XIN ᖗ AS THE SEAT OF THE EMOTIONS IN CONFUCIAN

SELF-CULTIVATION
ANDREW H. PLAKS
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

The aim of this essay is to reconsider the use of the term xin ᖗ, in
early Chinese sources to signify the seat of the emotional faculties of
the inner self, as this relates to the broader Confucian notion of self-
cultivation. This study will focus upon the canonic conceptions formu-
lated in the Four Books, especially in key passages in the Daxue, the
Zhongyong, and the book of Mencius, as well as in the Xunzi and
certain other Warring States and Early Han texts. I will argue that
what is conventionally translated as the ‘heart’ or the ‘mind’, in its
double role as the locus of both the emotional and the cognitive men-
tal functions, occupies the middle ground between the deeper layers of
interior selfhood, on the one side, and the interface of the inner self
with its surrounding natural and human environment, on the other.
This position as an intermediary zone bridging the interior and exte-
rior dimensions of consciousness may seem at first glance to present a
rather unproblematic picture of the human heart. But in a variety of
classical Confucian texts, the imperative of cultivating or ‘regulating’
the thinking and feeling core of the self remains profoundly ambigu-
ous–particularly with respect to the question of whether the emotional
responses need to be refined and brought to fulfillment, or they must
be contained and held in check.
Before we proceed to an analysis of certain crucial passages in the
relevant sources that bear upon this issue, it may be helpful to review
the broader semantic range covered by the term xin in a variety of
early Chinese classical and philosophical writings. My survey has
been facilitated by using Christoph Harbsmeier’s Elementary Exer-
cises in Ancient Chinese Conceptual History No. 1 (‘The Ancient
Chinese Concept of the Heart’) as a point of departure.1 We observe
that in a large portion of these usages, the term is extended from its

1 Unpublished manuscript, 1996?

114 ANDREW H. PLAKS

more literal senses–either the physical, ‘somatic,’ organ of cardiac

function, the slightly more abstract idea of a structural or conceptual
core, or the notion of the seat of vitality in sentient beings–to refer
metaphorically to a number of more intangible aspects of the inner
self mental capacity, moral inclinations, personal attitudes, and the
like. Although some important sources take pains to differentiate be-
tween the mental and the physical aspects of ‘self’˄xin and shen 䑿)
or between the cognitive and volitional functions of mind (sometimes
distinguished by the terms xin and yi ᛣ), the texts often ignore or
gloss over these distinctions and use xin as a simple place-holder or as
an expression virtually equivalent to various other terms (shen ⼲, yi,
zhi ᖫ,ʳ etc.) that overlap one another and become nearly interchange-
able in certain contexts.
We may begin the present inquiry by noting the striking fact that
discussions of the xin layer of interiority specifically identifying it as
the locus of the emotions are surprisingly infrequent in these sources.
Granted, the intuitive association between the ‘heart’ and ‘feelings’ is
as common in Chinese as it is in most other languages and modes of
cultural expression. But in philosophical usage this connection ap-
pears to be the exception rather than the rule. What remains from this
semantic looseness is a range of meaning that seems to me fairly con-
gruent with the term ‘consciousness’ in contemporary discourse–with
the important qualification that the Chinese sources often introduce a
crucial distinction between the innermost layers of the self, and those
closer to the surface of conscious experience.
Coming to grips with the essential meaning of the term xin is not
just a linguistic problem; it entails many of the most basic issues of
Confucian philosophical speculation. In discussions on the substance
of the individual self and the process of its full actualization through
the paradigmatic acts of self-cultivation (typically taking the form of
commentarial exposition of the relevant passages in the Four Books),
many of the standard Chinese terms of discourse are brought to bear in
posing the basic arguments. These include the perennial dualities of
‘inner’ and ‘outer’ (nei-wai ‫ݙ‬໪), ‘activated’ and ‘latent’ (dong-jing
ࢩ䴰 ), and ‘substance’ and ‘function’ (ti-yong 储⫼), among other
conventional frames of reference. Quite often these apparent dichoto-
mies are invoked to probe the complementary interpenetration, rather
than the exclusive separation, of the respective divisions of the inner
self. And so the most salient passages in the sources dealing with the
 XIN AS THE SEAT OF EMOTIONS 115

functioning of xin reveal an essential ambivalence that cannot be

neatly packaged in any simplistic dualisms. For example, when the
seemingly self-evident division between xin and shen is analyzed ac-
cording to the conventional categories of ti-yong or dong-jing, the
question of which of these terms represents the static substance and
which the active function becomes something less than unequivocal
(for example, one may say that the xin, though spatially fixed and in-
sulated within the body, may well be perceived as a more active, even
hyperactive, element).
Coming back to our central topic of the emotional content of self as
the object of Confucian cultivation, the central issue about xin be-
comes whether –to use the popular expression– it is the problem or the
solution. In other words: is the human ‘heart’ the archetypal seat of
destabilizing impulses, as we are taught in a variety of early texts
ranging from the spurious Dayumo ໻⾍䃼 chapter of the Shangshu
ᇮ᳌ (“The heart of man is unstable; the ‘heart’ of the Way is ineffa-
ble” Ҏᖗᚳॅˈ䘧ᖗᚳᖂʼ, to important passages in the Xunzi (see
below)?2 Or is it, by contrast, the pure core of the perfectible self, as
we learn in innumerable classical writings from the Neiye and Xinshu
chapters of the Guanzi to Mencius; or, alternatively, are we to view it
as the moral governing agent of the integral person, as, for example, in
chapter 16 of the Chunqiu fanlu: “The essential core of selfhood resides
in the heart, just as the authority over a kingdom is vested in its ruler.”
(䑿ҹᖗ⚎ᴀ, ೟ҹ৯⚎Џʼ, among many other sources?3 The answer
to this question is, in the final analysis, equivocal, not only when we
set one polemical voice against its disputants, but even within the cor-
pus of philosophical statements attributed to one or another individual
thinker.
In the remainder of this essay, I wish to take a closer look at this am-
bivalent attitude toward the xin by examining a number of early texts
that set the terms for the later Confucian debate on these questions
throughout the Imperial period. It will be convenient to begin with the
well-known opening passage of the Daxue in which what is conven-
tionally translated as the ‘rectification of the mind’ (zheng qi xin ℷ݊
ᖗ) is presented as one of the central links in the chain syllogism outlin-
ing the paradigmatic acts of Confucian self-realization. In my own new
translation of the Daxue for Penguin Classics I try to bring out the full

2 Shangshu zhengyi, 4:24 (136).

3 Chunqiu fanlu yizheng, p. 182.
116 ANDREW H. PLAKS

implications of this phrase by rendering it as: ‘setting straight the seat of

one’s emotional and cognitive faculties:
Those men of old who wished to cause the light of their inner moral
force to shine forth before the entire world had first to establish orderly
rule in their kingdoms. Wishing to establish orderly rule in their king-
doms, they had first to put their royal houses into proper balance; wish-
ing to put their families into proper balance, they had first to cultivate
their own moral character as individuals; wishing to cultivate their own
character as individuals, they had first to set straight the seat of their
emotive and cognitive faculties: wishing to set these faculties straight,
they had first to achieve a state of integral wholeness in the inner depths
of their consciousness; wishing to achieve a state of wholeness in their
innermost consciousness, they had first to expand to the utmost their
range of comprehension. And the key to this desire to maximize their
range of comprehension lay in extending to all things in the objective
world the correct conceptual grid.
সП℆ᯢᯢᖋᮐ໽ϟ㗙‫݊⊏ܜ‬೟Τ℆⊏݊೟㗙‫ܜ‬唞݊ᆊΤ℆唞݊
ᆊ㗙‫ׂ݊ܜ‬䑿, ℆ׂ݊䑿㗙‫ܜ‬ℷ݊ᖗ, ℆ℷ݊ᖗ㗙‫ܜ‬䁴݊ᛣΤ℆䁴
݊ᛣ㗙‫ܜ‬㟈݊ⶹΤ㟈ⶹ೼Ḑ⠽DŽ4
At each of the more externalized levels, or phases, of this continuum
of individual fulfillment (from the ‘entire world’ down to the individ-
ual character), the domain of self-cultivation under discussion is
treated as the grammatical object of an act of regulation, this ex-
pressed with a series of verbs of ordering: pingʳ ᑇ, zhi ⊏ʿ qi 唞,
zheng ℷ) –in each case the diametrical opposite of the Confucian
anathema of ‘disordering’ (luan і). In the expansion and elaboration
upon the concept of ‘rectification’ or ‘ordering’ of the mind found in
Chapter 7 of the standard Neo-Confucian recession of the treatise, this
idea is explicated in characteristic fashion through a series of negative
examples delineating the destabilizing force of emotional impulse:
The meaning of the statement: ‘the cultivation of one’s moral character
as an individual is predicated upon setting straight the seat of one’s
mental faculties’ is that: when one’s personal relations are governed by
animosity and resentment, then one is incapable of achieving this
straightness of mind: when one is possessed by fear and trepidation. one
is incapable of achieving straightness of mind: when one’s conscious-
ness is occupied by feelings of fondness and delight. one is incapable of
achieving straightness of mind: and when one is obsessed with anxiety
and grief. one is. likewise. incapable of achieving straightness of mind.
In cases such as these, one’s mental capacity is, in effect, absent: one

4 Daxue, in Sishu jizhu, pp. 1-2.

 XIN AS THE SEAT OF EMOTIONS 117
looks but does not see, listens but does not hear, eats but is not aware of
the flavor of his food. This is what is meant by the statement: ‘the culti-
vation of one’s moral character as an individual is predicated upon set-
ting straight the seat of one’s mental faculties.
᠔䃖ׂ䑿೼ℷ݊ᖗ㗙Ψ䑿᳝᠔ᗓឹࠛϡᕫ݊ℷΤ᳝᠔ᘤ័ࠛϡᕫ
݊ℷΤ᳝᠔དῖࠛϡᕫ݊ℷΤ᳝᠔᝖ᙷࠛϡᕫ݊ℷDŽᖗϡ೼⛝Ψ
㽪㗠ϡ㽟Τ㙑㗠ϡ㘲Τ亳㗠ϡⶹ݊ੇDŽℸ䃖ׂ䑿೼ℷ݊ᖗDŽ5
The fairly explicit import of these formulations is that this process of
rectification must consist in curbing the destructive pull of human
feelings. But this simple message is turned in another direction when
we return to the initial paradigm of the text and seek to determine
what differentiates the disorienting tendencies of the ‘heart’ from the
deeper wellsprings of motivation described in the very next line with
the ambiguous term yi. We have already noted that the essential dis-
tinction between xin and yi remains undefined in many early Chinese
sources. But the structural logic of the chain argument of the opening
paradigm in the Daxue requires that yi be construed in this context as
a more internal, quiescent dimension of consciousness –in contrast to
the use of this term elsewhere to describe a more active process of
motivation (see, for example, Chunqiu fanlu ᯹⾟㐕䴆: “[When the
mind is set in motion,] the direction in which it moves is called “con-
sciousness” ᖗП᠔П䃖ᛣ).6 Significantly, the stratum of the inner
consciousness here marked yi is itself represented in the Daxue as be-
ing just as much in need of the stabilizing effect of its own respective
act of cultivation, what I pointedly call ‘attaining the integral whole-
ness of the innermost consciousness’ (cheng qi yi 䁴݊ᛣ). Even more
telling, this stage of the cultivation process is also envisioned as ‘con-
taining’, in a sense, the yet more inwardly disposed seats of moral
consciousness and existential awareness that are treated under the ru-
brics of zhizhi and gewu in the following lines (though these terms are
never fully elaborated in the extant recensions of the text). This leaves
the layer of consciousness indicated by the term xin back at the outer
margins of the inner self, in its pivotal position of interface between
the internal and the external aspects of individual cultivation.
As we have seen, the Daxue refers to the emotions only obliquely,
in its negative illustration of the cultivation of the xin. But our under-
standing of these passages is clarified when we read them in light of

5 Daxue, pp. 7-8.

6 Chunqiu fanlu yizheng, p. 452.
118 ANDREW H. PLAKS

the relevant sections in its sister-text, the Zhongyong. Despite the

striking fact that this latter work makes no significant usage of the
term xin itself, the classic definition of the twin ideals of ‘equilibrium’
and ‘harmony’ (zhonghe Ё੠) found in the opening chapter of this
treatise makes very explicit reference, as we recall, to the archetypal
markers of emotional life (xi-nu-ai-le ୰ᗦઔῖ):
It is only to that state of latency within which the four archetypal mark-
ers of human experience: joy, wrath, grief and delight have not yet
emerged into concrete manifestation that we may properly attribute the
perfectly centred balance of the ‘mean.’ Once these markers have
emerged into reality, in such manner that they remain in balance and in
due proportion, we may then speak of them as being, rather, in a state of
‘harmony.’ What is here termed the ‘mean’ constitutes the all-inclusive
ground of being of the universe as a cosmic whole, whereas the term
‘harmony’ refers to the unimpeded path of fullest attainment in the
world of human experience. When the attributes of both the balanced
mean and harmony are realized to their fullest extent, then Heaven and
Earth assume on this ground their proper cosmic positions, and the re-
generative processes of all the myriad creatures are sustained therein.
୰ᗦઔῖП᳾ⱐ䃖ПЁΤⱐ㗠ⱚЁ㆔䃖П੠DŽЁг㗙໽ϟП໻ᴀ
гΤ੠г㗙໽ϟП䘨䘧гDŽ㟈Ё੠໽ഄԡ⛝Τ㨀⠽㚆⛝DŽ7
Here the Zhongyong probes the conceptual ground of human fulfil-
ment by introducing a primary distinction between a latent, potential
state of being in which the markers of emotional experience are ‘not
yet activated’ (weifa ᳾ⱐ), so to speak, and one in which they have
now emerged into concrete reality (yifa Ꮖⱐ). The apparent usage
here of the adverbs ‘before’ and ‘after’ (literally, ‘not yet’ and ‘al-
ready’) may be subject to serious misinterpretation, since what is at
issue in these formulations is a crucial conceptual dichotomy, not a
temporal sequence moving from one stage of development to the next.
It marks what is essentially an ontological division between two
realms: the universal ground of being, free of these experiential mark-
ers, and the finite human world, perceived through the prism of emo-
tional responses. When we subject the Zhongyong to a careful reading
and analysis, we can grasp its central argument grounded in the dis-
tinction between that ideal state of perfectly centered balance (zhong)
ascribed to the former dimension, and a secondary, proximate degree
of self-perfection in the latter realm that requires the restoration of
equilibrium through a process of compensatory counter-balancing.

7 Zhongyong, in Sishu jizhu, p. 2.

 XIN AS THE SEAT OF EMOTIONS 119

This notion of secondary equilibrium is what is described in both Chi-

nese and Greek sources with the musical metaphor of ‘harmony.’ The
unstated but nevertheless clear implication of this logical division be-
tween two modes of being is that the emotional content of concrete
human existence requires an unrelenting process of adjustment and
counterbalancing if one is to approach the desired state of self-
contained wholeness (cheng 䁴): the same quality that defines the
Zhongyong’s vision of the maximum degree of perfection of the ‘way
of man’–attainable by the greatest ‘sages’ alone, and that only hypo-
thetically. In this light, the classic statement of this principle in chap-
ter 20 of the same text, taking the form of a play on the verbal sense of
the word cheng borrowed (with slight modification) from Mencius:
A perfect state of integral wholeness can only be attributed to the Way
of Heaven; the process of making oneself whole is, however, within the
province of the Way of Man. ‘Integral wholeness’ means a state of cen-
tered balance requiring no striving, complete attainment requiring no
mental effort. To strike the mean with absolute effortlessness is the
mark of none but those of perfect cultivation. The process of ‘making
oneself whole,’ by contrast. requires choosing the good and holding fast
to it with all one’s strength.
䁴㗙໽П䘧гΤ䁴П㗙ҎП䘧гDŽ䁴㗙ϡ࢝㗠ЁΤϡᗱ㗠ᕫDŽᕲ
ᆍЁ䘧㘪ҎгDŽ䁴П㗙᪛୘㗠೎෋П㗙гDŽ8ʳ
transforms its meaning from an unchanging state of perfect balance to
a ceaseless process of striving and attainment.
The contradictory senses of pursuing self-cultivation through the
checking and channeling of emotional impulses or through their re-
finement and perfection find expression in a series of key dialogues in
the book of Mencius. On the one side, we have a set of passages based
upon the conception of the human ‘heart’ as the innate core of moral
consciousness. When Mencius speaks of the ‘heart of the newborn
babe’ in chapter 4B (䲶ပϟ)
Mencius said, “A great man is one who retains the heart of a new-born
babe.”
ᄳᄤ᳄ˍ໻Ҏ㗙ϡ༅݊䌸ᄤПᖗ㗙гˎ9ʳ
when he claims in chapter 2A (݀ᄿϥϞ) to have attained by the age
of forty ‘an unmoved mind’ ៥ಯकϡࢩᖗ10ʳechoing Confucius’ par-

8 Zhongyong, p. 20.
9 Mengzi yizhu, p. 189.
10 Mengzi yizhu, p. 197.
120 ANDREW H. PLAKS

allel claim of having reached a state of inner balance by the age of

seventy (this is apparently the only substantive use of the term xin in
the entire Lunyu text) :
The Master said: “At fifteen I set my heart on learning; at thirty I took
my stand; at forty I came to be free from doubts; at fifty I understood
the Decree of Heaven; at sixty my ear was attuned; at seventy I fol-
lowed my heart’s desire without overstepping the line”.
ᄤ᳄Ψ਒क᳝Ѩ㗠ᖫᮐᅌΤϝक㗠ゟΤಯक㗠ϡᚥΤѨक㗠ⶹ໽
ੑΤ݁क㗠㘇䷚Τϗक㗠ᕲᖗ᠔℆ʿʳϡ䐄ⶽˎ11
and when he gives a full exposition in chapters 2A and 6A (ਞᄤϞ)
of his vision of the inborn ‘hearts’ of compassion, shame, and the like:
Mencius said: “No man is devoid of a heart sensitive to the suffering of
others ... My reason for saying that no man is devoid of a heart sensitive
to the suffering of others is this. Suppose a man were, all of a sudden, to
see a young child on the verge of falling into a well. He would certainly
be moved to compassion, not because he wanted to get in good graces
with the parents, nor because he wished to win the praise of his fellow
villagers and friends, nor yet because he disliked the cry of the child.
From this it can be seen that whoever is devoid of the heart of compas-
sion is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of shame is not hu-
man, whoever is devoid of the heart of courtesy and modesty is not hu-
man, and whoever is devoid of the heart of right and wrong is not hu-
man. The heart of compassion is the germ of benevolence; the heart of
shame, of dutifulness; the heart of courtesy and modesty, of observance
of the rites; the heart of right and wrong, of wisdom ...
ᄳᄤ᳄ΨҎⱚ᳝ϡᖡҎПᖗ…ҹ䃖Ҏⱚ᳝ϡᖡҎПᖗ㗙ΨҞҎС
㽟ᅎᄤᇛܹᮐѩΤⱚ᳝ᘉᚩᛏ䲅ПᖗDŽ䴲᠔ҹܻѸᮐᅎᄤП⠊↡
гΤ䴲᠔ҹ㽕䅑ᮐ䛝咼᳟টгΤ䴲ᚵ݊㙆㗠✊гDŽ⬅ᰃ㾔П⛵‫و‬
䲅Пᖗ䴲ҎгΤ⛵㕲ᚵПᖗ䴲ҎгΤ⛵䖁䅧Пᖗ䴲ҎгΤ⛵ᰃ䴲
Пᖗ䴲ҎгDŽᛏ䲅ПᖗҕПッгΤ㕲ᚵПᖗ㕽ПッгΤ䖁䅧Пᖗ
⾂ПッгΤᰃ䴲ПᖗᱎПッг…
…The heart of compassion is, possessed by all men alike: likewise the
heart of shame, the heart of respect, and the heart of right and wrong.
The heart of compassion pertains to benevolence, the heart of shame to
dutifulness, the heart of respect to observance of the rites, and the heart
of right and wrong to wisdom. Benevolence, dutifulness, observance of
the rites, and wisdom are not welded on to me from the outside; they
are in me originally. Only this has never dawned on me. That is why it
is said. ‘Seek and you will find it: let it go and you will lose it.’”
ᛏ䲅ПᖗҎⱚ᳝ПΤ㕲ᚵПᖗҎⱚ᳝ПΤᙁᭀПᖗҎⱚ᳝ПΤᰃ
䴲ПᖗҎⱚ᳝ПDŽᛏ䲅ПᖗҕгΤ㕲ᚵПᖗ㕽гΤᙁᭀПᖗ⾂

11 Lunyu yizhu, p. 12.

 XIN AS THE SEAT OF EMOTIONS 121
гΤᰃ䴲ПᖗᱎгDŽҕ㕽⾂ᱎ䴲⬅໪䨴៥гΤ៥೎᳝ПгΤᓫᗱ
㘇⶷DŽᬙ᳄Ψ∖ࠛᕫПΤ㟡ࠛ༅ПDŽ12ʳ
it seems to follow unequivocally that all that is required of the junzi is
to cultivate the inborn potentiality for moral perfection already present
in his essential human nature. This is spelled out in those passages
where the process of cultivation at issue is explicitly defined as ‘pre-
serving’ (cun ᄬ) , ’nurturing’ (yang 仞), and most importantly, ‘fully
realizing’ (jin ⲵ) the innate moral consciousness (e.g. “A gentleman
differs from other men in that he retains his heart...” ৯ᄤ᠔ҹ⭄ᮐҎ
㗙ҹ݊ᄬᖗ; “There is nothing better for the nurturing of the heart
than to reduce the number of one’s desires... 仞ᖗ㥿୘ᮐᆵ℆; “ For a
man to give full realization to his heart is for him to understand his
own nature ... By retaining his heart and nurturing his nature he is
serving Heaven ⲵ݊ᖗ㗙ⶹ݊ᗻг…ᄬ݊ᖗ仞݊ᗻΤ᠔ҹџ໽
г) . 13
These crucial passages must be reconciled, however, with a series
of other Mencian expressions stressing the need to actively engage in
a struggle to hold the natural tendencies of the human heart in check
The most conspicuous of these moments is probably seen in the fa-
mous lines in chapter 7A (ⲵᖗϞ):
Mencius said, “Benevolence is the heart of man, and rightness his road.
Sad it is indeed when a man gives up the right road instead of following
it and allows his heart to stray without enough sense to go after it.
When his chickens and dogs stray, he has sense enough to go after them,
but not when his heart strays. The sole concern of learning is to go after
his strayed heart. That is all.”
ᄳᄤ᳄ΨҕΤҎᖗгDŽ㕽ΤҎ䏃гDŽ㟡݊䏃㗠ᓫ⬅Τᬒ݊ᖗ㗠ϡ
ⶹ∖ΤઔઝΪҎ᳝䲲⢀ᬒࠛⶹ∖ПΤ᳝ᬒᖗ㗠ϡⶹ∖ʽᅌଣП䘧
⛵ҪΤ∖݊ᬒᖗ㗠Ꮖ⶷DŽ14ʳ
Here Mencius proposes his essential definition of learning as ‘retriev-
ing’ the heart from its apparently congenital tendency toward devia-
tion from the proper path (qiu qi fangxin). A similar idea can be seen
in his well-known discussion in chapter 7B (ⲵᖗϟ) on the need to
‘reduce one’s desires’ (guayu) as a precondition of the proper cultiva-
tion of the heart:
Mencius said, “There is nothing better for the nurturing of the heart
than to reduce the number of one’s desires. When a man has but few

12 Mengzi yizhu, pp. 79-80, 259.

13 Mengzi yizhu, pp. 197, 339, 301.
14 Mengzi yizhu, p. 267.
122 ANDREW H. PLAKS

desires, even if there is anything he fails to retain in himself, it cannot

be much; but when he has a great many desires, then even if there is
anything he manages to retain in himself, it cannot be much.”
ᄳᄤ᳄Ψ仞ᖗ㥿୘ᮐᆵ℆Τ݊⚎Ҏгᆵ℆Τ䲪᳝ϡᄬ⛝㗙ᆵ⶷DŽ
݊⚎Ҏг໮℆Τ䲪ᄬ⛝㗙ᆵ⶷DŽ15
The contrast between these two types of formulations may not always
be entirely clear, but it impinges very substantially upon our concep-
tion of the place of emotional experience in the canonic Confucian
view of self-cultivation. What in Mencius and in the Four Books in
general remains an unresolved tension between the vision of a hypo-
thetically pure moral consciousness at the core of selfhood and, at the
same time, the unceasing need to control the wayward pull of the hu-
man heart was to become a central theme of later Confucian moral
philosophy. In the so-called ‘School of Principle’ (lixue ⧚ᅌ) from
Song times on, this problem was typically understood as due to the
blocking effect of personal desire (sibi ⾕㬑) an idea already adum-
brated in chapter 7B of Mencius:
A trail through the mountains, if used, becomes a path in a short time,
but, if unused, it becomes blocked by grass in an equally short time.
Now your heart is blocked by grass.
ᄳᄤ䃖催ᄤ᳄ˍቅᕥП䐞䭧ҟ✊⫼П㗠៤䏃Τ⚎䭧ϡ⫼ࠛ㣙าП
⶷DŽҞ㣙าᄤПᖗ⶷DŽ16ʳ
and explored to great depth in chapter 21 (“On Dispelling Obfusca-
tion” jiebi 㾷㬑) of the Xunzi:
Obfuscation may be caused by desires or by aversions, it may be due to
initial factors or to resulting factors, to factors that are either remote or
close at hand, broad in scope or superficial, stemming from longstand-
ing causes or from more recent ones. Whenever one draws distinctions
among the various phenomena of the world this will invariably lead to
mutual obfuscation between the opposing terms. This is a universal
handicap caused by the workings of the human mind.
…℆⚎㬑Τᚵ⚎㬑Τྟ⚎㬑Τ㌖⚎㬑Τ䘴⚎㬑Τ䖥⚎㬑Τम⚎
㬑Τ⏎⚎㬑Τস⚎㬑ΤҞ⚎㬑DŽ޵㨀⠽⭄ࠛ㥿ϡⳌ⚎㬑DŽℸᖗ㸧
П݀ᙷгDŽ17
This convergence in the views of Mencius and Xunzi reminds us that
the differences between the two thinkers are by no means reducible to
the sort of simplistic polemic on the ‘good’ or ‘evil’ substance of hu-

15 Mengzi yizhu, p. 339.

16 Mengzi yizhu, p. 331.
17 Xunzi jijie, p. 388.
 XIN AS THE SEAT OF EMOTIONS 123

man nature conventionally attributed to them. Just as Mencius strug-

gles with contradictory aspects of the place of the emotional content
of xin within his vision of self-cultivation, Xunzi as well (despite his
singlemindedly polemical style of argumentation) leaves unresolved
considerable areas of ambivalence with respect to his conception of
the substance and functioning of the mind as an object of the cultiva-
tion process. This is very striking in view of those well-known pas-
sages in which he describes in great detail the ‘natural’ propensity of
the mind to be beclouded by destabilizing impulses:
... And should one inquire how the mind attains this understanding, I
would say: “By virtue of its three attributes: emptiness, singularity, and
quiescence ... It is in constant motion, and yet it still has the capacity we
may call quiescence.”
ᖗԩҹⶹΩ᮹Ψ㰯ϔ㗠䴰…ᖗ᳾௫ϡࢩгΤ✊㗠᳝᠔䃖䴰DŽ
... And so, where the Book of the Way speaks of: “the instability of the
heart of man, the ineffability of the ‘heart’ of the Way,” it is only one
who is endowed with the perspicacity of a true man of cultivation who
is capable of understanding the incipient signs of the most unstable and
ineffable things.
ᬙ(䘧㍧ቅ) ᳄:ҎᖗПॅΤ䘧ᖗПᖂDŽॅᖂПᑒᚳᯢ৯ᄤ㗠ᕠ㛑ⶹ
ПDŽ
The fact that desire is not dependent upon the attainability of its object
is something ingrained in one’s natural predisposition, while the pursuit
of desire in accordance with that which is attainable is a propensity de-
rived from the workings of the heart ... Thus when one’s desires exceed
one’s capacity and his actions are inadequate to satisfy them, then the
heart will put them to rest ...
℆ϡᕙৃᕫ᠔ফТ໽гDŽ∖㗙ᕲ᠔ৃফТᖗгĂᬙ℆䘢П㗠ࢩϡ
ঞΤᖗℶПгDŽ18
In these passages, Xunzi describes the restless, wayward tendencies of
the heart that need to be tamed and corrected through both coercive
and self-generated patterns of order. At the other end of the conceptual
spectrum, however, his thinking is also anchored by a very strong
faith in the power of the human mind, in its hypothetically undisturbed
state, to both contain and express the essential patterns of cosmic and
human perfection. This apparent ambivalence reminds us that Xunzi’s
explicit polemics conform to the general assumptions implicit in so
much of the so-called ‘ritual corpus.’ We recall certain teachings in
the Li Ji,e.g. the following passage in the Liyun ⾂䘟

18 Xunzi jijie, pp. 395-96, 400-01, 427-28.

124 ANDREW H. PLAKS

What are the basic human emotions? They are seven in number: joy,
wrath, grief, fear, love, abhorrence and desire. ... Thus desire and abhor-
rence constitute the principal points of inception for the workings of the
heart ... Should one wish to penetrate these feelings in a consistent
manner, failing the expressive medium of ritual what other means does
one have to do so?
ԩ䃖ҎᚙΨ୰ᗦઔ័ᛯᚵ℆Τϗ㗙…ᬙ℆ᚵ㗙ᖗП໻ッгʿʳ…ʳ℆ϔ
ҹもПΤ㟡⾂ԩҹઝΩ19
in which the essential function of ritual is understood both as a set of
normative structures for containing unruly behavior and as a mode of
expression for refining and bringing to fulfillment the emotional con-
tent of human experience.

My tentative conclusions regarding these issues are rooted in the ob-

servation made earlier regarding the intermediary position of the emo-
tional and cognitive faculties seated in the human heart, turning in one
direction inward to the instinctive moral consciousness, and in the
other looking out to the external interaction of the physical and the so-
cial self. Needless to say, this tension is never resolved in academic
philosophizing about ideals of human perfection. And it is precisely
this ambivalent position of Confucian thought with respect to the sub-
stance of xin that lends the greatest power and poignancy to countless
moving literary examples of our common human failure to achieve
this ideal. This is what has been called the ‘paradox of self’ in the
great masterpieces of Chinese poetry and prose. In the discourse of
moral philosophy, Confucian thinkers may speak movingly of the
paradigmatic cultivation of the individual character as the basis for
perfecting one’s relations with his fellow man and, by extension, with
the entire objective universe. This seems to be the rather idealistic vi-
sion behind such expressions as “bringing oneself, one’s fellow man,
and all other things to realization” (chengyi, chengren, chengwu ៤Ꮖʿʳ
៤Ҏʿʳ ៤⠽) in the Mencius, the Zhongyong and other canonic texts.
But in the representation of the flawed condition of human reality in
the medium of fictional narrative, the imperative of balanced self-
perfection gives way to far more compelling portraits of disequilib-
rium: to the self-destructive forces of pride and passion in works such
as Sanguozhi yanyi and Shuihuzhuan, and to the deeply troubling in-
versions of the ideal of self-fulfillment that take the form of wanton

19 Liyun, in Liji zhengyi, 22:194 (1422).

 XIN AS THE SEAT OF EMOTIONS 125

self-indulgence in Jin Ping Mei and fruitless self-absorption in Hon-

gloumeng. At the heart of these Chinese literary and philosophical re-
flections on both the path of proper cultivation and the thorns and
brambles of desire that inevitably block it, lies the emotional core of
human experience designated by the term xin.

REFERENCES
Chunqiu fanlu yizheng ᯹⾟㐕䴆㕽䄝, comp. Su Yu 㯛㟜, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju,
1992.
Daxue ໻ᅌ, in Sishu jizhu ಯ᳌䲚⊼, Taipei: Shijie shuju, 1968.
Harbsmeier, Christoph, Elementary Exercises in Ancient Chinese Conceptual History,
No. 1, unpublished manuscript.
Liji zhengyi ⾂㿬ℷ㕽, in Shisanjing zhushu कϝ㍧⊼⭣, comp. Ruan Yuan 䰂‫ܗ‬Τ
rpt. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979.
Lunyu yizhu 䂪䁲䅃⊼, comp. Yang Bojun ἞ԃዏ, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980.
Mengzi yizhu ᄳᄤ䅃⊼, comp. Yang Bojun ἞ԃዏ, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1990.
Shangshu zhengyi ᇮ᳌ℷ㕽, in Shisanjing zhushu कϝ㍧⊼⭣, comp. Ruan Yuan 䰂
‫ܗ‬, rpt. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979.
Xunzi jijie 㤔ᄤ䲚㾷, comp. Wang Xianqian ⥟‫ܜ‬䃭, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1988.
Zhongyong Ёᒌ, in Sishu jizhu ಯ᳌䲚⊼, Taipei, Shijie shuju, 1968.