SINDICO V DIAZ

pouses Virgilio and Virginia Sindico (Sindico) sued respondents Felipe and

Erlinda Sombrea (Sombrea) who refused to return the land owned by the
former. The arrangement arose from the request of Sombrea‘s parents from
the Sindicos that former will cultivate the disputed land in exchange of an
income sharing.

After the death of the Sombrea‘s parents, Spouses Sindico demanded the
return of the said land which brought about the suit filed with the Regional
Trial Court. The Sombreas assailed the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case as
they assert that the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has
exclusive and original jurisdiction as provided under Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP).

The RTC dismissed the case ruling in consonance with the Sombreas‘

contention and subsequently denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
the spouses Sindico.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has the exclusive original jurisdiction over the
pending case

HELD:

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the

complaint. It is not affected by the pleas set up by the defendant in his answer
or in a motion to dismiss, otherwise, jurisdiction would be dependent on his
whims. The allegations in petitioner‘s complaint show that the action is one
for recovery of possession, not one which involves an agrarian dispute.

Section 3(d) of RA 6657 or the CARP Law defines agrarian dispute over which

the DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction as “refer[ing] to any controversy
relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture…”

That respondents only basis in assailing the jurisdiction of the trial court is

that the subject matter of the case is an agricultural land and that they do not
deny at all the allegation of the complaint of petitioners that there is no
tenancy or leasehold agreement between them unmistakably show that there
is no agrarian dispute to speak of over which the DARAB has exclusive
original jurisdiction.

Finally, since petitioners‘ action is one for recovery of possession and does not
involve an agrarian dispute, the RTC has jurisdiction over it.

TOLENTINO V LEVISTE

[G.R. No. 156118. November 19, 2004] PABLO T. TOLENTINO and TEMPUS
PLACE REALTY MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. OSCAR
LEVISTE, Presiding Judge, RTC, Quezon City, Br. 97 and SPOUSES GERARDO
CINCO, JR. and PAMELA H. CINCO, respondents
Sps. Gerardo Cinco, Jr., and Pamela H. Cinco. purchased from petitioners a
condominium unit in Tempus Place Condominium in Quezon City. Despite,
however, the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the delivery of the
owners copy of the condominium certificate of title, petitioners failed to
deliver possession of the unit because they have allegedly leased it to a third
party. Hence, Sps Cinco filed Cinco filed a complaint for specific performance
with damages against petitioners Tempus Place Realty Management
Corporation and Pablo T. Tolentino. Petitioners failed to file their answer to
the complaint, the RTC, issued an order granting respondents motion to
declare petitioners in default, and granted the relief prayed for by sps Cinco.
Petitioners thereafter filed a motion for new trial. They contended that their
right to fair and impartial trial had been impaired by reason of accident,
mistake or excusable negligence of their former counsel, a certain Atty.
Villamor.[4] The trial court denied the motion for new trial for lack of merit.
petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals an action for annulment of
judgment based on several grounds that include , that the court has no
jurisdiction and/or authority and has committed a grave abuse of discretion
in awarding amounts in excess of what is prayed for in the complaint nor
proved by the evidence as well as in palpable violation of the mandatory
provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court and applicable decisions of
the Supreme Court.

Held : Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to:

1)either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or

2)over the subject matter of the claim.[22]

Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or respondent is acquired :

1)by voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to

the court, or 2)by coercive process issued by the court to him, generally by the
service of summons.

The trial court clearly had jurisdiction over the person of the defending party,
the petitioners herein, when the latter received the summons from the court.

On the other hand, jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim is
conferred by law and is determined from the allegations in the complaint.
Under the law, the action for specific performance and damages is within the
jurisdiction of the RTC. Petitioners submission, therefore, that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction does not hold water. We note that petitioners arguments to
support their stand that the trial court did not have jurisdiction actually
pertain to the substance of the decision. Jurisdiction is not the same as the
exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction,
jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered
therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter,
the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the
jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of
jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an
appeal. The petition was denied.
MANILA RAILROAD VS. ATTY.-GENERAL (G.R. NO. L-6287)

FACTS:

On Dec 1907, Manila Railroad Co. began an action in CFI Tarlac for the
condemnation of a certain real estate which measures up to 69,910 square
meters in area located in Tarlac. This is for construction of a railroad line from
Paniqui to Tayug in the province of Tarlac.

Before beginning the action, Manila Railroad had caused to be made a

thorough search in the Office of the Registry of Property and of the Tax where
the lands sought to be condemned were located and to whom they belonged.
As a result of such investigations, it alleged that the lands in question were
located in the province of Tarlac.

After filing and duly serving the complaint, the plaintiff, pending final
determination of the action, took possession of and occupied the lands
described in the complaint, building its line and putting the same in operation.

On Oct 4, Manila Railroad gave notice to the defendants that on Oct. 9, a

motion would be made to the court to dismiss the action upon the ground that
the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, it having just been
ascertained by the plaintiff that the land sought to be condemned was situated
in the Province of Nueva Ecija, instead of the Province of Tarlac, as alleged in
the complaint. This motion was heard and, after due consideration, the trial
court dismissed the action upon the ground presented by the plaintiff.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the CFI of Tarlac has power and authority to take cognizance
of an action by the railroad company for the condemnation of real estate
located in another province.

Whether or not Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Act. No. 1258
are applicable and so the CFI has no jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:

As to the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled in affirmative, Sections 55 and
56 of Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission confer perfect and complete
jurisdiction upon the CFI of these Islands with respect to real estate. Such
jurisdiction is not made to depend upon locality. There is no suggestion of
limitation. The jurisdiction is universal. It is nowhere suggested, much less
provided, that a Court of First Instance of one province, regularly sitting in
said province, may not under certain conditions take cognizance of an action
arising in another province or of an action relating to real estate located
outside of the boundaries of the province to which it may at the time be
assigned

Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply directs
the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain
cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with the provisions of the
procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to
exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject
matter. It means simply that he may thereby lose jurisdiction of the person or
that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something
essential to sustain it.

As to the subject matter, nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court over
diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall be removed. That is
a matter of legislative enactment which none but the legislature may change.
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the court over the person is, in some
instances, made to defend on the consent or objection, on the acts or
omissions of the parties or any of them. Jurisdiction over the person, however,
may be conferred by consent, expressly or impliedly given, or it may, by an
objection, be prevented from attaching or removed after it has attached.

As to the second issue, the Supreme Court rule in the negative, that section
377 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to actions by railroad
corporations to condemn lands; and that, while with the consent of
defendants express or implied the venue may be laid and the action tried in
any province selected by the plaintiff nevertheless the defendants whose
lands lie in one province, or any one of such defendants, may, by timely
application to the court, require the venue as to their, or, if one defendant, his,
lands to be changed to the province where their or his lands lie. In such case
the action as to all of the defendants not objecting would continue in the
province where originally begun. It would be severed as to the objecting
defendants and ordered continued before the court of the appropriate
province or provinces. While we are of that opinion and so hold it cannot
affect the decision in the case before us for the reason that the defendants are
not objecting to the venue and are not asking for a change thereof. They have
not only expressly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court but
are here asking that that jurisdiction be maintained against the efforts of the
plaintiff to remove it.

The question of venue as presented in the Acts mentioned does not relate to
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter, it simply granting to the
defendant certain rights and privileges as against the plaintiff relative to the
place of trial, which rights and privileges he might waive expressly or by
implication.

For these reasons the Supreme Court reversed the judgement and the cause
remanded to the trial court with the direction to proceed with the action in
accordance with law.

G.R. No. 86773 February 14, 1992

SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER-AQUACULTURE

DEPARTMENT (SEAFDEC-AQD), DR. FLOR LACANILAO (CHIEF), RUFIL
CUEVAS (HEAD, ADMINISTRATIVE DIV.), BEN DELOS REYES (FINANCE
OFFICER), petitioners, 
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JUVENAL
LAZAGA, respondents.
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the decision of
the NLRC sustaining the labor arbiter, in holding herein petitioners liable to
pay private respondent the amount of P126,458.89 plus interest thereon
computed from May 16, 1986 until full payment thereof is made, as separation
pay and other post-employment benefits.
On April 20, 1975, private respondent Juvenal Lazaga was employed as a
Research Associate an a probationary basis by the SEAFDEC-AQD and was
appointed Senior External Affairs Officer on January 5, 1983 with a monthly
basic salary of P8,000.00 and a monthly allowance of P4,000.00. Thereafter,
he was appointed to the position of Professional III and designated as Head of
External Affairs Office with the same pay and benefits.
SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of an international organization, the
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, organized through an
agreement entered into in Bangkok, Thailand on December 28, 1967 by
the governments of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia
and the Philippines with Japan as the sponsoring country

On May 8, 1986, petitioner Lacanilao in his capacity as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD

sent a notice of termination to private respondent informing him that due
to the financial constraints being experienced by the department, his
services shall be terminated at the close of office hours on May 15, 1986 and
that he is entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one (1) month of his
basic salary for every year of service plus other benefits.
Upon petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD’s failure to pay private respondent his
separation pay, the latter filed on March 18, 1987 a complaint against
petitioners for non-payment of separation benefits plus moral damages and
attorney’s fees with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC
Petitioners in their answer with counterclaim alleged that the NLRC has no
jurisdiction over the case inasmuch as the SEAFDEC-AQD is an international
organization and that private respondent must first secure clearances from
the proper departments for property or money accountability before any
claim for separation pay will be paid, and which clearances had not yet been
obtained by the private respondent.
LABOR ARBITER: ordered petitioner to pay the benefits claimed
NLRC: affirmed the LA.
PETITIONER CONTENDS that: SEAFDEC-AQD is immune from suit owing to
its international character and the complaint is in effect a suit against the State
which cannot be maintained without its consent.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner is within the scope of application of Philippine

labor laws (WON SEAFDEC is immuned from suit)
HELD: Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture
Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency beyond the
jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC.
Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments
(AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state
in whose territory its office is located.
In so far as they are autonomous and beyond the control of any one State, they
have a distinct juridical personality independent of the municipal law of the
State where they are situated. As such, according to one leading authority
“they must be deemed to possess a species of international personality of
their own.” (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, 83 [1956 ed.])
One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from
local jurisdiction, i.e.,that it is immune from the legal writs and processes
issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason
for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the
local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host
government may interfere in there operations or even influence or control its
policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local
jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its
responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states.
WHEREFORE, finding SEAFDEC-AQD to be an international agency beyond the
jurisdiction of the courts or local agency of the Philippine government, the
questioned decision and resolution of the NLRC dated July 26, 1988 and
January 9, 1989, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for
having been rendered without jurisdiction.

 
SOLIVEN vs. FAST FORMS
FACTS:
Marie Antoinette R. Soliven, petitioner, filed with the RTC of Makati a
complaint for sum of money with damages against Fastforms Philippines, Inc.
Soliven alleges that Fastforms through its president Dr. Escobar, obtained a
loan from her amounting to P170,000.00 payable in a period of 21 days, with a
3% interest. This loan was evidence by a promissory note executed by Dr.
Escobar. Respondent issued a postdated check but advised petitioner not to
deposit the check as the account from where it was drawn has insufficient
funds. Respondent proposed to petitioner that the P175,000.00 be "rolled-
over," with a monthly interest of 5% (or P8,755.00). Petitioner agreed to the
proposal. Respondent then issued several checks as payment for interests but,
despite petitioner’s repeated demands, respondent refused to pay its principal
obligation and interests due.
Respondent, in its answer with counterclaim, denied that it obtained a loan
from petitioner; and that it did not authorize its then president, Dr. Escobar, to
secure any loan from petitioner or issue various checks as payment for
interests.
RTC rendered its decision in favor or Soliveb and ordered Fastforms to pay
their obligation. Respondent then filed a MR questioning for the first time the
trial court’s jurisdiction. It alleged that since the amount of petitioner’s
principal demand (P195,155.00) does not exceed P200,000.00, the complaint
should have been filed with the MTC.
Soliven opposed the MR, stressing that respondent is barred from assailing
the jurisdiction of the trial court since it has invoked the latter’s jurisdiction
by seeking affirmative relief in its answer to the complaint and actively
participated in all stages of the trial. RTC denied the MR, ruling the totality of
the claim therein exceeds P200,000.00 and that under the principle of
estoppel, respondent has lost its right to question its jurisdiction.
On appeal, CA reversed the trial court’s Decision on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioner filed a MR but was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: 
Should the case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the RTC? NO.
HELD: 
No. While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, "this rule
presupposes that estoppel has not supervened."
In the instant case, respondent actively participated in all stages of the
proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an
affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial
court’s jurisdiction, especially when an adverse judgment has been rendered.
The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be
assailed at any stage, a litigant’s participation in all stages of the case before
the trial court, including the invocation of its authority in asking for
affirmative relief, bars such party from challenging the court’s jurisdiction. A
party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. The Court frowns upon the
undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and
submitting his case for decision and then accepting judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

 
 Siena Realty Corp. vs. Gal-langG.R. No. 145169. May 13, 2004Facts:
 The petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 RevisedRules of Court is the September 13, 2000.
The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners’
 petitionfor certiorari for being filed 9 days late. Petitioners thereupon filed
(on July 10, 2000) a motionfor reconsideration of the June 20, 2000 Order of
the appellate court.As provided under the Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure,
“
The petitionmay be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order, resolution soughtto be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it
relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or ofa corporation, board,
officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction overthe
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the
Court of Appealswhether or not the same is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it
involves the acts or omissions of a quasi- judicial agency, and unless
otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filedin and
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.If the petitioner had filed a motion for
new trial or reconsideration after notice of said judgment,order or resolution,
the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied,
theaggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but
which shall not be lessthan five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of
such denial. No extension of time shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen
”
 The Supreme Court issued in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC (Reglamentary Period to
File Petitions forCertiorari and Petition for Review on Certiorari) a Resolution
dated August 1, 2000 approvingthe amendment to the provision of Section 4,
Rule 65 which took effect on September 1, 2000,reads:SECTION 4. When and
where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)days
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration ornew trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or
not, the sixty (60) day period shall becounted from notice of the denial of the
said motion.The CA ruled that the sixty (60) day period within which to file a
Petition for Certiorari is notcounted from the date of the receipt of the denial
of Motion for Reconsideration, but from thedate of the receipt of the
questioned order or decision, except that such 60-day period isinterrupted
upon the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue:
 Whether or not the Resolution of CA issued with grave abuse of discretion as
it was madewithout taking prior judicial notice of Supreme Court A.M. no. 00-
2 - 03 SC which resolutiontook effect on September 1, 2000, and which
amended the second paragraph of section 4, rule 65of the 1997 rules of civil
procedure
 
 
Held:
 Even if petitioner did not raise or allege the amendment in their motion for
reconsideration before it, the Court of Appeals should have taken mandatory j
udicial notice of this Courtsresolution in A.M. Matter No. 00-02-03 SC. The
resolution did not have to specify that it hadretroactive effect as it pertains to
a procedural matter. Contrary to private respondents allegationthat the
matter was no longer pending and undetermined, the issue of whether the
petitionfor certiorari was timely filed was still pending reconsideration when
the amendment took effecton September 1, 2000, hence, covered by the its
retroactive application.The order of the trial court granting private
respondents Motion to Dismiss the complaint was afinal, not interlocutory,
order and as such, it was subject to appeal, not a petition for certiorari. Atthe
time petitioners filed before the appellate court their petition for certiorari on
the 60th dayfollowing their receipt of the October 20, 1999 Order of the trial
court denying their Motion forReconsideration of its dismissal order, the said
October 20, 1999 Order had become final andexecutory after the 15th day
following petitioners receipt thereof.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is, in
light of the foregoing discussions, hereby DENIED.
 
 ADHERENCE OF JURISDICTION - Once Attached, not ousted bysubsequen
t statute unless so provided08 SOUTHERN FOOD v. SALAS
February 18, 1992 | Medialdea,
 J.
|
Doctrine:
The Rule is that when a court has already obtained jurisdictionand is exercising
jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceedis not affected
by new legislation placing jurisdiction in another tribunal.
Facts:
 
●
 
Respondent Raul Laurente was employed in Southern Food SalesCorporation. On July
5, 1979, Laurente was terminated for grossneglect of duty andor dishonesty
due to the ff: the dismissal of 4salesmen whose anomalies were tolerated by
Laurente despiteknowledge thereof, the falsifying of his meal receipts, the
failure tosubmit his income tax receipt for 1978, and for themisrepresentation
of his travel itinerary.
●
 
Laurente first filed a
civil action for damages against SouthernFood Sales.
He then filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor(now DOLE) for illegal
dismissal.
●
 
Southern Food filed a motion to dismiss on the civil case claimingthat the NLRC had
jurisdiction. In the meantime, LA Ildefonso
 Agbuya rendered a decision finding Laurente’s termination was for
a valid and just cause to which Laurente filed an appeal.
●
 
On Feb 28, 1980, the court in the civil case deferred thedetermination of the
motion to dismiss until after the trial
●
 
Because of this, Southern Food filed a MR but respondent JudgeBernardo
Salas denied the MR. Hence, Southern Food filed apetition with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminaryinjunction.
Issue:
W/N Judge Salas committed grave abuse of discretion in deferringthe
determination of the motion to dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of the
court over the claims for damages.
Held:NO
. The court had jurisdiction over the case for claims for damages.
●
 
 A court order deferring action on a motion to dismiss until trial
isinterlocutory and cannot be challenged until final judgment exceptwhen the
judge is proceeding in excess or outside of its jurisdiction.
However, in this case, the judge
did not
proceed inexcess of jurisdiction.
●
 
 Article 217 (a) (4) of the Labor Code as amended by Section 9 ofRepublic Act
No. 6715 clearly provides that the labor arbiter shallhave original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide claimsfor actual, moral, exemplary and other forms
of damages arisingfrom an employer-employee relationship.
●
 
However, when the civil case for damages was instituted in 1979,the
applicable law then was Article 217 (a) (3) of the Labor Code asamended by
Presidential Decree No. 1367.
●
 
The Rule is that when a court has already obtained jurisdiction andis
exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction toproceed is not
affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction inanother tribunal.
●
 
Except where the statute expressly provides or it is intended tooperate as to
actions pending before its enactment.
●
 
But where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court hasretroactive effect,
it cannot be applied to a case that was pendingprior to the enactment of the
statute.
●
 
Republic Act No. 6715 which took effect on march 21, 1989, wherethe same
law does not expressly so provide, or does not intend tooperate as to actions
pending before its enactment, henceprejudicial to the orderly administration of
justice
Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied for
are denied,and the petition is ordered dismissed.No costs.
Notes
 Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.
—
 (a) TheLabor Arbiters shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
thefollowing cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-
agricultural:(3) All other cases arising from employer-employee relations duly
endorsedby the Regional Directors in accordance with the provisions of this
Code;Provided, that the Regional Directors shall not endorse and Labor
Arbitersshall not entertain claims for moral or other forms of damages.
RA 6715

SEC. 9. Article 217 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended
to read as follows:

“ART. 217. Jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the commission.—(a) Except as

otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days
after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension,
even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all
workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

“(1) Unfair labor practice cases;

“(2) Termination disputes;

“(3) If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers
may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment;

“(4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising
from the employer-employee relations;

“(5) Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including
questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and

“(6) Except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and
maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee relations,
including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an
amount exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), whether or not
accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.

“(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by Labor Arbiters.

“(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective

bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor
Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary
arbitration as may be provided in said agreements.”

II. A.2 – SPECIFIC JURISDICTION OF COURTS

URBANO v. CHAVEZ
DOCTRINE:
Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion, and so holds that the Office of the
Solicitor
General is not authorized to represent a public official at any stage of a
criminal case or in a civil suit for
damages arising from a felony. This pronouncement applies to all public
officials and employees in the
executive, legislative and judicial branches of the Government.
FACTS:
The case at bar involved two consolidated cases with the following facts:
1) G.R. No. 87977 Criminal Case filed by Urbano and Acapulco against
DILG Secretary Santos for alleged violation of the provisions of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act The Office of the Solicitor General entered its
appearance as counsel for the said respondents as far as the preliminary
investigation of the case is concerned, which prompted Urbano and Acapulco
to question such appearance on the basis that acting as counsel for Secretary
Santos will run in conflict with the Office of the Solicitor General’s role as the
appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines.

2) G.R. No. 88578 Civil Case for Damages filed by Co against Solicitor
Chavez alleged that thedefendant maliciously published a defamatory
imputations against Co while he was the counsel of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), stating that he was involved
in some anomalous transactions relating to the funds of the national
government during the time that President Marcos was in office. The
Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss on behalf of the
defendant. The petitioner contended that he was suing the defendant in
his personal capacity for acts which he committed beyond the scope of
his authority and as such he cannot be represented by the said Office in
the civil suit instituted with the trial court. In both instances, the Office
of the Solicitor General assailed the position that it was authorized to
represent any public official even if the said official was sued in his
personal capacity pursuant to the unconditional provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 478which defines the functions of the said
Office as well as Executive Order No. 300 issued on July 26, 1987 which
made the said office an independent agency under the Office of the
President of the Philippines.

ISSUE:
W/N the Office of the Solicitor General can represent a public officer or
employee in the
preliminary investigation of a criminal action or in a civil action for damages.

RULING:
The herein Petitions are hereby GRANTED. The Office of the Solicitor General
is permanently prohibited from representing the said respondents.

RATIO:
Inasmuch as the State can speak and act only by law, whatever it does say and
do must be lawful, and that which is unlawful is not the word or deed of the
State, but is the mere wrong or trespass of those individual persons who
falsely speak and act in its name. Therefore, the accused public
official should not expect the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
to defend him for a wrongful act which cannot be attributed to the State itself.
In the same light, a public official who is sued in a criminal case is actually
sued in his personal capacity inasmuch as his principal, the State, can never
be the author of a wrongful act, much less commit a crime. Thus, the Court
rules that the Office of the Solicitor General is not authorized to represent a
public official at any stage of a criminal case. For this reason, the doctrine
announced in Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Ortega and
Solicitor General v. Garrido and all decided cases affirming the same; in so far
as they are inconsistent with this pronouncement, should be deemed
abandoned. This observation should apply as well to a public official who is
haled to court on a civil suit for damages arising from a felony allegedly
committed by him. Any pecuniary liability he may be held to
account for on the occasion of such civil suit is for his own account. The State
is not liable for the same. A fortiori, the Office of the Solicitor General likewise
has no authority to represent him in such a civil suit for damages. “The office
of the Solicitor General is authorized to enter its appearance as counsel for
any public official, against whom a criminal charge had been instituted, during
the preliminary investigation stage thereof. Nevertheless, in the same case,
this Court held that once an information is led against the public official, the
Office of the Solicitor General can no longer represent the said official in the
litigation.”

G.R. No. 171496 REPUBLIC v. ORTIGAS 717 SCRA 601

REPUBLIC v. ORTIGAS
G.R. No. 171496
717 SCRA 601
March 03, 2014
FACTS: Respondent Ortigas caused the segregation of its property and
reserved one portion for road widening. It designated Lot 5-B-2-A-1 which
was  actually used for road widening and it was not compensated for the use
of its property.

Respondent filed with the RTC of Pasig a petition for authority to sell to the
government the said lot and alleged that the DPWH requested the conveyance
of the property for road widening purposes.

Petitioner filed an opposition, alleging that respondent Ortigas’ property can

only be conveyed by way of donation to the government, citing Section 50 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, also known as the Property Registration Decree.

ISSUE: Whether respondent Ortigas’ property should be conveyed to the

Republic of the Philippines only by donation.

RULING: No. Respondent Ortigas may sell its property to the government. It

must be compensated because its property was taken and utilized for public
road purposes.

Petitioner’s reliance on the Property Registration Decree is erroneous. It

contemplates roads and streets in a subdivided property, not public
thoroughfares built on a private property that was taken from an owner for
public purpose.

As a rule, when there is taking of private property for some public purpose,
the owner of the property taken is entitled to be compensated.

There is taking when the following elements are present:

1. The government must enter the private property;

2. The entrance into the private property must be indefinite or permanent;
3. There is color of legal authority in the entry into the property;
4. The property is devoted to public use or purpose;
5. The use of property for public use removed from the owner all beneficial
enjoyment of the property.

All of the above elements are present in this case. Petitioner construction of a
road — a permanent structure — on respondent Ortigas’ property for the use
of the general public is an obvious permanent entry on petitioner Republic of
the Philippines’ part. Given that the road was constructed for general public
use gives it public character, and coursing the entry through the DPWH gives
it a color of legal authority. As a result, respondent may not anymore use the
property for whatever legal purpose it may desire. In other words, respondent
was effectively deprived of all the bundle of rights attached to ownership of
property.

Hence, respondent Ortigas’ property should be conveyed to the Republic of

the Philippines with just compensation

ORTIGAS VS. C.A

Facts:  In 1981, the Metropolitan Manila Commission (now MMDA) enacted
an Ordinance reclassified as a commercial area a portion of Ortigas Avenue
from Madison to Roosevelt Streets of Greenhills Subdivision where the lot is
located. In 1984, private respondent leased the lot and constructed a single
story commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company.
In 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against the owner of the lot with the RTC,
the complaint sought the demolition of the said commercial structure for
having violated the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale. Complainant
prayed for the issuance of a TRO and injunction to prohibit petitioner from in
engaging a commercial activity on the lot while the trial court issued and
denied the MR of the private Respondent. Private Respondent filed with the
CA a special civil action for certiorari, ascribing to the trial court grave abuse
of discretion which the appellate court granted. Complainant seasonably
moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court denied it, hence this
petition.

Issue: Whether the retroactive effect of the assailed ordinance violates the
Right to Non-Impairment of Contracts of the complainants?
Held: No, In general, the court agree that laws are to be construed as having
only prospective operation. Lex prospicit, non respicit. Equally settled, only
laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto
and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have
retroactive effect. A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner
changes the intent of the parties to the contract necessarily impairs the
contract itself and cannot be given retroactive effect without violating the
constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts.

But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. One involves

police power. A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or
govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and
may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is
applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in
existence. Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to
yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general
welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power
must be read into every contract. The contractual stipulations annotated on
the Torrens Title, on which Ortigas relies, must yield to the ordinance. When
that stretch of Ortigas Avenue from Roosevelt Street to Madison Street was
reclassified as a commercial zone by the Metropolitan Manila Commission in
March 1981, the restrictions in the contract of sale between Ortigas and
Hermoso, limiting all construction on the disputed lot to single-family
residential buildings, were deemed extinguished by the retroactive operation
of the zoning ordinance and could no longer be enforced. While our legal
system upholds the sanctity of contract so that a contract is deemed law
between the contracting parties, nonetheless, stipulations in a contract cannot
contravene “law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.”
Otherwise such stipulations would be deemed null and void.

RCADI v. LRC and RD of Davao DIGEST

DECEMBER 21, 2016  ~ VBDIAZ

TOPIC: Nationality of a corporation
Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. v. The Land
Registration Commission and the Register of Deeds of Davao City, G.R.
No. L-8451, December 20,1957
Facts:
On October 4, 1954, Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of the City
of Davao, executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land located in the same city
covered by Transfer Certificate No. 2263, in favor of the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc.,(RCADI) is corporation sole organized
and existing in accordance with Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a
Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent. Registry of Deeds Davao (RD) required
RCADI to submit affidavit declaring that 60% of its members were Filipino
Citizens. As the RD entertained some doubts as to the registerability of the
deed of sale, the matter was referred to the Land Registration
Commissioner (LRC) en consulta for resolution. LRC hold that pursuant to
provisions of sections 1 and 5 of Article XII of the Philippine Constitution,
RCADI is not qualified to acquire land in the Philippines in the absence of
proof that at leat 60% of the capital, properties or assets of the RCADI is
actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens. LRC also denied the
registration of the Deed of Sale in the absence of proof of compliance with
such requisite. RCADI’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Aggrieved,
the latter filed a petition for mandamus.
Issue:  
Whether or not the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the
Philippines, or better still, the corporation sole named the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., is qualified to acquire private
agricultural lands in the Philippines pursuant to the provisions of Article XIII
of the Constitution.
Ruling:
RCADI is qualified.
While it is true and We have to concede that in the profession of their faith,
the Roman Pontiff is the supreme head; that in the religious matters, in the
exercise of their belief, the Catholic congregation of the faithful throughout the
world seeks the guidance and direction of their Spiritual Father in the Vatican,
yet it cannot be said that there is a merger of personalities resultant therein.
Neither can it be said that the political and civil rights of the faithful, inherent
or acquired under the laws of their country, are affected by that relationship
with the Pope. The fact that the Roman Catholic Church in almost every
country springs from that society that saw its beginning in Europe and the fact
that the clergy of this faith derive their authorities and receive orders from the
Holy See do not give or bestow the citizenship of the Pope upon these
branches. Citizenship is a political right which cannot be acquired by a sort of
“radiation”. We have to realize that although there is a fraternity among all the
catholic countries and the dioceses therein all over the globe, the universality
that the word “catholic” implies, merely characterize their faith, a uniformity
in the practice and the interpretation of their dogma and in the exercise of
their belief, but certainly they are separate and independent from one another
in jurisdiction, governed by different laws under which they are incorporated,
and entirely independent on the others in the management and ownership of
their temporalities. To allow theory that the Roman Catholic Churches all over
the world follow the citizenship of their Supreme Head, the Pontifical Father,
would lead to the absurdity of finding the citizens of a country who embrace
the Catholic faith and become members of that religious society, likewise
citizens of the Vatican or of Italy. And this is more so if We consider that the
Pope himself may be an Italian or national of any other country of the world.
The same thing be said with regard to the nationality or citizenship of the
corporation sole created under the laws of the Philippines, which is not
altered by the change of citizenship of the incumbent bishops or head of said
corporation sole.
We must therefore, declare that although a branch of the Universal Roman
Catholic Apostolic Church, every Roman Catholic Church in different
countries, if it exercises its mission and is lawfully incorporated in accordance
with the laws of the country where it is located, is considered an entity or
person with all the rights and privileges granted to such artificial being under
the laws of that country, separate and distinct from the personality of the
Roman Pontiff or the Holy See, without prejudice to its religious relations with
the latter which are governed by the Canon Law or their rules and regulations.
It has been shown before that: (1) the corporation sole, unlike the ordinary
corporations which are formed by no less than 5 incorporators, is composed
of only one persons, usually the head or bishop of the diocese, a unit which is
not subject to expansion for the purpose of determining any percentage
whatsoever; (2) the corporation sole is only the administrator and not the
owner of the temporalities located in the territory comprised by said
corporation sole; (3) such temporalities are administered for and on behalf of
the faithful residing in the diocese or territory of the corporation sole; and (4)
the latter, as such, has no nationality and the citizenship of the incumbent
Ordinary has nothing to do with the operation, management or administration
of the corporation sole, nor effects the citizenship of the faithful connected
with their respective dioceses or corporation sole.
In view of these peculiarities of the corporation sole, it would seem obvious
that when the specific provision of the Constitution invoked by respondent
Commissioner (section 1, Art. XIII), was under consideration, the framers of
the same did not have in mind or overlooked this particular form of
corporation. If this were so, as the facts and circumstances already indicated
tend to prove it to be so, then the inescapable conclusion would be that this
requirement of at least 60 per cent of Filipino capital was never intended to
apply to corporations sole, and the existence or not a vested right becomes
unquestionably immaterial.

The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

 xxx
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. (Sec. 5, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)

Facts: 

CFI issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the deceased bodies
of 7 persons believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his
hacienda in Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. Armed with the above warrant,
the Philippine Constabulary proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings made in a
canefield yielded two common graves containing the 7 bodies.

Seven (7) separate complaints for murder were thus filed against Pablo Sola
and 18 other persons before CFI of Kabankalan. The trial court ordered their
arrest. However, without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that
the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court granted them the right
to post bail. Pablo Sola and two others have since been released
from detention. The witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution
of their fears that if the trial is held at the CFI Himamaylan which is but 10
kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least 2 of
the accused are official with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have
been released on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large.
There had also been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the
families of the witnesses. Prosecution petitioned for a) change of venue for
trial and b) cancellation of the bail bonds.

Issues:

1. Whether or not change of venue is proper

2. Whether or not the bail bond should be cancelled for failure to abide by the

basic requirement that the prosecution be heard in a case where the accused
is charged with a capital offense, prior to bail being granted.

Held:

1. Yes. The Constitution is quite explicit. The Supreme Court could order "a
change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." The
exercise by this Honorable Court of its above constitutional power in this case
will be appropriate. The witnesses in the case are fearful for their lives. They
are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during
any of the days of trial. Because of fear, they may either refuse to testify or
testimony falsely to save their lives. It may be added that there may be cases
where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals, be less than
terrifying, but the question must always be the effect it has on the witnesses
who will testify. The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever
be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of
venue.

2. Yes. Considering that bail was granted to the accused without hearing the

prosecution, the bail bonds must be cancelled and the case remanded to the
sala of Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio for such hearing.

Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital

offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular
trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a
reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the
court should resolve the motion for bail. If the prosecution should be denied
such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process,
and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that
ground.

Justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of
fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep
the balance true. This norm which is of the very essence of due process as the
embodiment of justice requires that the prosecution be given the opportunity
to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt. It does not suffice, as asserted
herein, that the questions asked by the municipal judge before bail was
granted could be characterized as searching. That fact did not cure an
infirmity of a jurisdictional character. (People vs. Sola, G.R. No. L-56158-64
March 17, 1981)

G.R. No. 178842

RENE H. IMPERIAL and NIDSLAND RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDGAR L. ARMES, Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Regional Trial Court, 5th
Judicial
Region, Legazpi City and ALFONSO B. CRUZ, JR.,, Respondents.

FACTS:
In 1993, Julian C. Napal and Rene Imperial entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement to
organize a domestic corporation to be named NIDSLAND. They agreed
that Napal will
contribute a parcel of land consisting of four lots to the
corporation as his capital
contribution while Imperial will pay Napal’s existing obligations, among
others. However,
Napal failed to deliver one of the properties and instead sold the same to
Antonio Cruz.
Imperial then filed a derivative suit in behalf of NIDSLAND against
Napal before the
Securities and exchange Commission which ruled in favor of NIDSLAND
and ordered,
among others, the issuance of new TCT in the name of NIDSLAND. Aggrieved,
Cruz filed
a petition before the RTC for the annulment of the SEC claiming that since the
property
was already registered in his name, any deed of conveyance executed
pursuant to the
SEC decision is null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the TCT issued in the name of NIDSLAND pursuant to the SEC
decision is
null and void?

RULING:
Yes, the said TCT is null and void.
The Court held that the RTC has no jurisdiction to nullify the SEC decision but
it likewise
held that the SEC does not have jurisdiction to order the cancellation of the
sale between
Napal and Cruz as well as to cancel Cruz's TCT and order its
transfer to NIDSLAND.
Accordingly, the SEC decision was issued with grave abuse of
discretion and is
therefore void and all acts emanating from it have no force and effect.
Thus, the TCT
issued pursuant to it has no legal effect. However, the Court cannot nullify said
TCT in its
proceedings due to the indefeasibility of a Torrens title. A registration under
the Torrens
system confirms that the person whose name appears as owner of the land is
indeed the
true owner. Except for specific circumstances allowed by law, a person who
registers his
or her ownership over a piece of land makes his or her title indefeasible
because the law
does not allow any other person to attack or challenge it. Because
the title is
indefeasible, third persons interested in the registered land can
simply look at the
certificate of title and rely on the information stated in it.’
In this case, Cruz has to file the appropriate petition in the trial court to nullify
the TCT
issued to NIDSLAND.

[CASE DIGEST] St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC and Bienvenido Aricayos

September 16, 1998 | G.R. No. 130866

St. Martin Funeral Home, petitioner

National Labor Relations Commission and Bienvenido Aricayos, respondents

FACTS:

Bienvenido Aricayos worked as Operations Manager of St. Martin Funeral

Home in San Fernando, Pampanga.

On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly
misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by St. Martin
Funeral Home of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR). Aricayos subsequently filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the
Labor Arbiter.

During the hearing, St. Martin Funeral alleged that Aricayos was not its
employee. It was argued that there was employer-employee relationship
because there was no contract of employment, nor was Aricayo's name
included in the semi-monthly payroll. Further, St. Martin Funeral alleged that
Aricayos was only helping the business and he was doing so voluntarily as an
indication of gratitude for the financial assistance he had previously received
from the owner of the business.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of St. Martin Funeral and held that indeed,
there was no employer-employee relationship between the parties.

But the Labor Arbiter's ruling was overturned by the NLRC, which ordered
that the case be remanded back to the Labor Arbiter. Hence, the instant
petition by St. Martin Funeral Home.

ISSUES:

1. Whether there was an employer-employee relationship between Aricayos and

St. Martin Funeral Home. -- The SC did not discuss this issue.

2. Where should appeals of NLRC's decisions be filed? -- The Court of Appeals

via  petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

HELD:

1. The Court did not discuss the merits of the case. Instead, it reexamined the
functional validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial review it
has long adopted and still follows with respect to decisions of the NLRC. The
increasing number of labor disputes that find their way to the Court and the
legislative changes introduced over the years into the provisions of P.D. No.
442 (The Labor Code of the Philippines) and B.P. 129 (The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980) stridently call for and warrant a reassessment of
that procedural aspect.

2. After reviewing statutory amendments to pertinent laws and the intent of

the legislators, the Court declared that all references in the amended Section 9
of B.P. No. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) to supposed
appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby
declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65.
Consequently, all such petitions shall henceforth be initially filed in the Court
of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as
the appropriate forum for the relief desired.