CASE ANALYSIS

In The Subject Of

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

Submitted By

ABISHEK JAMES

200401427018

BBA LLB (2020-2025)

Submitted To

Dr. VEDASHREE. A

Date of Submission
October 19, 2022
 THE DOCTRINE OF HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION

1.

IN RE: THE KERALA EDUCATION BILL

(1959 1 SCR 995)

In The Supreme Court of India

Date of Judgement: 22 May, 1958

Bench: S. Das, B.S Kapur, V Aiyar, J Imam, Bhagwati

INTRODUCTION

The ‘Kerala education Bill’ case is a landmark case under Article 29 of the constitution, an
article that guarantees the cultural rights to the citizens of India. The judgment of the court
was delivered on the reference made by president under 143 for advice of supreme court on
the question. The ‘Kerala education bill’ reference was second reference under Art. 143, the
first was made in Re Delhi Laws Act, 1912 by president.

The doctrine of harmonious construction came into existence as a result of many varied court
interpretations of different statutes in a variety of cases. The fundamental principle behind
this doctrine is, a statute has a legal purpose and should be read in its totality and after that,
the interpretation that is consistent with all the provisions of that statute should be used.
 FACTS OF THE CASE

Professor Joseph Mundasseri, the education minister for the Communist Party of India
(1957), introduced the Education Bill in the Kerala assembly. The Governor of Kerala
reserved the bill for consideration of the President. Several doubts were said to have arisen
regarding the constitutional validity of the provisions of the bill. Thus, the President used its
power under Article 143 of the Constitution and referred the questions to the Supreme Court
for its opinion.

ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether clause 3 (5) and clause 36 of the bill are in violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution?
2. Whether the clause 8 (3) and clauses 9 to 13 of the bill are in violation of Article 30
(1) of the Constitution?
3. Whether clause 15 of the bill violates Article 14 of the Constitution?
4. Whether clause 33 of the bill is in violation of Article 226 of the Constitution?

JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court in this case held that while discussing the constitutional validity of clause
3 (5), the court found it is relevant to discuss the validity of other clauses of the bill. It was
alleged that clause 3 (5) violates Article 14 of the Constitution. The court referred to the
previous judgments where Article 14 was the subject and held that it forbids class legislation
however allows reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. The court expressed
its opinion over clause 36 by stating that the power conferred upon the Government under
this clause has to be exercised for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this
bill. In similar words, the rules framed must implement the policy and purpose laid down in
its preamble and other clauses of the bill.
On analysing the provisions of Article 30 (1), the Court does not suppose that the protection
and privilege of this article applies only to the educational institutions established after the
date our Constitution came into operation. If however this hypothesis is considered true, then
the educational institutions established by minority communities before the commencement
of the Constitution would not be entitled to the benefits of Article 30 (1). This conception
clearly violates Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution which provides to every citizen of India
the right to practice any profession or to carry on any trade, occupation or business. Article
30 (1) broadly covers both pre- Constitution and post- Constitution institutions. The article
gives two rights to the minorities namely, to establish and to administer educational
institutions of their choice. 

ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court articulated the doctrine of harmonious construction in the case, Re Kerala
Education Bill Case (1957). The court added that there was no inherent conflict between the
Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of the State Policy and they together
constitute an integrated scheme and a comprehensive administrative and social programme
for a modern democratic state. The court called them supplementary and complementary to
each other. Therefore, effort should be put to construe them harmoniously, so that the courts
avoid any conflict among the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles. They basically
run parallel to each other and neither one is subordinate to the other.
Whenever a discrepancy arises between two or more statutes or different clauses or sections
of a statute, the doctrine of harmonious construction must be followed. The doctrine is based
on the straightforward principle that every statute has a legal purpose and should be read in
totality. The interpretation should be such that it is unswerving and all of the statute’s
provisions should be used. 

2.
 STATE OF RAJASTHAN V GOPI KISHAN SEN

(AIR 1992 SC 1754)

In The Supreme Court of India

Date of Judgement: 7 April, 1992

Bench: L Sharma, A. Anand

FACTS OF THE CASE

Gopi Kishan Sen was appointed as a teacher in 1972. He has claimed his salary in the pay
scale of Rs. 160-360/- per month which was refused by the State. He made an application
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the High Court of Rajasthan.
The State claimed that aforesaid pay scale of Rs. 160-360/- per month is allowed to trained
teachers. Since the petitioner was not trained, he was appointed at the fixed rate of Rs. 130/ -
per month until he became trained. The matter is admittedly governed by the provisions of
Rajasthan Civil Services (New Pay Scales) Rules 1969 read with Education Subordinate
Service Rules, 1971. It may, however, be stated that the scales have been revised
subsequently. The amount of Rs. 130/- per month was fixed as the salary of the respondent in
accordance with the provisions in the Schedule which reads as follows;
Freshly recruited untrained graduates in this scale will receive fixed pay of Rs. 130/-until he
gets trained. The above provision has been struck down by the High Court in part on the
ground of illegal discrimination and the appellant has been directed to pay the respondent his
salary at the higher rate for the period 1972 to 1982 also during which period he was an
untrained teacher.

ISSUES RAISED
1. Whether the trained and untrained teachers have been performing identical duties and
there should, therefore, be parity in their salary?
2. Whether the Rule 29 of the Rajasthan Services Rules, 1951 prevail over the Rajasthan
Civil Services (New Pay Scales) Rules, 1969?

JUDGEMENT

Supreme Court in the present case held that Rule 29 dealing with payment of increment is in
general terms while the Schedule in the 1969 Rules makes a special provision governing the
untrained teachers, attracting the maxim ''generalibus special derogant', i.e., if a special
provision is made on a certain subject, that subject is excluded from the general provision.
The Schedule in the 1969 Rules, therefore, must be held to prevail over the general
provisions of 1951 Rules. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the judgment under appeal is
set aside and the writ petition of the respondent filed in the High Court is dismissed.

ANALYSIS

The rule of harmonious construction of apparently conflicting statutory provisions is

well-established for upholding and giving effect to all the provisions as far as it may be
possible, and for avoiding the interpretation which may render any of them ineffective or
otiose.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court observed that the rule of harmonious
construction of seemingly contradictory statutory provisions is well recognized for as far as it
may be possible to uphold and give effect to all the provisions and avoid the interpretation
which may render any of them powerless. 

Rule 29 of the Rajasthan Services Rules, 1951 dealing with the increment in pay scale is in
general terms, while the schedule in the Rajasthan Civil Services (New Pay Scales) Rules,
1969 has a special provision overseeing the untrained teachers. This case thus attracts the
maxim ‘generalibus specialia derogant’ because when a special provision is made on a
certain subject then that subject is excluded from the general provision. 
3.

CALCUTTA GAS COMPANY PRIVATE LIMITED V. STATE OF

WEST BENGAL
 (1962 AIR 1044)

In The Supreme Court of India

Date of Judgement: 5 February, 1962

Bench: Sinha, Bhuvneshwar P, N Rajagopala, T.L Venkatarama, Mudholkar, J.R

Aiyyar

INTRODUCTION

The rule of Harmonious construction is the thumb rule to interpretation of any statute. An
interpretation which makes the enactment a consistent whole, should be the aim of the courts
and a construction which avoids inconsistency or repugnancy between the various sections or
parts of the statute should be adopted.

In the case of Calcutta Gas Company Private Limited vs, the State of West Bengal the
legislative assembly of West Bengal passed the Oriental Gas Company in 1960. The
respondent sought to take the management of the gas company under this act. The appellant
challenged the validity of this act by holding that the state legislative Assembly had no power
to pass such an Act under Entries 24 and 25 of the State List because the Parliament had
already enacted the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act ,1951 under Entry 52 of the
Central List dealing with industries.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant was appointed as Manager of the Oriental Gas company which owned an
industrial undertaking for the manufacture and sale of fuel gas in Calcutta by an agreement
between the appellant company and the Oriental Gas company. The West Bengal Legislature
passed the Oriental Gas Company Act, 1960, and Section 4 provided that the said
undertaking shall stand transferred to the State Government for five years for management
and control.
On 3rd October 1960, the State Government issued a notification stating that the management
and control of the said undertaking would be taken over by it. Th e appellant filed a writ
petition impugned the constitutional validity of the said Act and sought appropriate writs
restraining the State Government form giving effect to it and quashing the said notifications.
The High Court rejected the petition and held that the State Legislature had the competence
to enact the impugned Act and its constitutional validity was beyond question. The appellant
filed an appeal in the Supreme Court of India against the said order of the High Court.

ISSUES RAISED
1. Whether the state legislature is competent to enact the Oriental Gas Company Act,
1960?

JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court of India held that the Legislature of a State has the exclusive power to
make law in respect of gas industry by virtue of entry 25 of List II, and that entry 24 does not
comprehend gas industry.

The expression “industry” in entry 52 of List I bears the same meaning as that in entry 24 of
List II, with the result that the said expression in entry 52 of List I also does not take in a gas
industry. In the result, we agree with the High Court that the impugned Act was within the

legislative competence of the West Bengal State Legislature and was validly made.

It can be perceived from this case that statutes are drafted by the legislatures and there is
every possibility of situations of ambiguity, conflicts, etc. Here, Courts come with several
doctrines of the constitution to protect the statutes and acts as interpreters to render justice.
 ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court in this case used the rule of harmonious construction and held that it was
clear that the gas industry was covered completely by Entry 25 of the State List over which
the State had full control. Therefore, the state had the power to make laws in this regard.
Therefore, with the help of the rule of harmonious construction, the Supreme Court expressed
that the gas industry came under Entry 25 which is a part of the State List, and this gives the
State full control over it. It was observed by the Supreme court that there are so many
subjects in three lists in the constitution that there is bound to be some overlapping and it is
the duty of the courts in such situation is yet to harmonise them, if possible, so the effect can
be given each of them.

Entry 24 of the state list covers the entire industries in the state. Entry 25 is only limited to
the gas industry. Therefore Entry 24 covers every industry barring the Gas industries because
it has been specifically covered under Entry 25. Corresponding to Entry 24 of the State List,
there is entry 52 in the union list. Therefore, by harmonious construction it became clear that
the gas industry was exclusively covered by entry 25 of the state list over which the state has
full control. Therefore, the State was fully competent to make laws in this regard.

4.

KM NANAVATI V STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

(1962 AIR 605)

 In The Supreme Court of India

Date of Judgement: 24 November, 1961

Bench: Subbarao K

INTRODUCTION

The case of K.M. Nanavati v. the State of Maharashtra is one of the landmark judgments in
the history of the Indian Judiciary. The judgement, in this case, was passed on 24th November
1961 when old criminal laws were in force in India. This case is referred to as the last case of
jury trial in India though it was indeed not the last one. This judgement laid emphasis on
various constitutional principles which made it a famous case of that time grabbing the
attention of the media and the general public.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner K.M. Nanavati, an Indian Naval Officer, shifted to Bombay with his wife
Sylvia and their children. A businessman named Prem Ahuja was residing with his sister in
the same city. When Nanavati was frequently away from Bombay on his official duty for
longer durations then Sylvia, his wife, fell in love with Prem Ahuja and developed Illicit
relations with him.

When Nanavati returned from his ship, he tried to be affectionate to his wife to which she
was not being responsive on multiple occasions. On 27 April 1959, Nanavati asked his wife if
she had been faithful to him. She merely shook her head to indicate that she was not. On 27
April 1959, Sylvia confessed to her husband about the Illicit relationship with Prem Ahuja.
In the heat of agony, Nanavati went to his ship to procure a loaded revolver and then went to
the office of Prem Ahuja.  On not finding him at the office he drove to Ahuja’s residence and
shot him dead. K.M. Nanavati, the accused, initially was declared not guilty under Section
302 by the Jury with an 8: 1 verdict.

The case was then referred by the Sessions Judge to the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay
under Section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.The Hon’ble High Court
declared the accused guilty under Section 302 of IPC. An appeal was finally made to the
Hon’ble Supreme Court.

ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether the High Court lacked jurisdiction under Section 307 of the CrPC to
examine the facts in order to determine the competency of the Sessions Judge’s
referral.

2. Whether the High Court had the power to strike aside a jury’s decision on the
grounds of misdirection in charge under Section 307(3) of the CrPC.

JUDGEMENT

 The Supreme Court held that it was a case of pre-meditated murder and that the defence of
grave and sudden provocation could not be conceived. The Supreme Court observed that the
appellant (accused), KM Nanavati had sufficient self-control over his senses when the
incident occurred. After hearing about his wife’s intention to marry the victim, Nanavati was
thinking about the future of his family. Nanavati had sufficient time to calm down and all the
actions of Nanavati indicate that they were intentional with the motive to kill Prem Ahuja.
To, the issue of whether the governor’s pardoning powers and a special leave petition could
be exercised together or not, the Supreme Court held that both cannot move together. If a
special leave petition is filed before the Supreme Court, then the governor’s pardoning
powers are terminated. The Supreme Court concluded that the governor “overreached” the
powers conferred on him.

Supreme Court said that the high court should evaluate the evidence and give weightage to
the opinions of judges and jury and then pass the judgement of acquittal or conviction after
the reference has been made by the learned session’s judge under Section 307 of Criminal
Procedure Code, 1898. The Hon’ble Supreme Court agreed with the Bombay high court’s
observations about the learned judge’s allegation of misdirection on part of the jury.

The Supreme Court laid down two rules to be followed to determine the competency of a
sessions judge’s referral. First of all, the judge must dissent from the jury’s decision. Second,
in the opinion of the learned session’s judge, the decision pronounced must be of such nature
that no reasonable man could have pronounced. If these two conditions are not satisfied, then
the high court has the power to reject the referral.

So, the decision of the High Court of Bombay was upheld by the Supreme Court and the
appeal was liable to be dismissed. Exception 1 to Section 300 was not attracted to the present
case and the accused was found to be guilty of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code.

ANALYSIS

The High Court held Nanavati guilty of the offence of murder and this decision was further
challenged in the Supreme Court. In the meantime, the Governor of Bombay by the use of
power vested in him under Article 161 of the Constitution of India passed an order for the
suspension of Nanavati.  
The decision of the Governor was questioned because when the suspension was ordered the
case was sub-judice under the Supreme Court. Applying the principle of harmonious
construction to settle the conflict that arose between the executive and the judiciary, the
Supreme Court held that Article 161 and the suspension by the Governor was not applicable
when the case was sub-judice.

 The rule of harmonious construction brings consistency between different conflicting

provisions so that none of them is rendered powerless or dead-letter as there has been
considerable thought by the legislature in making them. IN THIS CASE it can be concluded
that the principle of harmonious construction or interpretation is an effective tool of
interpretation used by the Indian courts to not only resolve conflicts but also to make
important decisions.