Metatheoretical Foundations For Post Normal Risk

Journal of Risk Research
ISSN: 1366-9877 (Print) 1466-4461 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjrr20
Metatheoretical foundations for post-normal risk
Eugene A. Rosa
To cite this article: Eugene A. Rosa (1998) Metatheoretical foundations for post-normal risk,
Journal of Risk Research, 1:1, 15-44, DOI: 10.1080/136698798377303
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/136698798377303
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Journal of Risk Research 1 (1), 15–44 (1998)
Metatheoretical foundations for

post-normal risk*
EUGE NE A. ROSA
Department of Sociology, Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99164 USA
Abstract
The rst goal of this paper is to sketch a three-part, synoptic framework that could
ease the way beyond the current impasse of competition among the various meta-
theoretical orientations (e.g. realism vs. social constructivism, positivism vs. cultural
theory, etc.) in the risk eld. The framework will be constructed on a foundation of
metatheoretical principles and its form will accommodate the best features of the
competing orientations. Because the articulated principles will build rst on a position
of realism, we can refer to the framework as a whole as Reconstructed Realism (RR).
Because the content of the framework comprises its rst two key parts, ontological
realism and epistemological hierarchicalism, we can refer to the content by the
acronym OREH. The second goal of the paper is to epistemically connect the synoptic
framework, RR, to a methodological framework for conducting risk analysis, thereby
providing a bridge between theory and practice. The existing methodological frame-
work that bears logical symmetry to RR is the one developed by Funtowicz and Ravetz
in a suite of papers (1985; 1991; 1992; 1993; 1994) and which they call ‘post-normal
science’. Connecting RR – the synoptic framework under development – with post-
normal science completes the third part of the framework, and the resulting product is
properly labelled ‘post-normal risk.’
Our life of shing is so perilous that even
though we worship all the gods in the world,
many of us still die untimely deaths.
Noriko Ogiwara
Dragon Sword and Wind Child
1. Introduction
Risk has a very long past, but very short history. Risk history, now three decades and over
three thousand books and articles old (Renn, 1998), continues to mature as a distinctly
identi able eld of study. As part of that maturity we can detect the emergence of
*This paper has continually improved through the various stages of its development because of opportunities to
present earlier versions at The London School of Economics and Political Science, The Swedish Collegium for
Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, and The Wissenschaftszentrum-Berlin and because it attracted the thoughtful
comments and criticisms of Robert Brulle, Mario Bunge, Tom Burns, Tom Dietz, Riley Du nlap, Lee Freese, Silvio
Funtowicz, Rob Grif n, Louis Gu ay, Katherine Hayles, Carlo Jaeger, Jim Jasper, Valerie Jenness, Allan Mazur,
Chandra Murkerji, Jerry Ravetz, Ortwin Renn, Tom Rudel, Jim Short, and Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Paul Stern,
Tom Webler, Steve Zavestoski, and the anonymous reviewers. An earlier version of this paper was presented at
the 1996 annual meetings of SRA–Europe, 3–5 June, University of Surrey, Gu ildford, UK.
1366-9877 © 1998 E & FN Spon

16 Rosa
consensus over several key foundational issu es. First, there is growing consensus that while
the standard model of scienti c investigation remains a necessary form of risk analysis
(especially in the tasks of risk identi cation and estimation), it is no longer a suf cient form
(especially in the areas of risk evaluation and management). Second, a corollary of the rst
generalization, is that there remains considerable work to be done to understand the
human perceptions and responses to identi ed risks. This need reinforces the importance
of continuing to de ne the risk eld as an inherently interdisciplinary activity, and
acknowledge the central role of the social sciences in this challenge. Third, there is a con-
sensus, perhaps the strongest of the three, of the need to devise better procedures for the
democratic management of risks in society (Kunreuther and Linnerooth, 1982; Wynne,
1987; NRC, 1989; Shrader-Frechette, 1991; Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1992; Rosa et al., 1993;
Beck, 1995 [1991]; Renn et al., 1995; Rosa and Clark, 1998; Stern and Fineberg, 1996).
Consensus one and three converge to produce a fourth consensus; namely that the eld of
risk is a topic involving scienti c investigation where the long venerated philosophical dic-
tum of separating facts from values, of separating the categorical from the normative
(‘Don’t mix is with ought’), is relentlessly blurred (Toulmin, 1982; Graham et al., 1988;
Shrader-Frechette 1991).1
The motivation for the ideas presented here is the premise that our efforts to get on
with the challenges contained within the above areas of consensus are impeded by the
absence of a synoptic framework to orient our investigations in a disciplined way.2
Too much of our effort toward understanding risk, it seems, is devoted to debating the
merits of competing paradigms and metatheoretical orientations (revealed preference
versus perceived preference, cultural theory versus rational action, social constructivism
versus naive positivism, methodological individualism versus methodological holism,
etc.) with adherents to each point of view becoming more deeply entrenched within
the rst principles of their orientation the longer the debate continues.3 Such dialectic
is, no doubt, an ineluctable feature of incipient elds of inquiry and essential, under
most circumstances, to their intellectu al vitality. Yet, its unbounded continuance
threatens our ability to develop a cumulative understanding of risk.
Here I will sketch out the key elements of the synoptic framework premised
above. It will be sketched in abstract and meta-terms, leaving the details of examples and
implications to the next stage of work. The framework will be erected on a foundation of
metatheoretical elements derived from realism. We can therefore refer to the structure of
the framework as Reconstructed Realism or RR.4 Its planks consist of ontological realism
1 One of the most signi cant, but least recognized, features of Thomas Kuhn’s (1970 [1962]) description of scien-
ti c practice was the introduction of an awareness of the role of value judgments in science. Furthermore, Kuhn
was explicit about the blurring of the value-based normative part of science with the categorical part. A change
took place in modern science with respect to ‘the time-honoured philosophical theorem: “Is” cannot imply “ought.”
That theorem has, in practice, become a tag, and is no longer everywhere honoured. A number of contemporary
philosophers have discovered important contexts in which the normative and descriptive are inextricably mixed. “Is”
and “ought” are by no means always so separate as they have seemed’ (Postscript to Kuhn, 1970 [1962]:207).
2 This is not to deny the availability of classi cation frameworks (Renn, 1992) and of integrated frameworks
(Kasperson et al., 1988), but to point to the need for a framework that is both philosophically grounded and capable
of organizing alternative perspectives on risk.
3 The collection by Golding and Krimsky (1992a) nicely lays out most of the key perspectives.
4 From the point of view of social scienti c theory the orientation of the framework, though not its details nor its
re nement to risk, is consistent with the critical realism of Donald Campbell (Cook and Campbell, 1979) and Roy
Bhaskar (1978 [1975]) and the environmental realism of Dunlap and Catton (1994). From a philosophy of science
standpoint it is consistent with the ‘naturalistic’ position of such philosophers as Larry Lauden (1984; 1990), Dudley
Post-normal risk 17
and epistemological hierarchicalism, or simply the acronym OREH. The framework

begins with the recognition that there is merit to each of the competing perspectives on
risk. Thus, it seeks to preserve their best features, while delineating the scope conditions
of their applicability within a coherent structure. Part of this goal, then, is to accommodate
alternative forms of rationality for addressing risk.
The second goal is to epistemically link the synoptic framework, and its metatheo-
retical foundation, to a methodological framework for conducting risk analysis. By risk
analysis we refer to the four separate stages of: (i) hazard or risk identi cation, (ii) risk
estimation, (iii) risk evaluation, and (iv) risk management (NRC 1983; Dietz et al.,
1998). Our methodological goal is consistent with but extends the scienti c procedu-
ralism of Shrader-Frechette (1991). To the extent our epistemic linking is successful it
will provide a bridge between theory and practice. The existing methodological frame-
work that bears symmetry with RR is the one developed by Funtowicz and Ravetz in
a suite of papers (1985; 1991; 1992; 1993; 1994) and which they call ‘post-normal science.’
A coherent link between RR and post-normal science will produce ‘post-normal risk,’
at once a comprehensive way of thinking about risks while providing a disciplined
approach to evaluating and managing risks.
Despite a conciliatory intent, I do not hold tightly to the naive hope that this frame-
work will put an end to debates among the various paradigms and metatheoretical
perspectives. Rather, my aim is more modest: to shift the debate away from the irre-
solvable arena of deciding on a ‘correct’ theoretical orientation and toward more fruitful
arenas, such as deciding on the conditions that favour the explanatory power of one
orientation over another or the conditions that favour integrated approaches among
paradigms. To the extent that this aim is achieved, it holds out hope for a more direct
path to a theoretically cumulative understanding of risk.
2. Broad orientations
I will begin the development of the RR framework by an indirect route. The route will
rst take us through a critical review of the two dominant competing paradigms in the
risk eld: positivistic science (including its behavioural and normative complement, the
rational actor paradigm), on the one side, and cultural theory and social constructivism,
on the other side. The two paradigms, or schools of thought, one inspired by
Enlightenment thinking, the other inspired to criticize Enlightenment thinking, represent
the polar opposites on a theoretical continuum of temperaments seeking to render risk
Shapere (1984), and Bhaskar (1979) but especially consistent with the scientic proceduralism of Kristin Shrader-
Frechette (1991) and with Ortwin Renn’s (1981) model of graduated rationality. Shrader-Frechette situates this
naturalistic position in the risk eld, thereby contributing to its re nement.
5 Despite a growing recognition of the need to recognize both science and social context in risk policy and manage-
ment, there remains a lingering antagonism between these opposite paradigms. The antagonism was captured
succinctly by Krimsky and Golding (1992b:362):
Cultural theorists and other sociologists of science have abandoned ‘objectivity’ under the rubric of ‘social
constructionism.’ Knowledge, it is claimed, is relative to the culture. With two beliefs in opposition each legit-
imized by its functional role in its respective cultural context, the notion of universal objectivity loses its
meaning.
On the other hand, proponents of technical risk assessment accept a view of objectivity uncritically. They
neglect weaker from stronger epistemic systems of science. We are left with two unsatisfying positions. Either
all knowledge, including scientic knowledge, is relativised, or we have an uncritical acceptance of scientic
risk assessment that fails to distinguish levels of con dence.
18 Rosa
intelligible.5 Our indirect route through paradigm evaluation is necessary because one
principle objective of RR, as noted above, is to preserve the best features of the
competing paradigms. To achieve this goal we need to know not only the paradigms’ chief
strengths, but particularly their weaknesses. Since key paradigm weaknesses stem from
issues in philosophy, we mu st rst pause to examine some philosophical fundamentals.
2.1. PHILOSOPHICAL FUNDAMENTALS

We need to distinguish between two branches of philosophy directly relevant to risk
research: ontology and epistemology. Ontology refers to the branch of metaphysics
dealing with what exists, the nature of existence, or the state of the world: What’s ‘out
there?’ Epistemology refers to the acquisition of knowledge, to the thoroughness of
that knowledge, and to the foundation for justifying that knowledge. How do we know
what’s ‘out there?’
One version of ontological theory is realism (or objectivism) – the idea that a world
exists independent of percipient human observers. This realist position is the bedrock
of our commonsense ideas of the world around us. It is the bedrock presupposition,
too, of science. Since the Enlightenment, at least, the fundamental scienti c outlook
has been based upon an ontological theory of realism: that there exists an external
world whose properties are independent of human existence; that this world is amenable
to reliable if imperfect human understanding through systematic inquiry; and this under-
standing corresponds to that external reality.6 We can refer to this as the external
realism, ER, presupposition.
It is important to note that science includes in its realist ontology not only the presup-
position that an ‘objective’ world exists, but also that this world can be known, although
not perfectly. RR, our synoptic framework, fully agrees with the rst of these presup-
positions, but agrees with the second only with considerable quali cation – a key point
to be taken up later.
An opposite version of ontological theory, principally from a phenomenological tradi-
tion, emphasizes the experiencing of the world rather than pure re ection. It denies
the realism of an external physical world. Philosophically, phenomenology’s ideal is to
be as presupposition free as possible, thereby letting the world come to us rather than
our going out to the world with conceptual templates in hand. There is no nal inter-
pretation of features of the world because all knowledge is subject to re-interpretation.
One consequence of this orientation is that there is no meaningful way of separating
the world from our interpretation of it. The world only exists through mind and spirit;
remove meaning given by mind or remove spirit and there is no world. The dichotomy
of subject and object, like other conceptual dualisms, is an unjusti ed convention, with
limited validity. In its extreme form the world ‘out there’ and our understanding of it
are conterminous. Or, as Cole has recently put the matter: ‘The accepted body of knowl-
edge is the functional equivalent of nature’ (1992:27).
To summarize, one end of the theoretical continuum comprising risk research is
anchored by a realist-objectivist ontology. At this end we can place positivism, as does
6 Einstein put this most succinctly when he said ‘The belief in an external world independent of the percipient subject
is the foundation of all science’ (quoted in Kline, 1985: 19).
7 Shrader-Frechette (1991) refers to this as ‘naive positivism;’ naive due to its belief that the science of risk can be
applied without consideration of sociological, political, and ethical principles.

Post-normal risk 19
Shrader-Frechette (1991),7 and the rational actor paradigm, as do Jaeger et al., (1995).
We will refer to this as the positivistic paradigm. The other end of the continuum is
anchored by a variety of antirealist, contextualized orientations, su ch as cultural theory
and the social construction of risk, which are aligned with phenomenology8 and whose
inclination is toward relativism.9 At this end we place cultural theory and social construc-
tivism, since they share not only an ontology, but also common intellectual roots, similar
foundations, similar presuppositions, and orient in similar directions.10 As a matter of
convenience we will combine cultural theory and social constructivism and refer to
them, from now on, as the constructivist paradigm. Because of their placement at a pole
of the continuum when we refer to the constructivist paradigm we will be referring to
the strong, not soft versions. The positivistic paradigm and the constructivist paradigm,
each in their own way as we shall see, are reductionistic in ontology, epistemology,
or method.
2.2. POSITIVISTIC PARADIGM

The short history of risk analysis has, from the beginning, been dominated by
approaches derived from science – especially science resting on some version of posi-
tivism, such as logical empiricism (e.g. Starr, 1969; Okrent, 1975; Lowrance, 1976; Rowe,
1977; Inhaber, 1979; Wilson and Crouch, 1982; Cohen, 1983; Whipple, 1992). Despite
the appearance of other paradigms challenging the privileged position of science, it
remains the principal basis upon which risk analysis is done and, in the view of some
leading practitioners (Morgan, 1995), ‘it is probably the strongest aspect of risk analysis
though data gaps still exist and the available science is not used as much as it should
be.’ Indeed, for all except the most committed relativists, science will remain a sin qua
non of the risk eld.
8
Shrader-Frechette (1991) labels the latter part of the continuum as cultural theory while Bunge (1993), throwing
out a much wider net of terms, includes in the antirealism realm: social construction, subjectivism, conventionalism,
ctionism, relativism, and hermeneutics.
9 Indeed, one of the leading proponents of the social construction of science (Collins, 1981) categorizes – approv-
ingly – one leading tradition in the social studies of science as relativists. Collins makes explicit the connection
between the relativistic social construction of science and its phenomenological precursors, by pointing to the later
work of Wittgenstein (1968 [1953]), to the phenomenology of Berger and Luckman (1966), and to the ethnomethod-
ology of Gar nkel (1967).
10 In particular, cultural theory and social constructivism share common roots in the German historical/romantic
tradition of scholarship. Cultural theory is traceable through British social anthropology to one of the founders of
the discipline of sociology, Frenchman Émile Durkheim. Although Durkheim was French, he spent time in Germany
and developed his thinking in the macroscopic German style: history, the state, social order rst with individuals
lling roles in these pre-existing social contexts. To the extent that social actors have agency it is agency tightly
circumscribed by social and cultural contexts (see Rosa et al., 1995 for an elaboration of the Du rkheimian tradi-
tion). The connections through British social anthropology were largely through the in uence of Mary Dou glas who
revived the sociology of knowledge in England along Durkheimian, Mannheimian, and constructivist lines (Ben-
David, 1981) and who introduced cultural theory to risk (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982).
The various versions of constructivism have an even more direct German lineage, traceable along phenomeno-
logical lines, including the development of hermeneutic and existential thought, from Nietzche to Husserl to
Heidegger to Schutz to the major modern statement of the position by Berger and Luckman (1966).
The appearance of Thomas Kuhn’s landmark social psychology of science (1962 [1970]), along with the work of
such philosophers of science as Feyerabend, 1978 [1975] provided a foundation for extending anthropological method-
ology and the social constructivist orientation to science rst (see, for example Collins, 1981; Knorr-Cetina, 1981;
Collins and Pinch, 1982; Shapin and Schaffer, 1985; Latour, and Woolgar, 1986 [1979]) and then to technology studies
that are now dominated by a ‘social construction of technology’ or SCOT approach (see, for example, Bijker et al.,
1990 [1987]).
20 Rosa
Both technical risk analysis and the rational actor approach to risk analysis belong
to a positivistic ontology and epistemology based in realism. Technical risk analysis
provides a basis for risk identi cation and estimation, while the rational actor paradigm
provides a basis for normative judgments.11 Both provide theory that is logical, often
mathematical, with semantic content within a coherent and organized framework. They
emphasize clarity, speci city of abstract concepts (being well versed in the practice of
converting abstractions – concepts, hypotheses, theories – into operational terms), and
congruence (via correspondence rules) with empirical evidence. Combining a singular
de nition of risk (probability times consequence) with these techniques permits the
conversion of risk to a common metric permitting, in turn, the comparison of seem-
ingly dissimilar hazards. They provide explanations that contain economy (sometimes
axiomatically stated) and prediction. In short, they often pass the three-part test of
sound scienti c investigation: consistency in internal logic, empirical support, and
predictability of outcomes under like conditions.
Shortcomings. Scienti c and technical risk analysis rests on a philosophical foundation
of realism in both ontology and epistemology. The positivist orientation is, thus, reduc-
tionistic. It seeks to reduce risk to a pure scienti c reality: the only world is a real world
and that is where risk resides (Shrader-Frechette, 1991). Moreover, our understanding
of risk is a neutral product of science, devoid of bias, ethics, or sociological shaping.12
The principal vehicle undergirding this orientation is the classic dichotomy between
facts and values, between categorical and normative views of the world. Risk analysis
is about facts. Values and normative judgments are excluded – at least for the rst two
stages of risk analysis: risk identi cation and risk estimation.
The claim for value neutrality may be justi able as an ideal in pure science, despite
the fact that it is dif cult to nd it in practice (as pointed out by Kuhn (1970 [1962])
and others). Yet risk analysis is seldom conducted with pure science as its singular goal.
Indeed, risk analysis’s principal raison d’être is to inform policy and other public choices.
It, then, is the bridge between theory (what is) and public philosophy (what ought to
be). Thus, to claim it is value neutral is to make the unfounded claim that it concerns
itself with facts and theory alone.
Positivism’s principal model, at least since Descartes, is a form of methodological
reductionism as well.13 Risk analysts in the positivistic tradition believe that risk iden-
ti cation and assessment can be reduced to the following of scienti c rules and
procedures (Shrader-Frechette, 1991) . They further believe, in the classic tradition of
science, that states of the world like risk (ontology) are nearly equivalent – via corre-
spondence rules – to knowledge claims about the world (epistemology). In effect, they
have a posteriori fused the ontology of risk with the epistemology of risk identi cation
and risk estimation. This is not good practice in risk characterization because it elimi-
11 Strong proponents of the rational actor paradigm claim that it not only provides a normative model of decision
making (what choices people ought to make to maximize their utility), but also a behavioural model (people are
rational and actually do make such choices). The work of Tversky and Kahneman, showing that people use many
heuristics and other mental ‘shortcuts’ resulting in persistent deviations from rational expectations, has brought
serious question to the behavioural side of the rational actor paradigm. (See Tversky and Kahneman, 1987 for a
summary assessment of their body of work as it pertains to the rational actor paradigm.)
12 There is perhaps no better example of this than Starr’s (1969) classic article launching modern risk analysis.
13 Wynne (1994) appropriately criticizes the limitations of the reductionism of positivistic science, in the context of
the science applied to global change, but seems unmindful of the social reductionism contained in the constructivist
approach he recommends.
Post-normal risk 21
nates the importance of values and context in knowledge claims about risk. Risk posi-
tivists often compound the problem further with the assumption, via the rational actor
paradigm, that a scienti c solution (e.g. the risk choice with maximum utility) is also
the ethical solution to risk problems. This is a version of the naturalistic fallacy,
a reduction of ethics to science (Moore, 1903).
In sum, the reductionisms of the positivistic paradigm are the result of ignoring values
in the fact-value continuum and of the a posteriori fusing of the ontology of risk with
epistemology. The net result of the fusion is a realism-objectivism bias. Such a bias
introduces blinders to the important social, political, and cultural contexts that shape
risk characterization.
2.3. CONSTRUCTIVIST PARADIGM: CULTURAL THEORY AND OTHER SOCIAL

CONSTRUCTIONS
Cultural theory is the most comprehensive approach to risk, ‘covering risk selection,
objectivity, science, rationality, and public perception’ (Krimsky and Golding, 1992:xv).
Cultural theory posits that risks are the dangers that societies de ne as troublesome
(Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). Since the identi cation of risks is entirely a social
process, risks do not exist in objective reality, but in the collective consciousness of
cultures; risk is thus a cultural phenomenon, not a physical one. Furthermore, social
structural patterns within the culture shape the mindsets of individuals, organizations,
and other aggregations. The structural patterns result from the conjunction of two
universal features of social life: the basis of group interaction and social networks
(group) and the boundaries that determine the range of those interactions (grid). The
resultant 2 2 matrix, from cross-tabulating two levels of group and grid, categorizes
separate systems of beliefs that are propense to think of dangers in different ways. How
prototypical individuals see risk depends upon where they stand in the matrix of belief
systems.
The social constructivist perspective has deep roots in the phenomenological tradi-
tion with its humanistic emphasis on a world of uidity and emergent properties. The
world is constituted out of our actions wherein we are continually negotiating the world’s
meaning. For the most devoted social constructivists there is no separation between
reality and our perception of reality; our negotiated knowledge of the world is the func-
tional equivalent of the world itself. The world is only understandable and has meaning
to the extent that we grant it those qualities (Stallings, 1995). Our perceptions of risk,
our choices of which risks to be concerned about, are equivalent to risk itself (Hilgartner,
1992). The social construction of risk is described by one if its most thoughtfu l and
leading advocates: ‘A key shift required by the perspective described here is that de-
nitions of risk, and knowledge, and responses to information and uncertainty are based
ultimately on the attempted maintenance of familiar social identities . . . Physical risks
thus have to be recognized as embedded within and shaped by social relations and the
continual negotiation of our social identities’ (Wynne, 1992:295).
Each orientation situates all knowledge within a circumscribed social context. Cultural
theory sees risk, for example, as a representation of collective belief systems. Risk is
relative to culture or social position. In contrast, the strong social constructivists see
risk as a negotiated perception of the world: risk is conterminous with our represen-
tations of it.
22 Rosa
There is little question that cu ltural theory and social constructivism have sharpened
our conceptual lenses by, if for no other reason, reminding us of sociology’s uncom-
promising rst principle: context matters. Social actors do not see the world with pristine
eyes, but with eyes mediated by experiences in the world and by social forces. Scientists,
too, see mediated worlds – worlds mediated by paradigms, by biases, and by social
values. The constructivist paradigm has also provided us with insights otherwise unavail-
able, a reminder of the role of important social forces (such as the media), a new
theoretical vocabulary, and connected the risk eld (initially a circumscribed technical
eld of study) with broader, longer-standing intellectu al traditions.
Shortcomings. Constructivist approaches have attracted a generous share of criticism –
criticisms of the basic approach (Searle, 1995), of its application to science (Cole, 1992),
and of its application to technology (Winner, 1993). Cultural theory, too, has also attracted
a sustained, wide-ranging criticism that continues unabated (see, for example, Boholm,
1996). It has also attracted systematic testing. Subjected recently to the most rigorous
empirical test to date, the data not only failed to support cultu ral theory but were actually
more consistent with other approaches to risk (Sjöberg, 1995) Since most of the other obvi-
ous shortcomings of cultural theory – including relativism, solipsism,14 political bias, the
blaming of victims, the dif culty on deciding upon conditions of falsi ability – have been
discussed elsewhere, I will not repeat them in detail here. Instead, I would like to focus
attention on three problems with constructivist approaches, including cultu ral theory, that
have generally escaped the attention of their critics: their failure to make a clear distinc-
tion between the process and product of socially constructed knowledge; their well-
intentioned, but naive politics; and their reductionism due to the puréeing of ontology and
epistemology into an undifferentiated mixture.
2.3.1. Knowledge as a social product

The basic assumption of this paradigm is that all knowledge is a social product. It is
doubtless true that knowledge is the product of social processes – for its generation,
its codi cation, its dissemination, and for its revision or rejection. This is a reaf rma-
tion of all constructivist orientations that reject a ‘God’s-eye-view’ of the world. It, too,
is a reaf rmation of sociology’s rst principle that insists on the constituativeness of
context. And few doubt this meaning of ‘constructed’ and ‘contextualized’ knowledge
claims. Overthrowing this insight is, therefore, a formidable challenge to sociological
wisdom, to commonsense logic, and to intellectu al consensus. Thus, we are on solid
ground in saying that, in this sense, there is general agreement with the constructivist
account that all knowledge is socially constructed. But used in this sense it is tauto-
logically true, and therefore not very useful. For the crucial issue is not so much with
the procedures – social as they may be – of how we gain knowledge, but with the
product. For even accepting the fact that all such processes are social does not preclude
the possibility that some of these processes produce no knowledge while others produce
better outcomes than the rest. The important points are that knowledge does not resu lt
from all social processes and that some knowledge seems to accord better with the
14As noted by Rayner (1992:98) solipsism, the claim that all views of the world are equally valid, is one of the
criticisms of cultural theory. Giddens extends this observation to the larger tradition underpinning the constructivist
paradigm: ‘. . .phenomenalism leads to solipsistic paradoxes’ (1978:251).
Post-normal risk 23
world or is, at least, more reliable than other knowledge. To torture Whitehead’s famous
phrase fully, the constructivist paradigm – by extending relativism to all knowledge
claims by combining process and product – offers a misplaced robustness.
2.3.2. Politics of constructivism

Constructivist approaches typically extend the boundaries of legitimate claims to knowl-
edge. Widely ranging styles of generating knowledge and of engaging in its discourse
are made legitimate – including lay styles. Extending legitimacy, especially beyond
science, grants, presumably, all intellectu al points of view an equal say on topics of
shared relevance. By all appearances the constructivist position represents a more
distributed, egalitarian view of which knowledge claims are to be considered legitimate
in the characterization of risk.
‘Knowledge is power’ said Bacon. Equilibrating knowledge claims, a noble deontolog-
ical goal, does not necessarily produce equality in claims over knowledge or in claims to
power, but can produce disturbing unintended consequences instead. The claim of equal
knowledge can reinforce existing knowledge and power differentials. If every knowledge
claim about risk is equally correct, then those individuals or institu tions with more power
need only exercise their own claim, responding to any objections, with logical impunity,
that their own claim is as correct as any other claim that can be made. If the powerful are
unscrupulous as well, this opens wide the possibility for the imposition of risks, for exam-
ple environmental and health hazards, unacceptable to those affected by them. In short,
an even playing eld does not ensure even-handed playing, but playing to a bully’s hand.
2.3.3. Philosophical purée

A particularly troublesome core feature of constructivism is the a priori blurring into one
of the ontology of risk (‘What is the nature of the world of risk?’) with the epistemology
of risk (‘How do we understand and know risks?’). Risk is a social construct. One imme-
diate consequence of this theoretical indiscretion is to make the theory reductionistic,
sociologically, a consequence soundly criticized by Shrader-Frechette (1991). Another
less apparent consequence of the blurring is to make the theory deterministic as well.
The indiscriminate mixing of ontology and epistemology is not good practice because
it introduces theoretical and logical mischief to the structure of understanding. This is
particularly true for cu ltural theory. For example, the failu re to distinguish between
ontology and epistemology in Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) means that risks can only
exist in collective meaning, not in a reality divorced from meaning. It is also a failure
to see a distinction in thinking between those who perceive the world in probabilistic
terms (i.e. in risk terms) from those who perceive the same world in deterministic terms
(i.e. in fated terms). This, in turn, camou ages the tenuous basis of the comparison
between modern, complex societies, like ours, and traditional societies, like the Hima
of Uganda (Douglas and Wildavsky’s example of cultural comparison).
A far more important shortcoming results from the fusing of ontology and episte-
mology. It results in the introduction of a constructivist bias into the very foundation
of constructive paradigm by assuming away realism at the outset. In particular, because
ontology and epistemology are treated as one, the conditions of one domain become
the limitations of the other. So, because knowledge claims (epistemology) about risk
are a social product and, therefore constructivist and imperfect, so too, it logically
24 Rosa
follows, are risk states of the world (ontology). The net effect is a set of blinders – the
symmetrical opposite of those of the positivistic tradition – making the constructivist
paradigm oblivious to the reality of dangers.
In sum, we have attempted to demonstrate the problems and biases in both the
realism paradigm and the constructivist paradigm from the fusing – each in their own
way – of the ontology and epistemology of risk. It, therefore, follows that we should
rst unpack these two separate domains of risk. It is to this task we now tu rn. Our
approach will be to begin by laying a foundation of realism, later to be structured
with constructivist perspectives. Thus, the rst objective of our task is to justify the pre-
supposition that a world exists independent of the observer who observes it.
3. A case for ontological realism

3.1. CONSTRAINTS ‘OUT THERE’
On what foundation can we establish a basis for ontological realism? What class of
signals from the world, whether conceived as independent or dependent on our
constructs, can we use to illustrate a case for realism? Which of these signals gives us
the strongest evidence for this illustration? Do the signals cohere around discernible
underlying principles? We address the middle two of these questions rst.
Gravity. The class of signals that seem most compelling in the case for realism, is the
one that, after Hayles (1995), represents ‘constraints.’ Here constraint is meant to
convey the notion of limitation – limitation imposed by a world beyond ourselves. Many
‘physical’ constraints may, in fact, be unalterable limitations. If so, they are then beyond
human agency. The issue of whether constraints should be viewed as a disembodied
interpretation of conditions in the world, versus conditions resting in an embodied
construction of the world, need not be resolved in order to take advantage of the power
of constraint to reveal knowledge. Constraints rule out some possibilities and, there-
fore, give us a more focused way of apprehending reality.15
Gravity is a prime example of such a constraint. On this Hayles16 (1995:52) writes:
Consider how conceptions of gravity have changed over the last three hundred years. In
the Newtonian paradigm, gravity is conceived differently than in the general theory of rela-
tivity. For Newton, gravity resulted from the mutual attraction between masses: for Einstein,
from the curvature of space. One might imagine still other kinds of explanations – for
example, a Native American belief that objects fall to earth because the spirit of Mother
15
Many of the highly heralded discoveries in science have this quality. The formulation of the second law of ther-
modynamics (which forever dashed the hopes of building a perpetual motion machine) and Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle (that the position and speed of subatomic particles could not be simultaneously measured) are two of the
most obvious examples of this.
16 Hayles, currently a distinguished professor of English at UCLA, holds advanced degrees in chemistry and English;
she even worked as a research chemist before becoming a professor of literature – and is something of a celebrated
postmodern theorist. It is interesting to note that despite the vast differences in starting point between her post-
modern, constructivist orientation and the realism orientation adopted here, both emphasize a similar class of signals
(constraints) and aim at a common goal (to, paraphrasing the title of Hayles’s article, seek a common ground).
Hayles describes her position as ‘constrained constructivism’ (1995:53) whereas the position argued here is called
reconstructed realism, RR. It is of further interest to note that Hayles was one of the ‘academic left’ singled out
for special criticism in the highly controversial assault by Gross and Levitt (1994) on the variety of contemporary
criticisms of modern science, and she is identi ed as one of the leading cultural analysts of science by Alan Sokal
in his highly publicized critique of postmodern thought via a spoof in one of that school’s leading journals (1996).
Post-normal risk 25
Earth calls out to kindred spirits in other bodies. No matter how gravity is conceived, no
viable model could predict that when someone steps off a cliff on earth, she will remain
spontaneously suspended in midair. Although the constraints that lead to this result are
interpreted differently in different paradigms, they operate universally to eliminate certain
con gurations from the realm of possible answers. Gravity, like any other concept is always
and inevitably a representation. Y et within the representations we construct, some are ruled
out by constraints and others are not (emphasis added).
If we ferret out the continuity in the representations of gravity, rather than the alter-
native context-bound accounts, we can discern a principle for addressing the rst
question above, namely the question of the foundational basis for realism. The prin-
ciple to be discerned is contained in the context invariability (over historical time in
Western science, and between Western and Native representations) in the shared recog-
nition of gravity’s constraint. In essence, we have pancultural17 recognition (meaning
similar perception and interpretation across gulfs in time and culture) of this constraint.
Such intersubjective agreement, widely dispersed in history and collective experience,
suggests that this physical feature of the world is sending compellingly similar signals
to us, the percipient observers. Moreover, it implies the coming of these signals from
somewhere outside our own phenomenological context of interpretation.
Chasing the Sun. Strong social constructivists may have grounds to object to this
example. Perhaps it is due to its ubiquity that we recognize gravity as a constraint. As
such, perhaps it is unique in its ability to command common perceptions. That being
so, it would be but an anomaly to an otherwise socially constructed world. This argu-
ment is embarrassed, however, by other pan-cultural knowledges18 – with the most
compelling of these (owing to its recognition of a physical phenomenon) being astro-
nomical observation. In particular, it is human experience with one of the most salient
objects in the physical environment – the sun.
The tracing of seasons, one result of the sun’s movement across the sky, can be found
on the remaining ribs of Ice Age Mammoths at least 37000 years ago, the work of
Acheulean hunters (Hall, 1984). And written calendars can be traced back to the last
ice age, 20000 years ago (Aveni, 1989). But more remarkable is the fact that virtually
every society reaching the stage of development that we call civilization knows that the
passage of seasons re ects a solar year of 365 days. Such bureaucratically organized
societies, typically designated states, were far-ung in both time and geography. They
are commonly characterized by extensive, highly organized economic systems, rigid
patterns of social strati cation, and the emergence of classes of specialists – often
including astronomical specialists.
That annual time is dominated by 365 days in the Occidental world is well known
and seldom questioned. It has been this way since before Christ in Roman times; the
Julian calendar, a product of the period, suf ced for sixteen hundred years until tweaked
by Pope Gregory. Easily overlooked is the fact that a 365 day calendar was adopted,
17 In this instance we can go even further and speak of a ‘universal’ recognition of the constraint of gravity. The
term ‘pancultural’ is preferred because it is not only meant to subsume the universal, but to account for instances
where there is widespread inter-cultural agreement – suf cient to support a conclusion of common recognition –
but which falls short of universality.
18 Among the panculturalisms of note are the similarity of perception across highly diverse cultures of core facial
expressions of emotion (Ekman et al., 1972), the recognition of literally all people ‘that men and women are different,
that babies come from women only, that women have a special role in nurturing infants’ (Mazur, 1991:28–29), and
the universal practice of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960).
26 Rosa
too, by ancient Egyptian, Chinese, Javanese, Aztec, Mayan, and Inca civilizations.
Whether for the Asian and African worlds this re ects independent discovery or the
diffu sion from a common source is subject to ongoing theoretical debate.
Far less problematic is the evidence from the new world. The Mesoamerican states
(Aztec, Maya, Inca), the evidence clearly shows, developed their 365 day reckoning
prior to the sudden European incursion in the sixteenth century.19 ‘Hermetically sealed
by two oceans, whatever ideas they may have developed about time would have taken
place in a pristine condition from the start. Hence, when we pry into pre-Columbian
systems of thought, unlike Asiatic and African cultures, we can be certain that what
we discover about how people make and model their time systems must have been
invented and developed independently, devoid of borrowing through social contact, at
least from Western civilization’ (Aveni, 1989:186).20
3.2. REALISM-ANTIREALISM CONSEQUENCES

The convergence of perceptions and representations across time and cultures is not
empirical proof of realism.21 Adopting a realist-objectivist perspective, instead, re ects
the logical choice between two competing presuppositions. On the one hand if we argu e
that convergences such as these are evidence of an independently existing reality, we
are already presupposing realism. The argument, thus, begs the question. On the other
hand, if we presuppose an entirely constructed or culturally conditioned reality, we are
also presupposing a reality independent of all social constructions that provides the raw
material out of which the constructions are formed.22 For even if our sensations are
always unreliable, they are being activated by some external source.
Searle puts it this way: ‘The ontological subjectivity of the socially constructed reality
requires an ontologically objective reality out of which it is constructed . . . a socially
constructed reality presupposes a nonsocially constructed reality . . . It is a logical conse-
quence of the main argument . . . /here that/ . . . you cannot have institu tional facts
[socially constructed facts] without brute facts’ (1995:191). Pancultural and time
distanced convergences occur because however many layers of construction we remove,
the signals, wherever they are coming from, must be coming from somewhere inde-
19 A tangible example is at the Mayan ruins of Chichén-Itzá where the castle (el castillo), the site’s largest and most
imposing structure contains 365 steps. There are 91 steps on each of its four sides, totaling 364, plus the upper plat-
form (Bloomgarden, 1983). Theoretical opinion interprets this as a planned design, re ecting the incorporation of
the yearly cycle into sacred architecture.
20 The remarkable fact of common adoption of the 365 day year is sometimes lost in the frequent practice by many
societies of developing religious, ritual, or civil calendars that deviate considerably from the 365 day year – such as
the 260 day ritual year of the Aztecs, or the 260 religious year of the Mayas, or the 354 day Moslem year. Despite
the importance of year length based upon other counts, astronomers and other specialists in every civilization of
which we are aware recognized the 365 day cycle that correlated with the seasons.
21 Indeed, there is no foolproof argument that an external world exists. There is, likewise, no foolproof argument
that it does not. But even within this limitation formal reasoning would seem to favour the realist view because of
the extreme dif culty of proving a negative proposition such as that of the constructivist position that claims there
is no separate world ‘out there.’
22 The idea of universal discovery or veri cation in science is often used to justify the realism-objectivism assump-
tion (Cole, 1992). But this reasoning, too, suffers from a question-begging fallacy. Even if this logical problem is
overlooked, universally shared scientic discovery or veri cation seems less compelling than pancultural conver-
gences that are less institutionally structured. After all, scientists work within paradigms (Kuhn, 1970 [1962]) so that
all scientic observations are, to use Popper’s term (1961 [1934]), theory impregnated – meaning, among other things,
the adoption by different scienti c observers of the same conceptual template. That being so, we should not be so
surprised to nd the same template producing similar ndings, however distanced in time or place they may be.
Post-normal risk 27
pendent of the constructions. The signals, too, are received with such similarity that
their representations are similar. It makes sense to think of that ‘wherever’ as external
reality, ER. In sum, based upon the principle of pancultural convergence and upon the
logical choices associated with observed pancultural practices we have sketched a
reasonable case for ontological realism. Our task now is to take that case to risk.
4. De ning Risk

As noted above, the risk eld has been compartmentalized into competing, some-
times antagonistic paradigms. Since the goal here is to mould a framework, RR, that brings
a greater coherence to the variety of perspectives, it is important that we begin from a
foundation that can comprise the various perspectives. We begin with the truism that to
abstract is to simplify. Proper metatheoretical frameworks are abstract; they therefore
simplify. One tool for accomplishing this simpli cation is de nition. De nitions are almost
never entirely true nor false, but, instead, are useful as tools of abstraction and for bring-
ing intellectual attention to a common focal point. De nitions are, therefore, a useful
foundation upon which to erect theoretical structure. They are also useful devices for sort-
ing domains of intellectu al agreement from those of contention.
What is Risk?.23 Despite the still rapidly growing literatu re on the topic of risk (Short,
1984; Beck, 1992 [1986]; Krimsky and Golding, 1992; Dietz et al., 1998; Renn, 1998)
there is remarkably little consensus over what, in fact, is meant by risk. On the one
hand, there is vigorous debate over the de nition of risk (e.g. Fischhoff et al., 1984),
while on the other hand, there is an intentional silence about de ning risk at all (Douglas
and Wildavsky, 1982; Giddens, 1990) despite book-length treatments of the topic.24
At one extreme are those who wish to de ne risk, typically viewing it as an objective
property of an event or activity and as measured as the probability of well-de ned,
adverse events (Kates and Kasperson, 1983). The most widely used de nition of risk,
a convention, is derived from positivism; risk is the probability of an adverse event (e.g.
injury, disease, death) times the consequences of that event (e.g. number of injuries or
deaths, types and severity of diseases) (Wilson and Crouch, 1982).
At the other extreme is the constructivist paradigm that at once eschews de ning
risk 25 while severely criticizing the conventional de nition. The harshest criticism has
come from a strong form of subjectivism within the constructivism paradigm that is
entirely opposed to the notion of objective risk. This strong form, a relativistic view of
social constructivism derived from a phenomenological philosophy, views risk as nothing
more than subjective perceptions shaped by the lters of cultu re and social structure
(Wynne, 1992). As with most extreme positions, the objectivist and subjectivist views
23 The de nition of risk developed in this section draws upon and synthesizes the independent conceptualizations
of Renn (1992) and especially Rosa (1994).
24 Constructivists in the Durkheimian tradition via culture theory, various versions of the phenomenological tradi-
tion, and the social constructivist position typically eschew de ning risk, while elaborating the concept. Unwittingly,
perhaps, this body of work appears to adopt a nominalist version of risk reality.
25
The reluctance of constructivists to de ne risk stems from an Aristotelian, anti-essentialist disposition (see, for
example, Rayner 1992:93), updated by Wittgenstein (1968 [1953]), that is unaccepting of de nitional ‘essences.’ A
logical extension of this ‘anti-essentialist’ position is to argue that since risk does not exist, in essence, it exists only
in the collective mind of humans; that is, through a shared understanding that we call culture. Thus, the question
‘What do we mean by risk?’ is begged, while risk becomes simultaneously de ned as a culturally relativistic fact.
Risk, then, is nothing more than what different groups of people think it is.
28 Rosa
of risk, taken separately, are poor descriptions of reality (Short, 1984; Dietz et al., 1998).
De nition. We propose a de nition here, not because it will necessarily attract universal
agreement nor because it will be de nitively correct, but because it will be the rst
brick in the foundation of our metatheoretical framework. The starting point of our
de nition is the widely shared presupposition that distinguishes between reality and
possibility (Markowitz, 1991; Evers and Nowotny, 1987). If the fu ture is either pre-
determined or independent of present human activities, the term ‘risk’ makes no sense
whatsoever. Thus, at the foundation of our de nition is the notion that certain states
of the world which are possible and not predetermined can, objectively, be de ned as
risk. The fact that these states are not predetermined means they are probabilistic and,
therefore, embedded with some degree of uncertainty.
Despite this ‘objective’ foundation, our ability to identify, measure, and understand
risks range from the putatively certain to the totally uncertain. To the extent that we
are limited in these abilities, risk will appear less and less like an objective state of the
world and more and more like a social construction – a crucial point to be developed
later. Furthermore, what individuals or societies perceive as risk and decide to choose
to concern themselves as risk are not shaped only by the objective state of risk, but
are also shaped by social, cultural, and political factors – as well as the precision of our
analytic tools for identifying risk in the rst place.
To the idea of possibility – and concomitantly, uncertainty – we add a second presup-
position: risk exists only when the uncertainty involves some feature of the world,
whether in natural events or in human activities, that impact human reality in some
way. Combining these two dimensions, we propose the following de nition:
De nition Risk is a situ ation or event where something of human valu e (including
humans themselves) has been put at stake and where the outcome is uncertain.
Our de nition ful ls our present task. It expresses an ontology (a theory of being) of
risk, an ontological realism that speci es which states of the world are to be concep-
tualized as risk.26 Whether it attracts widespread agreement or not, our de nition
26 A linguistic conundrum for the constructivist position on risk, but not for the ontological realism position, emerges
with the ordinary language assertion that someone or something is at risk, or that certain situations are risky or
hazardous. These make perfect sense if risk is de ned as an ontological state of the world. A person is at risk
because they are subject to an uncertain outcome in the world where the outcome contains something of stake to
that individual. On the other hand, if risk is entirely a social construction, a collective agreement about a percep-
tion, what is the meaning of these ordinary language assertions? If someone is at risk, does that mean that the
person is simply in a position to violate the collective agreement? Within a constructivist orientation it is dif cult
to know exactly the meaning of the assertions but easy to see the strained awkwardness that orientation produces.
27 It is important that a de nition of risk comprise not only undesirable, but also desirable outcomes in order to
capture at least two important domains of human risk action: investment risk and thrill risk. In portfolio theory risk
is understood to apply to desirable and undesirable outcomes on an equal footing. Investors do not think in terms
of a single stock but in terms of a portfolio of stocks where the risk of losing money on one share is balanced
against the probability of gaining from another share. Thus, all the more tting a de nition that can apply to both
losses and gains.
Another domain of social life where gains play a central role is adventure and thrill risk. Despite being gener-
ally overlooked in the risk literature, ‘desirable risk’ – risk that is sought, not avoided, because of the thrill and
intrinsic enjoyment it brings – is a pervasive feature of social life (Machlis and Rosa, 1990). The focus of the risk
literature has been almost exclusively on dangerous and other untoward risks resulting in de nitions, stated or
implied, that comprise only undesirable risks. Yet, de nitions of risk in service to a general theory of risk must be
able to accommodate the full range of human activities properly labelled as risky.
28 Except for inuential American economist Frank Knight (1921), and those who have uncritically accepted his
views, virtually all speci ed or implied de nitions of risk, despite the variation in their details, include some notion
Post-normal risk 29
captures three elements found in nearly all conceptions of risk – even when the term
is left unde ned and must be inferred from discourse about risk. The rst element is
the notion that risk expresses some state of reality of human concern or interest. At
stake is something of value to humans. The second element is that some outcome is
possible; an outcome can occu r. Here our de nition supersedes most de nitions in its
robust ability to accommodate both undesirable and desirable outcomes.27 Third,
implied in the second element but in need of its own speci cation, is that fact that it
seems impossible to talk of risk in the absence of the notion of uncertainty.28
Environmental and health risks both have the de ning features of uncertainty and
human stakes. We worry that there is some likelihood, never absolute certainty, that
certain human activities, such as types of fuels we consume, will impact the environ-
ment in untoward ways. We also worry, for example, that exposure to certain chemicals
has some likelihood of causing sickness or death.
Fig. 1. Risk: de ning dimensions.
of uncertainty. Knight sought to separate those two concepts in order to clarify some ambiguities in neoclassical
economics. He argued that ‘To preserve the distinction which has been drawn . . . between the measurable uncer-
tainty and an unmeasurable one we may use the term “risk” to designate the former and the term “uncertainty”
for the latter . . . We can also employ the terms “objective” and “subjective” probability to designate the risk and
uncertainty respectively . . .’ (1921:233). Thus, he de ned risk as knowing the probability or odds of an outcome and
uncertainty as not even knowing enough to calculate them . In Knight’s terms risks were insurable, whereas uncer-
tainties were not. Some of the more obvious problems with Knight’s distinction are that his de nition of uncertainty
is actually a de nition of ignorance (yet, seldom – as pointed out by Luce and Raiffa (1958) – are we totally igno-
rant of states of the world), which he contradicts with the idea that uncertainty is a subjective probability.
Furthermore, the fact that a precise estimate cannot be made of some untoward event (say, the level of radiation
that is harmful to humans) does not necessarily mean that humans exposed to radiation are not at risk. Also, we
can note that in the Bayesian tradition all probabilities are assumed to be subjective.
Recently, German sociological theorist, Ulrich Beck, places himself, perhaps unwittingly, in the Knight de ni-
tional camp by de ning risk in language almost identical to Knight’s as ‘insurable’ threats. ‘Is there an operational
criterion for distinguishing between risks and threats? Yes indeed: the denial of private insurance protection. This
criterion accommodates nuclear energy as well as larger portions of the chemical and genetic technology industries.
The litmus test for uncontrollability is the lack of insurance protection’ (1995 [1991]:127).
30 Rosa
4.1. STATES OF THE WORLD
We can note another important feature of our de nition; namely, that by specifying
the necessary and suf cient conditions of risk, it demarcates between other situations
or events where either human stakes, uncertainty, or both are absent. Thus, risk excludes
the following situ ations or events: those that are ‘certain’, but where human stakes are
not involved, such as planetary systems; those that are uncertain, but where human
stakes, at least putatively, are not involved, such as the behaviour of sub-atomic parti-
cles; and those that are certain and where human stakes are involved, such as fate.
These considerations lead to the 2 2 table of Figure 1.
The pattern of the four cells of Figure 1, derived from our risk de nition, pro-
vides a demarcation between not only states of the world, but also between domains
of inquiry and the knowledge systems making claims within those domains. Thus, for
deterministic states we nd celestial mechanics, for indeterministic states we nd
quantum mechanics, for fate we nd myth, and for risk we nd decision science. The
key derivation of this demarcation is the placement of risk. It occupies a single
cell, cell 3, the one in the lower left corner of the gure with the conjunction of un-
certainty and human stakes.29 This, then, it follows, is the proper scope of risk investi-
gation.
Figure 2 is an enlargement of cell 3, risk, with the two de ning features of risk forming
the axial continuums. De ning risk in this way uncovers several import-ant features of
the concept. First, the de nition is consistent with the etymology of the word: according
to humanist Peter Timmerman (1986:1) the word risk came to the English language from
the French in the 1660s, which had been adopted from the Italian word ‘riscare’30
Fig. 2. Dimensions of risk.
29 Although his antirealist position is antithetical to the position adopted in RR, Hillary Putnam’s idea (1990:1) that
‘the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world’ bears close resemblance to the epistemological
status of risk in our table categories.
30 This is the spelling in old Italian, the modern spelling being ‘rischiare’ with the noun form of the word being
‘rischio.’
Post-normal risk 31
meaning to navigate among dangerous rocks. Second, this representation of risk is consis-
tent with the standard de nition of risk in the technical literatu re as probability times
consequences (or outcomes).
Our representation of risk not only embeds the standard, technical de nition but is
also more robust. It, for example, easily accommodates debates among experts, among
laypersons, and between experts and laypersons – one of several persistent problems
produced by a singular positivistic perspective – because it points to the challenge of
establishing a precise measure of uncertainty as well as a precise measure of stakes
involved: these are key points of debate between such groups. Furthermore, as noted
above, it can accommodate ‘desirable risk’ (Machlis and Rosa, 1990) or the desirable
outcomes of portfolio analysis.
4.2. MAPPING THE DEFINITION INTO PROBABILITY SPACE

The horizontal dimension of Figure 2, uncertainty, is consistent with the representation
of risk in terms of probabilities or odds, as in formal analyses. By de nition, uncer-
tainty excludes impossible outcomes, on the one hand, and fated outcomes on the other.
Similarly, to say that a necessary element of risk is ‘possibility’ means that probabili-
ties of zero or one are removed from consideration. The vertical dimension, human
stakes, is consistent with outcomes and consequences – another consistency with conven-
tional and formal analyses.
Our mapping of risk into probabilities, in the range 0 < p < 1, eliminates by de ni-
tion the probabilities zero and one. A world where all probabilities about events are
zero (the event cannot happen) or one (the event is bound to happen) – p = 0 or 1 –
is a world of non-risk: a world of fate. This is the world of quadrant No. 2 in Figure 1.
Given the risk and fate states (quadrants 2 and 3) of the world, how does a culture
choose one over the other? They choose it through their epistemology – here an epis-
temological choice over ontology. Whichever quadrant a cultu re falls within, its
epistemology will re ect that ontology. So cultures occupying quadrant 2, let us call
them culture type X , will live in a world of shared belief about risk that is incompat-
ible with cultures occupying quadrant 3, type Y . This observation preserves the dignity
of prescienti c cultures – because their epistemology is perfectly tted to their ontology
– who do not normally think of the world in probabilistic terms. If the argument is
plausible thus far, then it raises the question of whether on this count, namely risks,
comparisons between cultures in the separate quadrants is meaningful. In other words,
if the question we wish to direct to different cultures is: What is the nature of danger
in your world?, the answers from the two culture types, X and Y , are fully antithetical.
So, comparisons can be made, such as between Western cultures and tribes like the
Hima of Uganda (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982), but we are left wondering whether
the results are specious.
31Once we pay attention to the separation of ontology from epistemology we are in a position to recognize varia-
tions on the time-honoured objective–subjective dichotomy. The ontological refers to predicates of entities, while
the epistemological refers to predicates of judgment. As Searle (1995) points out, there are four logical combina-
tions: objective in the ontological and epistemological sense (e.g. Mt. Rainier is in Washington State); objective
ontologically, but subjective epistemologically (Mt. Rainier is more beautiful than Mt. Hood); subjective ontologi-
cally, but objective epistemologically (I have a pain in my arm); and subjective in the ontological and epistemological
sense (Duchamp is a better artist than Picasso).
32 Rosa
4.3. RISK AS ONTOLOGICAL REALISM
A logical consequence of de ning risk as an objective state of the world is that risk
exists independent of our perceptions and of our knowledge claims, subjective judg-
ments, about what is at risk and how likely a risk will be realized. Furthermore, placing
risk into an ontological category leaves open the question of our knowability of given
risks: the question of the epistemology or risk.31 By granting risk an ontological statu s
we make no claim that we know, or indeed can ever know, all conditions of the world
that are a convergence of uncertainty and of human concern, that is, of risk. Some of
our claims to knowledge about risk will be well founded, while others will be beyond
our grasp. One appealing consequence of this feature is that it neither inherently de nes
away or contradicts either the positivistic paradigm, on the one hand, or the construc-
tivist paradigm such as cultural theory or social constructivism, on the other hand.
Indeed, it places debates between paradigms into an arena of disagreement over ques-
tions of knowledge: about our perceptions and understandings of risk, and about our
understanding of how groups or societies choose to be concerned with some risks while
ignoring others. In effect, it de nes paradigmatic debates over risk as an issue in epis-
temology. Operationally, these debates are often over the evidence available from which
to infer the probability that a risk will be realized.
4.3.1. Risk = Perceptions of Risk
The above conceptualization challenges cultural theory and constructivism because, as
we have seen, they regard perceptions of risk, however shaped by social context, to be
isomorphic with risk in the world itself. Risk arises from perceptions of it. (Douglas
and Wildavsky, 1982; Freudenburg, 1989; Rayner, 1992; Wynne, 1992). On this view we
cannot distinguish risk from risk perception.32 This viewpoint, however, is not con ned
to the constructivist paradigm. For example, leading risk psychometrician Paul
Slovic has recently written: ‘Human beings have invented the concept of “risk” . . . there
is no such thing as “real risk” or “objective risk”’ (Slovic, 1992: 119). And Shrader-
Frechette, whose work otherwise runs parallel to and is complementary to the position
developed here, argues: ‘In sum, there is no distinction between perceived and actual
risks because there are no risks except perceived risks. If there were hazards that were
not perceived, then we would not know them’ (1991:84).
There are a number of logical problems with the risk = perception thesis. First, the posi-
tion can take us dangerously close to absolute relativism (even solipsism) which, except
for extreme constructivists, is generally unacceptable to most risk scholars. Whatever our
perceptions, right or wrong, some risks are undeniably real – not merely our cultural ju dg-
ment about them. ‘The risk of death, for instance, is real.33 But it is also, in part, a proba-
bility and such probabilities can rarely be known with certainty. Until death becomes a
certainty, the risk of death is purely perceived, theoretical, or estimated’ (Shrader-
Frechette, 1991:80). While this logic is coherent and probably correct as far as it goes, it is
a challenging logic, for it needs to preserve a realist’s view of risk, on the one hand, with
the ineluctable implication that, on the other hand, risk identi cation can only occur via
32
It does not necessarily follow that cultural theory or constructivism deny differences in the quality of various social
constructions of risk.
33 The inevitability of death, with a probability of one, excludes it from our de nition of risk. Death is a certainty,
not a risk. What is a risk is the cause and timing of death.

Post-normal risk 33
the perception of risks. To say that risk is Janus-like (it is at once both real and perceived)
is a challenging way for most people to think about this issue.
If we presuppose risk to be an ontological state of the world, as proposed by our
de nition, while our identi cation of risks (through perceptions rst, along with other
means) is presupposed to be an epistemological matter we can achieve the same
outcome with a less cu mbersome logic. Risk and perception of risk, in this logic, are
simply separate domains of the world. Furthermore, this logic preserves the intent of
the original argument – that dangers do exist ‘out there’ but we can only know which
ones by perceiving them rst – while simplifying its structure.
A second problem with risk = perception emerges with the interpretation that risks
only exist if they are perceived (Slovic, 1992). This interpretation has at least three
dif culties. If, initially, it means that risks must rst be perceived to actually exist, this
eliminates the possibility of dangers that are real but are not yet risks because they
have yet to be perceived. To argue that no dangers exist (new, undiscovered diseases
for example) beyond those we perceive or beyond our current measurement sophisti-
cation is a dif cult argument to sustain. It is another version of the ‘argument from
ignorance’ fallacy (Shrader-Frechette, 1985), meaning that if we are ignorant of some
danger there is little basis for claiming the danger exists at all.34 If, second, it means
that the term risk is applicable to only the dangers we perceive, it truncates the real
world of dangers down to a conceptual category – risk. If that is the intent of this posi-
tion, then it would be more appropriate to identify risk = perception as a theoretical
scope condition, not as a truncated conceptual frame for a phenomenon that is much
broader in actuality. If, third, it means that risk is entirely a subjective phenomenon
(Kunreuther and Slovic, 1996) then, again, the result is a conceptualization that fuses
ontology with epistemology – with all the undesirable consequences noted above
including, of course, the introduction of a constructivist bias.
Having made a case for the ontological realism of risk we must now turn to the task
of its connection to the epistemology of risk – to our understanding of risk states of
the world.
5. Ontological realism/epistemological hierarchicalism (OREH)

Insofar as our argument for a realist-objectivist ontology of risk is sound, it immedi-
ately raises the crucial question: Does it ineluctably follow that, on the logic of
symmetry, the epistemology of risk is also realist-objectivist? This, in fact, is the extreme
positivist position as noted above. The answer to the question, as we will argue below,
is a categorical ‘no.’ Knowledge claims about risk may be realist based or constructivist
based depending upon the evidentiary basis of our claims to knowledge. That there is
not necessarily a one-to-one correspondence between the ontology and epistemology
of risk is due, at its foundation, to the intervening role of human perception and inter-
pretation of our realist world of risk. The epistemology of risk comprises a continuum
ranging from realism/objectivism to relativism/subjectivism.
L imitations to human knowledge Human perceptual and cognitive capabilities are inher-
ently limited. As a consequence we can neither generate perfect knowledge about the
Taken to its logical extreme, this line of reasoning reduces to the cliché: ‘What you don’t know cannot hurt you.’
34
Taken to the world of real risks, it poses challenging problems in theoretical reasoning.
34 Rosa
world, nor can we create a ‘tru e’ understanding of our physical and social environments
– risky ones or otherwise. Facts seldom speak for themselves and considerable ambi-
guity surrounds even the most basic facts. The world ‘out there’ and our understanding
of it can never be isomorphic: human understanding can only approximate the
world we seek to explain. Thus, our claims to knowledge about our worlds are always
subjective – and always fallible. Strong constructivists take this fact as a basis for
claiming that all claims to knowledge about our worlds are, therefore, relative; one
claim is generally as good as any other.
The position taken here is epistemological hierarchicalism. Connecting it to the onto-
logical realism of our framework, we can refer to their combination as ontological
realism/epistemological hierarchicalism, or by the acronym OREH. Epistemological
hierarchicalism does not deny the fallibility of all knowledge claims. What it denies is
that all knowledge claims are equally fallible. Instead, it posits variations in the quality
of knowledge claims along a continuum ranging from those of considerable agreement
to those of great disagreement. Knowledge claims, while always short of absolute truth,
admit to degrees of approximation to what is true.
A very important result of this logic is to make the ontology and epistemology of
risk logically independent of one another. OREH is, at once, consistent with episte-
mological relativism but goes beyond those versions that equalize all knowledge claims
or deny the privileging of particular claims. OREH admits to differences in the types,
the quality, and the aptness of our knowledge.
We now need to explicate a principle consistent with OREH for judging the place-
ment of knowledge claims along the epistemological continuum. To do that we must
rst identify the principle’s proper scope of applicability. Because of consensus three
(the democratization of risk assessment and management) and consensus four (the blur-
ring of categorical and normative features of risk in assessment and management) noted
above, the principle is limited in scope to the rst two stages of risk analysis – risk
identi cation and risk estimation – only. Risk assessment and management should be
epistemologically inclusionary, embracing an extended range of paradigms, perspec-
tives, and stakeholders with alternative claims to knowledge. On this point recent years
have witnessed growing agreement.
5.1. OSTENSIBILITY AND REPEATABILITY (O&R) AS DEMARCATION PRINCIPLE

FOR EPISTEMOLOGICAL HIERARCHICALISM
The adoption of OREH places a further demand on the argument: how to decide on the
placement of knowledge claims on the continuum of epistemic agreement. We need a
principle that will permit us to develop a hierarchy of risk judgments in the range from
realism to relativism. We need a hierarchy that comprises a continuum of epistemological
realism to epistemological constructivism. And we need to align the resultant hierarchy
with consonant paradigms for characterizing risk. I suggest that we develop this principle
on the basis of the consistency of signals from the external world. We can use our two
previous examples in support of a realism foundation, gravity and the 365 day calendar,
as a basis for deducing such a principle. In particular, an underlying criteria of both pan-
cultural examples are the ostensibility (‘I can point to examples’) and repeatability (‘The
examples will repeat themselves’) of the relevant phenomena. Furthermore, the ostensi-
bility and repeatability, or O&R, principle is consistent with all attempts to develop
Post-normal risk 35
Fig. 3. The realism–constructivism continuum of knowledge claims about risk. Note: Because the
diagram compresses four variables – ostensibility, repeatability, uncertainty and outcome stakes
– into two dimensions, the orientation of the axes is high to low, rather than the typical orien-
tation.
scienti c explanation; developed, as they are, on the basis of evidence ultimately perceiv-
able to the human senses – empirical evidence.35
In essence, the ostensibility criterion asks the question: ‘Do you see what I see?’36 If
the answer is ‘yes’ we have inter-subjective agreement. The greater the agreement, the
higher the placement of this knowledge claim in our hierarchy. If, on the other hand,
the answer is ‘no’ the repeatability criterion responds: ‘Just wait and you will have
another opportunity to observe what I see.’ To the extent the subject observation is
truly ostensible, the repeatability criterion almost assures inter-subjective agreement at
some point.37 Should particular evidence fail these criteria support for the epistemo-
logical realism also fails. Under such conditions we need to look away from
epistemological realism and toward constructivism and related perspectives as a way of
understanding. The O&R principle is straightforwardly applicable to risks, providing a
basis for judging their placement on the realism – constructivism continuum.
35 Archer (1987) develops a sophisticated argument along these lines, while extending the reasoning to include the
importance of language translations.
36 Needless to say, the ‘seeing’ may be with the naked eye or be aided by instrumentation.
37 The expectation of widespread intersubjective agreement about risk is not merely an unrealistic hope, as the accu-
mulating empirical evidence shows. Cross-cultural studies of risk perceptions comparing Americans to Hu ngarians
(Englander et al., 1986), to Norwegians (Teigen et al., 1988), to the French (Karpowicz-Lazreg and Mullet, 1993),
to Poles (Goszczynska et al., 1991), to Hong Kongese (Keown, 1989) and to Japanese (Kleinhesselink and Rosa,
1991) show a continuity in the structure of the cognitive maps between cultures, even as the contents of those maps
vary.
36 Rosa
O&R provides the underpinning of one of the strongest, most widely held scienti c
principles: predictability. In addition, because of its commitment to precision, science
often prefers to express its relationships in functional, quanti ed forms. The extent to
which some phenomenon is ostensible and repeatable would seem to give some clues
about the degree to which the phenomenon can be easily quanti ed. At the same time
that O&R restates the fundamental demands of positivistic science, it leaves the door
open for alternative approaches when the conditions of O&R are not met. Indeed, it
insists on the inclusion of a wide range of alternative orientations under conditions of
low ostensibility and low repeatability. Furthermore, it provides a decision rule for distin-
guishing circumstances supporting a realist epistemology from circumstances that do not.
The O&R criteria also establish scope conditions that determine the boundaries of apt-
ness of different classes of knowledge claims. The principle provides a matching of our
state of knowledge about given risks with the toolbox of paradigms at our disposal. As the
evidence becomes increasingly thin, there is an accompanying rise in the applicability of
cultural theory, social constructivism, discourse analysis, and other knowledge systems as
well as participatory approaches to the understanding of risk. It is this domain, too, that is
most in need of public input and democratic participation (Habermas, 1971; 1975; 1984–87;
Renn et al., 1995). Figure 3 displays the epistemological scope conditions of risk.
The three conditions are labelled: (i) grounded realism; (ii) synthetic realism; and
(iii) social construction respectively. The placement of the curved lines on the graph
should be interpreted as rough approximations, not sharp dividing lines. The RR frame-
work and its proposed demarcation principle, O&R, have been stated at a level of
abstraction appropriate to metatheoretical explication, not to operational precision. One
consequence is that it is not yet possible to specify a precise operation rule for the
placement of the demarcation points.38 We must also be willing to admit that the speci-
city of this demarcation rule may be superseded by one of greater precision or one
of wider grasp. Even so, this would not seriously threaten OREH nor the reconstructed
realism, RR, framework which it supports.
Paradigmatic Examples. We have pointed out that a complete speci cation of the demar-
cation principle is beyond the compass of our argument. Nevertheless, we would empty
the argu ment of content without some representation of the principle. To address this
problem I propose that we seek the principle, not in top-down, formal derivation, but
in a bottom-up, informal procedure. In particular, I suggest that we look for paradig-
matic examples of each of the three conditions of the world scoped by the framework.
The reasoning here is that, similar to Wittgenstein’s (1968 [1953]) ideas about standards
of morality, paradigmatic examples serve as a gauge for de ning concepts that elude
de nition on other grounds.
It can be argued that paradigmatic examples are a re ection of the ostensibility prin-
ciple outlined earlier. They represent cases lying beyond our ability to de ne them but
38One reviewer opined that such demarcations do not permit precise operationalization.
39A number of insurance companies have found themselves in nancial trouble or have even gone bankrupt due
to the extraordinary claims associated with catastrophic risks from natural disasters (Kunreuther, 1996). These losses
are tied to risks that are ostensible but whose repeatability is too sporadic and unpredictable to yield accurate knowl-
edge claims about them, at least at the present. Thus, this genre of insured risks ts best in the category of synthetic
realism. New, more powerful computers and advances in information technology are rapidly improving our ability
to discern the pattern of repeatability in natural disasters. Should these advances prove successful – meaning fairly
accurate predictions of natural disasters can be made – natural disaster risks would be a likely candidate to move
into the category of grounded realism.
Post-normal risk 37
to which we can point to and say ‘everybody sees this in a similar way.’ The logic here
is intuitive, meaning hidden from our understanding of it, but it is nevertheless inter-
subjectively reliable since everybody sees the ‘same thing.’
It should be noted that paradigmatic examples, by de nition, assume away de ni-
tions of themselves – a priori. They exist only to the extent there is consensus about
them. This precludes listing a full range of such examples. Thus, while I list some candi-
date examples putatively representative of each of the O&R domains, their statu s as
paradigmatic examples is contingent upon widespread acceptance. With that caveat in
mind, here are some candidates.
An example of risks that qualify for epistemological realism, called grounded realism
in Figure 3, is the wide variety of accident and injury risks for which there is ample
actuarial data (Baker et al., 1992), and which sustain the insurance companies that
insure them.39 An example of risks that are undeniably real, but which elude a deep
or precise understanding, are the risks associated with ionizing radiation (Goldman,
1996). Scientists must interpolate between very high and very low dosages and ethics
precludes gathering data in the missing ranges. Examples of risk whose real-world statu s
is very much in question are the risk of global climate change, in a rst instance, and
the risks associated with high-level nuclear wastes, in the second instance. Hopefully
these early suggestions and the RR framework will stimulate other candidates.
6. Linking OREH to operational methodology

Of what use can we make of an understanding of where risks fall on the continuum of
epistemological realism to epistemological relativism? What instrumental knowledge
does this provide us? The answer to these questions is that instrumental knowledge
contained in the epistemological categorization of risk points us to the appropriate oper-
ational tools – namely, methodology – to apply to the tasks of risk identi cation and
risk estimation. Thus, the third and nal part of the RR framework is its epistemic link
to a disciplined methodology for applying the framework to risk characterization.
Post-normal science. Funtowicz and Ravetz (1985; 1991; 1992; 1993; 1994) in a suite of
papers have provided just such a methodology – called, by them, a heu ristic tool for ‘post-
normal’ science. Here, by linking the RR framework with ‘post-normal science,’ we
arrive at a disciplined system for ‘post-normal risk.’40 In brief, Funtowicz and Ravetz have
recognized, in anticipation of and consistent with the argument here, that the modern
world has generated a set of problems demanding scienti c understanding, but which are
too complex or too ambiguous (indeed, often laden with ‘ineradicable uncertainties’) to
yield to science alone. Furthermore, in af rmation of consensus four stated in the intro-
duction of this argument, they acknowledge that understanding and decision making
mu st take place in a value-laden context. The ordinary practice of science is unprepared
for uncertainty and values. As a consequence, science is an essential but incomplete
knowledge system for many of the environmental and other risk problems facing the
world. This core idea, in their own words . . . ‘has been motivated by the realization that
the new problems facing our industrial civilization, although requiring scienti c inputs
for their resolution, involve a problem-solving activity that is different in character from
the kind that we have previously take for granted’ (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1992:253).
40 I am indebted to Ragnar Löfstedt for rst suggesting such a link.

38 Rosa
Fig. 4. Three types of problem-solving strategies.

Source: Funtowicz and Ravetz (1985).
Since it is the unavoidability of uncertainty and the unavoidability of values that

account for the different character of modern problems, the inadequacy of applied
science, and the missing element in risk research, these two features gure prominently
in the Funtowicz and Ravetz scheme. System uncertainties and decision stakes (values),
then, become the dimensions of a heuristic tool, a methodology for risk characterization.
Uncertainties and stakes, then too, become the basis for the heuristic’s three types of
problem-solving, or methodological strategies. Figure 4 captures the methodological
scheme in a simple diagram.
At the lowest dimensions traditional analytic tools are adequate to the task. Where
uncertainty and decision stakes are low, for example, applied science (or puzzle solving in
Kuhnian terms, 1970 [1962]) is an adequate strategy for addressing risk characterization.
With an increase in uncertainty and stakes the adequate strategy shifts to, in their terms,
professional consultancy. This is borrowed from the common practice in private and pub-
lic decision making of incorporating, but not relying solely, on outside expertise in reach-
ing a nal decision. A common example of this is the relationship between a physician and
patient in decisions over the patient’s health. Finally, the key innovation of the heuristic
is the identi cation of the outer limits of decision stakes and uncertainty, which are so
extreme on both dimensions that the traditional tools – applied science and consultancy –
fail the task. This new frontier of decision problems is termed ‘post-normal.’ Each of these
strategies is associated with different types of peer communities: applied science must
meet the standards of a closed community of scienti c peers, professional consu ltancy a
somewhat larger peer reference, and post-normal science the largest peer community.
41It is worth remarking that, despite their isomorphism, the OREH framework was developed independently of the
‘post-normal’ heuristic.
Post-normal risk 39
Post-normal risk . Several features are worth noting about the diagram and its inter-
pretation. Most important to note is the pattern isomorphism41 with Figure 3. In
substance, the epistemological hierarchicalism depicted in Figure 3 provides a philo-
sophical underpinning to the methodological hierarchicalism of Figure 4. Applied
science as methodology in Figure 4 seems most apt u nder the conditions of grounded
realism of Figure 3 where uncertainty of outcomes and the stakes of outcomes are
empirically well-behaved. Similarly, the professional consultancy of Figure 4 appears
congruent to conditions of synthetic realism of Figure 3 where we are con dent of risk
identi cation, but not of estimation. Finally, post-normal science of Figure 4, where
traditional methods are inadequate, is consistent with the social constructivism of Figure
3. Both admit to levels of ignorance – ‘usuable ignorance’ – that extend the range of
permissible knowledge sources and knowledge claims.
The last point, so crucial to both arguments, requires some elaboration. The social
constructivism area of OREH, shown in Figure 3, represents a state of epistemology,
a state of our knowledge that rests upon evidence of low ostensibility and low repeata-
bility; that is, where the O&R principle is unful lled. Accordingly, it was previously
argued that to understand risk under such conditions we must widen the range of accept-
able knowledge systems and the range of mechanisms for lay knowledge and lay
participation. We must adopt a pluralist orientation to inquiry – from realism-based to
constructivist – and, in addition, ensure an equitable representation among stakeholders,
both professionals and laypersons.
The abstract argument of OREH and the abstract terms of the demarcation principle,
O&R, are converted to operational means in the post-normal science heuristic. This is
accomplished with the idea of an extended peer community. This extended peer commu-
nity will make use of not only available scienti c evidence, but also extended facts – lay,
anecdotal, and other information, beliefs, or values held by this larger community.
Perhaps the exemplar of such an extended peer grouping is the compilation by commu-
nities of epidemiological data, called ‘popular epidemiology’ (Brown, 1987), to document
the consequences of environmental hazards, such as exposure to toxic wastes or radioac-
tive substances. Post-normal science, with its extended peer community, is not a
substitu te for applied science nor a substitute for professional consultancy, but an essen-
tial complement to these methodologies. Funtowicz and Ravetz put the matter succinctly:
‘In this way we envisage a democratization of science, not in the sense of turning over
the research labs to untrained persons, but rather bringing this relevant part of science
into public debate along with all the other issues affecting our society’ (1992:254).
Reasoning from different beginnings, the framework developed here, RR, and post-
normal science converge to a common conclusion: that many of the most serious and
pressing risk and environmental problems require the systematic democratization of
assessment procedures. This conclusion, we can observe, is consistent with the strong
consensus in the risk eld noted above. The incorporation of post-normal science as part
three of RR has deeper implications. For what we have accomplished here is
to, on the one hand, provide a disciplined philosophical foundation for the methodo-
logical heuristic proposed by Funtowicz and Ravetz while, on the other hand, tie
ontological realism/epistemological hierarchicalism, OREH, to the operational strategies
of that heuristic. The net result is an enrichment of each framework. RR is enriched with
operational strategy; its requisite third part. And post-normal science is enriched
with an articulated epistemology.
40 Rosa
7. Summary and conclusions

The key point we have tried to develop here is the reality of risk as a state of the
world. We have organized the argument for this point within a three-part, metatheo-
retical framework called reconstructed realism, RR. The foundation for that framework
was laid with a case for an external world of realism, ER. We then de ned risk on that
ontological basis, as ontological realism OR. Risk represents a state of the world where
there is a conjunction between uncertainty of outcome and human concern about the
outcome. This was the rst part of the framework.
We also recognized that the state of the world is not the same as state of knowledge
about the world. Human limitations preclude isomorphism between the world and our
understanding of it. Thus, all claims to knowledge about the world are fallible. But, all
such claims are not equal in their fallibility; some serve us better than others. We there-
fore claimed an epistemological hierarchy of knowledge claims, EH, that formed a
realism to constructivism continuum. This was part two of our framework. We then
invoked a demarcation principle, ostensibility and repeatability or O&R, for properly
placing knowledge systems on the continuum. The combination of ontological realism
and epistemological hierarchicalism, OREH, formed the contents of the RR framework.
Finally, the framework was incomplete without an operational method for putting it
into practice. It was necessary to identify a method consistent with the OREH contents
of the framework, otherwise its overall integration and coherence would be compro-
mised. Despite independent development, and despite a somewhat different orientation,
the post-normal science heuristic of Funtowicz and Ravetz was found to t perfectly
to this task. It was, therefore, incorporated as the third and nal part of the RR struc-
ture. The nal result is an organized metatheoretical structure attentive to philosophical
fundamentals, respectful of competing systems for generating risk knowledge, and
armed with methodological tools.
We developed this framework with the hope that it could point us away from contin-
uing debates over rst principles and point us toward a more organized system for
conducting research that takes advantage of the best featu res of the paradigms
competing over claims to risk knowledge. This was not, however, the pious hope that
debate would end. Rather, it was the hope that we could shift the arena of debate from:
What is risk? to What is our knowledge? about risk. And how could we best use our
various systems of knowledge to improve our democratic decision making over risk
choices? To the extent that the framework eases us in that direction, it will have more
than ful lled its goal.
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Journal of Risk Research

ISSN: 1366-9877 (Print) 1466-4461 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjrr20

Metatheoretical foundations for post-normal risk

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Metatheoretical foundations for

1366-9877 © 1998 E & FN Spon

and epistemological hierarchicalism, or simply the acronym OREH. The framework

2.1. PHILOSOPHICAL FUNDAMENTALS

applied without consideration of sociological, political, and ethical principles.

2.2. POSITIVISTIC PARADIGM

2.3. CONSTRUCTIVIST PARADIGM: CULTURAL THEORY AND OTHER SOCIAL

2.3.1. Knowledge as a social product

2.3.2. Politics of constructivism

2.3.3. Philosophical purée

3. A case for ontological realism

3.2. REALISM-ANTIREALISM CONSEQUENCES

4. De ning Risk

Fig. 1. Risk: de ning dimensions.

Fig. 2. Dimensions of risk.

4.2. MAPPING THE DEFINITION INTO PROBABILITY SPACE

not a risk. What is a risk is the cause and timing of death.

5. Ontological realism/epistemological hierarchicalism (OREH)

5.1. OSTENSIBILITY AND REPEATABILITY (O&R) AS DEMARCATION PRINCIPLE

6. Linking OREH to operational methodology

40 I am indebted to Ragnar Löfstedt for  rst suggesting such a link.

Fig. 4. Three types of problem-solving strategies.

Since it is the unavoidability of uncertainty and the unavoidability of values that

7. Summary and conclusions

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4. De ning Risk

Fig. 1. Risk: de ning dimensions.

40 I am indebted to Ragnar Löfstedt for rst suggesting such a link.