234571

AKSHAY AWASTHI .

Started on Friday, 28 May 2021, 2:32 PM

State Finished
Completed on Friday, 28 May 2021, 6:29 PM
Time taken 3 hours 57 mins
Grade Not yet graded

Information

Instructions:
1. Answer any THREE (3) questions. All questions carry equal marks.
2. Permitted Materials: The Reading Materials of the Course on the Learning Platform

Response history

Step Time Action State

1 28/05/21, 14:32 Started

2 28/05/21, 18:29 Seen

3 28/05/21, 18:29 Attempt finished

Question 1

Complete

Marked out of 20.00

1. What does Rawls criticise as an intuitionistic theory of justice? How is this different from his criticism of utilitarian theories of justice? Illustrate with
examples.

Rawls criticises intuttionsim saying that since

Response history

Step Time Action State Marks

Step Time Action State Marks

1 28/05/21, 14:32 Started Not yet answered

2 28/05/21, 18:29 Saved: Rawls criticises intuttionsim saying that since Answer saved

3 28/05/21, 18:29 Attempt finished Complete

Question 2

Not answered

Marked out of 20.00

2. What is the impact of reordering Rawls' principles of justice? Illustrate how the basic structure of society may be just under one arrangement but
unjust under the other.

Response history

Step Time Action State Marks

Step Time Action State Marks

1 28/05/21, 14:32 Started Not yet answered

2 28/05/21, 18:29 Attempt finished Not answered

Question 3

Complete

Marked out of 20.00

3. Does the Hart-Dworkin debate on law as rules OR law as principles and rights affect the relationship between law and justice?

Hart and Dworkin's debate around the law as rules and law as principles is a critical one where Hart argues law to mean a combination of primary and
secondary rules whereby rules are to be followed strictly and where there are no rules to guide a decision-maker then he needs to follow strong
discretion. Dworkin argues against this position of Hart where he says in cases where there is no rule to guide our decision (which Dworkin calls as
hard cases) what is to be done in such situations.
This hard case situation has been portrayed through the vehicle in the park example whereby a signboard prohibits any vehicle to be allowed in the
park. Then in simple terms, it would result to mean that one cannot take his car or truck in the park. However, if we interpret it further then would that
definition of the vehicle also restrict any person on a tricycle, carrying his baby, or a person on roller skates? Such a situation has been described as
hard cases by Dworkin, whereby no rules can help us directly answering the problem. Dworkin asks Hart, how does he resolve that problem then?
In addition, he confronts Hart around the argument of legal obligation as made in the courts by lawyers as to legal obligation, in cases where it can be
straightforward or in other cases where cases are decided at point T2 for an act committed at point T1, when a party had no knowledge about an
obligation which it was supposed to be fulfilled. Dworkin answers that by saying follow legal positivism.
Basically, he corners Hart saying that his conception of rules i.e. Primary and secondary is not that easy to work upon and it should be read along with
principles and policies. So Lawyers in practical functioning while arguing hard cases and judges deciding upon them is a herculean task as there is no
foregone conclusion available. In deciding these cases judges have to make use of standards that do not function as rules. If Hard cases are to be
argued only on the basis of Rules then other important standards are susceptible to be missed.
He says principles and policies are these standards that we need to take into account. These are followed because of the justice and fairness
requirements.
He distinguishes principles from rules in a generic sense through highlighting the Riggs v Palmer (heir murdering grandfather to inherit the will)
and Heengisen v. Bloomfield (Car warranty case) in both the situation there is a Hard Case, where no rule can provide a direct answer.
He circles Hart by saying how he would answer the query here, Hart would argue here saying that Judges should only follow the rule and no random
standards. he should apply the law to determine what are valid rules apply here. Meaning thereby Rules are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion.
While Dworkin would argue here that judges should apply Rules and principles simultaneously, by attaching the weight to different rules at hand.
Further, Dworkin argues about the nature of discretion that judges have here, He says, Hart argues that when we run out of rules we have extra-
legal standards to apply to the case and any sort of standards can be applied therein. Meaning thereby that judges have strong discretion in such
cases.
Dworkin rejects this and says judges have weak discretion in such cases as they only have a choice to make thereby attaching the weight to different
available principles. As in a strong form of discretion, judges apply the law as post facto which is problematic for him.

His position is near to inclusive legal positivism, thereby reading rules and principles simultaneously. He further suggests in questions of deciding
nature of discretion, nature of master rule/rule of recognition/legal obligation in hard cases- positivist approach should be abandoned.
The debate affects the relationship between law and justice as for Hart law is combination of primary and secondary rules which are to be followed
strictly, with the rule of recognition to award validity to other rules. His conception of the law might not award justice in hard cases and for that
matter, Dworkin's principles and policy concept come to help. The law would be more in line with justice if the conception of Rule by Hart would
include Dworkin's conception of principles and policies to guide judges to interpret rules in hard cases, where no rule gives any answer.
The example

Response history

Step Time Action State Marks

Step Time Action State Marks

1 28/05/21, Started Not yet

14:32 answered

2 28/05/21, Saved: * Hart and Dworkin's debate around the law as rules and law as principles is a critical one where Answer
18:29 Hart argues law to mean a combination of primary and secondary rules whereby rules are to be followed saved
strictly and where there are no rules to guide a decision-maker then he needs to follow strong discretion.
Dworkin argues against this position of Hart where he says in cases where there is no rule to guide our
decision (which Dworkin calls as hard cases) what is to be done in such situations. * This hard case
situation has been portrayed through the vehicle in the park example whereby a signboard prohibits any
vehicle to be allowed in the park. Then in simple terms, it would result to mean that one cannot take his
car or truck in the park. However, if we interpret it further then would that definition of the vehicle also
restrict any person on a tricycle, carrying his baby, or a person on roller skates? Such a situation has been
described as HARD CASES BY DWORKIN, whereby no rules can help us directly answering the
problem. Dworkin asks Hart, how does he resolve that problem then? * In addition, he confronts Hart
around the argument of legal obligation as made in the courts by lawyers as to legal obligation, in cases
where it can be straightforward or in other cases where cases are decided at point T2 for an act committed
at point T1, when a party had no knowledge about an obligation which it was supposed to be fulfilled.
Dworkin answers that by saying follow legal positivism. * Basically, he corners Hart saying that his
conception of rules i.e. Primary and secondary is not that easy to work upon and it should be read along
with principles and policies. So Lawyers in practical functioning while arguing hard cases and judges
deciding upon them is a herculean task as there is no foregone conclusion available. In deciding these
cases judges have to make use of standards that do not function as rules. _I__f Hard cases are to be
argued only on the basis of Rules then other important standards are susceptible to be missed._ * He says
principles and policies are these standards that we need to take into account. These are followed because
of the JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS REQUIREMENTS. * He distinguishes principles from rules in a
generic sense through highlighting the RIGGS V PALMER (HEIR MURDERING GRANDFATHER TO
INHERIT THE WILL) AND HEENGISEN V. BLOOMFIELD (CAR WARRANTY CASE) in both the
situation there is a Hard Case, where no rule can provide a direct answer. * He circles Hart by saying
how he would answer the query here, Hart would argue here saying that Judges should only follow the
rule and no random standards. he should apply the law to determine what are valid rules apply here.
Meaning thereby Rules are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion. * While Dworkin would argue here
that judges should apply Rules and principles simultaneously, by attaching the weight to different rules at
hand. * Further, Dworkin argues about the nature of discretion that judges have here, He says, HART
ARGUES that when we run out of rules we have extra-legal standards to apply to the case and any sort of
standards can be applied therein. Meaning thereby that judges have STRONG DISCRETION in such
cases. * Dworkin rejects this and says judges have weak discretion in such cases as they only have a
choice to make thereby attaching the weight to different available principles. As in a strong form of
discretion, judges apply the law as post facto which is problematic for him. * His position is near to
inclusive legal positivism, thereby reading rules and principles simultaneously. He further suggests in
questions of deciding nature of discretion, nature of master rule/rule of recognition/legal obligation in
hard cases- positivist approach should be abandoned. * The debate affects the relationship between law
and justice as for Hart law is combination of primary and secondary rules which are to be followed
strictly, with the rule of recognition to award validity to other rules. His conception of the law might not
award justice in hard cases and for that matter, Dworkin's principles and policy concept come to help. The
law would be more in line with justice if the conception of Rule by Hart would include Dworkin's
conception of principles and policies to guide judges to interpret rules in hard cases, where no rule gives
any answer. * The example

3 28/05/21, Attempt finished Complete

18:29
Question 4

Complete

Marked out of 20.00

4. Is Cohen right to insist that in a ‘just society’ individuals must practice Rawls' two principles of justice? Why?

Rawls provided for principles of justice (the two principles of justice i.e. Liberty principle and distribution principles that are to be applied upon
institutions in a society and not to individuals. However, post the original position individuals are not guided by any such principles of justice. The
egalitarian principles do not govern their everyday decision-making. He leaves only natural duties to be left for individuals to apply to post the original
position.
Cohen has a problem with this approach of Rawls, he says a society where principles of justice do not guide will eventually fail on the distributive
aspect. He basically argues against the distributive justice principle, whereby Rawls does accept inequality in distribution, he says any unequal
distribution that cannot be justified by some other principle is unjust. He says since such Rawls' unequal distributions are not based on choices, fault,
or desert, hence he is concerned with this approach of Rawls. He says it is possible to adopt personal and impersonal standpoints. He introduces an
idea of Prerogative, saying the state is bound by different principles but not individuals.
However, the enquiry here is into more general propositions of application of these principles to individuals. Which I argues as:
I agree with Cohen's argument of application of principles of justice to individuals as they are the driver of institutions, thus we need certain
principles for them. So even if we create institutions to further justice but not derive any account of principles for justice towards. Let's say for that
matter if we design institutions for furthering two principles of justice, we can ideally argue that they would work in the direction of furthering justice.
However, this proposition is to be read in light of the individuals who are running those institutions. What if they are immoral or corrupt? shouldn't
we take this proposition into account and provide for some principles to guide their behavior, so that those just institutions can also act as just. for that
matter, we need something more than Rawl's natural duties.
Also, individuals apply plural groundings for justice in their day-to-day lives, while dealing with various issues, and they exist howsoever, thus
ignoring them from the lens of justice does not look okay, (As Rawls ignores the application of principles of justice on individuals. Therefore,
Cohen's account of applying principles of justice to individuals is pertinent in order to govern their day-to-day behavior.
Also since states and individuals are different units and cant be treated similarly in almost all the spheres. Thus, as Cohen argues we need more than
what Rawl's suggests as natural duties
Therefore it can be said that Rawls' stretched the intuition-based argument to an extent that he does not take into account any other principles other
than two principles of justice, so he totally ignores the application of any such principles to individuals or even any other principles for that
matter. Cohen's account of taking individuals into consideration seems appropriate since individuals are important. He also seems right to not repulse
Rawl's principles totally.

Response history

Step Time Action State Marks

Step Time Action State Marks

1 28/05/21, Started Not yet

14:32 answered

2 28/05/21, Saved: * Rawls provided for principles of justice (the two principles of justice i.e. Liberty principle and Answer
18:29 distribution principles that are to be applied upon institutions in a society and not to individuals. saved
However, post the original position individuals are not guided by any such principles of justice. The
egalitarian principles do not govern their everyday decision-making. He leaves only natural duties to be
left for individuals to apply to post the original position. * Cohen has a problem with this approach of
Rawls, he says a society where principles of justice do not guide will eventually fail on the distributive
aspect. He basically argues against the distributive justice principle, whereby Rawls does accept
inequality in distribution, he says any unequal distribution that cannot be justified by some other principle
is unjust. He says since such Rawls' unequal distributions are not based on choices, fault, or desert, hence
he is concerned with this approach of Rawls. He says it is possible to adopt personal and impersonal
standpoints. He introduces an idea of Prerogative, saying the state is bound by different principles but not
individuals. * However, the enquiry here is into more general propositions of application of these
principles to individuals. Which I argues as: * I agree with Cohen's argument of application of principles
of justice to individuals as they are the driver of institutions, thus we need certain principles for them. So
even if we create institutions to further justice but not derive any account of principles for justice towards.
Let's say for that matter if we design institutions for furthering two principles of justice, we can ideally
argue that they would work in the direction of furthering justice. However, this proposition is to be read
in light of the individuals who are running those institutions. What if they are immoral or corrupt?
shouldn't we take this proposition into account and provide for some principles to guide their behavior, so
that those just institutions can also act as just. for that matter, we need something more than Rawl's
natural duties. * Also, individuals apply plural groundings for justice in their day-to-day lives, while
dealing with various issues, and they exist howsoever, thus ignoring them from the lens of justice does
not look okay, (As Rawls ignores the application of principles of justice on individuals. Therefore,
Cohen's account of applying principles of justice to individuals is pertinent in order to govern their day-
to-day behavior. * Also since states and individuals are different units and cant be treated similarly in
almost all the spheres. Thus, as Cohen argues we need more than what Rawl's suggests as natural duties
* Therefore it can be said that Rawls' stretched the intuition-based argument to an extent that he does not
take into account any other principles other than two principles of justice, so he totally ignores the
application of any such principles to individuals or even any other principles for that matter. Cohen's
account of taking individuals into consideration seems appropriate since individuals are important. He
also seems right to not repulse Rawl's principles totally.

3 28/05/21, Attempt finished Complete

18:29
Question 5

Not answered

Marked out of 20.00

5. Does Okin or Cooter make the more compelling criticism of Rawls’ theory of justice? Are these criticisms independent of each other or related?

Response history

Step Time Action State Marks

Step Time Action State Marks

1 28/05/21, 14:32 Started Not yet answered

2 28/05/21, 18:29 Attempt finished Not answered

Question 6

Complete

Marked out of 20.00

6. Does the principle of national responsibility produce global justice? Is Rawls’ proposals for a realistic utopia in the ‘Laws of the Peoples’ more likely
to do so?

National Responsibility:
Miller starts his argument by talking about the various case examples like car bombs in Baghdad, Famine in Niger, and so on, in order to deep dive
into the proposition of finding the answer to such situations is a typical task as it contains complex sort of problems hence finding an answer here is
very difficult.
He generally poses a certain solution to this complex problem of saying that we could see this complex problem in the light of following propositions:
those who have plenty to provide
we design institutions to set things right
And these problems are majorly equality problems
In his theory of National Responsibility, he says that we can see people either as Agents and then decide our approach towards the problem. He is not
in favor of assigning individual responsibility to everyone as Pogge argues. Rather, he states that if we see people as agents then we have to empower
them to set their lives right internally and for that matter, we owe responsibility as members of a society and not individually thereby drawing national
boundaries on our responsibilities. We can't blame individuals everywhere for such problems as the degree of responsibility they owe would differ,
thus rejecting a cosmopolitan account.
He proposes an institution-based approach for the same saying we should as national governments come up with international institutions to deliver aid
and rectify the complex problems of global justice. These institutions like FAO, UN, UNICEF are to be the unit that would deliver justice to people
worldwide.
This means looking at the global justice problem as a national problem because we have the strongest bonds. SO our citizenship matters so our
national boundaries. He asks us to mix institutional ethics and individual ethics to solve this problem.
It does tend to produce global justice by limiting the inquiry to a more national level, unlike cosmopolitan (who imposes a wide liability for all the
actions worldwide no matter how related someone is). I agree with his account of global justice as a thing separate from social justice, as he offers a
more realistic account for global justice focusing upon institutions as units to further justice. Clearly, I'm sitting here has not a major role for a situation
in Isreal, however, I would have a closely related to a situation in India. Therefore, equating the two is not a great approach. Thus, a more practical
solution would be taking institutions as accounts of inquiry at the global level.

Rawl's Realist Utopia:

Rawls repeats his original position experiment at an international level with peoples being members of the original position. His vision is to come up with
a position of peaceful and cooperative international order, all liberal and decent people (his division of peoples) would help the burdened states in order to
uplift them and to help them become self-sufficient. He limits his approach here to by mentioning that peoples have a limited responsibility towards other
peoples and majorly towards decent peoples and burdened societies.
His inquiry is limited to more or less the liberal peoples who could then make institutions to help other peoples increase economic and political
coordination. He asks for limited help to other societies and nothing for outlaw states.

Rawls' concept of justice is more idealistic and far-fetched as his conception of decent peoples, which he calls Kazanisthan looks unrealistic. In reality
finding, such states are much more difficult. His argument is more realistic as compared to his domestic one, but his argument about liberal peoples not
going to war and would be the light to guide global justice seems a little far-fetched in some cases.
However, I believe the help or assistance Rawls wants to advance seems practical as beliefs of one society cannot be imposed on others as it is, therefore
minimal interference is required.

I believe that both theories would help in advancing global justice as both are based on the world as it is. Not taking into account other imaginary
considerations also both the theories do not advance any world state, which is an unrealistic consideration, thus, have a tendency to work.

Response history

Step Time Action State Marks

Step Time Action State Marks

1 28/05/21, Started Not yet

14:32 answered

2 28/05/21, Saved: National Responsibility: * Miller starts his argument by talking about the various case examples Answer
18:29 like car bombs in Baghdad, Famine in Niger, and so on, in order to deep dive into the proposition of saved
finding the answer to such situations is a typical task as it contains cOMPLEX SORT OF PROBLEMs
hence finding an answer here is very difficult. * He generally poses a certain solution to this complex
problem of saying that we could see this complex problem in the light of following propositions: * those
who have plenty to provide * we design institutions to set things right * And these problems are majorly
equality problems * In his theory of National Responsibility, he says that we can see people either as
Agents and then decide our approach towards the problem. He is not in favor of assigning individual
responsibility to everyone as Pogge argues. Rather, he states that if we see people as agents then we have
to empower them to set their lives right internally and for that matter, we owe responsibility as members
of a society and not individually thereby drawing national boundaries on our responsibilities. We can't
blame individuals everywhere for such problems as the degree of responsibility they owe would differ,
thus rejecting a cosmopolitan account. * He proposes an institution-based approach for the same saying
we should as national governments come up with international institutions to deliver aid and rectify the
complex problems of global justice. These institutions like FAO, UN, UNICEF are to be the unit that
would deliver justice to people worldwide. * This means looking at the global justice problem as a
national problem because we have the strongest bonds. SO our citizenship matters so our national
boundaries. He asks us to mix institutional ethics and individual ethics to solve this problem. * It does
tend to produce global justice by limiting the inquiry to a more national level, unlike cosmopolitan (who
imposes a wide liability for all the actions worldwide no matter how related someone is). I agree with his
account of global justice as a thing separate from social justice, as he offers a more realistic account for
global justice focusing upon institutions as units to further justice. Clearly, I'm sitting here has not a major
role for a situation in Isreal, however, I would have a closely related to a situation in India. Therefore,
equating the two is not a great approach. Thus, a more practical solution would be taking institutions as
accounts of inquiry at the global level. Rawl's Realist Utopia: Rawls repeats his original position
experiment at an international level with _peoples _being members of the original position. His vision is
to come up with a position of peaceful and cooperative international order, all liberal and decent people
(his division of peoples) would help the burdened states in order to uplift them and to help them become
self-sufficient. He limits his approach here to by mentioning that peoples have a limited responsibility
towards other peoples and majorly towards decent peoples and burdened societies. His inquiry is limited
to more or less the liberal peoples who could then make institutions to help other peoples increase
economic and political coordination. He asks for limited help to other societies and nothing for outlaw
states. Rawls' concept of justice is more idealistic and far-fetched as his conception of decent peoples,
which he calls Kazanisthan looks unrealistic. In reality finding, such states are much more difficult. His
argument is more realistic as compared to his domestic one, but his argument about liberal peoples not
going to war and would be the light to guide global justice seems a little far-fetched in some cases.
However, I believe the help or assistance Rawls wants to advance seems practical as beliefs of one
society cannot be imposed on others as it is, therefore minimal interference is required. I believe that
both theories would help in advancing global justice as both are based on the world as it is. Not taking
into account other imaginary considerations also both the theories do not advance any world state, which
is an unrealistic consideration, thus, have a tendency to work.

3 28/05/21, Attempt finished Complete

18:29