Hazap

FSA Treatment Facility
HAZOP REPORT
Consultant: Vanguard Solutions Middle East

(a Gexcon company – www.gexcon.com)
S19155-DAR-RX-001
Rev. A
REVISION RECORD
Revision Date Description Originator Checked Approved
Kamran Shahzad
A 01-08-19 Draft Report – Issued for review Bilal Niazi
Khan Hussain
Vanguard Solutions Middle East (a GEXCON Company) Phone +971 4 367 1406
Office no. 18, AG-PF-24, Silver Tower Fax +971 4 366 4588
JLT, PO Box 35314 Email admin@vanguardsolutions.me
Dubai, UAE Website www.gexcon.com
FSA Treatment Facility – Ma’aden Wa’ad Al Shamal Phosphate Company – Turaif
HAZOP Report
LIST OF ACRONYMS
Abbreviation Description
DCS Distributed Control System
FSA Flourosilicic Acid
ERP Emergency Response Plan
HAZOP Hazard and Operability Study

HSE Health, Safety & Environment
LOPA Layer of protection analysis
LOPC Loss of Primary Containment
OIM Operation Instruction Manual
P&ID Piping and Instrument Diagram
PMT Project Management Team
SOW Scope of work
VSME Vanguard Solutions Middle East
Vanguard Solutions Middle East (DMCC) Page 2

S19155-DAR-RX-001 Rev. A August 2019
HAZOP Report
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................... 4

2. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 6
2.1. FSA Treatment Project Background ......................................................................... 6
2.2. FSA Treatment Facility Process Description ............................................................ 6
3. HAZOP STUDY METHODOLOGY ............................................................... 8
3.1. Objectives of the HAZOP Study ............................................................................... 8
3.2. HAZOP Assessment ................................................................................................ 8
3.3. Terms in HAZOP Study ............................................................................................ 8
3.4. Guide Words in HAZOP Study ................................................................................. 8
3.5. Methodology ............................................................................................................ 9
3.6. Risk Ranking .......................................................................................................... 11
3.7. HAZOP Study Records .......................................................................................... 13
4. HAZOP NODE DETAILS ............................................................................ 14
5. HAZOP RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................................. 15
6. REFERENCES ............................................................................................ 16
Appendix A – Attendance Sheet

Appendix B – HAZOP Worksheets
Appendix C – CARF (Correction Action & Recommendation Forms)
Appendix D – Marked P&IDs

HAZOP Report
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This Report contains the findings from HAZOP Workshops conducted for Ma’aden Wa’ad
Al Shamal Phosphate Company project FSA (Flourosilicic Acid) Treatment Facility.
The Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Workshops were held for two days on July 24th &
25th 2019 at MWSPC office (Admin Building) Turaif, Saudi Arabia.
The HAZOP team comprised personnel from MWSPC Engineering, Project Management,
Instrumentation & Operations, and with facilitation by HAZOP Chairman, from Vanguard
Solutions Middle East.
HAZOP study was carried out for FSA Treatment Facility to address the Hazard &
Operability issues by identifying credible process deviations and evaluation of potential
hazards arising from the facility. It shall be noted that HAZOP study did not address any
design review, nor it is used to introduce additional equipment / further modifications to
increase operational flexibility etc. Such requests were recommended for outside HAZOP
review, unless it could be demonstrated that the review is necessary to address an
unacceptable safety concern or to enable the process to be operated according to the
design specification.
HAZOP study was carried out using conventional "Guideword based HAZOP"
methodology where specific parameters and associated guidewords are used.
Below are some of the important considerations followed over the course of this HAZOP
process.
- Scope of the HAZOP study has been limited to the current design as reflected on
P&IDs (IFC) made available to the HAZOP team during session.
- Risk ranking has been completed in accordance with the 5X5 HSE Risk Matrix
provided by MWSPC. While assigning probability and severity, the ‘worst case’ or the
‘governing case’ severity in a category is used. In general, ‘Safety’ is the ‘governing
case’.
- Where appropriate, the HAZOP team made recommendations either to minimize
safety / environmental impact, enhance operability or to evaluate / review further
certain aspects of the design to strengthen existing safeguards.
- In total seven (07) recommendations were made and proposed actions. The
recommendations were also risk ranked to facilitate prioritization of actions and their
close-out. All seven (07) recommendations were risk ranked for the ‘Medium’ risk
consequences. It is suggested that the HAZOP recommendations should be
completed on priority basis and should be in place before the facility is operated, for
the safe & reliable operation. Complete list of HAZOP recommendations is included in
table below;
Table 1-1: HAZOP Recommendations
Recommendations Responsibility Risk Ranking
1. Update P&ID (MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3002) to reflect PMT Medium

tripping of sludge pump at low low (LL) suction pressure (PIT-
4202)
2. Consider providing tripping of sludge pump (3600-PMP-300) in PMT Medium
case of high high discharge pressure to avoid sludge pump
damage (3600-PMP-300) due to block discharge
3. Consider providing high discharge pressure protection for air PMT Medium
blowers (3600-BLW-100/101)

HAZOP Report
4. Consider stopping of reaction feed and sparging blower (3600- PMT Medium
BLW-00/101) when exhaust fan damper is in closed position
through interlock.
5. Consider stopping of exhaust fan (3600-FAN-100) if discharge PMT Medium
damper (3600-ADVFXA-004) is closed through interlock.
BLW-00/101) when exhaust fan (3600-FAN-100) is tripped
through interlock.
7. Consider providing new pressure transmitter at suction of PMT Medium
exhaust fan (3600-FAN-100) with high high-pressure interlock
to stop reaction feed and sparging blower (3600-BLW-
100/101)
8. Consider providing interlock for closing HV-7302 in case of PMT Medium
sludge pump (3600-PMP-300) tripping/stoppage to avoid
damage of sludge pump (3600-PMP-300) due to reverse flow
9. Consider providing interlock for tripping of CTSFT pump PMT Medium
(3600-PMP-200) in case of low low seal water pressure
10. Update P&ID (MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3002) to reflect seal PMT Medium
water battery limit valve as normally open (NO) and isolation
valve on CTSFT pump (3600-PMP-200) as normally open
(NO).
11. Ensure operator/working personnel carry portable gas Operation Medium
detectors (O2 and CO2) all the time and evacuate area in
case of oxygen deficiency and update ERP accordingly. Also
ensure area if free of CO2 before startup of FSA treatment
facility.
12. It is recommended to conduct LOPA workshop for assessing Engineering Medium
the SIL level of all proposed interlocks and already
implemented interlocks in the DCS
In the opinion of HAZOP Chairman:

▪ The review team worked through the assessment methodically and effectively to
identify deviations from design intent;
▪ Appropriate recommendations have been made.
Note: MWSPC is to ensure that the HAZOP shall not be affected by any design updates /
changes post-workshop. If the changes justify any updates of the existing reviews, the
proposed changes shall be revalidated in the HAZOP as required.

HAZOP Report
2. INTRODUCTION
2.1. FSA Treatment Project Background

Phosphate ore from Umm Wu’al mine is beneficiated to a phosphate concentrate in the
Beneficiation Plant. Gangue material high in calcite and other mineral constituents and low
in fluorapatite are rejected to and adjacent Tailings Storage Facility (TSF) landfill. The
phosphate concentrate is reacted with sulphuric acid to produce phosphoric acid and
gypsum, which is separated from the acid by filtration. The gypsum is disposed of in an
adjacent area using a wet disposal system where the gypsum is slurried with water and
the produced slurry pumped to the gypsum stack in the storage area. After the gypsum
settles the sluiced water collected in the decant pond area of the wet stack is returned to
the phosphoric acid plant to transport new gypsum as a slurry.
The gypsum wet disposal system receives all the other effluents from the site operating as
zero liquid discharge. The rejects from the Beneficiation plant are disposed in the
separated TSF. All the flourosilicic acid (FSA) produced in Phosphoric Acid Plant (PAP)
Merchant Grade Acid (MGA) evaporators is sent to the gypsum wet disposal system. It is
expected by that the concentration of flourosilicic acid will build up with time in the water
used to slurry the gypsum.
To control the concentration in the decant water by precipitation of the excess flourosilicic
acid using a calcium carbonate source at acidic pH, rather than at neutral pH with quick
lime or hydrated lime used in processes that require full FSA neutralization. The estimated
control of the flourosilicic acid level in the decant water associated with the gypsum wet
disposal system, requires precipitation of 30% of the total flourosilicic acid produced in
PAP during the first year, and 60% from the second year and beyond.
2.2. FSA Treatment Facility Process Description

A stream of decant water is mixed with FSA to provide the total flourosilicic acid make up
feed identified to be removed from the gypsum wet disposal system water (decant water).
The removal of flourosilicic acid is accomplished by reaction of the acid with a finely
divided source of calcium carbonate to precipitate fluorspar and silica byproduct. The
reaction is conducted at the temperature of the feed streams, i.e. without provision of any
external heating. No temperature increase is expected from the heat of reaction.
Three sources of calcium carbonate have been identified:
1. Beneficiation plant combined thickened slimes and fine tailings (CTSFT) slurry
2. Beneficiation plant thickened slimes (TS) before combining with the thickened fine
tailings that contain flotation surfactants.
The reaction takes place in two agitated reactors in series equipped with air spargers to
strip out the CO2 gas evolved from the reaction, to get higher reactivity of the calcium
carbonate and to avoid buildup of CO2 gas.
The air to the spargers is supplied by a dedicated blower. Agitation of the reactors has
been designed to get a high reaction yield and also to avoid pockets of unreacted calcium
carbonate which may result in the reactor contents erupting. Freeboard space over the
reactors slurry level sized to allow the gas bubbles and foam produced in the reaction of
the calcium carbonate. In case of froth a skimmer and froth handling system (collection
tank, pump to sludge pipeline) is provided. Additional flourosilicic acid in the feed as an
excess is used to achieve higher reaction kinetics and to minimize unreacted calcium
carbonate in the sludge deposited in the gypsum stack.

HAZOP Report
The design is to feed the calcium carbonate to react with 65% of the feed flourosilicic
acid feed, i.e. 53% excess of flourosilicic acid. The reaction pH is acidic.
Reactors feed is split with 60 to 70% going to the first reactor with the remaining going to
the second reactor. The reaction sludge is pumped to the top of the gypsum stack where
the solids in the sludge settle with the stacked gypsum and the sluiced water returns to the
decant water pond for reuse to slurry fresh gypsum in PAP.

HAZOP Report
3. HAZOP STUDY METHODOLOGY

3.1. Objectives of the HAZOP Study
The objective of this HAZOP study is to systematically examine the latest revision of the
P&IDs for the identification of credible process deviations and evaluation of potential
hazards arising from the proposed design. Another objective of this study is to evaluate
that the safeguards for the identified hazards are adequate for either reducing risk or
mitigating the consequences. Where appropriate, recommendations are generated to
address the identified issues, and/or to identify areas that need to be further investigated.
Also, the study identified possible operability and maintainability issues under normal
operating conditions, within the defined design parameters.
3.2. HAZOP Assessment

HAZOP study is carried out using conventional "Guideword based HAZOP" methodology
where specific parameters and associated guidewords are used.
HAZOP proceedings is recorded using PHA-Pro version v8.6. Risk Ranking is completed
using 5X5 HSE Risk Matrix provided by MWSPC. The requirements of MWSPC HSSE
standards covering risk assessment, and Project reference data, are also entered into this
program.
3.3. Terms in HAZOP Study

Since HAZOP Study technique is so systematic and highly structured, it is necessary to
use certain terms in a precise and disciplined way. Below are few terms used in HAZOP.
Table 3-1: HAZOP Study Terms
HAZOP Term Description
The intention defines how the part of the process (being studied) is expected to
Intention operate. This can take a number of forms and can be either descriptive or
diagrammatic.
These are the reasons why deviations might occur. Once a deviation has been
Causes
shown to have a conceivable or realistic cause, it can be treated as meaningful.
Consequences These are the results of the deviations should they occur.
Hazards These are the consequences which can cause damage, injury or loss.
A section of a process unit generally consisting of piping and vessels that

Node
allows the study team to HAZOP equipment in an organized fashion.
3.4. Guide Words in HAZOP Study

Guide words are the tools that are used to systematically direct the HAZOP study. They
are words or phrases that, when considered together with a process parameter, form a
hypothetical deviation for the team to consider. Below are HAZOP guidewords.
Table 3-2: HAZOP Study Guidewords
Guideword Description
Negation of the design intent (e.g. no flow when there should be;
No (Flow)
no pressure when there should be)
Less
Less of a physical property than there should be - Quantitative
(Flow, Pressure, Temp & decrease (e.g., lower flow rate than there should be)
Level)

HAZOP Report
Guideword Description
More
More of a physical property than there should be - Quantitative
(Flow, Pressure, Temp & increase
Level)
Reverse (Flow) Logical opposite of the design intent (e.g., reverse flow)
Other than Composition/Contamination /Deposition
Other Operations
Part of (Startup/Shutdown, Maintenance/Inspection, Isolation / Purging /
Testing etc.
Part of HSE
3.5. Methodology
A description of the approach used by the HAZOP Team is provided below. The process
systems are divided into Nodes. Each Node represents the system to be analysed. For
each Node that is defined the following process is carried out:
1. The process lines covered by the Node highlighted were highlighted on the relevant
P&IDs
2. A process engineering overview was provided to the HAZOP Team
3. The Node definition process parameters were input and checked for consistency.
4. The Deviation being assessed is selected. Brainstorming of all causes within the
Node for the Deviation in question are identified and recorded. If no causes are
identified, then this is stated as “no Credible Causes identified by the HAZOP team”
5. Once all the causes are recorded, each cause is individually analyzed and the
relevant consequences (Hazardous or Risk Events) are detailed without any benefit of
any installed safeguards in place. Wherever possible, these are recorded in a time
sequential manner so that a full history of the development of the consequences could
be recorded. If process functionality is available (and had not failed as defined by the
cause description) then these functions are considered to be still active and were not
recorded as they provide inherent designs.
6. The severity of any safety & environmental hazardous condition arising is recorded
using the definitions in MWSPC HSE Risk matrix. (Note: In some cases,
consequences included multiple Risk Events. If this is the case the highest severity
ranking of the safety & environmental hazardous condition is recorded in the required
field).
7. Safeguards that are defined on the P&ID’s or in associated issued Project documents
are then recorded.
8. Any recommendation required are then added to the worksheet and assigned to a
relevant company and department.
9. The next cause is then analyzed in the same way until all the causes, consequences
and safeguards had been assessed.
10. At this point the first cause and subsequent causes within the deviation are reviewed
with all defined safeguards in place for the cause in question and the likelihood of the
consequences achieving their hazardous result(s) (as defined in the Risked Events) is
recorded using the likelihood level guidance provided in MWSPC HSE Risk Matrix.

HAZOP Report
11. Once completed the next deviation is selected and the whole process was repeated
until all Nodes had been fully assessed.
The HAZOP Chairmen and HAZOP Team reviewed the wording of each entry into the
HAZOP recording system to ensure that sufficient information and understanding is
provided to meet the client requirements.
For each deviation identified as relevant to the node under consideration, the causes,
consequences (risk events) and safeguards are identified on the HAZOP worksheets.
Consequences are divided into safety, environment and commercial, and these are
assigned severity rankings.
Figure 3-1: Typical HAZOP Methodology

HAZOP Report
3.6. Risk Ranking

The traditional HAZOP method does not include any formal ranking of the hazards
identified. Sometimes this makes it difficult to prioritize the recommendations for
implementation. It is beneficial and recommended to use a risk ranking scheme to rank
hazards (failure scenarios) according to their estimated severity and likelihood. While
assigning hazard severity and likelihood levels, the availability of identified existing
safeguards be taken into account.
A five-point scheme for hazard severity and likelihood levels, and the corresponding risk
matrix (given on following page) are used to Risk Rank recommendations from the
HAZOP study.
Following the assignment of severity and likelihood levels and the corresponding risk level
for a hazard, the risk tolerability guidelines provided are used to define whether further
safeguards (recommendations) required to lower the risk to an acceptable level.
Table 3-3: Hazard Severity Levels
Ranking Severity Description
Safety Multiple fatalities of staff, contractors or the public

Long term environmental damage (5 years or longer, requiring
1 Catastrophic
> $ 5 million to study or correct or in penalties)
Regulatory intervention and prosecution possible
Single Fatality, Serious injury or occupational illness (non-

recoverable) or permanent major disabilities (acute or chronic)
Medium term (1-5 year) environmental damage requiring $ 1-
2 Major
5 million to study or correct.
Breach of licenses, legislation, regulation or corporate
mandated standards
Lost time or restricted injury or occupational illness

(recoverable)
Short term (<1 year) environmental damage requiring upto $ 1
3 Moderate million to correct
Breach of standards, guidelines or impending legislation, or
subject raised as corporate concern through audit findings or
voluntary agreements
Medical treatment required, no lost time or occupational
illness
4 Minor Environmental damage requiring upto $ 250,000 to study or
correct
Exceedance of internal procedures or guidelines
Near miss
Negligible environmental impact managed within operating
5 Insignificant budgets
No breach of licenses, standards, guidelines or related audit
findings

HAZOP Report
Table 3-4: Probability Levels
Likelihood Description
A Almost certain - Very high, may occur at least several times per year
B Likely - High, may arise about once per year
C Possible - Possible, may arise at least once in a 1 to 10 years period
D Unlikely - Not impossible, likely to occur during the next 10 to 25 years
E Rare - Very Low, very Unlikely during the next 25 years
Table 3-5: Risk Matrix
1 Medium Medium High High Extreme
2 Medium Medium Medium High Extreme

Severity
3 Low Medium Medium High High
4 Low Low Medium Medium High
5 Low Low Medium Medium Medium
E D C B A
Likelihood
Table 3-6: Risk Tolerability Guidelines
Risk Ranking Description
Extreme Countermeasures required immediately else stop operation immediately
High Countermeasures required to reduce risk to acceptable level
Medium Countermeasures required to reduce risk to acceptable level
Low Operation permissible but risk elements should eventually be addressed

HAZOP Report
3.7. HAZOP Study Records

The HAZOP is formally documented in the HAZOP worksheets and contains, for each
node, the following information:
▪ A description of the intent of the node;
▪ All P&IDs referred to in the HAZOP of the node;
▪ The guidewords and deviations applied to the node;
▪ Causes for any deviation from the node’s intent;
▪ Any consequences of such deviations;
▪ All safeguards in place to eliminate or mitigate these consequences;
▪ All recommendations raised; and
▪ Recommendation responsibility.
In addition to these, a risk ranking system is applied to each consequence.
The HAZOP Worksheets are attached as an Appendix B.

HAZOP Report
4. HAZOP NODE DETAILS

Table 4.1 summarizes the following information:
▪ Node Name - this includes the main equipment items;
▪ Node Notes – specific design comments made for that node;
▪ Node Intention;
▪ All P&IDs for that node
Table 4-1: Node Details
Node P&ID
Node Design Fluid Design Conditions/Parameters
No. P&ID No. Rev.
1 FSA Treatment Facility MD-512-3600-EG- C03 FSA, CTSFT Charging Pump (With VFD) - 3600-
PR-PID-3001 Decant Water PMP-200
Maximum design flow rate: 51 m3/hr
MD-512-3600-EG- C03 Nominal Flow rate: 39 m3/hr
PR-PID-3002
Operating Pressure: 7 bar
MD-512-3600-EG- C01 Power drive rated: 20 KW
PR-PID-3004 Head: 52.2 M
Sludge Pump (With VFD) - 3600-PMP-300

Maximum design flow rate: 435 m3/hr
Nominal Flow rate: 362 m3/hr
Operating Pressure: 9 bar
Power drive rated: 152.5 KW
Head: 96.8 M
Reactor - 3600-REA-100/101
Design working/total volume: 379/557 M3
Residence time per reactor: 1 h
Air Blower - 3600-BLW-100/101

Flow rate: 6351 Nm3/hr
Exhaust Fan - 3600-FAN-100

Maximum design flow rate: 30000 NM3/hr
Power drive rated: 6 KW
ESP: 600 PA
2 Utilities MD-512-3600-EG- C03
PR-PID-3003

HAZOP Report
5. HAZOP RECOMMENDATIONS
Where appropriate, the HAZOP team made recommendations either to minimize safety /
environmental impact, enhance operability or to evaluate / review further certain aspects
of the design to strengthen existing safeguards.
Risk ranking has been completed in accordance with the 5X5 HSE Risk Matrix provided
by MWSPC. While assigning probability and severity, the ‘worst case’ or the ‘governing
case’ severity in a category is used. In general, ‘Safety’ is the ‘governing case’.
In total seven (07) recommendations were made and proposed actions. The
recommendations were also risk ranked to facilitate prioritization of actions and their
close-out. All seven (07) recommendations were risk ranked for the ‘Medium’ risk
consequences. It is suggested that the HAZOP recommendations should be completed on
priority basis and should be in place before the facility is operated, for the safe & reliable
operation. Complete list of HAZOP recommendations is included in table below:
Table 5-1: HAZOP Recommendations
1. Update P&ID (MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3002) to reflect PMT Medium

tripping of sludge pump at low low (LL) suction pressure (PIT-
4202)
2. Consider providing tripping of sludge pump (3600-PMP-300) in PMT Medium
case of high high discharge pressure to avoid sludge pump
damage (3600-PMP-300) due to block discharge
3. Consider providing high discharge pressure protection for air PMT Medium
blowers (3600-BLW-100/101)
BLW-00/101) when exhaust fan damper is in closed position
through interlock.
5. Consider stopping of exhaust fan (3600-FAN-100) if discharge PMT Medium
damper (3600-ADVFXA-004) is closed through interlock.
BLW-00/101) when exhaust fan (3600-FAN-100) is tripped
through interlock.
7. Consider providing new pressure transmitter at suction of PMT Medium
exhaust fan (3600-FAN-100) with high high-pressure interlock
to stop reaction feed and sparging blower (3600-BLW-
100/101)
8. Consider providing interlock for closing HV-7302 in case of PMT Medium
sludge pump (3600-PMP-300) tripping/stoppage to avoid
damage of sludge pump (3600-PMP-300) due to reverse flow
9. Consider providing interlock for tripping of CTSFT pump PMT Medium
(3600-PMP-200) in case of low low seal water pressure
10. Update P&ID (MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3002) to reflect seal PMT Medium
water battery limit valve as normally open (NO) and isolation
valve on CTSFT pump (3600-PMP-200) as normally open
(NO).
11. Ensure operator/working personnel carry portable gas Operation Medium
detectors (O2 and CO2) all the time and evacuate area in
case of oxygen deficiency and update ERP accordingly. Also
ensure area if free of CO2 before startup of FSA treatment
facility.
12. It is recommended to conduct LOPA workshop for assessing Engineering Medium
the SIL level of all proposed interlocks and already
implemented interlocks in the DCS

HAZOP Report
6. REFERENCES
[1] HAZOP scope of work document for FSA Treatment facility provided by MWSPC.
[2] Lees' Process Safety Essentials, S. Mannan, Elsevier, 2014.
[3] Practical HAZOPs, Trips, and Alarms, D. McDonald, Elsevier, 2004.
[4] HAZOP and HAZAN, T. Kletz, IChemE, 2001.
[5] Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, CCPS, AIChE, 2008.
[6] HAZOP: Guide to Best Practice, F. Crawley and B. Tyler, Elsevier, 2015.
[7] Application of HAZOP and What-If Safety Reviews, D. P. Nolan, Noyes, 1994.
[8] BS EN ISO 17776 - HAZOP
[9] IEC 61882 HAZOP Guide [2016]
[10] Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, S. Mannan, Elsevier, 2012.

HAZOP Report
APPENDIX A – ATTENDANCE SHEET
Vanguard Solutions Middle East (DMCC)

Appendix C - CARF August 2019
HAZOP Report

HAZOP Report

HAZOP Report
APPENDIX B – HAZOP WORKSHEET

FSA Treatment Facility Ma’aden Wa’ad Al Shamal Phosphate Company
HAZOP Report
Risk
No. Node Deviation Cause Consequences Safeguards Severi Likelihood HAZOP Recommendations By
Ranking
1 FSA 1. No Flow (CTSFT) 1. Tripping of CTSFT pump 1. Stoppage of reaction leading None
Treatment (3600-PMP-200) to decrease pH with no 5 C Medium
Package significant impact
2. Possible drop in reactor level LIT-3201/3202 available with low level 1. Update P&ID MD-512-3600-EG-
leading to sludge pump alarm PR-PID-3002 to reflect tripping of
damage due to cavitation LIT-3201/3202 available to trip (I9/I12) sludge pump at low low (LL)
sludge pump in case of low low level in suction pressure (PIT-4202)
4 D Low PMT
reactor
PIT-4202 available to trip (I-11) sludge
pump at low low suction pressure
3. Possible drop in reactor level LIT-3201/3202 available with low level

leading to reactor agitators alarm
damage (3600-AGI- LIT-3201/3202 available to trip (I9/I12)
100/101/102/103/104/105) 4 C Medium
reactor agitators in case of low low level in
reactor
4. Off spec product None

5 E Low
2. Spurious closure of HV- 1. Stoppage of reaction leading None

7301 to decrease pH with no 5 C Medium
significant impact
leading to sludge pump alarm
damage due to cavitation
LIT-3201/3202 available to trip (I9/I12)
sludge pump in case of low low level in 4 D Low
reactor
3. Possible damage of CTSFT FQIT-2203 available to trip (I7) CTSFT

pump (3600-PMP-200) due to pump in case of no discharge flow from the
blocked discharge pump 5 C Medium
Open/close indication of HV-7301 available
on DCS
4. Possible CTSFT pump FQIT-2203 available to trip (I7) CTSFT

discharge line rupture due to pump in case of no discharge flow from the
high pressure pump
4 C Medium
on DCS

damage (3600-AGI- LIT-3201/3202 available to trip (I9/I12) 4 C Medium
100/101/102/103/104/105) reactor agitators in case of low low level in
reactor
6. Off spec product None

5 E Low

Appendix B - HAZOP Workshop August 2019
HAZOP Report
Risk
Ranking
3. Inadvertent closure of 1. Stoppage of reaction leading None
manual isolation valve in to decrease pH with no 5 C Medium
downstream of CTSFT significant impact
pump 2. Possible drop in reactor level LIT-3201/3202 available with low level
damage due to cavitation LIT-3201/3202 available to trip (I9/I12)
reactor
3. Possible damage of CTSFT FQIT-2203 available to trip (I7) CTSFT
pump (3600-PMP-200) due to pump in case of no discharge flow from the
on DCS
high pressure pump
4 C Medium
on DCS

reactor
6. Off spec product None 5 E Low

2. No Flow (FSA) 1. Tripping of FSA pump 1. No reaction will take place if None
(23A50-PMP-005/006) FSA is not fed leading to off- 5 E Low
spec product.
damage due to cavitation LIT-3201/3202 available to trip (I9/I12) 4 C Medium
reactor
3. Stoppage of reaction leading High pH alarm AIT-1201/1202 available
to increase pH with no
significant impact AIT-1201/1202 available to stop (I-4 & I-5)
5 C Medium
CTFST pump & HV-7301 in case of high
high pH in reactor
2. Spurious closure of FV- 1. No reaction will take place if None

2202 FSA is not fed leading to off- 5 E Low
spec product.

reactor

HAZOP Report
Risk
Ranking
to increase pH with no AIT-1201/1202 available to stop (I-4 & I-5)
significant impact 5 C Medium
high pH in reactor
3. Inadvertent closure of 1. No reaction will take place if None
manual isolation valve in FSA is not fed leading to off- 5 E Low
FSA line spec product.
reactor
to increase pH with no AIT-1201/1202 available to stop (I-4 & I-5)
significant impact 5 C Medium
high pH in reactor
3. No Flow (Decant 1. Tripping of decant water 1. High viscosity & solid FIT-2201 available to trip (I-2) CTSFT pump
Water) pump (207ZZ-PMP- contents in reactor and and HV-7301 closure in case of Low Low
101/102/103) potential damage of agitator flow of decant water 4 C Medium
Agitator motor overload protection provided
2. Increase in pH leading to AIT-1201/1202 available to stop (I-4 & I-5)
foaming in reactor and piping CTFST pump & HV-7301 in case of high
and potential damage of high pH in reactor
piping and LOC due to CO2 3 C Medium
gas and reaction sludge.
Minor environmental damage
and possible injury
2. Spurious closure of FV- 1. High viscosity & solid FIT-2201 available to trip (I-2) CTSFT pump
2201 contents in reactor and and HV-7301 closure in case of Low Low
potential damage of agitator flow of decant water 4 C Medium
piping and loss of
3 C Medium
containment (LOC) due to
CO2 gas and reaction sludge.
and possible injury
3. Inadvertent closure of 1. High viscosity & solid FIT-2201 available to trip (I-2) CTSFT pump
manual isolation valve in contents in reactor and and HV-7301 closure in case of Low Low
decant water line potential damage of agitator flow of decant water 4 C Medium

and possible injury

HAZOP Report
Risk
Ranking
4. No Flow (Sludge) 1. Tripping of sludge pump 1. High level in reactor leading LIT-3201 / 3202 available with high level
(3600-PMP-300) to overflow to sump. Minor alarm
environmental damage LIT-3201 / 3202 available to trip all
4 C Medium
incoming streams in case of high high level
in reactor
Dike is provided
2. Spurious closure of HV- 1. High level in reactor leading LIT-3201 / 3202 available with high level
7302 to overflow to sump. Minor alarm
4 C Medium
in reactor
Dike is provided
2. Potential sludge pump Open/close indication of HV-7302 available 2. Consider providing tripping of
damage due to block on DCS sludge pump (3600-PMP-300) in
discharge case of high high discharge
4 C Medium PMT
pressure to avoid sludge pump
damage (3600-PMP-300) due to
block discharge
3. Possible Sludge pump Open/close indication of HV-7302 available
discharge line rupture due to on DCS 4 C Medium
high pressure
3. Inadvertent closure of 1. Possible Sludge pump PIT-4202 available to trip (I-11) sludge
4 C Medium
manual isolation valve in damage due to cavitation pump at low low suction pressure
suction line of sludge pump 2. High level in reactor leading LIT-3201 / 3202 available with high level
to overflow to sump. Minor alarm
4 C Medium
in reactor
Dike is provided
4. Empty Reactor (3600-REA- 1. Possible Sludge pump PIT-4202 available to trip (I-11) sludge
4 C Medium
100/101) damage due to cavitation pump at low low suction pressure
2. Potential reactor agitators LIT-3201/3202 available with low level
damage (3600-AGI- alarm
100/101/102/103/104/105) LIT-3201/3202 available to trip (I9/I12) 4 C Medium
reactor
5. No Flow (Sparging 1. Tripping of sparging air 1. Possible reaction carryover to AIT-1201/1202 available to stop (I-4 & I-5)
air) blower (3600-BLW-100/101) piping and potential damage CTFST pump & HV-7301 in case of high
of piping and LOC due to high pH in reactor
3 C Medium
and possible injury
2. Inadvertent closure of 1. Possible reaction carryover to AIT-1201/1202 available to stop (I-4 & I-5)
manual isolation valve in piping and potential damage CTFST pump & HV-7301 in case of high
sparging air line of piping and LOC due to high pH in reactor
3 C Medium
and possible injury
2. Possible blowers (3600-BLW- None 3. Consider providing high
100/101) damage due to 4 C Medium discharge pressure protection for PMT
blocked discharge air blowers (3600-BLW-100/101)

HAZOP Report
Risk
Ranking
6. No Flow (Exhaust 1. Closure of Suction damper 1. Possible release of CO2 into None 4. Consider stopping of reaction
gases) (3600-ADVFXA-003) the reactor surrounding area feed and sparging blower (3600-
which will lead to lack of 3 C Medium BLW-00/101) when exhaust fan PMT
oxygen effecting people in damper is in closed position
the surrounding area through interlock
2. Closure of damper (3600- 1. Possible release of CO2 into Damper (3600-ADFXA-001/002) are 4. Consider stopping of reaction
ADFXA-001/002) the reactor surrounding area mechanically locked open feed and sparging blower (3600-
which will lead to lack of BLW-00/101) when exhaust fan PMT
3 C Medium 12.It is recommended to conduct
LOPA workshop for assessing
the SIL level of all proposed
Engineering
interlocks and already
implemented interlocks in the
DCS
3. Closure of discharge 1. Possible release of CO2 into None 4. Consider stopping of reaction
damper (3600-ADVFXA- the reactor surrounding area feed and sparging blower (3600-
004) which will lead to lack of 3 C Medium BLW-00/101) when exhaust fan PMT
2. Possible exhaust fan damage None 5. Consider stopping of exhaust fan
due to surging (3600-FAN-100) if discharge
4 C Medium PMT
damper (3600-ADVFXA-004) is
closed through interlock
4. Tripping of exhaust Fan 1. Possible release of CO2 into None 6. Consider stopping of reaction
(3600-FAN-100) the reactor surrounding area feed and sparging blower (3600-
which will lead to lack of BLW-00/101) when exhaust fan PMT
oxygen effecting people in (3600-FAN-100) is tripped
the surrounding area through interlock.
3 C Medium 7. Consider providing new pressure
transmitter at suction of exhaust
fan (3600-FAN-100) with high
PMT
high-pressure interlock to stop
reaction feed and sparging
blower (3600-BLW-100/101)
7. Less Flow 1. Refer to No Flow (all
deviation) in this Node
8. More Flow (FSA) 1. Full opening of FV-2202 1. High level in reactor leading LIT-3201 / 3202 available with high level
4 C Medium
in reactor
Dike is provided
9. More Flow (Decant 1. Full opening of FV-2201 1. High level in reactor leading LIT-3201 / 3202 available with high level
Water) to overflow to sump. Minor alarm
incoming streams in case of high high level 4 C Medium
in reactor
Dike is provided

HAZOP Report
Risk
Ranking
10. More Flow (CTSFT) 1. Malfunction of pump VSD 1. High level in reactor leading LIT-3201 / 3202 available with high level
4 C Medium
in reactor
Dike is provided
and possible injury
3. High viscosity & solid Agitator motor overload protection provided
contents in reactor and AIT-1201/1202 available to stop (I-4 & I-5)
potential damage of agitator CTFST pump & HV-7301 in case of high
high pH in reactor 4 C Medium
11. Reverse Flow 1. Tripping/Stoppage of sludge 1. Possible sludge pump None 8. Consider providing interlock for
(Sludge) pump damage due to reverse closing HV-7302 in case of
rotation sludge pump (3600-PMP-300)
4 C Medium PMT
tripping/stoppage to avoid
damage of sludge pump (3600-
PMP-300) due to reverse flow
12. Misdirected Flow 1. No Credible cause identified
13. High Pressure 1. Spurious closure of HV- 1. Possible damage of CTSFT FQIT-2203 available to trip (I7) CTSFT
(CTSFT) 7301 pump (3600-PMP-200) due to pump in case of no discharge flow from the
on DCS
high pressure pump 4 C Medium
on DCS
2. Inadvertent closure of 1. Possible damage of CTSFT FQIT-2203 available to trip (I7) CTSFT
manual isolation valve in pump (3600-PMP-200) due to pump in case of no discharge flow from the
downstream of CTSFT blocked discharge pump 5 C Medium
pump Open/close indication of HV-7301 available
on DCS
high pressure pump 4 C Medium
on DCS
14. High Pressure 1. Spurious closure of HV- 1. Potential sludge pump Open/close indication of HV-7302 available
(Sludge) 7302 damage due to block on DCS 4 C Medium
discharge

HAZOP Report
Risk
Ranking
2. Possible Sludge pump Open/close indication of HV-7302 available
discharge line rupture due to on DCS 4 C Medium
high pressure
15. High Pressure 1. Inadvertent closure of 1. Possible blowers (3600-BLW- None 3. Consider providing high
(Sparging air) manual isolation valve in 100/101) damage due to discharge pressure protection for
sparging air-line at blower blocked discharge air blowers (3600-BLW-100/101)
4 C Medium PMT
discharge or reactor inlet
when one reactor is in
service
2. Blockage of sparging 1. Possible reaction carry over AIT-1201/1202 available to stop (I-4 & I-5)
nozzles to piping and potential CTFST pump & HV-7301 in case of high
damage of piping and LOC high pH in reactor
3 C Medium
due to CO2 gas and reaction
sludge. Minor environmental
damage and possible injury
16. High Pressure 1. Closure of discharge 1. Possible exhaust fan damage None 5. Consider stopping of exhaust fan
(Exhaust gases) damper (3600-ADVFXA- due to surging (3600-FAN-100) if discharge
4 C Medium PMT
004) damper (3600-ADVFXA-004) is
closed through interlock
2. Possible release of CO2 into None 4. Consider stopping of reaction
the reactor surrounding area feed and sparging blower (3600-
which will lead to lack of 3 C Medium BLW-00/101) when exhaust fan PMT
17. Less Pressure 1. Tripping of CTSFT pump 1. Possible drop in reactor level LIT-3201/3202 available with low level 1. Update P&ID MD-512-3600-EG-
(CTSFT) (3600-PMP-200) leading to sludge pump alarm PR-PID-3002 to reflect tripping of
sludge pump in case of low low level in 4 D Low suction pressure (PIT-4202) PMT
reactor
2. Spurious closure of HV- 1. Possible drop in reactor level LIT-3201/3202 available with low level
7301 leading to sludge pump alarm
reactor
3. Inadvertent closure of 1. Possible drop in reactor level LIT-3201/3202 available with low level
manual isolation valve in leading to sludge pump alarm
downstream of CTSFT damage due to cavitation LIT-3201/3202 available to trip (I9/I12)
pump sludge pump in case of low low level in 4 D Low
reactor
18. Less Pressure 1. Tripping of FSA pump 1. Possible drop in reactor level LIT-3201/3202 available with low level
(FSA) (23A50-PMP-005/006) leading to sludge pump alarm
4 C Medium
reactor

HAZOP Report
Risk
Ranking
2. Spurious closure of FV- 1. Possible drop in reactor level LIT-3201/3202 available with low level
reactor
FSA line damage due to cavitation LIT-3201/3202 available to trip (I9/I12) 4 C Medium
reactor
19. Less Pressure 1. Inadvertent closure of 1. Possible Sludge pump PIT-4202 available to trip (I-11) sludge
(Sludge) manual isolation valve in damage due to cavitation pump at low low suction pressure 4 C Medium
suction line of sludge pump
2. Empty Reactor (3600-REA- 1. Possible Sludge pump PIT-4202 available to trip (I-11) sludge
100/101) damage due to cavitation pump at low low suction pressure 4 C Medium
20. Less Pressure 1. Blockage of reactor vent 1. Possible reactor collapses Vent is adequately designed
(Reactor) leading to loss of containment Dike is provided 3 E Low
(LOC) causing possible injury
and environmental impact
21. High Temperature 1. No Safety concern
22. Less Temperature 1. No Safety concern
23. High Level (Sludge) 1. Tripping of sludge pump 1. High level in reactor leading LIT-3201 / 3202 available with high level
(3600-PMP-300) to overflow to sump. Minor alarm
in reactor
Dike is provided
2. Spurious closure of HV- 1. High level in reactor leading LIT-3201 / 3202 available with high level
7302 to overflow to sump. Minor alarm
4 C Medium
in reactor
Dike is provided
3. Inadvertent closure of 1. High level in reactor leading LIT-3201 / 3202 available with high level
manual isolation valve in to overflow to sump. Minor alarm
suction line of sludge pump environmental damage LIT-3201 / 3202 available to trip all
4 C Medium
in reactor
Dike is provided
24. High Level (FSA) 1. Full opening of FV-2202 1. High level in reactor leading LIT-3201 / 3202 available with high level
in reactor
Dike is provided

HAZOP Report
Risk
Ranking
25 High Level 1. Full opening of FV-2201 1. High level in reactor leading LIT-3201 / 3202 available with high level
. (Decant Water) to overflow to sump. Minor alarm
in reactor
Dike is provided
26. High Level 1. Malfunction of pump VSD 1. High level in reactor leading LIT-3201 / 3202 available with high level
(CTSFT) to overflow to sump. Minor alarm
in reactor
Dike is provided
27 Less Level 1. Tripping of CTSFT pump 1. Possible drop in reactor level LIT-3201/3202 available with low level 1. Update P&ID MD-512-3600-EG-
. (CTSFT) (3600-PMP-200) leading to sludge pump alarm PR-PID-3002 to reflect tripping of
sludge pump in case of low low level in suction pressure (PIT-4202)
reactor 4 D Low PMT

100/101/102/103/104/105) 4 C Medium
reactor
2. Spurious closure of HV- 1. Possible drop in reactor level LIT-3201/3202 available with low level
sludge pump in case of low low level in
4 D Low
reactor

reactor
downstream of CTSFT damage due to cavitation LIT-3201/3202 available to trip (I9/I12)
pump sludge pump in case of low low level in
4 D Low
reactor

HAZOP Report
Risk
Ranking
100/101/102/103/104/105) 4 C Medium
reactor
28. Less Level (FSA) 1. Tripping of FSA pump 1. Possible drop in reactor level LIT-3201/3202 available with low level
(23A50-PMP-005/006) leading to sludge pump alarm
reactor
2. Spurious closure of FV- 1. Possible drop in reactor level LIT-3201/3202 available with low level
reactor
FSA line damage due to cavitation LIT-3201/3202 available to trip (I9/I12) 4 C Medium
reactor
29. Isolation 1. No Safety concern
30. Contamination 1. No Safety concern

HAZOP Report
Risk
Ranking
2 Utilities 1. Instrument air failure 1. Inadvertent closure of 1. FV-2201/2202, HV- Refer to No Flow scenario in Node-1 (FSA
battery limit isolation valve 7301/7302 will move to fail Treatment Package)
safe position (closed) that will
lead to No Flow scenario of
Node-1 (FSA Treatment
Package)
2. Tripping of instrument air 1. FV-2201/2202, HV- Refer to No Flow scenario in Node-1 (FSA
system 7301/7302 will move to fail Treatment Package)
safe position (closed) that will
lead to No Flow scenario of
Node-1 (FSA Treatment
Package)
2. Seal water failure 1. Inadvertent closure of 1. Possible mechanical seal PIT-4203 available to trip sludge pump (I- 9. Consider providing interlock for
battery limit isolation valve damage of CTSFT pump 27) in case of low seal water pressure tripping of CTSFT pump (3600-
(3600-PMP-200), Sludge (3600-PMP-300) PMP-200) in case of low low seal PMT
pump (3600-PMP-300) and No safeguard available for CTSFT pump water pressure
Sump pump leading to loss of
containment (LOC) with
minor environmental impact 10.Update P&ID (MD-512-3600-
4 C Medium EG-PR-PID-3002) to reflect seal
water battery limit valve as
normally open (NO) and
isolation valve on CTSFT pump PMT
(3600-PMP-200) as normally
open (NO)
2. Tripping of seal water 1. Possible mechanical seal PIT-4203 available to trip sludge pump (I- 9. Consider providing interlock for
system damage of CTSFT pump 27) in case of low seal water pressure tripping of CTSFT pump (3600-
(3600-PMP-200), Sludge (3600-PMP-300) PMP-200) in case of low low seal
PMT
pump (3600-PMP-300) and No safeguard available for CTSFT pump water pressure
Sump pump leading to loss of
containment (LOC) with
minor environmental impact 10.Update P&ID (MD-512-3600-
4 C Medium EG-PR-PID-3002) to reflect seal
water battery limit valve as
normally open (NO) and
isolation valve on CTSFT pump PMT
(3600-PMP-200) as normally
open (NO)
3. Power Failure 1. Primary power source 1. Shutdown of all electrical None 11.Ensure operator/working
failure equipment’s (Pumps, personnel carry portable gas
Blowers, Fan and Agitators) detectors (O2 and CO2) all the
with potential CO2 release time and evacuate area in case
from reactor vent 3 C Medium of oxygen deficiency and update Operation
ERP accordingly. Also ensure
area if free of CO2 before
startup of FSA treatment facility

HAZOP Report
Risk
Ranking
2. Local power failure from 1. Shutdown of all electrical None 11.Ensure operator/working
PAP Sub-Station equipment’s (Pumps, personnel carry portable gas
Blowers, Fan and Agitators) detectors (O2 and CO2) all the
except CTSFT pump (3600- time and evacuate area in case
PMP-200) 3 C Medium of oxygen deficiency and update Operation
ERP accordingly. Also ensure
area if free of CO2 before
startup of FSA treatment facility
2. High level in reactor leading LIT-3201 / 3202 available with high level
environmental damage
LIT-3201 / 3202 available to trip all
in reactor
Dike is provided

and potential release of CO2 high pH in reactor
from reactor vent
3 C Medium
I-2 & I-3 available to trip to stop CTSFT
pump (3600-PMP-200) and close HV-7301
in case of low low flow of Decant Water and
FSA
4. High viscosity & solid AIT-1201/1202 available to stop (I-4 & I-5)
contents in reactor CTFST pump & HV-7301 in case of high
high pH in reactor 4 C Medium

HAZOP Report
APPENDIX C – CARF
Corrective Action & Recommendation Forms

HAZOP Report
HAZOP Study
Correction Action & Recommendation Form
Company Ma’aden Wa’ad Al Shamal Phosphate Company (MWSPC)

Project Name FSA (Flourosilicic Acid) Treatment Facility
Location Turaif
Recommendation / Action # 1
Problem Statement
Node 1: FSA Treatment Package
Deviation: No Flow (CTSFT)
Cause: Tripping of CTSFT pump (3600-PMP-200)
Consequence: Possible drop in reactor level leading to sludge pump damage due to cavitation
Recommendation / Action details
Update P&ID MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3002 to reflect tripping of sludge pump at low low (LL) suction
pressure (PIT-4202)
Risk Ranking L
Assigned to: PMT Date: 31-07-2019
Resolution
Work Completed Approved
By: By:
Date: Date:

HAZOP Report
HAZOP Study

Location Turaif
Problem Statement
Deviation: No Flow (Sludge)
Cause: Spurious closure of HV-7302
Consequence: Potential sludge pump damage due to block discharge
Consider providing tripping of sludge pump (3600-PMP-300) in case of high high discharge pressure
to avoid sludge pump damage (3600-PMP-300) due to block discharge
Risk Ranking M
Resolution
By: By:
Date: Date:

HAZOP Report
HAZOP Study

Location Turaif
Problem Statement
Deviation: High Pressure (Sparging air)
Cause: Inadvertent closure of manual isolation valve in sparging Air Line at blower
discharge or reactor inlet when one reactor is in service
Consequence: Possible blowers (3600-BLW- 100/101) damage due to blocked discharge
Consider providing high discharge pressure protection for air blowers (3600-BLW-100/101)
Risk Ranking M
Resolution
By: By:
Date: Date:

HAZOP Report
HAZOP Study

Location Turaif
Problem Statement
Deviation: No Flow (Exhaust gases)
Cause: Closure of Suction damper (3600-ADVFXA-003)
Consequence: Possible release of CO2 into the reactor surrounding area which will lead to lack of
oxygen effecting people in the surrounding area
Consider stopping of reaction feed and sparging blower (3600-BLW-00/101) when exhaust fan
damper is in closed position through interlock
Risk Ranking M
Resolution
By: By:
Date: Date:

HAZOP Report
HAZOP Study

Location Turaif
Problem Statement
Cause: Closure of discharge damper (3600-ADVFXA-004)
Consequence: Possible exhaust fan damage due to surging
Consider stopping of exhaust fan (3600-FAN-100) if discharge damper (3600-ADVFXA-004) is closed

through interlock
Risk Ranking M
Resolution
By: By:
Date: Date:

HAZOP Report
HAZOP Study

Location Turaif
Problem Statement
Cause: Tripping of exhaust Fan (3600-FAN-100)
(3600-FAN-100) is tripped through interlock.
Risk Ranking M
Resolution
By: By:
Date: Date:

HAZOP Report
HAZOP Study

Location Turaif
Problem Statement
Risk Ranking M
Resolution
By: By:
Date: Date:

HAZOP Report
HAZOP Study

Location Turaif
Problem Statement
Risk Ranking M
Resolution
By: By:
Date: Date:

HAZOP Report
HAZOP Study

Location Turaif
Problem Statement
Deviation: Reverse Flow (Sludge)
Cause: Tripping/Stoppage of sludge pump
Consequence: Possible sludge pump damage due to reverse rotation
Consider providing interlock for closing HV-7302 in case of sludge pump (3600-PMP-300)
tripping/stoppage to avoid damage of sludge pump (3600- PMP-300) due to reverse flow
Risk Ranking M
Resolution
By: By:
Date: Date:

HAZOP Report
HAZOP Study

Location Turaif
Problem Statement
Node 2: Utilities
Deviation: Seal water failure
Cause: Inadvertent closure of battery limit isolation valve
Consequence: Possible mechanical seal damage of CTSFT pump (3600-PMP-200), Sludge pump
(3600-PMP-300) and Sump pump leading to loss of containment (LOC) with minor
environmental impact
Consider providing interlock for tripping of CTSFT pump (3600-PMP-200) in case of low low seal
water pressure
Risk Ranking M
Resolution
By: By:
Date: Date:

HAZOP Report
HAZOP Study

Location Turaif
Problem Statement
Node 2: Utilities
Deviation: Seal water failure
Cause: Inadvertent closure of battery limit isolation valve
Consequence: Possible mechanical seal damage of CTSFT pump (3600-PMP-200), Sludge pump
(3600-PMP-300) and Sump pump leading to loss of containment (LOC) with minor
environmental impact
Update P&ID (MD-512-3600- EG-PR-PID-3002) to reflect seal water battery limit valve as normally
open (NO) and isolation valve on CTSFT pump (3600-PMP-200) as normally open (NO)
Risk Ranking M
Resolution
By: By:
Date: Date:

HAZOP Report
HAZOP Study

Location Turaif
Problem Statement
Node 2: Utilities
Deviation: Power Failure
Cause: Primary power source failure
Consequence: Shutdown of all electrical equipment’s (Pumps, Blowers, Fan and Agitators)
with potential CO2 release from reactor vent
Ensure operator/working personnel carry portable gas detectors (O2 and CO2) all the time an
evacuate area in case of oxygen deficiency and update ERP accordingly. Also ensure area if free of
CO2 before startup of FSA treatment facility
Risk Ranking M
Assigned to: Operation Date: 31-07-2019
Resolution
By: By:
Date: Date:

HAZOP Report
HAZOP Study

Location Turaif
Problem Statement
Cause: Closure of damper (3600-ADFXA-001/002)
It is recommended to conduct LOPA workshop for assessing the SIL level of all proposed interlocks
and already implemented interlocks in the
DCS
Risk Ranking M
Assigned to: Engineering Date: 31-07-2019
Resolution
By: By:
Date: Date:

HAZOP Report
APPENDIX D – MARKED P&IDs

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
C03 MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3001
REV DRAWING NUMBER 3600-AGI-100/101/102/103/104/105 3600-REA-100/101 3600-BLW-100 / 101 3600-PMP-400
REACTOR AGITATORS REACTORS AIR BLOWERS SUMP PUMP
POWER : KW SIZE : H 5000 MM X ID 12000 MM DESIGN MAX. FLOWRATE : 8000 NM3/H DESIGN MAX. FLOWRATE : 60 M3/H
A A
VOLUME : 557 M3 POWER DRIVE RATED :250 KW POWER DRIVE RATED : 4 KW ( NOTE 1 )
I26B I9 I6 I1 I12 I26A TO I15, DESIGN PRESSURE : ATM

DISCHARGE PRESSURE: 1.5 BARA HEAD : 9.5 M
YS I21 SHEET 2,
NOTE 7 I23 SHEET 2
332
TO I21,I23 TO I21,I23
I9 I6 I1 I12 SHEET 2 SHEET 2 I1 I6
TO I17, HIGH HIGH
I22 SHEET 2 LEVEL
TO I15,
I3 I2 I9 I16, I6
LOW LOW
3600-ABAFBA-0007
I26B LEVEL
I15 I23 SHEET 2, HIGH HIGH
I21 SHEET 2 LEVEL
HH
HH
LIC H
DN 25
FQI FQI LIC H
NC
2202 2201 3201 I26A
3202 L
L
LL LL
B CTSFT 100-3600-CTSFT-AR09-004-NI B
100-3600-CTSFT-AR09-002-NI
002 MD-521-3600-EG-PR-PID-3002
3600-ABAFBA-0002
PG
3600-ABAFBA-0026
3600-ABAFBA-0014
FROM CTSFT PUMPS I6
FQIT FY 4101 I12
LOW LOW
2202 I16 2202 LEVEL
DN 25
FE FV
NC
TI NC
+
NO
+
2202 2202
3001 DN 25
FSA DN 50
100-3600 -FSA-AR09-003-NI
009 MD-512-3A50-EG-PR-PID-2004 M
100-3600 -FSA-AR09-001-NI
100-3600 -FSA-AR09-002-NI
NO NOTE 9 100X80 80X100 NO
FROM 200-23A50-FSA-AR09-0023-NI FSA LINE 3600-ABAFBA-0001 3600-ABAFBA-0003 3600-ABAFBA-0017 3600-ABAFBA-0006
DN 50 3600-ABAFBA-0004 DN 50 NC
DECANT WATER 3600-ABAFBA-0025 NC NC
MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3002 014 200-3600-WPR-AG40-007-NI C03
100-3600-CTSFT-AR09-003-NI
TO 3600-PMP-300 SUCTION LINE NC
NC I18
NOTE 5
DN 25 NOTE 11 I9 NOTE 10
1,2,3 H
3600-ABAFBA-0037
DN 50 PG LIA
200-3600-WPR-AG40-006-NI
C C03 C
4102 3203
3600-ABAFBA-0013
C03
3600-ABAFBA-0019
C03 L
DECANT WATER LIT I17 LIT
MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3004 029 200-3600-WPR-AG40-009-NI FQIT FY
3600-ABAFBA-0008
DN 25
2201 2201 3201 1,2,3 3202
NC
TO 3600-SKR-100 200X150 150X200 NC FE FV
3600-FL-100 DN 25 I14
NO
+ +
TI 2201 2201 3600-ABAFBA-0005 HIGH
3600-AKGFBA-0007
3002 NO LEVEL
DECANT WATER 250-3600-WPR-AG40-001-NI 250-3600-WPR-AG40-003-NI 250-3600-WPR-AG40-005-NI DN 50 I13
012 MD-512-07ZZ-EG-PR-PID-3001 M LOW
3600-AKGFBA-0004
FROM EXISTING DECANT POND WATER NO
NC
250X150 150X250 LEVEL
3600-ABAFBA-0027
3600-AKGFBA-0002 NOTE 9 3600-AKGFBA-0005
RETURN PUMPS HEADER NC 3600-ABAFBA-0022 DN 50
3600-ABAFBA-0023
NO
100-3600-WPR-AG40-022-NI
NOTE 11
DN 25
NO
250-3600-WPR-AG40-004-NI
NC NC 100-3600-SLG-AG16-008-NI
DN 25 DN 50
TI 3600-ABAFBA-0009 NC
C03 VSD NOTE 10
3003 C03 VSD VSD VSD VSD VSD CO2+AIR
DECANT WATER 1200-3600-SGO-GRPDUCT-001-NI
250-3600-WPR-AG40-002-NI 031 MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3004
D 013 MD-512-07ZZ-EG-PR-PID-2001 D
3600-ABAFBA-0036
FROM EXISTING DECANT POND WATER NC M M M NC M M M TO EXHAUST FAN 3600-FAN-100
3600-ABAFBA-0018
3600-AKGFBA-0003 DN 20
RETURN PUMPS STANDBY HEADER 300-3600-ATA-AA03-005-PP
DN 25
NC
3600-ABAFBA-0035
3600-ABAFBA-0021 CO2+AIR
NC DN 25 1200-3600-SGO-GRPDUCT-002.-NI
NC 030 MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3004
400-3600-ATA-AA03-003-PP DN 20
3600-AKGFBA-0006
3600-ADVFXA-001
3600-ABFFBA-0004
TO EXHAUST FAN 3600-FAN-100
3600-AKGFBA-0009
3600-ADVFXA-002
100-3600-WPR-AG40-021-NI
300-3600-ATA-AA03-004-PP DN 2500
DN 2500 DN 200 N 11 N 11
400 X 300 N9 TO I21,I23 DN 200 N9
NC I5
NOTE 8
NO
N 10 SHEET 2 LIT
NC
NO N 10 N8
NC NOTE 10 N8 HIGH PH
NO
NOTE 8
NOTE 11 TO I21,I23 DN 20 3600-AGARBA-011 N 13 3203
N 13
100-3600-WPR-AG40-008-NI
DN 20 SHEET 2 3600-ABAFBA-0024 N 12
N7 H
N 17 AI N 17 N7
3600-ABAFBA-0034 I4 N 16 1202
HIGH PH N 16
N1
C03 N1
300-3600-ATA-AA03-002-PP
E E
300-3600-ATA-AA03-001-PP
H
AI N4 100-3600-SLG-AG16-009-NI
1201 NC N4
3600-AKGFBA-0015 NC SLUDGE
3600-AKGFBA-0037 NC
3600-AKGFBA-0016 026 MD-520-3600-EG-PR-PID-3002
N3 N3
400-3600-SLG-AG16-004-NI TO SLUDGE PUMPS 3600-PMP-300/301
NO
3600-AGARBA-010
3600-AGARBA-009
3600-AKGFBA-0010
020-3600-WSW-AQ15-004-NI
AIT
3600-ACKFBA-0002
1201 AIT SEAL WATER

1202 MD-521-3600-EG-PR-PID-3002 ***
NO
NO
FROM EXISTING SEAL WATER SYSTEM

3600-ACKFBA-0001
I 28
400-3600-SLG-AG16-012-NI
400-3600-SLG-AG16-011-NI
C03
C03 PH
PG PG AE
CO
PH CO
NOTE 9
1201 AE
100-3600-SLG-AG16-007-NI
4103 4104
F DN20 DN20 1202 I19 I 20 F
3600-ABAFBA-0020 3600-ABAFBA-0010 3600-AGI-100/101/102 3600-AGI-103/104/105
N 14 N 14
NO 3600-AGARBA-0037
TO I25 DN 50 DN 50
SHEET 4 NOTE 4
3600-BLW-100 3600-BLW-101
3600-AKGFBA-0036
I24 NOTE 4
300-3600-SLG-AG16-002-NI
3600-AKGFBA-0011 3600-REA-100 3600-REA-101
1,2
NO
N5 NOTE 5 NOTE 5 N5
200-3600-SLG-AG16-005-NI 200-3600-SLG-AG16-006-NI
80 X 100
NO NO
NC N2 N2 3600-AKGFBA-0014 M
NC NC
3600-AKGFBA-0035 M
3600-AKGFBA-0012 3600-AKGFBA-0013
300-3600-SLG-AG16-001-NI
G G
NOTES :
1- TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPPLIERS
2- THE RETENTION DYKE IS DESIGNED FOR 110% ONE REACTOR CAPACITY NOTE 2
3600-AGI-106 3600-PMP-400
MD-512-3600-EG-SR-DGA-3001
3- OVER FLOW LINE IS TO BE PROVIDED WITH GOOSE NECK OR AN OPEN TROUGH IN CASE OF FOAM GENERATION
4- WEIR IS PROVIDED TO AVOID BYPASS FROM THE INLET TO THE OUTLET WHICH WOULD LIMIT THE RESIDENCE TIME OF THE PRODUCT AND TO REMOVE THE SOLID PARTICLES WHICH TEND TO BE PRESENT AT THE BOTTOM OF THE REACTOR NO
5- AIR SPARGERS ARE REMOVABLE AND EQUIPPED WITH FLANGES FOR EASY OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 3600-AKGFBA-0038
6- ALL INSTRUMENTS TAGS SHALL BE PREFIXED BY FACILITY BREAKDOWN CODE 3600.
7- FOUR (04) OPERATING MODES ARE PROVIDED FOR OPERATOR SELECTION VIA THE SELECTOR SWITCH 3600-YI-0500 LOCATED ON REACTORS PANEL. FOR DETAILS OF OPERATING MODES, REFER TO OPERATING AND CONTROL PHILOSOPHY (DOC NO. MD-512-3600-EG-PR-RPT-3004)
8-DAMPER VALVES TO BE LOCKED OPEN TYPE
Node 01 FSA
9- ISOLATING SPOOL
10- PIPE TO FLOOR DRAIN
11- PIPE TO DRAINAGE COLLECTOR
Treatment Package ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION
CONTRACTOR: DRAWN KCH 19/07/18
C03 19.07.18 ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION GHH KCH JI
PROPRIETARY & CONFIDENTIAL NESMA & PARTNERS UMM WU'AL PHOSPHATE PROJECT
CONTRACTING CO. CHECKED 19/07/18 FSA TREATMENT PACKAGE 6.25
C02 11.05.18 ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION GHH KCH JI GHH
This document and the information contained P.O. Box 1498, Al-khobar 31952 PIPING & INSTRUMENTATION DIAGRAMS
H C01 21.03.18 ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION GHH KCH JI herein is Ma'aden proprietary know-how. Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia ENGINEER KCH 19/07/18 SHEET 1 H
This document or any part thereof should not Telephone: +966 (13) 897 1050
A06 12.03.18 ISSUED FOR 30 % REVIEW GHH KCH JI
16:00
be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system

13.10.17 ISSUED FOR 30 % REVIEW SUB-CONTRACTOR: APPROVED JI 19/07/18
A05 GHH KCH JI or transmitted by any means, electronic or
otherwise, or divulged without prior written ENGINEERING PROCUREMENT &
A04 16.08.17 ISSUED FOR 30 % REVIEW GHH KCH JI permission of Ma'aden. PROJECT MANAGEMENT S.A EMPLOYER
A03 09.06.17 ISSUED FOR 30 % REVIEW GHH KCH JI Silver Street, Fatma Building. Lake gardens DRAWING NUMBER REV
SCALE
DOCUMENT NUMBER REFERENCE DOCUMENTS REV DATE REVISION DESCRIPTION DRN CHK ENG APP EMP
1053 Tunis-TUNISIA -
P: (+216) 71 16 81 00 / F : (+216) 71 19 09 18 A1 MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3001 C03
06.06.17
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
C03 MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3002
REV DRAWING NUMBER
Interlock Description
3600-PMP-200 3600-PMP-300
High High level in reactor 1 close FV-2201
CTSFT CHARGING PUMP ( WITH VFD ) SLUDGE PUMP (WITH VFD)
A
I1 A
DESIGN MAX. FLOWRATE : 51 M3/H DESIGN MAX. FLOWRATE : 435 M3/H High High level in reactor 1 close HV-7301
POWER DRIVE RATED : 20 KW ( NOTE 4 ) POWER DRIVE RATED : 152.5 KW ( NOTE 4 )
High Highlevel in reactor 1 stop pump 3600-PMP-200
I2 Flow control in DECANT WATER feed line
HEAD : 55.2 M HEAD : 96.8 M I3 Flow control in FSA inlet line
I4 High PH in REACTOR 1
I5 High PH in REACTOR 2
I8 I1 I6 I4 I5 I2 I3 High High level in reactor 2 close FV-2201
I6
High High level in reactor 2 close HV-7301
LL LEVEL FROM LIT-1401 I 10 I21 I7 High High level in reactor 2 stop pump 3600-PMP-200
I7 Flow control in CTSFT feed line
PIA (OPEN) (CLOSED) I8 Suction low pressure stop pump 3600-PMP-200
B B
4201 ZLO ZLC FQI Low Low Level in reactor 1 stop pump 3600-PMP-300 and Agitator
L I4 I5 I2 I3 I1 I9
7301 7301 2203 3600-AGI-100/101/102
VSD
I10 low low level in CTSFT tank 21A61-TNK-010 stop pump 3600-PMP-200
PG
3600-ABAFBA-0011
PIT I11 Section low pressure stop pump 3600-PMP-300 to stop
3600-ABAFBA-0016
4105 I6 I 23 ZSO ZSL FQIT
4201 Low Low Level in reactor 2 stop pump 3600-PMP-300 and Agitator
M 7301 7301 2203 I12
3600-AGI-103/104/105
NO
FE
NO
HV +
I13 Low level stop sump pump 3600-PMP-400 and agitator 3600-AGI-106
+
TI 7301 2203 I14 High level start agitator 3600-AGI-106

DN50 CTSFT
3004 DN 50 100-3600-CTSFT-AR09-002-NI I15 Control valve FV-7202 interlock
CTSFT M 002 MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3001
100-3600-CTSFT-AR09-001-NI I16 Control valve FV-7201 interlock
001 MD-512-1A61-EG-PR-PID-2015 40 X 100 NO TO REACTORS (3600-REA-100/101)
FROM EXISTING CTSFT TANK 21A61 NO 100 X 80 DN100 3600-AKGFBA-0025 I17-1 Agitator 3600-AGI-100 interlock
3600-AKGFBA-0017 3600-AKGFBA-0021 NC I17-2 Agitator 3600-AGI-101 interlock
-TNK-010
3600-AKGFBA-0019
C C
NC
AR 09 3600-PMP-200 I17-3 Agitator 3600-AGI-102 interlock

AA 02 DN100 3600-AGARBA-0015
NOTE 1 I18-1 Agitator 3600-AGI-103 interlock
3600-AKGFBA-0020 NC
NC DN 25 I18-2 Agitator 3600-AGI-104 interlock
100-3600-WRW-AA02-001-NI
3600-AGARBA-0014
I18-3 Agitator 3600-AGI-105 interlock
3600-ABAFBA-0030
I19 Agitator 3600-AGI-106 interlock

NOTE 1 NC TI I20 Pump 3600-PMP-400 interlock
DN 20
3005
DN 25 SEAL WATER I21 Pump 3600-PMP-200 interlock
TI NC NC
025-3600-WSW-AQ15-002-NI 025-3600-WSW-AQ15-001-NI MD-512-1A61-EG-PR-PID-2015 006 I22 Pump 3600-PMP-300 interlock
3013 DN 20
RECIRCULATING WATER I23 On/off valve HV-7301 interlock
3600-AGARBA-0009 FROM EXISTING SEAL WATER SYSTEM
MD-512-1A61-EG-PR-PID-2020 NC I24-1 air blower 3600-BLW-100 interlock
DN 20
DN 20
FROM 150-21A61-WRW-AA02-722-NI I11 I9 I12 I26A I26B NC I24-2 air blower 3600-BLW-101 interlock
3600-AGARBA-0013 NOTE 1
D NOTE 5 3600-AGARBA-0031 I25 Exhaust fan interlock D
NC I26A 3600-PMP-300 VSD control via LIC-3202
NC I27 DN 20 (OPEN) (CLOSED)
I26B 3600-PMP-300 VSD control via LIC-3201
DECANT WATER
DN 25 I 22 3600-AKGFBA-0027
200-3600-WPR-AG40-006-NI 3600-ABAFBA-0037 PIA ZLO ZLC I27 Low seal water pressure stop pump 3600-PMP-300
012 MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3001 4202 PG NC 7302 7302 I28 Low seal water pressure stop pump 3600-PMP-400
C03 L DN 20
200-3600-WPR-AG40-007-NI
FROM DECANT WATER(FOR FLUSHING) VSD 4106

NC
3600-ABAFBA-0012
PIT 3600-AKGFBA-0028
NOTE 5 ZSO ZSL
3600-ABAFBA-0015
DN 50 4202 NC 7302 7302

M
3600-AKGFBA-0023
3600-ABAFBA-0036 DN 20
NO
NOTE 1 HV TI
NO
3600-AGARBA-0030 7302 3006

DN 50 SLUDGE
NC
350-3600-SLG-AT21-010-NI
SLUDGE DN50 HOLD
E 300-3600-SLG-AG16-003-NI E
021 MD-512-1A61-EG-PR-PID-0001 150 X 300 TO THE TOP OF THE GYPSUM STACK
NOTE 2 300X200 DN100
NO DN100 PIT PIA
FROM FIRST OR SECOND REACTORS PIT PIA NC I28 TO I20
NC 3600-AKGFBA-0025
3600-AKGFBA-0022 NC 3600-AKGFBA-0041 4204 4204 SHEET 1 Node 01 FSA
3600-AGARBA-0011
4203 4203
3600-AGARBA-0012
DN100 3600-PMP-300
3600-AGARBA-0010
NOTE 1 C03 Treatment Package

3600-AKGFBA-0040 NOTE 1 NC
NOTE : NOTE 1 DN 20
DN 50
DN 50
NO
C03
NO
1- PIPE TO FLOOR DRAIN

2- WHEN FIRST/ SECOND REACTOR IS OUT OF LINE SLUDGE
STREAM IS PUMPED FROM FIRST / SECOND REACTOR 020-3600-WSW-AQ15-003-NI SEAL WATER
020-3600-WSW-AQ15-004-NI
3-ALL INSTRUMENTS TAGS SHALL BE PREFIXED BY FACILITY BREAKDOWN CODE 3600. MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3001
4- TO BE CONFIRMED BY SUPPLIER NO NC
3600-AGARBA-0002 C03 DN 20 NO TO SUMP PUMP (3600-PMP-400)
5- PIPE TO DRAINAGE COLLECTOR 3600-AGLRBA-0001 3600-AGLRBA-0002
F
NO
CONTRACTOR:
NOTE 1
3600-AGARBA-0032 ISSUED
KCH
FOR CONSTRUCTION F
C03 17/07/18 ISSUED FOR 60 % REVIEW GHH KCH JI DRAWN 17/07/18
NESMA & PARTNERS UMM WU'AL PHOSPHATE PROJECT
CONTRACTING CO. CHECKED GHH 17/07/18 FSA TREATMENT PACKAGE 6.25
C02 11.05.18 ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION GHH KCH JI P.O. Box 1498, Al-khobar 31952
Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia ENGINEER KCH 17/07/18 PIPING & INSTRUMENTATION DIAGRAMS
Telephone: +966 (13) 897 1050
C01 21.03.18 ISSUED FOR 60 % REVIEW GHH KCH JI JI SHEET 2
SUB-CONTRACTOR: APPROVED 17/07/18
ENGINEERING PROCUREMENT &
A06 16.08.17 ISSUED FOR 60 % REVIEW GHH KCH JI PROJECT MANAGEMENT S.A EMPLOYER
DRAWING NUMBER REV
Silver Street, Fatma Building. Lake gardens MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3002
SCALE A2
DOCUMENT NUMBER REFERENCE DOCUMENTS REV DATE REVISION DESCRIPTION DRN CHK ENG APP EMP 1053 Tunis-TUNISIA - P: (+216) 71 16 81 00 / F : (+216) 71 19 09 18 C03
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
This document and the information contained herein is Ma'aden proprietary know-how. This document or any part thereof should not be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electronic or otherwise, or divulged without prior written permission of Ma'aden.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3003 C03
MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3002
TO FLOW CONTROL VALVE FV-2201
MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3001
TO FLOW CONTROL VALVE FV-2202
MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3001
REV DRAWING NUMBER
TO ON-OFF VALVE HV-7302

A A
INSTRUMENT AIR
INSTRUMENT AIR
INSTRUMENT AIR
3600-ABARRA-002
3600-ABARRA-012
3600-ABARRA-003
3600-ABARRA-005
DN 25
DN 25
NC
DN25
NO
NO
NO
DN 20
050-3600-IAS-AP10-001-NI
INSTRUMENT AIR
80-23C20-IAS-AP10-0006-NI 3600-ABARRA-001
B MD-512-39AA-EG-PR-PID-2055 DN 20 B
FROM EXISTING INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM 3600-ABARRA-013 NC
TI
3010 NOTE 1
INSTRUMENT AIR
TUBING
MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3002
TO ON-OFF VALVE HV-7301
TI
3012
C C
3600-ABARRA-009
NC
DN 20
PLANT AIR
040-3600-PRA-AZ02-001-NI
HOLD
PLANT AIR 3600-ABARRA-006 3600-ABARRA-007 TO UTILITIES STATION
50-23C20-PAS-AZ02-0233-NI
MD-512-39AB-EG-PR-PID-2035 3600-ABARRA-014 NC
DN 20
FROM EXISTING AIR SYSTEM 3600-ABARRA-011 Node 02 Utilities
TI NC
3009 DN 50 NOTE 1
SERVICE WATER
050-3600-WRS-AG13-001-NI
HOLD
SERVICE WATER 3600-ABARRA-008 C03 3600-ABARRA-0017
80-23C20-WRS-AG13-0233-NI
D MD-512-3C80-EG-PR-PID-2005 TO UTILITIES STATION D
3600-ABARRA-010 NC POTABLE WATER
FROM EXISTING SERVICE WATER SYSTEM DN 50 040-3600-WPD-AP12-002-IC
HOLD
TI 3600-AGARBA-0001 TO EYE WASH 3600-LEB-100 AND SAFETY SHOWER
3008 3600-AGARBA-0008 NOTE 1 POTABLE WATER
040-3600-WPD-AP12-003-IC
NC HOLD
DN 20
3600-AGARBA-0002 TO EYE WASH 3600-LEB-101 AND SAFETY SHOWER
050-3600-WPD-AP12-001-IC
POTABLE WATER 3600-AGARBA-0006 C03 POTABLE WATER
080-239MA-WPD-AP12-0010-IC 3600-AGARBA-0007 NC 040-3600-WPD-AP12-004-IC
MD-512-39WG-EG-PR-PID-2015 HOLD
DN 20
FROM EXISTING POTABLE WATER SYSTEM 3600-AGARBA-0003 TO EYE WASH 3600-LEB-102 AND SAFETY SHOWER
POTABLE WATER
E TI NOTE 1 040-3600-WPD-AP12-005-IC E
3007 HOLD
3600-AGARBA-0004 TO EYE WASH 3600-LEB-103 AND SAFETY SHOWER
POTABLE WATER
040-3600-WPD-AP12-006-IC
HOLD
C03 3600-AGARBA-0005 TO EYE WASH 3600-LEB-104 AND SAFETY SHOWER
POTABLE WATER 3600-AGARBA-0018 POTABLE WATER
80-21A61-WPD-AG14-522-IC
HOLD 040-3600-WPD-AP12-007-IC
HOLD
FROM EXISTING POTABLE WATER SYSTEM
TO EYE WASH 3600-LEB-105 AND SAFETY SHOWER
TI
NOTE:
1- TO DRAINAGE COLLECTOR
3011
ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION
F CONTRACTOR: DRAWN KCH 19/07/18 F
C03 19.07.18 ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION NESMA & PARTNERS UMM WU'AL PHOSPHATE PROJECT
CONTRACTING CO. CHECKED GHH 19/07/18 FSA TREATMENT PACKAGE 6.25
C02 11.05.18 ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION GHH KCH JI P.O. Box 1498, Al-khobar 31952
Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia ENGINEER KCH 19/07/18 PIPING & INSTRUMENTATION DIAGRAMS
Telephone: +966 (13) 897 1050
C01 21.03.18 ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION GHH KCH JI SUB-CONTRACTOR: APPROVED JI 19/07/18 SHEET 3
DRAWING NUMBER REV
Silver Street, Fatma Building. Lake gardens SCALE A2 MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3003 C03
DOCUMENT NUMBER REFERENCE DOCUMENTS REV DATE REVISION DESCRIPTION DRN CHK ENG APP EMP 1053 Tunis-TUNISIA - P: (+216) 71 16 81 00 / F : (+216) 71 19 09 18
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
C01 MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3004
REV DRAWING NUMBER
3600-FAN-100 3600-SKR-100
A A
EXHAUST FAN STACK
DESIGN MAX. FLOWRATE : 30000 NM3/H DIAMETER : 1.2 M (NOTE 4)

POWER : 6 KW (NOTE 3) HEIGHT : 20 M (NOTE 4)
100-3600-WPR-AG40-010-NI
ESP : 600 PA
40-3600-WPR-AG40-014-NI
NOTE 2
NOTE 1
40-3600-WPR-AG40-016-NI
40-3600-WPR-AG40-017-NI
40-3600-WPR-AG40-015-NI
40-3600-WPR-AG40-013-NI
20X40
B B
CO2+ AIR
1200-3600-SGO-GRPDUCT-001-NI
MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3001
FROM REACTOR 1 3600-REA-100 NOTE 1
NOTE 1
40-3600-WPR-AG40-012-NI
NOTE 1
20X40
NOTE 1
Node 01 FSA
CO2 + AIR
Treatment Package
80-3600-WPR-AG40-011-NI
1200-3600-SGO-GRPDUCT-002-NI
MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3001
NOTE 1
FROM REACTOR 2 3600-REA-101
C C
1200-3600-SGO-GRPDUCT-003.-NI
100-3600-WPR-AG40-010-NI
100-3600-WPR-AG40-018-NI
FROM I24 I24

SHEET 1
1,2
3600-AKGFBA-0030
D I 25 D
C01
200-3600-WPR-AG40-009-NI DECANT WATER
1200-3600-SGO-GRPDUCT-004-NI MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3001 29
3600-AKGFBA-0034
NC FROM FLASHING DECANT WATER

3600-ADVFXA-004 3600-AKGFBA-0028 SERVICE
100-3600-WPR-AG40-020-NI
DN 100 3600-ADVFXA-003 3600-AKGFBA-0029
NC DN 100
3600-FAN-100 NC
100-3600-WPR-AG40-019-NI 3600-SKR-100
E E
NOTE 4
SEAL POT
NOTE 5 NOTE 4
NOTE 4
NOTE :
1- SPRAY NOZZLES
2- OPENING ORIENTATION TO THE WEST
3- TO BE CONFIRMED / COMPLETED BY SUPPLIER
4- PIPE ROUTED TO FLOOR DRAIN
ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION

5- SEAL POT SIZING : H/L/L : 60 CM/ 60 CM/ 60 CM FROM BOTTOM OF DRAIN LINE
F CONTRACTOR: KCH F
C01 11.05.18 ISSUED FOR CONSTRUCTION NESMA & PARTNERS
DRAWN 11/05/18
CONTRACTING CO. GHH UMM WU'AL PHOSPHATE PROJECT
P.O. Box 1498, Al-khobar 31952
CHECKED 11/05/18 FSA TREATMENT PACKAGE 6.25
A03 13.03.18 ISSUED FOR 60 % REVIEW GHH KCH JI Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia KCH
Telephone: +966 (13) 897 1050
ENGINEER 11/05/18 PIPING & INSTRUMENTATION DIAGRAMS
A02 13.10.17 ISSUED FOR 60 % REVIEW GHH KCH JI SUB-CONTRACTOR: APPROVED JI 11/05/18 SHEET 4
DRAWING NUMBER REV
Silver Street, Fatma Building. Lake gardens SCALE
DOCUMENT NUMBER REFERENCE DOCUMENTS REV DATE REVISION DESCRIPTION DRN CHK ENG APP EMP 1053 Tunis-TUNISIA - P: (+216) 71 16 81 00 / F : (+216) 71 19 09 18 A2 MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3004 C01
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

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FSA Treatment Facility

Consultant: Vanguard Solutions Middle East

Revision Date Description Originator Checked Approved

DCS Distributed Control System

FSA Flourosilicic Acid

ERP Emergency Response Plan

HAZOP Hazard and Operability Study

Vanguard Solutions Middle East (DMCC) Page 2

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................... 4

Appendix A – Attendance Sheet

Vanguard Solutions Middle East (DMCC) Page 3

Recommendations Responsibility Risk Ranking

1. Update P&ID (MD-512-3600-EG-PR-PID-3002) to reflect PMT Medium

Vanguard Solutions Middle East (DMCC) Page 4

Recommendations Responsibility Risk Ranking

In the opinion of HAZOP Chairman:

Vanguard Solutions Middle East (DMCC) Page 5

2.1. FSA Treatment Project Background

2.2. FSA Treatment Facility Process Description

Vanguard Solutions Middle East (DMCC) Page 6

Vanguard Solutions Middle East (DMCC) Page 7

3. HAZOP STUDY METHODOLOGY

3.2. HAZOP Assessment

3.3. Terms in HAZOP Study

HAZOP Term Description

A section of a process unit generally consisting of piping and vessels that

3.4. Guide Words in HAZOP Study

Vanguard Solutions Middle East (DMCC) Page 8

Vanguard Solutions Middle East (DMCC) Page 9

Figure 3-1: Typical HAZOP Methodology

Vanguard Solutions Middle East (DMCC) Page 10

3.6. Risk Ranking

Table 3-3: Hazard Severity Levels

Ranking Severity Description

Safety Multiple fatalities of staff, contractors or the public

Single Fatality, Serious injury or occupational illness (non-

Lost time or restricted injury or occupational illness

Vanguard Solutions Middle East (DMCC) Page 11

Table 3-4: Probability Levels

B Likely - High, may arise about once per year

C Possible - Possible, may arise at least once in a 1 to 10 years period

D Unlikely - Not impossible, likely to occur during the next 10 to 25 years

E Rare - Very Low, very Unlikely during the next 25 years

Table 3-5: Risk Matrix

1 Medium Medium High High Extreme

2 Medium Medium Medium High Extreme

3 Low Medium Medium High High

4 Low Low Medium Medium High

5 Low Low Medium Medium Medium

Table 3-6: Risk Tolerability Guidelines

Risk Ranking Description

Extreme Countermeasures required immediately else stop operation immediately

High Countermeasures required to reduce risk to acceptable level

Medium Countermeasures required to reduce risk to acceptable level

Low Operation permissible but risk elements should eventually be addressed

Vanguard Solutions Middle East (DMCC) Page 12

3.7. HAZOP Study Records