The 

Soviet invasion of Manchuria, formally known as the Manchurian strategic

offensive operation (Russian: Манчжурская стратегическая наступательная
операция, romanized: Manchzhurskaya Strategicheskaya Nastupatelnaya Operatsiya) or
simply the Manchurian operation (Маньчжурская операция), began on 9 August
1945 with the Soviet invasion of the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo. It was the
largest campaign of the 1945 Soviet–Japanese War, which resumed hostilities between
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Empire of Japan after almost six years
of peace. Since 1983, the operation has sometimes been called Operation August
Storm after U.S. Army historian David Glantz used this title for a paper on the subject.[1]
Soviet gains on the continent were Manchukuo, Mengjiang (the northeast section of
present-day Inner Mongolia) and northern Korea. The Soviet entry into the war and the
defeat of the Kwantung Army was a significant factor in the Japanese government's
decision to surrender unconditionally, as it became apparent that the Soviet Union had
no intention of acting as a third party in negotiating an end to hostilities on conditional
terms.[1][2][14][15][16][17][18][19]

Summary[edit]
Main article: Soviet–Japanese War §  Summary
As agreed with the United Kingdom and the United States (Western Allies) at
the Tehran Conference in November 1943 and the Yalta Conference in February 1945,
the Soviet Union entered World War II's Pacific Theater within three months of the end
of the war in Europe. The invasion began on 9 August 1945, exactly three months after
the German surrender on May 8 (9 May, 0:43 Moscow time).
Although the commencement of the invasion fell between the American atomic bombing
of Hiroshima, on 6 August, and only hours before the Nagasaki bombing on 9 August,
the timing of the invasion had been planned well in advance and was determined by the
timing of the agreements at Tehran and Yalta, the long-term buildup of Soviet forces in
the Far East since Tehran, and the date of the German surrender some three months
earlier; on August 3, Marshal Vasilevsky reported to Premier Joseph Stalin that, if
necessary, he could attack on the morning of 5 August.
At 11 p.m. Trans-Baikal (UTC+10) time on 8 August 1945, Soviet foreign
minister Vyacheslav Molotov informed Japanese ambassador Naotake Satō that the
Soviet Union had declared war on Japan, and that from 9 August the Soviet government
would consider itself to be at war with Japan.[20] At one minute past midnight Trans-
Baikal time on 9 August 1945, the Soviets commenced their invasion simultaneously on
three fronts to the east, west and north of Manchuria:

 Khingan–Mukden offensive operation (9 August 1945 – 2 September 1945)

(Lesser Khingan-Mukden area);
 Harbin–Kirin offensive operation (9 August 1945 – 2 September 1945)
(Harbin-Jilin area); and
 Sungari offensive operation (9 August 1945 – 2 September 1945).
Though the battle extended beyond the borders traditionally known as Manchuria—that
is, the traditional lands of the Manchus—the coordinated and integrated invasions of
Japan's northern territories has also been called the Battle of Manchuria.[21] It has also
been referred to as the Manchurian strategic offensive operation.[22]

Background and buildup[edit]

Main article: Soviet–Japanese War §  Background and buildup
See also: End of World War II in Asia
The Russo-Japanese War of the early 20th century resulted in a Japanese victory and
the Treaty of Portsmouth by which, in conjunction with other later events including
the Mukden Incident and Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September 1931, Japan
eventually gained control of Korea, Manchuria and South Sakhalin. In the late 1930s
there were a number of Soviet-Japanese border incidents, the most significant being
the Battle of Lake Khasan (Changkufeng Incident, July–August 1938) and the Battle of
Khalkhin Gol (Nomonhan Incident, May–September 1939), which led to the Soviet–
Japanese Neutrality Pact[23][24] of April 1941. The Neutrality Pact freed up forces from the
border incidents and enabled the Soviets to concentrate on their war with Germany, and
the Japanese to concentrate on their southern expansion into Asia and the Pacific
Ocean.
With success at Stalingrad, and the eventual defeat of Germany becoming increasingly
certain, the Soviet attitude to Japan changed, both publicly, with Stalin making
speeches denouncing Japan, and "privately", with the Soviets building up forces and
supplies in the Far East. At the Tehran Conference (November 1943), amongst other
things, Stalin, Winston Churchill, and Franklin Roosevelt agreed that the Soviet Union
would enter the war against Japan once Germany was defeated. Stalin faced a
dilemma: he wanted to avoid a two-front war at almost any cost yet the Soviet leader
also wanted to extract gains in the Far East as well as Europe. The only way Stalin
could make Far Eastern gains without a two-front war would be for Germany to
capitulate before Japan.
Due to the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact, the Soviets made it policy to intern Allied
aircrews who landed in Soviet territory following operations against Japan, although
airmen held in the Soviet Union under such circumstances were usually allowed to
"escape" after some period of time.[25] Nevertheless, even before the defeat of Germany
the Soviet buildup in the Far East steadily accelerated. By early 1945 it had become
apparent to the Japanese that the Soviets were preparing to invade Manchuria, though
they were unlikely to attack prior to Germany's defeat. In addition to their problems in
the Pacific, the Japanese realised they needed to determine when and where a Soviet
invasion would occur.
At the Yalta Conference (February 1945), amongst other things, Stalin secured from
Roosevelt the promise of Stalin's Far Eastern territorial desires, in return for agreeing to
enter the Pacific War within two or three months of the defeat of Germany. By the
middle of March 1945, things were not going well in the Pacific for the Japanese, and
they withdrew their elite troops from Manchuria to support actions in the Pacific.
Meanwhile, the Soviets continued their Far Eastern buildup. The Soviets had decided
that they did not wish to renew the Neutrality Pact. The terms of the Neutrality Pact
required that 12 months before its expiry, the Soviets must advise the Japanese of this,
so on 5 April 1945 they informed the Japanese that they did not wish to renew the
treaty.[26] This caused the Japanese considerable concern,[27][28] but the Soviets went to
great efforts to assure the Japanese that the treaty would still be in force for another
twelve months, and that the Japanese had nothing to worry about.[29]
On 9 May 1945 (Moscow time), Germany surrendered, meaning that if the Soviets were
to honour the Yalta agreement, they would need to enter war with Japan by 9 August
1945. The situation continued to deteriorate for the Japanese, and they were now the
only Axis power left in the war. They were keen to remain at peace with the Soviets and
extend the Neutrality Pact,[29] and they were also keen to achieve an end to the war.
Since Yalta they had repeatedly approached, or tried to approach, the Soviets in order
to extend the Neutrality Pact, and to enlist the Soviets in negotiating peace with the
Western Allies. The Soviets did nothing to discourage these Japanese hopes, and drew
the process out as long as possible (whilst continuing to prepare their invasion forces).
[29]
 One of the roles of the Cabinet of Admiral Baron Suzuki, which took office in April
1945, was to try to secure any peace terms short of unconditional surrender.[30] In late
June, they approached the Soviets (the Neutrality Pact was still in place), inviting them
to negotiate peace with the Western Allies in support of Japan, providing them with
specific proposals and in return they offered the Soviets very attractive territorial
concessions. Stalin expressed interest, and the Japanese awaited the Soviet response.
The Soviets continued to avoid providing a response. The Potsdam Conference was
held from 16 July to 2 August 1945. On 24 July the Soviet Union recalled all embassy
staff and families from Japan. On 26 July the conference produced the Potsdam
Declaration whereby Churchill, Harry S. Truman and Chiang Kai-shek (the Soviet Union
was not officially at war with Japan) demanded the unconditional surrender of Japan.
The Japanese continued to wait for the Soviet response, and avoided responding to the
declaration.[29]
The Japanese had been monitoring Trans-Siberian Railway traffic and Soviet activity to
the east of Manchuria and in conjunction with the Soviet delaying tactics, this suggested
to them that the Soviets would not be ready to invade east Manchuria before the end of
August. They did not have any real idea, and no confirming evidence, as to when or
where any invasion would occur.[15] They had estimated that an attack was not likely in
August 1945 or before Spring 1946; but the Stavka had planned for a mid-August 1945
offensive and had concealed the buildup of a force of 90 divisions. Many had crossed
Siberia in their vehicles to avoid straining the rail link.[31]
The Japanese were caught completely by surprise when the Soviets declared war an
hour before midnight on 8 August 1945, and invaded simultaneously on three fronts just
after midnight on 9 August.

Combatant forces[edit]
Soviets[edit]
The Far East Command,[2] under Marshal of the Soviet Union Aleksandr Vasilevsky, had
a plan to conquer Manchuria that was simple but huge in scale,[1] calling for a
massive pincer movement over all of Manchuria. This was to be performed by
the Transbaikal Front from the west and by the 1st Far Eastern Front from the east;
the 2nd Far Eastern Front was to attack the center of the pocket from the north.[2] The
only Soviet equivalent of a theater command that operated during the war (apart from
the short-lived 1941 "Directions" in the west), Far East Command, consisted of
three Red Army fronts.
Transbaikal Front[edit]

Basic map showing the Soviet invasion plan for Manchuria[2]

The Transbaikal Front, under Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, included:[1]

 17th Army
 36th Army
 39th Army
 53rd Army
 6th Guards Tank Army
 Soviet Mongolian Cavalry Mechanized Group under Issa Pliyev
 12th Air Army.
The Transbaikal Front was to form the western half of the Soviet pincer movement,
attacking across the Inner Mongolian desert and over the Greater Khingan mountains.
[2]
 These forces had as their objectives firstly to secure Mukden (present day Shenyang),
then to meet troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front at the Changchun area in south central
Manchuria,[1] and in doing so finish the double envelopment.[1]
Amassing over one thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, the 6th Guards Tank
Army was to serve as an armored spearhead, leading the Front's advance and
capturing objectives 350 km (220 mi) inside Manchuria by the fifth day of the invasion.[1]
The 36th Army was also attacking from the west, but with the objective of meeting
forces of the 2nd Far Eastern Front at Harbin and Tsitsihar.[2]
1st Far Eastern Front[edit]
The 1st Far Eastern Front, under Marshal Kirill Meretskov, included:[1]

 1st Red Banner Army

 5th Army
 25th Army
 35th Army
 10th Mechanized Corps
 9th Air Army.
The 1st Far Eastern Front was to form the eastern half of the pincer movement. This
attack involved the 1st Red Banner Army, the 5th Army and the 10th Mechanized
Corps striking towards Mudanjiang (or Mutanchiang).[1] Once that city was captured, this
force was to advance towards the cities of Jilin (or Kirin), Changchun and Harbin.[1] Its
final objective was to link up with the forces of the Transbaikal Front at Changchun and
Jilin thus closing the double envelopment movement.
As a secondary objective, the 1st Far Eastern Front was to prevent Japanese forces
from escaping to Korea, and then invade the Korean Peninsula up to the 38th parallel,
[1]
 establishing in the process what later became North Korea. This secondary objective
was to be carried out by the 25th Army.[1] Meanwhile, the 35th Army was tasked with
capturing the cities of Boli (or Poli), Linkou and Mishan.[1]
2nd Far Eastern Front[edit]
The 2nd Far Eastern Front, under General Maksim Purkayev, included:[1]

 2nd Red Banner Army

 15th Army
 16th Army (whose 56th Rifle Corps was its only formation to see combat,
on South Sakhalin)
 5th Separate Rifle Corps
 Chuguevsk Operational Group
 Amur Military Flotilla
 10th Air Army
The 2nd Far Eastern Front was deployed in a supporting attack role.[1] Its objectives
were the cities of Harbin and Tsitsihar,[2] and to prevent an orderly withdrawal to the
south by the Japanese forces.[1] The front also included the 88th Separate Rifle Brigade,
composed of Chinese and Korean guerrillas of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United
Army who had retreated into the USSR in the beginning of the 1940s. The unit, led
by Zhou Baozhong, was set to participate in the invasion for use in sabotage and
reconnaissance missions, but was considered too valuable to be sent into the
battlefield. They were thus withheld from participating in combat and instead used for
leadership and administrative positions for district offices and police stations in the
liberated areas during the subsequent occupation.[32] The Korean battalion of the brigade
(including future leader of the DPRK, Kim Il-sung) were also sent to assist in the
following occupation of Northern Korea as part of the 1st Far Eastern Front.[32]
Once troops from the 1st Far Eastern Front and Transbaikal Front captured the city of
Changchun, the 2nd Far Eastern Front was to attack the Liaotung Peninsula and seize
Port Arthur (present day Lüshun).[1]

Soviet forces under the Far East Command[1]

Transbaikal 1st Far East 2nd Far East

Total
Front Front Front

Men 1,577,725 654,040 586,589 337,096

Artillery pieces 27,086 9,668 11,430 5,988

Multiple rocket launchers 1,171 583 516 72

Tanks and self-propelled guns 5,556[h] 2,416 1,860 1,280

Aircraft 3,721 1,324 1,137 1,260

Each front had "front units" attached directly to the front instead of an army.[1] The forces
totaled 89 divisions with 1.5 million men, 3,704 tanks, 1,852 self propelled guns, 85,819
vehicles and 3,721 aircraft. Approximately one-third of its strength was in combat
support and services.[1] The Soviet plan incorporated all of the experience in maneuver
warfare that they had acquired in fighting the Germans.[1]
Japanese[edit]
The Kwantung Army of the Imperial Japanese Army, under General Otozo Yamada,
was the major part of the Japanese occupation forces in Manchuria and Korea, and
consisted of two Area Armies and three independent armies:[1]

 First Area Army (northeastern Manchukuo), including:

o 3rd Army
o 5th Army
 Third Area Army (southwestern Manchukuo), including:
o 30th Army
o 44th Army
 Independent units:
o 4th Army (an independent field army responsible for northern
Manchuria)
 o 34th Army (an independent field army responsible for the areas
between the Third and Seventeenth Area Armies in northern
Korea)
o Seventeenth Area Army (responsible for Korea; assigned to the
Kwantung Army at the eleventh hour, to no avail)
Each Area Army (Homen Gun, the equivalent of a Western "army") had headquarters
units and units attached directly to the Area Army, in addition to the field armies (the
equivalent of a Western corps). In addition, the Japanese were assisted by the forces of
their puppet states of Manchukuo and Mengjiang. Manchukuo had an army of about
170,000 to 200,000 troops, while Mengjiang had around 44,000 troops, with the majority
of these puppet troops being of dubious quality.[citation needed] Korea, the next target for the
Soviet Far East Command, was garrisoned by the Japanese Seventeenth Area Army.
[citation needed]

An IJA Type 95 Ha-Go of the Manchuria Tank School

Including the Japanese forces in Korea, the Kwantung Army had over 900,000 men in
31 divisions and 13 brigades; there were about 400 obsolescent tanks and 2,000
aircraft (of the 1040 aircraft in Manchuria, only 230 were combat types and 55 were
modern[33]).[34] However, the Kwantung Army was far below its authorized strength; most
of its heavy equipment and all of its best military units had transferred to the Pacific
Theater over the previous three years to contend with the advance of American forces.
Some Kwantung Army units had also re-deployed south against the Nationalist
Chinese in Operation Ichigo in 1944. By 1945 the Kwantung Army contained a large
number of raw recruits and conscripts, with generally obsolete, light, or otherwise limited
equipment. Almost all of the tanks were early 1930s models such as the Type 95 Ha-
Go and Type 89 I-Go, the anti-tank units only possessed Type 1 37 mm anti-tank
guns that were ineffective against Soviet armor, and the infantry had very few machine-
guns and no anti-materiel rifles or submachine guns. As a result, the Japanese forces in
Manchuria and Korea had essentially been reduced to a light-infantry counter-
insurgency force with limited mobility and limited ability to fight a conventional land war
against a coordinated enemy. In fact, only six of the Kwantung Army's divisions existed
prior to January 1945. Accordingly, the Japanese regarded none of the Kwantung
Army's units as combat ready, with some units being declared less than 15% ready.[35]
The Imperial Japanese Navy did not contribute to the defense of Manchuria, the
occupation of which it had always opposed on strategic grounds. Additionally, by the
time of the Soviet invasion, the few remnants of its fleet were stationed and tasked for
the defense of the Japanese home islands in the event of an invasion by American
forces.
Compounding their problems, the Japanese military made many wrong assumptions
and major mistakes, most significantly:

 They wrongly assumed that any attack coming from the west would follow
either the old railway line to Hailar, or head into Solun from the eastern tip of
Mongolia. The Soviets did attack along those routes, but their main attack
from the west went through the supposedly impassable Greater Khingan
range south of Solun and into the center of Manchuria.
 Japanese military intelligence failed to determine the nature, location and
scale of the Soviet buildup in the Soviet Far East. Based upon an initial
underestimation of Soviet strength and on the monitoring of Soviet traffic on
the Trans-Siberian railway, the Japanese believed that the Soviets would not
have sufficient forces in place for an offensive before the end of August 1945,
and that an attack was most likely in the autumn of 1945 or in the spring of
1946.
Due to the withdrawal of the Kwantung Army's elite forces for redeployment into the
Pacific Theater, the Japanese made new operational plans during the summer of 1945
for the defence of Manchuria against a seemingly inevitable Soviet attack. These called
for redeploying the bulk of available forces from the border areas; the borders were to
be held lightly and delaying actions were to be fought while the main force was to hold
the southeastern corner in strength (so defending Korea from attack).[14]
Further, the Japanese had observed Soviet activity only on the Trans-Siberian railway
and along the east Manchurian front, and accordingly prepared for an invasion from the
east. They believed that when an attack occurred from the west, the redeployed forces
would be able to deal with it.[14][15]
Although the Japanese redeployment in Manchukuo had begun, it was not due for
completion until September 1945, and hence the Kwantung Army was in the midst of
redeploying when the Soviets launched their attack simultaneously on all three fronts.

Campaign[edit]
See also: Battle of Mutanchiang
Manchurian offensive

The operation was carried out as a classic double pincer movement over an area the
size of the entire Western European theatre of World War II. In the western pincer, the
Red Army advanced over the deserts and mountains from Mongolia, far from their
resupply railways. This confounded the Japanese military analysis of Soviet logistics,
and the defenders were caught by surprise in unfortified positions. The Kwantung Army
commanders were engaged in a planning exercise at the time of the invasion, and were
away from their forces for the first eighteen hours of conflict.
Japanese communication infrastructure was poor, and the Japanese lost
communication with forward units very early on. However, the Kwantung Army had a
formidable reputation as fierce and relentless fighters, and even though understrength
and unprepared, put up strong resistance at the town of Hailar which tied down some of
the Soviet forces. The Japanese defenders held out until 18 August, when 3,827
survivors surrendered.[36] At the same time, Soviet airborne units seized airfields and city
centers in advance of the land forces, and aircraft ferried fuel to those units that had
outrun their supply lines.
Due to Japanese 37mm and 47mm anti-tank guns being only suitable for fighting light
Soviet tanks, Japanese forces decided to use suicide bomber squads strapped with
grenades and explosives as their main improvised anti-tank weapon.[37][38]
There are some reports that Japanese Army aviation were using kamikaze planes to
attempt to stop the Soviet advance.[39][40][41]
Nevertheless, the prospect of a quick defeat to the Japanese Army seemed far from
clear. Given the fanatical and sometimes suicidal resistance put up by the Japanese
forces similar in April-June 1945 Battle of Okinawa, there was every reason to believe
that a long, difficult campaign for the capture of the last remaining Japanese fortified
areas was expected. In some parts of the Soviet offensive these expectations were
fulfilled.[42]
The Soviet pincer from the East crossed the Ussuri and advanced around Khanka
Lake and attacked towards Suifenhe, and although Japanese defenders fought hard
and provided strong resistance, the Soviets proved overwhelming.
Soviet troops crossing into Manchuria, 9 August 1945

After a week of fighting, during which time Soviet forces had penetrated deep into
Manchukuo, Japan's Emperor Hirohito recorded the Gyokuon-hōsō which was
broadcast on radio to the Japanese nation on 15 August 1945. It made no direct
reference to a surrender of Japan, instead stating that the government had been
instructed to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration fully. This created confusion
in the minds of many listeners who were not sure if Japan had surrendered. The poor
audio quality of the radio broadcast, as well as the formal courtly language in which the
speech was composed, worsened the confusion.
The Imperial Japanese Army Headquarters did not immediately communicate the
cease-fire order to the Kwantung Army, and many elements of the army either did not
understand it, or ignored it. Hence, pockets of fierce resistance from the Kwantung
Army continued, and the Soviets continued their advance, largely avoiding the pockets
of resistance, reaching Mukden, Changchun and Qiqihar by 20 August. The cease-fire
order was eventually communicated to the Kwantung Army, but not before the Soviets
had made most of their territorial gains.

Soviet troops enter the city of Harbin following its liberation on 21 August 1945

On the Soviet right flank, the Soviet-Mongolian Cavalry-Mechanized Group entered

Inner Mongolia and quickly took Dolon Nur and Kalgan. The Emperor of Manchukuo
(and former Emperor of China), Puyi, was captured by the Red Army.
On August 18, several Soviet amphibious landings were conducted ahead of the land
advance: three landings in northern Korea, one landing in South Sakhalin, and one
landing in the Kuril Islands. This meant that, in Korea at least, there were already Soviet
soldiers waiting for the troops coming overland. In South Sakhalin and the Kurils, it
meant a sudden establishment of Soviet sovereignty.
The land advance was stopped a good distance short of the Yalu River, the start of the
Korean Peninsula, when even aerial supply became unavailable. The forces already in
Korea were able to establish control in the peninsula's northern area. In accordance
with arrangements made earlier with the American government to divide the Korean
Peninsula, Soviet forces stopped at the 38th parallel, leaving the Japanese still in
control of the southern part of the peninsula. Later, on 8 September 1945, American
forces landed at Incheon.

Aftermath[edit]
See also: Soviet–Japanese War §  Importance and consequences, and Khabarovsk
War Crime Trials

Soviet Red Army Martyrs Cemetery built in Manzhouli after the war

The invasion of Manchuria was a factor that contributed to the surrender of Japan and
the end of World War II. In addition, the Soviet occupation of Manchuria, along with the
northern portions of the Korean Peninsula, allowed for those regions to be transferred
by the Soviet Union into the control of local communists. The control of these regions by
communist governments backed by Soviet authorities would be a factor in the rise of the
Chinese Communists and shape the political conflict of the Korean War.
Several thousand Japanese who were sent as colonizers to Manchukuo and Inner
Mongolia were left behind in China. The majority of Japanese left behind in China were
women, and these Japanese women mostly married Chinese men and became known
as "stranded war wives" (zanryu fujin).[43][44] Because they had children fathered by
Chinese men, Japanese women were not allowed to bring their Chinese families back
with them to Japan, so most of them stayed. Japanese law only allowed children
fathered by Japanese fathers to become Japanese citizens.
In late 1949, numerous members of the former Kwantung Army who had been captured
in the Soviet invasion of Manchuria were convicted in connection with the activities
of Unit 731, and related units for their connections with crimes against humanity and the
use of chemical and biological weapons.[45]

War crimes[edit]
Further information: Gegenmiao massacre and Soviet war crimes
During the invasion of Manchuria, Soviet soldiers killed and raped Japanese civilians.
[46]
 The most famous example was the Gegenmiao massacre, Soviet soldiers from an
armoured unit massacred over one thousand Japanese women and children.[47] Property
of the Japanese were also looted by the Soviet troops.[46] Soviet forces responsible for
the massacre had carried out the same crimes against civilians in East Prussia.[47]
According to Soviet historian Vyacheslav Zimonin, many Japanese settlers committed
mass suicide as the Red Army approached. Mothers were forced by Japanese military
to kill their own children before killing or being killed themselves.[48] The Japanese army
often took part in the killings of its civilians. The commander of the 5th Japanese Army,
General Shimizu, commented that "each nation lives and dies by its own laws."
Wounded Japanese soldiers who were incapable of moving on their own were often left
to die as the army retreated.[48]
British and U.S. reports indicate that the Soviet troops that occupied Manchuria (about
700,000) also looted and terrorized the local people of Mukden and were not
discouraged by Soviet authorities from "three days of rape and pillage". In Harbin,
Soviet forces ignored protests from Chinese Communist Party leaders on the mass rape
and looting.[49][50][51][52][53][54] There were several incidents in which Chinese police forces in
Manchuria arrested or even killed Soviet troops for committing various crimes, leading
to some conflicts between the Soviet and Chinese authorities in Manchuria.[55]
During the Soviet occupation of North Korea, it was also reported that Soviet soldiers
also committed rape against both Japanese and Korean women alike in the northern
half of the Korean peninsula.[56][57] Soviet soldiers also looted the property of both
Japanese and Koreans living in northern Korea.[58] The Soviets laid claim to Japanese
enterprises in Manchuria and northern Korea and took valuable materials and industrial
equipment.[49][58]
Konstantin Asmolov of the Center for Korean Research of the Russian Academy of
Sciences dismisses Western accounts of Soviet violence against civilians in the Far
East as exaggeration and rumor and contends that accusations of mass crimes by the
Red Army inappropriately extrapolate isolated incidents regarding the nearly 2,000,000
Soviet troops in the Far East into mass crimes. According to him, such accusations are
refuted by the documents of the time, from which it is clear that such crimes were far
less of a problem than in Germany. Asmolov further asserts that the Soviets prosecuted
their perpetrators while prosecution of German and Japanese "rapists and looters" in
WWII was virtually unknown.[59][neutrality  is  disputed]

See also[edit]
 Foreign interventions by the Soviet Union
 Japanese settlers in Manchuria
 Military history of Japan
 Military history of the Soviet Union
 Mongolia in World War II
 Outer Manchuria
 Russian invasion of Manchuria
 Soviet invasion of Xinjiang
 War crimes in Manchukuo
Explanatory notes[edit]
1. ^ Combined with the 34th Army in northern Korea, the Kwantung Army had 713,729 troops.[1][3]
[5]

2. ^ Of this total, 188 were fighters, 9 bombers, 27 reconnaissance, 8 transports, and 810
trainers.
3. ^ There was one tank regiment, the 12th, in Northern Korea at that time.
4. ^ Coox, Alvin D. Nomonhan; Japan Against Russia, 1939. 1985; 2 volumes. Stanford
University Press. ISBN 0-8047-1160-7. Page 1176. 21,389 dead is from Japanese medical
records; the Soviets claimed that the number of Japanese dead numbered 83,737. This
number does not count POWs who died due to mistreatment in camps after the war.
5. ^ After the war, the number of Japanese soldiers and amounts of materiel in Soviet
possession are as follows: 594,000–609,000 POWs, 861–925 aircraft, 369–600 tanks, 2,576–
3,704 guns and mortars, and 2,129–2,300 other vehicles[10]
6. ^ Coox, Alvin D. Nomonhan; Japan Against Russia, 1939. 1985; 2 volumes. Stanford
University Press. ISBN 0-8047-1160-7. Page 1176. 21,389 dead is from Japanese medical
records; the Soviets claimed that the number of Japanese dead numbered 83,737. This
number does not count POWs who died due to mistreatment in camps after the war.
7. ^ After the war, the number of Japanese soldiers and amounts of materiel in Soviet
possession are as follows: 594,000–609,000 POWs, 861–925 aircraft, 369–600 tanks, 2,576–
3,704 guns and mortars, and 2,129–2,300 other vehicles[10]
8. ^ Soviet sources give 4,841 tanks and 1,393 self-propelled guns as fit for service on 5 August
1945 in the Far East. These were a most varied fleet to be found anywhere, and included pre-
war BT-5 fast tanks alongside IS-2 heavy tanks and Lend-Lease Sherman M4A2 tanks.

References[edit]
1. ^ Jump up to:a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa LTC David M. Glantz (February 1983), "August
Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria". Leavenworth Papers No. 7,
Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth Kansas.
2. ^ Jump up to:a b c d e f g h "Battlefield Manchuria – The Forgotten Victory", Battlefield, 2001, 98
minutes.
3. ^ Jump up to:a b Glantz, David M. & House, Jonathan (1995), When Titans Clashed: How the
Red Army Stopped Hitler, Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, ISBN 0-7006-
0899-0, p. 378
4. ^ Jump up to:a b AJRP: Dispositions and Deaths Retrieved 5/3/2021
5. ^ p. 230
6. ^ I. B. Moschanskiy, "West - East", Ch. 12, "Разгром Квантунской армии". Retrieved
5/3/2021. Japanese AFV losses in combat were relatively light.
7. ^ Jump up to:a b SCAP, "Final Report: Progress of Demobilization of the Japanese Armed
Forces, 30 December 1946" Part IV, inclosure no. 51. Retrieved 4/23/2021
8. ^ Jowett, p. 53.
9. ^ "Russia and USSR in Wars of the 20th Century". И.И.Ивлев. Archived from  the original on
5 May 2008. Retrieved  11 July 2008.. Total casualties of the three fronts, excluding the
Pacific Fleet involved in the invasions of the Kuriles and South Sakhalin.
10. ^ Jump up to:a b c Coox, Alvin D. Nomonhan; Japan Against Russia, 1939. 1985; 2
volumes. Stanford University Press. ISBN 0-8047-1160-7. Page 1176.
11. ^ Glantz, David (2004). Soviet Operational and Tactical Combat in Manchuria, 1945: 'August
Storm'. Routledge. Page 124.
12. ^ "Russia and USSR in Wars of the 20th Century". И.И.Ивлев. Archived from  the original on
5 May 2008. Retrieved  11 July 2008.
13. ^ Australian War Memorial. "Australia-Japan Research Project: Dispositions and deaths".
Citing figures of the Relief Bureau of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, March 1964. Total
dead in Manchuria are given as 45,900 for the IJA, but this includes the earlier Soviet-
 Japanese border conflicts (c. 10,000 deaths), soldiers killed by Chinese Northeast Anti-
Japanese United Army and Chinese Anti-Japanese volunteer armies in the Manchurian
insurgency (c. 15,000 deaths), and POW deaths after the war.
14. ^ Jump up to:a b c Hayashi, S. (1955). Vol. XIII – Study of Strategic and Tactical peculiarities of
Far Eastern Russia and Soviet Far East Forces. Japanese Special Studies on Manchuria.
Tokyo, Military History Section, Headquarters, Army Forces Far East, US Army.
15. ^ Jump up to:a b c Drea, E. J. (1984). "Missing Intentions: Japanese Intelligence and the Soviet
Invasion of Manchuria, 1945".  Military Affairs. 48 (2): 66–
73.  doi:10.2307/1987650.  JSTOR  1987650.
16. ^ Robert Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender, Stanford University Press, 1954 ISBN 978-0-
8047-0460-1.
17. ^ Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire, Penguin,
2001 ISBN 978-0-14-100146-3.
18. ^ Robert James Maddox, Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism, University of
Missouri Press, 2007 ISBN 978-0-8262-1732-5.
19. ^ Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan,
Belknap Press, 2006 ISBN 0-674-01693-9.
20. ^ "Soviet Declaration of War on Japan", 8 August 1945. (Avalon Project at Yale University)
21. ^ Maurer, Herrymon, Collision of East and West, Henry Regnery, Chicago, 1951, p. 238.
22. ^ "Stalin's War on Japan".  www.armyupress.army.mil. Retrieved  2022-12-11.
23. ^ Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, April 13, 1941. (Avalon Project at Yale University)
24. ^ Declaration Regarding Mongolia, April 13, 1941. (Avalon Project at Yale University)
25. ^ Goodby, James E; Ivanov, Vladimir I; Shimotomai, Nobuo (1995). "Northern Territories" and
Beyond: Russian, Japanese, and American Perspectives. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
Publishing Group. p.  36. ISBN 027595093X.
26. ^ Soviet Denunciation of the Pact with Japan, April 5, 1945. (Avalon Project at Yale
University)
27. ^ So sorry, Mr Sato, April 1945, Time magazine.
28. ^ Russia and Japan Archived 2011-09-13 at the Wayback Machine, declassified CIA report
from April 1945.
29. ^ Jump up to:a b c d Boris Nikolaevich Slavinskiĭ, The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact: A
Diplomatic History 1941–1945, Translated by Geoffrey Jukes, 2004, Routledge. (Extracts on-
line)
30. ^ Jones, F. C. "Manchuria since 1931", 1949, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.
pg.221
31. ^ Glantz, David M. (1995).  When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. Kansas,
USA: University Press of Kansas. p. 278.  ISBN  0-7006-0899-0.
32. ^ Jump up to:a b Gavryuchenkov Yuri Fedorovich.  "Kim Il Sung". zhurnal.lib.ru. Retrieved 25
September  2019.
33. ^ Coox p. 1062
34. ^ Japanese Monographs No. 155 Record of Operations against Soviet Russia, Northern and
Western Fronts (August – September 1945)[permanent dead link] p. 270
35. ^ Glantz, "August Storm", p. 32
36. ^ Hastings, Max (2007). Nemesis: The Battle for Japan 1944-45. London: William Collins.
p. 543.
37. ^ Мерецков К. А. "На службе народу". — М.:  Политиздат, 1968.
38. ^ "August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Stragetic Offensive in Manchuria"  (PDF). Retrieved  Oct
7, 2022.
39. ^ "Японские летчики-камикадзе против Красной Армии в 1945 году" (in Russian).
Retrieved Oct 7, 2022.
40. ^ "The Soviet Invasion of Manchuria led to Japan's Greatest Defeat". Retrieved  Oct 7,  2022.
41. ^ "Soviet Invasion of Manchuria: Catching Japan Unawares". 4 October 2016. Retrieved  Oct
7, 2022.
42. ^ ""August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria. Leavenworth Papers
№7. by LTC David. M. Glantz"". Combat Studies Institute, fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1983.
Archived from  the original on 2011-08-24. Retrieved 2010-06-15.
 43. ^ Left Behind: Japan's Wartime Defeat and the Stranded Women of Manchukuo
44. ^ Mackerras 2003, p. 59.
45. ^ Sheldon H. Harris, "Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932–1945, and the
American Cover-up (rev. ed)", Routledge, 2002, p. 318.
46. ^ Jump up to:a b Tillman, Barrett (2022-04-14). When the Shooting Stopped: August 1945.
Bloomsbury Publishing. pp.  101–02.  ISBN  978-1-4728-4897-0.
47. ^ Jump up to:a b Ealey, Mark.  "An August Storm: the Soviet-Japan Endgame in the Pacific
War". Japan Focus. Retrieved 21 February 2014.
48. ^ Jump up to:a b Zimonin, Vyacheslav (1987). "The Truth and Lies About Japanese
Orphans". Far Eastern Affairs. No. 2–6. Moscow: Academy of Sciences of the USSR. p. 121.
49. ^ Jump up to:a b Jones, FC (1949). "XII. Events in Manchuria, 1945–47"  (PDF).  Manchuria
since 1931. London, Oxford University Press: Royal Institute of International Affairs. pp. 224–
5 and pp.227–9. Archived from the original  (PDF) on 19 December 2013. Retrieved 17
May 2012.
50. ^ Christian Science Monitor, 12 October 1945, Japanese armies were guilty of appalling
excesses, both in China and elsewhere, and had the Russians dealt harshly with only
Japanese nationals in Manchuria this would have appeared as just retribution. But the
indiscriminate looting and raping inflicted upon the unoffending Chinese by the Russians
naturally aroused the keenest indignation.
51. ^ Pakula, Hannah (2009). The last empress: Madame Chiang Kai-Shek and the birth of
modern China. Simon & Schuster. p. 530.  ISBN  978-1-4391-4893-8. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
52. ^ Heinzig, Dieter (2004). The Soviet Union and communist China, 1945–1950: the arduous
road to the alliance. ME Sharpe. p.  82. ISBN 0-7656-0785-9. Retrieved  2010-11-28.
53. ^ Lim, Robyn (2003).  The geopolitics of East Asia: the search for equilibrium. Psychology
Press. p.  86. ISBN 0-415-29717-6. Retrieved  2010-11-28.
54. ^ Spector, Ronald H (2008).  In the Ruins of Empire: The Japanese Surrender and the Battle
for Postwar Asia. Random House. p. 33.  ISBN  978-0-8129-6732-6. Retrieved 2010-11-28.
55. ^ Hess, Christian A. "From Colonial Jewel to Socialist Metropolis: Dalian 1895-1955"  (PDF).
56. ^ Edele, Mark (2015), Maiolo, Joseph; Bosworth, Richard (eds.), "Soviet liberations and
occupations, 1939–1949", The Cambridge History of the Second World War: Volume 2:
Politics and Ideology, The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, vol.  2, pp. 487–508, ISBN 978-1-107-03407-5, retrieved  2021-
05-09
In Korea, Red Army men also ‘committed depredations against the Japanese and Koreans, including rape and
looting, on what appears to have been a wide scale and which went quite beyond taking revenge against the
enemy and its Korean allies’

57. ^ Cumings, Bruce. "The North Wind: The Origins of the Korean War"  (PDF).
58. ^ Jump up to:    Edele, Mark (2015), Maiolo, Joseph; Bosworth, Richard (eds.), "Soviet
a b

liberations and occupations, 1939–1949",  The Cambridge History of the Second World War:
Volume 2: Politics and Ideology, The Cambridge History of the Second World War,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, vol. 2, pp.  487–508,  ISBN  978-1-107-03407-5,
retrieved 2021-05-09
Even in North Korea, ‘Japanese enterprises of military and heavy industry’ were considered ‘trophies of the
Red Army, since all these enterprises to one degree or another worked for the Japanese army’. These factories
‘must be transferred to the Soviet Union as partial payment of reparations’, as a December 1945 document put
it.

59. ^ Asmolov, Konstantin (2008). "Pobeda na Dal'nem Vostoke" [Victory in the Far East]. In

Dyukov, Aleksandr; Pyhalov, Igor (eds.).  Velikaya obolgannaya voina [The Great Slandered
War] (in Russian). Vol. 2. Moscow: Yauza. Archived from  the original on 2017-09-04.
Retrieved 2012-08-31.

 Jowett, Phillip (2005). Rays of the Rising Sun: Japan's Asian Allies 1931–45
Volume 1: China and Manchukuo. Helion and Company Ltd. ISBN 1-874622-
21-3.
 External links[edit]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to World War II Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation.

 Japanese in Manchuria and Korea following the war

show
v

e
World War II

show
v

e
Empire of Japan
Categories: 
 1945 in China
 1945 in Japan
 1945 in Mongolia
 1945 in the Japanese colonial empire
 1945 in the Soviet Union
 August 1945 events in Asia
 Battles involving Manchukuo
 Battles involving Mongolia
 Battles involving the Soviet Union
 Battles of World War II involving Japan
 Conflicts in 1945
 History of Inner Mongolia
 History of Manchuria
 Invasions by the Soviet Union
 Japan–Soviet Union relations
 Kwantung Army
 Kwantung Leased Territory
 Manchukuo
 Mengjiang
 Mongolia–Soviet Union relations
 Wars involving Manchukuo
 World War II invasions
 World War II operations and battles of the Pacific theatre
 World War II sites of the Soviet Union
 This page was last edited on 31 January 2023, at 02:36 (UTC).
 Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License 3.0; additional terms may
apply. By using this site, you agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy. Wikipedia® is a registered
trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., a non-profit organization.