Hilton v.

Guyot
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), was a United States Supreme Court case where
the Court ruled that the recognition and enforceability of a foreign judgment rested on
the "comity of nations," namely whether there would be any reciprocity and mutual
recognition by the foreign jurisdiction from which the judgment was issued.[1]
Hilton established the fundamental basis for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments in the United States,[2] remaining "the most detailed exposition of any
American court" on this principle.[3] It is also viewed as the quintessential statement of
comity in international law,[4] and is one of the earliest decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court to assert that international law is part of U.S. law.[5]
Hilton and Libbey, U.S. citizens conducting business in Paris, France, were sued in
French court by Guyot, the administrator of a French firm, for sums allegedly owed to
that firm. They appeared and litigated the merits before the French court, which rendered
a judgment against them that was affirmed by a higher court and became final. Guyot
sought to enforce that judgment in federal district court in New York, which held that the
French judgment was enforceable without retrial on the merits. Hilton and Libbey
subsequently appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Opinion of the Court[edit]

The central question before the Court was whether a judgment had force beyond the
limits of the sovereign jurisdiction from which its authority derived. In finding that there
was no applicable treaty or domestic statute from which an answer could be derived, the
Court determined that it was incumbent on the judiciary to ascertain the law, based on
guidance from "judicial decisions, from the works of jurists and commentators, and from
the acts and usages of civilized nations."
In an opinion authored by Justice Horace Gray, the Court, drawing upon both domestic
and international legal sources, concluded that whether any foreign judgment was to be
enforced in the U.S. rested on whether there was comity between the U.S. and the
foreign jurisdiction in question. In articulating this position, the Court set forth the
general standard for making this determination and for what defined international
comity.
No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the
sovereignty from which its authority is derived. The extent to which the
law of one nation, as put in force within its territory, whether by executive
order, by legislative act, or by judicial decree, shall be allowed to operate
within the dominion of another nation, depends upon what our greatest
jurists have been content to call 'the comity of nations.' Although the
phrase has been often criticised, no satisfactory substitute has been
suggested. 'Comity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the
other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory
to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its
own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
[6]
Applying this standard, the Court reasoned, after examining relevant French laws and
judicial decisions, that a French court would not have recognized a foreign judgment
without having first considered its merits. Therefore, based on the notion of reciprocity
derived from international comity, U.S. courts should similarly examine the merits of
any judgment prior to ruling on its enforcement. The judgment of the U.S. circuit court
was subsequently reversed and the case remanded for retrial.
The Court's opinion is notable for drawing heavily from international legal sources,
specifically the laws and practices of over a dozen nations all over the world regarding
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Thus, Hilton was one of the first
Supreme Court cases to apply customary international law—the prevailing practices of
states—in making its determination as to non-U.S. judgments:
It appears, therefore, that there is hardly a civilized nation on either
continent, which, by its general law, allows conclusive effect to an
executory foreign judgment for the recovery of money. In France, and in a
 few smaller States — Norway, Portugal, Greece, Monaco, and Hayti —
the merits of the controversy are reviewed, as of course, allowing to the
foreign judgment, at the most, no more effect than of being prima
facie evidence of the justice of the claim. In the great majority of the
countries on the continent of Europe — in Belgium, Holland, Denmark,
Sweden, Germany, in many cantons of Switzerland, in Russia and Poland,
in Roumania, in Austria and Hungary, (perhaps in Italy,) and in Spain —
as well as in Egypt, in Mexico, and in a great part of South America, the
judgment rendered in a foreign country is allowed the same effect only as
the courts of that country allow to the judgments of the country in which
the judgment in question is sought to be executed.

Hilton v. Guyot

Hilton (Plaintiff) and Libbey (Plaintiff) appealed from a federal district court holding that
a French court judgment against them for amounts allegedly owed to a French firm was
enforceable without retrial on the merits.

Synopsis of Rule of Law

No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which
its authority is derived.

Facts
Hilton (Plaintiff) and Libbey (Plaintiff), New York citizens trading in Paris, were sued in
France by Guyot (Defendant), the administrator of a French firm, for sums allegedly owed
to that firm.  The Plaintiffs appeared and litigated the merits in the French proceeding. 
The French court rendered a judgment against them that was affirmed by a higher court and
became final.  Defendant then sought to enforce that judgment in federal district court in
New York.  That court held the judgment enforceable without retrial on the merits.  The
Plaintiffs then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Issue
Do laws have any effect, of their own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from
which its authority is derived?

Held
(Gray, J.)  No.  No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the
sovereignty from which its authority is derived.  No sovereign is bound, unless by special
compact, to execute within his dominions a judgment rendered by the tribunals of another
state, and if execution be sought by suit upon the judgment or otherwise, the tribunal in
which the suit is brought, or from which execution is sought, is, on principle, at liberty to
examine into the merits of such judgment, and to give effect to it or not, as may be found
just and equitable.  However, the general comity, utility and convenience of nations have
established a usage among most civilized states, by which the final judgments of foreign
courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally carried into execution, under certain
regulations and restrictions, which differ in different countries.  Additionally, judgments
rendered in France, or in any foreign country, by the laws of which our own judgments are
reviewable upon the merits, are not entitled to full credit and conclusive effect when sued
upon in this country, but are prima facie evidence only of the justice of the plaintiffs’
claim.  Reversed.

Dissent
(Fuller, C.J.)  The doctrine of res judicata should be applicable to domestic judgments as
well as to foreign judgments, and rests on the same general ground of public policy that
there should be an end of litigation.

Discussion
The Court’s decision in Hilton v. Guyot reflects the traditional rule of reciprocity. 
According to this concept, foreign nation judgments were granted the same or comparable
treatment as American judgments were given by the judgment nation.  Since the Court in
Hilton found that French courts would not have enforced or executed a judgment rendered
in this country, it therefore held that the French judgment at issue should be nonconclusive
here.

JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON

WILLIAM F. GEMPERLEv s . HELEN SCHENKER andPAUL SCHENKER
As the wife had authority to sue in his behalf, she was also empowered to represent
him in suits filed against him, particularly ina case which is a consequence of the
action brought by her in hisbehalf.”FACTS:Paul Schenker acting through his wife
Helen Schenkerfiled a complaint against William Gemperle for
theenforcement of Paul Schenker’s allegedly initial subscription to the
shares of stock of the Phil. SwissTrading Company and the exercise of his
allegedpreemptive rights to the unissued original capital stockof said
corporation.Believing that the suit was only for the purpose of harassing and
degrading his reputation, Gemperle alsofiled a damage suit against the Schenkers.The
trial court ruled in favor of Gemperle.Thus, Helen Schenker appealed alleging
that PaulSchenker cannot be sued or joined as defendants because the trial court
never acquired jurisdiction overhis person because he was outside of the Phil. thus heis
beyond the jurisdiction of our court.Hence, this petition.ISSUE:Whether or not the
lower court had acquired jurisdiction overthe person of Schenker.RULING:Yes.
Where a Swiss citizen residing abroad was served withsummons through his wife,
who was then residing in the Philippinesand who was also his representative and
attorney-in-fact in a priorcivil case which was filed at her behest in her
aforementionedcapacity, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over his person
bymeans of service of summons to his wife.DISPOSITION:REVERSED.

POST #4: JURISDICTION: Basis of the Exercise of the Judicial Kind

JURISDICTION:Basis of the Exercise of the Judicial Kind

What is Jurisdiction?
I.               Two Kinds:
·      Judicial – “…the power or authority of a court to try a case, render judgment,
and execute it in accordance with law.”
·      Legislative – “…the ability of the state to promulgate laws and enforce them
on all persons and property within its territory.”

II.             Four main jurisdiction questions when dealing with Conflict of Laws:

·      Has the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or over his
property?
·      Has the court jurisdiction over the subject matter?
o   This is commonly referred to as competency.
·      Has the suit been brought in the proper venue in cases where a foreign
element is involved?
·      Is there a statute or doctrine under which a court otherwise qualified to try
the case may or may not refuse to entertain it?
o   Known as forum non conveniens.

Judicial Jurisdiction: Basis of Its Exercise

I.               Three Groups of Bases:
·      Jurisdiction over the person, based on forum-defendant contacts.
·      Jurisdiction over the res, based on forum-property contacts.
·      Jurisdiction over the subject-matter.
In the absence of jurisdictional basis, a court should not try the case. A judgment
rendered without jurisdictional basis will not be considered valid.

II.             Jurisdiction Over the Person; In Personam

Acquired by:
·      Voluntary appearance of a party and his submission to authority.
o   Plaintiff – the moment he invokes the court’s aid by filing a suit. Also,
a non-resident plaintiff consents to the court’s jurisdiction over
subsequent proceedings arising out of his original cause of action (e.g.
counterclaims).
 o   Defendant – when he (a) enters his appearance in court (unless the
same is to protest the court’s jurisdiction), or (b) is served with the
legal process within the state.
·      Personal or substituted service of summons (Sec. 6 and 7, Rule 14 of
Revised Rules of Court):
Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant.—Whenever practicable, the
summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in
person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Sec. 7. Substituted service.—If, for justifiable causes, the defendant
cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving copies at the defendant’s office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

III.           Jurisdiction Over the Property; In Rem and Quasi In Rem

Acquired by:
·      Seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the
actual custody of the law; or
·      Institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the
power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective.
o   The property, though at all times within the potential power of the
court, may never be taken into actual custody at all.

Due process only requires that the defendant be given adequate notice and opportunity to
be heard – this is acquired through service of summons by publication.
In rem – the situs “binds the world”, not just the interests of specific persons (e.g.
registration of land title).
Quasi in rem – power over property, but only affecting the interests of particular persons
in that property (e.g. an action to quiet title).

IV.           Judicial Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is traditionally based on the state’s physical power over persons and property
within its territory.
In the US, the basis has shifted to considerations of minimum contacts and fundamental
fairness:
·      International Shoe Co. v. Washington – minimum contacts between
defendant and forum, such as activities done by a corporation/’s agent in a
state where it is not “present”.
·      Shaffer v. Heitner – minimum contacts existing among the forum, defendant,
and cause of action.
For in rem proceedings, the shift in basis has not made much of an effect.

The minimum contact requirement has led states to legislate long-arm statutes:
·      Specify the kinds of contacts upon which jurisdiction will be asserted (e.g.
commission of a tort within the state, celebration of a contract in the state,
etc.).
·      Some of these statutes allow courts to assert jurisdiction in any case not
inconsistent with the Constitution.

V.             Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter

Acquired by: basing it upon the nature of the controversy.

Constitutional and statutory laws allocate cases among the courts according to the nature
of the controversy, determining the competence of a court to try a case. (e.g., Family
courts, Sandiganbayan, appellate jurisdiction, etc.)
“It is not enough that a court has a power in abstract to try and decide the class of
litigation to which a case belongs; it is necessary that said power be properly invoked…
by filing a petition.” (Caluag v. Pecson, 1948)
Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of the parties.
“By jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant the nature of the cause of action and of
the relief sought, and this is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the
court, and is to be sought for in general nature of its powers, or in authority specially
conferred.” – Idonah Perkins v. Roxas, 72 Phil. 514 (1941)

HILTON V. GUYOT
f: 2 cases
CASE 1: Gustave Guyot (liquidator for French firm CHARLES FORTRICH &
CO.) sued co-partners of A.T. STEWART & CO. Henry Hilton and William
Libbey (residents of NY) in FRENCH COURT for amount due to the French
firm
Summary
Plaintiff: french
Defendant: american
Forum 1: France
Case2:  Guyot sued Hilton and Libbey in US Circuit Court for the amount due
based on the FRENCH JUDGMENT. US CC held judgment conclusive, entered
decree in favor of Guyot W/O EXAMINING ANEW MERITS OF THE CASE
-Hilton and Libbey now appeals: French courts gives no force and effect to the
duly rendered judgments in US Courts against French citizens SO US courts
should also not give force and effect to French judgments against US citizens
H: for Hilton and Libbey
GR: Law has only effect within territory of state
"No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from
which its authority is derived. "
X: if there's comity of nations
"The extent to which the law of one nation, as put in force within its territory,
whether by executive order, by legislative act, or by judicial decree, shall be
allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation,  DEPENDS UPON
what our greatest jurists have been content to call THE COMITY OF NATIONS"
COMITY
-neither a matter of absolute obligation nor mere courtesy and good will
-RECOGNITION WHICH ONE NATION ALLOWS WITHIN ITS
TERRITORY
…OF THE LEGISLATIVE
…EXECUTIVE
…OR JUDICIAL ACTS
OF ANOTHER NATION,
HAVING DUE REGARD BOTH TO
...INTERNATIONAL DUTY
…AND CONVENIENCE
AND TO THE RIGHTS OF ITS OWN CITIZENS OR OF OTHER PERSONS
WHO ARE UNDER THE PROTECTION OF ITS LAWS
-application to the case: French only gives prima facie effect (not conclusive) on
the judgment of foreign courts unless that state has treaty with France
-France tries the case anew
-Prima facie evidence yung judgment iff:
*rendered by competent court having jurisdiction over COA and Parties
*upon due allegations and proofs
*opportunity to defend against them
*proceedings are according to course of civilized jurisprudence
*judgment stated in clear and formal record
-judgment may be IMPEACHED if:
*fraud or prejudice
*principles of IL  and COMITY, it should not be given full credit
*it is usual that countries not give conclusive effect on foreign judgments, mere
prima facie effect
DISSENTING: J HARLAN, BREWER AND JACKSON:
-apply res judicata and public policy that there should be end to litigation
Digests:
William Gemperle v. Helen Schenker (1967)

Paul Schenke, a Swiss citizen, through his wife and atty-in-fact Helen, filed a
complaint against Gemperle. Subsequently, Gemperle filed an action for damages against
the Schenke spouses for publication of allegations that damaged his reputation. The CFI
of Rizal dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over Paul and for want of cause of
action against Helen. The SC reversed, holding that the court had acquired jurisdiction
over Paul through the service of summons addressed to him and served upon Helen.

Doctrine: Helen had authority to sue, and had actually sued on behalf of her husband, so
she was empowered to represent her husband in suits filed against him, particularly in a
case which arose from the action she brought on her husband’s behalf.

Pennoyer v. Neff (1878)

J. H. Mitchell, an Oregon lawyer, won an Oregon judgment against Neff for $300
in attorney’s fees. Neff owned land in Oregon, which Pennoyer acquired under a
Sheriff’s deed, which was attached in satisfaction of the Mitchell judgment. At the time
the action was commenced and judgment rendered finding Neff in default, Neff was a
non-resident of Oregon. He was not personally served with summons, and did not appear
before the court; the only notice was constructive service of summons by publication.
Neff then filed an action against Pennoyer in federal court to recover the land,
contending that the sale was invalid because the state court had not acquired jurisdiction
over him. He argued that constructive service of summons by publication was not
sufficient to vest the state court with jurisdiction over his person, rendering the sale
invalid. The federal court ruled in favor of Neff. Pennoyer appealed to the Supreme
Court, which affirmed the federal court’s judgment.

Doctrine: Substituted service by publication is enough for proceedings in rem; but for in
personam proceedings, constructive service by publication upon a non-resident is
ineffectual.

Digests:

William Gemperle v. Helen Schenker (1967)

Paul Schenke, a Swiss citizen, through his wife and attorney-in-fact Helen, filed a
complaint against Gemperle. Subsequently, Gemperle filed an action for damages against
the Schenke spouses for publication of allegations that damaged his reputation. The CFI
of Rizal dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over Paul and for want of cause of
action against Helen. The SC reversed, holding that the court had acquired jurisdiction
over Paul through the service of summons addressed to him and served upon Helen.

Doctrine: Helen had authority to sue, and had actually sued on behalf of her husband, so
she was empowered to represent her husband in suits filed against him, particularly in a
case which arose from the action she brought on her husband’s behalf.

Pennoyer v. Neff (1878)

J. H. Mitchell, an Oregon lawyer, won an Oregon judgment against Neff for $300
in attorney’s fees. Neff owned land in Oregon, which Pennoyer acquired under a
Sheriff’s deed, which was attached in satisfaction of the Mitchell judgment. At the time
the action was commenced and judgment rendered finding Neff in default, Neff was a
non-resident of Oregon. He was not personally served with summons, and did not appear
before the court; the only notice was constructive service of summons by publication.

Neff then filed an action against Pennoyer in federal court to recover the land,
contending that the sale was invalid because the state court had not acquired jurisdiction
over him. He argued that constructive service of summons by publication was not
sufficient to vest the state court with jurisdiction over his person, rendering the sale
invalid. The federal court ruled in favor of Neff. Pennoyer appealed to the Supreme
Court, which affirmed the federal court’s judgment.
Doctrine: Substituted service by publication is enough for proceedings in rem; but for in
personam proceedings, constructive service by publication upon a non-resident is
ineffectual.

Q&A:

Long-Arm statutes are enacted in order to address what problem, and how?

The problem of determination of minimum contacts between defendant and forum. With
long-arm statutes, states may specify what types of contacts are deemed "minimum",
enough to confer jurisdiction upon the courts over the subject.

COMPUSERV INC., vs PATTERSON

No. 95-3452, July 22, 1996

FACTS:
CompuServe, Inc., established in Ohio, provides an opportunity for subscribers to post
and sell software in the form of "shareware." CompuServe accepted payment for the
shareware from purchasers and remitted that payment, less a commission, to the authors
of the software. Richard S. Patterson, a resident of Texas, subscribed to CompuServe for
marketing his navigation software. Before use of the shareware service, Patterson entered
into a "Shareware Registration Agreement" ("SRA") that provided that Ohio law
governed the parties' relationship. Subsequent to the posting of Patterson's navigation
software, CompuServe itself began to market its own navigation software. Patterson
believed that CompuServe's software was confusingly similar to his own trademarked
software and notified CompuServe.

CompuServe filed a declaratory judgment action in the District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, seeking a declaration that it had not infringed Patterson's trademarks.
Patterson filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court
granted Patterson's motion.

CompuServe filed an appeal arguing that Patterson's repeated availment of the shareware
sales procedures constituted minimum contacts with the forum state. CompuServe
further argued that the existence of the Shareware Registration Agreement clearly
stipulating that Ohio law governed disputes regarding the agreement meant that the
exercise of personal jurisdiction comported with traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an Internet service provider's home state can exercise jurisdiction over an
out-of-state author of software who had subscribed and received commissions by using
the Internet service provider.

HELD:
Yes. A forum state can exercise jurisdiction over an author of software who sells his
software via a Internet service provider based in the forum state because 1) the author
purposefully avails himself of the forum's laws by acting in the forum, 2) the cause of
action arises from that availment, and 3) the burden on the defendant author is less than
that on the forum state's interests in determining its laws concerning trademarks and
trade names.

THE MANILA HOTEL CORP. AND MANILA HOTEL INTL. LTD., petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ARBITER CEFERINA J.
DIOSANA AND MARCELO G. SANTOS, respondents.

FACTS: During his employment with the Mazoon Printing Press in the Sultanate of
Oman, respondent Santos received a letter from Mr. Gerhard R. Shmidt, General
Manager, Palace Hotel, Beijing, China. Mr. Schmidt informed respondent Santos that he
was recommended by one Nestor Buenio, a friend of his. On November 5, 1988,
respondent Santos left for Beijing, China. He started to work at the Palace Hotel.
Subsequently, respondent Santos signed an amended "employment agreement" with the
Palace Hotel, effective November 5, 1988. In the contract, Mr. Shmidt represented the
Palace Hotel. The Vice President (Operations and Development) of petitioner MHICL
Miguel D. Cergueda signed the employment agreement under the word "noted". On
August 10, 1989, the Palace Hotel informed respondent Santos by letter signed by Mr.
Shmidt that his employment at the Palace Hotel print shop would be terminated due to
business reverses brought about by the political upheaval in China. On September 5,
1989, the Palace Hotel terminated the employment of respondent Santos and paid all
benefits due him, including his plane fare back to the Philippines. On October 24, 1989,
respondent Santos, through his lawyer, Atty. Ednave wrote Mr. Shmidt, demanding full
compensation pursuant to the employment agreement. On February 20, 1990, respondent
Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Arbitration Branch, National
Capital Region, National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Palace Hotel and
Mr. Shmidt were not served with summons and neither participated in the proceedings
before the Labor Arbiter. On June 27, 1991, Labor Arbiter decided the case against
petitioners. On July 23, 1991, petitioners appealed to the NLRC, arguing that the POEA,
not the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC was the proper forum for the instant case.

DECISION: The NLRC was a seriously inconvenient forum. Under the rule of forum
non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may assume jurisdiction over the case if it
chooses to do so provided: (1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent
decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to
have power to enforce its decision.37 The conditions are unavailing in the case at bar.
FACTS:
The Respondent’s decedents died in an aircraft in the Scottish Highlands. All the
decedents were Scottish residents, as were their heirs. As the decedents' personal
representative, respondent filed suit against petitioner in the United States because
petitioner manufactured the aircraft in Pennsylvania and the law was more favorable to
their case. Petitioner wanted to litigate the tort action in Scotland.

ISSUE:
Whether the possibility of an unfavorable change of the law in plaintiff’s home forum
bar dismissal under forum non convenient (Transfer to a More Convenient Forum)?

ANSWER:
No, the possibility of an unfavorable change in the law should not, by itself, bar
dismissal.
The possibility of an unfavorable change in the law in Scotland should not, by itself, bar
dismissal. The court held that plaintiffs may not defeat a motion to dismiss on the ground
of forum non conveniens merely by showing that the substantive law that would be
applied in the alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiffs than that of the chosen
forum, since the possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily not be given
conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry. In this case
the proper forum was Scotland given that fewer evidentiary problems would be posed if
the trial were held in Scotland; the inability to implead potential third party defendants
clearly supported holding the trial in Scotland; and public interest favored trial in
Scotland, the accident having occurred in its air space, all the decedents being Scottish,
and apart from the manufacturers, all potential plaintiffs and defendants being either
Scottish or English.

In Re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York – 634 F. Supp. 842
(S.D.N.Y. 1986)
June 10, 1986
FACTS:
On the night of 23 December 1984, a gas leak occurred at the pesticide plant of Union
Carbide India Limited (UCIL) in Bhopal, India resulting in the deaths of more than 2,000
people and injuries to more than 200,000 others. . Thereafter, the India passed a law
giving the Indian government the exclusive right to represent the victims of the disaster.
As thus, the Indian government filed a complaint before a New York district court.
The Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum
non conveniens and lack of personality.
The district court granted the motion on three conditions, namely, that UCC: (1) consent
to the jurisdiction of Indian courts and waive defenses based on the Statute of
Limitations; (2) agree to the satisfy the judgement of the Indian court, provided it
complied with the requirements of due process; and (3) be subject to discovery under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the US.
Consequently, the Indian government filed sued the UCIL and the UCC before the a
district court in India.
The UCC appealed the conditions.
Arguments for the Defendant
While Indian courts may provide an adequate alternative forum, they adhere to standards
of due process much lower than that followed in the US. Hence, US courts must
supervise the proceedings before Indian courts.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens is proper.
HELD:Yes.The Indian courts are adequate alternative fora.
Ratio Decidendi
Almost all of the estimated 200,000 plaintiffs are citizens and residents of India who
have revoked their representation by an American counsel in favor of the Indian
government, which now prefers Indian courts. Further, the UCC has already consented to
the assumption of jurisdiction by the Indian courts. All the witnesses and evidence are
likewise in India.
As to the conditions, the first is valid in order to secure the viability of the Indian courts
as alternate fora. The second is problematic as it gives the impression that foreign
judgments the UCC’s consent is necessary in order for the judgement of the Indian courts
to be enforceable in New York. The laws of New York, in fact, recognizes that a
judgment rendered by a foreign court may be enforced in that State except if such
judgment was rendered in violation of due process or without jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant.
The request of UCC of supervision by US courts of Indian courts is untenable. The
power of US courts cannot extend beyond their territorial jurisdiction. Moreover, once
US courts dismiss a case on the ground of forum non conveniens, they lose any further
jurisdiction over the case, except in case of an action for enforcement later on. Denial of
due process may, however, constitute a defense against the enforcement of the Indian
judgment. The third condition is likewise invalid. Basic justice dictates that both parties
must be given equal access to evidence in each other’s possession. Hence, both parties
maybe subjected to the modes of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
on equal terms subject to approval by Indian courts.

UNITED AIRLINES INC VS CA

G.R. No. 124110 April 20, 2001UNITED AIRLINES, INC.,Petitioner vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ANICETO FONTANILLA,
in his personal capacity and in behalf of his minor son
MYCHAL ANDREW FONTANILLA, Respondents.

FACTS:
Aniceto Fontanilla bought from United Airlines,through the Philippine Travel Bureau in Manila,
three “Visit the U.S.A.” tickets from himself, his wife and his minors on, Mychal, to visit
the cities of Washington DC, Chicago and Los Angeles.All flights had been confirmed
previously by United Airlines.
Having used the first coupon to DC and while at the Washington Dulles Airport, Anice
to changed their itinerary, paid the penalty for rewriting their tickets and was issued
tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the words: “Check-in-required.” They
were then set to leave but were denied boarding because the flight was
overbooked. The CA ruled that private respondents’ failure to comply with the check-in requirement will
 not defeat his claim as the denied boarding rules were not complied with applying the laws of the USA,
relying on the Code of Federal Regulation Part on Oversales of  the USA

ISSUE: WON the CA is correct in applying the laws of USA.

HELD:  No.
According to the doctrine of “lex loci contractus”, the law of the place where a contract is made or entered into
governs with respect to its nature and validity, obligation and interpretation shall govern. This has been said to
be the rule even though the place where the contract was made is different from the place where it is to be
performed. Hence, the court should apply the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued, where the
passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant
airline. Therefore, although, the contract of carriage was to be performed in the United States, the tickets were
purchased through petitioner’s agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets were "rewritten" in D.C.,however, such
fact did not change the nature of the original contract of carriage entered Into by the parties in Manila.

Piper Aircraft v. Reyno

Brief Fact Summary

A plane crashed in Scotland killing six Scottish people.  A wrongful death lawsuit was
filed in a U.S. court on behalf of the decedents.  Defendants were named as the makers of
the plane and the propeller, both companies based in the United States.  The trial court
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, on forum non conveniens grounds.  The federal
court of appeals reversed and remanded to trial.

Synopsis of Rule of Law

(1) The possibility of an unfavorable change in law does not bar dismissal on the ground of
forum non conveniens.  (2) The presumption in favor of the plaintiff’s forum choice
applies with less than maximum force where the real parties in interest are foreign and
private and public interests favor trial outside the United States.

Facts
In 1976, a plane crashed in Scotland killing six people, all Scottish.  The twin-engine
plane was manufactured in Pennslvania by Piper aircraft (Defendant), and the propellers
were manufactured by Hartzell Propeller, Inc. (Defendant) in Ohio.  The airplane was
registered in Great Britain and was owned and maintained by Air Navigation and Trading
Co.  It was operated by McDonald Aviation, Ltd., a Scottish air taxi service.  The court
appointed administratrix of the estates of the five passengers, Gaynell Reyno (Plaintiff),
filed a wrongful death lawsuit in a U.S. court on behalf of the decedents.  The lawsuit
named Piper (Defendant) and Hartzell (Defendant) as defendants, but not Air Navigation
and Trading or McDonald Aviation.  Reyno (Plaintiff) admits that the action against
Defendants was filed in the United States because its laws on the issues were more
favorable to her case than Scottish laws.  Defendants moved to dismiss on the ground of
forum non conveniens, and the district court granted the motions.  The Third Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded to trial.

Issue
(1) Does the possibility of an unfavorable change in law does not bar dismissal on the
ground of forum non conveniens?  (2) Does the presumption in favor of the plaintiff’s
forum choice apply with less than maximum force where the real parties in interest are
foreign and private and public interests favor trial outside the United States?

Held
(Marshall, J.)
(1) No.  The possibility of an unfavorable change in law does not bar dismissal on the
ground of forum non conveniens.  While the possibility of an unfavorable change in law
should sometimes be a relevant consideration in a forum non conveniens inquiry, for
example when the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or
unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all.  However, in this case, the remedies that would
be provided by the Scottish courts do not fall in that category.  There is no danger here
that the relatives of the decedents will be deprived of any remedy or untreated unfairly. 
Also, if substantial weight were given to the possibility of a change in law, dismissal would
rarely be proper, and the forum non conveniens doctrine would become nearly useless. 
Finally, if substantial weight were given to the possibility of a change in law, deciding
motions to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens would become difficult, and
choice-of-law analysis would become more important, and courts would often be required to
interpret the law of foreign jurisdictions.  American courts would become even more
attractive to foreign plaintiffs than they already are.  The flow of litigation into the United
States would increase and further congest already crowded courts.

(2) Yes.  The presumption in favor of the plaintiff’s forum choice applies with less than
maximum force where the real parties in interest are foreign and private and public interests
favor trial outside the United States.  Under Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501
(1947), dismissal will be appropriate where trial in the plaintiff’s chosen forum imposes a
heavy burden on the defendant or the court, and where the plaintiff is unable to offer any
specific reasons of convenience supporting his choice.  The district court determined that
the plaintiff’s choice of forum deserved less deference since the real parties in interest are
foreign, and properly turned to balancing the private interests of the plaintiffs and
defendants, as well as consideration of the public interests.  When the forum has been
chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient, but when the plaintiff is
foreign, this assumption is much less reasonable.  The central purpose of any forum non
conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is convenient, and therefore, a foreign
plaintiff’s choice deserves less deference.  Also, the district court reasonably considered
the private and public interests would be best served if the trial were held in Scotland. 
The district court was correct in concluding that the problems posed by the inability to
implead potential third-party defendants supported holding the trial in Scotland. 
Additionally, the factors relating to the public interest were also reasonable.  Scotland has
a very strong interest in this litigation.  Reversed.

Dissent
(Stevens, J.)  Whereas a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds should not
be denied just because the alternate forum is less favorable to recovery, the case should be
remanded to determine whether the district court was correct in deciding that Pennsylvania
was not a convenient forum.

Discussion
In footnote 6 of the opinion, the court lists the private and public interests that are balanced
in a Gilbert inquiry, but the court does not state how factors are balanced to reach a
conclusion.

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS VS. QUISUMBING

FACTS:
The private respondent, International School, Inc. pursuant to Presidential Decree
732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of
foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.
The school grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded to local hires. These
include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel
allowance. Foreign hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more
than local hires. The School justifies the difference on two “significant economic
disadvantages” foreign-hires have to endure, namely (a) the “dislocation factor” and
(b) limited tenure.
The compensation scheme is simply the School’s adaptive measure to remain
competitive on an international level in terms of attracting competent professionals in
the field of international education.
Local hires filed a petition claiming that point-of-hire classification employed by the
School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-
hires constitutes racial discrimination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the School’s system of compensation is violative of the

principle of “equal pay for equal work”

RULING: Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the

Labor Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and penalizes the payment of lesser
 compensation to female employees as against a male employee for work of equal
value. Art. 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in
regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in an labor
organization.

Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should paid similar salaries. If an
employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that
these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and
human experience. If the employer has discriminated against an employee, it is
for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.

The employer in this case had failed to do so. There is no evidence here that foreign-
hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than local-hires. Both groups have
similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working
conditions.

INT’L SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE) v. QUISUMBING

FACTS: Petitioners work under private respondent International School. The school
hires both local and foreign hires. Foreign hires are granted with more benefits and
higher salary. Respondent says this is because of dislocation factor and limited tenure.
Petitioners contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local hires. They
claim that it is discriminatory to Filipinos and it constitutes racial discrimination.

HELD: There is violation of equal protection. Equal pay for equal work, persons who
work with substantially equal qualifications, skillsm effort, and responsibility under
similar conditions should be paid similar salaries. If an employer accords the same rank
and position, the presumption is that they perform equal work. Here, both groups have
similar functions which they perform under similar conditions. There is no evidence that
foreign hires perform 25% more efficient than local hires. The dislocation factor and
tenure are properly accorded by the benefits they received.

ISAE v. Quisumbing G.R. No. 128845, June1,

 
2000
 
Fact: Private respondent, the School, hires both foreign and local teachers as members
ofits faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The
Schoolemploys four tests to determine whether a faculty member should be classified as
a foreign-hire or a local hire. Should the answer to any of four tests queries point to the
Philippines,the faculty member is classified as a local hire; otherwise, he or she
is deemed a foreign-hire.The School grants foreign-hires salary rate twenty-five percent
(25%) more than local-hires.
The School justifies the difference on two “significant economic disadvantages” foreign
-
hires have to endure, namely: (a) the “dislocation factor” and (b) li
mited tenure. Whennegotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on
June 1995, petitioner
International School Alliance of Educators, “a legitimate labor union and the
collective bargaining representative of all faculty members” of the S
chool, contested the difference insalary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue
eventually caused a
deadlock between the parties. Petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the Nation
alConciliation and Mediation Board to bring the parties to a compromise prompted the
DOLEto assume jurisdiction over the dispute. DOLE Acting Secretary, issued an Order
resolvingthe parity and representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE
Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied pet
itioner’s motion for reconsideration in an Order
dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%)
morethan local-hires is an invalid and unreasonable classification and violates the
EqualProtection Clause.
Held: Yes, Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the
LaborCode. The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the
longhonored legal truis
m of “equal pay for equal work.” Persons who work with substantially
equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be
paid
similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its “international character”
notwithstanding. The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that
local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires. The employer in this case has
failed toshow evidence that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively
than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they
perform undersimilar working conditions. In this case, the court find the point-of-hire
classificationemployed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates
of foreign-hiresand local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable
distinction between theservices rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of
the School of accordinghigher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and,
certainly, does not deservethe sympathy of the Court.
Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 94723. August 21, 1997)

KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and

Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA
E. SALVACION, petitioners,
vs.CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING
CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT,respondents.

Facts: Respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured the
12-year old petitioner Karen Salvacion to go with him in his apartment where the former
repeatedly raped latter. After the rescue, policemen recovered dollar and peso checks
including a foreign currency deposit from China Banking Corporation (CBC). Writ of
preliminary attachment and hold departure order were issued. Notice of Garnishment was
served by the Deputy Sheriff to CBC which later invoked R.A. No. 1405 as its answer to
it. Deputy Sheriff sent his reply to CBC saying that the garnishment did not violate the
secrecy of bank deposits since the disclosure is merely incidental to a garnishment
properly and legally made by virtue of a court order which has placed the subject
deposits in custodia legis. CBC replied and invoked Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits of Greg Bartelli are exempt from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever. Central Bank of the
Philippines affirmed the defense of CBC

Issue: Whether or not Sec. 113 of Central Bank Circular 960 and Sec. 8 of RA 6426
amended by PD 1246 otherwise known  as the “Foreign Currency Deposit Act” be made
applicable to  a foreign transient

HELD: NO. The provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246,
insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE
to
Ratios:T]he application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we
rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts
from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a
foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign
guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code
which provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro.” Simply stated, when
the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would
respond to the vehement urge of conscience. It would be unthinkable, that the questioned
Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli
for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.

Call it what it may — but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against Peso?
Upholding the final and executory judgment of the lower court against the Central Bank
Circular protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a
transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim of a crime? This
situation calls for fairness against legal tyranny.

Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 94723)

Facts:Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, was charged with serious Illegal
detention and Rape of herein petitioner Karen Salvacion. Upon his arrest, it was
recovered from him among others, bank books and a dollar account with China Bank
Corp. On the day of the hearing of his petition for bail, he was able to escape from jail.
Pending his arrest the criminal cases were archived. Meanwhile, in the Civil Case against
Bartelli, the Judge granted the prayer of attachment and a notice of garnishment was
served on China Bank. China Bank invoked R.A. No. 1405 and later on, Section 113
Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits of Bartelli are exempt
from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. This prompted
petitioner’s counsel to inquire herein respondent whether the said circular has any
exception or has been repealed/amended. Respondent cited that the provision is absolute
in application. Meanwhile, the court has rendered judgment in favor of petitioners.
Petitioners tried to execute on Bartelli’s dollar deposit with China Bank but the bank
invoked the CB Circular. Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief from this Court.

Issue:Whether or not the secrecy of foreign currency deposits should be made applicable
to a foreign transient?

Ruling: NO.This Court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.It is worth mentioning

that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the country’s economy was in
a shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and presumably, this was the reason
why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the present times show that the country
has recovered economically; and even if not, the questioned law still denies those entitled
to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the
questioned law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous
effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus:

It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that the Offshore Banking System and the
Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders
and investors (Vide second Whereas of PD No. 1034; third Whereas of PD No. 1035). It
is these deposits that are induced by the two laws and given protection and incentives by
them. Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the
kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and
protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country
and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time.

Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist or a transient. He deposited his

dollars with respondent China Banking Corporation only for safekeeping during his
temporary stay in the Philippines.

For the reasons stated above, the Solicitor General thus submits that the dollar deposit of
respondent Greg Bartelli is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court
processes.

In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we
rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts
from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a
foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign
guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code
which provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. “Ninguno non
deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro.” Simply stated, when the statute is
silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the
vehement urge of conscience.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No.
1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to
be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances.

SALVACION VS. CENTRAL BANK

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and

Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA
E. SALVACION vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA
BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT
G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997

FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of
rape and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him
several dollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however,
able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded
Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorney’s fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.

Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China
Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order
or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic
Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency
Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?
HELD: NO.The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No.
1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be
INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are
hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to
release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the
judgment.Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable
judgment and award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then
proceeded to show that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not
anymore present; and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled
to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law
may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing
outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.The SC adopted the comment
of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign
Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and
investors and, subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the foreign currency
deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos.
1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor
stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the
bank only for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is
not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD
No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes.
Further, the SC said: “In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its
justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of
any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever,
is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved
by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New
Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of
laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.”
___________

NOTES:
– On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured
petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein,
Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was
able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and
7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen,
Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen
recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No.
021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8
(Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account — China Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-
122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed
Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant. FROM ATTY. BAYANI^^