THE GIVENNESS OF SELF

AND OTHERS IN HUSSERL'S

TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY

Wayne K. Andrew

Some Earlier Difficulties

Is the later development of Husserl's phenomenological psychology a

form of subjective idealism, that is, does his philosophy entail an affirma-
tion that mental life alone is knowable, that all one can know are his own
internal states? Is it Husserl's aim to construct the reality of the world
from the certainty of subjectivity and does not such an attempt merely
leave Husserl as a solus ipse? Earlier introductions to Edmund Husserl's s
phenomenology develop the thesis that phenomenology does entail a
form of subjective idealism and is to be rejected for this reason. (See, for
example, Nakhnikian, 1963; Schutz, 1966.)
Arguments, such as Nakhnikian's, that Husserl is a subjective idealist
are based on his exposition and analysis of the "transcendental ego" as
recovered by the transcendental reduction (the method of bracketing).
Nakhnikian says: "The idea (of the transcendental reduction) is to
reduce the whole of reality to transcendentally reduced data. Otherwise
put, the ideal is to construct the whole of reality from transcendentally
reduced data" (p. 629). After some discussion of David Hume, he goes
on to exposit what he believes to be more of Husserl's position.

"The world" cannot be thought of except as being constituted by the

transcendentalego's intentionalacts .... It follows(from Husserl's argument)
that nothingcan existif it is not dependentfor its existenceon the transcendental.
This impliesthat the essencesemergingas residuesat the endof phenomenological
and transcendentalreductionas wellas bodiesand other mindsare existentially
dependentuponthe transcendentalego .... This sortof inferenceis characteristic
of subjectiveidealismand it is obviouslyinvalidwithoutfurthersupplementation.
(p. 629)
Nakhnikian has more to say but this is enough for my purposes. His
earlier work suggests how easy it is to start down the wrong path from the

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very beginning by assuming that the "idea is to construct the whole of

reality from transcendentally reduced data." This is emphatically not
the "idea." The whole idea of bracketing (the transcendental reduction)
is to exclude existential judgments about what is real or not real.
Bracketing places one in the realm of the possible or the conceivable as
such; it allows us to perform an analysis of the given (the phenomena)
without asking whether the given is real or not. Nothing of existence is
affirmed or denied (Husserl, 1931, pp. 169-170). Nakhnikian runs into
another problem when he discusses the "transcendental ego." Given
that the transcendental ego means nothing more than the composition of
subjective states of one person's psyche, then conclusions, like
Nakhnikian's, are justified. But this assumption is not supported and I
have reason to believe Husserl would deny it. In the Cartesian
Meditations ( 1960), Husserl distinguishes between the transcendental
ego and the empirical ego or "I" of a natural man living and acting in the
everyday world. The transcendental ego does not include only the
specific ego of a specific individual but must include an ego that is
conscious of "others" and of an "objective world" implied by the
independence of the "others" (p. 25).

The Phenomenological Reduction

Such earlier analyses, like Nakhnikian's, are not sufficient, but they do
encourage a more detailed explication of Husserl's phenomenology of
self and others. In general, the problem concerning the nature of self and
others involves the nature of Husserl's transcendental reduction (or
bracketing) and especially the transcendental ego. In order to investigate
the realm of the transcendental ego (or transcendental consciousness or
sphere of pure consciousness), one must assume the phenomenological
attitude which is a "disconnection" or "bracketing" of nature. What does
Husserl mean by this?
In the first place it goes without sayingthat with the suspendingof the natural
world, physical and psychological, all individual objectivities which are
constitutedthroughthe functionalactivitiesof consciousnessin valuationand in
practice are suspended-all varieties of cultural expression, works of the
technicaland fine arts, of the sciencesalso ... aestheticand practicalvalues of
every shape and form .... All the sciencesnatural and mental,with the entire
knowledgethey have accumulated, undergo disconnection.(Husserl, 1931,
p. 171)
Now that we are given some general idea of what is included in the
brackets, the question still remains, what is bracketing? What does the
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transcendental reduction mean to all of these areas that have been so

reduced? In the Ideas: An Introduction to Pure Phenomenology,
bracketing means the suspension of what is not given to "pure con-
sciousness" as immanent, as immediately experienceable. Bracketing
means a suspension or disconnection of the thesis of the "natural
standpoint." What is the natural standpoint and its thesis? It is an
attitude, a way of looking at the world, a way of being part of the world. I
cannot describe it better than this statement of Husserl's:

I find continuallypresentand standingover againstme the one spatio-temporal

fact-worldto whichI myselfbelongas do all other men foundin it and relatedin
the same way to it. This "fact-world" ... I findto be out there, and also take it
just as it givesitselfto me as somethingthat existsout there .... To knowit more
comprehensively,more trustworthily,more perfectly than the naive lore of
experienceis able to do, and to solve all the problems of scientificknowledge
which offer themselvesupon its ground,that is the goal of the sciencesof the
natural standpoint. ( 1931,p. 106)

In the natural attitude or standpoint, one takes for granted the

transcendency of the world around him and in him, but in bracketing such
taking for granted of transcendents must be suspended. They are not
denied; objects, events, ideas are still there, but reduced to their
givenness, to phenomenal status only. The transcendental reduction or
bracketing then means this and only this: the suspension of all existential
judgments involved in the natural standpoint ( 1931, p. 106-111 ). To use
Husserl's own words:

(By bracketing)I do not then deny this "world" as thoughI were a sophist;I do
not doubt that it is there as though I were a sceptic, but I use the
"phenomenological" reduction, which completely bars me from using any
judgment that concerns spatio-temporalexistence.(1931, p. 110)

I conclude from this exposition that the phenomenological reduction

places me in the realm of possibility or the conceivable as such and makes
my investigation an investigation of the possible forms of experience.
The sphere of phenomenology is the sphere of possible experience; its
aim is to examine or explicate transcendentally reduced data, and
transcendentally reduced data are the data given in "immanent"
experience without prior judgments such as real or not real. My
conclusions here are in general agreement with others but place more
emphasis on the realm of pure possibility. (See for example: Allen,1976,
p. 166.)
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On the preceding page, "pure consciousness" was used as the subject

of transcendentally reduced data. Since Husserl brackets mental
phenomena, as well as the physical and the eidetic, then mental
phenomena must also be an "object" in pure consciousness. There must
be a distinction between pure consciousness and natural consciousness.
The ego of the former is the transcendental ego and of the latter, the
psychological or empirical ego (Husserl, 1960, pp. 25-27). What is the
nature of their difference?

The Psychological and Transcendental Ego

The psychological ego is the ego of a man in the natural standpoint. It

is the ego of "I, the man, who in natural self experience finds himself as a
man" (Husserl, 1960, p. 25). This psychological ego is the object of
individual psychology (some parts of it anyway); it is my own purely
internal experience, it is my psychic life as a part of the real world. The
natural standpoint posits the world and aspects in it as real, as
independent of me, the particular observer. The "me" or "I" of the
natural standpoint and everything involved in this "me" as my opinions,
beliefs, attitudes, and forms of awareness in general, comprises my
psychological ego.
If this is understood, then what does it mean to transcendentally reduce
(bracket) the psychological ego? In bracketing the physical world, all
existential judgments concerning its reality are suspended. Under the
brackets, the "physical world" becomes "actuality-phenomena." In
bracketing my psychological ego, all existential judgments concerning its
reality are suspended. Under the brackets, psychological ego becomes
phenomenological "self experience"; both I and the world of the natural
standpoint are data in "pure consciousness." In the natural standpoint,
the psychological ego is a subject in the objective world; the transcendental
ego is subject of the phenomenological attitude. The crucial difference is
this: The objective world is transcendent to my psychological ego in the
natural standpoint, but in the phenomenological reduction, and only
within it, the transcendental ego constitutes (gives meaning to) all the
transcendentally reduced data, to the given as such. The "psychological
ego," the "objective world" including the existence of "others" exist as
possibilities of experience within the transcendental ego which constitutes
"others," the "objective world" and also my "psychological ego." It can
never be emphasized enough that this constituting refers to reduced (or
bracketed) data. The transcendental ego is not constructing the "whole
of reality from transcendentally reduced data." The transcendental ego
does not equal the reduced psychological ego; it is not the ultimate reality
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of the world. In what sense then is the transcendental ego ultimate or

absolute, if at all?
The transcendental ego emerges as the result of the phenomenological
reduction. It was Husserl's life long aim to give knowledge an absolute
foundation, an indubitable beginning. The question he seems to be asking
is, in my attempt to bracket everything, is there any area or region which
cannot be bracketed? If bracketing means disconnecting an awareness of
experience from the judgment that the experience is real or not, then the
answer is yes. I cannot disconnect myself from my experience. To affirm
that "I have an experience" implies that "I am" whether the experience
is real or not. But the "I" of the last sentence is not a psychological "I"; it
is the transcendental "I" referring to the transcendental ego. In Husserl's s
own words:

"I exist, egocogito," no longersignifies,"I, this man exist." No longeram I the

man who in natural self-experiencefinds himself as a man ... nor am I the
separately consideredpsyche itself (1960, p. 25).

The transcendental ego is not a metaphysical entity of ultimate reality;

with it, we have not rescued a little tag-end of the world, as the sole
unquestionable part of it and that now the problem is to infer the rest of
the world by rightly conducted arguments, according to principles innate
in the ego. "I," as the transcendental ego, am not a man, or a pure spirit,
or a pure psyche. Rather, "I" am the implied sense or meaning of every
possible experience within "pure consciousness." The term "pure
consciousness" is to be taken in the same sense as "pure logic" or "pure
mathematics"; in which, we do not consider whether the "subject" has
specific or general applications in the physical world as a proof of that
"subject." In "pure consciousness," I, the transcendental ego, describe
and develop "pure possibilities" of experience that may or may not
exist, in an actual sense, in any one individual's psyche. Thus, this "I" is
the subject of every possible predicate involving statements of possible
experiences within "pure consciousness."
Thus far, I have reached several conclusions which should be
summarized. The transcendental reduction involves the suspension of
the thesis of the natural standpoint, that is, the "belief in the reality of
the world. The existence of both the physical and mental aspects of the
world is put out of play or bracketed. By the transcendental reduction, I
discover myself as a transcendental ego differing from my empirical ego
which takes itself as existing in a real world. This discovery takes place
within the sphere of possible experience as such, not in the sphere of
actuality.
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Self and Others Within the Transcendental Ego

It has been implicitly suggested that the region of the transcendental

ego is broader or more inclusive than the psychological ego which is
embedded within it in the form of "self experience." The implication is
that the transcendental ego includes modes of consciousness that are not
modes of "self-experience," that in some way "others" and the
"objective world" (as actuality-phenomena) are constituted within the
transcendental ego as different from "self-experience." In other words,
what is being proposed is this: The region of the transcendental ego
contains subregions which are within it, but outside of each other. There
is a "primordial region" of "self experience" (or my ... "ownness"),
the region of the "other" and of "others," and the possibility of an
"objective world" which is an outgrowth of the possibility of the
community of "others" (Husserl, 1960, pp. 92-94). But to discover or
establish these possibilities, "I" as the transcendental ego must perform
a phenomenological analysis of the cogitatum involved, thus establishing
through phenomenology, the meaning and explication of my "ownness"
("self-experience") and the manner in which the "other" is given as
different from my "ownness."

The Givenness of Self

A phenomenological description of my sphere of"ownness" involves

the pure description of what is peculiar to me, as an ego of "self-
experience" (Husserl, 1960, p. 95). The description of "my ownness"
first gives me the statement that it is "non-alien." I must then free myself,
as the transcendental ego, from all that is "non-alien" and enter into my
sphere of "ownness" or "self-experience." In my sphere of "ownness"
then, "I obviously cannot have the 'alien' or 'other' as experience and
therefore cannot have the sense 'objective world' as an experiential
sense" (Husserl, 1960, p. 96). When I, as the transcendental ego,
exclude everything "non-alien" from my experience by entering into my
sphere of "ownness" or "self-experience," "I find as uniquely singled
out my animate organism as the only body that is not just a body, but an
animate organism" (Husserl, 1960, p. 97). It is only this body within my
sphere of"ownness" to which, in accordance with experience, I ascribe
fields of sensations, fields of warmth, coldness, tactual sensations, etc. It
is the only body which I control immediately; the only body in which one
sense can perceive another and itself be the object of a perception. (I can
touch my eyes with my hands and see my hands with my eyes, each
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acting as the object of the other.) Within my sphere of ownness then,

other men appear as bodies, but my body is given as my animate
organism; furthermore, my psychological ego becomes my personal ego
who operates this animate organism. My personal ego and my animate
organism are members of my sphere of "ownness" as described by me,
the transcendental ego.
My first phenomenological description of " self-experience" is that it is
"non-alien" or non-other, that it includes my personal ego as operator of
my animate organism. Further analysis of"self experience" shows that
the whole stream of my subjective processes becomes accessible to me.
There are my constituted unities and meanings (my subjective arrange-
ment of physical objects and data of all kinds: for example, the unity
"home" which summarizes and blends together many contents). There
are my "habits" and my "beliefs" which also belong to my "self-
experience" (Husserl, 1960, p. 100).
Starting out then as the transcendental ego, I discover within my
consciousness a region of "self-experience," and the "system of its
harmoniousness," and name this region my "primordial world." My
primordial world has a personal ego, my personal ego which correlates
with my transcendental ego but is restricted in the following way: all
aspects of my personal ego belong to my transcendental ego but the
converse is not true. From the descriptions of the last two paragraphs
then, I draw an important conclusion. The primordial world, the personal
ego of this world, and all the subjective processes belonging to this
personal ego are equivalent to the idea of a solus ipse, a self alone and
isolated in private experience. If all I, as the transcendental ego, could
ever describe or experience were experiences of this primordial world,
then my knowledge and possibilities of knowledge would be nothing
more than a form of self knowledge or solipsism. Are there any
possibilities within experience that give modes of consciousness which
are not modes of "self-experience" (modes of the primordial world)?
Husserl says that the fact:
That my own essence can be contrasted for me with somethingelse or that
I ... can becomeaware of someoneelse (who is not I but someoneother than I)
presupposesthat not all my own modesof consciousnessare modesof myself
consciousness.(1960, p. 105)

The Givenness of Others

Thus far, I, as the transcendental ego, have been concerned with the
definition and articulation of the primordial sphere, the sphere of my
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"ownness," of my "self-experience." The next step is the clarification

'
and explication of how I come to experience " someone" else as an alter-
ego not related to my personal ego of my primordial world. Within the
primordial sphere, the other was given as a body only. But if my
transcendental ego is not a solus ipse, then the other must be known in
some way as "someone else," as an "alter ego," like or similar to the ego
and animate organism of my primordial world.

Experienceis originalconsciousness;and in fact we generallysay, in the case of

experiencinga man: the other is himselfthere before us "in person." On the
other hand, this beingthere in person does not keepus fromadmittingforthwith
that, properly speaking, neither the other ego himself, nor his subjective
processesor his appearancesthemselves,nor anythingelsebelongingto his own
essence, becomes given in our own experience originally.If it were, if what
belongsto the other's ownessenceweredirectlyaccessible,it wouldbe merelya
momentof my own essenceand ultimatelyhe himselfand I myselfwouldbe the
same. (Husserl, 1960, pp. 108-109)

With respect to the transcendental ego then, the "other" as "someone

else" cannot be given to this ego with the same immediacy that the
personal ego with its animate organism is given. In Husserl's descriptions,
the "other" as a "someone else" is given to the transcendental ego as a
"co-present, a kind of appresentation" ( 1960, p. 109). The formation of
this (or any) appresentation is a combination of something given
immediately (an originary presentation) and a motivational attitude
specifically elicited as a result of and in connection with the originary
presentation. In other words, what is "there perceptually motivates belief
in something else as being there too" (1960, p. 110). The appresentation
of the "other" differs from presentation which is immediate; its meaning
entails "making present to consciousness a 'there too,' which nevertheless
is not `itself there' and can never become an itself there" (1960, p. 109).
This means that when the "body" of the "other" is given, his "ego" is
appresented as a "there too" with his body and yet "it" is not "itself
there" as given immediately. In fact, according to Husserl, "it" can't be
there in this sense. If "it" were, then "it" would be part of my own "self-
experience," part of my "personal ego."

The "Other," accordingto his own constitutedsense, points to me myself;the

other is a "mirroring"of my ownselfand yet not a mirroringproper,an analogue
of my own selfand yet againnot an analoguein the usual sense.(Husserl, 1960,
p. 94)

More detailed understanding of the appresentation of someone else as

an alter ego involves an understanding of "apperceptive transfer" and its
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basic principle, "pairing." From Husserl, I receive this description:

Let us assumethat anotherman enters into our perceptualsphere.Primordially

reduced that signifies-In the perceptual sphere pertainingto my "primordial
world" a body is presented,which as primordial,is of courseonly a determining
part of myself-an "immanent transcendency." Since, in this nature and this
world(of " self-experience")my animateorganismis the onlybodythat is or can
be constitutedoriginallyas an animateorganism(afunctioningorgan),the body
over there, which is neverthelessapprehendedas an animate organism,must
have derivedthis senseby an apperceptivetransfer frommyanimate organism,
and done so in a manner that excludesan actually direct, and hence primordial
showingof thepredicatesbelongingto an animateorganism .... It is clear from
the very beginningthat only a similarity connecting, within my primordial
sphere, that body over there with my body can serve as the motivationalbasis
for the analogizingapprehensionof that body as anotheranimateorganism ....
(It mustbe understood,however,that) .... Apperceptionis not an inference,not
a thinkingact ... (but) ... points back to a primalinstitutingin whichan object
with a similar sense became constituted for the first time (1960, p. 110).

As I understand Husserl's description, it means something like the

following: I, as the transcendental ego, upon examination of my
primordial world (realm of my "self experience") discover that in this
primordial world, I have a personal ego and an animate organism. When
I examine my personal ego and my primordial world, I discover that
there are other "bodies" extremely similar to my "body" in an almost
infinite number of ways (not only anatomically but in function, use, etc.);
also, I discover a fact of consciousness which must be explained: My ego
of my primordial world takes other bodies, similar to mine, to have egos
just as my animate organism does. Certain other bodies within my
primordial world are constituted as animate organism, and thus as
"bodies" that are not "my body," but "bodies" that belong to another
ego which is outside the sphere of my primordial world. How can this
happen? Through logical inference? No. Through thinking acts, logical
analogies or definite conscious choice to do so? No. The "other" as a
mirror or bodily analogue of my bodily being must be given in
appresentation. Her or his body, extremely like my own, is given
immediately and motivates a belief, by an "apperceptive transfer from
my own animate organism," that the other's personal ego with all of its
subjective processes is "itself there." My own primordial world serves as
a motivational basis for the "analogizing apprehension" of that "body"
as another "animate organism." I do not perceive the "other" as an
animate organism (this would be a phenomenological contradiction); I
apperceive the other as such.
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My apperception, in the above sense, is a combination of an original

perception plus a knowledge of what that perception means (what is the
"sense of it") within my own primordial world. Elementary examples of
this occur with objects. For instance, if someone has never seen a dinner
plate and doesn't know it is round and if I show the plate to him at various
angles in a controlled laboratory situation, he will not necessarily see the
plate as round but as various forms of ellipses; but if he knows it is a round
dinner plate, then despite the various viewing angles, he will still "see" it
as circular. An apperceptive transfer (an analogizing apprehension)
takes place whenever I anticipate perceptually, look ahead visually. I
may tell you that I'm going to show some examples of dinner plates, and
though I may show you examples that you have never seen before, you
still may fit them all into the sense "dinner plates." You interpret
perceptually the new experiences within the old visual sense.
Although what I have described are examples of apperception and
apperceptive transfer, these examples differ from the "apperception of
the other" with respect to the method of verification. There is one view in
which I can immediately perceive the dinner plate as round, whereas it is
phenomenologically impossible to immediately perceive the "other's"
subjective processes and still have him remain as an "other." I
apperceive the "other" as an "alter ego," by means of an "apperceptive
transfer of sense" from my own animate organism to his. But what is the
nature of this transfer of sense, that is, how does it take place?
The method of the apperceptive transfer of sense whereby the other is
known to me as animate organism, Husserl calls "pairing," "Ego
and alter ego are always given in an original pairing"' (Husserl, 1960,
p. 112). To Husserl, pairing is a form of passive synthesis designated as
association. In a pairing association, two or more data are given in
experience with prominence; they form a unity of similarity, thus being
constituted as a pair. These data then in some sense overlap each other,
the degree being from partial similarity to complete likeness. "As a result
of this overlapping, there takes place in the paired data a mutual transfer
of sense-that is to say: an apperception of each according to the sense of
the other" (Husserl, 1960, p. 113).
Husserl's idea of pairing has parallels with other concepts in the early
development of psychology. The bodily presence of another person
could be considered as establishing in me an "open gestalt" which
automatically motivates the positing by me (a transfer of sense) of a
psychic reality to the other, which then "closes the gestalt" (Hartmann,
1935, p. 184). Seeing the other as an animate organism completes the
gestalt of being a person. Likewise, Thorndike's concept of"belongingness"
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suggests that one member of a natural pair, bodily presence, will

automatically bring forth the other member, an interior, mental life,
when bodily being is presented within my experience (Hartmann, 1935,
p. 197).
Within the primordial world of my transcendental ego, a "body"
presents itself to my personal ego as similar in an "infinite" number of
ways to my animate organism, "a body with determinations such that it
must enter into a phenomenal pairing with mine" (Husserl, 1960, p. 113).
There takes place an overlapping and with this overlapping a mutual
transfer of sense so that the "other" may be apperceived according to the
sense of my body and my body according to the sense of his. The "other"
is apperceived as an animate organism like me.
I would like to elaborate on this a little more with my own
interpretations included. My primordial world with my personal ego and
animate organism is indeed a solus ipse. Within this sphere, other
persons, objects, events are only presented as "bodies," "objects," and
"events" of my perception. And yet, of all the possible "bodies" that are
given in my primordial sphere only one general form manifests such
determinations that literally force me (motivates a belief within me) to
pair that bodily form with my animate organism. But the other body, so
similar to my own, cannot be my own. I, as the transcendental ego,
cannot experience the "other" in the sense of "my ownness" as
described earlier. At the same time, the "other" cannot be paired as
strongly with any other "objects" or "things," in my primordial sphere,
as the "other" can with my animate organism. The unique status of this
"other body" appears in the sense of being out "There" while my own
"body" is "Here." But, I apperceive that if my own body were out
"There" instead of "Here," that is the way I would appear; I would
appear as a "body" with all my outward manifestations, but without an
immediately "present" interior or psychic life. In fact, if I were to be out
"There" instead of "Here" it is a phenomenological necessity that my
personal ego and its subjective processes not be present immediately. If
they were, then I would not be out "There" but "Here," within my
primordial world. I believe that Husserl means something like the above
when he says I apperceive the alter ego as a "being there too" which is
not "itself there."
Perhaps another parallel with psychology will further clarify the
givenness of the other. Experiments on the perception of causality
(Michotte, 1963) clearly demonstrated that we may readily perceive
causal relations such as the launching or entraining of objects under
illusory conditions. That is, objects may be made to appear as if they are
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launching, entraining or striking other objects even though they are not.
Thus, certain perceptual conditions identified by Michotte may be
employed to compel an imputation such as x struck y. Similarly the
bodily being of another person with all of her or his behaviors,
mannerisms and structural characteristics compel an imputation of
psychic pairing along with a "physical" presence within my own
experience.
If the preceding parallel with Michotte's work is accurate, then a
number of empirical possibilities are suggested by Husserl's analysis.
For example, as the bodily being of another person differs drastically
from what is "normal" to a group or culture, then we might expect
psychic imputations to be very different. The "deformed or very different
other" might be seen as having a very different interior life.
If it is granted that the "other" is given in appresentations and the
specific manner of these appresentations arise through an apperceptive
transfer of sense when my own animate organism is paired with the
"body" of the "other," there still remains the problem of the possibility
of verification. Previously, I stated that appresentations of "objects"
contain the possibility of verification in direct presentations. (In viewing
the front of a house, its sides and back are also appresented as part of the
"house-itself," but I can verify such appresentations by walking around
the house.) However, appresentations of the "other," as alter ego, are
not verified in this sense. How then are they verified?
Appresentations of the "other," as an animate organism and
governing ego, are verified in "unitary transcending experiences"; every
experience of the "other" points to further experiences that would fulfill
and verify the appresentations. Husserl gives this explanation:
The experienced animate organism of another continues to prove itself as
actuallyan animateorganismsolelyin its changingbut incessantlyharmonious
"behavior".... Such harmonious behavior (as having a physical side that
indicatessomethingpsychicappresentatively)must present itselffulfillinglyin
original experience,and do so throughoutthe continuouschange in behavior
fromphase to phase. The organismbecomesexperiencedas a pseudo-organism
preciselyif there is somethingdiscordantabout its behavior .... Whatevercan
becomepresentedand evidentlyverifiedoriginally-is somethingI am;or else it
belongs to me as peculiarly my own. Whatever... is experienced in that
foundedmanner whichcharacterizesa primordiallyunfulfillableexperience-
an experience that does not give something itself originallybut consistently
verifiessomethingindicated-is "other." It (the other) is thereforeconceivable
only as an analogueof somethingincludedin my peculiarownness(my animate
organismin this case). (1960, pp. 114-15)
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From the above quote, I draw this conclusion: The verification of

appresentations of the "other," as alter ego, lies in the possibility of
constantly unfolding new horizons which strengthen the appresentation
by being in harmony with it. The "other" constantly fulfills my
anticipations of him/her as an alter ego in the manner of his behavior,
thus continually verifying the original appresentation.
The verification of the other's interiority or psychic system is mediated
by the possibility of a seemingly inexhaustible exploration of the other's s
modes of presentation within my primordial world. The presence of the
other in a "physical" form, mirror of my own exterior form, provides a
horizon of possibilities each of which may act as a sign and constellations
of signs continuing to compel confirmation of the other as an animated
organism, as a psycho-physical being and truly an alien ego. Thus, at the
most radical levels of my bracketed personal being, I am still compelled to
confirm the possibility of the other "person" as an alien or separate identity
from me. As has been concluded previously, my personal being at its
deepest levels of subjective possibility is "never wholly free from an
intersubjective situation." (Giorgi, 1970, p. 81)

Conclusions

Since the beginning, I have been interested in a double, but connected

understanding of Husserl's thought on self and other. The earlier discussion
of transcendental reduction was necessary because of the ease in which it
can be misunderstood. If Husserl's possibilities are taken as actualities,
as the way the natural world is and has to be, then one hasn't a chance of
understanding him, let alone refuting him. Following a very brief review
of the reduction concept, I have been specifically interested in two
phenomenological possibilities: The development of phenomenal "self-
experience," named the primordial world, and the phenomenal "other,"
the mediated world (my term).
In general, the nature of the primordial world was described as a solus
ipse. Here are my personal ego and animate organism, my subjective
processes, habits, beliefs, my personal relations and interpretations of
the "objects" around me. But within my primordial world a sort of
negation appears. My personal ego is presented with another "bodily
form" like mine. By its very determinations, this form must be "paired"
with my own animate organism. In the "apperceptive transfer of sense"
that is involved with this pairing, I realize the "other" as an animate
organism, as an alter ego: I, as being Here, would appear as the other
does over There if I were There. The other's ego must be absent from
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immediate inspection in order for the other to be There, otherwise the

other would be Here, as a part of my ownness. For me then, as a
transcendental ego, the world of the "other" is built on the foundations of
appresentation, appresentations given as modes of consciousness just as
strongly, but not immediately like my primordial world is given.
In this last paragraph, as throughout the entire paper, "I" and "ego" are
used in a variety of ways. Husserl's use of these terms is a prime cause of
confusion. Before any other discussion, I'll review these usages. First of
all, there is the "I" or transcendental ego; it is the implied subject of every
possible experience. Any reflection on any possible experience in pure
consciousness, whether a private (self) experience or an experience of
"others" as alter egos, implies this transcendental ego or "I." It is the
meaning or sense of every possible predicate and as such is not identical
to private experience, mental life, psyche, or spirit. Second, there is the
"I" or "personal ego" of the primordial world. It is the subject of all
"self-experiences" within "pure consciousness." This "I" or personal
ego is the bracketed correlate the "I" or psychological ego of a man in the
natural standpoint. Third, there is the "I" or alter ego of the "other" as he is
given in "pure consciousness," as an appresentation. This alter ego, as
well as others, forms a region in "pure consciousness" with his/her own
style of verification differing from that of the primordial world. Fourth,
there is the "I" which refers to Husserl and myself as writers about
phenomenology. This "I," at various times depending on the contexts, is
always an "I" in one of the previous senses mentioned.
If these usages are understood, one may realize what a quote out of
context could do to Husserl. Any one-paragraph quote could easily
"prove" him to be a solipisist or at least a subjective idealist as well as a mad
metaphysician with fairy-tale worlds. But by intent, Husserl is obviously
neither a solipsist nor a subjective idealist ( 1931, pp. 168-70). Also, he
claims his conclusions to be founded on possible experience (bracketed
experience). But regardless of intent, has his phenomenology entailed
these positions?
With respect to the issue of a radical subjectivism or solipsism,
Husserl's phenomenology of the self and other does not appear to entail
either. First of all, a solipsist makes his statements about the reality of the
natural world which Husserl does not. Furthermore, in phenomenology,
the "other" as "someone else" as well as a "community of others" are
possibilities to myself at the most radical levels of my being, and in fact,
the possibility of an "objective" world depends on the "possibility of
others." Husserl, then, is neither a solipsist by intent nor by implication.
However, the issue of subjective idealism is more difficult. If a subjective
idealist is one who tries to construct the whole of reality from the
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certainty of his own private experiences or subjectivity, then Husserl is

not one. He claims the nature of reality is the aim of the sciences of the
natural standpoint; phenomenology reaches its realm only by suspension
of the thesis of the natural standpoint. In explicating this realm, I may
find that my descriptions of essences have an actuality status, just as pure
mathematics may find applications in the objective world, but these
explications and the methods used are not proved, nor founded in the
natural world. Thus, in this first sense, Husserl is not a subjective
idealist; he is not constructing empirical existence.
But what if a subjective idealist is defined as one who asserts that
mental life, alone, is knowable? If mental life is defined broadly enough,
then may not it equal Husserl's transcendental ego, and thus making it a
form of subjective idealism? I would defend Husserl in the following way:
Mental life defined so broadly is meaningless in experience, either actual
or possible. In the natural world, we all do in fact distinguish between the
mental and the physical aspects of our world. Mental life represents my
psychological ego and all of its cognitive-subjective processes. It is in
contrast to the objective world of the sciences and cultural community.
Mental life, as so interpreted, becomes, when bracketed, the "primordial
world," the world of "self-experience." It does not become the trans-
cendental ego. I, as the transcendental ego, am aware of the possibility of
"others" as alter ego, not just as "bodies." Since, it is possible to be
aware of "others" and hence possible for an "objective world," my
transcendental ego includes not only mental possibilities but physical
possibilities too. Thus, how can it be construed as mental life only,
without distorting both the actual and possible senses of "mental"?
Furthermore, the subjective idealist, like the solipsist, makes his claims
about the nature of the "real" world and again Husserl is not doing this. If
"mental life" becomes the transcendental ego, it is no longer just "mental
life." If it does not, then Husserl is not a subjective idealist in this sense or
in the former.
If Husserl's phenomenology is not claiming to construct reality, if it is
not claiming that mental life alone is knowable, or that I alone exist, and
if indeed, it ends with the possibility of "others," as independent of
"myself," and the possibility of an "objective world" from the community
of "others," then it cannot be solipsism or subjective idealism as
discussed above. In Husserl's own words:

If anyoneobjects,withreferenceto these discussionsof ours,that they transform

the wholeworldinto subjectiveillusionandthrowthemselvesinto the armsof an
"idealismsuch as Berkeley's,"we can only makeanswerthat he has not grasped
the meaningof these discussions.( 1931,p. 168)
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Summary

Husserl's explication of "self" and "others" occurs within his

founding science of pure possibilities or "bracketed" consciousness and
experience. His analysis of self and others seeks, in part, to demonstrate
that "personal" or "self-experience" is not the only possibility of
immanent consciousness but that "other persons" are also given as
possibilities. The possibility of others, though in a form of givenness
different from that of self, provides a basis for inter-subjectivity. Thus,
Husserl's phenomenological analysis can, if it does avoid solipsism and
subjective idealism in general, establish inter-subjectivity as coextensive
with subjectivity within the deepest possibilities of experience. Husserl's
discussion of how the other as an external person or alien ego occurs as a
given after all beliefs in an independently existing world are suspended
(bracketed) shares some interesting parallels with psychological concepts
and also suggests foundational possibilities for research on how the other
is constituted as a separate "person" within our consciousness.

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Husserl, E. [Ideals: General introduction to pure phenomenology](B. Gibson, trans.).
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