take responsibility for one's deeds and to exonerate God, the world, ancestors,
chance, and society. Nietzsche believed that we behave like other animals, mostly out of instinct.
But compared to such instincts, the gift of reason came much later and is only marginally more
effective. Nietzsche gives us a picture of a split-up self: every one of us is a battlefield for
warring biological urges without a master controller in command. The ego, the superego, and the
id are all battles that take place within the human body, according to Freud, a Nietzsche scholar,
and lover. Daniel Dennett takes things a step further by offering us a "pandemonium" picture of
the human mind based on neuroscience studies. According to Dennett, the self is created from a
variety of "many drafts" of reality that may be thought of as a form of "fiction."

Dennett notes how closely his "fictional ego" resembles Nietzsche's ideas. Even a
"fictional" self, though, is nevertheless capable of making choices and is not only a passive
receiver of experience. Nietzsche's advice to "live dangerously" or "multiply views" seems ad
hoc in this situation. His willingness to lay forth guidelines for how we should behave creates a
contradiction between his work's morality deconstruction and his willingness to do so. Even
though the significance and worth of various normative systems change significantly over time,
Nietzsche argues that all normative systems that play a function similar to the one we connect
with "morality" have a few fundamental traits.

In particular, all normative systems have both descriptive and normative components in
that they (a) presuppose a specific descriptive account of people and human agency in the sense
that for the normative claims comprising the system to have an understandable application to
people, specific metaphysical and empirical claims about people and agency must be true; and
(b) the system's norms favor the interests of some people, frequently any specific morality, in
turn, will only be the target of Nietzsche's critique.

CONCLUSION

The passage's overall idea—that "there are entirely no moral facts"—is what I find most
intriguing. Morality, according to Nietzsche, is only an interpretation that is transformed into
reality by culture. This is in line with the GM Essay 1 thesis, which holds that morals are the
manifestation of the numerous psychologies that give rise to them. Nietzsche's philosophy of
morality as well as any other moral system that a future Zarathustra may devise have no
substance outside of the bias of those who advocate it. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
Nietzsche does not appear to have a core interest in formulating laws or principles that would
enable modern people to behave better.
 Instead, improving individuals is what he is most concerned with. His attention seems to
be on a future guy rather than his actions now. Nietzsche, however, does not limit his critiques of
morality to a specific individual or a socially, philosophically, historically, or socially
constrained example. Therefore, it is insufficient to claim that he just criticizes utilitarian
morality, Christian morality, Kantian morality, or European morality, although he occasionally
criticizes all of these. To fully understand the breadth of his critique, it is necessary to determine
what morality, in Nietzsche's derogatory meaning, is like morality as the object of his critique.

The higher man feels awe and respect for himself because he is aware of the monumental
task that is before him and the greatness that resides within him. He affirms life even in the face
of extreme suffering by being "a proud and well-turned-out human being who says Yes, who is
sure of the future, who guarantees the future."

REFERENCES

 Caldwell, R. (2001). Nietzsche and morality | Issue 70 | Philosophy now. Philosophy

Now | a magazine of ideas. https://philosophynow.org/issues/70/Nietzsche_and_Morality

 Potts, D. L. (2011, March 7). Does Nietzsche believe in morality? The Atlas Society |
Ayn Rand, Objectivism, Atlas Shrugged. https://www.atlassociety.org/post/does-
nietzsche-believe-in-morality

 Leiter, B. (2021). Nietzsche’s moral and political philosophy (Stanford encyclopedia of

philosophy). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche-moral-political/#ScopCritMoraPejoSens

 Academy of Ideas. (2017, January 30). Nietzsche and morality: The higher man and the
herd. Academy of Ideas | Free Minds for a Free Society.
https://academyofideas.com/2017/01/nietzsche-and-morality/