Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 15 (2002) 467–475

www.elsevier.com/locate/jlp

A criterion for developing credible accident scenarios for risk

assessment
Faisal I Khan a, S A Abbasi b,∗
a
Faculty of Engineering and Applied Sciences, The Memorial University of Newfoundland, St John, NF, Canada, A1B 3X5
b
Computer Aided Environmental Management Unit, Centre for Pollution Control & Energy Technology, Pondicherry University, Pondicherry-
605 014, India

Abstract

Maximum credible accident analysis is one of the most widely used concepts in risk assessment of chemical process industries.
Central to this concept is the aspect of ‘credibility’ of envisaged accident scenarios. However, thus far the term credibility is mostly
treated qualitatively, based on the subjective judgement of the concerned analysts. This causes wide variation in the results of the
studies conducted on the same industrial unit by different analysts.
This paper presents an attempt to develop a criterion using which credible accident scenarios may be identified from among a
large number of possibilities. The credible scenarios thus identified may then be processed for detailed consequence analysis. This
would help in reducing the cost of the analysis and prevent undue emphasis on less credible scenarios at the expense of more
credible ones.
 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Accident scenarios; Maximum credible accident analysis; Risk assessment; Industrial accidents

1. Introduction 2. Delineation of maximum credible accident scenario.

One of the most powerful and widely used concepts
in several risk assessment methodologies (Fig. 1)—
specifically in maximum credible accident analysis
(MCAA) and quantitative risk analysis (QRA)—is the
concept of credible accident scenarios. These authors
and others have described the use of this concept (Kletz,
1985; Arendt, 1990, Van Sciver, 1990; Popazaglou, Niv-
oliantiou, & Christou, 1992; Suokas, 1988; Khan &
Abbasi, 1995, 1996, 1997a,b; 1998, 1999, 2001). It
essentially involves following steps (Fig. 2):
1. Development of credible accident scenarios. For the
units of any industry being analysed, a set of scen-
arios are developed for accidents which are ‘credible’;
the credibility being qualitatively understood as a
combination of likelihood (of occurrence) and scale
(of damage potential).
Corresponding author. Tel.: +91 413 655263; fax: +91 413
∗ credibility are mostly qualitative, based on the subjective
655227/655265.
E-mail address: profFabbasi@vsnl.com (S.A. Abbasi).
Based on the credibility of the accident scenarios they
are ranked, and maximum credible accident scenarios
are identified.
3. Damage calculations through mathematical model-
ling. The impact of these scenarios—for example
explosion followed by a fire ball—is then studied
using available models of explosion, boiling liquid
expanding vapour cloud explosion (BLEVE), con-
fined vapour cloud explosion (CVCE), vapour cloud
explosion (VCE) and fire ball.
4. Risk estimation. Based on the damage potential esti-
mated in the previous step and the probability of
occurrence of these credible accident scenarios, risk
factors are estimated.
Central to these steps is the aspect of ‘credibility’. A
‘credible’ accident is one which is within the realm of
possibility and which is also likely to be severe enough
to cause significant damage. However thus far the
aspects of reasonable probability and significance of
judgement of the analyst. This causes wide variation in
the results of same study conducted by different analysts

0950-4230/02/$ - see front matter.  2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
PII: S 0 9 5 0 - 4 2 3 0 ( 0 2 ) 0 0 0 5 0 - 5
468 F.I. Khan, S.A. Abbasi / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 15 (2002) 467–475

Fig. 1. A typical set of risk assessment methodologies.

(Contini, Amendal, & Ziomas, 1992). A little error or
ignorance in these subjective judgements (in particular
the development of accident scenarios) would cause
erroneous results or may cause failure of the study. The
more realistic the accident scenario, the more accurate
is forecasting the type of accident, its consequences, and
associated risks. This would help in the development of
more appropriate and effective strategies for crisis pre-
vention and management.
Thus it is required to have some systematic procedure
to envisage all the probable accident scenarios, and
further to decide which are the most credible ones.
2. Maximum credible accident scenarios
2.1. Development of accident scenarios and their
credibility
2.1.1. Accident scenarios
An accident scenario is a description of an expected
situation. It contains single events or combinations of
events. The expectation of a scenario does not mean it
will indeed occur, but that there is a reasonable prob-
ability that it would occur. A scenario is neither a spe-
cific situation nor a specific event, but a description of
 F.I. Khan, S.A. Abbasi / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 15 (2002) 467–475 469

Fig. 2. Steps involved in developing a maximum credible accident scenario.

a typical situation that covers a set of possible events or 앫 poisoning of people

situations (Fig. 3). It is the basis of risk study; it tells
us what may happen so that we can devise ways and
means of preventing or minimising the possibility. A
scenario can influence several aspects of the design.
Example: An expected leak of toxic/flammable chemi-
cal can affect
앫 location of gas detectors
앫 location of ESD valves and other valves
앫 insulation of equipment
앫 load to structure/equipment
앫 operational procedures
앫 location of fire fighting equipment
앫 emergency preparedness equipment
Accident scenario forms a focal point of the heuristic
process. It enables the use of the wisdom of hindsight
(experiences of past accidents) and state-of-the-art
knowledge (to evaluate its impact) in forecasting acci-
dent situations (Fig. 3). The forecast is fed back to the
past and the present knowledge for generating new
knowledge. Accident scenario is thus a reference point
as well as a link between the past, present, and future.
470 F.I. Khan, S.A. Abbasi / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 15 (2002) 467–475
Fig. 3. Specific inputs to an accident scenario.
Such scenarios are generated based on the properties
of chemicals handled by the industry, physical con-
ditions under which reactions occur or reactants/products
are stored, geometries and material strengths of vessel
and conduits, in-built valves and safety arrangements
etc. External factors such as site characteristics
(topography, presence of trees, ponds, rivers in the vicin-
ity, proximity to other industries or neighbourhoods etc.)
and meteorological conditions should also be considered.
Contini, Amendal, and Ziomas (1991) reported a
benchmark exercise undertaken with the aim of
assessing the state-of-the-art in risk analysis. A study of
the accidental release and dispersion of ammonia from
a pressurised and refrigerated tank was performed by 11
different risk assessment teams drawn from different
countries. The teams used different software for release
and dispersion estimation. A total of eight different acci-
dent scenarios was generated by the teams:
1. Release of ammonia, through a small hole or a press-
ure relief valve, from the vapour space of a pressur-
ised ammonia storage tank.
2. Catastrophic failure of a pressurised ammonia stor-
age tank.
3. Release of ammonia, through the pressure relief
valves or a small hole, from the vapour space of the
refrigerated ammonia tank.
4. Large spill of refrigerated ammonia on the ground,
from the bottom of the refrigerated ammonia tank.
5. Release of ammonia, through a large hole on the roof
of the refrigerated tank.
6. Spill of ammonia into the annuls of the refrigerated
ammonia tank.
7. Release of ammonia through a rupture of the under-
ground ammonia transfer pipeline.
8. Spill of ammonia onto and under water, at the island.
 F.I. Khan, S.A. Abbasi / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 15 (2002) 467–475
Among these, the most common accident scenarios
studied were:
앫 catastrophic failure of a pressurised storage tank,
앫 release of ammonia through a large hole on the roof.
These accident scenarios were selected for detailed
study based on their damage potential. However, if one
considers likelihood of occurrence also as one of the
parameters in the selection of scenarios for detailed
study, the results would be different from the ones
arrived at by the study team described by Contini et al.
(1992), and Khan and Abbasi (1997a,b, 1998). The scen-
ario release of ammonia, through a small hole or a
pressure relief valve, from the vapour space of a press-
urised ammonia storage tank has maximum probability
of occurrence and also sufficient potential to cause sig-
nificant damage. These aspects make this scenario ‘the
most credible’. Scenarios 2, 4, and 5 are also credible
and should be studied in detail.
Furthermore, among the two accident scenarios
(catastrophic failure of a pressurised storage tank, and
release of ammonia through a large hole on the roof)
studied in detail by the different study teams, the first
accident scenario was modelled as a two-phase release
of ammonia in bulk followed by denser-than-air-gas dis-
persion. The second scenario was modelled as a continu-
ous two-phase release followed by denser-than-air-gas
dispersion. However, in the opinion of the authors the
two worst accident scenarios can be refined further. The
catastrophic failure of vessel will occur only through
BLEVE (boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion) or
CVCE (confined vapour cloud explosion) because
ammonia is stored under high pressure in a liquefied
state. The explosive release will lead to overpressure and
shock-wave generation. These would create high turbu-
lence in the atmosphere and strongly influence the pro-
cess of dispersion of ammonia. The adverse conse-
quences would be over pressure, and toxic dispersion
under changed atmospheric conditions. But the study
team has totally neglected the overpressure effect and
change in atmospheric conditions.
2.2. Credibility of accident scenarios
A credible accident is defined as ‘the accident which
is within the realm of possibility (i.e., probability higher
than 1∗e⫺06/yr) and has a propensity to cause significant
damage (at least one fatality)’. This concept (Hagon,
1984; HSE, 1988; Ale, 1991; Lees, 1996) comprises
both probable damage caused by an accident and prob-
ability of its occurrence. There may be a type of accident
which may occur very frequently but would cause little
damage. And there may be another type of accident
which may cause great damage but would have very low
probability of occurrence. Both are not ‘credible’. But
471
accidents which have appreciable probability of occur-
rence as well as significant damage potential (as quant-
ified above) come under the category of ‘credible acci-
dents’.
Therefore a credible accident scenario should contain
two sets of information: a description of the situation
and the probability of occurrence. The description of the
situation must not reduce the freedom of finding sol-
utions and must not restrict the means available for sol-
ution. A good accident scenario should describe the most
prime cause of an event. As an example: define a leak
rate instead of explosion pressure because here, one
could go further and describe the cause of the leak as
well.
There may be a number of accidents, which occur
quite frequently, but due to proper control measures, or
involvement of less quantity, have been controlled effec-
tively. A few examples of such accidents are:
1. leak from gasket,
2. leak from pump or valve,
3. release of chemical from vent or relief valve,
4. fire in pump due to over heating, etc.
These accidents have generally been controlled before
they escalate, as control and monitoring equipment is
placed there, due to the known fact that they may fail
or malfunction—leading to a problem. Whereas, there
are less problematic areas/units which are generally
ignored or not given due attention. It is because in the
past not many accidents or even no accident being
reported. In such situations even a small leak may lead
to a disastrous accident. If one analyses the past acci-
dents, it reveals that most of the catastrophic accidents
have occurred in ignorance and in particular areas either
marked green (not very hazardous) or the control
arrangements were inadequate. The disaster at Vishakh-
apatnam is the current example which proves that most
of the risk and hazard studies are lacking in envisaging
credible accident scenarios, therefore the control meas-
ures and/or emergency plans are not so effective.
2.3. The MCS process
The sequential steps of MCS Methodology are
presented in Fig. 2.
The process starts with the development of all plaus-
ible accident scenarios in the unit (Fig. 3). In the second
step damage radii are calculated for each accident scen-
ario. This can be done using either Dow’s fire and
explosion index (Dow FEI), mond toxic index, or the
fire and explosion damage index (FEDI) and toxic dam-
age index (TDI). In the subsequent step, the probability
of each accident scenario is estimated. This can be done
either using the industry’s specific data (failure rates of
various components used in the process unit) or using
472 F.I. Khan, S.A. Abbasi / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 15 (2002) 467–475
the data available in literature (frequencies of occurrence
of various events under different conditions). This pro-
cedure of probability estimation is easy but it is a little
crude and has been subject to criticism. However, we
feel that, as the objective is to get a rough estimate of
probability, this procedure is adequate. The more accur-
ate estimation of probability would be done in the sub-
sequent step of risk assessment. The use of more reliable
methods of probability estimation e.g. fault tree analysis,
not only requires large sets of data but also large compu-
tational time, and cost. These are not justifiable at this
stage of accident scenario development.
Once damage radii and probabilities are known, two
factors, A and B are estimated using site-specific infor-
mation such as population density, asset value, etc. The
procedure to estimate is elaborated as under:
Factor A may be estimated for each accident scenario
using the following equation.
Ai ⫽ (damage radii)i∗
(probability of occurrence)i∗
(asset density)i
A⫽ [1⫺(1⫺A1)∗ (1⫺A2)∗
(1⫺A3)………(1⫺Ai)]
Similarly Factor B may be estimated for each acci-
dent scenario.
Bi ⫽ (damage radius)i∗
(probability of occurrence)i∗
(asset density)i
B⫽ [1⫺(1⫺B1)∗ (1⫺B2)∗
(1⫺B3)………(1⫺Bi)]
Where, i specifies the events in the accident scenario.
These two factors are then combined to give factor C,
which represents credibility of the accident scenario.
C ⫽ (A2 ⫹ B2)1/2
The higher the value of C more credible the acci-
dent scenario.
2.4. Delineation of maximum credible accident
scenarios
Once all the credible accident scenarios have been
identified, they are further studied to decide the most
credible ones. The most credible accident scenarios are
those which have high damage potential as well as high
probability of occurrence. There may be scenarios which
may have damage potential higher than the most credible
ones but due to their low probability of occurrence may
not qualify as credible.
This step helps in further shortlisting important acci-
dent scenarios. The short listed accident scenarios (most
credible ones) may be further processed for damage
potential estimations, risk estimation, and finally to
develop hazard mitigation/minimisation and/or disaster
management strategies.
The term most credible is defined considering: the
objective of study, available time and resources, and the
operational constraints. Therefore, the significance of the
term most credible varies widely depending upon the
analyst or team of analysts conducting the study.
3. Damage potential estimation
Damage potential estimation involves assessment of
likely consequences if a scenario does materialise. The
damage potentials are quantified in terms of damage
radii (the radii of the area in which the damage would
readily occur), damage to property (shattering of window
panes, caving of buildings) and toxic effects
(chronic/acute toxicity, mortality). The assessment of
consequence involves a wide variety of mathematical
models. For example source models are used to predict
the rate of release of hazardous material, the degree of
flashing, and the rate of evaporation. Models for
explosions and fires are used to predict the character-
istics of explosions and fires. The impact intensity mod-
els are used to predict the damage zones due to fires,
explosion and toxic load. Lastly toxic gas release and
dispersion models are used to predict human response
to different levels of exposures to toxic chemicals. The
dependence among various consequence models is
shown in Fig. 4.
3.1. Illustrative examples showing application of
MCAA
3.1.1. Example 1
MCAA methodology has been applied to study a pol-
ymerisation reactor operating at 200 °C and 2 atm. The
main raw material in the reactor is ethylene, while the
product is polyethylene in semi-solid state. The popu-
lation density of the surrounding area is 5 person/sqm,
while asset density is 100 Rs/sqm.
A total of four different accident scenarios have
been envisaged:-
Scenario 1:Leak of ethylene from the reactor (either
through vent valve, pipe connection or from gaskets)
causes the formation of a vapour cloud, which on meet-
ing an ignition source causes fire ball.
Scenario 2:Leak of ethylene in a similar way but with
relatively less flow rate. The vapour cloud formed due
to release on ignition burns as flash fire.
Scenario 3: Generation of over-pressure in the reactor
(either due to runway side reactions, failure of
vent/pressure relief valve, or excess accumulation of
material), causes the reactor to fail as BLEVE. The
 F.I. Khan, S.A. Abbasi / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 15 (2002) 467–475 473

Fig. 4. Interconnection between events constituting an accident.

released material (mainly ethylene) being highly flam-
mable, ignites to a fire ball on coming in contact with
an ignition source (even the heat generated due to
explosion is sufficient to ignite the chemical).
Scenario 4:Release of ethylene with a high flow rate,
forms a large vapour cloud of high concentration (in the
explosibility range) which, on ignition, causes a vapour
cloud explosion.
result for this scenario is presented in Table 2, which
revels that an area of about ~17 m radius would be under
severe threat (50% probability of causing fatality) due
to high heat load.
Table 2
The damage calculation results for accident scenario 2 (flash fire) of
illustrative example 1

Parameters Values
3.1.2. Discussion
The four scenarios have been processed for the esti- Fire: Flash fire
mation of credibility. The results are presented in Table Volume of vapour cloud (cub. m) 31893.73
1. It is evident that accident scenario 2 has maximum Effective time of fire (sec) 8958.10
value of credibility followed by scenarios 1 and 3. Even- Effective thermal load (kJ/sq. m) 645.66
Damage Radii (DR) due to thermal load
though scenario 2 has lowest damage radius (20 m only) DR for 100% fatality/damage (m) 11
compared to scenarios 3 and 4(~150 and ~200 m), it has DR for 50% fatality/damage (m) 17
maximum credibility due to its very high frequency of DR for 100% third degree of burn (m) 25
occurrence compared to other scenarios. On the basis of DR for 50% third degree of burn (m) 37
the credibility estimation, accident scenario 2 has been Higher order accident
The probability of leading secondary accident in a 0.01
ranked as the most credible and processed further for unit placed at 30 m apart
damage effect calculations. The damage calculation

Table 1
Credibility factors for the scenarios discussed in illustrative example 1

Accident scenario damage radius, m Frequency of occurrence (/yr) Factors Credibility factor C
A B

Fire ball 35 0.001 3.84 384.8 385.3

Flash fire 20 0.05 314.15 6283.1 6302.7
BLEVE+fire ball 150 1∗E-04 35.34 706.8 707.6
VCE 200 1∗E-06 0.62 12.5 12.5
474 F.I. Khan, S.A. Abbasi / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 15 (2002) 467–475

3.1.3. Example 2 Table 4

MCAA methodology has been further used to study The damage calculation results for accident scenario 3 (flash fire) of
illustrative example 2
the ethylene storage unit. The unit stores ~100 MT of
ethylene in liquid state under pressurised condition. The Parameters Values
site characteristics are same as in example 1.
A total of five different accident scenarios have been Fire: Flash fire
developed for the possible accidents in the storage unit. Volume of vapour cloud (cub. m) 9152300.25
Scenario 1: Release of ethylene from the vessel causes Effective time of fire (sec) 1255.50
a dense vapour cloud which, on meeting an ignition Effective thermal load (kJ/sq. m) 98741.51
Damage Radii (DR) due to thermal load
source, leads to a vapour cloud explosion. DR for 100% fatality/damage (m) 275
Scenario 2: Generation of high pressure in reactor or DR for 50% fatality/damage (m) 348
instant release of ethylene with high flow rate causes the DR for 100% third degree of burn (m) 417
unit to fail as BLEVE. The released chemical on ignition DR for 50% third degree of burn (m) 496
turns into a fire ball. Higher order accident
The probability of leading secondary accident in a 1.0
Scenario 3: A slow but continuous release of ethylene unit placed at 30 m apart
forms a vapour cloud of relatively lower concentration
which, on ignition, burns as a flash fire.
Scenario 4: Formation of vapour cloud with ethylene
concentration high enough for the cloud to be flam- 4. Summary and conclusion
mable. On ignition causes fire ball.
Scenario 5: Generation of excessively high pressure
In this paper we have highlighted the usefulness of
in the vessel leads to CVCE. The released chemical
the methodology Maximum Credible Accident Analysis
catches fire.
(MCAA) in identifying hazards in chemical process
industries, developing scenarios of likely accidents, and
3.1.4. Discussion
forecasting the consequences if the scenarios turn into
The fire accident scenarios have been processed for
reality. We have then focussed on the scenario develop-
credibility estimation. The result are presented in Table
ment step as the most critical of the steps associated with
3. It is evident that scenarios 2 and 5 are the most cred-
the MCAA methodology, and have illustrated how in the
ible ones. These scenarios neither have maximum prob-
absence of a rational criterion for developing credible
ability of occurrence nor have the maximum damage
accident scenarios this exercise may become totally sub-
potential yet the combined effect of adequate probability
jective, leading to erroneous (and possibly disastrous)
and adequate damage potential makes then highly cred-
conclusions. In this context we have made an attempt
ible. Scenario 3 has maximum frequency of occurrence
to develop and present a criterion using which credible
while scenario 1 has widest damage radius, yet neither
accident scenarios may be identified from among a large
of them are credible.
number of possibilities.
Accident scenarios 3 and 5 were processed for esti-
mating their damage potential. The results are presented
in Tables 4 and 5. It is evident from Table 4 that con-
tours of 50% probability of damage would encompass Acknowledgements
an area of radius ~350 m, while the same for accident
scenario 5 would exceed ~450 m. Both scenarios indi- The authors thank the Department of Science & Tech-
cate the seriousness of risk and the need to workout nology, Government of India, for finacial support and
appropriate management programmes. Dr R.K. Tayal for helpful discussions.

Table 3
Credibility factors for the scenarios described in illustrative example 2

Accident scenario Damage radius, m Frequency of occurrence (/yr) Factors Credibility factor C
A B

VCE 500 4∗E-06 15.68 314.1 314.5

Flash fire 400 3∗E-04 753.41 15079.5 15098.3
BLEVE+fire ball 15 0.03 105.02 2120.5 2123.1
VCE 60 3∗e-03 169.64 3392.6 3396.8
CVCE+fire ball 500 2∗E-04 785.2 15707.8 15927.4
 F.I. Khan, S.A. Abbasi / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 15 (2002) 467–475 475

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