CONFLICT OF LAWS IN MARITIME DISPUTES BETWEEN CHINA

AND OTHER ASIAN COUNTIRES

ABSTRACT
This study delves into the challenging issue of regional disputes in the South China Sea,
examining the causes and implications of rising tensions in the region. Issues over the area
are not unusual; nevertheless, the South China Sea problem is unique since it includes six
reporter nations pushing their respective interests. The South China Sea is rich in raw wealth,
and authority over those resources is the principal cause the countries bordering the South
China Sea are battling over it. Because of the ocean lines that run through it, this land is vital
for the global group. The issue has the potential to erupt in a large hard confrontation,
resulting in human casualties and a negative impact on global exchange. A few violent
clashes have lately occurred, however the issue has indeed been stabilised by political talks
and efforts to establish commercial ties. The worldwide group is particularly concerned with
China, as it has the most widespread regional presence. Regardless, little attention is paid to
the US, which instigates the Chinese reaction by supporting its friends in the fight and
keeping army bases in or near the contested region, close Chinese borders. Till now but, there
has been little discussion about protecting maritime margins. The ideal scenario would occur
if the states decided on and implemented an equitable distribution of all assets. In any case,
after reviewing the data, China is going to wield the most power in the mentioned region
because to its conservative ability to undermine other petitions.

I. INTRODUCTION
The South China Sea (SCS) transfers the bulk of the world largest freight, making it a vital
maritime route for all mainlands to exchange goods. In any event, the region's present
political evolution might pave the way for staged violence. This would jeopardise world
commerce and have financial ramifications for the whole population. Until the mid -
twentieth century, the South China Sea, notably the Paracel and Spratly Islands, received
little attention. In any event, this region has been the site of a political battle between Brunei,
China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam over lucrative natural gas and oil
deposits near the Paracel and Spratly Islands since the 1970s. Numerous violent incidents
have occurred, and the argument over the Paracel and Spratly Islands has been a source of
actual friction between these nations. On the other hand, both forceful power and sensitive
power have been linked to answer the question with minimal consequence. Conflicts have
been intensifying and becoming more frequent. Non-inquirer countries are also being
included to maintain their interests in the region. China's imperialistic plans in the South
China Sea are fueled by opposing forces. However, China's financial strength restricts their
ability to respond. Despite the pressured condition in the SCS and the potential financial
repercussions of any major conflict, there is little awareness of the issue among a poorly
educated population of people. This study will seek to show the geographical importance of
the SCS, clarify the legal concerns, and analyse the core of the problem and the progression
of the conflict.

OVERVIEW OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

The South China Sea is a part of the western Pacific Ocean located in Southeast Asia south of
China, east and south of Vietnam, west of the Philippines, and north of Borneo. The Malay
Peninsula's east coast and the southern half of the Gulf of Thailand touch the stretch of water.
The sea has an area of around 3,700,000 km2 (1,350,000 sq mi), which is greater than India.
It is linked to the East China Sea via the Taiwan Strait and the Philippine Sea through the
Luzon Strait.1

In terms of width, it spans from the Gulf of Tonkin in the west to the Philippine islands in the
east, and from the Taiwan Strait in the upper east to the Malacca Strait in the southwest.
Around 250 islands, sandbars, reefs, and coasts dot the South China Sea. Some of them form
an island cluster.2 In any event, power over the Spratly and Paracel Islands equates to control
over the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the mainland rack that encompasses them.
Other land structures in the South China Sea that are irreconcilable are the Pratas Islands,
Scarborough Shoal, which is substantially submerged throughout the year, and Macclesfield
Bank, which is inundated in water all year. The landscape of the South China Sea has
changed in recent decades as a result of the massive creation of mimicked islands. China has
so far constructed more than eight million square metres of human-manufactured land in the
SCS, making it the most profitable country in the SCS. By the meantime, while constructing

1
‘Map of the South China Sea’ https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/South-China-Sea-political-
map.htm accessed 30 August 2022
2
Asif Khan, ‘South China Sea Dispute Under Law of Sea’ (2018)
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327564800_South_China_Sea_Dispute_Under_Law_of_Sea accessed
30 August 2022
the created land, China did not consider the feelings of ample natural experts. The project
comprised unearthing massive volumes of corals and sand from the ocean's bottom, which
were then distributed across poor coral reefs. Regardless of the shown lost harm generated by
the development activity, it does not appear that China intends to help their initiatives.

II. NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

According to David Rosenberg, professor of political science at Middlebury College, the

primary root of violence in the region is rivalry over resources. 3 Within 100 miles of the
South China Sea's shoreline, almost half a billion people reside, and the volume of shipping
through its waterways has increased as China and ASEAN nations grow international
commerce and oil imports. The need for resources, notably hydrocarbons and fisheries, has
indeed increased economic competitiveness in the region, especially given China's increasing
coastal development.

In accordance with the World Bank, the South China Sea contains substantiated oil reserves
of at least seven billion barrels and an approximate 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas,
providing enormous economic possibility for smaller nations such as Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Vietnam, as well as energy supplies for China's increasing, booming
economy.4 The disputed seas have been designated as the primary offshore site for natural gas
extraction by China's National Energy Administration, and a prominent Chinese energy
company already has initiated exploring in water depths off the southern coast. When India's
state-run Oil and Natural Gas Corp formed a partnership with PetroVietnam to extract oil in
the disputed seas, competitive tensions rose.

Relatively small fishing events, on the other hand, have become the focal point of maritime
conflict, as diminishing fish populations have pushed fishermen further into contested regions
in quest of supply, as well as extremely valuable illicit organisms. During the recent conflict,
Philippine navy troops seized eight Chinese fishing vessels in the Scarborough Shoal,
discovering illegally harvested marine species on board. The alleged capture of the poachers
triggered a two-month stalemate between the two governments.

III. STRATEGICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA.

ECONOMIC
3
David Rosenberg, “Governing The South China Sea: From Freedom Of The Seas To Ocean Enclosure
Movements” [2011]
4
‘South China Sea Tensions’ (14 May 2014) < https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/south-china-sea-tensions >
accessed 2 September 2022
It is believed that the South China Sea contains 150 billion barrels of hydrocarbon reserves.
Thus, whomever dominates and gains sovereign over the South China Sea's islands, reefs,
and waterways will have recourse to such vast energy riches. 5 Furthermore, the Malacca
Strait is the shortest maritime route between African and Persian Gulf producers and Asian
clients. For these reasons, unrestricted access to hydrocarbon reserves and other minerals is
critical for China's future power security. China's expansion has resulted in it being the
world's second largest user of oil, and demand for energy in China is likely to rise much more
in the decades ahead.

According to the studies, 80% of Japan's and 70% of Taiwan's oil and other crude material
imports are electronic example of a physical at shipping via the SCS. Approximately 25% of
the world's oil supply is routed through the SCS from the Middle East to Japan and the
United States.6 No one really asserts that if container ships stop travelling in SCS waters, the
countries that rely on oil imported through the South China Sea will lose power in a short
amount of time. For such mentioned reasons, any substantial confrontation in the territory
would definitely have a negative impact on worldwide markets. The world's most trading
nations, China, Japan, and the United States, would be impacted the most.

MILITARY BASE

The South China Sea serves as a demarcation line for China's southern peninsula. China's
dominance of the region will enable it to build a military wall from which it will be able to
confront any possible military danger. For instance, any trade blockade against China by any
state or group of nations could only be implemented through control of the South China Sea.

China's regulation of the area's land will allow it to build and broaden military bases from
which it can exert influence against domestic and international opponents like the United
States. This is especially important for countries that oppose China's territorial assertions in
the South China Sea. A substantial Chinese military involvement in the South China Sea,
having strictly delineated military capacity, serves to deny possible rivals access to the area
and deter future military engagement targeted at China. As can be seen, deterrence is a
significant military goal in China's South China Sea strategy. China is well aware that

5
Taylore Fravel, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea” [2011]
<http://taylorfravel.com/documents/research/fravel.2011.CSA.china.strategy.scs.pdf > accessed 5 September
2022
6
Asif Khan, ‘South China Sea Dispute Under Law of Sea’ (2018)
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327564800_South_China_Sea_Dispute_Under_Law_of_Sea accessed
3 September 2022
maintaining a modern and competent military is crucial to pursuing and achieving its
strategic ambitions in the South China Sea. As a result, China's military has seen practically
continual twofold rise in defence budget.7 This significant rise in military upgrading and
expansion has mostly centred on the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA Navy). Given
the region's pre-eminence in maritime security, this development and upgrading of maritime
capacity is unsurprising.

Favouring naval expansion has necessitated a shift away from the traditionally property force
that has been the mainstay of the Chinese military in the past. This has needed the Chinese to
shift their focus away from coastal processes and toward much grander blue sea capabilities.
To avoid a full-fledged military conflict with any of its rivals in the South China Sea, China
has carefully created a giant fleet of special forces troops which can be backed up by the
military if necessary. The Chinese have invested heavily in improving and enlarging such
forces. For example, the Chinese Maritime Police, the Maritime Safety Administration, and
the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command are all militia soldiers at the frontline of South
China Sea quarrels and China's regional worries. Chinese officials have been creating and
broadening corals and island nations in controversial areas for the purpose to become military
sites and airbases that may be used for military applications in the nearish term, ignoring
local and global calls to halt such activities and prompting other geographical countries to do
so within their border lines.

ECONOMIC

When it comes to interacting with South China Sea quarrels, China's military force and
formal international stance weren't the only nationwide tools at her discretion. Because of
China's economic rise and significant expansion in commerce with the region's countries,
China may utilise her economic influence to supplement her international efforts. The
ASEAN Fair Market is the most populous free trade region by people and the ranks third by
nominal GDP. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, China's bilateral commerce
with ASEAN countries increased by 64%.8 Therefore, China has used financial relations and
trade as a powerful instrument for foreign strategy and diplomacy, a practise known as
China's economic clout.

7
Katie Hunt, ‘ China to narrow gap with U.S. by increasing military spending’ (5 March 2015)
<http://edition.cnn.com/2015/03/05/asia/china-military-spending/> accessed 3 September 2022
8
Robert D. Kaplan, The South China Sea and The End of a Stable Pacific (The United States, New York,
Random House, 2014) 40
China also has extended its investment and commerce in the region to the point where such
assistance and investment might be used both as positive and negative reinforcement, or as a
negotiating tactic in dealing with South China Sea territorial conflicts For example, in order
to resolve South China Sea disputes, Beijing has demonstrated the ability and willingness to
use economic power for political ends. When tensions between China and the Philippines
erupted over one of the disputed reefs, China stiffened restrictions on Philippine fruit imports.
The Chinese were quite astute in making this manoeuvre, given bananas constitute the
Philippines' foremost agricultural export.9 This obviously demonstrates that China would not
be reluctant to use her economic strength to achieve her political goals in the South China Sea
issues.

CHINA'S PRAGMATIC ATTITUDE

China has displayed a clear management of her immediate geopolitical domain by employing
a coordinated strategy to Ends, Ways, and Means. However, she may have one flaw: her
unwillingness to follow international norm. The application of International Law, especially
as it relates to boarders, is perhaps the most convincing element of the International System
that may have some impact.

THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (UNCLOS)

The goal of this topic in this research article is to reacquaint the reader with key concepts of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which offers sea law
would apply to the SCS. Following a review of the issue, it should be clear how important the
state can assure its control; how long this power and influence lasts; under what conditions
the island may be claimed; how strong and broad sovereignty and independence the island
can provide, if any; and how to resolve the adjacent coastal issue. This is essential to grasp
when considering what the nations are going to fight for and how the intersecting cases must
be remedied.

The main report on the subject, Freedom of the Seas, dates back to the seventeenth century.
According to the study, the beaches side nations were authorised to draw out their power
progress in the water, but only to the extent that they could regulate it sufficiently. It
eventually meant that the coastal nations owned the ocean to the extent that the collective
sphere could go. Inside any event, with the technological advancements of the twentieth

9
Sarah, Regional Disorder, 73
century, it was clear that nations could effectively supervise control of the vast oceans that
existed that were more than three miles.

IV. COLLIDING MARITIME ZONES

The same number of nations end up sharing a shorelines, which is normally covered by the
states' territorial sea. Because the nearby states, no state has the authority to prolong its
sovereign seas well beyond mean average boundary between two nations unless exceptional
circumstances arise. The EEZs cover areas where at least two coastline nations are within 400
nautical miles of each other. Article 74 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea recommends that the categorisation be consistent with international law.

The ICJ recommends to highlight covered zones by first illustrating centre lines, then
changing middle lines in light of potentially unique circumstances, and finally ensuring that
the conclusion is fair to both parties. However, because ownership of a bit of the ocean
transmits to the country wealth and power due to expanded national sovereignty, it is natural
that nations are attempting to pick up a larger piece of the surrounding sea zone to the harm
of the other state. Another method governments are striving to establish their power zone is
by claiming additional island in their maritime zone, since this island will generate marine
zone. This is the status with the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands. Six nations have staked
a claim to these small islands. The marine zone extends around a section of such islands,
giving the express that owns them extra powers for misusing regular assets

CHINA'S TERRITORIAL CLAIM

China boasts the world's fastest expanding economy and seafaring vessels, as well as a vast
shipbuilding sector and ownership of major seaports and 16 major interior river harbours.
However, its travel east to the Pacific Ocean is blocked by a group of three islands, while
transit to the Indian Ocean Region is controlled by the Straits of Singapore, Malacca, Sunda,
and Lombok. Navigation from China to the northeastern Asia Pacific region can be restricted
by the straits of Osumi, Tsushima, and Tsugaru, which are controlled by Japan.

As from 12th through the 17th centuries, various Chinese historical records made mention of
the Spratlys and even showed the height above sea level. In 1876, China placed the very first
legitimate title to the Paracel Islands. The Chinese removed the German research team from
the Spratlys seven years later. Nonetheless, even during twentieth century, China lost certain
islands to other countries. Japan also had a presence in the SCS in the 1930s. The much-
discussed nine-dashed map was first published in 1947. The method of delineation and the
relevance of the map never were resolved. In 1996, China published benchmarks around the
Paracel Islands but did not mention the Spratly Islands, having promised to deal with the
issue later.

Claims in the south china the majority of the SCS and implements several programmes to
achieve its objectives. In 2009, the UN secretary-general received a Note Verbale from China
affirming China's unimpeachable power over the SCS islands and waterbodies. The Note
Verbale was adorned with a nine-dashed line map. The international community, on the other
hand, gravely questioned the factuality of the nine-dashed assertion. The u-shaped nine-
dashed story appears southward from the Chinese mainland, passing along the Philippine and
Vietnamese coasts before terminating near the Malaysian coast. Taiwan and its surrounding
waters are completely encircled by the nine-dashed line. The nine-dashed line covers 90% of
the South China Sea. The rest of the world concerned about the crisis expressed concern that
the historical right is not really a legitimate argument under the UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea. The Philippines and Vietnam had already previously stated that a nation could
only glean mineral resources from the marine zones surrounding its land or island territories
under UNCLOS, and and therefore they would not acknowledge China's historical
authorization to assets inside the nine-dash line.

TAIWAN’S TERRITORIAL CLAIM

In 1949, the Communist Party deposed the nationalists and formed the People's Republic of
China. They maintained all South China Sea policy and alleges, as did the new Republic of
China, Taiwan. Ever since, Chinese and Taiwanese titles have been used interchangeably,
though their positions have changed. Taiwan maintained control of Itu Aba, which the
Republic of China had captured in 1947, and has billeted a military there since 1963. Itu Aba
is the largest of the Spratlys but the only one that may satisfy the UNCLOS benchmark of
being able to support human life, granting it its own EEZ.

Whereas Malaysia and Vietnam concurrently petitioned the UN for an extension of their
coast line further than the 200-mile EEZ limit in 2009, China forwarded a map to their
complaint notice, officially affirming how well these lines demarcate the entirety of their
assertion. Whereas the lines covered the majority of the South China Sea, the accompanying
language luckily obscured the issue.10
10
Michael Flecker, ‘Early Voyaging In The South China Sea: Implications On Territorial Claims’ (2015)
https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/nscwps19_early_voyaging_south_china_sea_implications_territorial_clai
 V. VIETNAM’S TERROTORIAL CLAIM

Only 11 of Vietnam's 21 reefs can produce EEZ; the remaining seven are less important
because they can only establish territorial sea if UNCLOS is followed. 11 Vietnam's power
over the islands is based on a combination of continental shelf theory and historical claims.
The Spratly Islands were ruled by Vietnam in the 15th century, and this claim was
documented in the 17th century, when the majority of Vietnamese charts involved sections of
the Spratlys under Vietnamese regulation. Vietnam is under French colonial power since
1884, when it gained control of the Spratly and Paracel island chains. An other assertion is
that the continental shelf should be extended to include the region occupied by the inhabited
islands. Nonetheless, Vietnam designated straight baselines beginning at its coast in 1982, but
not all of them were compliant with UNCLOS, and hence were not acknowledged by the
global system. Vietnam, like China, has already been charged of constructing manmade bases
and airbases including on reefs that are ordinarily several feet below the surface.
Nevertheless, the Vietnamese position on such reefs has been contested since, according to
their geological structure, they cannot be appropriated.

VI. PHILLIPINES TERITORRIAL CLAIM

On nine islands, the Philippines has enjoyed permanent rule. Moreover, there are rumours
that Irving Reef, the tenth ecological feature, is guarded by Philippine Navy warships that
arrive on a regular basis to protect the region. The Philippine goals for dominion over these
islands collide with those of China, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The Philippines has
various reasons to trust in its lawful authority over certain Spratly Islands. According to the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the islands are situated within the neighbouring or
adjacent zone of the main Philippine islands; the area is economically and strategically
important for the state; and the final, most forceful point refers to rights.

Because there is a trough between the Philippine archipelago and the Spratly Islands, they are
not included in the Philippines' continental shelf. As a result, the natural expansion of the
continental shelf is inapplicable. The Philippines are permitted to request 200 nautical miles
of EEZ; nevertheless, if delimited from the Philippine islands, the whole region of Spratly
claimed by the Philippines would be excluded. Furthermore, the assertion concerning

ms.pdf> accessed 10 September 2022

11
Asif Khan, ‘South China Sea Dispute Under Law of Sea’ (2018)
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327564800_South_China_Sea_Dispute_Under_Law_of_Sea accessed
10 September 2022
abandoned land is erroneous because the other states were present on the characteristics when
the Philippines made its claim.

VII. CONCLUSION

This research concentrated on the South China Sea and the issue that has the possibility of
turning into a major violent war. The worth of the land in terms of its natural material
reserves has been discussed, as has the region's importance in world trade. The initiative
attempted to incorporate globally accepted legal features that establish the scope of sovereign
rights entitling each claimant to utilise natural resources and define the size of the territory
authorised to claim. The historical aspect of the SCS claims was explored in order to clarify
the context of the dispute. The territorial conflicts as well as other events in the SCS were
thoroughly reported and analysed. Finally, the role of quasi players was evaluated. The SCS
situation is vital to investigate because, if a larger collision occurs, passage across the world's
most significant sea-lanes will be jeopardised, affecting global trade. Six nations have
asserted their sovereign claims over the land, resulting in multiple violent battles. The
conflicting maritime claims in the SCS have not yet resulted in war; yet, while tensions
persist, the possibility of serious confrontation looms. ASEAN, the global institution tasked
with empowering claimants, has had little influence on dispute settlement. The SCS territorial
claimants' economic dependence on China has prevented them from being more tenacious in
maintaining their claims.