Husserl presented phenomenology with a transcendental turn.

In part this means that Husserl

took on the Kantian idiom of “transcendental idealism”, looking for conditions of the
possibility of knowledge, or of consciousness generally, and arguably turning away from any
reality beyond phenomena. But Husserl’s transcendental turn also involved his discovery of
the method of epoché . We are to practice phenomenology, Husserl proposed, by
“bracketing” the question of the existence of the natural world around us. We thereby turn
our attention, in reflection, to the structure of our own conscious experience. Our first key
result is the observation that each act of consciousness is a consciousness of something, that
is, intentional, or directed toward something.
EXAMPLE: Consider my visual experience wherein I see a tree across the square. In
phenomenological reflection, we need not concern ourselves with whether the tree exists: my
experience is of a tree whether or not such a tree exists. However, we do need to concern
ourselves with how the object is meant or intended. I see a Eucalyptus tree, not a Yucca tree;
I see that object as a Eucalyptus, with a certain shape, with bark stripping off, etc. Thus,
bracketing the tree itself, we turn our attention to my experience of the tree, and specifically
to the content or meaning in my experience. This tree-as-perceived Husserl calls the noema
or noematic sense of the experience.

Phenomenology is the science or the study of phenomenon. The term “phenomenon” is being
coined to refer to anything that exists which the mind is conscious. Phenomenology is considered to be
a difficult science or a rigorous science. Husserl's concept of rigorous science provided a new view of
how science is formed in general, and it sparked significant advancements that led to a re-evaluation of
the scientific character of other sciences, particularly the social sciences.

Husserl took a transcendental approach to phenomenology. In part, this means Husserl adopted
Kant's vocabulary of "transcendental idealism," in which he seeks conditions for the possibility of
knowledge, or awareness in general, but avoiding any reality beyond experiences. However, Husserl's
transcendental turn included the development of the epoché technique. Husserl stated that we should
practice phenomenology by "bracketing" the question of the natural world's existence. As a result, we
focus our attention on the structure of our own conscious experience in the form of reflection. The
observation that each act of awareness is a consciousness of something, that is, deliberate or directed
toward something, is the first and most important result.

Phenomenology should be seen as a method that is pure and free of many presuppositions or
judgements. He believes that when a person lessens its presuppositions in doing phenomenology, the
more it becomes pure science. Husserl, through the phenomenological method, tries to overcome the
natural attitude. For him, natural attitude refers to the most pre-dominant attitude of his time, namely
the scientific attitude. Arriving at a concrete results is through the process of induction or deduction –
this is the scientific attitude works.

Husserl believes that the subject “I” is always conscious of his world. In transcendental-
phenomenological reduction, the object is reduced to the very activity of the subject or person’s
consciousness. The subject becomes aware of the subjective aspects of the object when the person
enquire into the beliefs, feelings and desires which shapes the experience.
For Husserl, the noema has constituents that we are not aware of, “anticipations” that we have tacitly
taken over from our culture and never thought about, even bodily settings, which we would have great
difficulty describing in words even if we should be made aware of them. Also, among our “anticipations”
when we perceive an object is the anticipation that the object has features that go far beyond what we
anticipate, features that we have never thought about and that are not even tacitly anticipated, features
that have nothing corresponding to them in the noema, except our recognition that the object goes far
beyond our anticipations. It is transcendent, Husserl said; it is not exhausted by our anticipations, and it
never will be. As we go on examining the object, walk around it, turn it around, explore it with our
various senses or with scientific instruments, our anticipations always go beyond what “meets the eye”
or our other senses. The object, in turn, goes beyond anything that we ever anticipate.

Husserl insisted that phenomenology is reflective.

Husserl wants us to take it as a rational being that is not just thinking but more of a
reflecting being. He did not simply take these reflections as final and unchangeable. Rather, he
sees it as something that could be the beginning of more substantial reflections. Our experiences
are limitless because as we continue to live, there is something to reflect upon. Husserl, in his
method, gives us the authority to examine ourselves and how these experiences can be beneficial
to us in relating to others. When I understand things the way others will understand them,
connections will be built up.

The pandemic is something others might see as a scary event because it took the lives of many.
Others may see it as a blessing, especially for business owners of face masks and other health
supplies. I have my own experience of the pandemic as a seminarian and as a worker. But we can
have our common insight of a pandemic, and that could be a scenario that reveals that the
healthcare system and plans of the Philippines are not yet prepared for a greater emergency
crisis.

Phenomenology, after all, is going back to our original experiences. From my own personal point
of view, phenomenology is essential in order to understand and learn from the experiences of
others. Quentin Lauer examines Husserl’s "transcendental subjectivity" as the source of all
objectivity. We see things from a more objective point of view of things and experiences.
Through this, we can give a definition that is more objective, universal, true, and understandable
for all. The Phenomenological method of Husserl reiterates that the original whole experience is
not being devalued as primary reflection should work. Breaking it into smaller chunks of
experience will make it more defined and clear. We can analyze things better through pieces. We
can make more relationships more meaningful and appreciated. Phenomenology teaches us to be
relatable in many aspects.