IV.
Search and Seizure – Rule 126
483. Stonehill v. Diokno, GR No. L-19550, 19 June 1967
G.R. No. L-19550 | 19 JUNE 1967 | Concepcion | Search & Seizure
Digest by: gonzales
Petitioners: Stonehill, Brooks, and Beck
Respondents: Search warrants were issued against Stonehill et al AND the
corporations they were officers of.
The warrant was for “"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters,
and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins
(cigarette wrappers)." Allegedly Stonehill et al violated the Central Bank law, Tariff
and Customs Law, Internal Revenue, and RPC. Stonehill argues that the warrants
are void.
Note: for this case, there were two classifications of search warrant: Against the
office of the corporation, or against the residence of Stonehill et al.
ISSUE: were any of the warrants valid? Only those against the corporation, kasi of
a technicality…
As to the warrant against the office of the corporation: the corporation has a
personality separate and distinct from its officers, thus here it was the corporation
that should have questioned the warrant against them. But here, Stonhill et al
questioned the warrants in their personal capacity, thus they did not properly
question the warrant against the corporation.
As to the warrant against the residences of Stonehill: there are two essential
elements that must be met before a warrant is properly issued:
● (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined
by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and
● (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
However, the warrant here was a GENERAL WARRANT because no specific
offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect
to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible
for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause
To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish
probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the
warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply
with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no
such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is
probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only
possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing
evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative
of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Facts:
● The respondents in this case were prosecutors and judges who, requested
and issued, on different dates, 42 SEARCH WARRANTS against Stonehill,
Brooks, and Beck and the corporations of which they were officers. The
warrants directed any peace officer to search Stonehill et al and their
corporations for: "Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and
loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)."
● Allegedly, these were "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and
proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the
means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
● Stonehill argues that the warrants are null and void because: (1) they do
not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the
warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners
in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were
made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money
seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be
disposed of in accordance with law.
● Stonehill thus files this case for certiorari, prohibitionn, mandamus, and
injunction with the SC, seeking to restrain the prosecutors from using the
gathered evidence in a deportation case against them.
● In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, (1) that the contested
search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2)
that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent;
and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence
against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the
aforementioned searches and seizures.
● The SC granted an injunction: but only as to those papers, documents, etc.
that were found in the RESIDENCES OF STONEHILL ET AL. But not to those
papers found in the OFFICE OF THE CORPORATION. (take note of this
distinction!)
Issue/s:
● Among the two groups, was any warrant valid? Only the warrants on the
corporation were valid, based on failure to question them. The warrants on the
people of Stonehill et al were absolutely invalid.
Ratio:
As to the papers found in the OFFICE OF THE CORPORATION:
● Stonehill has no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants,
simply because corporations have a personality separate and distinct from
their officers, here in petitioners Stonehill et al. Indeed, it is well settled that
the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
 been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. It was their legal means.
corporations, that should have questioned the search warrants as to the ● This is furthered by the description of the effects to be searched and seized
corporate offices. (True you can have officers do this, but there was no by the warrrant: they allowed the seizure of all business transactions,
showing that Stonehill were representing their corporations when they brought regardless of if they were legal or illegal. (See what was to be seized in the
this action; from the beginning their represented themselves personally here) facts) The description therein was too broad, and not particularly described --
this violated our Bil of Rights and this warrant is characterized as a general
As to the papers found in THE RESIDENCES OF STONEHILL ET AL: warrant.
● In connection with said documents, papers and things, two important ● Prosecutors argue that under American common law before, even if evidence
questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in is obtained via an illegal search, such evidence will still be acceptable in court;
question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, this was based on the idea that "no criminal should go free merely because
are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the the constable has blundered."
negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in ● SC explains however, that other common law jurisdictions have already given
evidence against petitioners herein. up on this American approach, instead using the exclusionary rule; that
● The constitution provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their evidence obtained through an illegal search/warrant is inadmissible in court.
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and ● To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party
cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law.
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not
be seized." possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no
● Thus, there are two essential elements that must be met before a warrant justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
is properly issued: justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the
○ (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
○ (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
● None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants.
Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and DISPO: It is so ordered.
juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed
were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued
the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom
it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the
applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by
herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict
anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the
aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision
of said laws.
● To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out
completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution,
for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication
and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace
officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional
provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when
 484. Burgos v. Chief of Staff, GR No. L-64261, 26 December 1984
G.R. No. 64261 | December 26, 1984 | J. Escolin | Search and Seizure
Digest by: GRAN
Petitioners: Jose Burgos, Sr., Jose Burgos, Jr., Bayani Soriano, and J. Burgos
Media Services, Inc.
Respondents: The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, The Chief,
Philippine Constabulary, The Chief Legal Officer, Presidential Security Command,
The Judge Advocate General, et al.
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
● Two search warrants were issued against the premises known as the
business addresses of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers.
After the search, several printing machines and equipment utilized for the
printing, publication, and delivery of newspapers were seized.
● This caused the petitioners to file a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction
questioning the validity of the search warrants and asking for the return of
the seized articles.
Issue: W/N the search warrants in question were validly issued – NO
● The court agrees with the petitioners’ contention that the application and its
supporting affidavits could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding
of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue.
● When the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper
publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive
materials the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a
specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he
has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.
○ Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that
petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment
and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents
which were used and are all continuously being used as a means
of committing the offense of subversion punishable under
Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." is a mere conclusion of
law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause.
○ Equally insufficient is the statement contained in the joint affidavit
of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence
gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises
above-mentioned and the articles and things above-described
were used and are continuously being used for subversive
activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal
organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for
Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement."
● The Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the
complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a
search warrant may be justified. As couched, the quoted averment in said
joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of
sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez.
● Another factor pointed out by the court is that they are in the nature of
general warrants. In this case, the premises searched were the business
and printing offices of newspapers. As a consequence of the search and
seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with their printing and
publication of being discontinued.
● Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent
to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and
constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in
print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework
where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
Facts:
● Two search warrants were issued against the premises known as “No. 19,
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City” which are the business addresses of “Metropolitan
Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers.
● After the search, printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles
and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said
newspapers, and numerous papers, documents, books and other written
literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos,
Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
● This caused the petitioners to file a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction questioning
the validity of the search warrants and asking for the return of the seized
articles. They also prayed that the respondents be enjoined from using the
articles seized as evidence in a criminal case initiated against them in the
RTC.
● During the hearing, the Solicitor General set forth the following:
○ It manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned
articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution
of the legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..."
○ Before impugning the validity of the warrants before this Court, the
petitioners should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the
court that issued them.
○ The petition shall be dismissed due to laches since the search
warrants were issued on December 7, 1982 and the this petition was
filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than
6 months.
● Petitioners explained that their belated filing of the petition was due to the
fact that they tried to first exhaust other remedies as the recent events in the
country has taught them that everything has become a matter of executive
benevolence. Hence, they first sent a letter to President Marcos and after
waiting in vain for 5 months, then decided to come to this Court.
● Court addressed some of the issues raised:
○ As regards the argument regarding the filing of a motion to quash,
despite the procedural flaw, the seriousness and urgency of the
constitutional issues involved as well as the public interest generated
(since it was televised) justified the Court’s exercise of its inherent
power to suspend its rules.
 ○ As regards the belated filing due to the exhaustion of remedies, the
Court stated that there is no ground to punish or chastise the
petitioners. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts they exerted
negated the presumption that they have abandoned their right to
possession of the seized properties.
Issue/s:
● W/N the search warrants in question were validly issued – NO
Ratio:
● The questioned search warrants were issued upon application of Col. Rolando
N. Abadilla (Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom) as accompanied by the
Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango (members of the
Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group) whom conducted a surveillance of
the premises prior to filing with the court.
● The court agrees with the petitioners’ contention that the said documents
could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause
upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution.
● Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
● When the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper
publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive
materials the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a
specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has
published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.
○ Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that
petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment
and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents
which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of
committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential
Decree 885, as amended ..." is a mere conclusion of law and does
not satisfy the requirements of probable cause.
○ Equally insufficient is the statement contained in the joint affidavit of
Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence
gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises
above-mentioned and the articles and things above-described were
used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in
conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations
such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines,
and April 6 Movement."
● The Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant
or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may
be justified. As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before
respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court
in Alvarez.
● Another factor is that they are in the nature of general warrants.
○ In Stanford, the search warrant with directions to "seize any evidence
in connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have
been held too general, and that portion which authorized the seizure
of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of
the Connecticut General" was held to be a general warrant, and
therefore invalid. The description of the articles sought to be seized
under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized
differently. It was highlighted therein that it is not the policy of our
government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks
with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent
danger to state security.
● In this case, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of
newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises
were padlocked and sealed, with their printing and publication of being
discontinued.
● Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to
the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and
constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in
print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework
where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
Other issues addressed:
● The issue faulting the respondent judge for his failure to conduct an
examination under oath has been declared moot and academic since
petitioners themselves conceded during hearing that such has been
conducted.
● The issue raised as regards the 2 search warrants pinpointing only to one
place has been ruled out as a mere typographical error since it is absurd for
the judge to have issued 2 warrants for one place and the said addresses
were specifically set forth in the application filed.
● The issue raised questioning the seizure of several properties despite the
warrant being addressed to one of the petitioners alone (who does not own all
the properties seized) was addressed by the court by stating that ownership
is of no consequence in the matter since it is sufficient if one has control or
possession of the subject properties.
● The issue as regards the machineries being immovables was found to be
without any merit. The Court ruled that machinery which are movable by
nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement,
property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any
other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the
agent of the owner. Petitioners here do not claim to be owners of the
land/building were the machineries were placed.
Dispositive: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-
82[b] issued by respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and
void and are accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the
return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are
hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs. SO ORDERED.
485. People v. Marti, GR No. 81561, 18 January 1991
G.R. No. 81561 | Date January 18, 1991 | Bidin, J | Search & Seizure- private citzn
Digest by: GUEVARRA
Petitioners: People
Respondents: Andre Marti
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
Appellant Andre Marti and his common-law wife went to the booth of the Manila
Packing and Export Forwarders to send four (4) packages to a friend in Zurich,
Switzerland. When asked by the attendant, Anita Reyes, if the packages could be
examined and inspected, appellant refused, assuring that they were simply gifts of
books cigars, and gloves. The packages were then placed in a box and was sealed
with masking tape for shipment.
Facts:
As a standard operating procedure before delivering packages to the Bureau of
Customs and/or Burueau of Posts, Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding
agency and husband of Anita Reyes, opened the box for final inspection. A peculiar
odor emitted therefrom and he found dried leaves inside. He brought samples to
NBI, and informed them that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Agents of
the NBI went to his office and found the shipment containing bricks of dried
marijuana leaves, some of which were packed inside the gloves and neatly stocked
underneath tabacalera cigars. Thereafter, an information was filed against the
appellant in violation of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), for which he was found
guilty. Appellant assailed the decision, claiming that the evidence was obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure, and
further, that the court erred in admitting in evidence the illegally searched and seized
packages.
W/N the search and seizure committed by the private individual inviolate the
constitutional right of the accused against unlawful searches and seizures?- NO
As the Court held in several other cases, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State in the absence of governmental interference.
This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the
immunity of one’s person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government;
and the search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its
agents, not upon private individuals. In the present case, it was the proprietor of the
forwarding agency who made search/inspection of the packages and the contraband
came into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant’s
rights against unreasonable search and seizure. The NBI agents made no search
and seizure, much less an illegal one. Thus, the alleged act of the private individual
in violation of a constitutional right cannot be invoked against the State.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore
applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked
with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to
whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally
be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is
made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own
and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police
authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for
only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended
to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
● The appellant, Andre Marti, together with his common-law wife, Shirely Reyes,
went to Manila Packing and Export Forwarders to send four (4) gift wrapped
packages alleged to contained books, cigars, and gloves for his friend Waltier
Fierz living in Zurich, Switzerland. The attendant, Anita Reyes, received their
package and asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the
packages. The appellant refused and Anita Reyes no longer insists on
examining the packages.
● Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of
Posts, Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor and husband of Anita Reyes, following
standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When
Job Reyes opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His
curiosity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves
and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a
cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He
made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams
of the contents thereof.
● Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and
requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the
cellophane wrapper. He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's
shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, (August 14, 1987).
Job Reyes was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. He informed the
NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes
and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer went to the Reyes' office at
Ermita, Manila.
● Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed
and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the
styrofoam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried
marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane
wrappers. The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened
 by Job Reyes. He discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like
dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained Tabacalera
cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly
stocked underneath the cigar. The NBI agents made an inventory and took
charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt"
acknowledging custody of the said effects.
● The NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. The NBI agents asked
for assistance to Manila Central Post Office’s Chief Security, where the
appellants passport addressed was indicated.
● The Appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited
by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves.
On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves
to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that
the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic
chemist.
● An Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
● Trial court convicted him for violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to
Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Accused appealed
to the court averring that his constitutional right to illegal searches and
seizures is violated when his parcels were opened without his permission.
Issue/s:
● W/N the search and seizure committed by the private individual inviolate the
constitutional right of the accused against unlawful searches and seizures?-
NO
Ratio:
● In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and
has struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the
constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures.
However, on the cases cited by the SC, the evidence so obtained were
invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers
or other authorized government agencies.
● The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to
be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting
in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State
authorities.
● Therefore, In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
● First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the
proposition that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the
prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr.
Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made
search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a
standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary
measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau
of Posts. After Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took
samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place
of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcel containing the rest of the
shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents.
Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one,
contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.
● Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable
search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by
the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is
not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has
been committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d
135). Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the
part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the
constitution.
● The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures
therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its
agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be
invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
● If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must
generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However,
if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not
the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE,the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
 486. People v. Bongcarawan, GR No. 143944, 11 July 2002
G.R. No. | Date | Ponente | Rule 126: Search and Seizure
Digest by: HAM
Petitioners: People of the Philippines
Respondents: Basher Bongcarawan
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
Bongcarawan was travelling aboard Super Ferry 5 when a co-passenger suspected
him of stealing her jewelry. When his body was inspected by ship security, they found
none. When ship security inspected his baggage, they found not the jewelry but
SHABU. Thus, ship security called for the help of the Coast Guard and Bongcarawan
was arrested and the shabu was seized.
ISSUE: W/N the evidence seized from Bongcarawan (SHABU) is admissible in
evidence. - YES.
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected
by the Constitution. Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding. It should be stressed, however, that
protection is against transgression committed by the government or its agent.
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the
vessel security personnel. It was only after they found shabu inside the suitcase that
they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of
the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without
government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
Facts:
● Basher Bongcarawan was charged with possession of 8 packs of Shabu under
RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992.
● Bongcarawan was abord M/V Super Ferry 5, sailing from Manila to Iligan. A
passenger, Lorena Canoy, had her jewelry missing and suspected
Bongcarawan as the thief. The security officers of the vessel accompanied
Canoy and found Bongcarawan.
● With his consent, he was bodily searched but no jewelry was found. When his
baggage was inspected, Bongcarawan opened his suitcase and the security
officers saw small packets suspected to be shabu.
● The security officers asked the help of the Coast Guard, and arrested
Bongcarawan and seized the suspected shabu. Both were later turned over
to PAOCTF and NBI, and the suspected shabu was confirmed to be shabu.
● Bongcarawan, on the other hand, said that by a neighbor to bring the suitcase
to Iligan. He claimed that he did not himself open the suitcase (he claims that
he did not know the passcode) but was forced open by the security officers
who found the suspected shabu.
Issue/s:
● W/N the evidence seized from Bongcarawan (the shabu) is admissible in
evidence. - YES.
Ratio:
● The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right
protected by the Constitution. Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. It should be stressed,
however, that protection is against transgression committed by the
government or its agent.
● As held by this Court in the case of People v. Marti, in the absence of
governmental interference, liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked against the State. The constitutional proscription against unlawful
searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
● In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by
the vessel security personnel. It was only after they found shabu inside the
suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The
search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was
therefore carried out without government intervention, and hence, the
constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure does
not apply.
● There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search
and seizure performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered
as one conducted by the police authorities for like the latter, the former are
armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security officer
in the case at bar is a private employee and does not discharge any
governmental function. In contrast, police officers are agents of the state
tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of the law. Historically and
until now, it is against them and other agents of the state that the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in
Criminal Case No. 06-7542, convicting accused-appellant Basher Bongcarawan of
violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
is AFFIRMED.
 487. Malaloan v. CA, GR No. 104879, 6 May 1994
G.R. No. | Date | Ponente | Rule 126: Search and Seizure
Digest by: JOSEF
Petitioners: ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, in his capacity
as Presiding Judge, Branch 131, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City; HON. TIRSO
D.C. VELASCO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 88, Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
An application for a search warrant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan
City. The search warrant was sought for in connection with an alleged violation of
P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions) perpetrated in Quezon
City. Respondent RTC Judge of Kalookan City issued the Search Warrant On the
same day, members of the CAPCOM, armed with subject search warrant,
proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to and firearms, explosive materials
and subversive documents, among others, were seized and taken during the search.
Herein petitioners, who were found within the premises searched, were indicated for
violation of P.D. 1866 in a Criminal Case before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, presided over by respondent Judge Velasco. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Quashal of Search Warrant before the Quezon City court. The respondent Quezon
City Judge issued the challenged order, consolidating subject cases but denying the
prayer for the quashal of the search warrant under attack, the validity of which
warrant was upheld; opining that the same falls under the category of Writs and
Processes, within the contemplation of paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines, and can be served not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing
court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court. Petitioners appealed
the order. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
● W/N only the court which has jurisdiction over the criminal case can issue
the search warrant --NO
● W/N a court whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the place to be
searched can issue a search warrant therefor -- YES
RULING: A search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to
respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, or
in anticipation thereof. We definitely cannot accept the conclusion that the grant of
power to the courts mentioned therein, to entertain and issue search warrants where
the place to be searched is within their territorial jurisdiction, was intended to exclude
other courts from exercising the same power.
It is incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction over the criminal case
can issue the search warrant, as would be the consequence of petitioners' position
that only the branch of the court with jurisdiction over the place to be searched can
issue a warrant to search the same. It may be conceded, as a matter of policy, that
where a criminal case is pending, the court wherein it was filed, or the assigned
branch thereof, has primary jurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and where no
such criminal case has yet been filed, that the executive judges or their lawful
substitutes in the areas and for the offenses contemplated in Circular No. 19 shall
have primary jurisdiction. This should not, however, mean that a court whose
territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the place to be searched cannot issue a
search warrant therefor, where the obtention of that search warrant is necessitated
and justified by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and place.
Conversely, neither should a search warrant duly issued by a court which has
jurisdiction over a pending criminal case, or one issued by an executive judge or his
lawful substitute under the situations provided for by Circular No. 19, be denied
enforcement or nullified just because it was implemented outside the court's
territorial jurisdiction.
Facts:
● 1st Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern Sector (now Central
Sector) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City an application for
search warrant. The search warrant was sought for in connection with an
alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions) perpetrated in Quezon City.
● Respondent RTC Judge of Kalookan City issued Search Warrant No. 95-90.
● On the same day, members of the CAPCOM, armed with subject search
warrant, proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to, where a labor
seminar of the Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education and Research
(EILER) was then taking place.
● According to CAPCOM's "Inventory of Property Seized," firearms, explosive
materials and subversive documents, among others, were seized and taken
during the search.
● And all the sixty-one (61) persons found within the premises searched were
brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City but most of them were later released,
with the exception of the herein petitioners, EILER Instructors, who were
indicated for violation of P.D. 1866 in Criminal Case No. Q-90-11757 before
Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over by
respondent Judge Velasco.
● Petitioners presented a "Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant
and For the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence" before the Quezon
City court; and a "Supplemental Motion to the Motion for Consolidation,
Quashal of Search Warrant and Exclusion of Evidence Illegally Obtained.
● The respondent Quezon City Judge issued the challenged order,
consolidating subject cases but denying the prayer for the quashal of the
search warrant under attack, the validity of which warrant was upheld; opining
that the same falls under the category of Writs and Processes, within the
contemplation of paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, and can
be served not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but
anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court (National Capital Judicial
Region);. . .
● Petitioners appealed the order. The CA affirmed.
Issue/s:
● W/N only the court which has jurisdiction over the criminal case can issue the
search warrant --NO
● W/N a court whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the place to be
searched can issue a search warrant therefor -- YES
Ratio:
● Petitioners invoke the jurisdictional rules in the institution of criminal actions to
invalidate the search warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan
City because it is directed toward the seizure of firearms and ammunition
allegedly cached illegally in Quezon City. This theory is sought to be
buttressed by the fact that the criminal case against petitioners for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 was subsequently filed in the latter court. The
application for the search warrant, it is claimed, was accordingly filed in a court
of improper venue and since venue in criminal actions involves the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, such warrant is void for having been issued by a court
without jurisdiction to do so.
● The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for
and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a
criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special
criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as
equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific
courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites,
procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely
different from those for the institution of a criminal action.
● A search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to
respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been
instituted, or in anticipation thereof.
● In the latter contingency, as in the case at bar, it would involve some judicial
clairvoyance to require observance of the rules as to where a criminal case
may eventually be filed where, in the first place, no such action having as yet
been instituted, it may ultimately be filed in a territorial jurisdiction other than
that wherein the illegal articles sought to be seized are then located.
● This is aside from the consideration that a criminal action may be filed in
different venues under the rules for delitos continuados or in those instances
where different trial courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the same
criminal offense.
● In fact, to illustrate the gravity of the problem which petitioners' implausible
position may create, we need not stray far from the provisions of Section 15,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court on the venue of criminal actions.
● It would be an exacting imposition upon the law enforcement authorities or the
prosecutorial agencies to unerringly determine where they should apply for a
search warrant in view of the uncertainties and possibilities as to the ultimate
venue of a case under the foregoing rules. It would be doubly so if compliance
with that requirement would be under pain of nullification of said warrant
should they file their application therefor in and obtain the same from what
may later turn out to be a court not within the ambit of the aforequoted Section
15.
● We definitely cannot accept the conclusion that the grant of power to the
courts mentioned therein, to entertain and issue search warrants where the
place to be searched is within their territorial jurisdiction, was intended to
exclude other courts from exercising the same power
● Administrative Circular No. 13 provides that:
If, in the implementation of the search warrant properties are seized
thereunder and the corresponding case is filed in court, said case shall be
distributed conformably with Circular No. 7 dated September 23, 1974, of this
Court, and thereupon tried and decided by the judge to whom it has been
assigned, and not necessarily by the judge who issued the search warrant.
(Emphasis supplied.)
● It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction over
the criminal case can issue the search warrant, as would be the consequence
of petitioners' position that only the branch of the court with jurisdiction over
the place to be searched can issue a warrant to search the same. It may be
conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a criminal case is pending, the
court wherein it was filed, or the assigned branch thereof, has primary
jurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and where no such criminal case has
yet been filed, that the executive judges or their lawful substitutes in the areas
and for the offenses contemplated in Circular No. 19 shall have primary
jurisdiction.
● This should not, however, mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction does
not embrace the place to be searched cannot issue a search warrant therefor,
where the obtention of that search warrant is necessitated and justified by
compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and place. Conversely,
neither should a search warrant duly issued by a court which has jurisdiction
over a pending criminal case, or one issued by an executive judge or his lawful
substitute under the situations provided for by Circular No. 19, be denied
enforcement or nullified just because it was implemented outside the court's
territorial jurisdiction.
● Concern is expressed over possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more
accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending
in one court and the search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure
of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case.
This arrangement is not unknown or without precedent in our jurisdiction. In
fact, as hereinbefore noted, this very situation was anticipated in Circular No.
13 of this Court under the limited scenario contemplated therein.
● Nonetheless, to put such presentiments to rest, we lay down the following
policy guidelines:
1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction
to issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An
application for a search warrant may be filed with another court only under
extreme and compelling circumstances that the applicant must prove to the
satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due course to the
application depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing
the same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover.
2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same
may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any
proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the
resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available,
existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for
the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the
issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal
case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property
seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since
two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation,
a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are
 alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping,
a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion
rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during
the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of
the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress
shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.
4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash
the same and is not otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all
personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it
to the court wherein the criminal case is pending, with the necessary
safeguards and documentation therefor.
5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense
is charged in different informations or complaints and filed in two or more
courts with concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the
issue of which court will try the case shall have been resolved, such court shall
be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on applications for
search warrants incident to the criminal case.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED and the
assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23533 is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 488. RE: REPORT ON THE PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE SPOT AUDIT IN
170 from January 2015 up to May 10, was probable cause for their issuance
THE RTC, BRANCH 170, MALABON CITY, A.M. No. 16-05-142-RTC, September 5,
2017. 2016, and 19235 of which are John/Jane and in compliance with law and
A.M. No. 16-05-142-RTC | Sep 5, 2017 | Del Castillo, J | Search warrants Doe search warrants. Out of the 790 procedure" and that he has no no control
search warrants issued, 442 or 55.95% over which search warrant applications
Digest by: June
thereof have yielded negative results, will be filed in the RTC of Malabon City,
remained unserved, or were otherwise much less those that will be raffled to
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
never returned to the court Branch 170.69 Neither does he or the
A spot audit was conducted in RTC branch 170, Malabon city which was presided
court personnel under him have any
by Judge Zaldy B. Docena. The results of the investigation showed that Judge
hand in the implementation of the search
Magsino and Judge Docena issued search warrants outside of their territorial
warrants issued by him or the outcome
jurisdiction without the necessary statement of compelling reasons in the search
or results thereof. Furthermore, there is
warrant application or where the compelling reasons appear to be without merit.
nothing irregular in his issuance of 192
John/Jane Doe search warrants,
Issue: W/N the absence of a statement of compelling reasons in a warrant
considering that the crimes involved
application is a ground for its outright denial when filed in a court which does not
therein are mostly violations of the
have territorial jurisdiction over the alleged criminal act? No
Cybercrime Prevention Act and the £-
Commerce Act, where there is indeed
Held: It is settled that the inclusion of a statement of compelling reasons in a search
difficulty in obtaining the identities of the
warrant application that is filed in a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction
alleged perpetrators.
over the place of commission of the alleged crime is a mandatory requirement, and
its absence renders the application defective. However, the absence of the
statement of compelling reasons is not a ground for an outright denial of the search Judge Docena denies having violated
warrant application since it is not one of the requisites for the issuance of a search Judge Docena granted 758 search Section 2(a) of Rule 126 of the Rules of
warrant. An application for a search warrant merely constitutes a criminal process warrant applications even though the Court and Section 12, Chapter V of A.M.
and is not in itself a criminal action. The venue is only procedural, and not places of commission of the crimes No. 03-8-02, given that the issuance of
jurisdictional, in applications for the issuance of a search warrant. The issue on the involved therein were outside the search warrants is inherent in all courts
absence of a statement of compelling reasons in an application for a search warrant territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of and venue in search warrant applications
does not involve a question of jurisdiction over the subject matter, as the power to Malabon City. Out of 758 is merely procedural and not
issue search warrants is inherent in all courts. Thus, the trial court may only take applications,37 had completely failed jurisdictional.
cognizance of such issue if it is raised in a timely motion to quash the search warrant. to cite compelling reasons to warrant - He cannot deny motu propio the
Otherwise, the objection shall be deemed waived, pursuant to the Omnibus Motion their filing in the RTC of Malabon City. warrant applications due to the absence
Rule. Here, Judge Docena and Judge Magsino simply exercised the trial court's There were also instances where the of compelling reasons and improper
ancillary jurisdiction over a special criminal process when they took cognizance of compelling reasons cited by the venue as these have to be raised by the
the applications and issued said search warrants. The propriety of the issuance of applicant appear to be without merit, accused/respondent in a motion to
these warrants is a matter that should have been raised in a motion to quash or in a and Judge Docena failed to ask the quash. If a respondent does not raise the
certiorari petition, if there are allegations of grave abuse of discretion on the part of required probing and exhaustive issue on venue, he/she must be deemed
the issuing judge. inquiry on the veracity of the to have waived this defense
compelling reason invoked. - the warrant applications were granted
on the good faith belief that the
Facts:
compelling reasons were meritorious
● The OCA conducted a spot audit in RTC branch 170, Malabon city which was
and that this determination should be
presided by Judge Zaldy B. Docena.
respected unless it is shown that [he] is
● The result of the investigation on Branch 170 and Judge Docena's arguments:
guilty of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of
Arguments of Judge Docena jurisdiction.
Findings - the rule requiring judges to conduct a
probing and exhaustive inquiry is
Judge Docena submits that he granted applicable only to the determination of
the search warrant applications before probable cause" and not to the
Judge Docena granted all 790 search
him "in the good faith belief that there compelling reasons cited by an applicant
warrant applications raffled to Branch

in a search warrant application as the
existence of compelling reasons does
not relate to the existence of probable
cause which is the basis for the issuance
of the search warrant.
Typographical errors only as Branch 170
There were warrants issued ahead of the uses previous documents as templates
date of warrant application in order to save time and effort. As such
he claims that the dates in the orders
pertaining to some search warrant
applications were not properly edited to
reflect the correct date
● On Judge Magsino: The OCA found that he granted a considerable number
of search warrant applications where the offenses were committed outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Malabon.
● Based on these findings, the OCA recommended that Judge Docena should
be dismissed from service for gross ignorance of the law, gross negligence
and gross misconduct. It also found Judge Magsino to have violated the
following: (a) violation of Supreme Court rules and circulars concerning the
raffle of search warrant applications, and Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court and Section 12, Chapter V of the Guidelines in the Selection and
Designation of 1'.,xecutive Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives
and Duties on the issuance of search warrants, and Section 12(b ), Rule 126,
Rules of Court on, among others, the filing of the returns; and (b) inefficiency
in the performance of his duties as Presiding Judge of Branch 74, same court,
and FINED in the amount of ₱20,000.00;
● On the court personnel: Suspension for Atty. Dizon (Clerk of court office) &
Atty. Hernandez (Branch clerk of court). The court stenographers Labagnao,
Fardo, San Pedro and Mendoza were found guilty of simple neglect of duty.
Salonga (Clerk in charge) was also found guilty of simple misconduct.
Issue/s:
● W/N the absence of a statement of compelling reasons in a warrant application
is a ground for its outright denial when filed in a court which does not have
territorial jurisdiction over the alleged criminal act? No
Ratio:
● Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides for the proper venue where
applications for search warrant should be filed:
SEC. 2. Court where applications for search warrant shall be filed. - An
application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:(a) Any court
within whose jurisdiction a crime was committed. (b) For compelling reasons
stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime
was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any
court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced. However,
if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made
in the court where the criminal action is pending
● It is settled that the inclusion of a statement of compelling reasons in a search
warrant application that is filed in a court which does not have territorial
jurisdiction over the place of commission of the alleged crime is a mandatory
requirement, and its absence renders the application defective. However, the
absence of the statement of compelling reasons is not a ground for an outright
denial of the search warrant application since it is not one of the requisites for
the issuance of a search warrant. Section 4 of Rule 126 provides:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not
issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
● The statement of compelling reasons is only a mandatory requirement in so
far as the proper venue for the filing of search warrant application is
concerned. It cannot be viewed as an additional requisite for the issuance of
a search warrant.
● An application for a search warrant merely constitutes a criminal process and
is not in itself a criminal action. The venue is only procedural, and not
jurisdictional, in applications for the issuance of a search warrant. the issue on
the absence of a statement of compelling reasons in an application for a
search warrant does not involve a question of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, as the power to issue search warrants is inherent in all courts. Thus,
the trial court may only take cognizance of such issue if it is raised in a timely
motion to quash the search warrant. Otherwise, the objection shall be deemed
waived, pursuant to the Omnibus Motion Rule
● An administrative proceeding is not the proper forum to review the search
warrants issued by Judge Docena and Judge Magsino in order to determine
whether the compelling reasons cited in their respective applications are
indeed meritorious. The determination of the existence of compelling reasons
is a matter squarely addressed to the sound discretion of the court where such
application is filed, subject to review by an appellate court in case of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
● Judge Docena and Judge Magsino simply exercised the trial court's ancillary
jurisdiction over a special criminal process when they took cognizance of the
applications and issued said search warrants. And as previously discussed,
the propriety of the issuance of these warrants is a matter that should have
been raised in a motion to quash or in a certiorari petition, if there are
allegations of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the issuing judge.
On their Administrative liability
● The OCA found Judge Docena in bad faith in issuing search warrants because
of the following: (1), the high incidence of search warrant operations that
yielded negative results, remained unserved, or otherwise were never
returned to the court;(2) He used leading questions during the examination of
the applicant and the witness in SW16-257 and SW14-134;102 (3) 4 search
warrants issued by him have been nullified due to insufficiency of compelling
reasons in the search warrant application; (4) there were search warrants
 issued ahead of the application. However, these circumstances are
insufficient to overturn the presumption that Judge Docena acted in good faith
● The low success rate of search warrant application cannot be attributed to him
as courts have no participation in the implementation of search warrants.
● The nullification of the 4 search warrants by the CA does not automatically
mean that the all warrants issued by him suffer from the same infirmity. Not
every mistake of a judge in the performance of his duties makes him liable for
it. But he is liable for gross neglect of duty for the serious mismanagement of
search warrants applications in his branch as he failed to properly monitor the
submission of the returns.
Administrative liability of other court personnel
● The court personnel of Branch 170, namely Atty. Jesus S. Hernandez (Branch
Clerk of Court), Ms. Zenaida Z. Salonga (Clerk-in-Charge), together with Ms.
Olivia M. Labagnao, Ms. Rosario M. San Pedro, Ms. Debhem N. Fajardo, and
Ms. Gigi M. Mendoza, all court stenographers, are all guilty of simple neglect
of duty for failure to diligently perform their respective administrative duties.
Court personnel Violations
Atty. Hernandez a. Case records have no minutes of
the proceedings.
b. Some search warrants are
incorrectly dated, thus making it
appear that they were issued ahead
of the date of filing of their respective
applications
c. Some search warrants were
handed over to the witnesses
instead of the applicants.
d. There is no date and time of
receipt of the case folder by Branch
170 on the face of the search
warrant applications.121 e. The
search warrant case folders in
Branch 170 are not paginated.
f. In several applications, some
documents attached thereto are not
original copies.
g. Case folders are not property
stitched, and some folders have
loose pages. Other folders, too, are
merely attached using fasteners
Court Stenographers They failed to produce a total of 34
stenographic notes or seven sets of
consolidated notes, and to properly
label their stenographic notes.125 It
also appears that they only prepared
transcripts of stenographic notes
upon request of the applicants
Ms. Zenaida Z. Salonga (Clerk-in- failed to maintain the required log
Charge), book for search warrant applications
in Branch 170.
● On Judge Magsino and Atty. Dizon: They are administratively liable for simple
misconduct, in their capacities as the Executive Judge and the Clerk of Court
of the RTC of Malabon for: (1) imposing their own internal policies and
practices in lieu of the existing rules in the raffle of applications involving
ordinary cases covered by Chapter V of the Guidelines on the Selection and
Designation of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and
Duties. (2) failure to observe the proper ratio of the raffling of cases (3) Their
use of an improvised system of counting the applicants (instead of the
applications) in the special raffle as an Executive Judge, and a Clerk of Court,
has no to deviate from the prescribed ratio for the raffling of cases without
prior approval from this Court. Such practice resulted in an inequitable
distribution of search warrant applications between Branches 170 and 74 at a
ratio of almost 6:1, or a six out of seven chance that an application will be
raffled to Branch 170, thereby removing the unpredictability of the raffling
process, so much so that some applicants already indicate that their
applications are being filed with Branch 170.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. FINDS Hon. Celso R. L. Magsino, Jr., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
74, Malabon City, and then Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Malabon City,
GUILTY of simple misconduct, and hereby orders him to pay a FINE in the amount of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00), with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely;
2. FINDS Atty. Esmeralda G. Dizon, Clerk of Court, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court,. Malabon City, GUILTY of simple misconduct, and hereby orders
her to pay a FINE in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00), with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely;
3. FINDS Hon. Zaldy B. Docena, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 170,
Malabon City, GUILTY of gross neglect of duty, and hereby SUSPENDS him from office
for a period of two (2) years without pay, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely;
4. FINDS Atty. Jesus S. Hernandez, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 170, Malabon City, GUILTY of simple neglect of duty, and hereby SUSPENDS
him from office for a period of one (1) month without pay, with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely;

5. FINDS Ms. Zenaida Z. Salonga, Clerk-in-Charge, and Ms. Olivia M. Labagnao, Ms.
Debhem E. Fardo, Ms. Rosario M. San Pedro, and Ms. Gigi M. Mendoza, Court
Stenographers, Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon City, GUILTY of simple
neglect of duty, and are ADMONISHED to be more diligent and circumspect in the
performance of their duties.

SO ORDERED.
 1. Procedure for issuance of a search warrant
489. Pendon v. CA, GR No. 84873, 16 November 1990
G.R. No. 84873 | November 16, 1990 | Medialdea | Search warrant; probable cause;
determining existence thereof
Digest by: M. Lim
Petitioners: ERLE PENDON, for himself and as Managing Partner of KENER
TRADING COMPANY
Respondents: THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ENRIQUE T. JOCSON in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental, FISCAL ALEXANDER N. MIRANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of
Bacolod City and THE PROVINCIAL COMMANDER OF THE 331st PC COMPANY,
BACOLOD CITY
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
First Lieutenant Rojas filed an application for a search warrant. It was subscribed
before Bacolod City MTC Judge Magallanes and supported by the joint deposition
of two (2) witnesses. Judge Magallanes issued a search warrant, commanding the
search of the property described in the warrant. Constabulary officers conducted a
search of the premises described in the search warrant and seized several articles.
Pendon was charged for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. Before his arraignment,
Pendon filed an application for the return of the articles seized by virtue of the
search warrant on the ground that the said search warrant was illegally issued.
Judge Jocson issued an order impliedly denying the application for the quashal of
the search warrant without ruling on the issue of the validity of the issuance
thereof. Pendon filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus, assailing the legality of the search warrant and praying
for the permanent prohibition against the use in evidence of the articles and
properties seized and the return thereof to petitioner. The CA dismissed the
petition. In this petition, Pendon raised in this petition is the legality of the issuance
of the search warrant.
W/N the issuance of the search warrant was legal – NO
Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched. In determining the existence of probable cause,
it is required that:
1. The judge (or) officer must examine the witnesses personally;
2. The examination must be under oath; and
3. The examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions
and answers.
These requirements are provided under Section 4, Rule 126 of the New Rules of
Criminal Procedure.1
In this case, We find that the requirement mandated by the law and the rules that
the judge must personally examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of
1 Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
searching questions and answers before issuing the warrant, was not sufficiently
complied with. The applicant himself was not asked any searching question by
Judge Magallanes. The records disclose that the only part played by the applicant,
Lieutenant Rojas was to subscribe the application before Judge Magallanes. The
application contained pre-typed questions, none of which stated that applicant had
personal knowledge of a robbery or a theft and that the proceeds thereof are in the
possession and control of the person against whom the search warrant was sought
to be issued.
Another infirmity of the search warrant is its generality. The law requires that the
articles sought to be seized must be described with particularity. The items listed in
the warrant are so general that the searching team can practically take half of the
business of Kener Trading, the premises searched.
Far more important is that the items described in the application do not fall under
the list of personal property which may be seized under Section 2, Rule 126 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure because neither the application nor the joint
deposition alleged that the item/s sought to be seized were:
a. the subject of an offense;
b. stolen or embezzled property and other proceeds or fruits of an offense;
c. used or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense.
No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the petitioner may be, their
seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant.
W/N the return is proper – YES
The seized articles were described in the receipt issued by PC Sergeant Mamaril as
galvanized bolts, V-chuckle, U-bolts, and angular bar. There is no showing that the
possession thereof is prohibited by law hence, the return thereof to petitioner is
proper. Also, the use in evidence of the articles seized pursuant to an invalid search
warrant is enjoined by Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution.
Facts:
● First Lieutenant Felipe L. Rojas, Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine
Constabulary-Criminal Investigation Service (PC-CIS), Bacolod City, filed an
application for a search warrant.
o The application was subscribed before Judge Demosthenes D.
Magallanes of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bacolod City and
supported by the joint deposition of two (2) witnesses, Ignacio L.
Reyes, an employee of NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation)
and IAI Eduardo Abaja of the CIS of Bacolod City.
● Judge Magallanes issued a search warrant, commanding the search of the
property described in the warrant.
● Constabulary officers stationed in Bacolod City conducted a search of the
premises described in the search warrant and seized the following articles, to
wit: 1) 272 kilos of galvanized bolts, V chuckle and U-bolts; and 2) 3 and 1/2
writing and under oath the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together
with any affidavits submitted.
 feet angular bar. The receipt was signed by Digno Mamaril, PC Sergeant and
marked "from Kenneth Siao".
● Kenneth Siao was charged for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. 1612)
with the office of the City Fiscal by the National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR).
o Siao filed a counter-affidavit alleging that he had previously
relinquished all his rights and ownership over the Kener Trading to
herein petitioner Erle Pendon.
o In a resolution, the office of the City Fiscal recommended the
dismissal of the complaint against Siao and the filing of a complaint
for the same violation against petitioner.
o Petitioner Pendon was charged for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law.
● Before his arraignment, petitioner Pendon filed an application for the return of
the articles seized by virtue of the search warrant on the ground that the said
search warrant was illegally issued.
o The prosecuting fiscal filed an opposition to the application.
o The application was subsequently amended to an application for
quashal of the illegally-issued search warrant and for the return of
the articles seized by virtue thereof.
● Respondent Judge Jocson issued an order impliedly denying the application
for the quashal of the search warrant without ruling on the issue of the validity
of the issuance thereof.
o Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.
● Petitioner Pendon filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus with a prayer for a restraining order, assailing the
legality of the search warrant and praying for the permanent prohibition
against the use in evidence of the articles and properties seized and the return
thereof to petitioner.
o The CA dismissed the petition. It found the existence of a probable
cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant.
o Petitioner Pendon filed a motion for reconsideration of the above
decision but it was denied in a resolution.
● The basic issue raised in this petition is the legality of the issuance of the
search warrant.
o Petitioner contends that the application for the search warrant and
the joint deposition of the witnesses miserably failed to fulfill the
requirements prescribed by the Constitution and the rules.
o Petitioner argues that the application of 1st Lt. Rojas and the joint
deposition of Abaja and Reyes failed to comply with the requisites of
searching questions and answers. The joint deposition of the
witnesses showed that the questions therein were pretyped,
mimeographed and the answers of the witnesses were merely filled-
in. No examination of the applicant and of the joint deponents was
personally conducted by Judge Magallanes as required by law and
the rules.
o Additionally, petitioner also contends that both the application of
Rojas and the joint deposition of Abaya and Reyes show that neither
of the affiants had personal knowledge that any specific offense was
committed by petitioner or that the articles sought to be seized were
stolen or that being so, they were brought to Kenneth Siao.
o Lastly, the petitioner contends that, even assuming for the sake of
polemics, that the articles belong to the latter, his Constitutional right
prevails over that of NAPOCOR.
Issue/s:
A. W/N the issuance of the search warrant was legal – NO
B. W/N the return is proper – YES
Ratio:
A. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed under
Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.
● Under the above provision, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only
upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been
defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought
to be searched. In determining the existence of probable cause, it is
required that:
1. The judge (or) officer must examine the witnesses personally;
2. The examination must be under oath; and
3. The examination must be reduced to writing in the form of
searching questions and answers.
● These requirements are provided under Section 4, Rule 126 of the New
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
● It has been ruled that the existence of probable cause depends to a large
degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination,
however, the opinion or finding of probable cause must, to a certain degree,
be substantiated or supported by the record.
● In this case, We find that the requirement mandated by the law and the rules
that the judge must personally examine the applicant and his witnesses in the
form of searching questions and answers before issuing the warrant, was not
sufficiently complied with. The applicant himself was not asked any searching
question by Judge Magallanes. The records disclose that the only part played
by the applicant, Lieutenant Rojas was to subscribe the application before
Judge Magallanes. The application contained pre-typed questions, none of
which stated that applicant had personal knowledge of a robbery or a theft and
that the proceeds thereof are in the possession and control of the person
against whom the search warrant was sought to be issued. In the case of Roan
v. Gonzales, where the applicant himself was not subjected to an interrogation
but was questioned only "to ascertain, among others, if he knew and
understood (his affidavit) and only because the application was not yet
subscribed and sworn to," We held that:
○ "Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not
sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them
to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the
Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-
existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person
giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.'
 ■ "It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and
exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro forma, if the claimed
probable cause is to be established. The examining
magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the
affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application."
● Likewise, the joint deposition made by the two (2) witnesses presented
by the applicant can hardly satisfy the same requirement. The public
respondent prosecutor admitted in his memorandum that the questions
propounded were pre-typed.
● The offense which petitioner was sought to be charged was violation of the
anti-fencing law which punishes the act of any person who, with intent to gain
for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal,
sell or dispose of, or shall buy or sell, or in any other manner deal in any article,
item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should have known to
him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft
(Sec. 2a, P.D. 1612). The four (4) questions propounded could hardly support
a finding of probable cause. The first question was on the personal
circumstances of the deponents. The second and third were leading questions
answerable by yes or no. The fourth question was on how the deponents knew
about their answers in the second and third questions. The judge could have
exploited this last question to convince himself of the existence of a probable
cause but he did not. There was also no statement in the joint deposition that
the articles sought to be seized were derived from the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or a theft or that applicants have any knowledge that a robbery or
theft was committed and the articles sought to be seized were the proceeds
thereof. It was not even shown what connection Kenneth Siao has with Kener
Trading or with the premises sought to be searched. By and large, neither the
application nor the joint deposition provided facts or circumstance which could
lead a prudent man to believe that an offense had been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense, if any, are in the possession
of the person named in the application.
○ "[T]he searching questions propounded to the applicants of the
search warrant and his witnesses must depend to a large extent upon
the discretion of the Judge just as long as the answers establish a
reasonable ground to believe the commission of a specific offense
and that the applicant is one authorized by law, and said answers
particularly describe with certainty the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. The examination or investigation
which must be under oath may not be in public. It may even be held
in the secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the
examination or investigation is not merely routinary but one that is
thorough and elicit the required information. To repeat, it must be
under oath and must be in writing. (Mata v. Bayona, 50720, March
26, 1984, 128 SCRA 388) (emphasis supplied)
2 Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. — Mere possession of any goods, article, item,
object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be
prima facie evidence of fencing.
● And, in Quintero v. NBI, G.R. No. L-35149, June 23, 1988, 162 SCRA 467,
483:
○ "As held in Nolasco v. Paño No. 69803, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA
163), the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to
the applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to establish
probable cause. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an
application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a
general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of
a valid search warrant."
● Another infirmity of Search Warrant No. 181 is its generality. The law
requires that the articles sought to be seized must be described with
particularity. The items listed in the warrant, to wit: "NAPOCOR Galvanized
bolts, grounding motor drive assembly, aluminum wires and other NAPOCOR
Towers parts and line accessories" are so general that the searching team
can practically take half of the business of Kener Trading, the premises
searched. Kener Trading, as alleged in petitioner's petition before respondent
Court of Appeals and which has not been denied by respondent, is engaged
in the business of buying and selling scrap metals, second hand spare parts
and accessories and empty bottles.
● Far more important is that the items described in the application do not
fall under the list of personal property which may be seized under
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure because neither
the application nor the joint deposition alleged that the item/s sought to
be seized were:
a. the subject of an offense;
b. stolen or embezzled property and other proceeds or fruits of an
offense;
c. used or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense.
● It is noted that respondent Judge Jocson himself had doubts about the
existence of probable cause in the issuance of the search warrant. In denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to quash and
application for articles seized by virtue of search warrant No. 181, he stated:
○ "The seeming lack of probable cause during the application for
search warrant in the lower court is cured by the admission for the
accused of counsel that at least one of the items seized bore the
identifying mark of complainant National Power Corporation and the
failure to aver in the quashal motion and in the open hearing that the
seized items themselves were acquired in the usual course of
business for value in good faith. However, this order is without
prejudice to the right of the accused to pursue against the
administrative liability of MTCC Judge Demosthenes Magallanes."
● In his memorandum, City Fiscal Mirano stated that the articles seized by virtue
of the search warrant was taken from the possession of petitioner who signed
the receipt in behalf of Kener Trading, which possession is punishable under
Section 5, P.D. 1612.2
 ● No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the petitioner may
be, their seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant. Again, in the case of
Mata v. Bayona, G.R. No. 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 388:
○ ". . . that nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but
the fulfillment of the legal requisites. It might be well to point out what
has been said in Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera:
○ 'It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater
importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the
right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his
private affairs, books and papers from inspection and scrutiny of
others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the
public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government."
○ "Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with
the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A
liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual to
prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the
rights secured by the Constitution. No presumption of regularity are
to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to
justify it."

B. Finally, the seized articles were described in the receipt issued by PC

Sergeant Mamaril as galvanized bolts, V-chuckle, U-bolts and 3 1/2 feet
angular bar. There is no showing that the possession thereof is prohibited by
law hence, the return thereof to petitioner is proper. Also, the use in evidence
of the articles seized pursuant to an invalid search warrant is enjoined by
Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution.

Dispositive:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. Judgment is hereby rendered: 1) declaring
Search Warrant No. 181 issued by Judge Demosthenes Magallanes NULL and VOID;
2) ordering the return of the items seized by virtue of the said warrant to herein
petitioner; and 3) permanently enjoining respondents from using in evidence the articles
seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 181 in Criminal Case No. 5657.
 490. Paper Industries Corp. v. Asuncion,
GR No. 122092 | 19 May 1999 | Panganiban | Search Warrant
Digest by: ET
Petitioners: PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
EVARISTO M. NARVAEZ JR., RICARDO G. SANTIAGO, ROBERTO A.
DORMENDO, REYDANDE D. AZUCENA, NICEFORO V. AVILA, FLORENTINO M.
MULA, FELIX O. BAITO, HAROLD B. CELESTIAL, ELMEDENCIO C. CALIXTRO,
CARLITO S. LEGACION, ALBINO T. LUBANG, JEREMIAS I. ABAD and HERMINIO
V. VILLAMIL
Respondents: JUDGE MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; STATE PROSECUTOR LEO B. DACERA III;
and the SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIT OF THE PNP TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
COMMAND
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant before the
RTC of Quezon City, stating: 1. That the management of Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound, is in possession or has
in its control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject
of the offense, or used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which
are being kept and concealed in the premises described; 2. That a Search Warrant
should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession and bring to the
described properties. After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge
Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search warrant. The police enforced
the search warrant at the PICOP compound and seized a number of firearms and
explosives. Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the
petitioners filed a «Motion to Quash» before the trial court. Subsequently, they also
filed a Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash and a Motion to
SuppressEvidence. W/N the search warrant is valid? - NO
The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such
presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing
and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts
personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.
In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trail court
failed to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2)
SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance or
the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not
licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was
not described with particularity.
Facts:
● Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant
before the said RTC of Quezon City. He alleged that the management of
Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound,
Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice President
Ricardo G[.] Santiago, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered
firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or
used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which . . . are
[being kept] and conceal[ed] in the premises herein described.That a Search
Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession
and bring to this Honorable Court the following described properties:
o Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56, ten (10) M16 US rifles, two
(2) AK-47 rifle[s], two (2) UZI submachinegun[s], two (2) M203
Grenade Launcher[s] cal. 40mm, ten (10) cal.45 pistol[s], ten (10)
cal.38 revolver[s], two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s], assorted
ammunitions for said calibers of firearms and ten (10) handgrenades.
● Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion granted such a warrant and the PICOP
compound was searched and seized.
● Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the
petitioners filed a "Motion to Quash" before the trial court. Subsequently, they
also filed a "Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash" and a "Motion to
Suppress Evidence."
Issue/s:
● W/N the search warrant is valid? - NO
Ratio:
● The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2)
such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and
the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge,
in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses
testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically
describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
● In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trail
court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other
deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing
for the issuance or the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that
petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3)
the place to be searched was not described with particularity.
● As earlier stated, Chief Inspector Pascua's application for a search warrant
was supported by (1) the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and
SPO2 Cecilio T. Moriro, (2) a summary of information and (3) supplementary
statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno. Except for Pascua and Bacolod
however, none of the aforementioned witnesses and policemen appeared
before the trial court. Moreover, the applicant's participation in the hearing for
the issuance of the search warrant consisted only of introducing Witness
Bacolod.
● The trial judge failed to propound questions, let alone probing questions, to
the applicant and to his witnesses other than Bacolod (whose testimony, as
will later be shown, is also improper).
● Bacolod failed to affirm that none of the firearms seen inside the PICOP
compound was licensed. Bacolod merely declared that the security agency
and its guard were not licensed. He also said that some of the firearms were
owned by PICOP. Yet, he made no statement before the trail court PICOP,
aside from the security agency, had no license to possess those firearms.
Worse, the applicant and his witnesses inexplicably failed to attach to the
application a copy aforementioned "no license" certification from the Firearms
 and Explosives Office (FEO) of the PNP or to present it during the hearing.
Such certification could have been easily obtained, considering that the FEO
was located in Camp Crame where the unit of Bacolod was also based.
● In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed to described the place
with particularly. It simply authorizes a search of "the aforementioned
premises," but it did not specify such premises. The warrant identifies only one
place, and that is the "Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located
at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig[,] Surigao del Sur." The PICOP
compound, however, is made up of "200 offices/building, 15 plants, 84 staff
houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick
service outlets and some 800 miscellaneous structures, all of which are
spread out over some one hundred fifty-five hectares." Obviously, the warrant
gives the police officers unbridled and thus illegal authority to search all the
structures found inside the PICOP compound.
● As a result of the seizure of the firearms, effected pursuant to Search Warrant
No. 799 (95) issued by the respondent judge, the PNP filed with the
Department of Justice a complaint docketed as IS No. 95-167 against herein
petitioners for illegal possession of firearms. State Prosecutor Dacera, to
whom the Complaint was assigned for preliminary investigation, issued a
subpoena requiring petitioners to file their counter-affidavits.
●
● Instead of complying with the subpoena, petitioners asked for the suspension
of the preliminary investigation, pending the resolution of their motion to quash
the search warrant. They argued, as they do now, that the illegal obtained
firearms could not be the basis of the criminal Complaint. Their motion was
denied. A subsequent Motion for Reconsideration met the same fate. In the
present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners assert that "State
Prosecutor Dacera cannot have any tenable basis for continuing with the
proceedings in IS No. 95-167."
● Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and
the Rules of Court, all the firearms, explosives and other materials seized were
"inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." As the Court noted in an
earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence was "the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures." Verily, they are the "fruits of the
poisonous tree." Without this exclusionary rule, the constitutional right "would
be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the
freedom from all brutish means evidence means of coercing evidence . . .."

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby GRANTED
and Search Warrant No. 799 (95) accordingly declared NULL and VOID. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court on October 23, 1995 is hereby MADE
PERMANENT. No pronouncement as to costs.
 491. People v. Dichoso, GR Nos. 101216-18, 4 June 1993
G.R. No. | Date | Ponente | Procedure for issuance of a search warrant
Digest by: MAULION
Petitioners: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondents: REDENTOR DICHOSO y DAGDAG, SONIA DICHOSO y
VINERABLE and JAIME PAGTAKHAN y BICOMONG, accused.
REDENTOR DICHOSO y DAGDAG, accused-appellant.
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
Dichoso was found guilty of violating Section 15, Article III and Section 4, Article II
of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
A search warrant was issued on the house of the accused after the judge found that
there was probable cause to believe that the accused were illegally in possession of
undetermined quantity/amount of dried marijuana leaves and Shabu and sets of
paraphernalias stored inside the nipa hut within the compound of their residence at
Farconville Sub., Phase II, San Pablo City which should be seized. Pursuant to the
search warrant, the NARCOM seized shabu and marijuana, as well as a notebook
containing a suspected list of customers. Dichoso was then arrested and was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violations of the provisions of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
On his appeal to the Supreme Court, he questioned the validity of the search
warrant, contending that it was a general warrant as it was issued for "Violation of
RA 6425 known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended" and did not
specify the particular offense which he violated under the said law, contrary to the
requirements prescribed by the Rules.
W/N the search warrant is valid? YES. While it is for "Violation of RA 6425 known
as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992 as amended," the body thereof, which is
controlling, particularizes the place to be searched and the things to be seized, and
specifies the offense involved, viz., illegal possession of marijuana and shabu and
paraphernalia in connection therewith. Furthermore, The Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are
subsumed into "prohibited" and "regulated" drugs and defines and penalizes
categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class
or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the
said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Facts:
● On February 23, 1991, by virtue of Search Warrant No. 028 upon the spouses
Redentor Dichoso and Sonia Dichoso residing at Farconville Subd., Phase II,
San Pablo City, the NARCOM team approach their residence. The search
ensued in the nipa house where they discovered:
o 200 grams of suspected marijuana wrapped in a plastic inside a
cabinet.
o six (6) decks of suspected shabu wrapped in an aluminun foil and
o the "Golden Gate" notebook (Exhibit F) containing the list of
suspected customers of dangerous and regulated drugs together
with the corresponding quantity and prices
● Then, the search was shifted to the main house of the Dichosos. However, the
search produced negative results.
● On June 1991, the trial court promulgated the decision finding Dichoso guilty
of violation of Section 15, Article III and Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. Also, it is the finding of the Court that Jaime Pagtakhan violated
Section 16 of said Act. Both of them should be made to suffer the
consequences of their unlawful acts.
● Dichoso sought to reverse the RTC decision contending that:
o Search Warrant No. 028, obtained and executed by the NARCOM
agents, is a general warrant because it was issued for "Violation of
RA 6425 known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended"
and did not specify the particular offense which he violated under the
said law, contrary to the requirements prescribed by the Constitution
and the Rules of Court, and that it was issued in violation of Section
3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which provides that "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
o he was framed by the police officers. He states that a certain Jun
planted the deck of shabu found on the table where he and his
companions were gathered around.
o (1) Exhibit "B" (a "Pagpapatunay" attesting to the result of the search
conducted by the NARCOM team and listing the items confiscated),
(2) Exhibit "C" (a "Pagpapatunay" attesting to the lawful manner of
the search), and (3) Exhibit "D" (the Receipt for Property Seized) are
inadmissible in evidence since he signed them while under police
custody without having been accorded his Constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel.
o he cannot be convicted for violation of R.A. No. 6425, as amended,
for unlawfully selling, delivering and giving away to another, and
distributing 1.3 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu)
and dried marijuana leaves, fruit tops and seeds since he was not
caught "in flagrante."
Issue/s:
● W/N the search warrant is valid? YES
Ratio:
● It is clear that the search warrant cannot be assailed as a general search
warrant because while it is for "Violation of RA 6425 known as the "Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1992 as amended," the body thereof, which is controlling,
particularizes the place to be searched and the things to be seized, and
specifies the offense involved, viz., illegal possession of marijuana and shabu
and paraphernalia in connection therewith. These are evident from the clause,
"are illegally in possession of undetermined quantity/amount of dried
marijuana leaves and methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) and sets of
paraphernalias stored inside the nipa hut within the compound of their
residence at Farconville Sub., Phase II, San Pablo City."
 ● The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with
dangerous drugs which are subsumed into "prohibited" and "regulated" drugs
and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or
which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search
warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. This is in contradiction to Dichoso’s claim that there
must be three search warrants.

● Since Search Warrant No. 028 is valid, the articles seized by virtue of its
execution may be admitted in evidence. Consequently, the trial committed no
error in denying the appellant's motion to quash the said warrant and refusing
to dismiss the informations filed against him.

● This so-called warrant rule — that only those listed in the search warrant may
be seized — which the appellant claims to have been enunciated in 1920 in
Uy Khetin vs. Villareal and which he now summons to his rescue, is not without
exceptions. Among such exceptions is the plain view doctrine enunciated in
Harris vs. United States and Coolidge vs. New Hampshire which has been
adopted in our jurisdiction.

● However, this Court finds that the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to
sustain a conviction for unlawful sale of shabu in Criminal Case No. 6711-SP
(91) and for unlawful sale of marijuana in Criminal Case No. 6712-SP (91).
There is, however, overwhelming evidence which establishes with moral
certainty the guilt of the appellant for illegal possession of shabu and
marijuana under Section 16, Article III and Section 8, Article II, respectively,
of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of San Pablo City, dated 11 June 1991, in Criminal Cases Nos. 6711-SP (91)
and 6712-SP (91) is hereby modified. As modified, accused-appellant REDENTOR
DICHOSO y DAGDAG is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended,
in Criminal Case No. 6711-SP (91) and Section 8 of Article II of the said Act in Criminal
Case No. 6712-SP (91). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby
sentenced in each case to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8)
years as minimum to twelve (12) years as maximum, and to pay a fine of Twelve
Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00).
 492. Kho v. Macalintal, GR Nos. 94902-06, 21 April 1999
G.R. No. | Date | Ponente | Procedure for issuance of search war
Digest by: Nelly
Petitioners: BENJAMIN V. KHO and ELIZABETH ALINDOGAN, Petitioners
Respondents: HON. ROBERTO L. MAKALINTAL and NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, Respondents
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
NBI agents applied for the issuance of search warrants (in anticipation of criminal
cases to be filed against petitioner Kho) in his residence in No. 45 Bb. Ramona
Tirona St., BF Homes, Phase I, Paranaque, and another search warrant for his
residence in No. 326 McDivitt St., Bgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque. These were applied
for after the NBI agents conducted personal surveillance in the two houses on the
basis of a confidential info they received that said houses were used as storage for
unlicensed firearms and chop-chop vehicles. On the same day, the respondent
Judge conducted the necessary examination of the applicants and their witnesses
and issued the search warrants. The next day, the NBI agents, pursuant to said
warrants, searched both houses and recovered various high-powered firearms,
hundreds of rounds of ammunition, radio and telecommunication equipment, two
units of motor vehicles (Lite-Ace vans) and one motorcycle. Petitioner filed MTQ.
Denied.
WON search warrants were issued without probable cause? NO.
WON search warrants were issued in violation of the procedural requirements under
the Constitution? NO
WON search warrants were general warrants? NO
WON MTQ can touch on questions on propriety of enforcement of search warrants?
NO.
I. The application for the questioned search warrants was based on the
personal knowledge of the applicants and their witnesses. Records show that
the NBI agents who conducted the surveillance and investigation testified
unequivocably that they saw guns being carried to and unloaded at the two houses
searched, and motor vehicles and spare parts were stored therein. Also, the
existence of a probable cause depends to a large extent upon the finding or
opinion of the judge who conducted the required examination of the
applicants and the witnesses. The Judge was the one who personally examined
the applicants and witnesses and who asked searching questions vis-a-vis the
applications for search warrants. He was thus able to observe and determine
whether subject applicants and their witnesses gave accurate accounts of the
surveillance and investigation they conducted at the premises to be searched. In the
absence of any showing that respondent judge was recreant of his duties in
connection with the personal examination he so conducted on the affiants before
him, there is no basis for doubting the reliability and correctness of his findings and
impressions.
II. Nothing improper is perceived in the manner the respondent Judge
conducted the examination of subject applicants for search warrants and their
witnesses. He personally examined them under oath, and asked them
searching questions on the facts and circumstances personally known to
them, in compliance with prescribed procedure and legal requirements. It can
be gleaned that the sworn statements and affidavits submitted by the witnesses were
duly attached to the pertinent records of the proceedings. It was within the
discretion of the examining Judge to determine what questions to ask the
witnesses so long as the questions asked are germane to the pivot of inquiry
- the existence or absence of a probable cause.
III. The law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in
precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the
searching authorities. Otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the
applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of
things they are looking for. Since the element of time is very crucial in criminal
cases, the effort and time spent in researching on the details to be embodied
in the warrant would render the purpose of the search nugatory. Where, by the
nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is
not required that a technical description be given, for this would mean that no
warrant could issue. In the case under consideration, the NBI agents could not
have been in a position to know before hand the exact caliber or make of the firearms
to be seized. Although the surveillance they conducted did disclose the presence of
unlicensed firearms within the premises to be searched, they could not have known
the particular type of weapons involved before seeing such weapons at close range,
which was of course impossible at the time of the filing of the applications for subject
search warrants. Verily, the failure to specify detailed descriptions in the warrants
did not render the same general.
IV. The question of whether there was abuse in the enforcement of the
challanged search warrants is not within the scope of a Motion to Quash. In a
Motion to Quash, what is assailed is the validity of the issuance of the warrant.
The manner of serving the warrant and of effecting the search are not an issue
to be resolved here. Whether the places searched and objects seized are
government properties are questions of fact outside the scope of the petition under
consideration.
Facts:
● NBI Agent Max B. Salvador applied for the issuance of search warrants
against Banjamin V. Kho, now petitioner, in his residence at No. 45 Bb.
Ramona Tirona St., BF Homes, Phase I, Paranaque. On the same day,
Eduardo T. Arugay, another NBI agent, applied with the same court for the
issuance of search warrants against the said petitioner in his house at No. 326
McDivitt St., Bgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque.
● The search warrants were applied for after teams of NBI agents had
conducted a personal surveillance and investigation in the two houses
referred to on the basis of confidential information they received that the said
 places were being used as storage centers for unlicensed firearms and chop-
chop vehicles.
● Respondent NBI sought for the issuance of search warrants in anticipation of
criminal cases to be instituted against petitioner Kho.
● On the same day, the respondent Judge conducted the necessary
examination of the applicants and their witnesses, after which he issued
Search Warrant Nos. 90-11, 90-12, 90-13, 90-14, and 90-15.
● On the following day, May 16, 1990, armed with Search Warrant Nos. 90-11
and 90-12, NBI agents searched subject premises at BF Homes, Paranaque,
and they recovered various high-powered firearms and hundreds of rounds of
ammunition.
● Meanwhile, another search was conducted at the house at No. 326 McDivitt
St. Bgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque, by another team of NBI agents using Search
Warrant Nos. 90-13, 90-14 and 90-15.
● The said second search yielded several high-powered firearms with
explosives and more than a thousand rounds of ammunition. The
simultaneous searches also resulted in the confiscation of various radio and
telecommunication equipment, two units of motor vehicles (Lite-Ace vans) and
one motorcycle.
● Upon verification with the Firearms and Explosives Unit in Camp Crame, the
NBI agents found out that no license has ever been issued to any person or
entity for the confiscated firearms in question.
● Likewise, the radio agents found out that no license has ever been issued to
any person or entity for the confiscated firearms in question. Likewise, the
radio tranceivers recovered and motor vehicles seized turned out to be
unlicensed and unregistered per records of the government agencies
concerned.
● The raiding teams submitted separate returns to the respondent Judge
requesting that the items seized be in the continued custody of the NBI
● The petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the said Search Warrants, contending
that: 1. The search warrants were issued without probable cause; 2. The same
search warrants are prohibited by the Constitution for being general warrants;
3. The said search warrants were issued in violation of the procedural
requirements set forth by the Constitution; 4. The search warrants aforesaid
were served in violation of the Revised Rules of Court; and 5. The objects
seized were all legally possessed and issued.
● respondent Judge denied Motion To Quash of petitioners.
● Petitioners question the issuance of subject search warrants, theorizing upon
the absence of any probable cause therefor. They contend that the
surveillance and investigation conducted by NBI agents within the premises
involved, prior to the application for the search warrants under controversy,
were not sufficient to vest in the applicants personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances showing or indicating the commission of a crime by them
Issue/s:
● W/N search warrants were issued without probable cause? NO.
● W/N search warrants were issued in violation of the procedural requirements
under the Constitution? NO
● W/N search warrants were general warrants? NO
● W/N MTQ can touch on questions on propriety of enforcement of search
warrants? NO.
Ratio: (red- claims of petitioner)
● I. Records show that the NBI agents who conducted the surveillance and
investigation testified unequivocably that they saw guns being carried to and
unloaded at the two houses searched, and motor vehicles and spare parts
were stored therein. In fact, applicant Max B. Salvador declared that he
personally attended the surveillance together with his witnesses (TSN, May
15, 1990, pp. 2-3), and the said witnesses personally saw the weapons being
unloaded from motor vehicles and carried to the premises referred to.
● It is therefore decisively clear that the application for the questioned
search warrants was based on the personal knowledge of the applicants
and their witnesses.
● Also, the existence of a probable cause depends to a large extent upon
the finding or opinion of the judge who conducted the required
examination of the applicants and the witnesses.
● After a careful study, the Court discerns no basis for disturbing the findings
and conclusions arrived at by the respondent Judge after examining the
applicants and witnesses. Respondent judge had the singular opportunity to
assess their testimonies and to find out their personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances enough to create a probable cause.
● The Judge was the one who personally examined the applicants and
witnesses and who asked searching questions vis-a-vis the applications
for search warrants. He was thus able to observe and determine whether
subject applicants and their witnesses gave accurate accounts of the
surveillance and investigation they conducted at the premises to be
searched.
● In the absence of any showing that respondent judge was recreant of his
duties in connection with the personal examination he so conducted on the
affiants before him, there is no basis for doubting the reliability and correctness
of his findings and impressions.
● II. Petitioners brand as fatally defective and deficient the procedure followed
in the issuance of subject search warrants, reasoning out that the same did
not comply with constitutional and statutory requirements. They fault
respondent Judge for allegedly failing to ask specific questions they deem
particularly important during the examination of the applicants and their
witnesses. To buttress their submission, petitioners invite attention to the
following question, to wit:
“How did you know that there are unlicensed firearms being kept by Benjamin
Kho at No. 45 Bb. Ramona Tirona St., Phase I, BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro
Manila?”
● Petitioners argue that by propounding the aforequoted question, the
respondent Judge assumed that the firearms at the premises to be searched
were unlicensed, instead of asking for a detailed account of how the NBI
agents came to know that the firearms being kept thereat were unlicensed.
● This stance of petitioners is similarly devoid of any sustainable basis.
● Nothing improper is perceived in the manner the respondent Judge
conducted the examination of subject applicants for search warrants
and their witnesses.
● He personally examined them under oath, and asked them searching ● In a Motion to Quash, what is assailed is the validity of the issuance of
questions on the facts and circumstances personally known to them, in the warrant. The manner of serving the warrant and of effecting the
compliance with prescribed procedure and legal requirements. search are not an issue to be resolved here.
● It can be gleaned that the sworn statements and affidavits submitted by the ● According to petitioner Kho, the premises searched and objects seized during
witnesses were duly attached to the pertinent records of the proceedings. the search sued upon belong to the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
● It was within the discretion of the examining Judge to determine what Bureau (EIIB) of which he is an agent and therefore, the NBI agents involved
questions to ask the witnesses so long as the questions asked are had no authority to search the aforesaid premises and to confiscate the
germane to the pivot of inquiry - the existence or absence of a probable objects seized.
cause. ● Whether the places searched and objects seized are government properties
● III. Petitioners claim that subject search warrants are general warrants are questions of fact outside the scope of the petition under consideration.
proscribed by the Constitution. According to them, the things to be seized were
not described and detailed out, i.e. the firearms listed were not classified as to
size or make, etc. Dispositive:
● Records on hand indicate that the search warrants under scrutiny specifically WHEREFORE, for want of merit and on the ground that it has become moot and
describe the items to be seized academic, the petition at bar is hereby DISMISSED. No pronoucement as to costs.
● The Court believes, and so holds, that the said warrants comply with
Constitutional and statutory requirements.
● The law does not require that the things to be seized must be described
in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of
the searching authorities.
● Otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a
warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are
looking for.
● Since the element of time is very crucial in criminal cases, the effort and
time spent in researching on the details to be embodied in the warrant
would render the purpose of the search nugatory.
● Where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must
be rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given,
for this would mean that no warrant could issue.
● Verily, the failure to specify detailed descriptions in the warrants did not
render the same general.
● In the case under consideration, the NBI agents could not have been in a
position to know before hand the exact caliber or make of the firearms to be
seized.
● Although the surveillance they conducted did disclose the presence of
unlicensed firearms within the premises to be searched, they could not have
known the particular type of weapons involved before seeing such weapons
at close range, which was of course impossible at the time of the filing of the
applications for subject search warrants.
● It is indeed understandable that the agents of respondent Bureau have no way
of knowing whether the guns they intend to seize are a Smith and Wesson or
a Beretta.
● Consequently, the list submitted in the applications for subject search
warrants should be adjudged in substantial compliance with the requirements
of law.
● IV.Petitioners contend that the searching agents grossly violated the
procedure in enforcing the search warrants in question. The petition avers
supposedly reprehensible acts perpetrated by the NBI agents.
● The question of whether there was abuse in the enforcement of the
challanged search warrants is not within the scope of a Motion to Quash.
 493. Worldwide Web Corporation v. People
G.R. No. 161106 | Jan 13, 2014 | Sereno | Procedure for issuance of a search
warrant
Digest by: PEREZ
Petitioners: Worldwide Web Corporation and Cherryll L. Yu
Respondents: People of the Philippines and PLDT
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
This case involves two consolidated petitions. The PNP filed an application for
search warrants against petitioners WWC and PLANET INTERNET. Three warrants
were issued by the RTC:
1st - against WWC in relation to the crime of theft.
2nd - against PLANET INTERNET in relation to the violation of PD 401.
3rd - against PLANET INTERNET in relation to the crime of theft.
WWC and PLANET INTERNET filed their respective motions to quash, which was
granted by the RTC on the ground that the warrants issued were in the nature of
general warrants.
PLDT moved for a motion for a consideration, which was denied.
PLDT appealed to the CA, which ruled in favor of PLDT reversing the quashal.
WWC and PLANET INTERNET now file this Rule 45 petition alleging, foremost, that
the CA erred in giving due course to the appeal given that PLDT, without the
conformity of the public prosecutor, had no personality to question the quashal of
the search warrants. SC disagreed. An application for search warrants is not a
criminal action.
An application for a search warrant is a "special criminal process," rather than
a criminal action. Hence, any aggrieved party may question an order quashing the
same without need for the conformity of the public prosecutor. The rule that criminal
actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor
does not apply.
Extra Doctrine:
WWC and PLANET INTERNET aver that the RTC ruling on the motion to quash is
an interlocutory order and not a final order, hence PLDT should have filed a Rule 65
petition rather than a Rule 41 appeal. The SC disagrees, elucidating:
If the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case, the quashal
of a search warrant is merely interlocutory.
If the search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of a criminal case yet
to be filed, the quashal of a search warrant is a final order.
Facts:
● WWC offers a service called GlobalTalk, an internet-based international call
service, which can be availed of via prepaid or billed/post-paid accounts. If a
PLDT phone number is registered in GlobalTalk, international calls by
subscribers will be billed by PLDT only as domestic calls under the number
6891135.
● Based on the records of PLDT, the number 6891135 is registered to WWC in
an address in Pasig City. Upon ocular inspection, the occupant of the unit is
Planet Internet, which also uses the telephone lines registered to WWC.
● Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special
Operations Office (RISOO) of the PNP filed applications for warrants alleging
that WWC and PLANET INTERNET were conducting illegal toll bypass
operations, which amounted to theft and a violation of PD 401 (Penalizing the
Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone Connections, the
Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts).
● The RTC granted the application, issuing three warrants. The warrants were
implemented on the same day by RISOO operatives, resulting in the seizure
of hundreds of items.
● WWC and PLANET INTERNET filed their respective motions to quash, which
was granted by the RTC on the ground that the warrants issued were in the
nature of general warrants.
● PLDT MR-ed but was denied. PLDT appealed to the CA, which ruled in favor
of PLDT reversing the quashal.
● WWC and PLANET INTERNET now file this Rule 45 petition alleging,
foremost, that the CA erred in giving due course to the appeal given that
PLDT, without the conformity of the public prosecutor, had no personality to
question the quashal of the search warrants
Issue/s:
● W/N PLDT may question an order quashing search warrants without the
conformity of the public prosecutor? - YES
● W/N the quashal order is an interlocutory order, which must be petitioned for
review rather than appealed? - NO
● W/N the search warrants were in the nature of general warrants? - NO
Ratio:
An application for a search warrant is not a criminal action:
● The Rules of Court states the general rule that the public prosecutor has
direction and control of the prosecution of all criminal actions commenced by
a complaint or information. However, a search warrant is obtained, not by the
filing of a complaint or an information, but by the filing of an application
therefor.
● As held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, an application for a search warrant
is a "special criminal process," rather than a criminal action:
● The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for
and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a
criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special
criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as
equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific
courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites,
procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely
different from those for the institution of a criminal action.
 ● For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely INTERNET and was then able to confirm that they had utilized various
constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order telecommunications equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables,
in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers, PABX or switching equipment, a
and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal d support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other
property and bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass operations.
criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy,
drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity. Dispositive:
● In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 20
provisions on search warrants, such warrant is definitively considered merely August 2003 and Resolution dated 27 November 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26190 are
as a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary AFFIRMED.
jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to
its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues as
formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein.
● Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action.
Meanwhile, the SC had consistently recognized the right of parties to question
orders quashing those warrants. Accordingly, the SC sustained the CA’s ruling
that the conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary before an
aggrieved party moves for reconsideration of an order granting a motion to
quash search warrants.

The quashal order in this case is a final order, not interlocutory:

● Petitioners cite Marcelo v. De Guzman wherein the court ruled that an order
granting a motion to quash a search warrant is an interlocutory order. The SC
held that reliance in Marcelo is misplaced.
● An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as
an incident in a main criminal case already filed in court or in anticipation of
one yet to be filed. Whether the criminal case has already been filed before
the trial court is significant for the purpose of determining the proper remedy
from a grant or denial of a motion to quash a search warrant.
● Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case,
as it was in Marcelo, the quashal of a search warrant is merely interlocutory.
There is still "something more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the
determination of the guilt of the accused therein."
● In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of
a criminal case yet to be filed, the order quashing the warrant (and denial of a
motion for reconsideration of the grant) ends the judicial process. There is
nothing more to be done thereafter.

The search warrants were not in the nature of general warrants:

● In this case, considering that items that looked like "innocuous goods" were
being used to pursue an illegal operation that amounts to theft, law
enforcement officers would be hard put to secure a search warrant if they were
required to pinpoint items with 100% precision. The police should not be
hindered in the performance of their duties, which are difficult enough of
performance under the best of conditions, by superficial adherence to
technicality or far-fetched judicial interference.
● PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to be searched
as identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of its telephone services
and business. Prior to the application for the search warrants, PLDT
conducted ocular inspection of the premises of WWC and PLANET
 2. Warrantless searches
Moving Vehicles
494. Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
267 US 132 | 1925| Taft| Warrantless Search of Moving Vehicle
Digest by: RECAÑA
Petitioners: George Carroll & John Kiro
Respondents: United States
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
Carroll and Kiro were indicted and convicted for transporting in an automobile
(Oldsmobile Roadster) intoxicating spirituous liquor: 68 quarts of so called bonded
whisky and gin, in violation of the National Prohibition Act. The ground on which they
assail the conviction is that the trial court admitted in evidence two of the 68 bottles,
one of whisky and one of gin, found by searching the automobile. They contended
that the search and seizure were in violation of the Fourth Amendment (the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures), and therefore that use of the liquor
as evidence was not proper.
WON the search and seizure made without a warrant is in violation of the Fourth
Amendment (the right against unreasonable searches and seizures) - NO
The Fourth Amendment denounces only such searches or seizures that are
unreasonable, and it is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an
unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will
conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.
Search without a warrant of an automobile, and seizure therein of liquor subject to
seizure and destruction under the National Prohibition Act (US Domestic law in
dispute), do not violate the Fourth Amendment, if made upon probable cause, i.e.,
upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the officer,
that the vehicle contains such contraband liquor.
Probable cause was held to exist where prohibition officers, while patrolling a
highway much used in illegal transportation of liquor, stopped and searched an
automobile upon the faith of information previously obtained by them that the car
and its occupants, identified by the officers, were engaged in the illegal business of
"bootlegging" (the illegal manufacture, distribution, or sale of goods, especially
alcohol or recordings).
Facts:
● Federal agents Cronenwett and Scully were in an apartment in Grand Rapids.
Three men came to that apartment, a man named Kruska and the two
defendants, Carroll and Kiro.
● Cronenwett was introduced to them as one Stafford, working in the Michigan
Chair Company in Grand Rapids, who wished to buy three cases of whiskey.
The price was fixed at $13 a case.
o The three men said they had to go to the east end of Grand Rapids
to get the liquor and that they would be back in half or three-quarters
of an hour.
● They went away, and in a short time Kruska came back and said they could
not get it that night, that the man who had it was not in, but that they would
deliver it the next day; the proposed vendors did not return the next day, and
the evidence disclosed no explanation of their failure to do so.
o NOTE: Cronenwett had noted that the car used by the accused was
an Oldsmobile Roadster.
● Cronenwett and his subordinates were engaged in patrolling the road leading
from Detroit to Grand Rapids, looking for violations of the Prohibition Act. This
seems to have been their regular tour of duty.
● Eventually, Carroll and Kiro, going eastward from Grand Rapids in the same
Oldsmobile Roadster, passed Cronenwett and Scully some distance out from
Grand Rapids.
o The officers followed Carroll and Kiro as far as East Lansing, halfway
to Detroit, but they lost trace of them.
● Some two months later, Scully and Cronenwett, on their regular tour of duty,
with Peterson, the State officer, were going from Grand Rapids to Ionia, on
the road to Detroit, when Kiro and Carroll met and passed them in the same
automobile, coming from the direction of Detroit to Grand Rapids.
● The government agents turned their car and followed the vehicle at some point
and searched it. They found behind the upholstering of the sears, the filling of
which had been removed, 68 bottles.
● The defendants, George Carroll and John Kiro, were indicted and convicted
for transporting in an automobile intoxicating spirituous liquor, to-wit: a. 68
quarts of so-called bonded whiskey and gin, in violation of the National
Prohibition Act.
● The ground on which they assail the conviction is that the trial court admitted
in evidence two of the 68 bottles, one of whiskey and one of gin, found by
searching the automobile.
o It is contended that the search and seizure were in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, and therefore that use of the liquor as evidence
was not proper.
● Before the trial, a motion was made by the defendants that all the liquor seized
be returned to the defendant Carroll, who owned the automobile. This motion
was denied.
Issue/s:
● WON the search and seizure made without a warrant is in violation of the
Fourth Amendment (the right against unreasonable searches and seizures) -
NO
Ratio:
● Section 26, Title II, of the National Prohibition Act, provides that, when an
officer "shall discover any person in the act" of transporting intoxicating liquor
in any automobile, or other vehicle, in violation of law, it shall be his duty to
seize the liquor and thereupon to take possession of the vehicle and arrest
the person in charge of it, and that, upon conviction of such person, the court
shall order the liquor destroyed, and, except for good cause shown, shall order
a public sale, etc. of the other property seized.
● This provision of law is supported by the Fourth Amendment which states in
part as follows
 ○ “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects *** against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall [be issued] but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
● The Fourth Amendment denounces only such searches or seizures that are
unreasonable, and it is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an
unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which
will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual
citizens.
● Search without a warrant of an automobile, and seizure therein of liquor
subject to seizure and destruction under the Prohibition Act, do not violate the
Amendment, if made upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably
arising out of circumstances known to the officer, that the vehicle
contains such contraband liquor.
● Probable cause was held to exist where prohibition officers, while patrolling a
highway much used in illegal transportation of liquor, stopped and searched
an automobile upon the faith of information previously obtained by them that
the car and its occupants, identified by the officers, were engaged in the illegal
business of "bootlegging" (the illegal manufacture, distribution, or sale of
goods, especially alcohol or recordings).
● Various acts of Congress are cited to show that, practically since the beginning
of the Government, the Fourth Amendment has been construed as
recognizing a necessary difference between a search for contraband in a
store, dwelling-house, or other structure for the search of which a warrant may
readily be obtained, and a search of a ship, wagon, automobile, or other
vehicle which may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought.

Dispositive:
Judgment is AFFIRMED.
 495. Caballes v. CA, GR No. 136292, 15 January 2002
G.R. No. 136292 | 15 January 2002 | Ponente: Puno! J. | Topic: Warrantless Search
(Moving Vehicles)
Digest by: Recto
Petitioners: Rudy Caballes y Taiño
Respondents: Court of Appeals
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
Facts:v Caballes was charged with the crime of theft for allegedly stealing about
630-kg of Aluminum Cable Conductors belonging to National Power Corporation.
According to the police, while they were on routine patrol, they suspected the Jeep
driven by Caballes to be loaded with smuggled goods. They flagged down the
vehicle and thereafter discovered the said conductors. Caballes contends that the
flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who were on routine patrol, merely on
"suspicion" that "it might contain smuggled goods," does not constitute probable
cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure.
Issue/s: W/N the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible? – NO
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, a warrant is necessary in order to have a valid
search and seizure. The exceptions are as follow: (1) warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of
moving vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop
and frisk situations (Terry search); and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
In warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles, probable cause must be
established. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said
offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.
The Court, in this case, held that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply
because it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not
constitute "probable cause'' as would justify the conduct of a search without a
warrant. In addition, the police authorities did not claim to have received any
confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable
wires in his vehicle, which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Therefore,
the confiscated goods cannot be admitted in evidence.
Facts:
● Caballes was charged with the crime of theft for allegedly stealing about 630-
kg of Aluminum Cable Conductors belonging to National Power Corporation.
According to the police, while they were on routine patrol, they suspected the
Jeep driven by Caballes to be loaded with smuggled goods. They flagged
down the vehicle and thereafter discovered the said conductors. The goods
were brought to the police station and the accused was incarcerated in the
Municipal Jail for 7 days.
● Caballes contends that the flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who
were on routine patrol, merely on "suspicion" that "it might contain smuggled
goods," does not constitute probable cause that will justify a warrantless
search and seizure. He insists that, contrary to the findings of the trial court as
adopted by the appellate court, he did not give any consent, express or
implied, to the search of the vehicle. Perforce, any evidence obtained in
violation of his right against unreasonable search and seizure shall be deemed
inadmissible.
● RTC and CA found the accused guilty of the crime of theft. Hence this petition,
Issue/s:
● W/N the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible? – NO
Ratio:
● According to the Constitution, the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
● However, the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and
seizures is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1)
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (3) search of moving vehicles; (4) consented
warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search); and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
● In search for moving vehicles, the police are not given unlimited discretion to
conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants. The important thing is that
there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still
be present in such a case. Probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense
with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances
which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in
the place to be searched.
● One such form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without
warrant at military or police checkpoints which has been declared to be not
illegal per se, for as long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public order
and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. A checkpoint may either
be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive search.
● Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right
against unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in this
instance is limited to the following instances: (1) where the officer merely
draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds; (2) simply looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without
opening the car's doors; (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a
physical or body search; (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to
 a visual search or visual inspection; and (6) where the routine check is
conducted in a fixed area.
● On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search, such a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only
if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to
believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law- offender or they
will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to
be searched.
● In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the
police officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw
that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which,
according to them, was unusual and uncommon. We hold that the fact that the
vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be
covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would
justify the conduct of a search without a warrant.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused
Rudy Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Cost de oficio. SO
ORDERED.
 496. People v. Comprado, GR No. 213225, 4 April 2018
G.R. No. 213225 | 4 April 2018 | MARTIRES, J. | Search of a moving vehicle
Digest by: RELUCIO
Petitioners: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondents:RENANTE COMPRADO y BRONOLA
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
Accused-appellant was charged with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. One
evening, a confidential informant(CI) sent a text message to Police Inspector Orate,
Jr. (P/Insp. Orate) that an alleged courier of marijuana together with a female
companion, was sighted at Bukidnon. The alleged courier had in his possession a
backpack containing marijuana and would be traveling from Bukidnon to Cagayan
de Oro City. The CI added that the man would be carrying a backpack in black and
violet colors with the marking "Lowe Alpine." Thus, at about 9:45 in the evening, the
police officers stationed at Police Station 6 put up a checkpoint in front of the station.
At 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the policemen stopped the bus bearing the said body
and plate numbers. P/Insp. Orate, and three other officers boarded the bus and saw
a man matching the description given to them by the CI. The man was seated at the
back of the bus with a backpack placed on his lap. After P/Insp. Orate asked the
man to open the bag, the police officers saw a transparent cellophane containing
dried marijuana leaves. Thereafter, the police officers brought accused-appellant
and the seized bag to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. PNP Crime
Laboratory confirmed that it was marijuana.
W/N the warrantless search was valid – NO
W/N the seized items are admissible in evidence - NO
The Court finds that the totality of the circumstances in this case is not sufficient to
incite a genuine reason that would justify a stop-and-frisk search on accused-
appellant. An examination of the records reveals that no overt physical act could be
properly attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the
arresting officers that he had just committed, was committing, or was about to
commit a crime. In the case at bar, accused-appellant was just a passenger carrying
his bag. There is nothing suspicious much less criminal in said act. Moreover, such
circumstance, by itself, could not have led the arresting officers to believe that
accused- appellant was in possession of marijuana.
As regards search incidental to a lawful arrest, it is worth emphasizing that a lawful
arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings; the process cannot
be reversed. Thus, it becomes imperative to determine whether accused-appellant's
warrantless arrest was valid. Here, without the tip provided by the confidential
informant, accused- appellant could not be said to have executed any overt act in
the presence or within the view of the arresting officers which would indicate that he
was committing the crime of illegal possession of marijuana. Neither did the arresting
officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused- appellant had just
committed an offense. Again, without the tipped information, accused-appellant
would just have been any other bus passenger who was minding his own business
and eager to reach his destination. It must be remembered that warrantless arrests
are mere exceptions to the constitutional right of a person against unreasonable
searches and seizures, thus, they must be strictly construed against the government
and its agents.
The appellate court, in convicting accused-appellant, reasoned that the search and
seizure is valid because it could be considered as search of a moving vehicle. The
search in this case, however, could not be classified as a search of a moving vehicle.
In this particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and not a specific person.
Further, in search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally used as a means
to transport illegal items. It is worthy to note that the information relayed to the police
officers was that a passenger of that particular bus was carrying marijuana such that
when the police officers boarded the bus, they searched the bag of the person
matching the description given by their informant and not the cargo or contents of
the said bus. Moreover, in this case, it just so happened that the alleged drug courier
was a bus passenger. To extend to such breadth the scope of searches on moving
vehicles would open the floodgates to unbridled warrantless searches which can be
conducted by the mere expedient of waiting for the target person to ride a motor
vehicle, setting up a checkpoint along the route of that vehicle, and then stopping
such vehicle when it arrives at the checkpoint in order to search the target person.
Facts:
● Accused-appellant was charged with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
● On 15 July 2011, at 6:30 in the evening, a confidential informant(CI) sent a
text message to Police Inspector Orate, Jr. (P/Insp. Orate) that an alleged
courier of marijuana together with a female companion, was sighted at
Cabanglasan, Bukidnon.
● The alleged courier had in his possession a backpack containing marijuana
and would be traveling from Bukidnon to Cagayan de Oro City.
● At 9:30 in the evening, the CI called P/Insp. Orate to inform him that the
alleged drug courier had boarded a bus bound for Cagayan de Oro City.
● The CI added that the man would be carrying a backpack in black and violet
colors with the marking "Lowe Alpine." Thus, at about 9:45 in the evening, the
police officers stationed at Police Station 6 put up a checkpoint in front of the
station.
● At 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the policemen stopped the bus bearing the
said body and plate numbers. P/Insp. Orate, and three other officers boarded
the bus and saw a man matching the description given to them by the CI. The
man was seated at the back of the bus with a backpack placed on his lap.
After P/Insp. Orate asked the man to open the bag, the police officers saw a
transparent cellophane containing dried marijuana leaves.
● Thereafter, PO1 Tenio and PO3 De Oro brought accused-appellant and the
seized bag to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.
● Police Senior Inspector Charity Caceres (PSI Caceres) of the PNP Crime
Laboratory Office, Cagayan de Oro City, received the requests for
examination and the specimen. PSI Caceres, after conducting qualitative
examination of the specimen, issued Chemistry Report stating that the dried
leaves seized from accused-appellant were marijuana and which weighed
3,200 grams.
● Accused-appellant denied ownership of the bag and the marijuana. He
maintains that on 15 July 2011, at around 6:30 in the evening, he and his
 girlfriend went to the house of a certain Freddie Nacorda in Aglayan,
Bukidnon, to collect the latter's debt. When they were about to leave, Nacorda
requested him to carry a bag to Cagayan de Oro City.
● The RTC found accused-appellant guilty of illegal possession of marijuana. It
held that accused-appellant's uncorroborated claim that he was merely
requested to bring the bag to Cagayan de Oro City, did not prove his
innocence; mere possession of the illegal substance already consummated
the crime and good faith was not even a defense.
● The CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant. It opined that accused-
appellant submitted to the jurisdiction of the court because he raised no
objection as to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. The CA
reasoned that the seized items are admissible in evidence because the search
and seizure of the illegal narcotics were made pursuant to a search of a
moving vehicle
Issue/s:
● W/N the warrantless search was valid – NO
● W/N the seized items are admissible in evidence - NO
Ratio:
● The Bill of Rights requires that a search and seizure must be carried out with
a judicial warrant; otherwise, any evidence obtained from such warrantless
search is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. This proscription,
however, admits of exceptions, namely: 1) Warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest; 2) Search of evidence in plain view; 3) Search of a moving
vehicle; 4) Consented warrantless search; 5) Customs search; 6) Stop and
Frisk; and 7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.
● A stop-and-frisk search is often confused with a warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest. However, the distinctions between the two have already
been settled by the Court in Malacat v. CA:
○ In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the
arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether
an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In
this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest
before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.
At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search
the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may
reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money
or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or
the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which
might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing
violence.
○ We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a
"stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for
weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
○ We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries,
and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to
dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled
[to] the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault
him.
○ Other notable points ofTerry are that while probable cause is not
required to conduct a "stop and frisk" it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine
reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him.
● In the case of People v Cogaed, the Court found no sufficient justification in
the stop and frisk committed by the police. The Court, in that case, invalidated
the search and seizure ruling that there were no suspicious circumstances
that preceded the arrest.
● The Court finds that the totality of the circumstances in this case is not
sufficient to incite a genuine reason that would justify a stop-and-frisk search
on accused-appellant. An examination of the records reveals that no overt
physical act could be properly attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse
suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that he had just committed, was
committing, or was about to commit a crime.
● In his dissent from Esquillo v. People, Justice Lucas P. Bersamin emphasizes
that there should be "presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity
from which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal
activity." This principle was subsequently recognized in the recent cases of
Cogaed and Sanchez v. People.
● In the case at bar, accused-appellant was just a passenger carrying his bag.
There is nothing suspicious much less criminal in said act. Moreover, such
circumstance, by itself, could not have led the arresting officers to believe that
accused- appellant was in possession of marijuana.
● As regards search incidental to a lawful arrest, it is worth emphasizing that a
lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings; the
process cannot be reversed. Thus, it becomes imperative to determine
whether accused-appellant's warrantless arrest was valid.
● Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the
instances wherein a peace officer or a private person may lawfully arrest a
person even without a warrant:
○ Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
○ (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
○ (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
○ (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
 judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has bus. Moreover, in this case, it just so happened that the alleged drug courier
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. was a bus passenger. To extend to such breadth the scope of searches on
● Paragraph (a) of Section 5 is commonly known as an in flagrante delicto moving vehicles would open the floodgates to unbridled warrantless searches
arrest. For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be which can be conducted by the mere expedient of waiting for the target person
valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute to ride a motor vehicle, setting up a checkpoint along the route of that vehicle,
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is and then stopping such vehicle when it arrives at the checkpoint in order to
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence search the target person.
or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, the elements of ● Any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches
an arrest effected in hot pursuit under paragraph (b) of Section 5 (arrest and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. This
effected in hot pursuit) are: first, an offense has just been committed; and exclusionary rule instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the
second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In
committed it. other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures
● Here, without the tip provided by the confidential informant, accused- shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
appellant could not be said to have executed any overt act in the presence or ● Without the confiscated marijuana, no evidence is left to convict accused-
within the view of the arresting officers which would indicate that he was appellant. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite accused- appellant's failure
committing the crime of illegal possession of marijuana. Neither did the to object to the regularity of his arrest before arraignment. The legality of an
arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused- arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused.
appellant had just committed an offense. Again, without the tipped information, A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
accused-appellant would just have been any other bus passenger who was inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
minding his own business and eager to reach his destination. It must be
remembered that warrantless arrests are mere exceptions to the constitutional
right of a person against unreasonable searches and seizures, thus, they must Dispositive:
be strictly construed against the government and its agents. While the WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The 19 May 2014 Decision of the Court of
campaign against proliferation of illegal drugs is indeed a noble objective, the Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01156 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-
same must be conducted in a manner which does not trample upon well- appellant Renante Comprado y Bronola is ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from
established constitutional rights. Truly, the end does not justify the means. detention unless he is detained for any other lawful cause. The Director of the Bureau
● The appellate court, in convicting accused-appellant, reasoned that the search of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this Court
and seizure is valid because it could be considered as search of a moving the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.
vehicle:
○ Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in
recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said
circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in
such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the
examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When a
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would
be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon
probable cause,i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of
circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or
other vehicle contains [an] item, article or object which by law is
subject to seizure and destruction.
● The search in this case, however, could not be classified as a search of a
moving vehicle. In this particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and
not a specific person. Further, in search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle was
intentionally used as a means to transport illegal items. It is worthy to note that
the information relayed to the police officers was that a passenger of that
particular bus was carrying marijuana such that when the police officers
boarded the bus, they searched the bag of the person matching the
description given by their informant and not the cargo or contents of the said
 497. Veridiano v. People, GR No. 200370, 7 June 2017
G.R. No. 200370 | June 7, 2017 | J Leonen| Moving Vehicle
Digest by: REYES
Petitioners: MARIO VERIDIANO y SAPI
Respondents: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
Veridiano was charged with a crime of illegal possession of marijuana. A checkpoint
was set up by the police based on a tip from a concerned citizen. In the checkpoint,
the police chanced upon Veridiano riding a passenger jeepney. All the passengers
of the jeep was asked to disembark and were ordered to lift their shirts and empty
their pockets. It was alleged that it was there that the police discovered Veridiano in
possession of a tea bag containing marijuana.
The admissibility of the seized marijuana was raised by Veridiano in the Supreme
Court arguing that it is a “fruit of a poisonous tree” ie., obtained through an invalid
warrantless search.
The Court ruled in favor of Veridiano. It held that a checkpoint search is a variant of
a search of a moving vehicle. This kind of search, to be considered as reasonable,
must be "conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists.". The extent of the
inspection must be limited to a visual search. An extensive search may be
conducted only when the law enforcers have probable cause to believe that the
vehicle’s passengers committed a crime or when the vehicle contains instruments of
an offense.
To summarize, routinary and indiscriminate searches of moving vehicles are
allowed if they are limited to a visual search. But extensive searches are
permissible only when they are founded upon probable cause.
In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded
the allowable limits of warrantless searches. A tip is still hearsay no matter how
reliable it may be. They had no probable cause to believe that the accused
violated any law except for the tip they received.
Facts:
● Veridiano was charged with a crime of illegal possession of drugs (marijuana).
He was found guilty by both the trial court and Court of Appeals.
● During trial, the prosecution presented PO1 Cabello and PO1 Solano to testify.
● PROSECUTION VERSION
o They testified that they received a tip from a concerned citizen that a
certain alias “Baho”, who was later identified as Veridiano, was on
the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs.
o Following up on this tip, a checkpoint was set up in Nagcarlan,
Laguna. The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew
Veridiano. They allowed some vehicles to pass through after
checking that he was not on board.
o At around 10:00am, they chanced upon Veridiano inside a
passenger jeepney. The jeep was flagged down and the passengers
were asked to disembark. The police then asked them to lift their
shirts up and remove the contents of their pockets.
o The police were able to recover from Veridiano a tea bag containing
what was later on confirmed as marijuana.
● ACCUSED VERSION
o Veridiano testified that while riding the jeepney, he noticed that the
jeepney was being followed by three motorcycles. The motorcyclists
flagged down the jeep and two armed men boarded inside and
frisked him.
o He alleged these men found nothing in his person, but nevertheless
took him to the police station claiming that an illegal drug was found
in his possession.
● The case reached the Supreme Court. One of the arguments that Veridiano
raised was that the tea bag containing marijuana leaves was seized in
violation of his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
○ Petitioner was merely seated inside the jeepney at the time of his
apprehension.
○ He did not act in any manner that would give the police officers
reasonable ground to believe that he had just committed a crime or
that he was committing a crime.
○ Petitioner also asserts that reliable information is insufficient to
constitute probable cause that would support a valid warrantless
arrest.
Issue/s:
● W/N there is a valid warrantless arrest. YES but the objection is deemed
waived since it was not timely raised.
● W/N there was a valid warrantless search. NO [syllab topic]
Ratio:
WARRANTLESS ARREST
● In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante
delicto arrest. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner
was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the
presence of the law enforcers that would incite suspicion.
○ In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on
the tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to
support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to
be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was
being committed, or is about to be committed.
● The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under hot pursuit. The
law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance
indicating that petitioner had just committed an offense.
○ Again, a hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest.
Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on
their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just
committed a crime.
● The invalidity of arrest leads to several consequences, which are:
 ○ The failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of an accused;
○ Criminal liability of law enforcers for illegal arrest; and
○ Any search incident to the arrest becomes invalid thus
rendering the evidence acquired as constitutionally
inadmissible.
● Lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be raised in a motion
to quash before the accused enters his or her plea. Otherwise, it is deemed
waived.
● Likewise, the voluntary submission of an accused to the jurisdiction of the
court and his or her active participation during trial cures any defect or
irregularity that may have attended an arrest.
● Nevertheless, failure to timely object to the illegality of an arrest does
not preclude an accused from questioning the admissibility of evidence
seized.
WARRANTLESS SEARCH (sorry, this case discussed a lot, im putting it all here for
the sake of completeness; relevant portion is in the recit ready)
● There are exceptional circumstances "when searches are reasonable even
when warrantless." The following are:
○ Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest,
○ Search of "evidence in 'plain view,'
○ Search of a moving vehicle,
○ Consented warrantless search[es],
○ Customs Search
○ Stop and frisk, and
○ Exigent and emergency circumstances.
● As to warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest.
○ A search incidental to lawful arrest requires that the arrest be made
first before search is made. The process cannot be reversed. The
arrest must always precede the search.
○ As previously discussed, there is no valid warrantless arrest that
preceded the search.
● As to stop and frisk searches
○ Law enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in conducting "stop
and frisk" searches. While probable cause is not required, a "stop
and frisk" search cannot be validated on the basis of a suspicion or
hunch.
○ Law enforcers must have a genuine reason to believe, based on their
experience and the particular circumstances of each case, that
criminal activity may be afoot.
○ Petitioner in this case was a mere passenger in a jeepney who did
not exhibit any act that would give police officers reasonable
suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his possession.
● As to consented warrantless search
○ Although the right against unreasonable searches and seizures may
be surrendered through a valid waiver, the prosecution must prove
that the waiver was executed with clear and convincing evidence.
Consent to a warrantless search and seizure must be "unequivocal,
specific, intelligently given and unattende by duress or coercion."
○ Petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as
consent to the warrantless search. Mere passive conformity or
silence to the warrantless search is only an implied acquiescence,
which amounts to no consent at all.
● As to moving vehicle (syllabus topic)
○ The rules governing searches and seizures have been liberalized
when the object of a search is a vehicle for practical purposes.
However, the inherent mobility of vehicles cannot justify all kinds of
searches. Law enforcers must act on the basis of probable cause.
○ A checkpoint search is a variant of a search of a moving vehicle.
Nevertheless, routine checkpoints must be "conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists.". The extent of the inspection must be limited
to a visual search.
○ An extensive search may be conducted only when the law
enforcers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle’s
passengers committed a crime or when the vehicle contains
instruments of an offense.
● To summarize, routinary and indiscriminate searches of moving
vehicles are allowed if they are limited to a visual search. But extensive
searches are permissible only when they are founded upon probable
cause.
○ That the object of a warrantless search is allegedly inside a moving
vehicle does not justify an extensive search absent probable cause.
○ In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police
officers exceeded the allowable limits of warrantless searches. A tip
is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. They had no
probable cause to believe that the accused violated any law
except for the tip they received.
○ Moreover, the search was flawed at its inception. The checkpoint was
set up to target the arrest of the accused
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 16, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal
Case No. 16976-SP and the Decision dated November 18, 2011 and Resolution dated
January 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CR No. 33588 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Mario Veridiano y Sapi is hereby ACQUITTED and is
ordered immediately RELEASED from confinement unless he is being held for some
other lawful cause.
 Plain view
498. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987)
480 U.S. 321 | 3 March 1987 | Scalia | Plain View
Digest by: Kim
Petitioners: Arizona
Respondents: James Thomas Hicks
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
A bullet was fired through the floor of respondent’s apartment, injuring a man in the
apartment below. Police officers entered to search the apartment and they seized
weapons and a stocking-cap mask. One of the policemen, Officer Nelson, noticed
two sets of expensive stereo components, which seemed out of place in the squalid
and otherwise ill-appointed four-room apartment. Suspecting that they were stolen,
he read and recorded their serial numbers -- moving some of the components,
including a Bang and Olufsen turntable, in order to do so -- which he then reported
by phone to his headquarters. On being advised that the turntable had been taken
in an armed robbery, he seized it immediately. They later found out that the stereos
matched the ones stolen in the armed robbery and a warrant was obtained and
executed to seize that equipment as well. Respondent was subsequently indicted
for the robbery. The state trial court granted respondent's motion to suppress the
evidence that had been seized. The Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed. The
Arizona Supreme Court denied review, and the State filed this petition
W/N a search and/or seizure was conducted independent of the original cause for
entering the apartment – YES
We agree that the mere recording of the serial numbers did not constitute a seizure.
Officer Nelson's moving of the equipment, however, did constitute a "search"
separate and apart from the search for the shooter, victims, and weapons that was
the lawful objective of his entry into the apartment. Taking action, unrelated to the
objectives of the authorized intrusion, which exposed to view concealed portions of
the apartment or its contents, did produce a new invasion of respondent's privacy
unjustified by the exigent circumstance that validated the entry.
W/N the independent search and/or seizure was valid –NO
We reject, at the outset, the apparent position of the Arizona Court of Appeals that,
because the officers' action directed to the stereo equipment was unrelated to the
justification for their entry into respondent's apartment, it was ipso facto
unreasonable. However, the search was still invalid because Officer Nelson lacked
probably cause. The State has conceded, that Officer Nelson had only a "reasonable
suspicion," by which it means something less than probable cause.
Facts:
● A bullet was fired through the floor of respondent's apartment, striking and
injuring a man in the apartment below. Police officers arrived and entered
respondent's apartment to search for the shooter, for other victims, and for
weapons. They found and seized three weapons, including a sawed-off rifle,
and in the course of their search also discovered a stocking-cap mask.
● One of the policemen, Officer Nelson, noticed two sets of expensive stereo
components, which seemed out of place in the squalid and otherwise ill-
appointed four-room apartment.
● Suspecting that they were stolen, he read and recorded their serial numbers -
- moving some of the components, including a Bang and Olufsen turntable, in
order to do so -- which he then reported by phone to his headquarters. On
being advised that the turntable had been taken in an armed robbery, he
seized it immediately. It was later determined that some of the other serial
numbers matched those on other stereo equipment taken in the same armed
robbery, and a warrant was obtained and executed to seize that equipment as
well. Respondent was subsequently indicted for the robbery.
● The state trial court granted respondent's motion to suppress the evidence
that had been seized. The Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed. The Arizona
Supreme Court denied review, and the State filed this petition.
Issue/s:
● W/N a search and/or seizure was conducted independent of the original cause
for entering the apartment – YES
● W/N the independent search and/or seizure was valid –NO
● W/N the evidence should still be admitted under the “good faith” exception? -
NO
Ratio:
There was a search conducted independent of the original cause for entering the
apartment
● As an initial matter, the State argues that Officer Nelson's actions constituted
neither a "search" nor a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. We agree that the mere recording of the serial numbers did not
constitute a seizure. To be sure, that was the first step in a process by which
respondent was eventually deprived of the stereo equipment. In and of itself,
however, it did not "meaningfully interfere" with respondent's possessory
interest in either the serial numbers or the equipment, and therefore did not
amount to a seizure.
● Officer Nelson's moving of the equipment, however, did constitute a "search"
separate and apart from the search for the shooter, victims, and weapons that
was the lawful objective of his entry into the apartment. Merely inspecting
those parts of the turntable that came into view during the latter search would
not have constituted an independent search, because it would have produced
no additional invasion of respondent's privacy interest. But taking action,
unrelated to the objectives of the authorized intrusion, which exposed to view
concealed portions of the apartment or its contents, did produce a new
invasion of respondent's privacy unjustified by the exigent circumstance that
validated the entry.
Plain View Doctrine
● We reject, at the outset, the apparent position of the Arizona Court of Appeals
that, because the officers' action directed to the stereo equipment was
unrelated to the justification for their entry into respondent's apartment, it was
ipso facto unreasonable.
○ Mincey v. Arizona, supra, in saying that a warrantless search must
be "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation,"
was addressing only the scope of the primary search itself, and was
 not overruling by implication the many cases acknowledging that the
"plain view" doctrine can legitimate action beyond that scope.
● We now hold that probable cause is required (to invoke the plain view
doctrine). To say otherwise would be to cut the "plain view" doctrine loose from
its theoretical and practical moorings. We do not say, of course, that a seizure
can never be justified on less than probable cause. We have held that it can -
- where, for example, the seizure is minimally intrusive and operational
necessities render it the only practicable means of detecting certain types of
crime.
○ In this case, The State has conceded, that Officer Nelson had only a
"reasonable suspicion," by which it means something less than
probable cause.
○ In short, whether legal authority to move the equipment could be
found only as an inevitable concomitant of the authority to seize it, or
also as a consequence of some independent power to search certain
objects in plain view, probable cause to believe the equipment was
stolen was required.
● JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissent suggests that we uphold the action here on
the ground that it was a "cursory inspection," rather than a "full-blown search,"
and could therefore be justified by reasonable suspicion instead of probable
cause. As already noted, a truly cursory inspection -- one that involves merely
looking at what is already exposed to view, without disturbing it -- is not a
"search" for Fourth Amendment purposes, and therefore does not even
require reasonable suspicion. We are unwilling to send police and judges into
a new thicket of Fourth Amendment law, to seek a creature of uncertain
description that is neither a "plain view" inspection nor yet a "full-blown
search." Nothing in the prior opinions of this Court supports such a distinction
● If he had, then he should have done precisely what he did. If not, then he
should have followed up his suspicions, if possible, by means other than a
search -- just as he would have had to do if, while walking along the street, he
had noticed the same suspicious stereo equipment sitting inside a house a
few feet away from him, beneath an open window. It may well be that, in such
circumstances, no effective means short of a search exist. But there is nothing
new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality
of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all. Our disagreement with the
dissenters pertains to where the proper balance should be struck; we choose
to adhere to the textual and traditional standard of probable cause.

Evidence will not be admitted under the good faith exception

● The State contends that, even if Officer Nelson's search violated the Fourth
Amendment, the court below should have admitted the evidence thus
obtained under the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. That was
not the question on which certiorari was granted, and we decline to consider
it.

Dispositive:
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Arizona is Affirmed.
 499. People v. Musa
GR No. 96177 | 27 January 1993 | ROMERO, J. | Warrantless searches – Plain view
Digest by: Rioflorido
Petitioners: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondents: MARI MUSA y HANTATALU
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
The NARCOM agents based in Calarian, Zamboanga City planned a buy-bust
operation on a certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information
received from civilian informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling
marijuana in said place.
Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Mari Musa, while the
rest of the NARCOM group positioned themselves at strategic places outside Mari
Musa’s house. Ani approached Mari Musa, and purchased marijuana, giving him
P20.00 marked money. After receiving the money, Mari Musa went back to his house
and came back and gave Amado Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried
marijuana.
After Sgt. Ani gave the pre-arranged signal to the other NARCOM agents, the latter
moved in and arrested the appellant inside the house. They searched him to retrieve
the marked money but didn’t find it. Upon being questioned, the appellant said that
he gave the marked money to his wife.
Thereafter, T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and noticed what
T/Sgt. Belarga described as a “cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at
the corner of the kitchen.” They asked the appellant about its contents but
failing to get a response, they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves.
At the trial, the appellant questioned the admissibility of the plastic bag and
the marijuana it contains but the trial court issued an Order ruling that these
are admissible in evidence.
W/N the marijuana seized by the NARCOM agents are admissible as evidence –
NO
[alternative issue] W/N the “plain view” doctrine is applicable in this case – NO
GR: Consti declares inadmissible, any evidence obtained in violation of the
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.
EXC: While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and
seizure may be effected, exceptions to this rule are recognized. Rule 126, Section
12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless search and seizure
incident to a lawful arrest.
DOCTRINE OF “PLAIN VIEW” — The warrantless search and seizure, as an
incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one
arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.
Objects in the “plain view” of an officer who has the right to be in the position
to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
LIMITATION — The “plain view” doctrine may not, however, be used to launch
unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory
search made solely to find evidence of defendant’s guilt. The “plain view” doctrine
is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against
the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object. It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in “plain view,”
the “plain view” doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object where the
incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the “plain view” of the object.
Stated differently, it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items
that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise
subject to seizure.
NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — In the instant case, the appellant was
arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve the marked
money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole house
and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not
within their “plain view” when they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure.
The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another
before they sighted the plastic bag.
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of
the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant
what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it
and found the marijuana.
Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the
plastic bag because it was within their “plain view,” what may be said to be the object
in their “plain view” was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The
incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately
apparent from the “plain view” of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic
bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its
transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer. Therefore,
the “plain view” doctrine does not apply in this case.
However!! The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in
any way, the damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana. (basta guilty pa din siya
beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of other evidence)
Facts:
● The appellant, Mari Musa, seeks, in this appeal, the reversal of the decision
RTC of Zamboanga City, Branch XII, finding him guilty of selling marijuana in
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Prosecution Evidence:
● T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, leader of a NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) team
based at Calarian, Zamboanga City, instructed Sgt. Amado Ani to conduct
surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga
 City. Information received from civilian informer was that this Mari Musa was
engaged in selling marijuana in said place.
● A buy-bust was planned. Sgt. Amado Ani was assigned as the poseur buyer
for which purpose he was given P20.00 (marked money) by Belarga.
○ A pre-arranged signal was arranged consisting of Sgt. Ani’s raising
his right hand, after he had succeeded to buy the marijuana. The two
NARCOM teams proceeded to the target site in two civilian vehicles.
○ Belarga’s team was composed of Sgt. Belarga, team leader, Sgt.
Amado Ani, poseur buyer, Sgt. Lego and Sgt. Biong.
● Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Mari Musa, while
the rest of the NARCOM group positioned themselves at strategic places
about 90 to 100 meters from Mari Musa’s house.
○ T/Sgt. Belarga could see what went on between Ani and suspect Mari
Musa from where he was. Ani approached Mari Musa, who came out
of his house, and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted
some more stuff.
○ Ani gave Mari Musa the P20.00 marked money. After receiving the
money, Mari Musa went back to his house and came back and gave
Amado Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana.
○ Ani opened the two wrappers and inspected the contents. Convinced
that the contents were marijuana, Ani walked back towards his
companions and raised his right hand. The two NARCOM teams,
riding the two civilian vehicles, sped towards Sgt. Ani. Ani joined
Belarga’s team and returned to the house.
● At the time Sgt. Ani first approached Mari Musa, there were four persons
inside his house: Mari Musa, another boy, and two women, one of whom Ani
and Belarga later came to know to be Mari Musa’s wife.
● The second time, Ani with the NARCOM team returned to Mari Musa’s house,
the woman, who was later known as Mari Musa’s wife, slipped away from the
house. Sgt. Belarga frisked Mari Musa but could not find the P20.00 marked
money with him. Mari Musa was then asked where the P20.00 was and he
told the NARCOM team he has given the money to his wife (who had slipped
away).
● Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana inside
it somewhere in the kitchen. Mari Musa was then placed under arrest and
brought to the NARCOM office. (ito lang pinaka impt fact tbh, the rest are just
for context hahahuhu)
● At Suterville, Sgt. Ani turned over to Sgt. Belarga the two newspaper-wrapped
marijuana he had earlier bought from Mari Musa.
● The majiruana specimens were then examined, and gave positive results for
the presence of marijuana.
Defense Evidence (di masyadong impt, sama ko na lang din):
● Mari Musa was in his house at Suterville, Zamboanga City. With him were his
wife, Ahara Musa, known as Ara, his one-year old child, a woman manicurist,
and a male cousin named Abdul Musa.
● About 1:30 that afternoon, while he was being manicured at one hand, his wife
was inside the one room of their house, putting their child to sleep.
● Three NARCOM agents, who introduced themselves as NARCOM agents,
dressed in civilian clothes, got inside Mari Musa’s house whose door was
open. The NARCOM agents did not ask permission to enter the house but
simply announced that they were NARCOM agents. The NARCOM agents
searched Mari Musa’s house and Mari Musa asked them if they had a search
warrant. The NARCOM agents were just silent.
● The NARCOM agents found a red plastic bag whose contents, Mari Musa
said, he did not know. He also did not know if the plastic bag belonged to his
brother, Faisal, who was living with him, or his father, who was living in another
house about ten arms-length away. Mari Musa, then, was handcuffed and
when Mari Musa asked why, the NARCOM agents told him for clarification.
● Mari Musa was brought in a pick-up, his wife joining him to the NARCOM
Office at Calarian, Zamboanga City.
● Mari Musa denied the NARCOM agents’ charge that he had sold two wrappers
of marijuana to them; that he had received from them a P20.00 bill which he
had given to his wife. He did not sell marijuana because he was afraid that
was against the law and that the person selling marijuana was caught by the
authorities; and he had a wife and a very small child to support. Mari Musa
said he had not been arrested for selling marijuana before.
RTC Decision:
● After trial, the trial court rendered the assailed decision finding accused Mari
Musa y Hantatalu guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling marijuana.
He is sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay the fine of P20,000.00.
Appellant’s contentions – proceedings before the SC:
● The appellant assails the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic bag
containing marijuana which the NARCOM agents found in the appellant’s
kitchen.
● It appears that after Sgt. Ani gave the pre-arranged signal to the other
NARCOM agents, the latter moved in and arrested the appellant inside the
house. They searched him to retrieve the marked money but didn’t find it.
Upon being questioned, the appellant said that he gave the marked money to
his wife.
● Thereafter, T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and noticed
what T/Sgt. Belarga described as a “cellophane colored white and stripe
hanging at the corner of the kitchen.”
● They asked the appellant about its contents but failing to get a response,
they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves.
● At the trial, the appellant questioned the admissibility of the plastic bag
and the marijuana it contains but the trial court issued an Order ruling
that these are admissible in evidence.
Issue/s:
● W/N the marijuana seized by the NARCOM agents are admissible as evidence
– NO
● [alternative issue] W/N the “plain view” doctrine is applicable in this case – NO
Ratio:
● Built into the Constitution are guarantees on the freedom of every individual
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Furthermore, the Constitution,
in conformity with the doctrine laid down in Stonehill v. Diokno, declares
 inadmissible, any evidence obtained in violation of the freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures.
● While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and
seizure may be effected, exceptions to this rule are recognized. Thus, in
Alvero v. Dizon, the Court stated that “[t]he most important exception to the
necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident
to a lawful arrest.”
● Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a
warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest.
○ There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make a search upon the
person of the person arrested. The Court has ruled that “[a]n officer
making an arrest may take from the person arrested and money or
property found upon his person which was used in the commission
of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the
prisoner with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or
which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause.”
○ Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher,
the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money found on
the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without
arrest and search warrants.
● DOCTRINE OF “PLAIN VIEW” — The warrantless search and seizure, as an
incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one
arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.
○ Objects in the “plain view” of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence.
● LIMITATION — The “plain view” doctrine may not, however, be used to
launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a
general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant’s
guilt.
○ The “plain view” doctrine is usually applied where a police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object.
○ It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in
“plain view,” the “plain view” doctrine will not justify the seizure
of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not
apparent from the “plain view” of the object. Stated differently,
it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that
they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure.
● NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — In the instant case, the appellant
was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve
the marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched
the whole house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen.
○ The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their “plain view” when they
arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents
had to move from one portion of the house to another before
they sighted the plastic bag.
○ Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging
in one corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents.
They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the
appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the
marijuana.
○ Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police
officer’s eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have
discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had
they not forcibly opened it.
● Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the
plastic bag because it was within their “plain view,” what may be said to be the
object in their “plain view” was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana.
○ The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was
not immediately apparent from the “plain view” of said object. It
cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents,
whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or
otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer.
● We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the “plain
view” doctrine does not apply and the marijuana contained in the plastic
bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to
Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.
However!!
● The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in any
way, the damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation of Article II,
Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
● We hold that by virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and
the two wrappings of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other
pieces of evidence, the guilt of the appellant of the crime charged has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
OTHER ISSUES
● ILLEGAL SALE OF MARIJUANA DRUGS; FAMILIARITY BETWEEN BUYER
AND SELLER, NOT MATERIAL. — The contention that the appellant could
not have transacted with Sgt. Ani because they do not know each other is
without merit. The day before the buy-bust operation, Sgt. Ani conducted a
test-buy and he successfully bought a wrapper of marijuana from the
appellant. Through this previous transaction, Sgt. Ani was able to gain the
appellant’s confidence for the latter to sell more marijuana to Sgt. Ani the
following day, during the buy-bust operation. Moreover, the Court has held
that what matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and the
seller, for quite often, the parties to the transaction may be strangers, but their
agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana.
● PRESENCE OF OTHER PEOPLE, NOT CRUCIAL. — The appellant, again
to cast doubt on the credibility of Sgt. Ani, argues that it was impossible for
the appellant to sell marijuana while his wife, cousin and manicurist were
present. But the place of the commission of the crime of selling prohibited
drugs has been held to be not crucial and the presence of other people apart
from the buyer and seller will not necessarily prevent the consummation of the
 illegal sale. As the Court observed in People v. Paco, these factors may
sometimes camouflage the commission of the crime. In the instant case, the
fact that the other people inside the appellant’s house are known to the
appellant may have given him some assurance that these people will not
report him to the authorities.
● CASE OF PEOPLE VS. ALE, NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The
case of People v. Ale does not apply here because the policeman in that case
testified that he and his companion were certain that the appellant therein
handed marijuana cigarettes to the poseur-buyer based on the appearance of
the cigarette sticks. The Court rejected this claim. In the case at bar, however,
T/Sgt. Belarga did not positively claim that he saw the appellant hand over
marijuana to Sgt. Ani. What he said was that there was an exchange of certain
articles between the two. Contrary to the contention of the appellant, it was
not impossible for T/Sgt. Belarga to have seen, from a distance of 90-100
meters, Sgt. Ani hand to the appellant “something” and for the latter to give to
the former “something.”
● CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING DIRECT EVIDENCE;
SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE CRIME COMMITTED. — Notwithstanding the
fact that T/Sgt. Belarga could not have been certain that what Sgt. Ani
received from the appellant was marijuana because of the distance, his
testimony, nevertheless, corroborated the direct evidence, which the Court
earlier ruled to be convincing. The corroborative testimony of T/Sgt. Belarga
strengthens the direct evidence given by Sgt. Ani. Additionally, the Court has
ruled that the fact that the police officers who accompanied the poseur-buyer
were unable to see exactly what the appellant gave the poseur-buyer because
of their distance or position will not be fatal to the prosecution’s case provided
there exists other evidence, direct or circumstantial, e.g., the testimony of the
poseur-buyer, which is sufficient to prove the consummation of the sale of the
prohibited drug.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court AFFIRMED.
 500. People v. Doria
GR No. 125299 | 22 January 1999 | Puno, J. | Warrantless Searches
Digest by: Aly Uy
Petitioners: People of the Philippines
Respondents: Florencio Doria y Bolado And Violeta Gaddao y Catama @ "Neneth”
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
A buy-bust operation was conducted by the police which caught accused Doria red-
handed of selling prohibited drugs and during the operation the police officers
searched for the marked bills that they used in buying said drugs which happened
to be in the house of Gaddao, according to Doria. When they reached her house,
the police officers came upon a box. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open
and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its
contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His
suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the
box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. Both accused were convicted of the crime
chared. Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless arrest of Gaddao, the search of her person and house,
and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom was valid.
HELD: We hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not
unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section
5 of Rule 113. Under Section 5 (a), a person may be arrested without a warrant if he
"has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."
Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused
is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are
not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.
The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence,
and the seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills are different
matters.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any
evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. The rule is, however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made
without a warrant and the evidence obtained there from may be admissible in the
following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; 2) search of a moving
motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain
view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the
buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She
was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no
occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest
in "hot pursuit." In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen
pounced on her.
This brings us to the question of whether the trial court correctly found that the
box of marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid. The "plain
view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence
in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item
he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in
a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight.
The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object
seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore
cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents,
whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious
to an observer, then the content are in plain view and may be seized. In other words,
if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance
that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must
be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The marijuana was
not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation
of the law and the Constitution. 135 It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should
have been excluded and never considered by the trial court.
Note: Please read full-digest just to be sure
Facts:
● Accused-appellants were charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to
Sec. 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
● That on or about the 5th day of December, 1995 in the City of Mandaluyong,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and aiding
one another and without having been authorized by law, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, administer, deliver and give away to
another eleven (11) plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing
7,641.08 grams in violation of the above-cited law.
● Different versions were then presented.
● The prosecution contends the offense was committed as follows:
o In November 1995, members of the North Metropolitan District,
Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom),
received information from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one
"Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. The
Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy- bust
operation. The meeting between NARCOM agents and Jun was
scheduled on December 5, 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong
City.
o On December 5, 1995, at 6:00 in the morning, the CI went to the PNP
Headquarters at EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City to prepare for the
buy-bust operation. The Narcom agents formed Team. Chief of the
 North Metropolitan District PNP Narcom, gave the team P2, 000. 00
to cover operational expenses. From this sum, PO3 Manlangit set
aside P1,600.00 — a one thousand peso bill and six (6) one hundred
peso bills as money for the buy-bust operation. The market price of
one kilo of marijuana was then P1,600.00. P03 Manlangit marked the
bills with his initials and listed their serial numbers in the police
blotter.
o At 7:20 of the same morning, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced
PO3 Manlangit as interested in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. P03
Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills worth P1,600.00. "Jun"
instructed P03 Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw
Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from his
associate. An hour later, "Jun" appeared at the agreed place where
P03 Manlangit, the CI and the rest of the team were waiting. "Jun"
took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to P03
Manlangit. P03 Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua
rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did not find the
marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he left the
money at the house of his associate named "Neneth.” "Jun" led the
police team to "Neneth's" house nearby at Daang Bakal.
o The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman
inside. "Jun" identified the woman as his associate. SPO1 Badua
asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over
"Neneth's" house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a
carton box under the dining table. He saw that one of the box's flaps
was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The
plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana
earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit
entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside
the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared
to be dried marijuana leaves.
o Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the
marked bills from "Neneth." The policemen arrested "Neneth." They
took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with the box, its contents and the
marked bills and turned them over to the investigator at
headquarters. It was only then that the police learned that "Jun" is
Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama.
The one (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves recovered from "Jun" plus
the ten (10) bricks recovered from "Neneth's" house were examined
at the PNP Crime Laboratory. The bricks, eleven (11) in all, were
found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of various weights totalling
7,641.08 grams.
o The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants Florencio
Doria and Violeta Gaddao. Florencio Doria, a 33-year old carpenter,
testified that on December 5, 1995, at 7:00 in the morning, he was at
the gate of his house reading a tabloid newspaper. Two men
appeared and asked him if he knew a certain "Totoy." There were
many "Totoys" in their area and as the men questioning him were
strangers, accused-appellant denied knowing any "Totoy." The men
took accused-appellant inside his house and accused him of being a
pusher in their community. When accused-appellant denied the
charge, the men led him to their car outside and ordered him to point
out the house of "Totoy." For five (5) minutes, accused-appellant
stayed in the car. Thereafter, he gave in and took them to "Totoy's"
house.
o Doria knocked on the door of "Totoy's" house but no one answered.
One of the men, later identified as P03 Manlangit, pushed open the
door and he and his companions entered and looked around the
house for about three minutes. Accused-appellant Doria was left
standing at the door. The policemen came out of the house and they
saw Violeta Gaddao carrying water from the well. He asked Violeta
where "Totoy" was but she replied he was not there. When Violeta
entered her house, three men were already inside. Accused-
appellant Doria, then still at the door, overheard one of the men say
that they found a carton box. Turning towards them, Doria saw box
on top of the table. The box was open and had something inside. P03
Manlangit ordered him and Violeta to go outside the house and board
the car. They were brought to police headquarters where they were
investigated.
o Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his co- accused,
Violeta Gaddao, is the wife of his acquaintance, Totoy Gaddao. He
said that he and Totoy Gaddao sometimes drank together at the
neighborhood store. This closeness, however, did not extend to
Violeta, Totoy's wife.
o Violeta, a 35-year old rice vendor, claimed that on December 5, 1995,
she was at her house at Daang Bakal, Mandaluyong City where she
lived with her husband and five (5) children. Her husband, Totoy, a
housepainter, had left for Pangasinan five days earlier. She was
pumping water when a man clad in short pants and denim jacket
suddenly appeared and grabbed her left wrist. The man pulled her
and took her to her house. She found out later that the man was P03
Manlangit.
o Inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other
persons. They asked her about a box on top of the table. This was
the first time she saw the box. The box was closed and tied with a
piece of green straw. The men opened the box and showed her its
contents. She said she did not know anything about the box and its
contents. She also confirmed Doria was a friend of her husband. She
denied the charge against her and Doria and the allegation that
marked bills were found in her person.
● RTC: Convicted the accused and sentenced both to death and pay a fine of
P500,000.00 each.
According to the amendatory provisions of Sec. 13 of Republic Act
No. 7659 which cover violations of Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6425
and which was exhaustively discussed in People v. Simon, 234
SCRA 555, the penalty imposable in this case is reclusion perpetua
to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos. Taking into consideration, however, the provisions of
Sec. 23, also of Republic Act No. 7659 which explicitly state that:
 The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed
by any person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more
persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another
for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.
SO ORDERED.
Issue/s:
● W/N the buy-bust operation is valid.
● W/N the warrantless arrest of Violeta and the search of her person and house,
and the evidences obtained therefrom are valid/admissible?
● W/N the Marijuana seized may be admitted as evidence by virtue of the plain
view doctrine
Ratio:
Ratio to Issue 1
● Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. A buy-
bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers as an
effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of an
offense. Entrapment has received judicial sanction when undertaken with due
regard to constitutional and legal safeguards.
● Entrapment was unknown in common law. It is a judicially created twentieth-
century American doctrine... Entrapment sprouted from the doctrine of
estoppel and the public interest in the formulation and application of decent
standards in the enforcement of criminal law. It also took off from a
spontaneous moral revulsion against using the powers of government to
beguile innocent but ductile persons into lapses that they might otherwise
resist.
● The classic definition of entrapment is that articulated by Justice Roberts in
Sorrells v. United States, the first Supreme Court decision to acknowledge the
concept: "Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an
officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have
perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion or fraud of the officers." It
consists of two (2) elements: (a) acts of persuasion, trickery, or fraud carried
out by law enforcement officers or the agents to induce a defendant to commit
a crime; and (b) the origin of the criminal design in the minds of the
government officials rather than that of the innocent defendant, such that the
crime is the product of the creative activity of the law enforcement officer.
● It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of entrapment
used to outwit the persons violating or about to violate the law. Not every
deception is forbidden. The type of entrapment the law forbids is the inducing
of another to violate the law, the "seduction" of an otherwise innocent person
into a criminal career. Where the criminal intent originates criminal in the mind
of the entrapping person and the accused is lured into the commission of the
offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is entrapment and no
conviction may be had. Where, however, the criminal intent originates in the
mind of the accused and the criminal offense is completed, the fact that a
person acting as a decoy for the state, or public officials furnished the accused
an opportunity for commission of the offense, or that the accused is aided in
the commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to
prosecute him, there is no entrapment and the accused must be convicted.
The law tolerates the use of decoys and other artifices to catch a criminal.
● Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense that can be raised by an accused
and partakes of the nature of a confession and avoidance. It is a positive
defense. Initially, an accused has the burden of providing sufficient evidence
that the government induced him to commit the offense. Once established, the
burden shifts to the government to show otherwise. When entrapment is
raised as a defense, American federal courts and a majority of state courts
use the "subjective" or "origin of intent" to determine whether entrapment
actually occurred.
● In the case of People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng 63 we first laid down the
distinction between entrapment vis-a-vis instigation or inducement. Quoting
16 Corpus Juris, we held:
● ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. — While it has been said that the
practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal
prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from
mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes been held
to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it
is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission
were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the
'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that
detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting
in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the
offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely
furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective
will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him, free from the
influence or instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an owner
acts as a supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a
prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was formed
independently of such agent; and where a person approached by the thief as
his confederate notifies the owner or the public authorities, and, being
authorised by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the
larceny is nevertheless committed.
● [E]ntrapment is a facet of a broader problem. Along with illegal search and
seizures, wiretapping, false arrest, illegal detention and the third degree, it is
a type of lawless enforcement. They all spring from common motivations.
Each is a substitute for skillful and scientific investigation. Each is condoned
by the sinister sophism that the end, when dealing with known criminals of the
'criminal class,' justifies the employment of illegal means.
● Entrapment was considered valid.
Ratio to Issue 2
● As to Doria:
○ We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused- appellant Doria
is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as
provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
 (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
○ Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested
without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the
act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in
flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are
not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a
warrant.
○ The warrantless arrest of appellant Violeta the search of her person
and residence, and the seizure of the box of marijuana and marked
bills are different matters.
○ Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial
warrant and any evidence obtained without such warrant is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however,
not absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant
and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the
following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search
of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws;
(4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself
waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
○ The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without
a warrant of arrest and the search and seizure of the box of marijuana
and the marked bills were likewise made without a search warrant. It
is claimed, however, that the warrants were not necessary because
the arrest was made in "hot pursuit" and the search was an incident
to her lawful arrest.
○ To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall
under any of the three (3) instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as aforequoted. The
direct testimony of PO3 Manlangit, the arresting officer, however
shows otherwise.
● As to Gaddao:
○ Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the
buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a)
of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the
finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant
Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit."
In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen
pounced on her.
○ Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the
second instance of Rule 113. "Personal knowledge" of facts in
arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be
based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty
of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled
with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
○ She was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification
made by her co-accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his
direct examination that appellant Doria named his co- accused in
response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the marked
money was. Doria did not point to appellant Vileta as his associate in
the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked
bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing
drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house, with or
without her knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for
accused-appellant Doria 's word, the Narcom agents had no
reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug
pushing. If there is no showing that the person who effected the
warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts
implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal
offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.
○ Since the warrantless arrest of Violeta was illegal, it follows that the
search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the
marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident
to her arrest. This brings us to the question of whether the trial court
correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making
its warrantless seizure valid.
Ratio to Issue 3
● Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position
to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and
maybe introduced in evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which
he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view
is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or
properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the
course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand
and its discovery inadvertent.
● It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to
sight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where
 the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain
view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the
package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its
transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents
are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such
that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains
the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
● P03 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's house
because they were led there by appellant Doria. The Narcom agents testified
that they had no information on appellant Gaddao until appellant Doria name
her and led them to her. Standing by the door of appellant Gaddao's house,
P03 Manlangit had a view of the interior of said house. Two and a half meters
away was the dining table and underneath it was a carton box. The box was
partially open and revealed something wrapped in plastic.
● In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the
contents of the box were marijuana because he himself checked and marked
the said contents. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he merely
presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic
wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." A close scrutiny of the records reveals
that the plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent as to clearly
manifest its contents to a viewer. Each of the ten (10) bricks of marijuana in
the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic
bags — white, pink or blue in color. PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-
examination that the contents of the box could be items other than marijuana.
He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant
Gaddao about its contents. It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit
that the content of the box was marijuana. The marijuana was not in plain view
and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law
and the Constitution. It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been
excluded and never considered by the trial court.
● The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana was found in
the house of accused-appellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that she
herself is guilty of the crime charged. Apropos is our ruling in People v.
Aminnudin, viz:
● The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug
addiction and commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against
those who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the
susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be
more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the
liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty
alike against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however
praiseworthy their intentions.
● Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding
the right of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the
loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, 'I think it a less evil that some
criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.'
It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another,
especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. 140
● Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended by Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 punishes the "sale,
administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of a prohibited drug"
with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
P500,000.00 to P10 million, to wit:
● Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.
Dispositive:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City
acting as a Special Court in Criminal Case No. 3307-D is reversed and modified as
follows:
1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00).
2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
Just in case itanong:
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring opinion:
Valid Searches Without Warrants
The general rule is that a judicial warrant must first be duly obtained before search
and seizure may be conducted. The only allowable instances in which a search
may be conducted without a warrant are: (1) search incident to lawful arrest, (2)
search pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine, (3) search of moving vehicles, (4)
searches incidental to violation of customs laws, (5) search with consent, and (6) a
"stop and frisk."
1. Search Incident to Lawful Arrest
Section 12 of Rule 126 provides that a lawfully arrested person may be searched
without a warrant for dangerous weapons or anything else that may be used as
evidence of the offense. Such incidental search is, however, limited to the person
of the arrestee at the time of the apprehension. The search cannot be extended to
or made in a place other than the place of the arrest.
2. The "Plain View" Doctrine
The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law
enforcement officer is in a position where he has a clear view of a particular area or
has prior justification for an intrusion; (2) said officer inadvertently comes across (or
sees in plain view) a piece of incriminating evidence; and (3) it is immediately
apparent to such officer that the item he sees may be evidence of a crime or a
contraband or is otherwise subject to seizure.
3. Search of Moving Vehicles
The warrantless search of moving vehicles (including shipping vessels and aircraft)
is justified by practicability, viz.:
"The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures
construed as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a
dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant
may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or
automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a
warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
xxx xxx xxx
"The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle . . . Constructed as
covered vehicles to standard form in immense quantities, and with a
capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they furnish for successful
commission of crime a distinguishing means of silent approach and swift
escape unknown in the history of the world before their advent. The
question of their police control and reasonable search on highways or
other public place is a serious question far deeper and broader than their
use in so-called 'bootlegging' or 'rum running,' which in itself is no small
matter. While a possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but
a vehicle constructed for travel and transportation on highways. Their
active use is not in homes or on private premises, the privacy of which the
law especially guards from search and seizure without process. The
ba􏰅ing extent to which they are successfully utilized to facilitate
commission of crime of all degrees, from those against morality, chastity,
and decency to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of
common knowledge. Upon that problem, a condition, and not a theory,
confronts proper administration of our criminal laws. Whether search of
and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place
without a search warrant is unreasonable is in its 􏰅nal analysis to be
determined as a judicial question in view of all the circumstances under
which it is made."
4. Customs Searches
Under the Tariff and Customs Code, searches, seizures and arrests may be made
even without warrants, for purposes of enforcing customs and tariff laws. Without
mention of the need to priorly obtain a judicial warrant, the Code speci􏰅cally allows
police authorities to "enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure,
warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect,
search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope
or any person on board[;]or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law."
5. Search With Consent
Waiver of any objection to the unreasonableness or invalidity of a search is a
recognized exception to the rule against a warrantless search.The consent to the
search, however, must be express, knowing and voluntary. A search based merely
on
implied acquiescence is not valid, because such consent is not within the purview
of the constitutional guarantee, but only a passive conformity to the search given
under intimidating and coercive circumstances.
In People v. Lacerna, it was held that the otherwise prohibited intrusive search of
appellant's plastic bag was validated by the express consent of appellant himself,
who was observed to be "urbanized in mannerism and speech," and who moreover
stated that he had nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong.
6. "Stop and Frisk"
The "stop and frisk" concept is of American origin, the most notable case thereon
being Terry v. Ohio. The idea is that a police officer may after properly introducing
himself and making initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person manifesting
unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check, the latter's outer clothing for
possibly concealed weapons. The strict manner in which this notion should be
applied has been laid down as follows:
". . . where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in the light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed
and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this
behavior, he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable
inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to
dispel his reasonable fear for his own and others' safety, he is entitled for
the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him."
As in the warrantless arrest of a person reasonably suspected of having just
committed a crime, mere suspicious behavior would not call for a "stop and frisk."
There must be a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer's experience
and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has
weapons (or contraband) concealed about him.
A valid application of the doctrine was recognized in Posadas v. Court of Appeals
and in Manalili v. Court of Appeals. In Manalili, the law enforcers who were
members of the Anti- Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, observed during
their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was walking in a wobbly manner
along the city cemetery which, according
to police information, was a popular hangout of drug addicts. Based on police
experience, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of persons who were
"high" on drugs. The Court held that past experience and the surrounding
circumstances gave the police sufficient reason to stop the suspect and to
investigate if he was really high on drugs. The marijuana that they found in the
suspect's possession was held to be admissible in evidence.
Before I end, I must reiterate that the above exceptions to the general rule on the
necessity of a judicial warrant for any arrest, search and seizure must all be strictly
construed. Foremost in our minds must still be every person's prized and
fundamental right to liberty and security, a right protected and guaranteed by our
Constitution.
 501. Valeroso v. CA, GR No. 164815, 3 September 2009
G.R. No. 164815 | 3 September 2009 | Nachura | Plain View
Digest by: Amir
Petitioners: Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso
Respondents: Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
Police officers Disuanco raided and arrested Sr. Insp. Valeroso while he was
sleeping at this children’s boarding house. This was to arrest him pursuant to a
warrant of arrest for kidnapping. He was tied to a faucet and his room was
ransacked, after which they recovered 1 Cal. 38 Charter of Arms revolver with 5
bullets. He was then charged and convicted of illegal possession of firearms.
The case was then appealed to the SC (relaxation of rules), where the OSG
recommended Valeroso’s acquittal due to violation of his constitutional right
against illegal search and seizure.
Issue is W/N the firearm was validly obtained? No.
The case does not fall under any of the exceptions to the general rule that a warrant
is required before a law enforcer can validly search or seize the person, house,
papers, or effects of any individual and any evidence obtained in violation thereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The case does not fall under the exception of warrantless search pursuant to a lawful
arrest as that search only allows search in the area of an accused’s “area of control.”
This is to protect the arresting officers from weapons. However, the facts show that
the firearm was locked in a cabinet away from Valeroso, which is already outside of
his area of control.
The case does not fall under the plain view exception as this doctrine is usually
applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It must be right in
front of the police officers in their plain view. Here, the police officers had to ransack
Valeroso’s room to find the firearm.
Hence, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valeroso's right against
unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently, the evidence obtained in violation
of said right is inadmissible in evidence against him.
Facts:
● Police officers Disuanco received an Order directing him and 3 other
policemen to serve a Warrant of Arrest against Valeroso for a case of
kidnapping with ransom. On site in Culiat, Quezon City, they saw Valeroso
about to board a tricycle. He was arrested there and then and was read his
constitutional rights, and was bodily searched. As a result of the search, they
found a revolver with ammunition tucked in his waist.
● Valeroso was charged with a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for the
illegal possession of 1 Cal. 38 “Charter of Arms” revolver, without securing the
necessary license/ permit issued by the proper authorities.
● In his defense, Valeroso said that he was sleeping in the boarding house of
his children when he was awakened by 4 heavily armed men in civilian attire
who pointed guns at him and pulled him out of the room. He was then tied to
a faucet as the police ransacked his room and recovered a firearm.
● Disuanco informed Valeroso that there was a standing warrant for his arrest,
but the raiding team was not armed with a search warrant.
● RTC then convicted Valeroso, and the gun was confiscated in favor of the
government.
● After appealing the case to the SC, the OSG manifested that they recommend
Valeroso’s acquittal, finding proof that Valeroso was indeed arrested in the
boarding house. the OSG agrees with Valeroso that the subject firearm was
obtained by the police officers in violation of Valeroso's constitutional right
against illegal search and seizure, and should thus be excluded from the
evidence for the prosecution. They also argue that there was a memorandum
receipt issued to Valeroso for the gun.
●
Issue/s:
● W/N the firearm was validly obtained? No.
Ratio:
● As a general rule, following Section 2 Article III of the Constitution, the
procurement of a warrant is required before a law enforcer can validly search
or seize the person, house, papers, or effects of any individual. Any evidence
obtained in violation thereof shall be inadmissible in evidence.
● Exceptions under this rule include:
○ Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
○ Seizure of Evidence in Plain View
○ Search of a moving vehicle
○ Consented warrantless search
○ Customs search
○ Stop and Frisk
○ Exigent and Emergency Circumstances
○ Search of Vessels and Aircraft
○ Inspection of Buildings and Other Premises for the enforcement of
fire, sanitary, and building regulations.
● Elements of plain view:
○ valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
○ the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have
the right to be where they are;
○ the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
○ "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search
● SC says that the arrest and seizure of Valeroso do not fall under the
exceptions.
No valid search pursuant to a lawful arrest

● A valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on

the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The
phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun
on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous
to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.

● From the circumstances of Valeroso’s arrest and the ransacking of his house,
the arresting officers served the warrant of arrest without any resistance from
Valeroso. They placed him immediately under their control by pulling him out
of the bed, and bringing him out of the room with his hands tied. To be sure,
the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be
considered as an "area within his immediate control" because there was no
way for him to take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used
against him.

Plain View doctrine inapplicable

● The "plain view doctrine" may not be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general exploratory search made solely
to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The doctrine is usually applied where a
police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object

● The police officers were inside the boarding house of Valeroso's children,
because they were supposed to serve a warrant of arrest issued against
Valeroso. In other words, the police officers had a prior justification for the
intrusion. Consequently, any evidence that they would inadvertently discover
may be used against Valeroso. However, in this case, the police officers did
not just accidentally discover the subject firearm and ammunition; they
actually searched for evidence against Valeroso.

● Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valeroso's right against
unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently, the evidence obtained in
violation of said right is inadmissible in evidence against him

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008 Decision and June 30,
2008 Resolution are RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso is
hereby ACQUITTED of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
 502. Miclat, Jr. v. People, GR No. 176077, 31 August 2011
G.R. No.176077 | 31 August 2011 | Peralta| Plain View
Digest by: ABRAZALDO
Petitioners: ABRAHAM MICLAT, JR. y CERBO
Respondents: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
Police went to Miclat’s house based on a tip. PO3 Antonio peeped thru a curtain
covered window and saw him arranging plastic sachets containing shabu. He then
entered and arrested Miclat. RTC was charged and convicted of possession of
shabu.
W/N there was a valid warrantless search - YES(2)
For arrest based on in flagrante delicto, 2 elements must be present: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
PO3 literally saw him personally arranging shabu into sachets.
W/N there was a valid warrantless search [based on plain view] - YES
The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the
discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to
the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure.
When PO3 entered, the sachets were literally just there. Miclat even gave them to
him.
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.
● Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to
have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may
be introduced in evidence. An object is in plain view if the object itself is
plainly exposed to sight.
● The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur:
(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
(c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may
be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
● The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly
be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of
such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE,premises considered, the appeal is DENIED.The Decision dated
October 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28846 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.
SO ORDERED.

Facts:
● Miclat aka ABE was charged for possession of shabu.
● PROSEC EVID: Based on a tip from an informant, the police assembled a
team and went to the house of a certain “Abe”. PO3 Antonio peeped into the
house via a curtain covered window and saw “Abe” arranging several pieces
of small plastic sachets which he believed to be containing shabu. After PO3
antonio entered, “Abe” handed over 4 sachets. PO3 Antonio immediately
placed him under arrest and brought him and the sachets containing white
crystalline substance to their headquarters.
● DEFENSE EVID: Miclat alleges that he, his sister and his father were watching
TV at the upper level of their house. Upon hearing a commotion, he went down
and saw several police officers who were there to arrest him for drug pushing.
Miclat and his father were arrested. On their way to the Police Station, PO3
Pagsolingan showed to him a small sachet containing white crystalline
substances allegedly recovered by the raiding police team from their house.
● RTC convicted Miclat. Appeal to CA, RTC affirmed.

Issue/s:
● W/N there was a valid warrantless search [based on plain view] - YES

Ratio:
● For arrest based on in flagrante delicto, 2 elements must be present: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
 Plain sniff aroused Obiña’s suspicion and made him feel nervous (this was part of the
503. People v. Claudio case legit)
G.R. No. 72564. | 15 April 1988 | Gutierrez, Jr. | Plain Sniff ● With the feeling of something unusual, he had the urge to search the woven
Digest by: NAME OF DIGESTER plastic bag. But it was only at San Fernando, Pampanga that he was able to
Petitioners: Anito Claudio Y Bagtang go to the bag.
Respondents: People of the Philippines ● He inserted one of his fingers in a plastic bag located at the bottom of the
woven bag and smelt marijuana. The plastic woven bag appearing to contain
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine: camote tops on the top has a big bundle of plastic of marijuana at the bottom.
Anita Claudio was convicted of Possession and Sale of 1.1 kilos of Marijuana. ● He could immediately recognize the smell of marijuana because he was
Pat. Daniel Obiña, a police officer on his way home to Baguio City from Olongapo assigned at the time at the ANTI-NARCOTICS unit.
City on a bus, saw Claudio enter the bus with a plastic woven buri bag filled with ● He did not, however, do anything about it until they reached Olongapo City.
vegetables. Claudio sat on the seat in front of Obiña and placed the bag behind the When the accused alighted the bus, Obiña intercepted her and showed his ID
seat. as a policeman, telling her that he would search the bag on suspicion that
Obiña’s suspicion arose and he had the urge to search the contents of the bag. there was marijuana.
While the bus was in Pampanga, Obiña inserted one of his fingers in a plastic bag ● Claudio pleaded that they settle this at her house, but was unheeded, Obiña
at the bottom of the buri bag and recognized the smell of marijuana as he was instead handcuffing her and bringing her to the police headquarters.
assigned to the ANTI-NARCOTICS unit at the time.
When the bus reached Olongapo City and Claudio alighted, Obiña intercepted her, Issue/s:
introduced himself as a policeman, handcuffed her, and brought her to the police ● W/N the warrantless search, seizure and apprehension is unlawful – NO.
headquarters.
Ratio:
The issue is whether the warrantless search, seizure, and arrest was unlawful – ● Rule 113, Sec. 5(a): … A peace officer or a private person may without a
NO. warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
Rule 113, Sec. 5(a): … A peace officer or a private person may without a warrant, committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually Rule 126, Sec. 12: Search incident to lawful arrest.– A person lawfully arrested
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of the offense, without a search warrant.
Rule 126, Sec. 12: Search incident to lawful arrest.– A person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the ● In this case, Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs.
commission of the offense, without a search warrant. ● Obiña did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught
in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful
In this case, Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. arrest is in itself lawful. Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of
the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.
Obiña did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in
flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest Dispositive:
is in itself lawful. Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
marijuana.

Facts:
● Anita Claudio was convicted of Possession and Sale of 1.1 kilos of Marijuana
dried leaves.
● One of the prosecution’s witness was a police officer named Daniel Obiña,
who testified that he rode a bus on his way back home to his family in Baguio
City from Olongapo City when he encountered Obiña who sat in front of him.
● He saw that Claudio was carrying a woven buri bag made of plastic carrying
some vegetables. Claudio placed this bag at the back of her seat which
 Waiver or consented searches
504. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
G.R. No. | Date May 29, 1973 | Mr. Justice Stewart| waiver or consented searches
Digest by: Avillon
Petitioners: Merle R. Schneckloth
Respondents: Robert Clyde Bustamonte
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
Bustamonte was charged with possessing a check with intent to defraud. While on
a routine patrol, Police Officer James Rand stopped a car when he observed that
one headlight and its license plate light were burned out. There were 6 men in the
car including Bustamonte. The driver of the car could not produce a license. One of
the passengers, Alcala, gave his license to the officer and explained that the car
belonged to his brother. The six men stepped out of the car. Officer Rand asked
Alcala if he could search the car. Alcala said, “sure, go ahead.” Prior to the search,
no one was threatened with arrest, and, according to Officer Rand's uncontradicted
testimony, it "was all very congenial at this time." The driver testified that Alcala
helped in the search of the car by opening the trunk and glove compartment. Under
the left rear seat, the police officers found three checks that had previously been
stolen from a car wash. Bustamonte moved to suppress the evidence against him
on the ground that they had been acquired through an unconstitutional search and
seizure. The trial judge denied the motion and eventually he was convicted.
Bustamonte filed a writ of habeas corpus with the federal district court, which the
latter denied. On appeal of the denial of the writ, the appellate court ruled that the
State was under an obligation to demonstrate, not only that the consent had been
uncoerced, but that it had been given with an understanding that it could be freely
and effectively withheld.
Whether the knowledge of the right to refuse consent is a requirement for a
consent search - NO.
In determining whether a defendant's will was overborne in a particular case, the
Court has assessed the totality of all the surrounding circumstances -- both the
characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. Some of the
factors taken into account have included the youth of the accused, his lack of
education, or his low intelligence, the lack of any advice to the accused of his
constitutional rights, etc.. In all of these cases, the Court determined the factual
circumstances surrounding the confession, assessed the psychological impact on
the accused, and evaluated the legal significance of how the accused reacted. In
none of them did the Court rule that the Due Process Clause required the
prosecution to prove as part of its initial burden that the defendant knew he had a
right to refuse to answer the questions that were asked. While knowledge of the right
to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not
establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent. The approach
of the appellate court finds no support in any of our decisions that have attempted
to define the meaning of "voluntariness." Its ruling, that the State must affirmatively
prove that the subject of the search knew that he had a right to refuse consent,
would, in practice, create serious doubt whether consent searches could continue to
be conducted. Any defendant who was the subject of a search authorized solely by
his consent could effectively frustrate the introduction into evidence of the fruits of
that search by simply failing to testify that he in fact, knew he could refuse to consent.
And the near impossibility of meeting this prosecutorial burden suggests why this
Court has never accepted any such litmus paper test of voluntariness.
It is said, however, that a "consent" is a "waiver" of a person's rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The argument is that, by allowing the police to
conduct a search, a person "waives" whatever right he had to prevent the police from
searching. It is argued that, under the doctrine of Johnson v. Zerbst, to establish
such a "waiver," the State must demonstrate "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege." But these standards were enunciated in
Johnson in the context of the safeguards of a fair criminal trial. There is a vast
difference between those rights that protect a fair criminal trial and the rights
guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment(searches and seizures). Nothing, either
in the purposes behind requiring a "knowing" and "intelligent" waiver of trial rights,
or in the practical application of such a requirement suggests that it ought to be
extended to the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures. There is nothing in the purposes or application of the waiver requirements
of Johnson v. Zerbst that justifies, much less compels, the easy equation of a
knowing waiver with a consent search.
Facts:
● Respondent Bustamonte was brought to trial in a California court upon a
charge of possessing a check with intent to defraud.
● While on routine patrol in California, at approximately 2:40am, Police Officer
James Rand stopped an automobile when he observed that one headlight and
its license plate light were burned out.
● Six men were in the vehicle. Joe Alcala and the respondent, Robert
Bustamonte, were in the front seat with Joe Gonzales, the driver. Three older
men were seated in the rear.
● Gonzales could not produce a driver's license, so Officer Rand asked if any of
the other five had any evidence of identification. Only Alcala produced a
license, and he explained that the car was his brother's.
● After the six occupants had stepped out of the car at the officer's request, and
after two additional policemen had arrived, Officer Rand asked Alcala if he
could search the car. Alcala replied, "Sure, go ahead."
● Prior to the search, no one was threatened with arrest, and, according to
Officer Rand's uncontradicted testimony, it "was all very congenial at this
time." Gonzales testified that Alcala actually helped in the search of the car by
opening the trunk and glove compartment. In Gonzales' words:
o "[T]he police officer asked Joe [Alcala], he goes, 'Does the trunk
open?' And Joe said, 'Yes.' He went to the car and got the keys and
opened up the trunk."
● Under the left rear seat, the police officers found three checks that had
previously been stolen from a car wash.
● Bustamonte moved to suppress the introduction of certain material as
evidence against him on the ground that the material had been acquired
through an unconstitutional search and seizure.
 ● The trial judge denied the motion to suppress, and the checks in question were
admitted in evidence at Bustamonte's trial. On the basis of this and other
evidence, he was convicted, and the California Court of Appeal for the First
Appellate District affirmed the conviction.
● The appellate court found that:
o “the prosecution met the necessary burden of showing consent . . . ,
since there were clearly circumstances from which the trial court
could ascertain that consent had been freely given without coercion
or submission to authority. Not only officer Rand, but Gonzales, the
driver of the automobile, testified that Alcala's assent to the search
of his brother's automobile was freely, even casually given. At the
time of the request to search the automobile, the atmosphere,
according to Rand, was 'congenial,' and there had been no
discussion of any crime. As noted, Gonzales said Alcala even
attempted to aid in the search."
● Bustamonte sought a writ of habeas corpus in a federal district court. It was
denied.
● On appeal the appellate court ruled that:
o a consent was a waiver of a person's Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, and that the State was under an obligation to
demonstrate, not only that the consent had been uncoerced, but that
it had been given with an understanding that it could be freely and
effectively withheld
o Since the District Court had not determined that Alcala had known
that his consent could have been withheld and that he could have
refused to have his vehicle searched, we vacate the order denying
the writ and remand the case for further proceedings
● The instant certiorari petition was filed to determine whether the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments require the showing that the consent is given with an
understanding that it could be freely and effectively withheld.
Issue/s:
● Whether the knowledge of the right to refuse consent is a requirement for a
consent search - NO
Ratio: (Daming chika ang court dito na pwede iskip, but feel free to read everything.
See ratio in recit ready if gusto nyo straight to the . )
VOLUNTARINESS as a test for valid consent
● It is well settled under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments that a search
conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is "per se
unreasonable subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated
exceptions."
● It is equally well settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to
the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is
conducted pursuant to consent.
● "Voluntariness" has reflected an accommodation of the complex of values
implicated in police questioning of a suspect. At one end of the spectrum is
the acknowledged need for police questioning as a tool for the effective
enforcement of criminal laws. Without such investigation, those who were
innocent might be falsely accused, those who were guilty might wholly escape
prosecution, and many crimes would go unsolved. In short, the security of all
would be diminished. At the other end of the spectrum is the set of values
reflecting society's deeply felt belief that the criminal law cannot be used as
an instrument of unfairness, and that the possibility of unfair and even brutal
police tactics poses a real and serious threat to civilized notions of justice.
● The Due Process Clause does not mandate that the police forgo all
questioning, or that they be given carte blanche to extract what they can from
a suspect.
● "The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly established
test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness.
Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice
by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If
it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination
critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process."
● In determining whether a defendant's will was overborne in a particular case,
the Court has assessed the totality of all the surrounding circumstances -- both
the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.
● Some of the factors taken into account have included the youth of the
accused, his lack of education, or his low intelligence, the lack of any advice
to the accused of his constitutional rights, the length of detention, the repeated
and prolonged nature of the questioning, and the use of physical punishment
such as the deprivation of food or sleep. In all of these cases, the Court
determined the factual circumstances surrounding the confession, assessed
the psychological impact on the accused, and evaluated the legal significance
of how the accused reacted.
● In none of them did the Court rule that the Due Process Clause required the
prosecution to prove as part of its initial burden that the defendant knew he
had a right to refuse to answer the questions that were asked.
● While the state of the accused's mind, and the failure of the police to advise
the accused of his rights, were certainly factors to be evaluated in assessing
the "voluntariness" of an accused's responses, they were not, in and of
themselves, determinative.
● While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into
account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua
non of an effective consent.
● The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent not be
coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.
● The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with
the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot
be resolved by any infallible touchstone. To approve such searches without
the most careful scrutiny would sanction the possibility of official coercion; to
place artificial restrictions upon such searches would jeopardize their basic
validity.
● The approach of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit finds no support in
any of our decisions that have attempted to define the meaning of
"voluntariness." Its ruling, that the State must affirmatively prove that the
subject of the search knew that he had a right to refuse consent, would, in
practice, create serious doubt whether consent searches could continue to be
conducted.
● There might be rare cases where it could be proved from the record that a
person in fact, affirmatively knew of his right to refuse. But, more commonly,
where there was no evidence of any coercion, explicit or implicit, the
prosecution would nevertheless be unable to demonstrate that the subject of
the search in fact, had known of his right to refuse consent.
● Any defendant who was the subject of a search authorized solely by his
consent could effectively frustrate the introduction into evidence of the fruits
of that search by simply failing to testify that he in fact, knew he could refuse
to consent. And the near impossibility of meeting this prosecutorial burden
suggests why this Court has never accepted any such litmus paper test of
voluntariness.
● One alternative that would go far toward proving that the subject of a search
did know he had a right to refuse consent would be to advise him of that right
before eliciting his consent. That, however, is a suggestion that has been
almost universally repudiated by both federal and state courts and, we think,
rightly so.
● Consent searches are part of the standard investigatory techniques of law
enforcement agencies. They normally occur on the highway, or in a person's
home or office, and under informal and unstructured conditions. The
circumstances that prompt the initial request to search may develop quickly or
be a logical extension of investigative police questioning. The police may seek
to investigate further suspicious circumstances or to follow up leads
developed in questioning persons at the scene of a crime. These situations
are a far cry from the structured atmosphere of a trial where, assisted by
counsel if he chooses, a defendant is informed of his trial rights.
● Miranda v. Arizona explains:
○ "Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of
police officers in investigating crime. When an individual is in custody
on probable cause, the police may, of course, seek out evidence in
the field to be used at trial against him. Such investigation may
include inquiry of persons not under restraint. General on-the-scene
questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general
questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by
our holding.”
● Knowledge of a right to refuse is not a prerequisite of voluntary consent.
CONCEPT OF WAIVER IN TRIALS =/= Consent in search
● It is said, however, that a "consent" is a "waiver" of a person's rights under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The argument is that, by allowing the
police to conduct a search, a person "waives" whatever right he had to prevent
the police from searching. It is argued that, under the doctrine of Johnson v.
Zerbst, to establish such a "waiver," the State must demonstrate "an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."
● But these standards were enunciated in Johnson in the context of the
safeguards of a fair criminal trial.
● Almost without exception, the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver
has been applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a
criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial. Hence, and hardly
surprisingly in view of the facts of Johnson itself, the standard of a knowing
and intelligent waiver has most often been applied to test the validity of a
waiver of counsel, either at trial, or upon a guilty plea. The Court has also
applied the Johnson criteria to assess the effectiveness of a waiver of other
trial rights such as the right to confrontation, to a jury trial, and to a speedy
trial, and the right to be free from twice being placed in jeopardy.
● Guilty pleas have been carefully scrutinized to determine whether the accused
knew and understood all the rights to which he would be entitled at trial, and
that he had intentionally chosen to forgo them.
● The guarantees afforded a criminal defendant at trial also protect him at
certain stages before the actual trial, and any alleged waiver must meet the
strict standard of an intentional relinquishment of a "known" right.
● There is a vast difference between those rights that protect a fair criminal trial
and the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment. Nothing, either in the
purposes behind requiring a "knowing" and "intelligent" waiver of trial rights,
or in the practical application of such a requirement suggests that it ought to
be extended to the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
● A strict standard of waiver has been applied to those rights guaranteed to a
criminal defendant to insure that he will be accorded the greatest possible
opportunity to utilize every facet of the constitutional model of a fair criminal
trial. Any trial conducted in derogation of that model leaves open the possibility
that the trial reached an unfair result precisely because all the protections
specified in the Constitution were not provided.
 ● Similarly, a "waiver" approach to consent searches would be thoroughly
inconsistent with our decisions that have approved "third party consents." In
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, where a wife surrendered to the police guns and
clothing belonging to her husband, we found nothing constitutionally
impermissible in the admission of that evidence at trial, since the wife had not
been coerced. Frazier v. Cupp held that evidence seized from the defendant's
duffel bag in a search authorized by his cousin's consent was admissible at
trial.
● In short, there is nothing in the purposes or application of the waiver
requirements of Johnson v. Zerbst that justifies, much less compels, the easy
equation of a knowing waiver with a consent search. To make such an
equation is to generalize from the broad rhetoric of some of our decisions, and
to ignore the substance of the differing constitutional guarantees.
● In Miranda, the Court found that the techniques of police questioning and the
nature of custodial surroundings produce an inherently coercive situation. The
Court concluded that, "[u]nless adequate protective devices are employed to
dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement
obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice."
● And, at another point, the Court noted that, "without proper safeguards, the
process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime
contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the
individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not
otherwise do so freely."
● In this case, there is no evidence of any inherently coercive tactics - either
from the nature of the police questioning or the environment in which it took
place.
● There is no reason to believe, under circumstances such as are present here,
that the response to a policeman's question is presumptively coerced; and
there is, therefore, no reason to reject the traditional test for determining the
voluntariness of a person's response. Miranda, of course, did not reach
investigative questioning of a person not in custody, which is most directly
analogous to the situation of a consent search, and it assuredly did not
indicate that such questioning ought to be deemed inherently coercive.

Dispositive: Our decision today is a narrow one. We hold only that, when the subject
of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the basis of
his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that
the consent was in fact, voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion,
express or implied. Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the
circumstances, and while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be
taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as
a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent. Because the California court followed
these principles in affirming the respondent's conviction, and because the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in remanding for an evidentiary hearing, required more,
its judgment must be reversed. It so ordered.
 505. U.S. v. Matlock
415 U.S. 164 | February 20, 1974 | White | Waiver or consented searches
Digest by: AJ
Petitioners: United States of America
Respondents: William Earl Matlock
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
Spouses Marshall leased a house. In the east bedroom, their daughter Gayle Graff
lived with respondent William Matlock out of wedlock. Matlock was arrested in front
of the house for bank robbery. Gayle allowed the officers to enter the house and into
the east bedroom, where the officers found a diaper containing $4,995. Matlock
moved to suppress evidence on the ground that the search and seizure of the money
was illegal. The motion was granted.
Certiorari to CA. CA affirmed. Certiorari to SC.
(SC remanded: it only held that one of the hearsay evidence in the suppression
hearings should have been admitted.)
Recent authority clearly indicates that the consent of one who possesses common
authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting
person with whom that authority is shared.
Two requisites for a third party to consent to a search and seizure:
1.) that it reasonably appeared to the searching officers that just prior to the search,
that facts exist which will render the consenter's consent binding on the putative
defendant
2.) just prior to the search, facts do exist which render the consenter's consent
binding on the putative defendant
The district court agreed the first requirement was met: Gayle resided in the house
for a long time and was in the house during the arrest. Thus, she had apparent
authority to consent to the search.
The district court found that the second requirement was not proved because the
statements of Gayle admitting that she and Matlock were cohabiting as husband and
wife (though it turned out they weren't married) in the east bedroom were
inadmissible as hearsay (Gayle denied saying these so only the officers testified).
(EVID matter: SCOTUS held rules on evidence do not apply strictly in suppression
hearings. Anyway, the statements of Gayle were declarations against her interest
kasi it's a crime in Wisconsin to cohabit out of wedlock.)
So SCOTUS just said the Gayle's statements are admissible sa suppression
hearings, but remanded the case to the district court to appreciate the hearsay
evidence if it is sufficient for the second requisite.
From footnotes: Do you need to know that you're allowed to refuse for a consent
to a search to be considered voluntary? No need.
Facts:
● Origs: William Matlock was arrested in the yard in front of the Pardeeville
home. The home was leased from the owner by Mr. and Mrs. Marshall. Living
in the home were Mrs. Marshall, several of her children, including her
daughter, Mrs. Gayle Graff, Gayle's three-year-old son, and respondent.
● Although the officers were aware at the time of the arrest that respondent lived
in the house, they did not ask him which room he occupied or whether he
would consent to a search.
● Three of the arresting officers went to the door of the house and were admitted
by Mrs. Graff, who was dressed in a robe and was holding her son in her arms.
The officers told her they were looking for money and a gun, and asked if they
could search the house.
● Although denied by Mrs. Graff at the suppression hearings, it was found that
she consented voluntarily to the search of the house, including the east
bedroom on the second floor which she said was jointly occupied by Matlock
and herself. The east bedroom was searched, and the evidence at issue here,
$4,995 in cash, was found in a diaper bag in the only closet in the room.
● Matlock moved to suppress evidence. District court granted. It declared
inadmissible the out-of-court statements of Mrs. Graff that she cohabited with
Matlock as husband and wife (though it was found that they were not married).
● Certiorari to CA dismissed. Certiorari to SC.
Issue/s:
● W/N the government was able to prove that Gayle had actual authority to
permit the search of the room? SC said it appears that yes, but remanded the
case na lang to the district court
Ratio:
● Recent authority clearly indicates that the consent of one who possesses
common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent,
nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared.
● In Frazier vs. Cupp, where the petitioner says his cousin's consent to the
search of the bag is not allowed because he only allowed the cousin to use
one compartment, SC had none of that shit. By allowing the cousin to use the
bag, petitioner had borne the risk that he cousin would allow someone else to
look inside.
● These cases at least make clear that, when the prosecution seeks to justify a
warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that
consent was given by the defendant, but may show that permission to
search was obtained from a third party who possessed common
authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects
sought to be inspected.
● Before the seized evidence could be admitted at trial, the Government had to
prove:
1) First, that it reasonably appeared to the searching officers, just
prior to the search, that facts exist which will render the
consenter's consent binding on the putative defendant, and
2) Second, that just prior to the search, facts do exist which render
the consenter's consent binding on the putative defendant.
● (Evid matter, skip. Basically SCOTUS said the district court should have
admitted the out-of-court statements of Gayle given that the rules on evidence
 don't apply strictly in suppression hearings and declaration against interest
naman daw statements ni Gael kasi bawal cohabiting out of wedlock sa
Wisconsin so crime yun.)
● It appears to the SCOTUS, given the admissibility of Mrs. Graff's and
respondent's out-of-court statements, that the Government sustained its
burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that Mrs. Graff's
voluntary consent to search the east bedroom was legally sufficient to warrant
admitting into evidence the $4,995 found in the diaper bag. But SCOTUS
prefers that the District Court first reconsider the sufficiency of the evidence in
the light of this decision and opinion.
● (From footnotes: Gayle says she was not informed that she was allowed to
refuse the search. Case law has since made clear that it is not essential for
the prosecution to show that the consenter knew of the right to refuse consent
in order to establish that the consent was voluntary.)

Dispositive:
● The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded
to the Court of Appeals with directions to remand the case to the District Court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 506. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968)
G.R. No. 391 U.S. 543 (1968)| June 3, 1968 | Stewart, J. | Waiver or Consented
Searches
Digest by: CACHO
Petitioners: Mr. Bumper
Respondents: North Carolina
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
Petitioner Bumper was tried for rape in North Carolina state court, an offense
punishable by death unless the jury recommended life imprisonment. The
prosecution was permitted to challenge for cause all prospective jurors who stated
that they were opposed to capital punishment or had conscientious scruples against
imposing the death penalty. A rifle which was introduced at the trial was obtained by
a search of petitioner's grandmother's house, where he resided. Four officers
appeared at the home, announced that they had a warrant to search it, and were
told by the owner to "go ahead." At the hearing on a motion to suppress, which was
denied, the prosecutor stated that he did not rely on a warrant to justify the search,
but on consent. The jury found petitioner guilty, but recommended life imprisonment.
The state supreme court affirmed, holding that the trial court had properly denied the
request to suppress the evidence because it had been lawfully seized and was clear
evidence of guilt. Petitioner sought and was granted certiorari by the Supreme Court
of the United States.
Under the circumstances of the case at hand, was the evidence lawfully seized by
the police officers? No
The Court held that there was no consent when that consent was given only after
the official conducting the search asserted that he possessed a warrant. The Court
determined that such consent was not consent for purposes of authorizing a
warrantless search. According to the Court, one who, upon the command of an
officer authorized to enter and search and seize by search warrant, opens the door
to the officer and acquiesces in obedience to such a request, no matter by what
language used in such acquiescence, is but showing a regard for the supremacy of
the law. The presentation of a search warrant to those in charge at the place to be
searched, by one authorized to serve it, is tinged with coercion, and submission
thereto cannot be considered an invitation that would waive the constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, but rather is to be considered a
submission to the law.
Doctrine: When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of
a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and
voluntarily given. This burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than
acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority. A search conducted in reliance upon a
warrant cannot later be justified on the basis of consent if it turns out that the warrant
was invalid. The result can be no different when it turns out that the State does not
even attempt to rely upon the validity of the warrant, or fails to show that there was,
in fact, any warrant at all.
Facts:
● The petitioner was brought to trial in a North Carolina court upon a charge of
rape, an offense punishable in that State by death unless the jury recommends
life imprisonment. Among the items of evidence introduced by the prosecution
at the trial was a .22-caliber rifle allegedly used in the commission of the crime.
The jury found the petitioner guilty, but recommended a sentence of life
imprisonment. The trial court-imposed that sentence, and the Supreme Court
of North Carolina affirmed the judgment. We granted certiorari to consider two
separate constitutional claims pressed unsuccessfully by the petitioner
throughout the litigation in the North Carolina courts.
● First, the petitioner argues that his constitutional right to an impartial jury was
violated in this capital case when the prosecution was permitted to challenge
for cause all prospective jurors who stated that they were opposed to capital
punishment or had conscientious scruples against imposing the death penalty.
Secondly, the petitioner contends that the .22-caliber rifle introduced in
evidence against him was obtained by the State in a search and seizure
violative of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
● The petitioner lived with his grandmother, Mrs. Leath, a 66-year-old Negro
widow, in a house located in a rural area at the end of an isolated mile-long
dirt road. Two days after the alleged offense, but prior to the petitioner's arrest,
four white law enforcement officers -- the county sheriff, two of his deputies,
and a state investigator -- went to this house and found Mrs. Leath there with
some young children. She met the officers at the front door. One of them
announced, "I have a search warrant to search your house." Mrs. Leath
responded, "Go ahead," and opened the door. In the kitchen the officers found
the rifle that was later introduced in evidence at the petitioner's trial after a
motion to suppress had been denied.
● At the hearing on this motion, the prosecutor informed the court that he did
not rely upon a warrant to justify the search, but upon the consent of Mrs.
Leath. She testified at the hearing, stating, among other things:
"Four of them came. I was busy about my work, and they walked into the
house and one of them walked up and said, 'I have a search warrant to search
your house,' and I walked out and told them to come on in. . . . He just come
on in and said he had a warrant to search the house, and he didn't read it to
me or nothing. So, I just told him to come on in and go ahead and search, and
I went on about my work. I wasn't concerned what he was about. I was just
satisfied. He just told me he had a search warrant, but he didn't read it to me.
He did tell me he had a search warrant."
● "* * * *"
● ". . . He said he was the law and had a search warrant to search the house,
why I thought he could go ahead. I believed he had a search warrant. I took
him at his word. . . . I just seen them out there in the yard. They got through
the door when I opened it. At that time, I did not know my grandson had been
 charged with crime. Nobody told me anything. They didn't tell me anything,
just picked it up like that. They didn't tell me nothing about my grandson.

● Upon the basis of Mrs. Leath's testimony, the trial court found that she had
given her consent to the search, and denied the motion to suppress. The
Supreme Court of North Carolina approved the admission of the evidence on
the same basis.

Issue:

● Whether a search can be justified as lawful on the basis of consent when that
"consent" has been given only after the official conducting the search has
asserted that he possesses a warrant. We hold that there can be no consent
under such circumstances.

Ratio:

● When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a

search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and
voluntarily given.
● This burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to
a claim of lawful authority. A search conducted in reliance upon a warrant
cannot later be justified on the basis of consent if it turns out that the warrant
was invalid. The result can be no different when it turns out that the State does
not even attempt to rely upon the validity of the warrant, or fails to show that
there was, in fact, any warrant at all.
● When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a
warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the
search. The situation is instinct with coercion -- albeit colorably lawful
coercion. Where there is coercion, there cannot be consent.
● We hold that Mrs. Leath did not consent to the search, and that it was
constitutional error to admit the rifle in evidence against the petitioner.
Because the rifle was plainly damaging evidence against the petitioner with
respect to all three of the charges against him, its admission at the trial was
not harmless error.

Dispositive:

● The judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina is, accordingly,

reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion. It is so ordered.