Stop and frisk reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing petitioner was
507. Terry v. Ohio armed and thus presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating
392 U.S. 1 | June 10, 1968 | CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN | Stop and frisk
Digest by: capacite
Petitioners: JOHN W. TERRY
Respondents: STATE OF OHIO
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
Officer McFadden observed two strangers (petitioner and another man, Chilton) on
a street corner. He saw them proceed alternately back and forth along an identical
route, pausing to stare in the same store window, which they did for a total of about
24 times. Suspecting the two men of "casing a job, a stick-up," the officer followed
them, and saw them rejoin the third man a couple of blocks away in front of a store.
The officer approached the three, identified himself as a policeman, and asked their
names.
The men "mumbled something," whereupon McFadden grabbed the petitioner, spun
him around, patted down his outside clothing, and found in his overcoat pocket, but
was unable to remove, a pistol. The officer ordered the three into the store. He
removed the petitioner's overcoat, took out his revolver, and ordered the three to
face the wall with their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton
and Katz and seized a revolver from Chilton's outside overcoat pocket. The three
were taken to the police station.
Petitioner and Chilton were charged with carrying concealed weapons. On the
motion to suppress the guns. The trial court denied the motion to suppress and
admitted the weapons into evidence on the ground that the officer had cause to
believe that petitioner and Chilton were acting suspiciously, that their interrogation
was warranted, and that the officer, for his own protection, had the right to pat down
their outer clothing having reasonable cause to believe that they might be armed.
Petitioner and Chilton were found guilty.
Issue: W/N the search conducted by Officer McFadden was valid, and thus,
rendering the evidence uncovered by the search and seizure as admissible against
the petitioner. YES
Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in
the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for
the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search
of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might
be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under theFourth
Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence
against the person from whom they were taken.
At the time he seized petitioner and searched him for weapons, Officer McFadden
had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner was armed and dangerous, and it
was necessary for the protection of himself and others to take swift measures to
discover the true facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized. A
his suspicious behavior. The actions of Terry and Chilton were consistent with
McFadden's hypothesis that these men were contemplating a daylight robbery—
which, it is reasonable to assume, would be likely to involve the use of weapons—
and nothing in their conduct from the time he first noticed them until the time he
confronted them and identified himself as a police officer gave him sufficient reason
to negate that hypothesis.
Officer McFadden confined his search strictly to what was minimally necessary to
learn whether the men were armed and to disarm them once he discovered the
weapons. He did not conduct a general exploratory search for whatever evidence of
criminal activity he might find.
Facts:
● A Cleveland detective (McFadden), on a downtown beat which he had been
patrolling for many years, observed two strangers (petitioner and another
man, Chilton) on a street corner. He saw them proceed alternately back and
forth along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window,
which they did for a total of about 24 times.
○ Each completion of the route was followed by a conference between
the two on a corner, at one of which they were joined by a third man
(Katz) who left swiftly.
● Suspecting the two men of "casing a job, a stick-up," the officer followed them
and saw them rejoin the third man a couple of blocks away in front of a store.
The officer approached the three, identified himself as a policeman, and asked
their names.
● The men "mumbled something," whereupon McFadden grabbed the
petitioner, spun him around, patted down his outside clothing, and found in his
overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove, a pistol. The officer ordered the
three into the store.
○ He removed the petitioner's overcoat, took out his revolver, and
ordered the three to face the wall with their hands raised.
○ He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and seized a
revolver from Chilton's outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his
hands under the outer garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing
in his pat-down which might have been a weapon), or under
petitioner's or Chilton's outer garments until he felt the guns.
● The three were taken to the police station. Petitioner and Chilton were charged
with carrying concealed weapons.
● On the motion to suppress the guns, the prosecution took the position that
they had been seized following a search incident to a lawful arrest.
○ The trial court denied the motion to suppress and admitted the
weapons into evidence on the ground that the officer had cause to
believe that petitioner and Chilton were acting suspiciously, that their
interrogation was warranted, and that the officer, for his own
protection, had the right to pat down their outer clothing having
reasonable cause to believe that they might be armed.
● Petitioner and Chilton were found guilty. An intermediate appellate court
affirmed, and the State Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the ground
that "no substantial constitutional question" was involved.

Issue/s:
● W/N the search conducted by Officer McFadden was valid, and thus,
rendering the evidence uncovered by the search and seizure as admissible
against the petitioner. YES
Ratio: (You know the drill, if kulang sa oras, skip na lang papunta sa mga naka
bold/underline, thank you)
● The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers,and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated.
○ This inestimable right of personal security belongs as much to the
citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in
his study to dispose of his secret affairs.
○ The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, and
wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable expectation of
privacy, he is entitled to be free from unreasonable government
intrusion.
○ What the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but
unreasonable searches and seizures.
○ Unquestionably, the petitioner was entitled to the protection of the
Fourth Amendment as he walked down the street in Cleveland.
● The issue in this case is not the abstract propriety of the police conduct, but
the admissibility against petitioner of the evidence uncovered by the search
and seizure.
● The exclusionary rule cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products of
legitimate and restrained police investigative techniques on the ground that
much conduct which is closely similar involves unwarranted intrusions upon
constitutional protections.
○ Regardless of how effective the rule may be where obtaining
convictions is an important objective of the police, it is powerless to
deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police
either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forgo
successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal.
● The Fourth Amendment governs "seizures" of the person which do not
eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime—"arrests" in
traditional terminology.
○ It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has "seized"
that person.
○ A careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all
over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is a "search.”
● A search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth
Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope.
○ The scope of the search must be "strictly tied to and justified by" the
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.
● The Fourth Amendment comes into play as a limitation upon police conduct if
the officers stop short of something called a "technical arrest" or a "full-blown
search."
● The police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of
searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, or that in most
instances failure to comply with the warrant requirement can only be excused
by exigent circumstances, e.g., hot pursuit.
● In order to assess the reasonableness of Officer McFadden's conduct as
a general proposition, it is necessary first to focus upon the
governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon
the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen, for there is
no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the
need to search or seize against the invasion which the search or seizure
entails.
○ And in justifying the particular intrusion, the police officer must be
able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion.
○ The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only
when it is assured that at some point, the conduct of those charged
with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached,
neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of
a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances.
○ And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be
judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to
the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was
appropriate? Anything less would invite intrusions upon
constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial
than inarticulate hunches.
○ And simple good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not
enough. If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections
of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and that the people
would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ only
in the discretion of the police.
● Applying these principles to this case, we consider first the nature and extent
of the governmental interests involved.
● One general interest is of course that of effective crime prevention and
detection; it is this interest which underlies the recognition that a police officer
may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a
person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though
there is no probable cause to make an arrest.
○ It was this legitimate investigative function Officer McFadden was
discharging when he decided to approach petitioner and his
companions.
○ He had observed Terry, Chilton, and Katz go through a series of acts,
each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but which taken together
warranted further investigation. There is nothing unusual in two men
standing together on a street corner, perhaps waiting for someone.
Nor is there anything suspicious about people in such circumstances
strolling up and down the street, singly or in pairs. Store windows,
moreover, are made to be looked in.
○ But the story in quite different where, as here, two men hover about
a street corner for an extended period of time, at the end of which it
becomes apparent that they are not waiting for anyone or anything;
where these men pace alternately along an identical route, pausing
to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; where each
 completion of this route is followed immediately by a conference
between the two men on thecorner; where they are joined in one of
these conferences by a third man who leaves swiftly; and where the
two men finally follow the third and rejoin him a couple of blocks
away.
○ It would have been poor police work indeed for an officer of 30 years'
experience in the detection of thievery from stores in this same
neighborhood to have failed to investigate this behavior further.
● We are now concerned with more than the governmental interest in
investigating crime; in addition, there is the more immediate interest of the
police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with
whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly
and fatally be used against him.
○ Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take
unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.
● When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose
suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and
presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be
clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary
measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon
and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.
○ We must still consider, however, the nature and quality of the
intrusion on individual rights which must be accepted if police officers
are to be conceded the right to search for weapons in situations
where probable cause to arrest for crime is lacking.
● Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in this type of case
leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to
permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police
officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed
and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause
to arrest the individual for a crime.
○ The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed;
the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety
or that of others was in danger.
○ And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such
circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or "hunch," but to the specific reasonable
inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his
experience.
● We think on the facts and circumstances Officer McFadden detailed before
the trial judge, a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in
believing petitioner was armed and thus presented a threat to the officer's
safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior.
○ The actions of Terry and Chilton were consistent with McFadden's
hypothesis that these men were contemplating a daylight robbery—
which, it is reasonable to assume, would be likely to involve the use
of weapons—and nothing in their conduct from the time he first
noticed them until the time he confronted them and identified himself
as a police officer gave him sufficient reason to negate that
hypothesis.
● Although the trio had departed the original scene, there was nothing to indicate
abandonment of an intent to commit a robbery at some point.
○ Thus, when Officer McFadden approached the three men gathered
before the display window at Zucker's store he had observed enough
to make it quite reasonable to fear that they were armed; and nothing
in their response to his hailing them, identifying himself as a police
officer, and asking their names served to dispel that reasonable
belief.
○ We cannot say his decision at that point to seize Terry and pat his
clothing for weapons was the product of a volatile or inventive
imagination, or was undertaken simply as an act of harassment; the
record evidences the tempered act of a policeman who in the course
of an investigation had to make a quick decision as to how to protect
himself and others from possible danger, and took limited steps to do
so.
● The manner in which the seizure and search were conducted is, of course, as
vital a part of the inquiry as whether they were warranted at all.
○ The entire deterrent purpose of the rule excluding evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment rests on the assumption that
"limitations upon the fruit to be gathered tend to limit the quest itself."
○ Thus, evidence may not be introduced if it was discovered by means
of a seizure and search which were not reasonably related in scope
to the justification for their initiation.
● Suffice it to note that such a search, unlike a search without a warrant incident
to a lawful arrest, is not justified by any need to prevent the disappearance or
destruction of evidence of crime.
○ The sole justification of the search in the present situation is the
protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must
therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed
to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the
assault of the police officer.
● The scope of the search in this case presents no serious problem in light of
these standards.
○ Officer McFadden patted down the outer clothing of petitioner and
his two companions.
○ He did not place his hands in their pockets or under the outer surface
of their garments until he had felt weapons, and then he merely
reached for and removed the guns.
○ He never did invade Katz' person beyond the outer surfaces of his
clothes, since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which might
have been a weapon.
○ Officer McFadden confined his search strictly to what was minimally
necessary to learn whether the men were armed and to disarm them
once he discovered the weapons. He did not conduct a general
exploratory search for whatever evidence of criminal activity he might
find.
● We conclude that the revolver seized from Terry was properly admitted in
evidence against him.
○ At the time he seized petitioner and searched him for weapons,
Officer McFadden had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner
was armed and dangerous, and it was necessary for the protection
 of himself and others to take swift measures to discover the true facts
and neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized.
○ The policeman carefully restricted his search to what was
appropriate to the discovery of the particular items which he sought.
● We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in
the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the
initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for
his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might
be used to assault him.
○ Such a search is a reasonable search under theFourth
Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be
introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were
taken.

Dispositive:
Affirmed.
 508. Minnesota v. Dickerson
508 U.S. 366 | 1993 | Associate Justice Byron White | Stop and frisk
Digest by: DE LA TORRE
(US case. please bear with me huhu)
Petitioners: Minnesota
Respondents: Timothy Dickerson
Recit-ready Digest:
Two police officers were patrolling the area around an apartment building and saw
respondent was acting sketchy and evasive. Considering that the officers have had
experience regarding drug sales in such apartment building, the officers stopped the
respondent and conducted a patdown search on him. Although, initially, the officers
concluded and found no weapons on the respondent, one of the officers then
afterwards found a small lump on the respondent’s jacket, which turned out to be
crack cocaine in cellophane. During trial, the respondent moved to suppress the
same since he argued that the officer violated his right against unreasonable search
and seizure.
W/N the subject crack cocaine here was admissible in evidence? NO, the crack
cocaine here was not admissible in evidence, because the officers here who
conducted the search did not act within the lawful bounds marked by the Terry
v Ohio case.
(DOCTRINE) The Terry v Ohio case permits a brief stop of a person whose
suspicious conduct leads an officer to conclude, in light of his experience, that
criminal activity may be afoot, and a patdown search of the person for weapons,
when the officer is justified in believing that the person may be armed and presently
dangerous. If the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if
the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be
suppressed. The boundaries in the Terry v Ohio case require that a protective pat-
down search to involve only what is necessary for the detection of weapons.
(DOCTRINE) In the case of Michigan v. Long, the seizure of contraband other than
weapons during a lawful Terry search was justified by reference to the Court's cases
under the "plain-view" doctrine. Thus, if an officer lawfully pats down a suspect's
outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity
immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond
that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons.
(DOCTRINE) If the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified
by the realization that resort to a neutral magistrate under such circumstances would
be impracticable and would do little to promote the Fourth Amendment's objectives.
(parang, bale, ang sinasabi rito, kung contraband na ‘yung tingin na naramdaman ni
officer sa patdown search, valid na ‘yung warrantless seizure ng contraband na ‘yun
kasi going to a court pa at that moment just to seize the same would be
impracticable. at least that’s how i understood this). When a police officer who is
conducting a lawful patdown search for weapons feels something that plainly is
contraband, the object may be seized even though it is not a weapon.
In this case, however, the officer herein did not act within the lawful bounds marked
by the Terry v Ohio case. Herein, the officer was already aware and concluded that
the respondents did not have any weapons on him. It was only after such conclusion
when he detected the lump (of cocaine) through further tactile investigation. Thus,
the crack cocaine here was not admissible in evidence.
Facts:
● Two Minnesota police officers were patrolling a particular area, riding their
patrol car, at night then observed the respondent Dickerson leaving an
apartment. These two officers have previously responded to complaints of
drug sales in the hallways of such apartment building and have executed
several search warrants on the premises.
○ The respondent allegedly began walking toward the police, but
abruptly halted and walked the opposite way upon spotting the squad
car and making eye contact with one of the officers.
○ This arouse the suspicion of one of the officers and prompted him to
observe the respondent even more, who has now entered an alley
on the other side of the apartment building. Due to the respondent’s
evasive actions and the apartment building’s history of cocaine
traffic, the officers brought their squad car to the alley and ordered
the respondent to stop.
○ The officers then conducted a patdown search on the respondent
and concluded that there were no weapons on him. However, one of
the officers found a small lump in the front pocket of the respondent’s
nylon jacket. After examining further, such lump turned out to be
crack cocaine in cellophane.
● The respondent moved to suppress the cocaine in trial, as he argued that the
officer violated his right against unreasonable search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
○ The state trial court denied respondent’s motion to suppress the
cocaine and found him guilty of possession of a controlled
substance.
○ The Minnesota CA reversed the court’s ruling.
○ The state SC, however, held that both the stop and frisk of the
respondent were valid under the Terry v Ohio case (see the prior
case).
Issue/s:
● W/N the subject crack cocaine here was admissible in evidence? NO, the
crack cocaine here was not admissible in evidence, because the officers
here who conducted the search did not act within the lawful bounds
marked by the Terry v Ohio case.
Ratio:
● The police may seize nonthreatening contraband detected through the sense
of touch during a protective patdown search of the sort permitted by Terry v
Ohio case, so long as the search stays within the bounds marked by such
case.
○ The Terry v Ohio case permits a brief stop of a person whose
suspicious conduct leads an officer to conclude, in light of his
experience, that criminal activity may be afoot, and a patdown search
of the person for weapons when the officer is justified in believing
that the person may be armed and presently dangerous.
 ○ This protective search -- permitted without a warrant and on the basis ○ Because this further search was constitutionally invalid, the seizure
of reasonable suspicion less than probable cause – is not meant to of the cocaine that followed is likewise unconstitutional.
discover evidence of crime, but must be strictly limited to that which
is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to Dispositive:
harm the officer or others. 481 N. W. 2d 840, affirmed.
○ If the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine
if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and II,
will be suppressed. and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III and IV, in which STEVENS,
○ The boundaries in the Terry v Ohio case require that a protective pat- O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a
down search to involve only what is necessary for the detection of concurring opinion, post, p. 379. REHNQUIST, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in part
weapons. and dissenting in part, in which BLACKMUN and THOMAS, JJ., joined, post, p. 383.
● In the case of Michigan v. Long, the seizure of contraband other than weapons
during a lawful Terry search was justified by reference to the Court's cases
under the "plain-view" doctrine.
○ That doctrine (which permits police to seize an object without a
warrant if they are lawfully in a position to view it, if its incriminating
character is immediately apparent, and if they have a lawful right of
access to it) has an obvious application by analogy to cases in which
an officer discovers contraband through the sense of touch during an
otherwise lawful search.
○ Thus, if an officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and
feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately
apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond
that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons.
i. If the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be
justified by the realization that resort to a neutral magistrate
under such circumstances would be impracticable and
would do little to promote the Fourth Amendment's
objectives.
ii. (parang, bale, ang sinasabi rito, kung contraband na ‘yung
tingin na naramdaman ni officer sa patdown search, valid
na ‘yung warrantless seizure ng contraband na ‘yun kasi
going to a court pa at that moment just to seize the same
would be impracticable. at least that’s how i understood
this)
iii. When a police officer who is conducting a lawful patdown
search for weapons feels something that plainly is
contraband, the object may be seized even though it is not
a weapon.
● Here in this case, the officer herein did not act within the lawful bounds marked
by the Terry v Ohio case at the time he gained probable cause to believe that
the lump in the respondent’s jacket was contraband. The officer herein has
already concluded that the respondent had no weapons on him.
○ While the Terry v Ohio case entitled the officer to place his hands on
respondent's jacket and to feel the lump in the pocket, his continued
exploration of the pocket after he concluded that it contained no
weapon was unrelated to the sole justification for the search under
Terry v Ohio case.
i. The officer was already aware and concluded that the
respondents did not have any weapons on him. It was only
after such conclusion when he detected the lump (of
cocaine) through further tactile investigation.
 509. People v. Solayao, GR No. 119220, 20 September 1996
G.R. No. 119220 | September 20, 1996 | Romero | Stop and frisk
Digest by: DE VERA
Petitioners: People of the Philippines
Respondents: Nilo Solayao
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine: SPO3 Niño conducted an intelligence patrol with
CAFGU members to verify reports on the presence of armed persons roaming
around the barangays of Caibiran. They became suspicious of Solayao’s group of
drunk men and that Solayao was wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit.
Solayao’s companions, upon seeing the government agents, fled.
SPO3 Niño told Solayao not to flee and seized the dried coconut leaves which the
latter was carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally
known as "latong." SPO3 Niño confiscated the firearm after Solayao told him he did
not have a license nor connected to the military or intelligence group. Solayao was
charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under PD
1866.
W/N the homemade firearm was properly admitted in evidence – YES
The circumstances in this case are similar to those obtaining in Posadas v. CA,
where this Court held that "at the time the peace officers identified themselves and
apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee, they did not know that he had
committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag.
They did not know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an
arrest without a warrant." Nonetheless, the Court ruled that the search and seizure
brought about by the suspicious conduct of Posadas himself can be likened to a
"stop and frisk" situation. There was probable cause to conduct a search even before
an arrest could be made.
In the present case, after SPO3 Niño told Solayao not to run away, the former
identified himself as a government agents. The peace officers did not know that he
had committed, or was actually committing, the offense of illegal possession of
firearm. Tasked with verifying the report that there were armed men roaming in the
barangays surrounding Caibiran, their attention was understandably drawn to the
group that had aroused their suspicion (drunk + Solayao was wearing a camo
uniform/jungle suit). They could not have known that the object wrapped in coconut
leaves which Solayao was carrying hid a firearm.
As with Posadas, this case constitutes an instance where a search and seizure may
be effected without first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to "stop and
frisk" Solayao when his companions filed upon seeing the government agents.
Under the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have procured
a search warrant first. Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Nor was there error on the part of the
trial court when it admitted the homemade firearm as evidence.
Facts:
● Nilo Solayao was charged before the RTC with the crime of illegal possession
of firearm and ammunition under PD 1866.
● The lone prosecution witness, SPO3 Niño, narrated that he went to conduct
an intelligence patrol with CAFGU members to verify reports on the presence
of armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran.
● In Barangay Onion, they met the group of Solayao. They became suspicious
when they observed that Solayao’s group was drunk and that Solayao was
wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit. Solayao’s companions, upon
seeing the government agents, fled.
● SPO3 Niño told Solayao not to flee and introduced himself as "PC." He seized
the dried coconut leaves which the latter was carrying and found wrapped in
it a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally known as "latong."
○ When he asked Solayao who issued him a license to carry said
firearm or whether he was connected with the military or any
intelligence group, the latter answered that he had no permission to
possess the same.
○ SPO3 Niño confiscated the firearm and turned him over to the
custody of the policemen who subsequently investigated him and
charged him with illegal possession of firearm.
● Solayao, in his defense, did not contest the confiscation of the shotgun but
averred that this was only given to him by one of his companions,
Hermogenes, when it was still wrapped in coconut leaves.
○ He claimed that he was not aware that there was a shotgun
concealed inside the coconut leaves since they were using the
coconut leaves as a torch. He further claimed that this was the third
torch handed to him after the others had been used up.
○ His claim was corroborated by Balano that he indeed received a torch
from Hermogenes Cenining which turned out to be a shotgun
wrapped in coconut leaves.
● RTC: guilty
Issue/s: W/N the homemade firearm was properly admitted in evidence – YES
Ratio:
● In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the
burden of proving the elements thereof, viz: (a) the existence of the subject
firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not
have the corresponding license or permit to possess the same.
● Solayao argued that the RTC erred in admitting the subject firearm in evidence
as it was the product of an unlawful warrantless search.
○ He maintained that the search made on his person violated his
constitutional right to be secure in his person and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
○ Not only was the search made without a warrant but it did not fall
under any of the circumstances enumerated under Section 5, Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure: A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
○ Hence, the search being unlawful, the homemade firearm
confiscated from him is inadmissible in evidence for being "the fruit
of the poisonous tree."
 ● The law requires that the search be incident to a lawful arrest, in order that the
search itself may likewise be considered legal. Thus, a lawful arrest must
precede the search of a person and his belongings.
● However, Solayao and his companions' drunken actuations aroused the
suspicion of SPO3 Niño's group, as well as the fact that he himself was attired
in a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit and that upon espying the peace
officers, his companions fled. It should be noted that the peace officers were
precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons were
roaming around the barangays of Caibiran.
● The circumstances in this case are similar to those obtaining in Posadas v.
CA, where this Court held that "at the time the peace officers identified
themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee, they did
not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. They just suspected that he was
hiding something in the buri bag. They did not know what its contents were.
The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant."
○ This Court, nevertheless, ruled that the search and seizure brought
about by the suspicious conduct of Posadas himself can be likened
to a "stop and frisk" situation. There was probable cause to conduct
a search even before an arrest could be made.
● In the present case, after SPO3 Niño told Solayao not to run away, the former
identified himself as a government agents.
○ The peace officers did not know that he had committed, or was
actually committing, the offense of illegal possession of firearm.
○ Tasked with verifying the report that there were armed men roaming
in the barangays surrounding Caibiran, their attention was
understandably drawn to the group that had aroused their suspicion.
They could not have known that the object wrapped in coconut
leaves which Solayao was carrying hid a firearm.
● As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes an instance where a search and
seizure may be effected without first making an arrest. There was justifiable
cause to "stop and frisk" Solayao when his companions filed upon seeing the
government agents. Under the circumstances, the government agents could
not possibly have procured a search warrant first.
● Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Nor was there error on the part of the
trial court when it admitted the homemade firearm as evidence.
NOT RELEVANT
● As to the question of whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the
second element, that is, the absence of a license or permit to possess the
subject firearm, this Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General which
pointed out that the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant lacked
the necessary permit or license to possess the subject firearm.
● Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such
burden upon the prosecution. The absence of such license and legal authority
constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of
firearm, and every ingredient or essential element of an offense must be
shown by the prosecution by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
● In the case at bar, the prosecution was only able to prove by testimonial
evidence that Solayao admitted before Police Officer Niño at the time that he
was accosted that he did not have any authority or license to carry the subject
firearm when he was asked if he had one. In other words, the prosecution
relied on Solayao’s admission to prove the second element.
● An admission is a "statement by the defendant of fact or facts pertinent to
issues pending, in connection with proof of other facts or circumstances, to
prove guilt, but which is, of itself, insufficient to authorize conviction."
● An admission in criminal cases is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the commission of the crime charged.
● Moreover, said admission is extra-judicial in nature. As such, it does not fall
under Section 4 of Rule 129 which states: An admission, verbal or written,
made by a party in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same
case does not require proof.
● Not being a judicial admission, said statement by Solayao does not prove
beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of firearm.
It does not even establish a prima facie case. It merely bolsters the case for
the prosecution but does not stand as proof of the fact of absence or lack of a
license.
● While the prosecution was able to establish the fact that the subject firearm
was seized by the police from the possession of appellant, without the latter
being able to present any license or permit to possess the same, such fact
alone is not conclusive proof that he was not lawfully authorized to carry such
firearm. In other words, such fact does not relieve the prosecution from its duty
to establish the lack of a license or permit to carry the firearm by clear and
convincing evidence, like a certification from the government agency
concerned.
● When a negative is averred in a pleading, or a plaintiff's case depends upon
the establishment of a negative, and the means of proving the fact are equally
within the control of each party, then the burden of proof is upon the party
averring the negative.
● In this case, a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the
Philippine National Police that Solayao was not a licensee of a firearm of any
kind or caliber would have sufficed for the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the second element of the crime of illegal possession of
firearm.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao is hereby ACQUITTED for
insufficiency of evidence and ordered immediately released unless there are other legal
grounds for his continued detention, with cost de oficio.
 510. People v. Sy Chua, GR Nos. 136066-67, 4 February 2003
G.R. No 136066-67. | 4 February 2003
| Ynares Santiago | Stop and Frisk
Digest by:COLIE
Petitioners: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondents: BINAD SY CHUA
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
Binad Sy Chua was charged with Illegal Possession of ammunition and drugs
(SHABU).
Version of the Police
At 10 in the evening they received a report from their informant that Chua was about
to deliver drugs at the Thunder Inn Hotel. At 11:45 in the evening, their informer
pointed to a car driven by Chua.. After Chua alighted from the car carrying a sealed
Zest-O juice box, police officers hurriedly accosted him. Forthwith, a police officer
subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber
firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When the police officer peeked into the
contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance which
turned out to be a shabu.
Chua’s version
He stopped in front of a store near Thunder Inn Hotel to buy cigarettes and
candies.While at the store, he noticed a man approach and examine the inside of
his car. When he called the attention of the onlooker, the man immediately pulled
out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with raised hands. The man later on
identified himself as a policeman.the policeman proceeded to search him then took
his car keys and searched his car.
Chua maintains that the warrantless arrest and search made by the police operatives
was unlawful because prior to his arrest he has been under surveillance for two
years, there was therefore no compelling reason for the haste within which the
arresting officers sought to arrest and search him without a warrant;
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless arrest and search made by the police operatives was
lawful- NO
In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the "stop and frisk" principles
Facts:
is applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure
made by the police operatives on accused-appellant.
(FOCUS ON STOP AND FRISK)
VERSION OF THE POLICE
There could be no valid "stop-and-frisk" in this case. A stop-and-frisk was
defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate
him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The police officer should
properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a
person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the
latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending
police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police
officer’s experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
the person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It
should therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the
arrest for this principle to apply.
The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. There was no
valid "stop-and-frisk" in the case of Chua. To reiterate, Chua was first arrested
before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his
possession. The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial
inquiry into Chua’s business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice
box he was carrying. The apprehending police officers only introduced
themselves when they already had custody of Chua. Besides, at the time of
his arrest, Chua did not exhibit manifest unusual and suspicious conduct
reasonable enough to dispense with the procedure outlined by jurisprudence
and the law. There was, therefore, no genuine reasonable ground for the
immediacy of Chua’s arrest.
(JUST IN CASE MA’AM ASKS)
In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is
committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence
of the arresting officer. Emphasis should be laid on the fact that the law requires that
the search be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful
arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Accordingly, for this
exception to apply two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. The record
reveals that when Chua arrived at the vicinity of Thunder Inn Hotel, he merely parked
his car along the McArthur Highway, alighted from it and casually proceeded towards
the entrance of the Hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box. Accused-appellant did
not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt
manifestation that Chua has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime.
● Binad Sy Chua was charged with Illegal Possession of ammunitions and drugs
(SHABU).
● At around 10:00 in the evening, the police officers received a report from their
confidential informant that Chua was about to deliver drugs that night at the
Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. The informer further reported
 that Chua distributes illegal drugs in different karaoke bars in Angeles City.
On the basis of this lead, the PNP Chief of Angeles City immediately formed
a team of operatives.
● At around 11:45 in the evening, their informer pointed to a car driven by Chua
which just arrived and parked near the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel. After
Chua alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, police officers
hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As Chua
pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline
substance protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, a police officer
subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22
caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When the police officer peeked
into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline
substance which turned out to be a shabu.
CHUA’s VERSION
● Chua alleged that on the night in question, He stopped in front of a small store
near Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City to buy cigarettes and
candies. While at the store, he noticed a man approach and examine the
inside of his car. When he called the attention of the onlooker, the man
immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with raised
hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman. During the course
of the arrest, the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to open his
car. He refused, so the policeman took his car keys and proceeded to search
his car.
● Thereafter, he was brought to the Salakot Police Station and was held inside
a bathroom for about fifteen minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered
his men to call the media. In the presence of reporters, Col. Guttierez opened
the box and accused-appellant was made to hold the box while pictures were
being taken.
● Wilfredo Lagman corroborated the story of Chua in its material points. He
testified that he witnessed the incident while he was conducting a routine
security check around the premises of the Guess Building, near Thunder Inn
Hotel.
● Chua maintains that the warrantless arrest and search made by the police
operatives was unlawful; that in the light of the testimony of SPO2 Nulud that
prior to his arrest he has been under surveillance for two years, there was
therefore no compelling reason for the haste within which the arresting officers
sought to arrest and search him without a warrant;
ISSUE: w/n the warrantless arrest and search made by the police operatives was
lawful- NO
● In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the "stop and frisk"
principles is applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search
and seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant.
● In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the very moment
he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in
the presence of the arresting officer. Emphasis should be laid on the fact that
the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is
beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his
belongings. Accordingly, for this exception to apply two elements must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.
● We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. The
record reveals that when Chua arrived at the vicinity of Thunder Inn Hotel, he
merely parked his car along the McArthur Highway, alighted from it and
casually proceeded towards the entrance of the Hotel clutching a sealed Zest-
O juice box. Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For all
intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that Chua has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime.
● As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it has been held that "reliable
information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in
the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to
constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
● In the instant case, the apprehending policemen already had prior knowledge
from the very same informant of Chua’s activities. The team leader of the
arresting operatives, admitted that their informant had been telling them about
the activities of Chua for two years prior to his actual arrest on September 21,
1996.
● The police operatives cannot feign ignorance of the alleged illegal activities of
accused-appellant. Considering that the identity, address and activities of the
suspected culprit was already ascertained two years previous to the actual
arrest, there was indeed no reason why the police officers could not have
obtained a judicial warrant before arresting Chua and searching his person.
Whatever information their civilian asset related to them hours before Chua’s
arrest was not a product of an "on-the-spot" tip which may excuse them from
obtaining a warrant of arrest. Accordingly, the arresting team’s contention that
their arrest of Chua was a product of an "on-the-spot" tip is untenable.
● In the same vein, there could be no valid "stop-and-frisk" in this case. A stop-
and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the
street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The police
officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach
and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order
to check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The
apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with
the police officer’s experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed
about him. It should therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure should
precede the arrest for this principle to apply.
 ● This principle of "stop-and-frisk" search was invoked by the Court in Manalili accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua of violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No.
v. Court of Appeals. In said case, the policemen chanced upon the accused 6425 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine
who had reddish eyes, walking in a swaying manner, and who appeared to be of P1,000,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua
high on drugs. Thus, we upheld the validity of the search as akin to a "stop- is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. Consequently, he is ordered
and-frisk." In People v. Solayao, we also found justifiable reason to "stop-and- forthwith released from custody, unless he is being lawfully held for another crime.
frisk" the accused after considering the following circumstances: the drunken
actuations of the accused and his companions, the fact that his companions
fled when they saw the policemen, and the fact that the peace officers were
precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons where
roaming the vicinity.

● The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. There was no
valid "stop-and-frisk" in the case of Chua. To reiterate, Chua was first arrested
before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his
possession. The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial
inquiry into Chua’s business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice
box he was carrying. The apprehending police officers only introduced
themselves when they already had custody of Chua. Besides, at the time of
his arrest, Chua did not exhibit manifest unusual and suspicious conduct
reasonable enough to dispense with the procedure outlined by jurisprudence
and the law. There was, therefore, no genuine reasonable ground for the
immediacy of Chua’s arrest.

● Neither can there be valid seizure in plain view on the basis of the seized items
found in Chua’s possession. First, there was no valid intrusion. Second, the
evidence, i.eThe plastic bags found in the Zest-O juice box which contained
crystalline substances later identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu) and the 20 rounds of .22 caliber ammunition, were not inadvertently
discovered. The police officers first arrested accused-appellant and
intentionally searched his person and peeked into the sealed Zest-O juice box
before they were able to see and later on ascertained that the crystalline
substance was shabu. There was no clear showing that the sealed Zest-O
juice box accused-appellant carried contained prohibited drugs. Neither were
the small plastic bags which allegedly contained crystalline substance and the
20 rounds of .22 caliber ammunition visible. These prohibited substances
were not in plain view of the arresting officers; hence, inadmissible for being
the fruits of the poisonous tree.

● In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving

vehicle, a consented warrantless search, or a customs search. It cannot even
fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for the evidence at hand is
bereft of any such showing.1a\^/phi1.net

● All told, the absence of ill-motive on the part of the arresting team cannot
simply validate, much more cure, the illegality of the arrest and consequent
warrantless search of accused-appellant.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City, Branch 59, in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-507 and 96-513, convicting
 511. People v. Cogaed, GR No. 200334, 30 July 2014
G.R. No. | Date | Ponente | Topic/Keywords
Digest by: FRANCISCO
Petitioners: People of the Philippines
Respondents: Cogaed
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
Acting on an informant’s tip that a certain ‘Marvin Buya’ will be transporting marijuana
from LU, PSI Bayan set up checkpoints. A passenger jeepney arrived and the driver
signalled to the police that Cogaed and Dayao were carrying marijuana. They were
asked about the contents of their bag, and Cogaed said he did not know since he
was carrying it for his barriomate, Marvin. When he opened the bag, it revealed three
bricks of what looked like marijuana. They were then arrested and brought to the
police station, and asked to empty their bags, revealing more marijuana. RTC
convicted Cogaed for violation of RA 9165. While initially an unlawful search, he
waived its illegality by consenting to the search.
W/N there was a valid search and seizure of marijuana as against the appellant -
NO
W/N the evidence obtained through the search should be admitted; and whether
there was enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused - NO
SC: unlawful search = exclusionary rule = evidence insufficient to convict =
acquit & release
While probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk."A genuine reason must
exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant
the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. In the instant
case however, Cogaed was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling
aboarda jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a
jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police
officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the police that
Cogaed was "suspicious."
Cogaed’s silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive
environment brought about by the police officer’s excessive intrusion into his private
space. The prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the waiver
of a constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any
coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.
Facts:
At about 6am of Nov 25, Police Senior Inspector Bayan (PSI Bayan) received a text
message from an unidentified civilian informer that one Marvin Buya would be
transporting marijuana within La Union. Accordingly, the police set up checkpoints in
the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City.
A passenger jeepney arrived in the checkpoint.
- The jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to to the police, indicating the two male
passengers who were carrying marijuana.
- The police approached the two male passengers who were later identified as
petitioner Cogaed and Dayao, a 14-year old minor.
- Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a yellow bag.
When asked as to the contents of the bag, Cogaed said that he did not know as he was
merely transporting it as a favor for his barriomate, Marvin. When he opened the bag,
it revealed three bricks of what looked like marijuana. They were then arrested and
brought to the police station, and asked to empty their bags, revealing more marijuana.
The RTC found Cogaed guilty for violation of RA 9165.
- Initially ruled that the search was illegal since he was not doing anything suspicious
to justify a stop and frisk search, let alone caught in flagrante delicto to justify a search
incidental to lawful arrest.
- However, the trial court stated that notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed
"waived his right to object to such irregularity" when "he did not protest when SPO1
Taracatac, after identifying himself, asked him to open his bag."
- CA affirmed
Issue/s:
W/N there was a valid search and seizure of marijuana as against the appellant - NO
W/N the evidence obtained through the search should be admitted; and whether there
was enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused - NO
Ratio:
Search Incidental to Lawful Arrest v Stop and Frisk
Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante
delicto, and the search conducted within the vicinity and within reach by the person
arrested is done to ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the
evidence.
On the other hand, "stop and frisk" searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence
of a crime. A ‘stop and frisk’ situation’s object is either to determine the identity of a
suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer
seeks to obtain more information.
- This court stated that the "stop and frisk" search should be used when dealing
with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets
where unarguably there is no time to secure a search warrant.
No stop and frisk
The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not
comply with all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for
law enforcement. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the
privacy of citizens.
The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness"present in the situation where the
police officer finds himself or herself in.
While probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk."A genuine reason must
exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant
the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
Further, police officers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance. There
should be "presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken
together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity.
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no
approximation for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person
searched was not even the person mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the
name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true
that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this
still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to
search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant
In past cases of validated warrantless search, the police officers using their senses
observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing a man with reddish eyes and walking
in a swaying manner, based on their experience, is indicative of a person who uses
dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear is probably hiding
something as well.
In the instant case however, Cogaed was simply a passenger carrying a bag and
traveling aboarda jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about
riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made by the
police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the police that
Cogaed was "suspicious."
The jeepney driver had to point to Cogaed. He would not have been identified by
the police officers otherwise.
For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient
that the police officer introduce himself or herself, or be known as a police officer.
The police officer must also inform the person to be searched that any inaction on
his or her part will amount to a waiver of any of his or her objections that the
circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search.
- The police officer must communicate this clearly and in a language known
to the person who is about to waive his or her constitutional rights. There
must be an assurance given to the police officer that the accused fully
understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature of a person’s
constitutional right to privacy requires no less.
Exclusionary Rule
Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because
it is "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures."
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search
of his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no
evidence left to convict Cogaed.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San Fernando
City, La Union and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03394 are hereby
REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, accused-appellant VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby
ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he is being heldfor
some other legal grounds. No costs.

It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable
degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion
initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be
stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be an infringement
upon one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects.

No waiver
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume that
he did not object when the police asked him to open his bags.

The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been
more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee.

Cogaed’s silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive

environment brought about by the police officer’s excessive intrusion into his private
space. The prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a
constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In
all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.
 512. See People v. Comprado
G.R. No. 213225 | 4 April 2018 | Martires | stop and frisk
Digest by: gonzales
Petitioners: People
Respondents: Comprado
Comprado was arrested for possession for dangerous drugs. Allegedly, the police
received a tip that a certain man was carrying marijuana, and that such man rode a
bus with plate number KVP 988. Based solely on the tip, the bus was searched, and
Compardo matched the description of the informant so they searched him and saw
the dried leaves. He was then arrested. The leaves later tested as marijuana.
IS the marijuana admissible as evidence? NO
The police argue that what happened is either a search incidental to lawful arrest,
stop and frisk (terry frisk), or a search of a moving vehicle.
Very Short Answers:
- search incidental to lawful arrest: there must be a valid arrest before the
search; but what happened here was the police saw the dried leaves first,
then he was arrested, so this cannot be a search incidental to lawful arrest
- stop-and-frisk: this is a limited protective search of outer clothing for
weapons." Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads
him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed
and presently dangerous; Comprado was just holding a bag, he cannot be
said to look like he was committing/will commit/is committing, this cannot
arouse the needed belief in the police officer that he was in danger, and
that Comprado was armed.
- Search of a moving vehicle: the search must be over the car itself, not the
person. Here the bus was not the subject of the search, it was the person
of Comprado himself. Thus we cannot appreciate this.
Facts:
● Comprado is charged with violation of RA 9165, the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act (possession of DDA). the information reads:
○ That on July 15, 2011, at more or less eleven o'clock in the evening,
along the national highway, Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without being authorized by law to possess or use any
dangerous drugs, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally have in his possession, control and custody 3,200 grams
of dried fruiting tops of suspected marijuana, which substance, after
qualitative examination conducted by the Regional Crime
Laboratory, Office No. 10, Cagayan de Oro City, tested positive for
marijuana, a dangerous drug, with the said accused, knowing the
substance to be a dangerous drug.
VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION:
● Allegedly a confidential informant sent a text message to Police Inspector
Dominador Orate, Jr. that an alleged courier of [a backpack of] marijuana
together with a female companion, was sighted at Cabanglasan, Bukidnon.
Then later on in the night, the same informant texted Orate that the courier
boarded a bus with plate number KVP 988, and that the backpack was a
"LOWE ALPINE" bag.
● At 11pm, the policemen stopped a bus with plate KVP 988. They saw a man
that matched the description, they asked him to open the bag, and the dried
marijuana leaves were insides a transparent cellophane. Compardo was then
arrested and the leaves were tested, and tested positive as marijuana.
VERSION OF THE DEFENSE:
● Comprado denies ownership of the bag and marijuana. He alleges he was
was with his girlfriend in a the of a person who owed him a debt, Narcoda. As
Comprado was about to leave, Narcoda told him to carry a bag which he did.
He went on his way, until he was stopped while in a bus, and he was
inspected, and arrested for possession of DDA.
● RTC RULING: Guilty. CA affirmed.
Issue/s:
● Was the arrest valid? NO
● Are the seized items admissible in evidence (the dried marijuana leaves)? NO
Ratio:
● Argument of the police: This was either a search incidental to lawful arrest,
stop and frisk (terry frisk), or a search of a moving vehicle.
● The Bill of Rights requires that a search and seizure must be carried out with
a judicial warrant; otherwise, any evidence obtained from such warrantless
search is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. This proscription,
however, admits of exceptions, namely: 1) Warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest; 2) Search of evidence in plain view; 3) Search of a moving
vehicle; 4) Consented warrantless search; 5) Customs search; 6) Stop and
Frisk; and 7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.
● A stop-and-frisk search is often confused with a warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest.
● In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines
the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a
large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a
pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there
first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be
reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search
the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for
a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found
which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or
that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with
the means of escaping or committing violence.
● A stop-and-frisk (or a terry frisk) on the otherhand is "a limited protective
search of outer clothing for weapons." Where a police officer observes
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom
he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous. The police officer is
entitled [to] the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
● Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to
conduct a "stop and frisk" it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch
will not validate a "stop and frisk," A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-
and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer
may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior
even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and
self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself
that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
● The Court finds that the totality of the circumstances in this case is not
sufficient to incite a genuine reason that would justify a stop-and-frisk search
on accused-appellant. An examination of the records reveals that no overt
physical act could be properly attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse
suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that he had just committed, was
committing, or was about to commit a crime.
● Here, based solely on the actions of Comprado of holding the bag near
himself, it alone would not rouse the suspicion that he was commiting/had
committed/will commit a crime. There is nothing suspicious, much less
criminal in said act. Moreover, such circumstance, by itself, could not have led
the arresting officers to believe that accused-appellant was in possession of
marijuana.
● As to search incidental to lawful arrest. A lawful arrest must precede the
search of a person and his belongings; the process cannot be reversed. So
was the warrantless arrest of Comprado proper?
● Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the
instances wherein a peace officer or a private person may lawfully arrest a
person even without a warrant:
○ (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
○ (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
○ (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
● Paragraph (a) of Section 5 is commonly known as an in flagrante delicto
arrest. For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be
valid, two requisites must concur: (]) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, the elements of
an arrest effected in hot pursuit under paragraph (b) of Section 5 (arrest
effected in hot pursuit) are: first, an offense has just been committed; and
second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
● However, here without the tip of the informant, the police officers would not
have thought (on their own) that Comprado was in possession of marijuana.
Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating
that Comprado was committing an offense.
●
● Can we appreciate SEARCH OF A MOVING VEHICLE instead? Still no.
Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition
of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to
routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual
inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
such would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon
probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances
known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains [an]
item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.
● The search in this case, however, could not be classified as a search of a
moving vehicle. In this particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and
not a specific person. Further, in search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle was
intentionally used as a means to transport illegal items. Which is not the case
here.
● Any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. In other
words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Without the
confiscated marijuana, no evidence is left to convict Comprado.
DISPO: WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The 19 May 2014 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01156 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant Renante Comprado y Bronola is ACQUITTED and ordered
RELEASED from detention unless he is detained for any other lawful cause. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision
and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from
receipt.
 Search incidental to a lawful arrest
513. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)
395 U.S. 752 | June 23, 1969 | J. Stewart | Search incidental to arrest
Digest by: GRAN
Petitioners: Ted Steven Chimel
Respondents: State of California
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
● 3 policemen armed with a warrant of arrest went to petitioner’s house in
relation to a burglary incident in a certain coin shop.
● Upon petitioner’s arrival, he was served the arrest warrant and, without a
search warrant, was asked for his permission “to look around” his house
based on his lawful arrest.
● Despite his objection, the policemen went forth and looked through his
entire 3-bedroom house. The attic, garage, and workshop were searched
cursorily BUT the bedroom and sewing room were heavily searched. The
policemen even asked his wife to physically move the contents of the
drawers found therein side to side in order to view any item in connection
with the burglary.
● After about an hour of search, the policemen seized items such as coins,
medals, tokens, etc.
ALL LOWER COURTS: Affirmed the petitioner’s conviction.
US SUPREME COURT: Reversed.
Issue: W/N the warrantless search of the petitioner’s entire house can be
constitutionally justified as incident to one’s arrest – NO
● The Fourth Amendment is designed to prevent, not simply to redress,
unlawful police action. Moreover, its interests are not necessarily vindicated
so long as rights of criminal are protected against introduction of evidence
seized without probable cause.
● An application of the Fourth Amendment principles to the facts of this case
produces a clear result that the search here went far beyond the petitioner’s
person, and the area from within which he might have obtained either a
weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him.
● It is argued in the present case that it is ‘reasonable’ to search a man’s
house when he is arrested in it. But that argument is founded on little more
than a subjective view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police
conduct, and not on consideration relevant to Fourth Amendment interests.
● Test: In fact, questions of the reasonableness of searches depend upon
‘the facts and circumstances and the total atmosphere of the case. But
those facts and circumstances must be viewed in the light of established
Fourth Amendment principles.
● In this case, routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest
occurs—or, for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or
other closed or concealed areas in that room itself is unjustifiable. Such
searches, in the absence of well-recognized exceptions, may be made only
under the authority of a search warrant. Hence, the ‘adherence to judicial
processes’ mandated by the Fourth Amendment requires no less.
Facts:
● Three police officers arrived at the home of the petitioner with a warrant of
arrest for the burglary of a coin shop. The officers knocked on the door,
identified themselves to the petitioner’s wife, and asked if they might come
inside.
● After waiting for a few minutes for the petitioner to come home, one of the
officers handed the arrest warrant upon the petitioner’s arrival and asked for
permission to ‘look around.’ The petitioner objected but was advised that on
the basis of “the lawful arrest” the officers would nonetheless conduct a
search. However, no search warrant had been issued.
● The officers then looked through the entire three-bedroom house, including
the attic, the garage, and a small workshop. In some rooms the search was
relatively cursory. However, in the master bedroom and sewing room, the
officers directed the petitioner’s wife to open drawers and “to physically move
contents of the drawers from side to side so that they might view any items
that would have come from the burglary”.
● After about 45 minutes to 1 hour of search, they seized numerous items—
primarily coins, but also several medals, tokens, and a few other objects.
● California Superior Court: The petitioner was convicted of 2 charges of
burglary. The items taken from his house were admitted into evidence against
him, over his objection that they had been unconstitutionally seized.
● California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court: Affirmed the
decision. They agree with the petitioner’s contention that the warrant was
invalid because the supporting affidavit was set out in conclusory terms. But
held that since the warrant was procured “in good faith” and they had probable
cause for the petitioner’s arrest, that arrest had been lawful, and the search of
the petitioner’s home is justified despite the absence of a search warrant on
the ground that it had been incident to a valid arrest.
● Hence, this certiorari petition.
Issue/s:
● W/N the warrantless search of the petitioner’s entire house can be
constitutionally justified as incident to one’s arrest - NO
Ratio:
● The Fourth Amendment is designed to prevent, not simply to redress, unlawful
police action. Moreover, its interests are not necessarily vindicated so long as
rights of criminal are protected against introduction of evidence seized without
probable cause.
● An application of the Fourth Amendment principles to the facts of this case
produces a clear result that the search here went far beyond the
petitioner’s person, and the area from within which he might have
obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as
evidence against him. There was no constitutional justification, in the
absence of a search warrant, for extending the search beyond that area. The
scope of the search was, therefore, ‘unreasonable’ under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments and the petitioner’s conviction cannot stand.
● It is argued in the present case that it is ‘reasonable’ to search a man’s house
when he is arrested in it. But that argument is founded on little more than a
subjective view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct,
and not on consideration relevant to Fourth Amendment interests. Under such
 an unconfined analysis, Fourth Amendment protection in this area would
approach the evaporation point.
● To say that the search must be reasonable is to require some criterion of
reason. It is no guide at all to say that an ‘unreasonable search’ is forbidden—
that the search must be reasonable. The test, therefore, is the reason
underlying and expressed by the Fourth Amendment: the history and
experience which it embodies, and the safeguards afforded by it against the
evils to which it was a response.’ The questions of the reasonableness of
searches depend upon ‘the facts and circumstances and the total
atmosphere of the case, but those facts and circumstances must be
viewed in the light of established Fourth Amendment principles.
● It would be possible, of course, to draw a line between the cases of Rabinowitz
and Harris (cases where the searches incidental to arrest were upheld) on the
one hand, and this case on the other. For Rabinowitz involved a single room,
and Harris a four-room apartment, while in the case before us an entire house
was searched. But such a distinction would be highly artificial. The only
reasoned distinction is one between a search of the person arrested and the
area within his reach on the one hand, and more extensive searches on the
other.
ON THE IMPORTANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT
● The presence of a search warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave
emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the
citizen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals nor to make the
home a safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind
might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law.
● The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of
those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals. And so
the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the police
before they violate the privacy of the home. We cannot be true to that
constitutional requirement and excuse the absence of a search warrant
without a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional
mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.’
● The general requirement that a search warrant be obtained is not lightly to be
dispensed with, and ‘the burden is on those seeking (an) exemption (from the
requirement) to show the need for it.
(*Note: The US has a long history of flip-flopping decisions regarding the issue on
search incidental to a lawful arrest, I only put some citations that support the prevailing
doctrine.)
● Trupiano v. United States: (In this case, agents raided an illicit distillery,
consequently arresting the conspirators and seizing the illicit distillery. The
court held that the failure to procure a warrant despite having enough time
rendered the search unlawful)
○ It is a cardinal rule that, in seizing goods and articles, law enforcement agents
must secure and use search warrants wherever reasonably practicable.
This rule rests upon the desirability of having magistrates rather than police
officers determine when searches and seizures are permissible and what
limitations should be placed upon such activities. To provide the necessary
security against unreasonable intrusions upon the private lives of individuals,
the framers of the Fourth Amendment required adherence to judicial
processes wherever possible.
○ ‘A search or seizure without a warrant as an incident to a lawful arrest has
always been considered to be a strictly limited right. It grows out of the
inherent necessities of the situation at the time of the arrest. But there
must be something more in the way of necessity than merely a lawful arrest.’
● Dissent of J. Frankfurter in U.S. v. Rabinowitz (the case based upon by the
California Courts in convicting Chimel – In this case, the defendant was
dealing stamps with forged overprints and alongside his arrest, his one-room
business office was searched and the stamps found therein were seized and
admitted into evidence. The courts here rejected the Trupiano ruling and held
that the test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant but
whether the search is reasonable. Hence, a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest extends to the area in the possession or under the control of the
person arrested):
○ The approach taken in cases such as Go-Bart, Lefkowitz, and Trupiano was
essentially disregarded by the Rabinowitz Court, nor is the rationale by which
the State seeks here to sustain the search of the petitioner’s house supported
by a reasoned view of the background and purpose of the Fourth Amendment.
○ The Amendment’s proscription of ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ must
be read in light of ‘the history that gave rise to the words’—a history of ‘abuses
so deeply felt by the Colonies as to be one of the potent causes of the
Revolution. The Amendment was in large part a reaction to the general
warrants and warrantless searches that had so alienated the colonists and
had helped speed the movement for independence. In the scheme of the
Amendment, therefore, the requirement that ‘no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause,’ plays a crucial part.
SIMILAR ANALYSIS WITH STOP AND FRISK IN TERRY V. OHIO
● A similar analysis with stop and frisk underlies the ‘search incident to arrest’
principle and marks its proper extent. When an arrest is made, it is reasonable
for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove
any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or
effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered,
and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the
arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s
person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area
into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary
items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a
drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting
officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample
justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area
‘within his immediate control’—construing that phrase to mean the area
from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence.
● There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching
any room other than that in which an arrest occurs—or, for that matter, for
searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in
that room itself. Such searches, in the absence of well-recognized exceptions,
may be made only under the authority of a search warrant. The ‘adherence to
judicial processes’ mandated by the Fourth Amendment requires no less.
Dispositive: Reversed.
 514. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)
453 U.S. 454 | July 1 1981| Ponente | Search incidental to a lawful arrest- jacket
Digest by: GUEVARRA
Petitioners: New York
Respondents: Roger Belton
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
An automobile in which respondent was one of the occupants was stopped by a New
York State policeman for traveling at an excessive rate of speed. In the process of
discovering that none of the occupants owned the car or was related to the owner,
the policeman smelled burnt marihuana and saw on the floor of the car an envelope
suspected of containing marihuana. He then directed the occupants to get out of the
car and arrested them for unlawful possession of marihuana. After searching each
of the occupants, he searched the passenger compartment of the car, found a jacket
belonging to respondent, unzipped one of the pockets, and discovered cocaine.
Subsequently, respondent was indicted for criminal possession of a controlled
substance. After the trial court had denied his motion to suppress the cocaine seized
from his jacket pocket, respondent pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense, while
preserving his claim that the cocaine had been seized in violation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the search and seizure, but the New York Court of
Appeals reversed.
W/N the search was valid – YES
The search of respondent's jacket was a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest,
and hence did not violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The jacket, being
located inside the passenger compartment of the car, was "within the arrestee's
immediate control" within the meaning of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , wherein
it was held that a lawful custodial arrest creates a situation justifying the
contemporaneous warrantless search of the arrestee and of the immediately
surrounding area. Not only may the police search the passenger compartment of the
car in such circumstances, they may also examine the contents of any containers
found in the passenger compartment. And such a container may be searched
whether it is open or closed, since the justification for the search is not that the
arrestee has no privacy interest in the container but that the lawful custodial arrest
justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have.
Issue/s:
When a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an
automobile, the officer may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest,
search the passenger compartment of that automobile.
Ratio
Facts:
● On April 9, 1978, Trooper Douglas Nicot, a New York State policeman driving
an unmarked car on the New York Thruway, was passed by another
automobile traveling at an excessive rate of speed. Nicot gave chase,
overtook the speeding vehicle, and ordered its driver to pull it over to the side
of the road and stop. There were four men in the car, one of whom was Roger
Belton, the respondent in this case.
● The policeman asked to see the driver's license and automobile registration,
and discovered that none of the men owned the vehicle or was related to its
owner. Meanwhile, the policeman had smelled burnt marihuana and had seen
on the floor of the car an envelope marked "Supergold" that he associated
with marihuana. He therefore directed the men to get out of the car, and placed
them under arrest for the unlawful possession of marihuana. He patted down
each of the men and "split them up into four separate areas of the Thruway at
this time so they would not be in physical touching area of each other." He
then picked up the envelope marked "Supergold" and found that it contained
marihuana.
● After giving the arrestees the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 , the state policeman searched each one of them. He then searched
the passenger compartment of the car. On the back seat he found a black
leather jacket belonging to Belton. He unzipped one of the pockets of the
jacket and discovered cocaine. Placing the jacket in his automobile, he drove
the four arrestees to a nearby police station.
● Belton was subsequently indicted for criminal possession of a controlled
substance. In the trial court he moved that the cocaine the trooper had seized
from the jacket pocket be suppressed. The court denied the motion. Belton
then pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense, but preserved his claim that
the cocaine had been seized in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the search and seizure, reasoning that "[o]nce
defendant was validly arrested for possession of marihuana, the officer was
justified in searching the immediate area for other contraband."
● The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "[a] warrantless search
of the zippered pockets of an unaccessible jacket may not be upheld as a
search incident to a lawful arrest where there is no longer any danger that the
arrestee or a confederate might gain access to the article." Two judges
dissented. They pointed out that the "search was conducted by a lone peace
officer who was in the process of arresting four unknown individuals whom he
had stopped in a speeding car owned by none of them and apparently
containing an uncertain quantity of a controlled substance. The suspects were
standing by the side of the car as the officer gave it a quick check to confirm
his suspicions before attempting to transport them to police headquarters . . .
.". We granted certiorari to consider the constitutionally permissible scope of
a search in circumstances such as these.
● W/N the search was valid – YES
● It is a first principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that the police may
not conduct a search unless they first convince a neutral magistrate that there
is probable cause to do so. This Court has recognized, however, that "the
exigencies of the situation" may sometimes make exemption from the warrant
requirement "imperative
● Specifically, the Court held in Chimel v. California, that a lawful custodial
arrest creates a situation which justifies the contemporaneous search without
a warrant of the person arrested and of the immediately surrounding area.
 Such searches have long been considered valid because of the need "to viewed as incidental to the arrest or as justified by any other exigency.". And
remove any weapons that [the arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist in the Sanders case, the Court explicitly stated that it did not "consider the
arrest or effect his escape" and the need to prevent the concealment or constitutionality of searches of luggage incident to the arrest of its possessor.
destruction of evidence
The State has not argued that respondent's suitcase was searched incident to
● While the Chimel case established that a search incident to an arrest may not
his arrest, and it appears that the bag was not within his `immediate control'
stray beyond the area within the immediate control of the arrestee, courts have
found no workable definition of "the area within the immediate control of the at the time of the search.". (The suitcase in question was in the trunk of the
arrestee" when that area arguably includes the interior of an automobile and taxicab..)
the arrestee is its recent occupant. Our reading of the cases suggests the ● It is not questioned that the respondent was the subject of a lawful custodial
generalization that articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the arrest on a charge of possessing marihuana. The search of the respondent's
passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not jacket followed immediately upon that arrest. The jacket was located inside
inevitably, within "the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab
the passenger compartment of the car in which the respondent had been a
a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]." In order to establish the workable rule this
category of cases requires, we read Chimel's definition of the limits of the area passenger just before he was arrested. The jacket was thus within the area
that may be searched in light of that generalization. Accordingly, we hold that which we have concluded was "within the arrestee's immediate control" within
when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an the meaning of the Chimel case. The search of the jacket, therefore, was a
automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the search incident to a lawful custodial arrest, and it did not violate the Fourth
passenger compartment of that automobile. and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed.
● It follows from this conclusion that the police may also examine the contents
of any containers found within the passenger compartment, for if the
passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will containers
in it be within his reach. Such a container may, of course, be searched
whether it is open or closed, since the justification for the search is not that
the arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful
custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee
may have. Thus, while the Court in Chimel held that the police could not
search all the drawers in an arrestee's house simply because the police had
arrested him at home, the Court noted that drawers within an arrestee's reach
could be searched because of the danger their contents might pose to the
police.
● It is true, of course, that these containers will sometimes be such that they
could hold neither a weapon nor evidence of the criminal conduct for which
the suspect was arrested. However, in United States v. Robinson, the Court
rejected the argument that such a container - there a "crumpled up cigarette
package" - located during a search of Robinson incident to his arrest could not
be searched: "The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial
arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does
not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular
arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the
person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable
cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion
being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification."
● The New York Court of Appeals relied upon United States v. Chadwick, and
Arkansas v. Sanders, in concluding that the search and seizure in the present
case were constitutionally invalid. But neither of those cases involved an
arguably valid search incident to a lawful custodial arrest. As the Court pointed
out in the Chadwick case: "Here the search was conducted more than an hour
after federal agents had gained exclusive control of the foot-locker and long
after respondents were securely in custody; the search therefore cannot be
 515. People v. Chua Ho San, GR No. 128222, 17 June 1999
G.R. No. | Date | Ponente | Search incidental to lawful arrest
Digest by: HAM
Petitioners: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondents: CHUA HO SAN aka TSAY HO SAN
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
Chua, a Taiwanese national, was arrested without a valid warrant by La Union
police as he was just arriving in a speedboat in the Bacnoatan coastline. The
residents of the area informed the police of his arrival due to his speedboat being
an uncommon sight in the area. When Chua alighted, he walked casually with his
straw bag to the road, but when he saw the police officers, he ran but was later
caught. Inside the bag, there were found 28.7 kilos of crystal meth. The RTC
convicted Chua of transporting the shabu, and was sentenced to death. Chua
contends that his arrest was invalid and thus the seizure of the shabu cannot be
characterized as a search incidental to lawful arrest, and thus not admissible in
evidence.
ISSUE: W/N the arrest of Chua was a valid warrantless arrest. - NO.
The Court held that there was no valid warrantless arrest. The Court cited the
Rules in stating the three instances where a valid warrantless arrest can be made,
namely: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3)
arrests of escaped prisoners. The OSG contends that it was an in flagrante delicto
arrest as Chua’s arrival on the coast aroused suspicions on what he was doing
there. However, the Court held that Chua did not bear the hallmarks of being a
suspected drug courier. True, Chua entered Philippine territory without a visa. This
was not obvious to the police. But gossamer to the officers' sense perception and
view were Chua disembarking from a speedboat, Chua walking casually towards
the road, and Chua carrying a multicolored strawbag. These acts did not convey
any impression that he illegally entered Philippine shores. There was no probable
cause for the officers to arrest Chua, and, as such, there was no valid warrantless
arrest and any evidence seized from him is inadmissible.
Facts:
● Bacnotan, La Union police were monitorting the Bacnotan coastline on 29
March 1995. Around 12:45pm, a barangay captain radioed fro help requesting
assistance due to an unfamiliar speedboat being spotted. When they
inspected the speedboat, it had onboard one male passenger, and when the
passenger alighted, he had with him one strawbag. Upon seeing the police
officers, the man ran off but was however caught by the police officers. As the
arrested man did not know English, Tagalog, or Ilokano, they communicated
via “sign language” and the officers motioned for the man to open the bag.
● A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets containing
yellowish crystalline substances. CID then gestured to the man to close the
bag, which he did. As CID wished to proceed to the police station, he signaled
the man to follow, but the latter did not to comprehend.
● Later on,the interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan, finally arrived, through whom the
man was "apprised of his constitutional rights." The police authorities were
satisfied that the man and the interpreter perfectly understood each other
despite their uncertainty as to what language was spoken. But when the
policemen asked the man several questions, he retreated to his obstinate
reticence and merely showed his I.D. with the name Chua Ho San printed
thereon.
● CHUA was initially charged with illegal possession of methaphetamine
hydrochloride before the RTC which docketed the case as Criminal Case No.
4037, but was later changed to transport of 28.7 kilos of meth.
● In a decision promulgated on 10 February 1997, the RTC found that the
prosecution successfully discharged its burden of proving that CHUA
transported 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride without legal
authority to do so. Invoking People v. Tagliben as authority, the RTC
characterized the search as incidental to a valid in flagrante delicto
arrest, hence it allowed the admission of the methamphetamine
hydrochloride as corpus delicti.
Issue/s:
● W/N the arrest of Chua was a valid warrantless arrest. - NO.
Ratio:
● The Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures
does not, of course, forestall reasonable searches and seizure. What
constitutes a reasonable or even an unreasonable search in any particular
case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the
circumstances involved.
● This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not
absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been
deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving
vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consent
searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and (6) search incidental
to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure
pursuan to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with a valid wararnt of arrest, the Rules of
Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante
delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.
● This Court is therefore tasked to determine whether the warrantless arrest,
search and seizure conducted under the facts of the case at bar constitute a
valid exemption from the warrant requirement. Expectedly and quite
understandably, the prosecution and the defense painted extremely divergent
versions of the incident. But this Court is certain that CHUA was arrested and
his bag searched without the benefit of a warrant.
● In cases of in fragrante delicto, arrests, a peace officer or a private person
may without a warrant, arrest a person, when, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense.
 ● Guided by these principles, this Court finds that there are no facts on record
reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUA's participation in on going
criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the
obtrusive search. The RTC never took the pains of pointing to such facts,
but predicated mainly its decision on the finding that was "accused was
caught red-handed carrying the bagful of [s]habu when apprehended."
In short, there is no probable cause.

● In the case at bar, the Solicitor General proposes that the following details are
suggestive of probable cause — persistent reports of rampant smuggling of
firearm and other contraband articles, CHUA's watercraft differing in
appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the
Bacnotan seas, CHUA's illegal entry into the Philippines (he lacked the
necessary travel documents or visa), CHUA's suspicious behavior, i.e. he
attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease
by which CHUA can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate
dispatch towards the high seas, beyond the reach of Philippine laws.

● This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute "probable cause." None
of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of
marijuana or other prohibited drug, confidential report and/or positive
identification by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and
place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or
behavior and suspicious bulge in the waist — accepted by this Court as
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case. There was no
classified information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach
bearing prohibited drug on the date in question. CHUA was not identified as a
drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that
ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area
did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an
offense.

● True, CHUA entered Philippine territory without a visa. This was not obvious
to the police. But gossamer to the officers' sense perception and view were
CHUA disembarking from a speedboat, CHUA walking casually towards the
road, and CHUA carrying a multicolored strawbag. These acts did not convey
any impression that he illegally entered Philippine shores.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
66, San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 4037 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and accused-appellant CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged, the evidence not being sufficient to establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
 516. Cadua v. CA, GR No. 123123, 19 August 1999
G.R. No. | Date | Ponente | Search incidental to lawful arrest
Digest by: JOSEF
Petitioners: EDWIN CADUA
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
PO3 Joselito Burdeos and companions were patrolling when they received a radio
dispatch requesting them to proceed to an address. Said dispatch was based on a
report concerning an alleged holdup of complainants Lourdes Bulos and her
daughter Bernadette, who were in need of police assistance. At said address, police
officers found both complainants who stated that they were held up by two (2) men
near their house. Then, the police officers requested the complainants to board the
patrol unit in order to facilitate the search for the two (2) men. As they were patrolling
around the area, the police officers then noticed two (2) men walking alongside the
street and the complainants identified the men as the alleged holduppers, one of
which is the petitioner in this case. As the police approached the suspects, he
noticed that petitioner Cadua was about to pull something which was tucked at the
right side of his waist. The police promptly pointed his firearm at Cadua and warned
him not to move. He then frisked Cadua and found in his possession a .38 caliber
"paltik" revolver. The Prosecutor filed an information only for Illegal Possession of
Firearms against Cadua. According to the Prosecutor, during the investigation for
robbery, complainants manifested their doubts as to the identity of the respondents,
hence he set this matter for further investigation. On arraignment, petitioner pleaded
not guilty. He was later convicted. Petitioner appealed to the CA, which affirmed the
decision of the trial court. The CA ruled that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was
based on probable cause and that the police officers had personal knowledge of the
fact which led to his arrest. The subsequent search was therefore an incident to the
arrest, making the firearm found in his possession admissible in evidence.
ISSUE: W/N the incidental search and subsequent seizure of the unlicensed firearm
was valid --YES
RULING: Given the circumstances in this case, we are constrained to affirm the
finding below that the warrantless arrest of petitioner is lawful. We also agree that
the incidental search and subsequent seizure of the unlicensed firearm in question
is likewise lawful and valid pursuant to Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Noteworthy, among the exceptions to the necessity for a search warrant is the right
of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be made
either while a crime is actually being committed, or soon after its commission. The
right to search includes in these instances that of searching the person of one who
is arrested, in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or
as the means for its commission.
When petitioner was searched contemporaneously with the arrest, the "paltik" was
found in his possession, and seized. Such seizure cannot be considered unlawful
nor unreasonable. Moreover, at that moment of search and seizure, there was in the
mind of the arresting officer more than a mere suspicion that petitioner was armed.
Petitioner’s movements clearly suggested the presence of a weapon tucked at the
side of his waist. The fact that Burdeos made an immediate draw for his service
revolver was an instinctive response to petitioner’s actions which, under the
circumstances, indicated a high probability of an offensive attack with a lethal
weapon.
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection to the arrest,
or question concerning the defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made
before the accused enters his plea. The records in this case shows no such objection
to the arrest, nor any question as to the irregularity of his arrest, raised by petitioner.
Facts:
● PO3 Joselito Burdeos and companions were patrolling the vicinity of Fairview,
Quezon City when they received a radio dispatch requesting them to proceed
to Lot 10 Block 14, Alden Street, North Fairview. Said dispatch was based on
a report concerning an alleged holdup of complainants Lourdes Bulos and her
daughter Bernadette, who were in need of police assistance.
● At said address, police officers found both complainants who stated that the
alleged holduppers had just fled. PO3 Burdeos asked where the robbery took
place. Complainants replied that they were held up by two (2) men near their
house. The police officers also asked in what direction the alleged holduppers
fled and what they were wearing.
● Then, the police officers requested the complainants to board the patrol unit
in order to facilitate the search for the two (2) men. As they were patrolling
around the area, complainants informed the police officers that one of the
suspects was dressed in jeans and a t-shirt while the other was dressed in a
black top and black pants.
● The police officers then noticed two (2) men walking alongside the street and
as the officers slowed down the mobile unit to get a closer look, the
complainants identified the men as the alleged holduppers, one of which is the
petitioner in this case.
● The police officers slowed down to a stop, alighted from the vehicle, and called
out to the suspects. As Burdeos was approaching the suspects, he noticed
that petitioner Cadua was about to pull something which was tucked at the
right side of his waist. Burdeos promptly pointed his firearm at Cadua and
warned him not to move. He then frisked Cadua and found in his possession
a .38 caliber "paltik" revolver. PO3 Reynoso Bacnat then apprehended
Cadua’s companion, who was later identified as Joselito Aguilar. In Aguilar’s
possession was found a fan knife.
● Originally, Chief Inspector Faustino referred to the City Prosecutor’s Office for
investigation of the cases of Robbery, Violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession
of Firearms) and Violation of PD 5121 (Concealment of a Deadly Weapon).
● However, Assistant City Prosecutor found only the case for Illegal Possession
of Firearms warranting the filing of an Information. According to Prosecutor
Paragua, during the investigation for robbery, complainants manifested their
doubts as to the identity of the respondents, hence he set this matter for further
investigation.
● On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued,
resulting in his conviction.
● Petitioner seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
decision of the trial court. The CA ruled that the warrantless arrest of petitioner
was based on probable cause and that the police officers had personal
knowledge of the fact which led to his arrest. The subsequent search was
therefore an incident to the arrest, making the firearm found in his possession
admissible in evidence.
Issue/s: must be made before the accused enters his plea. The records in this case
● W/N the incidental search and subsequent seizure of the unlicensed firearm shows no such objection to the arrest, nor any question as to the irregularity
was valid --YES of his arrest, raised by petitioner.

Ratio: Dispositive:
● Given the circumstances in this case, we are constrained to affirm the finding WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the
below that the warrantless arrest of petitioner is lawful. We also agree that the MODIFICATION that petitioner is hereby SENTENCED to 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day
incidental search and subsequent seizure of the unlicensed firearm in of prision correccional medium as minimum, to 5 years, 4 months, and 20 days of
question is likewise lawful and valid pursuant to Section 12, Rule 126 of the prision correccional maximum as maximum, there being no aggravating and mitigating
Rules of Court, to wit: circumstances, plus a fine of P15,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment should
● "SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested petitioner fail to pay. However, since petitioner has already served more than seven (7)
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as years, (5) months in prison, which is now beyond the maximum principal penalty
proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant." imposed at present for his offense, even if a subsidiary penalty for unpaid fine is
● Noteworthy, among the exceptions to the necessity for a search warrant is the included, he is hereby ordered RELEASED immediately, unless he is being held for
right of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest. A lawful arrest any other lawful cause.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
may be made either while a crime is actually being committed, or soon after
its commission. The right to search includes in these instances that of SO ORDERED.
searching the person of one who is arrested, in order to find and seize things
connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means for its commission.
● When petitioner was searched contemporaneously with the arrest, the "paltik"
was found in his possession, and seized. Such seizure cannot be considered
unlawful nor unreasonable. Moreover, at that moment of search and seizure,
there was in the mind of the arresting officer more than a mere suspicion that
petitioner was armed. Petitioner’s movements clearly suggested the presence
of a weapon tucked at the side of his waist. The fact that Burdeos made an
immediate draw for his service revolver was an instinctive response to
petitioner’s actions which, under the circumstances, indicated a high
probability of an offensive attack with a lethal weapon.chanrobles.com : virtual
law library
● Petitioner’s counsel mistakenly relies on the case of People v. Aminnudin. In
said case, Aminnudin was acquitted on the charge of illegally transporting
marijuana because the Court found that the search could not be considered
an incident to a lawful arrest considering that the circumstances did not come
under the exceptions provided for by applicable law and the Rules of Court. It
was therein held that the warrantless arrest and the subsequent search were
illegal, hence the evidence thereby obtained was inadmissible. However,
Aminnudin differs radically from the case now before us. In Aminnudin," [i]t is
clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a
warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V
Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. And from the
information they had received they could have persuaded a judge that there
was probable cause, indeed to justify the issuance of a warrant."
● A situation involving a surveillance mission like that of Aminnudin could not
compare to that of an unexpected crime of holdup-robbery. Police behavior in
the latter case would necessitate a different course of action as well as
different rules of engagement, compared to the former. In the case now before
us, there is no supervening event, much less considerable amount of time
between reaching the scene of the crime and the actual apprehension of the
suspect.
● Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection to the
arrest, or question concerning the defect or irregularity attending an arrest
 517. People v. Delos Reyes, GR No. 174774, 31 August 2011
G.R. No. 174774 | Aug 31, 2011 | Leonardo De Castro | Search incidental to a lawful
arrest
Digest by: June
Petitioners: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Respondents: ROLANDO S. DELOS REYES, alias "Botong," and RAYMUNDO G.
REYES, alias "Mac-Mac," Accused-Appellants.
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
Accused-appellants Rolando S. delos Reyes and Raymundo G. Reyes, Emmanuel
de Claro, and Mary Jane Lantion-Tom (Lantion-Tom) were all arrested without a
warranted for illegal possession, sale, delivery, distribution, and/or transportation of
shabu. Their arrest proceeded from a police operation conducted due to information
provided by a confidential informant. Based on the version of the prosecution,
Raymundo Reyes (Macmac) and Rolando (Botong) entered into a drug deal with
Emmanuel Claro together with Lantion-Tom. When Rolando and Raymundo arrived
in the Whistletop Bar and Restaurant, Emmanuel proceeded to his car where
Lantion-Tom was waiting. Emmanuel took a box in a transparent plastic bag from
his car which he gave to Rolando who, in turn, gave it Raymundo. The arresting
officers accosted the accused/respondents who according to the arresting officers
admitted having in their possession illegal drugs; that the recovered items containing
ten (10) pcs. of heat sealed transparent plastic bags of white crystalline substance
with a total weight of 980.9 grams turned positive to the test for shabu. On the other
hand, the accused presented a different version of events wherein it was shown that
they were arrested in different places and that no exchange occurred between
Raymundo and Roland and Emmanuel and Lantion- Tom. The RTC found
Emmanuel, Rolando and Raymundo guilty and all 3 filed their notices of appeal.
However, Emmanuel withdrew his notice of appeal and replaced it with an MR. The
MR was granted by the RTC and Emmanuel was acquitted as the court admitted
that it erred in giving more weight to the testimonies of the police officers.
Issue: W/N WON the warrantless arrests of Rolando and Raymundo were valid? No
Held: Search incidental to a lawful arrest: includes a valid warrantless search and
seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the
search. In this instance, the law requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before
a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. However, this rules has
exceptions: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (arrest in flagrante
delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
a place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another
(arrest of escaped prisoners) In cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense. The arresting officer must have personal knowledge of such fact
or personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or
constitutive of probable cause In flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable
information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the
presence and within the view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute
probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. To constitute a valid
in flagrante delicto arrest, 2 requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. In this case, it is evident from the
testimony of the police that they arrested accused-appellants and searched the
latter’s persons without a warrant after seeing Rolando delos Reyes and Emmanuel
de Claro momentarily conversing in the restaurant, and witnessing the white plastic
bag with a box or carton inside being passed from Lantion-Tom to Emmanuel de
Claro, to accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, and finally, to accused-appellant
Reyes. These circumstances, however, hardly constitute overt acts "indicative of a
felonious enterprise." Lectura, Santiago, and Yumul had no prior knowledge of the
suspects’ identities, and they completely relied on their confidential informant to
actually identify the suspects. None of the police officers actually saw what was
inside that box. There is also no evidence that the confidential informant himself
knew that the box contained shabu. No effort at all was taken to confirm that the
arrested suspects actually knew that the box or carton inside the white plastic bag,
seized from their possession, contained shabu. The police officers were unable to
establish a cogent fact or circumstance that would have reasonably invited their
attention, as officers of the law, to suspect that accused-appellants, Emmanuel de
Claro, and Lantion-Tom "has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit" a crime, particularly, an illegal drug deal
Facts:
● Accused-appellants Rolando S. delos Reyes and Raymundo G. Reyes,
Emmanuel de Claro, and Mary Jane Lantion-Tom (Lantion-Tom) were all
arrested for illegal possession, sale, delivery, distribution, and/or
transportation of shabu. A case was filed against delos Rolando, Raymundo
and Emmanuel for the violation of Republic Act No. 6425 while a preliminary
investigation was being done against Lantion-Tom.
● Version of the Prosecution: In their Joint Affidavit of Arrest, the arresting
officers claims that on 17 February 2000 a confidential informant called them
to inform them of a narcotics drug deal to commence at the vicinity of the
parking area of Shangrila Plaza Hotel, Mandaluyong City; that they were
dispatched to verify the reports and conduct police operations; that about 2:00
p.m. after meeting with the confidential agent, they strategically positioned
themselves at the vicinity parking area of said hotel; that about 10:00 p.m.,
accused/respondent Reyes a.k.a. Mac-Mac, on board a white Toyota Corolla,
and accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes, a.k.a. "Botong," on board a
red Toyota Corolla, arrived with accused/respondent Reyes subsequently
proceeding inside Whistletop Bar and Restaurant, and accused/respondent
[Rolando] delos Reyes calling accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro
through his cellular phone; that accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes
and [Emmanuel] de Claro then proceeded to the latter’s parked Mazda car
where respondent Lantion-Tom was waiting; from the parked car, a box in
transparent plastic bag was taken, which accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de
Claro handed-over to accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes;
accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes in turn handed the box in a plastic
bag to accused/respondent Reyes; that the arresting officers accosted the
accused/respondents who according to the arresting officers admitted having
in their possession illegal drugs; that the recovered items containing ten (10)
 pcs. of heat sealed transparent plastic bags of white crystalline substance with
a total weight of 980.9 grams turned positive to the test for shabu
● Rolando's version based on his sinumpaang salaysay: he was in Buenas
Market, Manggahan Pasig City together with Marlon David (neigbor) and
Raymundo Reyes when a group of men with firearms approached him and
forcibly took him, Marlon and Raymundo to Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig all
the while accusing them of carrying shabu. Marlon David was separated from
Rolando and was later released on 18 February 2000; This claim was
supported by the barangay blotter in Manggahan, Pasig where Rolando's wife
reported the incident and Marlon David's testimony narrating the same facts
as Rolando's version
● Emmanuel De Claro's version:He and his common law wife, Lantion Tom
was only at the whistlestop bar to to talk to Lantion Tom's accountant Milan
regarding their business permits. That they were with Roberto (Emmanuel's
brother) and a friend, James, with the two remaining outside the restaurant;
that respondent Lantion-Tom went to accompany Ms. Milan, while Emmanuel
was left inside; that after Ms. Milan left, respondent Lantion-Tom was suddenly
surrounded by men who introduced themselves as police officers and were
arresting them for being the source of "shabu" in a drug deal; that all of them,
Emmanuel, Roberto and James were likewise arrested and continuously
questioned on their complicity in the drug deal; that they were taken to Camp
Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila and subjected to further investigation;
that Roberto and James were released the following day. This was
corroborated by the testimony of Roberto and Lantion Tom.
● Inconsistencies on the statement of Police officers:
● The testimonies of Virgilio Santiago, Eraldo Lectura, Angel Yumul and
Benjamin David, who apprehended and/or investigated the case against
accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom; and P/Insp.
Benjamin Cruto, Jr.13 (Cruto), the forensic chemist of the PNP Crime
Laboratory were taken.
○ Santiago initially testified that Lantion-Tom Handed a white plastic
bag containing a box to Emmanuel which he gave Botong then to
Mac-mac. However on cross, he admitted that he did not actually see
what was inside the plastic bag and that he did see Rolando hand
over such plastic bag to Raymundo. From his position, he could not
conclude that the suspects were committing an illegal drug deal as
he had no prior knowledge of the contents of the plastic bag, and that
he and the other arresting officers just relied on the information
relayed by the confidential informant. Also, the police team did not
recover any money from the arrested suspects. The confidential
informant merely informed the police the following morning that the
money for the illegal drugs was already deposited in the bank. The
police, however, failed to make further queries from the confidential
informant about the bank.
○ Lectura: He initially denied that Marlon David was with Botong when
the latter was arrested, but he later admitted that the police also
arrested Marlon David. He claimed that he was the one who seized
the shabu but subsequently claimed that it was Santiago who seized
it. Afterwards, he maintained that it was he who recovered the shabu
from Mac-Mac. Lastly, he acknowledged that his team heavily relied
on the information given by the confidential informant in identifying
the suspects in the illegal drug deal, who were eventually arrested.
○ Yumul: substantially narrated the same version of events as that of
Santiago and Lectura. However, he could not recall the positions of
the members of his team when they were conducting the operation.
○ David: testified that he received from Lectura a plastic bag
containing a box with 10 heat-sealed sachets of suspected shabu
inside. Lectura told him that the articles were seized from the
suspected drug dealers. David marked his initials "BSD" on the
confiscated articles, then prepared a request to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination of the specimens.
○ Cruto: conducted the physical examination by weighing the contents
of each sachet, revealing that two sachets weighed 99.6 grams each;
two sachets, 99.5 grams each; one sachet, 99.2 grams; two sachets,
98.4 grams each; one sachet, 98.3 grams; one sachet, 94.9 grams;
and one sachet, 93.5 grams. P/Insp. Cruto then took a representative
sample from each plastic sachet and proceeded with his chemical
and confirmatory examinations. The contents of the 10 heat-sealed
plastic sachets all tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu.
● RTC: Found Emmanuel Claro, Rolando Delos Reyes and Raymundo Reyes
guilty. All 3 filed a notice of appeal.
● Subsquently, Emmanuel withdrew his notice of appeal and filed an MR. He
claims that the accusation that he was engaging in an illegal drug deal was
suspicious. He pointed out that although these police officers testified that
Lantion-Tom, from the car, handed to him the plastic bag containing the box
with sachets of shabu, the prosecution still dropped the criminal charges
against Lantion-Tom. Furthermore, the prosecution failed to contradict his
well-supported alibi that he, his wife, and his brother went to Shangri-La Plaza
in Mandaluyong City to meet his wife’s accountant, so they could attend to
several documents pertaining to a business permit. Moreover, the RTC should
have highly regarded accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes’ testimony
which directly contradicted the police officers’ statements.
● The RTC acquitted Emmanuel Claro. The RTC explicitly admitted that it erred
in giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses SPO1
Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul, and in entirely rejecting the alibi of
the defense. However, due to the pending notice of Rolando and Raymundo,
their cases to the CA which sustained their convictions.
Issue/s:
● W/N WON the warrantless arrests of Rolando and Raymundo were valid? No
● W/N the testimony of the police officers are credible? No
Ratio:
On warrantless arrests
● Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides: The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
● Complementary to the above provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined in
Section 3, paragraph 2 of Article III of the Constitution, which solidifies the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, thus: (1) The privacy
of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding
● The foregoing constitutional proscription is not without exceptions. Search and
seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom
may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful
arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs
laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself
waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop
and frisk situations
● Search incidental to a lawful arrest: includes a valid warrantless search and
seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede
the search. In this instance, the law requires that there must first be a lawful
arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. As a
rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest.
The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests.
Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a
person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (arrest in flagrante
delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and
(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another (arrest of escaped prisoners)
● In cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. The arresting officer must have personal knowledge of such fact or
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or
constitutive of probable cause
● In flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent
any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within
the view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause
that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
● The requirement of an overt act is not fulfilled when it cannot be shown that
he was about to commit or has committed a crime. Cases have shown that
the following acts cannot be considered as overt acts that would justify a
suspicion and indicative of probable cause: (1) Merely walking on a gangplank
like any other passenger; (2) eyes darting side to side while holding his
abdomen; (3) standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard'
with his eyes 'moving very fast' and 'looking at every person that come nearer
to them.
● Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
● In this case, it evident from the testimony of the police that they arrested
accused-appellants and searched the latter’s persons without a warrant after
seeing Rolando delos Reyes and Emmanuel de Claro momentarily conversing
in the restaurant, and witnessing the white plastic bag with a box or carton
inside being passed from Lantion-Tom to Emmanuel de Claro, to accused-
appellant Rolando delos Reyes, and finally, to accused-appellant Reyes.
These circumstances, however, hardly constitute overt acts "indicative of a
felonious enterprise." Lectura, Santiago, and Yumul had no prior knowledge
of the suspects’ identities, and they completely relied on their confidential
informant to actually identify the suspects. None of the police officers actually
saw what was inside that box. There is also no evidence that the confidential
informant himself knew that the box contained shabu. No effort at all was taken
to confirm that the arrested suspects actually knew that the box or carton
inside the white plastic bag, seized from their possession, contained shabu.
The police officers were unable to establish a cogent fact or circumstance that
would have reasonably invited their attention, as officers of the law, to suspect
that accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom "has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit" a crime,
particularly, an illegal drug deal
● Moreover, they have also compromised the integrity of the shabu they seized.
The failure to mark the drugs at the place where it was taken leads to doubts
as to whether the items seized from the accused were the same evidence
presented to the court. Lectura, Santiago, and Yumul uniformly testified
before the RTC that they brought the arrested suspects to the police office for
investigation. However, Lectura and Santiago were vague as to how they
ascertained as shabu the contents of the box inside the white plastic bag,
immediately after seizing the same from accused-appellant Reyes and before
proceeding to the police office; while Yumul explicitly testified on cross-
examination that he saw the shabu for the first time at the police office. At any
rate, all three police officers recounted that the shabu was marked by SPO1
Benjamin David only at the police office.
● Without valid justification for the in flagrante delicto arrests of accused-
appellants, the search of accused-appellants’ persons incidental to said
arrests, and the eventual seizure of the shabu from accused-appellants’
possession, are also considered unlawful and, thus, the seized shabu is
excluded in evidence as fruit of a poisonous tree. Without the corpus delicti
for the crime charged, then the acquittal of accused-appellants is inevitable.
● The presumption of regularity cannot be used to cure the illegality of the arrest.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be
used as a basis for affirming accused-appellant's conviction because, first, the
presumption is precisely just that — a mere presumption. Once challenged by
evidence, as in this case, it cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot
preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not
overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
On the inconsistent statements of the police
● In this case, both the RTC and the CA have different findings and conclusions.
It must be noted that the RTC while initially convicting the accused, overturned
its finding when it acquitted Emmanuel. On the other hand, the CA, on appeal,
refused to consider the subsequent acquittal of Emmanuel de Claro by the
 RTC. Instead, the appellate court upheld the earlier ruling of the RTC giving Mandaluyong City; and that he and Marlon David were coerced to incriminate
absolute credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and themselves for possession of shabu. His claims were corroborated by Marlon
convicted accused-appellants of the crime charged. David’s testimony and Navarro’s Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 14,
● Guided by the settled rule that "where the inculpatory facts admit of several 2000. Also, Emmanuel de Claro, Lantion-Tom, and Roberto de Claro
interpretations, one consistent with accused's innocence and another with his consistently testified that they were at Shangri-La Plaza to meet Milan,
guilt, the evidence thus adduced failed to meet the test of moral certainty," we Lantion-Tom’s accountant, regarding documents for a business permit
find that the findings and conclusion of the RTC in its subsequent in which it (photocopies of the said documents were presented during trial); and that they
acquitted Emmanuel de Claro is more in keeping with the evidence on record were illegally arrested without warrant and forced to admit criminal liability for
in this case. It bears to stress that the very same evidence were presented possession of shabu. These pieces of evidence are overwhelmingly adequate
against Emmanuel de Claro and accused-appellants; if the evidence is to overthrow the presumption of regularity in the performance by the arresting
insufficient to convict the former, then it is also insufficient to convict the latter. police officers of their official duties and raise reasonable doubt in accused-
● The testimonies of Lectura, Santiago and Yumul are unreliable and appellants’ favor.
suspiciously fabricated. The testimonies of the police officers were ● Furthermore, even assuming that the prosecution’s version of the events that
inconsistent on material facts. took place on the night of February 17, 2000 were true, it still failed to establish
● Firstly, the court noted that these police officers gave identical testimonies of probable cause to justify the in flagrante delicto arrests of accused-appellants
the events that happened from the moment they arrived at 2 o’clock in the and search of accused-appellants’ persons, incidental to their arrests,
afternoon until the arrest of the accused at 10:30 o’clock in the evening at the resulting in the seizure of the shabu in accused-appellants’ possession.
EDSA Shangri-La premises. This uniform account given by these witnesses
cannot but generate the suspicion that the material circumstances testified to Dispositive:
by them were integral parts of a well thought-out and prefabricated story. WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
Because of the close camaraderie of these witnesses who belong to the same CR.-H.C. No. 01733 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants
police force it is not difficult for them to make the same story. Furthermore, Rolando delos Reyes and Raymundo Reyes are ACQUITTED on the ground of
their testimonies are so general which shows only too clearly that they testified reasonable doubt and they are ORDERED forthwith released from custody, unless they
uniformly only as to material facts but have not given the particulars and the are being lawfully held for another crime.
details having relation with the principal facts. While they testified that they
were at Shangri-La from 2 in the afternoon to 10 in the evening, they were not SO ORDERED.
able to tell the court how their group positioned strategically at the premises
without being noticed by their target. They also could not give an explanation
how their confidential informant was able to obtain information regarding the
drug deal that was supposed to take place on that date involving several
personalities. Except for their bare allegation that they have that information
regarding the drug deal they were not able to present any proof of such report,
say, entry in their logbook of such confidential report and a spot report. Even
their operation is not recorded as no documentary evidence was presented.
● There are also material inconsistencies between the police-witnesses’ sworn
statements following accused-appellants’ arrest and their testimonies before
the RTC. The police officers attested in their Joint Affidavit of Arrest that after
introducing themselves as police officers the subject persons deliberately
admitted that they have in their possession illegal drugs and thereafter showed
the same to the herein undersigned arresting officers thus they were placed
under arrest.Yet, during trial before the RTC, the police officers uniformly
testified that they brought accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro and
Lantion-Tom to the police office after arresting the four suspects in flagrante
delicto, without mention at all of the suspects’ purported admission.
● We also consider the fact that Lantion-Tom was never charged with any
criminal involvement even when, according to the prosecution’s version of
events, she was the first person to deliver the shabu. This seriously dents the
prosecution’s sequence of events on the night of February 17, 2000.
● In contrast, accused-appellants presented clear and convincing evidence in
support of their defenses, which the prosecution failed to rebut. Specifically,
accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes testified that he was illegally arrested
without warrant at Buenas Market, Cainta, Rizal, not at Shangri-La Plaza in
 518. Arizona v. Gant (2009)
556 U.S. 332 | April 21, 2009 | Stevens | Search incidental to a lawful arrest
Digest by: M. Lim
Petitioners: Arizona
Respondents: Rodney Joseph Gant
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
Rodney Gant was apprehended by Arizona state police on an outstanding warrant
for driving with a suspended license. After the officers handcuffed Gant and placed
him in their squad car, they went on to search his vehicle, discovering a handgun
and a plastic bag of cocaine. At trial, Gant asked the judge to suppress the
evidence found in his vehicle because the search had been conducted without a
warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures. The judge declined Gant's request, stating that the search
was a direct result of Gant's lawful arrest and therefore an exception to the general
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. The court convicted Gant on two counts
of cocaine possession.
The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding the search unconstitutional, and
the Arizona Supreme Court agreed. The Supreme Court stated that exceptions to
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement must be justified by concerns for
officer safety or evidence preservation. Because Gant left his vehicle voluntarily,
the court explained, the search was not directly linked to the arrest and therefore
violated the Fourth Amendment. In seeking certiorari, Arizona Attorney General
argued that the Arizona Supreme Court's ruling conflicted with the Court's
precedent, as well as precedents set forth in various federal and state courts.
W/N a search conducted by police officers after handcuffing the defendant and
securing the scene a violation of the Fourth Amendment's protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures?
Yes, under the circumstances of this case. Police may search a vehicle incident
to a recent occupant’s arrest only if (a) the arrestee is within reaching
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or (b) it is
reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.
When these justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee’s vehicle will be
unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the
warrant requirement applies.
Here, Mr. Gant was arrested for a suspended license and the narrow exceptions
did not apply to his case.
a. Unlike in Belton, which involved a single officer confronted with four unsecured
arrestees, the five (5) officers in this case outnumbered the three (3)
arrestees, all of whom had been handcuffed and secured in separate patrol
cars before the officers searched Gant’s car. Under those circumstances,
Gant clearly was not within reaching distance of his car at the time of the
search
b. An evidentiary basis for the search was also lacking in this case. Whereas
Belton and Thornton were arrested for drug offenses, Gant was arrested for
driving with a suspended license—an offense for which police could not
expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment of Gant’s car. Because
police could not reasonably have believed either that Gant could have
accessed his car at the time of the search or that evidence of the offense for
which he was arrested might have been found therein, the search in this case
was unreasonable.
Facts:
● Rodney Gant was apprehended by Arizona state police on an outstanding
warrant for driving with a suspended license.
○ After the officers handcuffed Gant and placed him in their squad
car, they went on to search his vehicle, discovering a handgun and
a plastic bag of cocaine.
● At trial, Gant asked the judge to suppress the evidence found in his vehicle
because the search had been conducted without a warrant in violation of the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures.
○ The judge declined Gant's request, stating that the search was a
direct result of Gant's lawful arrest and therefore an exception to the
general Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. The court
convicted Gant on two counts of cocaine possession.
● The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding the search unconstitutional,
and the Arizona Supreme Court agreed.
○ The Supreme Court stated that exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement must be justified by concerns for
officer safety or evidence preservation.
○ Because Gant left his vehicle voluntarily, the court explained, the
search was not directly linked to the arrest and therefore violated
the Fourth Amendment.
● In seeking certiorari, Arizona Attorney General argued that the Arizona
Supreme Court's ruling conflicted with the Court's precedent, as well as
precedents set forth in various federal and state courts.
Issue/s:
● W/N a search conducted by police officers after handcuffing the defendant
and securing the scene a violation of the Fourth Amendment's protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures? – YES
Ratio:
● Our analysis begins with the basic rule that “searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.”
○ Among the exceptions to the warrant requirement is a search incident
to a lawful arrest. The exception derives from interests in officer
safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in
arrest situations.
● In Chimel, we held that a search incident to arrest may only include “the
arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’—construing that
phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.”
○ That limitation, which continues to define the boundaries of the
exception, ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest is
commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting officers and
safeguarding any evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee
 might conceal or destroy. If there is no possibility that an arrestee
could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to
search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception
are absent and the rule does not apply.
● In Belton, we considered Chimel’s application to the automobile context.
○ A lone police officer in that case stopped a speeding car in which
Belton was one of four occupants. While asking for the driver’s
license and registration, the officer smelled burnt marijuana and
observed an envelope on the car floor marked “Supergold”—a name
he associated with marijuana. Thus having probable cause to believe
the occupants had committed a drug offense, the officer ordered
them out of the vehicle, placed them under arrest, and patted them
down. Without handcuffing the arrestees, the officer “ ‘split them up
into four separate areas of the Thruway … so they would not be in
physical touching area of each other’ ” and searched the vehicle,
including the pocket of a jacket on the backseat, in which he found
cocaine.
○ The New York Court of Appeals found the search unconstitutional,
concluding that after the occupants were arrested the vehicle and its
contents were “safely within the exclusive custody and control of the
police.” The State asked this Court to consider whether the exception
recognized in Chimel permits an officer to search “a jacket found
inside an automobile while the automobile’s four occupants, all under
arrest, are standing unsecured around the vehicle.” We granted
certiorari because “courts ha[d] found no workable definition of ‘the
area within the immediate control of the arrestee’ when that area
arguably includes the interior of an automobile.”
○ In its brief, the State argued that the Court of Appeals erred in
concluding that the jacket was under the officer’s exclusive control.
Focusing on the number of arrestees and their proximity to the
vehicle, the State asserted that it was reasonable for the officer to
believe the arrestees could have accessed the vehicle and its
contents, making the search permissible under Chimel. The United
States, as amicus curiae in support of the State, argued for a more
permissive standard, but it maintained that any search incident to
arrest must be “ ‘substantially contemporaneous’ ” with the arrest—
a requirement it deemed “satisfied if the search occurs during the
period in which the arrest is being consummated and before the
situation has so stabilized that it could be said that the arrest was
completed.” There was no suggestion by the parties or amici that
Chimel authorizes a vehicle search incident to arrest when there is
no realistic possibility that an arrestee could access his vehicle.
○ After considering these arguments, we held that when an officer
lawfully arrests “the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger
compartment of the automobile” and any containers therein. That
holding was based in large part on our assumption “that articles
inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment
of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within
‘the area into which an arrestee might reach.’ ”
● The Arizona Supreme Court read our decision in Belton as merely delineating
“the proper scope of a search of the interior of an automobile” incident to an
arrest. That is, when the passenger compartment is within an arrestee’s
reaching distance, Belton supplies the generalization that the entire
compartment and any containers therein may be reached. On that view of
Belton, the state court concluded that the search of Gant’s car was
unreasonable because Gant clearly could not have accessed his car at the
time of the search. It also found that no other exception to the warrant
requirement applied in this case.
○ Gant now urges us to adopt the reading of Belton followed by the
Arizona Supreme Court.
● Despite the textual and evidentiary support for the Arizona Supreme Court’s
reading of Belton, our opinion has been widely understood to allow a vehicle
search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility
the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search. This
reading may be attributable to Justice Brennan’s dissent in Belton, in which
he characterized the Court’s holding as resting on the “fiction … that the
interior of a car is always within the immediate control of an arrestee who has
recently been in the car.” Under the majority’s approach, he argued, “the result
would presumably be the same even if [the officer] had handcuffed Belton and
his companions in the patrol car” before conducting the search.
○ Since we decided Belton, Courts of Appeals have given different
answers to the question whether a vehicle must be within an
arrestee’s reach to justify a vehicle search incident to arrest, but
Justice Brennan’s reading of the Court’s opinion has predominated.
As Justice O’Connor observed, “lower court decisions seem now to
treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent
occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified
by the twin rationales of Chimel.” Justice Scalia has similarly noted
that, although it is improbable that an arrestee could gain access to
weapons stored in his vehicle after he has been handcuffed and
secured in the backseat of a patrol car, cases allowing a search in
“this precise factual scenario … are legion.” Indeed, some courts
have upheld searches under Belton “even when … the handcuffed
arrestee has already left the scene.”
○ Under this broad reading of Belton, a vehicle search would be
authorized incident to every arrest of a recent occupant
notwithstanding that in most cases the vehicle’s passenger
compartment will not be within the arrestee’s reach at the time of the
search. To read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search incident to
every recent occupant’s arrest would thus untether the rule from the
justifications underlying the Chimel exception—a result clearly
incompatible with our statement in Belton that it “in no way alters the
fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the
basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests.”
Accordingly, we reject this reading of Belton and hold that the
Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident
to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is
unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search.
○ Although it does not follow from Chimel, we also conclude that
circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search
incident to a lawful arrest when it is “reasonable to believe
 evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the
vehicle.” In many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for
a traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the
vehicle contains relevant evidence. But in others, including Belton
and Thornton, the offense of arrest will supply a basis for searching
the passenger compartment of an arrestee’s vehicle and any
containers therein.
● Neither the possibility of access nor the likelihood of discovering
offense-related evidence authorized the search in this case.
○ Unlike in Belton, which involved a single officer confronted with four
unsecured arrestees, the five (5) officers in this case outnumbered
the three (3) arrestees, all of whom had been handcuffed and
secured in separate patrol cars before the officers searched Gant’s
car. Under those circumstances, Gant clearly was not within reaching
distance of his car at the time of the search.
○ An evidentiary basis for the search was also lacking in this case.
Whereas Belton and Thornton were arrested for drug offenses, Gant
was arrested for driving with a suspended license—an offense for
which police could not expect to find evidence in the passenger
compartment of Gant’s car. Because police could not reasonably
have believed either that Gant could have accessed his car at the
time of the search or that evidence of the offense for which he was
arrested might have been found therein, the search in this case was
unreasonable.
● The State does not seriously disagree with the Arizona Supreme Court’s
conclusion that Gant could not have accessed his vehicle at the time of the
search, but it nevertheless asks us to uphold the search of his vehicle under
the broad reading of Belton discussed above. The State argues that Belton
searches are reasonable regardless of the possibility of access in a given case
because that expansive rule correctly balances law enforcement interests,
including the interest in a bright-line rule, with an arrestee’s limited privacy
interest in his vehicle.
● For several reasons, we reject the State’s argument.
○ First, the State seriously undervalues the privacy interests at stake.
Although we have recognized that a motorist’s privacy interest in his
vehicle is less substantial than in his home, the former interest is
nevertheless important and deserving of constitutional protection. It
is particularly significant that Belton searches authorize police
officers to search not just the passenger compartment but every
purse, briefcase, or other container within that space. A rule that
gives police the power to conduct such a search whenever an
individual is caught committing a traffic offense, when there is no
basis for believing evidence of the offense might be found in the
vehicle, creates a serious and recurring threat to the privacy of
countless individuals. Indeed, the character of that threat implicates
the central concern underlying the Fourth Amendment—the concern
about giving police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will
among a person’s private effects.
○ At the same time as it undervalues these privacy concerns, the State
exaggerates the clarity that its reading of Belton provides. Courts that
have read Belton expansively are at odds regarding how close in time
to the arrest and how proximate to the arrestee’s vehicle an officer’s
first contact with the arrestee must be to bring the encounter within
Belton’s purview and whether a search is reasonable when it
commences or continues after the arrestee has been removed from
the scene.
○ Contrary to the State’s suggestion, a broad reading of Belton is also
unnecessary to protect law enforcement safety and evidentiary
interests. Under our view, Belton and Thornton permit an officer to
conduct a vehicle search when an arrestee is within reaching
distance of the vehicle or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle
contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Other established
exceptions to the warrant requirement authorize a vehicle search
under additional circumstances when safety or evidentiary concerns
demand.
■ For instance, Michigan v. Long permits an officer to search
a vehicle’s passenger compartment when he has
reasonable suspicion that an individual, whether or not the
arrestee, is “dangerous” and might access the vehicle to
“gain immediate control of weapons.”
■ If there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains
evidence of criminal activity, United States v. Ross
authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the
evidence might be found. Unlike the searches permitted by
Justice Scalia’s opinion concurring in the judgment in
Thornton, which we conclude today are reasonable for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, Ross allows searches
for evidence relevant to offenses other than the offense of
arrest, and the scope of the search authorized is broader.
○ Finally, there may be still other circumstances in which safety or
evidentiary interests would justify a search.
○ These exceptions together ensure that officers may search a vehicle
when genuine safety or evidentiary concerns encountered during the
arrest of a vehicle’s recent occupant justify a search. Construing
Belton broadly to allow vehicle searches incident to any arrest would
serve no purpose except to provide a police entitlement, and it is
anathema to the Fourth Amendment to permit a warrantless search
on that basis. For these reasons, we are unpersuaded by the State’s
arguments that a broad reading of Belton would meaningfully further
law enforcement interests and justify a substantial intrusion on
individuals’ privacy.
● Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only
if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment
at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle
contains evidence of the offense of arrest. When these justifications are
absent, a search of an arrestee’s vehicle will be unreasonable unless
police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the warrant
requirement applies. The Arizona Supreme Court correctly held that this
case involved an unreasonable search.
Dispositive:
Accordingly, the judgment of the State Supreme Court is affirmed.
 Exigent and emergency circumstances
519. People v. De Gracia
GR Nos. 102009-10233 | 6 July 1994 | Regalado
Digest by: ET Maligalig
Petitioners: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondents: ROLANDO DE GRACIA, CHITO HENSON and JOHN DOES,
accused. ROLANDO DE GRACIA
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP)
staged a coup d’état on December 1989 against the Government. Efren Soria of
Intelligence Division, NCR Defense Command, together with his team, conducted a
surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office in EDSA, QC. Such surveillance was
conducted pursuant to an intelligence report that the said establishment was being
occupied by the elements of the RAM-SFP as communication command post. Near
the Eurocar office, there were crowd watching the on-going bombardment near
Camp Aguinaldo when a group of five men disengaged themselves and walked
towards their surveillance car. Major Soria ordered the driver to start the car and
leave the area. However, as they passed the area, the five men drew their guns and
fired at them, which resulted to the wounding of the driver. Nobody in the surveillance
team retaliated for they were afraid that civilians might be caught in the crossfire.
Thereafter, the search team raided the Eurocar Sales Office and confiscated 6
cartons of M-16 ammunition, 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different
calibers, and molotov. Obenia, who first entered the establishment, found De Gracia
holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through the door in the office of a certain
Colonel Matillano, No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because,
according to them, there was so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp
Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous
firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were
consequently closed. W/N the search and seizure is valid? - YES
The instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a
warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the
facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being
committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant
their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had
no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial
judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted,
his court was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search
warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
Facts:
● The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d' etat
staged in December, 1989 by ultra-rightist elements headed by the Reform
the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP)
against the Government. At that time, various government establishments and
military camps in Metro Manila were being bombarded by the rightist group
with their "tora-tora" planes. At around midnight of November 30, 1989, the
4th Marine Battalion of the Philippine Marines occupied Villamor Air Base,
while the Scout Rangers took over the Headquarters of the Philippine Army,
the Army Operations Center, and Channel 4, the government television
station. Also, some elements of the Philippine Army coming from Fort
Magsaysay occupied the Greenhills Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro
Manila.
● Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate
informations for illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in
furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide, docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-90-11755 and Q-90-11756, respectively, which were tried
jointly by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103.
● The records show that in the early morning of December 1, 1989, Maj. Efren
Soria of the Intelligence Division, National Capital Region Defense Command,
was on board a brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar
Sales Office located at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in Quezon City,
together with his team composed of Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon
Briones, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino, one S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt. Ramos. The
surveillance, which actually started on the night of November 30, 1989 at
around 10:00 P.M., was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report received
by the division that said establishment was being occupied by elements of the
RAM-SFP as a communication command post.
● Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around ten to
fifteen meters away from the Eurocar building near P. Tuazon Street, S/Sgt.
Henry Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to conduct his surveillance on
foot. A crowd was then gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-going
bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo. After a while, a group of five men
disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked towards the car of the
surveillance team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated in front,
saw the approaching group and immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the
car and leave the area. As they passed by the group, then only six meters
away, the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at the team, which
attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in
the surveillance team was able to retaliate because they sought cover inside
the car and they were afraid that civilians or bystanders might be caught in the
cross-fire.
● As a consequence, at around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching
team composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao as team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt.
Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion
under one Col. delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able
to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4
dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of
the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is located at the right
portion of the building. Sgt. Oscar Obenia, the first one to enter the Eurocar
building, saw appellant De Gracia inside the office of Col. Matillano, holding a
C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. De Gracia was the only person
then present inside the room. A uniform with the nametag of Col. Matillano
was also found. As a result of the raid, the team arrested appellant, as well as
Soprieso Verbo and Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar building.
They were then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the
explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No search
warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, at that
time there was so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo
was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing
within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were
consequently closed. The group was able to confirm later that the owner of
 Eurocar office is a certain Mr. Gutierrez and that appellant is supposedly a
"boy" therein.
● Appellant Rolando de Gracia gave another version of the incident. First, he
claims that on November 30, 1989, he was in Antipolo to help in the birthday
party of Col. Matillano. He denies that he was at the Eurocar Sales Office on
December 1, 1989. Second, he contends that when the raiding team arrived
at the Eurocar Sales Office on December 5, 1989, he was inside his house, a
small nipa hut which is adjacent to the building. According to him, he was
tasked to guard the office of Col. Matillano which is located at the right side of
the building. He denies, however, that he was inside the room of Col. Matillano
when the raiding team barged in and that he had explosives in his possession.
He testified that when the military raided the office, he was ordered to get out
of his house and made to lie on the ground face down, together with "Obet"
and "Dong" who were janitors of the building. He avers that he does not know
anything about the explosives and insists that when they were asked to stand
up, the explosives were already there.
● Appellant stated that he visited Col. Matillano in 1987 at the stockade of the
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP), and that he
knew Matillano was detained because of the latter's involvement in the 1987
coup d' etat. In July, 1989, appellant again went to see Matillano because he
had no job. Col. Matillano then told him that he could stay in the PC-INP
stockade and do the marketing for them. From that time until his arrest at the
Eurocar office, appellant worked for Matillano.
● contingencies continues cannot be less justified.
being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable
cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing,
the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant
from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989
when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency and
exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
● The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion,
is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell
the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court
for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual
procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by
a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial
warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously
the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or
capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government
forces, or any other milder acts but really in pursuance of the rebellious
movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the
situation that involves the very survival of society and its government and duly
constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels
find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which (are) of the
essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of
invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these

Issue/s:
● W/N the search and seizure is valid? - YES Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the impugned judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, but its
recommendation therein for executive clemency and the supposed basis thereof are
Ratio: hereby DELETED, with costs against accused-appellant.
● It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office
were not armed with a search warrant at that time. The raid was actually
precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as
headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance
conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a
group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives
raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite
requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break into the
office. The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely
not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and
ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The
presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives
could not be justifiably or even colorably explained. In addition, there was
general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense
firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which
was under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas were
obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were
deserted.
● Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant
case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless
search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts
obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was
 520. People v. Ayangao, GR No. 142356, 14 April 2004
G.R. No.LITA AYANGAO y BATONG-OG | April 14, 2004 | CORONA, J. | Exigent
and emergency circumstances
Digest by: MAULION
Petitioners: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondents: LITA AYANGAO y BATONG-OG
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
Policemen received an information that a woman would be traveling with marijuana
from Mountain Province to Pampanga. The informant went with them in the place
pointed and he personally identified the woman. They approached the woman. The
policemen noticed a protruding marijuana leaves from the sacks of sweet potatoes.
The policemen identified themselves and asked the woman to put out the contents
of the sack. The sack contains sweet potato with a bricklike substance packed with
a masking tape. In plain view of the policemen, it was identified to be marijuana.
She was arrested and was convicted in the trial court. Ayongao argued that the
marijuana is inadmissible since the warrantless search is invalid.
W/N there was a valid warrantless search – YES. The informant arrived at the
police station at 5:00 A.M. on August 13, 1999 and informed the officers that the
appellant would be arriving at 6:00 A.M. that day. The circumstances clearly called
for an immediate response from the officers.
This Court has already ruled that tipped information is sufficient probable cause to
effect a warrantless search. Although the apprehending officers received the tip
two weeks prior to the arrest, they could not be faulted for not applying for a search
warrant inasmuch as the exact date of appellant’s arrival was not known by the
informant.
Facts:
● Two weeks before August 13, 1999, policemen received information from one
of their informants that a certain woman from Mountain Province delivers dried
marijuana leaves for sale at Sapang Biabas, Mabalacat, Pampanga to some
drug pushers.
● Said information was also relayed by the informant to C/Insp. Rhodel O.
Sermonia who instructed the two operatives to conduct surveillance operation
against their target female who was described by their informant as about 50
years old, 5 feet in height, straight long hair and coming from Kalinga province.
● At around 5:00 o’clock in the morning of August 13, 1999, their informant went
to their headquarters and informed them that their suspect is due to arrive at
Sapang Biabas, Mabalacat. Police, together with the informant, immediately
went to Sapang Biabas and parked their car near the entrance of the road
going to Sapang Biabas.
● While they were in their car, the informer pointed to them a woman bearing
the same description given by the former. The woman alighted from the
tricycle and subsequently loaded two sacks with camote fruits on top. The two
officers proceeded to the place where the woman was and noticed marijuana
dried leaves protruding through a hole of one of the sacks.
● The police officers requested the woman to put out the contents of the said
sacks. The sacks yielded sweet potatoes mixed with 15 brick-like substance
wrapped in brown paper and masking tape. A brick, which was damaged on
the side and in plain view of the officers revealed dried marijuana leaves.
● The woman who was arrested identified herself as accused Lita Ayangao y
Batong-Og of Lacnog, Agbanawag Tabuk, Kalinga Province. Ayangao and the
suspected dried marijuana leaves were brought to the police officer’s
headquarter at Diamond Subdivision, Angeles City.
● The evidence confiscated from the accused were sent to the PNP Crime
Laboratory at Camp Olivas where it was examined by Chief Forensic Chemist
Daisy P. Babor. The Initial Laboratory Report issued indicated that the
specimens from the 15 bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves weighing
14.75 kilograms were found to be positive for marijuana.
● Ayangao, for her part, used frame-up as a defense. She also questioned the
legality of her arrest be
Issue/s:
● W/N there was a valid warrantless search – YES
● W/N (Issue) – YES/NO
Ratio:
● In the present case, the informant arrived at the police station at 5:00 A.M. on
August 13, 1999 and informed the officers that the appellant would be arriving
at 6:00 A.M. (just an hour later) that day. The circumstances clearly called for
an immediate response from the officers. In People vs. Valdez, this Court
upheld the validity of the warrantless arrest and corresponding search of
accused Valdez as the officer made the arrest on the strength of a similar on-
the-spot tip. In the case at bar, though all other pertinent details were known
by the officers except the date, they could not have applied for a search
warrant since the validity of a warrant was only for 10 days. Considering that
the officers did not know when the appellant was going to arrive, prudence
made them act the way they did.
● In this case, the arresting officers had probable cause to make the arrest in
view of the tip they received from their informant. This Court has already ruled
that tipped information is sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless
search. Although the apprehending officers received the tip two weeks prior
to the arrest, they could not be faulted for not applying for a search warrant
inasmuch as the exact date of appellant’s arrival was not known by the
informant.
● The warrantless arrest was also lawful because it fell under Rule 113, Section
5(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This section provides that a
peace officer may arrest a person even without a warrant when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or
is attempting to commit an offense. The Court finds that the arrest was lawful
 as appellant was actually committing a crime when she was arrested —
transporting marijuana, are act prohibited by law.

● Since a lawful arrest was made, the resulting warrantless search on appellant
was also valid as the legitimate warrantless arrest authorized the arresting
police officers to validly search and seize from the offender (1) any dangerous
weapons and (2) the things which may be used as proof of the commission of
the offense.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, of Angeles City,
finding the appellant guilty of transporting a prohibited drug and sentencing her to
reclusion perpetua and to pay the fine of ₱500,000, is hereby AFFIRMED.
 Hot pursuit
521. People v. De Lara, GR No. 94953, 5 September 1994
G.R. No. | Date | Ponente | Warrantless search in re Hot pursuit
Digest by: 2jointz 🌿
Petitioners: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
Respondents: ARMANDO DE LARA Y GALARO, accused-appellant.
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
A team led by Sgt. Enrique David of the NCIS, conducted a surveillance operation
on December 15 and 17, and confirmed the reported drug-pushing activities in
Garrido and Zamora Streets in Sta. Ana, Manila led by the group of appellant. No
arrest was made because the team was instructed by their superior to conduct a
surveillance operation only. On January 8, 1987, Malaya and People's Tonight
reported that there were rampant, drug-pushing activities in the area. Gen. Alfredo
Lim, then WPD Superintendent, reprimanded the NCIS office. On January 9,
because of the reprimand given by Gen. Lim, Capt. Cablayan instructed Sgt. David
to plan a buy-bust operation. During the buy bust, appellant sensed the presence of
police operatives. Appellant then ran inside his house with Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. (poseur
buyer) in pursuit. The latter was able to subdue appellant and apprehended him
inside the house. Sgt. David confronted appellant, who admitted that he kept
prohibited drugs in his house. Meanwhile, Appellant denied having sold marijuana
to anyone and claimed that the arresting officers merely planted the marijuana on
his person.
WON arrest was lawful? YES
WON seizure of drugs in the accused’s house was valid? YES.
The police operatives acted within the bounds of law. Section 5, Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedures dealing with warrantless arrests provides:
Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person;
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the buy-bust operation, the
policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the
drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest. Furthermore, during the scuffle,
Appellant then ran inside his house with Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. in pursuit. The latter subdued
him immediately and apprehended him while he was inside the house. The
policemen's entry into the house of appellant without a search warrant was in
hot-pursuit of a person caught committing an offense in flagrante. The arrest
that followed the hot-pursuit was valid. The seizure of the plastic bag
containing prohibited drugs was the result of appellant's arrest inside his
house. A contemporaneous search may be conducted upon the person of the
arrestee and the immediate vicinity where the arrest was made.
Facts:
● a team led by Sgt. Enrique David, conducted a surveillance operation on
December 15 and 17, and confirmed the reported drug-pushing activities in
Garrido and Zamora Streets in Sta. Ana, Manila by the group of appellant and
a certain Ricky alias "Pilay".
● No arrest was made because the team was instructed by their superior to
conduct a surveillance operation only.
● On January 8, 1987, Malaya and People's Tonight reported that there were
rampant, drug-pushing activities in the vicinity of Garrido and Zamora Streets
in Sta. Ana, Manila, prompting Gen. Alfredo Lim, then WPD Superintendent,
to reprimand the NCIS office.
● On January 9, because of the reprimand given by Gen. Lim, Capt. Cablayan
instructed Sgt. David to plan a buy-bust operation with Pfc. Martin Orolfo, Jr.
as the poseur-buyer
● the team, together with their confidential informant, went to Garrido Street.
Upon arriving threat, they strategically positioned themselves.
● Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. and the confidential informant proceeded to the house of
appellant located at No. 2267 Garrido Street, where they saw him standing
outside.
● The confidential informant introduced Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. to appellant as an
interested buyer of marijuana. Appellant asked Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. "Ilan ang
bibilhin ninyo?".
● Pfc. Orolfo, Jr., replied: "Two foils" handing at the same time the marked
twenty-peso bill to appellant.
● The latter, after placing the money in the right pocket of his pants, went inside
his house.
● Minutes later, appellant came back and handed two foils wrapped in onion
paper.
● It was after he handed the two foils to Pfc. Orolfo Jr., that he sensed the
presence of the police operatives. He then tried to retrieve the two foils but
Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. prevented him from doing so.
● During the scuffle, one foil was torn. Appellant then ran inside his house with
Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. in pursuit.
● The latter was able to subdue appellant. Sgt. David confronted appellant, who
admitted that he kept prohibited drugs in his house.
● Appellant showed the arresting officers a blue plastic bag with white lining
containing prohibited drugs.
● During the investigation, appellant was apprised of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel. When appellant was
asked to give a written statement, he refused to do so pending arrival of his
lawyer
● The prohibited drugs seized from appellant were brought to the NBI for
chemical analysis.
● drugs positive for marijuana.
● Appellant denied having sold marijuana to anyone and claimed that the
arresting officers merely planted the marijuana on his person.
 ● he went out to fetch his son, who was left in the care of a neighbor. Upon ● Q: What did the group do after he voluntarily admitted that he was keeping
returning to his house with his son, he was arrested by the police. prohibited drugs inside his house?
● The police proceeded to search his house, without any search warrant shown ● A: He pointed inside his house (sic) one plastic bag colored blue with
to him. After the search, he and his wife were brought to the WPD white lining containing prohibited drug"
headquarters. ● The policemen's entry into the house of appellant without a search
warrant was in hot-pursuit of a person caught committing an offense in
flagrante. The arrest that followed the hot-pursuit was valid.
Issue/s: ● II. We also find as valid the seizure of the plastic bag of prohibited drugs found
● W/N arrest was lawful? YES inside appellant's house.
● W/N seizure of drugs in the accused’s house was valid? YES. ● The seizure of the plastic bag containing prohibited drugs was the result
of appellant's arrest inside his house. A contemporaneous search may
Ratio: (red- appellant’s claims) be conducted upon the person of the arrestee and the immediate vicinity
● the police operatives acted within the bounds of law. Section 5, Rule 113 of where the arrest was made
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedures dealing with warrantless arrests ● [EVID]We find to be meritorious appellant's claim that he was not assisted by
provides: counsel during the custodial investigation, specifically when he was forced to
● Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person sign the photocopy of the marked twenty-peso bill, Receipt of Property Seized,
may, without a warrant, arrest a person; and the Booking and Information Sheet
● a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually ● The said documents are inadmissible in evidence for the reason that there
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; was no showing that appellant was then assisted by counsel nor his waiver
● b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal thereto put into writing (Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 3[2]).
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has ● Be that as it may, the rejection of said evidence would not affect the conviction
committed it; of appellant in view of the abundance of other evidence establishing his guilt.
● In the case at bench, appellant was caught red-handed in delivering two tin
foils of marijuana to Pat. Orolfo, Jr., the poseur-buyer. Dispositive:
● Applying the aforementioned provision of law, appellant's arrest was lawfully WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification that
effected without need of a warrant of arrest. appellant shall suffer an indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) years and TWO (2) days of
● Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the buy-bust operation, prision correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) years and ONE (1) day of prision mayor,
the policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation to as maximum.
apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest
● Appellant, however, asseverates that his arrest was precipitated only by
newspaper publications about the rampant sale of drugs along Garrido and
Zamora Streets, Sta. Ana, Manila. WRONG.
● A surveillance on the illegal activities of the appellant was already conducted
by the police as early as December 15 and 17, 1986.
● The newspaper reports concerning the illegal drug activities came out only on
January 8 and 14, 1987, long after the police knew of the said illegal activities.
● Appellant's eventual arrest on January 9, 1987 was the result of the
surveillance conducted and the buy-bust operation.
● The evidence shows that appellant ran inside his house upon sensing the
presence of the police operatives. Relevant portion of the testimony of Pat.
Orolfo, Jr., the poseur-buyer:
● A: He handed to me two tin foils containing suspected marijuana leaves
wrapped in onion paper.
● Q: And what happened next when he returned with those items?
● A: After he handed to me two foils, he sensed the presence of the operatives
and he tried to retrieve the two foils, sir, and I prevented him and during the
scuffle one piece of foil was broken, he tried to run inside the house, so I
subdued him immediately and apprehended him while he was inside the
house.
● Q: After he was subdued by your group, what happened?
● A: Sgt. David confronted him regarding this case and he voluntarily admitted
that he was still keeping prohibited drugs inside his house
 Customs searches
522. Boac v. People, GR No. 180597, 7 November 2008
G.R. No. 180597 | Nov 7, 2008 | Velasco Jr. | Customs Searches
Digest by: PEREZ
Petitioners: Raul basilio D. Boac, Ramon B. Golong, Cesar F. Beltran, and Roger
A. Basadre
Respondents: People of the Philippines
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
(Put Doctrine Here)
Facts:
● Petitioners Raul Basilio Boac, Ramon Betuin Golong, Cesar Fantone Beltran,
Roger Alcantara Basadre, and Benjamin Castaneda Alfonso are members of
the Philippine National Police (PNP)-Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG). They hold the ranks of Police Senior Superintendent, Police
Inspector, Senior Police Officer II, Senior Police Officer II, and Senior Police
Officer I, respectively. In 2005, they were charged with violation of Sec. 2203
in relation to Sec. 3612 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioners flagged
down, searched and seized three (3) container vans consigned to Japan Trak
surplus (Kakiage Surplus).
● Boac, Golong, and Beltran pleaded not guilty on January 23, 2006; Basadre
entered the same plea on February 20, 2006. Alfonso remained at large. At
pretrial, the prosecution and defense stipulated that in the evening of July 27,
2004, Golong, Beltran, Basadre, and Alfonso, upon the order of Boac, but
without the authority from and coordination with the Bureau of Customs
(BOC), Collection District X, Cagayan de Oro City, flagged down three
container vans consigned to Kakiage Surplus. The said vans were allowed to
be brought to the warehouse of the consignee and the actual search was done
on July 28, 2004.
● Atty. Lourdes V. Mangaoang, then Customs District Collector of Cagayan de
Oro City, testified that the CIDG operatives (herein petitioners) did not have a
written authority from the Commissioner of Customs or the District Collector.
According to her, Golong claimed that they had clear orders from Boac to open
and search the vans. She instructed her personnel to open the vans only to
show that there was nothing illegal in their contents. She prepared a letter of
protest addressed to Boac but it was ignored; hence, she filed the instant case.
● Dario C. Amolata, license customs broker, testified that he went to see the
vans after learning that they were flagged down by petitioners. The following
day, he went to the warehouse with Melvin Yamit and Richard Godoy of the
Enforcement and Security Services of the BOC, Region X to witness the
inspection of the vans. No contrabands were found upon inspection. Yamit
corroborated the testimony of Amolata.
● For the defense, Boac testified that on July 27, 2004, he was in Manila on
leave. Beltran allegedly informed him that three container vans with
contrabands were released by the BOC; thus, Boac instructed Golong and his
team to flag down the subject vans. After the inspection of the vans and
without finding any contraband, Boac directed Golong to leave the premises.
Golong corroborated Boac's testimony, adding that he and his team did not
open the vans on July 27, 2004 because there were no representatives from
the BOC. Beltran testified that in the morning of July 27, 2004, Voltaire
Sabelina, an appraiser from the BOC, informed him that three container vans
will be released from the pier around 5:00 p.m. It was alleged that inside the
two of the uninspected containers were television sets from Japan.
● SB ruled that petitioners belong to the category of officers in Sec. 2203 (d);
thus, they needed a written authority from the Commissioner of Customs or
District Collector in order to conduct searches, seizures and arrests. In this
case, the court said, the prosecution established the lack of said written
authority; even Beltran and Golong admitted that they did not have any
authorization to search the vans.
● Petitioners MR-ed but was denied. Hence, this case.
● Petitioners assert that they did not conduct any search, seizure, or arrest;
hence, there was no violation of the Tariff and Customs Code. During the
search conducted in the consignee's warehouse on July 28, 2004, the
employees of the owner of the shipment unloaded the goods under BOC
personnel supervision. Petitioners allege that they only witnessed the search;
they did not make any seizures or arrests. After searching the first van and
half of the second van without any contraband being found, Customs Police
Yamit and Godoy decided to stop the search despite the request of petitioners
to continue. Since the Customs Police were already leaving the area, Boac
instructed his team to leave the vicinity. 10
● Petitioners further claim that the police's authority to stop, search, and effect
seizure and arrest, if necessary, is no longer exclusively vested on the
Collector of Customs. Regular PNP members are generally empowered by
law to effect arrests in accordance with Republic Act No. (RA) 6975
Issue/s:
● W/N (Issue) – YES/NO
● W/N (Issue) – YES/NO
Ratio:
● The petition is meritorious. Petitioners should be acquitted of the charge.
● The prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. In this case, it is clear that petitioners neither searched the
container vans nor effected seizure and arrest. The testimony of Customs
Broker Amolata, the prosecution witness, supports this finding
● It should be noted that the container vans were brought to the consignee's
warehouse and not to the CIDG headquarters. On July 28, 2004, the container
vans were searched but not by petitioners, as testified to by petitioners Beltran
and Golong.
● The prosecution does not rebut the above testimonies of petitioners. In fact,
when questioned by Associate Justice Norberto Y. Geraldez, the prosecution
witness, Customs Broker Amolata, attested to the same fact.
● The search was actually conducted by Customs Police Yamit and Godoy on
July 28, 2004. The Customs Police held the keys of the vans, as attested to
by Amolata.
● Furthermore, the vans were opened without the presence of the PNP-CIDG's
team leader, Inspector Golong.
● The search was under the direction of the Customs Police because when the
Customs Police decided to stop the search, petitioners acceded and left the
premises.
● The foregoing testimony, which Golong corroborated, was not disputed by the
prosecution. It is thus very clear that the search was not done by petitioners Dispositive:
but by the Customs Police. Petitioners did not seize anything nor arrested WHEREFORE, the August 16, 2007 Decision and November 14, 2007 Resolution of
anybody. They merely observed the search which they requested to be the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners are ACQUITTED of
undertaken to check for contrabands. Notably, the consignee did not file any the charge against them. No costs. SO ORDERED.
complaint against petitioners.
●
● The information charged petitioners for illegally flagging down, searching, and
seizing the three container vans on July 27, 2004. Petitioners, however, could
not also be held liable for these acts. It is a fact that no search and seizure of
the vans was done on the night of July 27, 2004. The act of flagging down the
vehicles is not among those proscribed by Sec. 2203 of the Tariff and Customs
Code. Mere flagging down of the container vans is not punishable under the
said law.
●
● We ruled in People v. Ganguso:
●
● An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of
Rights guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he
must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due
process clause of the Constitution which protects the accused from conviction
except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the
prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the accused need not even
offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as,
excluding the possibility of error, produce absolute certainty. Moral certainty
only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is
responsible for the offense charged. 21
●
● Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused
must rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the
prosecution. The burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his innocence. 22 In this case,
the prosecution failed to show that petitioners committed the acts prohibited
by Sec. 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code. There is no such evidence,
testimonial or otherwise, that identifies petitioners as responsible for the
alleged illegal search. Hence, acquittal is in order. aCATSI
●
● As regards the second issue, there is no conflict between the aforequoted
provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code and RA 6975, as amended. The
jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Customs is clearly with regard to customs
duties. Should the PNP suspect anything, it should coordinate with the BOC
and obtain the written authority from the Collector of Customs in order to
conduct searches, seizures, or arrests. Coordination is emphasized in the
laws. While it is an admitted fact that there was no such coordination initiated
by the PNP-CIDG in this instance, nevertheless, petitioners cannot be
convicted under the Tariff and Customs Code since there is no evidence that
they did actually search the container vans.
 523. Bureau of Customs v. Ogario,,
GR No. 138081| 30 March 2000 | Mendoza| Customs Searches
Digest by: RECAÑA
Petitioners: Bureau of Customs (BOC), Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB)
Respondents: Nelson Ogario & Mark Montelibano
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
The Collector of Customs issued a warrant of seizure and detention of 25,000 bags
of rice bearing the name of "Snowman," shipped on board the M/V "Alberto" on the
basis of the report of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) that
the same were smuggled. Respondent Montelibano, consignee of the sacks of rice,
and his buyer, respondent Ogario, filed a complaint for injunction with RTC Cebu
praying for the quashal of the warrant.
Petitioners Bureau of Customs (BOC) and EIIB moved to dismiss the complaint, but
the same was denied on the ground that the warrant of seizure and detention issued
by the Collector of Customs on the basis of mere suspicion cannot divest the court
of its jurisdiction. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents and
ordered the return of the confiscated rice to respondents upon posting of a bond.
Reconsideration of the same was denied as well as petitioners' recourse to the Court
of Appeals. Meanwhile, the Collector of Customs rendered judgment forfeiting in
favor of the government the 25,000 bags of rice.
Petitioners elevated the ruling of the appellate court to SC via a petition for review
on certiorari raising as issue the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over forfeiture
cases before the Collector of Customs.
WON the RTC has jurisdiction to enjoin forfeiture proceedings in the Bureau of
Customs - NO
The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture
of dutiable goods and that the question of whether probable cause exists for the
seizure of an imported item is not for the courts to determine but rests solely with the
customs authorities. Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass
upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the
Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings. They
are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions
of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.
The rule that Regional Trial Courts have no review powers over such proceedings is
anchored upon the policy of placing no unnecessary hindrance on the government's
drive, not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon Customs, but more
importantly, to render effective and efficient the collection of import and export duties
due the State, which enables the government to carry out the functions it has been
instituted to perform.
Where to appeal? Actions of the Collector of Customs are appealable to the
Commissioner of Customs, whose decision, in turn, is subject to the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals and from there to the Court of
Appeals (Basis: RA 1125 or An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals).
Facts:
● Felipe A. Bartolome, District Collector of Customs of Cebu, issued a Warrant
of Seizure and Detention 1 of 25,000 bags of rice, bearing the name of
"SNOWMAN, Milled in Palawan" shipped on board the M/V "Alberto," which
was then docked at Pier 6 in Cebu City.
○ The warrant was issued on the basis of the report of the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), Region VII that the rice
had been illegally imported. The report stated that the rice was
landed in Palawan by a foreign vessel and then placed in sacks
marked "SNOWMAN, Milled in Palawan." It was then shipped to
Cebu City on board the vessel M/V "Alberto."
● Forfeiture proceedings were started in the customs office in Cebu, docketed
as Cebu Seizure Identification Case No. 17-98.
● Respondent Mark Montelibano, the consignee of the sacks of rice, and his
buyer, respondent Elson Ogario, filed a complaint for injunction (Civil Case
No. CEB-23077) in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.
● In separate motions, petitioners Bureau of Customs (BOC), Port of Cebu 3
and the EIIB, as well as the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard, sought the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction, but
their motions were denied. In its resolution, dated January 11, 1999
● BOC and EIIB moved for a reconsideration, but their motion was denied by
the RTC.
○ In the same order, the RTC also increased the amount of
respondents' bond to P22.5M.
● On certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the resolution and order of the RTC were
sustained. Accordingly, upon the motion of respondents, the RTC ordered the
sheriff to place in respondents' possession the 25,000 bags of rice.
○ Meanwhile, in the forfeiture proceedings before the Collector of
Customs of Cebu, a decision was rendered forfeiting M/V "Alberto";
the 25,000 bags of rice brand "Snowman"; and the two (2) trucks
bearing Plate Nos. GCC 844 and GHZ 388 are all FORFEITED in
favor of the government to be disposed of in the manner prescribed
by law while the seven (7) trucks bearing Plate Nos. GFX 557; GFX
247; TPV 726; GBY 874; GVE 989; and GDF 548 are RELEASED in
favor of their respective owners upon proper identification and
compliance with pertinent laws, rules and regulations.
○ Respondent Montelibano did not take part in the proceedings before
the District Collector of Customs despite due notice sent to his
counsel because he refused to recognize the validity of the forfeiture
proceedings.
● Eventually, petitioners filed the present petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals as to the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court
over forfeiture cases before the Collector of Customs
Issue/s:
● WON the RTC has jurisdiction to enjoin forfeiture proceedings in the Bureau
of Customs - NO
Ratio:
● In Jao v. Court of Appeals, this Court, reiterating its ruling in a long line of proceeding before the Collector of Customs is not final. An appeal
cases, said: There is no question that Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any lies to the Commissioner of Customs and thereafter to the Court of
competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture Tax Appeals. It may even reach this Court through the appropriate
proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or otherwise petition for review. The proper ventilation of the legal issues raised is
interfere with these proceedings. The Collector of Customs sitting in thus indicated. Certainly a court of first instance is not therein
seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and included. It is devoid of jurisdiction.
determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable ● It is noteworthy that because of the indiscriminate issuance of writs of
goods. injunction, the Supreme Court issued on June 25, 1999 Administrative Circular
○ The Regional Trial Courts are precluded from assuming cognizance No. 07-99 to all judges of lower courts entitled RE: EXERCISE OF UTMOST
over such matters even through petitions of certiorari, prohibition or CAUTION, PRUDENCE, AND JUDICIOUSNESS IN ISSUANCE OF
mandamus. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS AND WRITS OF PRELIMINARY
○ It is likewise well-settled that the provisions of the Tariff and Customs INJUNCTION. The circular states in part:
Code and that of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, otherwise ○ Finally, judges should never forget what the Court categorically
known as "An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals," specify the declared in Mison v. Natividad (213 SCRA 734, 742 [1992]) that "[b]y
proper fora and procedure for the ventilation of any legal objections express provision of law, amply supported by well-settled
or issues raised concerning these proceedings. Thus, actions of the jurisprudence, the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction
Collector of Customs are appealable to the Commissioner of over seizure and forfeiture proceedings, and regular courts cannot
Customs, whose decision, in turn, is subject to the exclusive interfere with his exercise thereof or stifle or put it to naught."
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals and from there ○ The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that this circular
to the Court of Appeals. is immediately disseminated and shall monitor implementation
○ The rule that Regional Trial Courts have no review powers over thereof. STRICT OBSERVANCE AND COMPLIANCE of this Circular
such proceedings is anchored upon the policy of placing no is hereby enjoined.
unnecessary hindrance on the government's drive, not only to
prevent smuggling and other frauds upon Customs, but more Dispositive:
importantly, to render effective and efficient the collection of WHEREFORE, the temporary restraining order issued on May 17, 1999 is hereby made
import and export duties due the State, which enables the permanent. The decision, dated April 15, 1999, of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
government to carry out the functions it has been instituted to and Civil Case No. CEB-23077 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Cebu City is
perform. DISMISSED.
○ Even if the seizure by the Collector of Customs were illegal, which
has yet to be proven, we have said that such act does not deprive
the Bureau of Customs of jurisdiction thereon.
● Respondents cite the statement of the Court of Appeals that regular courts still
retain jurisdiction "where, as in this case, for lack of probable cause, there is
serious doubt as to the propriety of placing the articles under Customs
jurisdiction through seizure/forfeiture proceedings."
○ They overlook the fact, however, that under the law, the question of
whether probable cause exists for the seizure of the subject sacks of
rice is not for the Regional Trial Court to determine. The customs
authorities do not have to prove to the satisfaction of the court that
the articles on board a vessel were imported from abroad or are
intended to be shipped abroad before they may exercise the power
to effect customs' searches, seizures, or arrests provided by law and
continue with the administrative hearings.
○ As the Court held in Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya:
The governmental agency concerned, the Bureau of Customs, is
vested with exclusive authority. Even if it be assumed that in the
exercise of such exclusive competence a taint of illegality may be
correctly imputed, the most that can be said is that under certain
circumstances the grave abuse of discretion conferred may oust it of
such jurisdiction. It does not mean however that correspondingly a
court of first instance is vested with competence when clearly in the
light of the above decisions the law has not seen fit to do so. The
 Airport searches
524. People v. Johnson, GR No. 138881, 18 December 2000
G.R. No. 138881 | 18 December 2000 | Ponente: Mendoza, J. | Topic: Airport
Searches
Digest by: Recto
Petitioners: People of the Philippines
Respondents: Leila Johnson y Reyes
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
Facts: Johnson was an American citizen who visited her relatives in the Philippines.
Upon arrival at the airpot for her departure back to the US, she was frisked by
Ramirez, one of the airport officer assigned to frisk departing passengers,
employees and crew to check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs, contraband
goods, and explosives. Ramirez felt something in her abdomen and when she asked
Johnson, the latter replied that she had to wear two panty gridles due to a recent
operation she had. Not satisfied, Ramirez reported the incident to her superior.
She was asked to go to the women’s room and they asked her to remove the thing
from her abdomen. They found 3 plastic packs of shabu. Thereafter, a case was
filed against her and she was charged and convicted with violation of Dangerous
Drugs Act.
Issue/s: W/N the warrantless search is valid and the confiscated drugs are
admissible as evdience? – YES
DOCTRINE: Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of
subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. There is
little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness,
the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations
associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport
public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject
to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be
subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to
routine airport procedures.|
iN THIS CASE,
In this case, the packs of shabu having thus been obtained through a valid
warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against the accused-
appellant herein. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although likewise without
warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of
"shabu" in her person in flagrante delicto.
Facts:
● Accused-appellant Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58
years old, a widow, and a resident of Ocean Side, California, USA. She is a
former Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American and had since
been working as a registered nurse. On June, 1998, she arrived in the
Philippines to visit her son’s family in Laguna.
● After her visit and on her way back to the US, pursuant to airport regulations
in NAIA, she was frisked by Ramirez, the lady frisker on duty that day. Ramirez
felt something hard on Johnson’s abdomen so she asked her about it. The
latter replied that she had to wear two panty gridles due to a recent operation
she had. Not satisfied, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior.
● Inside the womens room, she was asked to bring out the thing under her
gridle. She took out three plastic packs containing shabu. In her defense,
accused-appellant alleged that she was standing in line at the last boarding
gate when she was approached by Embile and two female officers. She
claimed she was handcuffed and taken to the women's room. She insisted
that nothing was found on her person.
● After another two hours, Col. Castillo and about eight security guards came in
and threw two white packages on the table. They told her to admit that the
packages were hers. But she denied knowledge and ownership of the
packages. RTC rendered a judgement finding her guilty of the illegal
possession of drugs. She contend that the search was in violation of her
constitutional right and that the drugs found cannot be admitted as evidence.
Issue/s:
● W/N the warrantless search is valid and the confiscated drugs are admissible
as evdience? – YES
Ratio:
● The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine
frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security
procedures.
● Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a
lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport
security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and
terrorism has come increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers
attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their
carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-
ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious
objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects
are.There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their
minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the
reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed,
travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs,
and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any
prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to
seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not
apply to routine airport procedures.
● The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained
through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against
the accused-appellant herein. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although
likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the
discovery and recovery of "shabu" in her person in flagrante delicto.
 ● There is, however, no justification for the confiscation of accused-
appellant's passport, airline ticket, luggage, and other personal effects. The
pictures taken during that time are also inadmissible, as are the girdle taken
from her, and her signature thereon. Rule 126, §2 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure authorizes the search and seizure only of the following:
Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of personal property:
1. Subject of the offense;
2. Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the
offense; and
3. Used or intended to be used as the means of committing
an offense.
● Accordingly, the above items seized from accused-appellant should be
returned to her.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 110,
finding accused-appellant guilty of violation of §16 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and
imposing upon her the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the fine imposed on accused-appellant is reduced to P50,000.00.
Costs against appellant.
The passport, airline ticket, luggage, girdle and other personal effects not yet
returned to the accused-appellant are hereby ordered returned to her. SO
ORDERED.
 525. People v. Canton, GR No. 148825, 27 December 2002
G.R. No. 148825 | 27 December 2002 | DAVIDE, JR., C.J | Airport searches
Digest by: RELUCIO
Petitioners: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondents: SUSAN CANTON
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
Appellant Susan was charged with violation of Section 16 of Article III of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425). ·On 12 February 1998,
SUSAN was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), being a departing
passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam. When she passed through the metal detector
booth, a beeping sound was emitted. Consequently, the frisker on duty frisked and
searched the appellant. The frisker felt something bulging at appellant's abdominal
area so she was brought to a comfort room for a thorough physical examination. It
was discovered that the appellant was carrying packages containing shabu. After
due proceedings, the trial court found her guilty as charged.
W/N the warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs, as well
as the arrest of Susan were violative of her constitutional rights - NO
In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security
procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 reading as
follows:
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier
concerned shall contain among others the following condition printed
thereon: "Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to
search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder
refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft," which
shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and the air
carrier.
This constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless searches
and seizures. As admitted by SUSAN and shown in Annex "D" of her Brief, the afore-
quoted provision is stated in the "Notice to All Passengers" located at the final
security checkpoint at the departure lounge. From the said provision, it is clear that
the search, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to weapons. Passengers are
also subject to search for prohibited materials or substances.
In this case, after the metal detector alarmed SUSAN consented to be frisked, which
resulted in the discovery of packages on her body. It was too late in the day for her
to refuse to be further searched because the discovery of the packages whose
contents felt like rice granules, coupled by her apprehensiveness and her obviously
false statement that the packages contained only money, aroused the suspicion of
the frisker that SUSAN was hiding something illegal. It must be repeated that R.A.
No. 6235 authorizes search for prohibited materials or substances. To limit the action
of the airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft and
sending her home (as suggested by appellant), and thereby depriving them of "the
ability and facility to act accordingly, including to further search without warrant, in
light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectivity in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society." Thus, the strip search in the ladies' room
was justified under the circumstances.
Facts:
● Appellant Susan Canton (hereafter SUSAN) was charged before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City with the violation of Section 16 of Article III of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended.
● ·On 12 February 1998, SUSAN was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA), being a departing passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam. When she
passed through the metal detector booth, a beeping sound was emitted.
Consequently, Mylene Cabunoc, the frisker on duty at that time, called her
attention, saying "Excuse me ma'am, can I search you?".
● Upon frisking SUSAN, Mylene felt something bulging at her abdominal area.
Mylene inserted her hand under the skirt of SUSAN, pinched the package
several times and noticed that the package contained what felt like rice
granules.
● When Mylene passed her hand, she felt similar packages in front of SUSAN's
genital area and thighs. She asked SUSAN to bring out the packages, but the
latter refused and said: "Money, money only." Mylene forthwith reported the
matter to SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes, her supervisor on duty.
● SPO4 De los Reyes instructed Mylene to call Customs Examiner Lorna Jalac
and bring SUSAN to a comfort room for a thorough physical examination.
Upon further frisking in the ladies' room, Mylene touched something in front of
SUSAN's sex organ. She directed SUSAN to remove her skirt, girdles and
panty. SUSAN obliged.
● Mylene and Lorna discovered three packages individually wrapped and
sealed in gray colored packing tape, which SUSAN voluntarily handed to
them.
● Mylene turned over the packages to SPO4 De los Reyes. The latter forthwith
informed his superior officer Police Superintendent Daniel Santos about the
incident. Together with SUSAN, they brought the gray plastic packs to the
customs examination table, opened the same and found that they contained
white crystalline substances which, when submitted for laboratory
examination, yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a regulated drug
● After consideration of the evidence presented, the trial court rendered a
decision finding SUSAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
violation of Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
Issue/s:
W/N the warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs, as well as
the arrest of Susan were violative of her constitutional rights - NO
Ratio:
The Court does not agree that the warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the
regulated drugs, as well as the arrest of SUSAN, were violative of her constitutional
rights
.
I. The search conducted on SUSAN was not incidental to a lawful arrest.
● We do not agree with the trial court and the OSG that the search and seizure
conducted in this case were incidental to a lawful arrest. SUSAN's arrest did
 not precede the search. When the metal detector alarmed while SUSAN was
passing through it, the lady frisker on duty forthwith made a pat down search
on the former. In the process, the latter felt a bulge on SUSAN's abdomen.
The strip search that followed was for the purpose of ascertaining what were
the packages concealed on SUSAN's body. If ever at the time SUSAN was
deprived of her will and liberty, such restraint did not amount to an arrest.
● As pointed out by the appellant, prior to the strip search in the ladies' room,
the airport security personnel had no knowledge yet of what were hidden on
SUSAN's body; hence, they did not know yet whether a crime was being
committed. It was only after the strip search upon the discovery by the police
officers of the white crystalline substances inside the packages, which they
believed to be shabu, that SUSAN was arrested. The search cannot,
therefore, be said to have been done incidental to a lawful arrest. In a search
incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest
before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed.
II. The scope of a search pursuant to airport security procedure is not confined
only to search for weapons under the "Terry search" doctrine.
● The Terry search or the "stop and frisk" situation refers to a case where a
police officer approaches a person who is acting suspiciously, for purposes of
investigating possibly criminal behavior in line with the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection. To assure himself that the person
with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly
and fatally be used against him, he could validly conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such person to discover weapons which might
be used to assault him.
● In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security
procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 reading
as follows:
○ SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier
concerned shall contain among others the following condition printed
thereon: "Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject
to search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances.
Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the
aircraft," which shall constitute a part of the contract between the
passenger and the air carrier.
● This constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures. As admitted by SUSAN and shown in Annex "D" of
her Brief, the afore-quoted provision is stated in the "Notice to All Passengers"
located at the final security checkpoint at the departure lounge. From the said
provision, it is clear that the search, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to
weapons. Passengers are also subject to search for prohibited materials or
substances.
● In this case, after the metal detector alarmed SUSAN consented to be frisked,
which resulted in the discovery of packages on her body. It was too late in the
day for her to refuse to be further searched because the discovery of the
packages whose contents felt like rice granules, coupled by her
apprehensiveness and her obviously false statement that the packages
contained only money, aroused the suspicion of the frisker that SUSAN was
hiding something illegal. It must be repeated that R.A. No. 6235 authorizes
search for prohibited materials or substances. To limit the action of the airport
security personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft and sending
her home (as suggested by appellant), and thereby depriving them of "the
ability and facility to act accordingly, including to further search without
warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and
ineffectivity in law enforcement, to the detriment of society." Thus, the strip
search in the ladies' room was justified under the circumstances.
III. The ruling in People v. Johnson is applicable to the instant case.
● The Court in People v. Johnson, held that:
○ Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner
reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased
security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an
aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on
baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray
scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious
objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the
objects are. There is little question that such searches are
reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the
safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations
associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified
through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their
airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited
materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure.
These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures
do not apply to routine airport procedures.
IV. The appellant, having been caught flagrante delicto, was lawfully arrested
without a warrant.
● Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
○ SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
[a] When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
[b] When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
[c] When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
 ● In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
● The present case falls under paragraph (a) of the afore-quoted Section. The
search conducted on SUSAN resulted in the discovery and recovery of three
packages containing white crystalline substances, which upon examination
yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. As
discussed earlier, such warrantless search and seizure were legal. Armed with
the knowledge that SUSAN was committing a crime, the airport security
personnel and police authorities were duty-bound to arrest her. As held in
People v. Johnson, her subsequent arrest without a warrant was justified,
since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person
flagrante delicto.

Dispositive:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch 110, in Criminal Case No. 98-0189 finding appellant SUSAN CANTON
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 16, Article III of the
Dangerous Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, and sentencing her to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000) and the costs is hereby AFFIRMED. The appellant's passport, plane
tickets, and girdles are hereby ordered to be returned to her. DaESIC
 V. Arrest - Rules 113 and 112, Secs. 5, 6, 7 and 9(b)
VI. 526. Sanchez v. Demetriou, GR Nos. 111771-77, 9 November 1993
G.R. No. 111771-77 | November 9, 1993 | J Cruz | Arrest
Digest by: REYES
Petitioners: ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ
Respondents: The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU (in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, NCR, Branch 70, Pasig), The Honorable
FRANKLIN DRILON (in his capacity as Secretary of Justice), JOVENCITO R.
ZUÑO, LEONARDO C. GUIYAB, JR., CARLOS L. DE LEON, RAMONCITO C.
MISON, REYNALDO J. LUGTU and RODRIGO P. LORENZO, (the last six
respondents in their official capacities as members of the State Prosecutor's Office)
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
On August 13, 1993, Sanchez was taken to Camp Vicente Lim by virtue of an
invitation issued by PNP Commander Piad. There, he was placed on “arrest status”
based on the positive identification of Centeno and Malabanan implication him as
the principal for the rape-slay of Sarmenta.
An inquest was made and a warrant (August 13 warrant) was issued for violation of
RA 6713. While he was detained, informations for the rape-slay case was filed, and
another set warrants were duly issued (August 26 warrant).
Sanchez moved to quash the information on the ground that his arrest on August
13, 1993 was illegal.
In determining the legality of arrest, the Court answered whether or not the invitation
amounted to an arrest. The Court held that YES, an invitation for questioning, when
made by a high ranking military official and conducted in a military camp may be
considered as an arrest.
This kind of arrest is not valid warrantless arrest as it was not made in flagrante
delicto or hot pursuit. The crime happened 48 days prior to the arrest, and the
arresting officers had no personal knowledge of the fact that the rape-slay was
perpetrated by Sanchez. In arresting him, they merely relied on the identification of
Centeno and Malabanan.
Nevertheless, while the original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless
illegal, the Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on August 26, 1993
against him and the other accused in connection with the rape-slay cases.
In summary, on August 13, the petitioner was unlawfully arrested for the rape-slay
case. However, the warrant in relation to the violation of R.A. 6713 (August 13
warrant). This August 13 warrant served as initial justification of his detention,
pending the issuance of the August 26 warrant. By analogy to Rule 102 (Habeas
Corpus), the subsequent issuance of the August 26 warrant cured the defect of the
initial valid warrantless arrest.
Facts:
● Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriate
charges against several persons, including the petitioner, in connection with
the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez. Based
on this request, a preliminary investigation was conducted by DOJ.
● While the preliminary investigation is pending, PNP Commander Rex Piad
issued an “invitation” to Sanchez requesting him to appear for investigation at
Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang. On August 13, 1993, he was immediately
taken to the camp upon the service of the invitation to him.
● In the camp, he was Sanchez was positively identified by Aurelio Centeno and
SPO III Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed extrajudicial confessions
implicating him as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of
Gomez. Consequently, he was placed on “arrest status” and taken to DOJ in
Manila.
● At the DOJ, an inquest was conducted, and a warrant was issued in
connection with criminal cases for violation of R.A. No. 6173. He was then
detained a Camp Crame.
● During his detention, on August 16, 1993, prosecutors filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, seven informations charging Sanchez with
rape and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. A warrant of arrest was
subsequently issued on August 26, 1993.
● Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the following grounds.
○ He was denied the right to present evidence at the preliminary
investigation;
○ Only the Ombudsman had the competence to conduct the
investigation;
○ His warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has therefore not
acquired jurisdiction over him;
○ He is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of
only two persons;
○ The informations are discriminatory because they do not include
Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia; and
○ As a public officer, he can be tried for the offense only by the
Sandiganbayan.
● Note: There are two warrants in this case – first the warrant in connection to
the RA 6173 issued after the inquest proceedings (August 13 warrant).
Second, the warrant in relation to rape and killing of Sarmenta (August 26
warrant)
Issue/s:
In relation to the third ground, whether or not his arrest (August 13) is illegal.
INITIALLY YES, BUT WAS CURED UPON SUBSEQUENT ISSUANCE OF A
WARRANT.
Ratio:
● "Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the
taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense. Under Section 2 of the same Rule, an arrest is
effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his voluntary
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.
○ Under this definition, physical restraint or a formal declaration of
arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part
 of one of the parties to arrest the other and an intent on the part of ● The rule is that if the accused objects to the jurisdiction of the court over his
the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission person, he may move to quash the information, but only on that ground.
is necessary. ○ If, as in this case, the accused raises other grounds in the motion to
● While petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim by virtue of an invitation, it quash, he is deemed to have waived that objection and to have
can be considered as a command or an order of arrest. submitted his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
● In Babst v National Intelligence Board, it was declared that (1) where he
invitation comes from a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking Dispositive:
military officers … and (2) the designated interrogation site is a military camp, WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The respondent judge is DIRECTED to
the same can easily be taken, not as a strictly voluntary invitation which continue with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 101141, 101142, 101143, 101144,
it purports to be, but as an authoritative command which one can only 101145, 101146 and 101147 and to decide them with deliberate dispatch.
defy at his peril.
● In this case, he invitation came from a high-ranking military official and the
investigation of Sanchez was to be made at a military camp. Although in the
guise of a request, it was obviously a command or an order of arrest that the
petitioner could hardly be expected to defy. In fact, apparently cowed by the
"invitation," he went without protest (and in informal clothes and slippers only)
with the officers who had come to fetch him.
● It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente Lim, the petitioner was placed
on "arrest status" after he was pointed to by Centeno and Malabanan as the
person who first raped Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Respondent himself
acknowledged during the August 13, 1993 hearing that, on the basis of the
sworn statements of the two state witnesses, the petitioner had been
"arrested.".
● This arrest is not valid warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court.
○ There is no in flagrante delicto arrest. the arresting officers were
not present when the petitioner allegedly participated in the killing of
Allan Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Neither did
they have any personal knowledge that the petitioner was
responsible therefor because the basis of the arrest was the sworn
statements of Centeno and Malabanan.
○ There is also no hot pursuit. The crime took place forty-six days
before the date of the arrest, it cannot be said that the offense had
"in fact just been committed" when the petitioner was arrested.
● The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal.
Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on
August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in connection with
the rape-slay cases.
● On August 13, the petitioner was unlawfully arrested for the rape-slay case.
However, the warrant in relation to the violation of R.A. 6713 (August 13
warrant). This August 13 warrant served as initial justification of his detention,
pending the issuance of the August 26 warrant.
● Applicable by analogy is the rule on habeas corpus that the issuance of the
corresponding warrant of arrest, against a person invalidly detained will cure
the defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to be released
because of such defect. The same doctrine has been consistently followed by
the Court for arrests, more recently in the Umil case.

● Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued, the trial court still
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
 1. Procedure for issuance of a warrant of arrest
527. Allado v. Diokno, GR No. 113640, 5 May 1994
G.R. No. 113630 | 5 May 1994 | Bellosillo | Procedure for issuance of a warrant of
arrest
Digest by:Kim
Petitioners: Diosado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza
Respondents: Hon. Roberto C. Diokno, Presiding Judge, Br. 62, Regional Trial
Court, Makati, Metro Manila, and Presidential Anti-Crime Commission
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, alumni of the College of
Law, University of the Philippines, are partners of the Law Firm of Salonga,
Hernandez and Allado. In the practice of their profession, and on the basis of an
alleged extrajudicial confession of a security guard, Umbal, they have been accused
of the heinous crime of kidnapping with murder (alleged victim: Van Twest) by the
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) and ordered arrested without bail by
respondent judge. The issue is W/N the issuance of the warrant of arrest was
proper? SC ruled that it was not proper.
There was not enough evidence to support the warrant of arrest
a warrant of arrest shall issue only upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce. Probable cause for an arrest or for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested.
Reasons why the evidence does not support the issuance of a warrant of arrest: (1)
Van Twest’s Death is Questionable, (2) Even Van Twest’s counsel doubted his
death, (3) The extrajudicial statement of Umbal sufferers from material
inconsistencies, and (4) Umbal’s extrajudicial confession is dated after the issuance
of the search warrant for the dwellings of Santiago.
The judge is guilty of grave abuse of discretion for not examining the evidence as
required
Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant for the
arrest of petitioners it appearing that he did not personally examine the evidence nor
did he call for the complainant and his witnesses in the face of their incredible
accounts. Instead, he merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors that
probable cause existed.
Soliven v. Makasiar: the judge (a) shall personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable
cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or, (b) if on the basis
1 Umbal claimed that he and his companions were met by petitioners at Silahis Hotel and in
exchange for P2.5M the former undertook to apprehend Van Twest who allegedly had an
international warrant of arrest against him. Thus, on 16 June 1992, after placing him under
surveillance for nearly a month, Umbal, Ex-policeman Rolando Gamatero, AFPCIG Agent Roberto
Santiago and SPO2 Sergio Antonino abducted Van Twest. They blocked his blue Nissan
Pathfinder under the Alabang overpass and forced him into their car. They brought him to a "safe
house" just behind the New Bilibid Prisons. Umbal was tasked to watch over their quarry. After
four (4) days, Gamatero, Santiago and Antonino returned to the "safe house" together with
thereof he finds no probable cause, may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
on the existence of probable cause.
Facts:
● The focal source of the information against petitioners is the sworn statement
dated 16 September 1993 of Security Guard Escolastico Umbal, a dischargee
of the Philippine Constabulary, implicating them as the brains behind the
alleged kidnapping and slaying of one Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a German
national. A search warrant was issued for two dwellings of Santiago (madami
nangyaring procedural in between but i didnt include it anymore cause di
naman siya issue, if you want to know what Umbral said in his extrajudicial
confession tho check the footnote)1
● petitioners heard over the radio that the panel had issued a resolution finding
a prima facie case against them and that an information had already been filed
in court. Upon verification with the Department of Justice, however, petitioners
were informed that the resolution was not yet ready for release, but later that
afternoon they were able to secure a copy of the information for kidnapping
with murder against them and the 15-page undated resolution under the
letterhead of PACC, signed by the panel of prosecutors, with the Head of the
PACC Task Force recommending approval thereof. That same day, the
information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati and raffled off
to Branch 62 presided by respondent Judge Roberto C. Diokno.
● respondent judge, in response to petitioner's request, time to submit their
opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest against all the accused.
petitioners complied. petitioner Allado filed an appeal with the Secretary of
Justice seeking review and reversal of the undated resolution on the panel of
prosecutors, which was adopted by Mendoza. petitioner Allado moved to defer
the proceedings before the trial court pending resolution of his appeal before
the Secretary of Justice. However, respondent judge issued the assailed
warrant of arrest against petitioners. Hence, petitioners filed with us the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining
order. prL
Issue/s:
● W/N the issuance of the warrant of arrest was proper? – NO
Ratio:
There was not enough evidence to support the warrant of arrest
● Section 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, lays down the requirements for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, i.e., a warrant of arrest shall issue only upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce
petitioners and SPO2 Roger Bato, known to Umbal also as "Batok." SPO2 Bato faked the
interrogation of Van Twest, pretending it was official, and then made him sign certain documents.
The following day, Gamatero shot Van Twest in the chest with a baby armalite, after which Antonio
stabbed him repeatedly, cut off his private part, and later burned his cadaver into fine ashes using
gasoline and rubber tires. Umbal could not recall the exact date when the incident happened, but
he was certain it was about a year ago .
● Probable cause for an arrest or for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested. And as a protection
against false prosecution and arrest, it is the knowledge of facts, actual or
apparent, strong enough to justify a reasonable man in the belief that he has
lawful grounds for arresting the accused.
● Standard for determining probable cause:
Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or
may be, well founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as
would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain
an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean
"actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely
based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause
does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely,
there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support
of the charge.
Whether an act was done causing undue injury to the government and
whether the same was done with manifest partiality or evident bad faith can
only be made out by proper and sufficient testimony. Necessarily, a
conclusion can be arrived at when the case has already proceeded on
sufficient proof.
● Reasons why the evidence does not support the issuance of a warrant of
arrest: (read the headers if you are in a hurry)
1. Van Twest’s Death is Questionable
The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission relies heavily on the sworn
statement of Security Guard Umbal who supposedly confessed his
participation in the alleged kidnapping and murder of Van Twest. For one,
there is serious doubt on Van Twest's reported death since the corpus delicti
has not been established, nor have his remains been recovered. Umbal
claims that Van Twest was completely burned into ashes with the use of
gasoline and rubber tires from around ten o'clock in the evening to six o'clock
the next morning. 29 This is highly improbable, if not ridiculous. A human body
cannot be pulverized into ashes by simply burning it with the use of gasoline
and rubber tires in an open field. Even crematoria use entirely closed
incinerators where the corpse is subjected to intense heat. 30 Thereafter, the
remains undergo a process where the bones are completely ground to dust.
In the case of Van Twest, there is not even any insinuation that earnest efforts
were exerted to recover traces of his remains from the scene of the alleged
cremation.
2. Even Van Twest’s counsel doubted his death
Strangely, if not awkwardly, after Van Twest's reported abduction on 16 June
1992 which culminated in his decimation by cremation, his counsel continued
to represent him before judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. Even Asst.
Solicitor General Estoesta believes that counsel of Van Twest doubted the
later's death. Obviously, counsel himself does not believe that his client is in
fact already dead otherwise his obligation to his client would have ceased
except to comply with his duty "to inform the court promptly of such death . .
. and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian
or other legal representative," which he did not.
3. The extrajudicial statement of Umbal sufferers from material
inconsistencies
In his sworn statement, he said that he together with his cohorts was met by
petitioners in Silahis Hotel where they hatched the plan to abduct Van Twest.
However, during the preliminary investigation, he stated that he was not part
of the actual meeting as he only waited outside in the car for his companions
who supposedly discussed the plan inside Silahis Hotel. Umbal also said that
petitioners arrived with Bato and conducted a mock interrogation of Van
Twest who thereafter signed various documents upon being compelled to do
so. During the clarificatory questioning, however, Umbal changed his story
and said that he was asked to go outside of the "safe house" at the time Van
Twest was interrogated and thus did not see if Van Twest indeed signed
certain documents.
4. Umbal’s extrajudicial confession is dated after the issuance of
the search warrant for the dwellings of Santiago
Most perplexing however is that while the whole investigation was supposedly
triggered off by Umbal's confession of 16 September 1993, the application of
the PACC operatives for a search warrant to be served in the two (2) dwellings
of Santiago was filed and granted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila on 15
September 1993, a day before Umbal executed his sworn statement. In
support of the application, the PACC agents claimed that Umbal had been in
their custody since 10 September 1993. Significantly, although he was said
to be already under their custody, Umbal claims he was never interrogated
until 16 September 1993 and only at the security barracks of Valle Verde V,
Pasig, where he was a security guard.
The judge is guilty of grave abuse of discretion for not examining the evidence as
required
● Verily, respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
warrant for the arrest of petitioners it appearing that he did not personally
examine the evidence nor did he call for the complainant and his witnesses in
the face of their incredible accounts. Instead, he merely relied on the
certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed.
● Soliven v. Makasiar we said that the judge (a) shall personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or, (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, may disregard
the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion on the existence of probable
cause.
● People v. Inting - important features of the constitutional mandate
(a) The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge; it is
not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain
(b) The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the
judge. It merely assists him in making the determination of probable
cause. By itself, the prosecutor's certification of probable cause is
ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcript of
stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents
behind the prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting
the judge in his determination of probable cause
(c) Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary
inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which
ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released.
● Lim v. Felix - [T]he Judge does not have to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same
functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there
 should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare
certification. All these should be before the Judge.
● In the case at bench, the undue haste in the filing of the information and the
inordinate interest of the government cannot be ignored. From the gathering
of evidence until the termination of the preliminary investigation, it appears
that the state prosecutors were overly eager to file the case and secure a
warrant for the arrest of the accused without bail and their consequent
detention. Umbal's sworn statement is laden with inconsistencies and
improbabilities. Bato's counter-affidavit was considered without giving
petitioners the opportunity to refute the same. The PACC which gathered the
evidence appears to have had a hand in the determination of probable cause
in the preliminary inquiry as the undated resolution of the panel not only bears
the letterhead of PACC but was also recommended for approval by the head
of the PACC Task Force. Then petitioners were given the runaround in
securing a copy of the resolution and the information against them.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The temporary
restraining order we issued on 28 February 1994 in favor of petitioners, Atty. Diosdado
Jose Allado and Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza, is made permanent. The warrant of arrest
issued against them is SET ASIDE and respondent Judge Roberto C. Diokno is
ENJOINED from proceeding any further against herein petitioners in Crim. Case No.
94-1757 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati. SO ORDERED.
 528. Pangamdaman v. Casar
GR No. 71782 | 14 April 1988 | NARVASA, J. | Procedure for issuance of a warrant of
arrest
Digest by: Rioflorido
Petitioners: HADJI IBRAHIM SOLAY PANGANDAMAN, MAGAMBAAN
PANGANDAMAN, MACARIAN PANGANDAMAN, MAMINTAL PANGANDAMAN,
PACALUNDO PANGANDAMAN, MANGORAMAS PANGANDAMAN, MACADAOB
P. PANGORANGAN KILATUN PANGANDAMAN, MARIO PANGANDAMAN,
MACABIDAR PANGANDAMAN, PUYAT P. ROMAMPAT, SANTORANI P.
DIMAPENGEN, NASSER P. DIMAPENGEN and DIAMA OPAO
Respondents: DIMAPORO T. CASAR, AS MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL JUDGE
OF POONABAYABAO, TAMPARAN AND MASIU, LANAO DEL SUR and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
A shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur, which left at least five
persons dead and two others wounded. What in fact transpired is still unclear.
Atty. Mangurun Batuampar, claiming to represent the widow of one of the victims,
filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal at Marawi City, asking for a
“full blast preliminary investigation” of the incident.
A criminal complaint for multiple murder was thereafter filed before the provincial by
P.C. Sgt. Jose L. Laru-an. On that same day, the respondent Judge examined
personally all three witnesses brought by the sergeant under oath thru his closed
and direct supervision, reducing to writing the questions to the witnesses and the
latter’s answers. Thereafter the Judge approved the complaint and issued the
corresponding warrant of arrest against the 14 petitioners (who were named
by the witnesses) and 50 “John Does.” Petitioners filed an MR, but said MR was
denied.
Contentions before the SC: the Judge in the case at bar failed to conduct the
investigation in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 3, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court.
W/N the respondent Judge had the power to issue the warrant of arrest without
completing the entire prescribed procedure for preliminary investigation – YES
Stated otherwise: W/N completion of the procedure laid down in Section 3 of Rule
112 is a condition sine qua non for the issuance of a warrant of arrest – NO
In conducting a preliminary investigation of any crime cognizable by the RTCs, a
judge of an inferior must observe the procedure prescribed in Section 3 of Rule 112,
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The procedure mandated by the Rule actually
consists of two phases or stages.
● The first phase consists of an ex-parte inquiry into the sufficiency of the
complaint and the affidavits and other documents offered in support
thereof.
● This second phase is designed to give the respondent notice of the
complaint, access to the complainant’s evidence and an opportunity
to submit counter-affidavits and supporting documents.
The procedure above described must be followed before the complaint or
information is filed in the Regional Trial Court. Failure to do so will result in a
denial of due process.
Here, no information is filed in the Regional Trial Court. There is no pretense
that the preliminary investigation has been completed, insofar as the respondent
Judge is concerned, and that he does not intend to undertake the second phase. In
this situation, it cannot be said that he has failed to observe the prescribed
procedure. What has happened is that after receiving the complaint and examining
the complainant’s witnesses, the respondent Judge issued the warrant now
complained of against the 14 petitioners, as well as against 50 “John Does.”
There is no requirement that the entire procedure for preliminary investigation
must be completed before a warrant of arrest may be issued. What the Rule
provides is that no complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court may be filed without completing the procedure. But nowhere is
it provided that the procedure must be completed before a warrant of arrest
may issue.
Indeed, it is the contrary that is true. The present Section 6 of the same Rule 112
clearly authorizes the municipal trial court to order the respondent’s arrest
even before opening the second phase of the investigation if said court is
satisfied that a probable cause exists and there is a necessity to place the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
The argument, therefore, must be rejected that the respondent Judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest against petitioners without
first completing the preliminary investigation in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. The rule is and has always been that such issuance need only await
a finding of probable cause, not the completion of the entire procedure of
preliminary investigation.
Other issues:
● There is a presumption of regularity as to the issuance of the warrant,
absent any contrary proof
● As to the 50 “John Does” however, the warrant issued against them is a
general warrant, which is void for being unconstitutional. Warrants of arrest
should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized.
Facts:
● The petitioners ask this Court:
○ to annul the warrant for their arrest issued by respondent Judge
Casar of the Municipal Circuit Court of Masiu, Lanao del Sur, in
criminal case “People vs. Hadji Ibrahim Solay Pangandaman, et al.”
○ to prohibit the Judge from taking further cognizance of said Criminal
○ to compel the Judge to forward the entire record of Criminal Case to
the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur for proper disposition
● Their plea is essentially grounded on the claim that the warrant for their arrest
was issued by the respondent Judge without a proper preliminary
investigation. The Solicitor General agrees and recommends that their
petition be granted and the warrant of arrest voided.
Antecedent Facts:
● A shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur, which left at
least five persons dead and two others wounded. What in fact transpired is
still unclear.
○ According to one version, armed men had attacked a residence in
Pantao, Masiu, with both attackers and defenders suffering
casualties. Another version has it that a group that was on its way to
another place, Lalabuan, also in Masiu, had been ambushed.
Preliminary Investigation Stage:
● On the following day, Atty. Mangurun Batuampar, claiming to represent the
widow of one of the victims, filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial
Fiscal at Marawi City, asking for a “full blast preliminary investigation” of the
incident.
○ The letter adverted to the possibility of innocent persons being
implicated by the parties involved on both sides — none of whom
was, however, identified — and promised that supporting affidavits
would shortly be filed.
● Immediately the Provincial Fiscal addressed a “1st indorsement” to the
respondent Judge, transmitting Atty. Batuampar’s letter and requesting that
all cases that may be filed relative to the incident be forwarded to his office,
which “has first taken cognizance of said cases.”
● August 10, 1985: A criminal complaint for multiple murder was filed before him
by P.C. Sgt. Jose L. Laru-an.
○ On that same day, the respondent Judge examined personally
all three witnesses brought by the sergeant under oath thru his
closed and direct supervision, reducing to writing the questions
to the witnesses and the latter’s answers.
○ Thereafter the Judge approved the complaint and issued the
corresponding warrant of arrest against the 14 petitioners (who
were named by the witnesses) and 50 “John Does.”
● An “ex-parte” motion for reconsideration was filed by Atty. Batuampar (joined
by Atty. Pama L. Muti), seeking recall of the warrant of arrest and
subsequent holding of a “thorough investigation.”
○ Ground: Judge’s initial investigation had been “hasty and
manifestly haphazard” with “no searching questions” having
been propounded.
○ The respondent Judge denied the motion for “lack of basis;”
hence the present petition.
Contentions before the SC:
● While they concede the authority of the respondent Judge to conduct a
preliminary investigation of the offenses involved, which are cognizable by
RTCs, the petitioners and the Solicitor General argue that the Judge in the
case at bar failed to conduct the investigation in accordance with the
procedure prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
○ That failure constituted a denial to petitioners of due process which
nullified the proceedings leading to the issuance of the warrant for
the petitioners’ arrest.
● It is further contended that August 10, 1985 was a Saturday during which
Municipal Trial Courts are open from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. only.
○ It would hardly have been possible for respondent Judge to
determine the existence of probable cause against 64 persons
whose participations were of varying nature and degree in a matter
of hours and issue the warrant of arrest in the same day.
○ There was undue haste and an omission to ask searching
questions by the Judge who relied “mainly on the supporting
affidavits which were obviously prepared already when
presented to him by an enlisted PC personnel as investigator.”
● The petitioners further assert that the respondent Judge conducted the
preliminary investigation of the charges in total disregard of the Provincial
Fiscal who, as said respondent well knew, had already taken cognizance of
the matter 12 days earlier and was poised to conduct his own investigation of
the same.
● Issuance of a warrant of arrest 50 “John Does” transgressed the Constitutional
provision requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the persons
or things to be seized.
Issue/s:
● W/N the respondent Judge had the power to issue the warrant of arrest without
completing the entire prescribed procedure for preliminary investigation – YES
● Stated otherwise: W/N completion of the procedure laid down in Section 3 of
Rule 112 is a condition sine qua non for the issuance of a warrant of arrest –
NO
Ratio:
Re: Power to issue warrant
● In conducting a preliminary investigation of any crime cognizable by the RTCs,
a judge of an inferior court (other than in Metro-Manila or the chartered cities,
where no authority to conduct preliminary investigation is vested in such
officials) must observe the procedure prescribed in Section 3 of Rule 112,
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
● Although not specifically so declared, the procedure mandated by the Rule
actually consists of two phases or stages.
○ The first phase consists of an ex-parte inquiry into the sufficiency
of the complaint and the affidavits and other documents offered
in support thereof.
▪ And it ends with the determination by the Judge either:
● (1) that there is no ground to continue with the
inquiry, in which case he dismisses the complaint
and transmits the order of dismissal, together with
the records of the case, to the provincial fiscal; or
● (2) that the complaint and the supporting
documents show sufficient cause to continue with
the inquiry and this ushers in the second phase.
○ This second phase is designed to give the respondent notice of
the complaint, access to the complainant’s evidence and an
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and supporting
documents.
▪ At this stage also, the Judge may conduct a hearing and
propound to the parties and their witnesses questions on
matters that, in his view, need to be clarified.
 ▪ The second phase concludes with the Judge rendering his
resolution, either for dismissal of the complaint or holding
the respondent for trial, which shall be transmitted, together
with the record, to the provincial fiscal for appropriate
action.
● The procedure above described must be followed before the complaint or
information is filed in the Regional Trial Court. Failure to do so will result
in a denial of due process.
● Here, no information is filed in the Regional Trial Court. There is no
pretense that the preliminary investigation has been completed, insofar
as the respondent Judge is concerned, and that he does not intend to
undertake the second phase.
● In this situation, it cannot be said that he has failed to observe the prescribed
procedure.
○ What has happened is simply that after receiving the complaint and
examining the complainant’s witnesses, and having come to believe,
on the basis thereof, that the offenses charged had been committed,
the respondent Judge issued the warrant now complained of against
the 14 respondents (now petitioners) named and identified by the
witnesses as the perpetrators of the killings and injuries, as well as
against 50 “John Does.”
● There is no requirement that the entire procedure for preliminary
investigation must be completed before a warrant of arrest may be
issued.
○ What the Rule provides is that no complaint or information for an
offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court may be filed without
completing the procedure.
○ But nowhere is it provided that the procedure must be
completed before a warrant of arrest may issue.
● Indeed, it is the contrary that is true. The present Section 6 of the same Rule
112 clearly authorizes the municipal trial court to order the respondent’s
arrest even before opening the second phase of the investigation if said
court is satisfied that a probable cause exists and there is a necessity to place
the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice.
○ “SECTION 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. —
○ (b) By the Municipal Trial Court. — If the municipal trial judge
conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an
examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, that a
probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of arrest.”
● This was equally true under the former rules, where the first phase of the
investigation was expressly denominated “preliminary examination” to
distinguish it from the second phase, or preliminary investigation proper. Thus,
the former Section 6 of Rule 112 provided:
○ “SECTION 6. Warrant of arrest, when issued. — If the judge be
satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by
the investigating officer that the offense complained of has been
committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the
accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his
arrest.”
● Mayuga vs. Maravilla: SC affirms the power of a justice of the peace or
municipal judge conducting a preliminary investigation to order the arrest of
the accused after the first stage (preliminary examination)
○ The investigating judge has the authority to order such arrest. Only
requirement prescribed is that before he may do so, he must examine
the witnesses to the complaint, the examination to be under oath and
reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers.
○ The “searching questions and answers” requirement is incorporated
in the present Section 6 of Rule 112 already quoted.
● The argument, therefore, must be rejected that the respondent Judge acted
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest against
petitioners without first completing the preliminary investigation in accordance
with the prescribed procedure. The rule is and has always been that such
issuance need only await a finding of probable cause, not the completion
of the entire procedure of preliminary investigation.
Re: Presumption of regularity of the warrant
● Contention: that there was scarcely time to determine probable cause against
64 persons (the 14 petitioners and fifty “Does”) within a matter of hours on a
Saturday when municipal trial courts are open only from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m
– this contention has no merit
○ Nothing in the record before this Court belies or discredits those
affirmations which have, besides, the benefit of the legal presumption
that official duty has been regularly performed.
○ There is really nothing unusual in completing within a three-hour
period the questioning of three witnesses in a preliminary
examination to determine the existence of probable cause.
● The record which, lacking proof to the contrary, must be accepted as an
accurate chronicle of the questioned proceedings, shows prima facie that the
respondent Judge had personally examined the witnesses to the complaint,
and a consideration of the latter’s sworn answers to his questions satisfies this
Court that the finding of probable cause against the petitioners was neither
arbitrary nor unfounded.
● The three witnesses to the complaint gave mutually corroborative accounts of
the incident.
○ All of them identified by name each of the fourteen petitioners as
members of the ambush group.
○ The respondent Judge can hardly be faulted for finding enough
cause to hold the petitioners named in the statements of three
eyewitnesses to killings perpetrated in broad daylight.
● Luna vs. Plaza: SC provided for the definition of “searching questions and
answers”
○ “whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that an offense has
been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof so that a
warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial”
○ What would be searching questions would depend on what is sought
to be inquired into, such as: the nature of the offense, the date, time,
and place of its commission, the possible motives for its commission;
the subject, his age, education, status, financial and social
circumstances, his attitude toward the investigation, social attitudes,
 opportunities to commit the offense; the victim, his age, status, family
responsibilities, financial and social circumstances, characteristics,
etc.
○ The questions, therefore must to a great degree depend upon the
Judge making the investigation
● Upon this authority, and considering what has already been stated above, this
Court is not prepared to question the propriety of the respondent Judge’s
finding of probable cause or substitute its judgment for his in the matter of
what questions to put to the witnesses during the preliminary examination.

Re: Warrant issued to 50 “John Does”

● Insofar, however, as said warrant is issued against 50 “John Does” not one of
whom the witnesses to the complaint could or would identify, it is of the nature
of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional
and once anathematized as “totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.”
● Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should
particularly describe the person or persons to be seized, the warrant must, as
regards its unidentified subjects, be voided.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid insofar as it
orders the arrest of the petitioners. Said warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued
against fifty (50) “John Does.” The respondent Judge is directed to forward to the
Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record of the preliminary investigation of the
complaint in Criminal Case No. 1728 of his court for further appropriate action. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
 529. Gutierrez v. Hernandez
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1628, | 8 June 2007 | Garcia, J. | Procedure for Issuance of a
Warrant of Arrest
Digest by: Aly Uy
Petitioners:P/SUPT. Alejandro Gutierrez, PCI Antonio Ricafort, SPO4 Ricardo G.
Ong, and SPO1 Arnulfo Medenilla
Respondents: Judge Godofredo G. Hernandez, Sr.
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine:
Agents from the PNP with the crew of ABS-CBN’s “Private Eye” led by Gus Abelgas
acted on a complaint which led to a rescue operation of 5 girls from a KTV Bar in
Mindoro. Criminal charges were thereafter filed. Several weeks after, complainants
(members of the rescue team + TV crew) learned that 4 out of the 5 girls rescued
withdrew their complaints against PO2 Ringor, et.al. and instead filed charges
against them before respondent Judge Godofredo Hernandez. It was later
discovered that warrants of arrest were issued against them by the respondent judge
just 1 day after the charges were filed. Petitioners filed an admin case against
Hernandez when he set the arraignment for the cases even without information
being filed.
Issue: W/N Respondent Judge committed grave ignorance of procedural rules –
YES
Sec. 3 of Rule 112 requires that in a preliminary investigation, after complainant and
his witnesses present their affidavits, respondent shall be subpenad and within 10
days from receipt of subpoena, shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his
witness.
It is apparent that petitioners were never issued subpoenas and were consequently
deprived of their right to file counter- affidavits.
Warrants of arrest were issued without complying with the requisite conditions.
Complaints against herein petitioners were filed on August 23, 2004. Motion for the
issuance of warrant of arrest was filed the next day and respondent Judge
immediately granted such and issued a warrant of arrest that same day.
Indubitably, no preliminary investigation was conducted as no subpoena was issued
to herein complainants
Sec. 6, Par (b) of Rule 112 holds that without waiting for the conclusion of
investigation, judge may issue warrant of arrest if 3 conditions are met.
Rule 112, Sec 6 (b) also permits judges to issue warrants of arrest while
the investigation is underway when 3 conditions concur. The judge must:
1. Have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his
witnesses by searching questions and answers; 2. Be satisfied that
probable cause exists; and 3. That there be a need to place the respondent
under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
Issuance was clearly irregular, it did not show any finding of a need to place
complainant under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
Even if the judge finds probable cause, it is not mandatory that he issue a warrant
of arrest. He must further determine the necessity of placing respondent under
immediate custody.
A worse display of gross ignorance was for holding arraignment knowing fully well
that no preliminary investigation had been conducted and no informations had yet
been filed. It is inexcusable for a Judge of 12 years to make such mistake.
Compassion works in respondents favor, what with the fact that this is his first
administrative case after more than a decade of judicial service, let alone the
circumstance that he has already compulsorily retired. OCAs recommended penalty
of FINE appears in order.
SHORT CASE
Facts:
● A rescue operation was conducted by petitioners following a complain by one
Ernesto Cruz which was brought to their office through Gus Abelgas’ TV
Program, Private Eye. Complaint of Cruz held that his daughter was allegedly
recruited at a KTV Bar.
● The team was able to rescue 5 young girls (which includes Enresto Cruz’
daughter) from the house of one Salvador Napolitano who claimed that a
certain PO23 Jose Ringor was responsible for bringing the women to such
place.
● Complaint for violation of RA 9208 was filed before the City Prosecutor against
PO2 Ringor, his recruiter and wife and a certain Bebang. Corresponding
Information was filed.
● Several weeks later, petitioners were surprised after discovering that cases
for grave coercion and qualified trespass had been filed against them and the
TV Crew before the sala of respondent judge.
● Apparently, some of the rescued girls retracted their complaint and instead
filed a case against herein petitioners.
● Petitioners alleged that PO2 Ringor brought the girls to a beach resort where
he threatened and coerced them into signing complaint against herein
petitioners and that J Hernandez also went to the beach house and conferred
with PO2 Ringor regarding retraction of complaint.
● It is also alleged that after such coercion and conference, SPO2 Ringor and J
Hernandez and others had a drinking spree where J Hernandez was seen
being entertained by two GROs given by one SPO2 Balacana.
● Because of this, petitioners filed Administrative Complaint with Office of Court
Administrator (OCA) alleging as well gros negligence on the part of J
Hernandez for 1) issuing warrant of arrests in inordinate haste and without the
required preliminary examination and personal etermination of probable cause
and for 2) setting for arraignment without Informations having been filed in
court.
● OCA found that respondent judge was guilty of gross ignorance of procedural
rules. But since this is the first complaint and because Hernandez had
compulsorily retired, OCA only recommended that he be fined.
Issue/s:
● W/N Respondent Judge committed grave ignorance of procedural rules
Ratio:
● Sec. 3 of Rule 112 requires that in a preliminary investigation, after
complainant and his witnesses present their affidavits, respondent shall be
subpenad and within 10 days from receipt of subpoena, shall submit his
counter-affidavit and that of his witness.
● It is apparent that petitioners were never issued subpoenas and were
consequently deprived of their right to file counter- affidavits.
● Warrants of arrest were issued without complying with the requisite conditions.
Complaints against herein petitioners were filed on August 23, 2004. Motion
for the issuance of warrant of arrest was filed the next day and respondent
Judge immediately granted such and issued a warrant of arrest that same day.
● Indubitably, no preliminary investigation was conducted as no subpoena was
issued to herein complainants
● Sec. 6, Par (b) of Rule 112 holds that without waiting for the conclusion of
investigation, judge may issue warrant of arrest if 3 conditions are met.
○ Rule 112, Sec 6 (b) also permits judges to issue warrants of arrest
while the investigation is underway when 3 conditions concur. The
judge must: 1. Have examined in writing and under oath the
complainant and his witnesses by searching questions and answers;
2. Be satisfied that probable cause exists; and 3. That there be a
need to place the respondent under custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice.
● Issuance was clearly irregular, it did not show any finding of a need to place
complainant under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice.
● Even if the judge finds probable cause, it is not mandatory that he issue a
warrant of arrest. He must further determine the necessity of placing
respondent under immediate custody.
● A worse display of gross ignorance was for holding arraignment knowing fully
well that no preliminary investigation had been conducted and no informations
had yet been filed. It is inexcusable for a Judge of 12 years to make such
mistake.
● Compassion works in respondents favor, what with the fact that this is his first
administrative case after more than a decade of judicial service, let alone the
circumstance that he has already compulsorily retired. OCAs recommended
penalty of FINE appears in order.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, (copy and paste the entire dispositive portion here)
 2. Warrantless arrests ● The arrest was not justified as the PC officers had sufficient time to procure a
530. People v. Aminnudin, GR No. 74869, 6 July 1988 warrant of arrest for Aminuddin. The police officers themselves admitted that
G.R. No. 74869 | 6 July 1988 | Cruz | In flagrante delicto they received a tip on Aminuddin’s arrival and the specifc ship he was sailing
Digest by: Amir in 2 days or 2 weeks or weeks before his arrival (conflicting reports).
Petitioners: People of the Philippines
Respondents: Idel Aminnudin y Ahni ● The SC then was constrained to apply the general rule that absent a valid
warrant of arrest, people have the right against unreasonable searches and
Recit-ready Digest + Doctrine: seizure of whatever nature, and that no warrant oaf arrest shall issue except
Aminuddin disembarked his ship in Iloilo City, where he was immediately accosted upon probable cause determined personally by a judge. The police officers
and searched by PC officers waiting for him. They found marijuana in his bag and had at least 2 days to convince a judge to issue a warrant but they failed to do
arrested him there and then. In his defense, he argued that he was a mere watch so. Hence, the arrest was unlawful.
and cigarettes vendor but the trial court didn’t believe him. He also argued that he
was manhandled, abused, and forced to admit that he carried marijuana. Issue is ● The case also does not fall under the exception of warrantless arrest in
W/N he was validly arrested without warrant? flagrante delicto as Aminuddin at that moment was not about to or in the
No. The SC found that based on the admissions of the police officers, they had at process of committing a crime. He was merely disembarking the ship.
least 2 days to procure a warrant of arrest. They received a tip beforehand on Expediency cannot be invoked to (warrantless searches on vessels and
Aminuddin’s arrival and the specific ship he was on. aircraft) as there was no danger that the ship will move away.
It cannot also be said that he was arrested in flagrante delicto as he was merely
disembarking his ship. He was not about to or in the process of doing anything
● With the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the
illegal.
accused-appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt
Hence, absent a valid warrant of arrest, and a valid reason for a warrantless arrest,
and he must therefore be discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.
his arrest is deemed unlawful, and the marijuana excluded from evidence. Since
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be
discharged on the presumption that he is innocent. ● “Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after
fourteen years of the despised dictatorship, when any one could be picked up
at will, detained without charges and punished without trial, we will have only
Facts: ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once
more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of
Rights guarantees.”
● Idel Aminuddin arrived in Iloilo City on 25 June 1984. Upon disembarking his
ship, PC Officers who were waiting for him accosted him, inspected him, and
allegedly found marijuana in his bag. He was later brought into custody for
further investigation, during which the NBI laboratory positively identified the
leaves obtained to be marijuana.He was later charged for a violation of the Dispositive:
Dangerous Drugs Act.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-
● In his defense, he argued that he was merely carrying watches as he was a appellant is ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.
watch and cigarettes vendor, that he was beaten up by the PC officers and
was forced to admit that the was carrying marijuana. The Trial Court found
that it was dubious that Aminuddin was merely selling watches when he only
carried 2 watches at that time, and he could not even recognize to whom he
gave one of the watches for free. The trial court also said that he failed to
prove the maltreatment he experienced.

Issue/s:
● W/N he was validly arrested? No.
●

Ratio: