Canon 6 Canons Apply to Lawyers In Government Service

RA 6713 (1989) sec. 4  

Case No. 15 - COLLANTES vs. RENOMERON(ROD)

Facts:  V & G had requested the respondent ROD to register some 163 deeds of sale with assignment of lots of the V & G mortgaged
to GSIS by the lot buyers. There was no action from the respondent. Respondent suspended the registration of the documents pending
compliance by V & G with a certain “special arrangement” between them. Fed up with the respondent’s extortionate tactics, the
complainant wrote him a letter challenging him to act on all pending applications for registration of V & G within 24 hours but he
denied registration for it were ambiguous as to parties and subject matter. LRA – Admin. Bonifacio, recommended to Secretary of
Justice that the respondent: (1) be found guilty of simple neglect of duty: (2) be reprimanded to act with dispatch on documents
presented to him for registration; and (3) be warned that a repetition of similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. Later, he
found respondent guilty of grave misconduct, recommended to Pres. Aquino that Renomeron be dismissed from the service, with
forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government service, effective
immediately. Less than 2 weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the NLTDRA, Attorney Collantes also filed in this
Court a disbarment complaint against said respondent.

Issue: Whether the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public
official..

Held:  YES
Yes, for his misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his lawyer’s oath. An oath imposes upon every lawyer
the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer’s oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his
suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action. The CPR applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and
employees to process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d] and prohibits them from directly or indirectly
having a financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting
gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office, the CPR
forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or
delay any man’s cause “for any corrupt motive or interest” (Rule 103).
 

Case No. 16 - ALI vs. ATTY. BUBONG

FACTS: A petition for disbarment was filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having found guilty of grave misconduct while
holding the position of ROD of Marawi City. The complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of
TCT in the names of Lawan-Datu etc. for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the record that the Baudali Datus are
relatives of respondent.
ISSUE: WON respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in the employ of the government.
HELD: YES
Grave misconduct was committed while being a government employee. Canon 6 of the CPR governing the conduct of
lawyers shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official apply. Further, Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 states that
a lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to
interfere with his public duties. In this case, respondent’s grave misconduct deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking
advantage of his office as the ROD Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules and governing land registration
for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil servant
but also to retain his membership in the bar.
Hence, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED.

Case No. 17 - OCA vs. Ladaga- pro bono counsel

FACTS: Respondent Atty. Misael Ladaga Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC of Makati, requested the Court Admin., Justice
Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Ladaga, in a Criminal Case for Fals. of Public
Document MTC. Pending his request, Lisa Andres, the private complainant of the criminal case sent a letter to the Court
Administrator requesting for a certification with regards to Atty. Ladaga’s authority to appear as counsel for the accused. Atty. Ladaga
admitted before the OCA that he had appeared in said criminal case without prior authorization. He reasoned out that his appearance
in the criminal case did not prejudice his office nor the interest of the public since he did not take advantage of his position and that his
appearances in court were covered by leave application approved by the presiding judge. The Court Admin. filed the instant admin.
complaint against respondent for violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of RA No. 6713- Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees, which provides:
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto – Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall
not:
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice
will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ladaga’s appearance as a pro bono counsel for his relative constitutes private practice of law as
prohibited by the rules. 

HELD: NO
Atty. Ladaga’s appearance as private counsel for his cousin does not constitute private practice of law. It should be noted that the
private practice of a profession, specifically the law profession, does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it
contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one-self to the public as a lawyer. Essentially,
the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the
legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services. XXXX Can still practice, provided that if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside
activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee.
While it is true that respondent filed leave applications corresponding to the dates he appeared in court, he, however, failed to obtain a
prior permission from the head of the Department (CJ of the Supreme Court). The presiding judge of the court to which respondent is
assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by law. Wherefore, respondent Atty. Misael Ladaga was REPRIMANDED
for appearing without prior authorization from the head of the Department with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would
be dealt with more severely.

Case No. 18 - Pimentel v. Fabros-election law

Facts: The records reflect, and respondents (ATTYS. VITALIANO C. FABROS and PACIFICO S. PAAS) admit the discrepancy
between the questioned certificate of canvass and the statement of votes of the Province of Isabela in the 1995 elections. While there
was no question that the municipal/city certificates of canvass were not tampered with, the tabulation of the figures on the
statement of votes was anomalous. For this, respondents were responsible. As public officers, respondents failed to live up to the
high degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill required of them. As lawyers, they were found to have engaged in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. They also violated their oath as officers of the court to foist no falsehood on
anyone. Furthermore, by express provision of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the avoidance of such conduct is
demanded of them as lawyers in the government service:
CANON 6 – These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. As lawyers in the
government service, respondents were under an even greater obligation to observe the basic tenets of the legal profession because
public office is a public trust.

RULING: Fabros and Paas FINED (P10k each) and WARNED

Case No. 19 – Huyssen v. Gutierrez

Facts: Gisela Huyssen applied for Philippine Visa under the Immigration Law. Respondent told complainant that in order that their
applications will be favorable acted upon, they need to deposit a certain sum of money which could be withdrawn after one year.
Huyssen paid Gutierrez a total of 20,000USD. After 1 year, Huyssen demanded the return of the 20,000USD to which Gutierrez
assured her that the amount will be returned. But after a couple of demands, the respondent still failed to pay, and he even presented
complainant several post-dated checks which were all dishonored. Hence this disbarment case against Gutierrez. 

Issue: Should respondent be disbarred?

Ruling: YES
Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the CPR states: "A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or
advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties."

Evidences showed respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking advantage of his position with the Board of Special Inquiry
of the Bureau of Immig. and Deportation, and the Court held that it makes it more reprehensible as it has caused damage to the
reputation and integrity of said office. The said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars lawyers in government
service from promoting their private interest. Promotion of private interest includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value
in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office.
ATTY. GUTIERREZ IS DISBARRED AND ORDERED TO PAY THE AMOUNT DUE TO HUYSSEN.
 

Case No. 20 - Berenguer-Landers v. Florin

A complaint for disbarment filed by Berenguer’s against herein respondents Florin, Jomales and Pedro Vega. Berenguers are the
registered owners of a hectare land in Sorsogon. A notice of coverage was issued by DAR regarding the acquisition of their
landholding pursuant to CARP. The Berenguers protested and applied for the exclusion of their land with the DAR and for a notice to
lift coverage based on the ground that their landholdings have been used exclusively for livestock.
DAR Secretary cancelled the Berenguers’ certificates of title CLOAs in favor of the members of the Baribag Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Development Cooperative (BARIBAG). Berenguers appealed to the DARAB. BARIBAG filed a Motion for the
Issuance of a Writ of Possession. The Berenguers opposed the motion saying that the execution would be premature in view of their
pending appeal before the DARAB (DENIED). Nevertheless, BARIBAG still filed a Motion for the Appointment of a Special Sheriff
(GRANTED BY FLORIN). Florin issued a Writ of Possession in favor of BARIBAG. They filed for the disbarment of respondents
Florin, Jornales, in his capacity as Assistant Regional Director for DAR, and Vega, in his capacity as DAR Legal Officer V, for
allegedly conspiring and confederating in the commission of the following acts:
a. for rendering an unjust judgement, orders and resolutions adverse and prejudicial to the interest of petitioners;
b. abuse of authority to cite counsel for petitioner in contempt and issuing an order of arrest without hearing contrary to the
rules of court;
c. atty. marcelino jornales and atty. pedro vega, inspite of their knowledge of the illegality of the writ of possession, persisted
and assisted in the illegal implementation of the writ of possession to the prejudice of legitimate farmers and petitioners.
 
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT FLORIN SHOULD BE SANCTIONED. 
 
HELD:  YES 

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.—A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party without authority
so to do. x x x.

In the instant case, the Berenguers want this Court to impose disciplinary sanction against the three (3) respondents as members of the
bar. Complaints were connected with the discharge of their quasi-judicial functions. Florin, being part of the quasi-judicial system of
our government, performs official functions of a RARAD that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the present controversy may
be likened that of a judge whose decision, including the manner of rendition, is made subject of an administrative complaint. Florin
ordered the issuance of such writs despite the pendency of the appeal with the DARAB.

It is the DAR Sec. who has juris. to order execution pending appeal. Records reveal that there was no order by the DAR Secretary
directing execution of the Order during the pendency of the Berenguers’ appeal. While a judge may not be disciplined for error of
judgment absent proof that such error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice, the facts on hand prove
otherwise. Florin’s issuance of the writ of execution and writ of possession in order to fully implement Reg. Dir. Dalugdug’s clearly
constitutes ignorance of the law for as a rule, a writ of execution is issued only after the subject judgment or order has already become
final and executory. Judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do injustice will be
administratively sanctioned. The act of issuing the writ of execution and writ of possession is not simply an honest error in judgment
but an obstinate disregard of the applicable laws and jurisprudence.

Thus, respondent ATTY. FLORIN is found guilty of violating the CPR. She is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 3 months.
With respect to the complaint against Jornales and Vega, there was no sufficient evidence to substantiate the charges against them.
Hence, is dismissed. For lack of sufficient evidence.
 
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor
allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Rule 6.01 – Primary Duty: That Justice is Done 
Case 21 - People v Pineda 

Rule 6.02 – Not to Use Public Position for Private Interest  

Case No. 22 - Misamin v. San Juan

FACTS: Herein respondent admits having appeared as counsel for the New Cesar’s Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while
he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. Respondent contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated
exercise of his profession. He contends that his appearance as counsel while holding a government position is not among the grounds
provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension
or removal of attorneys.

ISSUE: Whether or not the administrative case against the defendant should prosper.

RULING: NO
The court ruled in the negative. The matter is to be decided in an administrative proceeding as noted in the recommendation
of the Solicitor General. Nonetheless, the court held that while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for
respondent member of the bar to avoid all appearances of impropriety. 
Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a
public trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume was
inherent in the office held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated but also to be at the
beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest, is a matter that should not pass unnoticed. 
Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of the bar. should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and
misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of
membership in an honorable profession who does not even take care that his honor remains unsullied
This administrative complaint against respondent Miguel A. San Juan is dismissed for not having been duly proved.

Case No. 23 - Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo vs. Atty. Felina S. Dasig

FACTS: This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig, an official of the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED). The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in violation of the Attorney’s Oath for having used her
public office to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED. Almost all complainants in the
instant case are high-ranking officers of the CHED. In their sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with this Court on December 4, 1998,
complainants allege that respondent, while she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts that are grounds for
disbarment under Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
She demanded from Betty C. Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center in Novaliches, Quezon City, the
amount of P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service,
CHED. she demanded from Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student, the amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 for facilitation of her
application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. She demanded from Rocella G. Eje, a
student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs
Service, CHED. She demanded from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount which was subsequently confirmed to be
P15,000.00 and initial fee of P5,000.00 more or less for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the
Legal Affairs Service, CHED.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated her Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: YES
Respondent Atty. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and is hereby ordered DISBARRED. 

Respondent’s attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office are violative of Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful,
dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars lawyers in government
service from promoting their private interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in
any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office. Respondent’s conduct in
office falls short of the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, especially from one occupying a high public
office. For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and
confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened
with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.

For her violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon 1 and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts of dishonesty as well as gross misconduct as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, the
respondent deserves not just the penalty of three years’ suspension from membership in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, but outright disbarment. Her name shall be stricken off the list of attorneys upon
finality of the decision.
 

Case No. 24 - HUYSSEN vs. GUTIERREZ

Fact: Complainant alleged that in 1995, while respondent was still connected with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID),
she and her three sons, who are all American citizens, applied for Phil. Visas under Section 13[g] of the Immigration Law. Respondent
told complainant that in order that their visa applications will be favorably acted upon by the BID they needed to deposit a certain sum
of money for a period of one year which could be withdrawn after one year. Believing that the deposit was indeed required by law,
complainant deposited with respondent on six different occasions from April 1995 to April 1996 the total amount of US$20,000.
Respondent prepared receipts/vouchers as proofs that he received the amounts deposited by the complainant but refused to give her
copies of official receipts despite her demands. After one year, complainant demanded from respondent the return of US$20,000 who
assured her that said amount would be returned. Respondent promised to return the money and issued worthless checks. Thus, a
complaint for disbarment was filed by complainant in the CBD IBP.

Issue: Whether the Respondent, a Government Officer and a Lawyer is liable thus must be Disbarred in the Practice of Law.

Held: YES
Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office. Respondent’s act of
asking money from complainant in consideration of the latter’s pending application for visas is violative of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or
deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from
promoting their private interest. Promotion of private interest includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction
requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office. Respondent’s conduct in office betrays the
integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, especially from one occupying a high public office.

Case No. 25 -  Ramos v. Imbang

Facts: This case is about the disbarment or Suspension against Atty. Jose.  Imbang   for   multiple   violations   of   the   CPR. 1992,
Ramos sought the assistance of Atty.  Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos.
She gave Imbang P8, 500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued receipt for P5,000 only. Ramos tried to attend the scheduled hearings
of her cases against the   Jovellanoses.  Imbang   never   allowed   her   to   enter   the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. 
He would then come out after several hours to inform her  that   the   hearing   had been cancelled and rescheduled. This happened six
times and for each   “appearance”   in   court,   respondent   charged   her   P350.Ramos   was   shocked   to   learn   that   Imbang  
never   filed   any   case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Imbang should be disbarred.

Held: YES
YES, as per SC’s decision Lawyers   are   expected   to   conduct   themselves   with honesty   and   integrity. More   specifically,  
lawyers   in   government   service   are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny.
They are not only members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service. 
1. Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees provides Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the   Constitution   and   existing   laws,   the   following   constitute prohibited acts and transactions of
any public official and employee and are hereby declared unlawful (b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public
officials and employees during their incumbency shall not (1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by   the  
Constitution   or   law,   provided   that   such   practice   will   not conflict with their official function. In   this   instance,   Imbang  
received P5,000   from   the   complainant   and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship.

Rule 6.03 – Not to Accept Employment After Government Service 

RA 6713 sec.7 (b)  Not to Accept Employment After Government Service (RA6713 SEC. 7(B))

Case No. 26 - Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe

Facts: Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, a former clerk of court of Branch 81 of Romblon, addressed a letter-query to the Office of the
Court Administrator. It was related to Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 or the “Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees”, which prohibits public officials and employees from engaging during their incumbency “in the
private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice ill not conflict or tend to
conflict with their official functions.” 

Atty. Buffe questioned the provision giving preferential treatment to incumbent public officials and employees as regards private
practice, while nonincumbents, according to the last paragraph of Section 7 of RA 6713, cannot practice their profession in connection
with any matter before the office they used to be with for a period of one year after resignation, retirement or separation from public
office. Such question was due to the fact that, within one year after her resignation from her position, she engaged in the private
practice of law by appearing as private counsel in several cases before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon. 

After review, the Court found that Atty. Buffe misinterpreted the law. The confusion lay in the use of the term “such practice” after
the phrase "provided that" and the notion that incumbent public officials and employees are absolutely permitted to the practice of
their profession. By a thorough analysis of the provision, the Court pointed out the limitation that only those authorized by the
Constitution or law and those that do not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions are allowed. 

Issue: Did Atty. Buffe, as a lawyer, violate the rules governing the practice of law by means of her actions? 

Held: Yes

Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts and transactions of public officials and employees. Subsection
(b)(2) prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of their profession during their incumbency. As an exception, a public
official or employee can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is
authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict, or tend to conflict, with his or her official
functions.
The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after the public official or employee's resignation,
retirement, or separation from public office, except for the private practice of profession under subsection (b)(2), which can
already be undertaken even within the one-year prohibition period. As an exception to this exception, the one-year prohibited
period applies with respect to any matter before the office the public officer or employee used to work with.
The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office is a public trust; and serve to remove any impropriety,
real or imagined, which may occur in government transactions between a former government official or employee and his or
her former colleagues, subordinates or superiors. The prohibitions also promote the observance and the efficient use of every
moment of the prescribed office hours to serve the public.

IN THIS CASE, Atty. Buffe's admission that she immediately engaged in private practice of law within the one-year period of
prohibition stated in Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713.

The Court found Atty. Buffe guilty of professional misconduct and was fined. She was also sternly warned that repetition of the
violation shall be dealt with more severely. As ruled by the Court, by acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as "unlawful,"
Atty. Buffe contravened Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In addition, by failing to live up to her
lawyer’s oath, she also violated Canon 7 of the same Code.
  

RA 3019 sec. 3 (d) 

Case No. 27 - PNB v. Cedo

Facts: The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force and effect to respondent in the case at bar. Having
been an executive of complainant bank, respondent now seeks to litigate as counsel for the opposite side, a case against his former
employer involving a transaction which he formerly handled while still an employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics on adverse influence and conflicting interests, to wit: It is unprofessional to represent conflicting
interests, except by expressing conflicting consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this
canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interest when, on behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another
client requires him to oppose.

RULING: Cedo SUSPENDED for three years.

- PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 151809-12, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 526 (2005) - Trovela

Case No. 29 - TROVELA V ROBLES

(RA 3019 sec. 3 (d)ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT) JURISDICTION:]Q NOT SC BUT OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN

FACTS:  The complainant initiated this disbarment complaint against Pasig City Ass’t Prosecutor Robles of Pasig City for issuing a
resolution recommending the dismissal of his complaint for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC against Katigbak,
Salonga, and Reyes for insufficiency of evidence; and against Prosecutor Obuñgen and City Prosecutor Ang, both of Pasig City, for
approving the recommendati of dismissal. The complainant also seeks the disbarment of former Prosecutor Gen. Arellano and former
Secretary of Justice Leila M. De Lima (De Lima) for allegedly incurring inordinate delay in issuing their resolutions resolving his
petition for review and motion for reconsideration before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

ANTECEDENTS: Trovela, criminally charged Katigbak, Salonga and Reyes with estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal
Code. In his complaint-affidavit, Trovela stated that he became the Employee Relation Director of Sky Cable on November 1, 2004;
that he later on received a termination letter dated July 6, 2006 signed by Salonga informing him of his relief from work and of his
compensation being paid until the effective date of his termination; that his payslips for the periods from July 16, 2006 to July 31,
2006 and from August 1, 2006 to August 15, 2006 still reflected deductions of his savings contributions to the Meralco Employees
Savings and Loan Association (MESALA) amounting to P2,520.00 per payday period; that withholding taxes of P4,509.45 and
P4,235.70, respectively, were also deducted from his compensation; that he discovered that such deductions were not remitted to
MESALA when he closed his account on September 6, 2006; and that Sky Cable did not reimburse the amounts of his unremitted
deductions despite demand. 

In his resolution, ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR Robles recommended the dismissal of the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence meanwhile, PROSECUTOR Obuñgen and CITY PROSECUTOR Ang approved the recommendation of dismissal of the
complaint. Trovela, filed his petition for review to appeal the dismissal of his complaint. Thereafter, Arellano issued his resolution
finding no reversible error in resolution of Robles, hence, affirming the dismissal of the complaint. Trovela moved for reconsideration,
but his motion was denied by Secretary OF JUSTICE De Lima. 

Consequently, the complainant initiated disbarment proceedings against the RESPONDENTS insisting that THE
INORDINATE DELAYS ON THE PART OF RESPONDENTS ARELLANO AND DE LIMA IN COMING OUT WITH THEIR
SEPARATE RESOLUTIONS THAT ARE MERELY ANCHORED ON THE GROSSLY ERRONEOUS FINDINGS OF THE OPCP
NEGATE THEIR ALLEGATIONS THAT THEY ACTUALLY EXAMINED THE RECORDS OF THE CASE AND THE
EVIDENCE THAT I HAVE PRESENTED AND INDICATED THEIR LACK OF RESOLVE TO SEE THAT JUSTICE IS DONE.
ARELLANO and DE LIMA SUSTAINED THE WRONG PRESUMPTION MADE BY THE OPCP. EVEN IF THERE IS A PRIMA
FACIE EVIDENCE OF CORRUPTION AND ANOMALOUS CIRCUMSTANCES BY USING MANIPULATIVE SCHEMES IN
THE PART OF SKY CABLE, JUSTICE DE LIMA IGNORED THE SAME.

Complainant has posited that Robles, Obuñgen and Ang committed grave errors of facts and law that require an inquiry into
their mental and moral fitness as members of the Bar; and that Arellano and Secretary De Lima be declared guilty of dereliction of
duty or gross inexcusable negligence for belatedly resolving his petition for review and motion for reconsideration. 

ISSUE:Whether or not the respondents should be administratively disciplined based on the allegations of the complainant. 

RULING: 
We dismiss the administrative case against the respondents for lack of jurisdiction. 

The acts complained of undoubtedly arose from the respondents' performance or discharge of official duties as prosecutors of the
Department of Justice. Hence, the authority to discipline respondents Robles, Obuñgen, Ang and Arellano exclusively pertained to
their superior, the Secretary of Justice. In the case of Secretary De Lima, the authority to discipline pertained to the President. In either
case, the authority may also pertain to the Office of the Ombudsman, which similarly exercises disciplinary jurisdiction over them as
public officials pursuant to 
Section 15, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). Indeed, the accountability of respondents as officials
performing or discharging their official duties as lawyers of the Government is always to be differentiated from their accountability as
members of the Philippine Bar. The IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate them as such lawyers. 

R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," prescribes the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Section 15, paragraph 1 of R.A. No. 6770 provides: 
Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following power, functions and
dutiy to (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at
any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases. 

The 1987 Constitution clothes the Office of the Ombudsman with the administrative disciplinary authority to investigate and prosecute
any act or omission of any government official when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. Office
of the ombudsman is government agency responsible for enforcing administrative, civil and criminal liabbility of the government
officials ‘in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the govdernment to the people’.

HENCE, the court finding prima facie cases against them for violation of art. 208 of RPC and RA 3019 as amended, referred the
matter to the appropriate agency, office of the ombudsman, for prosecution.

THE COURT DISMISSED THE CASE OF DISBARMENT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.

RA 9485 (2007) – The Anti-red Tape Act of 2007, as amended by RA 11032 (2018

THE LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

Canon 7 Uphold Dignity and Integrity of the Profession

CASE 1- In re 1989 Elections of the IBP, B.M. No. 491
Facts: After the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter “IBP”) held on June 3, 1989, the
newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office before the Supreme Court en banc. However, disturbed by the
widespread reports from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments published in the
columns of some newspapers about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main protagonists for
the office of president of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of
government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in violation
of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The Supreme Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the
Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.
The election process itself (i.e. the voting and the canvassing of votes on June 3, 1989) was unanimously adjudged by the participants
and observers to be above board. What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported electioneering and extravagance
that characterized the campaign conducted by the three candidates for president of the IBP.

The Court en banc formed a committee and total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas issued
by the Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections.

Issue:  Whether or not IBP by-laws were violated.

Decision: IBP by-laws were violated. Elections held on June 3,1989 be annulled, relevant by-laws be amended as per the court’s
resolution and new elections be held such that the persons named in the resolution cannot contest for any IBP position.

CASE 2: Fernandez v. Grecia, A.C. No. 3694

Facts: In 1990, Linda Aves was admitted to St. Lukes Hospital. Among the doctors who treated her was Dr.Alberto Fernandez. She
was treated well hence she was sent home but then The next day she died togetherwith her unborn child. Damaso Aves, husband, then
filed a damage suit against the hospital and heimpleaded the attending doctors which included Fernandez. Aves hired Atty. Benjamin
Grecia to representhim.Grecia requested St. Luke to surrender before the court the medical records of Linda Aves. St. Lukecomplied
and the medical records were delivered to the Clerk of Court. In the morning of July 16, 1991,Grecia went to the of fice of the clerk of
court to borrow the said medical records. While Grecia wasexamining the said medical records, he tore in front of the Clerk and one
office staff two pages from themedical records and then handed it back to the Clerk. The Clerk was stunned as she watched Grecia
walkaway. She then reported the incident to the judge. The judge immediately took action and the torn pageswere eventually
recovered as it turned out that Grecia handed the torn pages to someone else.Grecia was then administratively charged by Dr.
Fernandez. Apparently, Grecia has been disbarred before.However, he was able to get to the good side of the Supreme Court hence he
was reinstated to theprofession.

ISSUE: Whether or not Grecia should be disbarred again.

HELD: Yes.
Grecia violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a lawyer, he should not engage inunlawful, dishonest, immoral and
deceitful conduct. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity anddignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar. A lawyer is an officer of thecourts; he is “like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice”.
Considering thatthis is his second offense, an incorrigible practitioner of “dirty tricks,” like Grecia would be ill-suited todischarge the
role of “an instrument to advance the ends of justice.” By descending to the level of acommon thief, respondent Grecia has demeaned
and disgraced the legal profession. He has demonstratedhis moral unfitness to continue as a member of the honorable fraternity of
lawyers. He has forfeited hismembership in the BAR.

CASE 3: Santos Jr. v. Llamas

FACTS: Atty. Francisco Llamas was complained of not paying his IBP dues.He was also cited in the complaint as not paying his
professional tax or PTR as it was intermittently indicated in his pleadings filed in court. It was also an alleged falsity when he included
his “IBP-Rizal 259060” where in fact he was not in good standing. Petitioner cited that Atty. Llamas was dismissed as Pasay City
Judge. But later revealed that the decision was reversed and he was subsequently promoted as RTC Judge of Makati. He also had
criminal case involving estafabut was appealed pending in the Court of Appeals. In the numerous violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he expressed willingness to settle the IBP dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Llamas is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: YES
YES. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, or until he has paid his IBP dues.

RATIO:
Even if he had “limited” practice of law, it does not relieve him of the duties such as payment of IBP dues. Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues
for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice.

CASE 4: Letter of Atty. Cecilio Arevalo, B.M. No. 1370

Facts:  In his letter, dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as
alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became
part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his
retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine
Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of one’s profession while in government service, and neither can he be
assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice
of law

Held:
SC held that the payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that
the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one’s membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of
practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.

 There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the
IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his
membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued. But we must here
emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory
power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities.
CASE 5: Velez v. de Vera

Facts: Complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on
the following grounds: 1) Atty. De Veras alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against him by the
State Bar of California. 2) That the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due his client, was found to have
performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department – San Francisco, State Bar of
California. Complainant alleged that the respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his license to practice law in the said state
in order to evade the recommended 3 year suspension. Atty. De Vera stated in his reply that the issues raised in above-mentioned
Complaint were the very issues raised in an earlier administrative case filed by the same complainant against him. In fact, according
to him, the said issues were already extensively discussed and categorically ruled upon by the SC in its Decision in Dec. 11, 2005 (In
Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera). He prayed that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the
principle of res judicata. Complainant maintained that there is substantial evidence showing respondent's moral baseness, vileness
and depravity, which could be used as a basis for his disbarment. Complainant stressed that the respondent never denied that he used
his client's money. Complainant argued that the respondent failed to present evidence that the SC of California accepted the latter's
resignation and even if such was accepted, complainant posited that this should not absolve the respondent from liability. Moreover,
complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar. He asserted that the first administrative case
filed against the respondent was one for his disqualification.

Issue: W/N ATTY. LEONARD S. DEVERA committed malpractice which amounted to moral turpitude in the State Bar of
California and should such be an applicable basis for a disbarment in the Philippines

Held:

Yes, there is substantial evidence of malpractice by Atty. De Vera. SC suspended him for 2 years.

Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states: Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Atty. de Vera did not deny complainant's (Julius Willis) allegation in the latter's memorandum that he (de Vera) received
US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he deposited said amount in his personal account and not in a separate trust account
and that, finally, he spent the amount for personal purposes. Atty. De Vera insists that Julius’ father authorized him to use the money,
and has repayed the full amount even before the administrative case was filed against him. However, aside from these self-serving
statements, the SC cannot find anywhere in the records of this case proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the
funds of his client.

Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder Willis had indeed testified that he "expected de
Vera might use the money for a few days" was not so much an acknowledgment of consent to the use by Atty. de Vera of his client's
funds as it was an acceptance of the probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his client's funds, which by itself did not speak
well of the character of Atty. de Vera or the way such character was perceived. CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN
TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION. Rule 16.01. A lawyer
shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each
client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Atty. De Vera’s actions caused dishonor, not only to himself
but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably
diminished whenever a member of the profession betrays their trust and confidence.

RA 6397 – Integrated Bar of the Philippines 

Rules of Court, Rule 139-A, secs. 9 & 10.

2009 IBP Elections.. In 1973, the Philippine Bar was integrated

Facts: Governing the IBP was... the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG), consisting of the governors from each of the nine (9)
geographic regions of the archipelago,[3] namely: Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Southern Luzon, Greater Manila, Bicolandia,
Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas Eastern Mindanao, and Western Mindanao.
The governors of the IBP-BOG are, in turn, elected by the House of Delegates which consists of members duly apportioned among the
chapters of each region.
When the Philippine Bar was first integrated, both the IBP-President and the EVP were elected by the IBP-BOG from among
themselves or... from other members of the Integrated Bar,[7] with the right of automatic succession by the EVP to the presidency for
the next succeeding full term.
The presidency rotated among all the nine regions in such order as the IBP-BOG had prescribed.
IBP-President and the EVP held a term of one (1) year, with the presidency rotating from year to year among the regions
On November 1, 1974, the IBP By-Laws took effect, providing that the IBP-President and the EVP be chosen by the Board of
Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis.[10] It was also provided that the
IBP-President and the EVP hold office for a term of two (2) years from July 1 following their election until June 30 of their second
year in office and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified.[11]... several amendments in the IBP By-Laws
were introduced, among which were the provisions relating to the election of its national officers. In Bar Matter No. 287, dated July 9,
1985, the Court approved the recommendation allowing the IBP-President, the EVP and... the officers of the House of Delegates to be
directly elected by the House of Delegates... Bar Matter No. 491. ordered: 1]... the annulment of the just concluded national elections;
2] the abolition of the system of election of national officers by direct action of the House of Delegates; 3] the restoration of the
former system of having the IBP-President and the EVP elected by the IBP-BOG from among... themselves, with right of succession
by the EVP to the presidency and subject to the rule that "the position of  Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be rotated among
the nine (9) IBP regions;"[13] 4] the holding of special elections for... the election of the first set of IBP-President and EVP;[14]  and
5] the appointment of a caretaker board to administer the affairs of the IBP pending the holding of special elections.[15]
Bar Matter No. 491, the Court ordered the amendment of Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-laws, to read
SEC. 47. National Officers. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice President to be chosen
by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall
be... ex officio Vice President for their respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to
be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board. (As amended pursuant to Bar Matter No. 491)
The Executive Vice President shall automatically become President for the next succeeding term. The Presidency shall rotate among
the nine Regions
On January 27, 1999, in Velez v. de Vera... reasoning that the rotation system applied only to the EVP, the Court considered the
election of then EVP Leonard De Vera (De Vera), representing the Eastern Mindanao region, as one... completing the first rotational
cycle and affirmed the election of Jose Vicente B. Salazar (Salazar) of the Bicolandia region as EVP.
Thus, Salazar became IBP-President for the 2005-2007 term with Feliciano Bautista (Bautista) of Central Luzon as EVP... he term of
Salazar was the start of the second rotational cycle.  Bautista eventually succeeded to the IBP presidency with Atty.
Rogelio Vinluan (Vinluan) as his EVP.
In 2009, however, the national and regional IBP elections were again tainted with numerous controversies,... The elections of Attys.
Manuel M. Maramba, Erwin M. Fortunato and Nasser A. Marohomsalic as Governors for the Greater Manila Region, Western
Visayas Region and Western Mindanao Region, respectively, for the term 2009-2011 are UPHELD
Attys. Rogelio Vinluan, Abelardo Estrada, Bonifacio Barandon, Jr., Evergisto Escalon, and Raymund Mercado are all found GUILTY
of grave professional misconduct arising from their actuations in connection with the controversies in the elections in the IBP last
April 25, 2009... and May 9, 2009 and are hereby disqualified to run as national officers of the IBP in any subsequent election.
Despite Bar Matter No. 491 and Velez,[21] which recognized the operational fact that the rotation was from the position of President
to that of the EVP, Section 47 was not immediately amended to reflect the official position of the Court. It was only... amended
through the December 14, 2010 Resolution
In the special elections that were held thereafter, Roan I. Libarios (Libarios), representing IBP-Eastern Mindanao Region, was elected
EVP and he later on succeeded as president.
On April 27, 2011, the IBP-BOG, acting on the letter of then Gov. Erwin M. Fortunato (Fortunato) of IBP-Western Visayas requested
that the
Court provide guidance on how it would proceed with the application of the rotational rule in the regional elections for governor of
IBP-Western Visayas
On December 4, 2012, the Court issued a resolution[24] addressing the issues with respect to the election of governor for IBP-Western
Visayas.
rotational rule was one by exclusion, the Court explained that... in the election of governor of a region, all chapters of the region
should be given the opportunity to have their nominees elected as governor, to the exclusion of those chapters that had already served
in the rotational cycle. Once a rotational cycle would be completed, all... chapters of a region, except the chapter which won in the
immediately preceding elections, could once again have the equal opportunity to vie for the position of governor of their region. The
chapter that won in the immediately preceding election, under the rotational cycle just... completed, could only vie for the position of
governor after the election of the first governor in the new cycle.
Issues:
Whether IBP-Southern Luzon has already served in the current rotation.
Whether the IBP-Western Visayas has already served in the current rotation.
Ruling:
The First Rotational Cycle
Already Completed... amendment was effected to underscore the shift of the rotation from the position of president to that of EVP.
The purpose of the system being to ensure that all the regions will have an equal opportunity to serve as EVP and then automatically...
succeed as president.
The notion that the ruling in Velez [50] should not be considered at all by the Court because it is barred by the Omnibus Motion Rule
deserves scant consideration. It may have been earlier overlooked, but the Court is not barred from motu propio... taking judicial
notice of such judicial pronouncement, pursuant to its continuing supervisory powers over the IBP.
The rule prescribes that once a member of the chapter is elected as Governor, his chapter would be excluded in the next turn until all
have taken their turns in the rotation cycle.
Once a full rotation cycle ends and a fresh cycle commences, all the chapters in the region are once again entitled to vie but subject
again to the rule on rotation by exclusion.
Election through a "rotation by exclusion" allows for a more democratic election process. The rule provides for freedom of choice
while upholding the equitable principle of rotation which assures that every member-chapter has its turn in every rotation cycle.
Thus, applying the principle of 'rotation by exclusion' in Western Visayas which starts with a new rotation cycle, all chapters (with the
exception of Romblon) are deemed qualified to vie for the Governorship for 2011-2013 term without prejudice to the chapters
entering into... a consensus to adopt any pre-ordained sequence in the new rotation cycle provided each chapter will have its turn in
the rotation.
To avoid the endless conflicts, confusions and controversies which have been irritably plaguing the IBP, the solution is to start another
rotational round, a new cycle, open to all regions.
DECLARE that the election for the position of the EVP for the 2011-2013 term be open to all regions.

Rule 7.01 – No False Statement 

In re Diao

Facts: After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application for such Bar examination,
that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The.matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor-General who caused the charge
to be investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because
contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the
required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially in the following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom which contradicts the credentials he had
submitted in support of his application for examination and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal
education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge; but he claims that although he had
left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army   passed the General Classification Test given therein, which
(according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered
his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
We have serious doubts about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit any certification to that effect (the
equivalence) by the proper school officiate However, it is urvneeesF?rv to dwel on thrs  since the second charge is clearly meritorious.
Diao never, obtained his A.A.1 from Qiusumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented, him as an A.A.
graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April 1949, he
says he was errorfpcuglv certified, due to confusion, as a (graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was. obviously of his own. making. Had his
application disclosed his having obtained A A. from Arellano University, it wculd also have disclosed that he got it in April 1019,
thereby showing that lie began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) °Lr months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree
And then he would not have been nermitted if  take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination
must affirm under oath, "That pieviors to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal
education
(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education." (italics on "previous")
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he was
allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been   obtained under false
pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled  the Bar, examinations is immaterial. Passing such examination is
not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is eqstaMy
essential.
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return
his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered,
Leda v. Tabang

Facts: Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang's good moral character, in two
Complaints she had filed against him, one docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 January 1982, and the present Administrative
Case No. 2505, which is a
Petition for Disbarment, filed on 14 February 1983... on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted marriage at
Tigbauan, Iloilo. The marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan, was performed under Article 76 of the Civil
Code[1] as one of... exceptional character
The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had finished his law studies (began in 1977), and had
taken the Bar examinations (in 1981), allegedly to ensure a stable future for them. Complainant admits, though, that they had not
lived... together as husband and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6 January 1982).
Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar. In his application, he declared that he was "single."
He then passed the examinations
First complaint:
Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No. 78, claiming that
Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out his application and, thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer's Oath for lack of good
moral character. Complainant also alleged that after Respondent's law studies, he became aloof and "abandoned" her
The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and required him to answer the Complaint.
Tabang's answer:... he admitted that he was "legally married" to Complainant on 3 October 1976 but that the marriage "was not as...
yet made and declared public" so that he could proceed with his law studies and until after he could take the Bar examinations "in
order to keep stable our future." He also admitted having indicated that he was "single" in his application to take the Bar "for reason
that to my... honest belief, I have still to declare my status as single since my marriage with the complainant was not as yet made and
declared public." He further averred that he and Complainant had reconciled as shown by her conformity to the "Explanation," for
which reason he prayed that... the Complaint be dismissed.
Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was Complainant's Affidavit or Desistance, which stated
that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out of a misunderstanding and communication gap and that she was refraining from pursuing her
Complaint against
Respondent.
Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No. 78 and allowed Respondent to take his Oath in a
Resolution dated 20 August 1952.
Present complaint (disbarment):
On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this time praying for Respondent's disbarment based on
the following grounds:
"a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with me assuming that our marriage is not valid, and
making a mockery of our marriage institution.
"b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already married in his application to take the bar exam.
"c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he submitted to the Supreme Court;
"d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing the affidavit of desistance and the conformity to his
explanation and later on the comment to his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not sincere, for he only befriended... me
to resume our marriage and introduced me to his family, friends and relatives as his wife, for a bad motive that is he wanted me to
withdraw my complaint against him with the Supreme Court."
Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated and unsigned letter addressed to Complainant,
allegedly written by Respondent after he had already taken his Oath stating, among others, that while he was grateful for
Complainant's help, he "could... not force myself to be yours," did not love her anymore and considered her only a friend.
Their marriage contract was actually void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code, among them the
minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before the... celebration of the marriage, an affidavit to that effect by the solemnizing officer,
and that the parties must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age, which they were not as they were both only twenty years old at the
time. He advised Complainant not to do anything more so as... not to put her family name "in shame." As for him, he had "attain(ed)
my goal as a full-pledge (sic) professional and there is nothing you can do for it to take away from me even (sic) you go to any court."
According to Complainant, although the letter was unsigned, Respondent's... initials appear on the upper left-hand corner of the
airmail envelope (Exh. "8-A-1").
Respondent denies emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it is Complainant who has been indulging in fantasy and
fabrications.
Tabang's defense:
Respondent avers that he and Complainant had covenanted not to disclose the marriage not because he wanted to finish his studies and
take the Bar first but for the reason that said marriage was void from the beginning in the absence of the... requisites of Article 76 of
the Civil Code that the contracting parties shall have lived together as husband and wife for at least five (5) years before the date of the
marriage and that said parties shall state the same in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to... administer oaths. He could
not have abandoned Complainant because they had never lived together as husband and wife. When he applied for the 1981 Bar
Examinations, he honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he was single.
Issues: "a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with me assuming that our marriage is not
valid, and making a mockery of our marriage institution.
Ruling:
Upon the facts on record, even without testimonial evidence from Complainant, we find Respondent's lack of good moral character
sufficiently established.
Respondent can not assume that his marriage to Complainant is void.
The presumption is that all the requisites and conditions of a marriage of an exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil Code
have been met and that the Judge's official... duty in connection therewith has been regularly performed.
Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to conflicting submissions before this Court to suit
himself. He has also engaged in devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose. In so doing, he has violated Canon 10
of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule
1001 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the... court to be misled by any artifice."
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to continue to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until further Orders, the
suspension to... take effect immediately.

Rule 7.02 – Not to Support Unqualified Bar Applicant  

Rule 7.03 – No Conduct Adversely Affecting the Profession

Velasco-Tamaray v. Daquis
Facts: Complainant filed a complaint affidavit before the IBP on 30 July 2007, alleging the respondent filed, on her behalf, a Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage without her consent and forged her signature on the Petition. She also alleged that the
respondent signed the said Petition as “Counsel for the Petitioner.” referring to the complainant. The complainant stated the
respondent was not her counsel but that of her husband, Leomarte Regala Tamaray.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated the canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Held:
    By pretending to be the counsel of the complainant, the respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR. For allowing the use of
petition with the forged signature of the complainant, the respondent violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the
CPR.

Other acts of the respondent that violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the CPR are as follows: engaging in a scuffle inside court chambers;
openly doubting paternity of the complainant’s son; hurling incentives at a Clerk of Court; harassing occupants of a property; using
intemperate language; and engaging in an extramarital affair.

The SC find the respondent guilty of violating the following provisions of the CPR: Rule 1.01, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7; Rule
10.01, Canon 10; and Canon 17. Violation against Rule 15.03, Canon 15 by the respondent was dismissed. The respondent was
disbarred and her name removed from the Roll of Attorneys.

Zaguirre v. Castillo
Tan v. Sabandal
FACTS: Respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but because of pending administrative complaints filed
against him regarding instances when he called himself “attorney” knowing full well that he was not yet admitted to the Bar, he was
not allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.  Oppositor’s evidence sufficiently show that respondent had held himself out as an attorney in
the agrarian, civil and criminal cases and he was paid for his “legal services”
He then filed a petition to be admitted to the Philippine Bar and to be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.   In a resolution
promulgated on November 29, 1983 respondent petition was denied.  Respondent asks for forgiveness, understanding and
benevolence and promises that, if given a chance to be a member of the Phil. Bar, he would always be faithful to the lawyer’s oath and
conduct himself in an upright manner.

Issue/Held: Whether or not respondent shall be admitted to the Philippine Bar rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of the
Court.  An applicant must satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character, fit and proper to practice law.  Sabandal hereby
allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.

Tapucar v. Tapucar

Facts: In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the disbarment of her
husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen)
Peña under scandalous circumstances. Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for conduct
unbecoming an officer of the court. in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the Judge
of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of six months suspension without pay, while in Administrative Matter Nos. 1720, 1911 and
2300-CFI, which were consolidated, this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation from service of respondent.

Issue: Whether or not respondent violated canon 1 of the code of professional responsibility.

Ruling: YES

 The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

 A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. Exacted from him, as a member of the profession charged with the responsibility to
stand as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency, truthfulness and responsibility that have been
compendiously described as “moral character.” To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain
the dignity of his profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar but also the administration of justice.

Guevara v. Eala

Facts: On March 4, 2002 a complaint of disbarment was filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar
Discipline against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the
lawyer’s oath. In the Complaint, Guevarra first met the respondent in January 2000 when his then fiancée Irene Moje introduced
respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne Tantoco with whom he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, Complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from
respondent Cellphone calls, as well as messages some which read “I love you,” “I miss you,” or “Meet you at Megamall.” He also
noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go
home from work. When he asked her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parent’s house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was
busy with her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and Respondent together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted
them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house. On April 22, 2001 complainant went uninvited to Irene’s birthday
celebration at which he saw her and the respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and
humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal
belongings. Complainant later found a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2007, the day of his wedding to Irene, Complainant soon
saw respondent’s car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B11 Street, New Manila where as he was later learn sometime in
April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on about January 18, 2002 together
with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.

Issue: Whether Concubinage or Adulterous relationship, be the reason for the disbarment of Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala.
Held: Lawyer’s oath stated that a lawyer should support the Constitution and obey the laws, Meaning he shall not make use of deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or be convicted in any crime involving moral turpitude. In the case
at bar Atty. Eala was accused of Concubinage, under ART. 334 of the Revised Penal Code, “ Any husband who shall keep a mistress
in a conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall
cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium period. Section 2 of ART.
XV states that “Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state.
Respondent’s grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the constitution and the laws, that he as a lawyer has sworn to uphold. Hence the
court declared Atty. Jose Emmanul M. Eala DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation
of canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Advincula v. Macabata

FACTS: Petitioner Advincula, a client of the respondent lawyer Atty. Macabata filed a disbarment case against the latter  on the
grounds of gross immorality. The petitioner alleged that the respondent took advantage of his position as a lawyer by  kissing  her and
lure her to agree to have sexual relations with him.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral or which constitute serious moral depravity that would
warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.

HELD:

No. The Court perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie, forms of
greetings, casual and customary. The act of kissing by the respondent towards the complainant, even if considered offensive and
undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral.

Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor
erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to
clearly show the lawyer’s unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged as well as the
motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the offense should also be considered.

The complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED and hereby
reprimanded.

Tiong v. Florendo

Facts: Atty. George Florendo has been serving as the lawyer of spouses Elpidio and Ma. Elena Tiong. Elpidio, a US citizen is often
times away. For two years, he suspected that his wife and Atty. Florendo were having an affair. Finally in 1995, he was able to listen
to a telephone conversation where he heard Atty. Florendo mention amorous words to Ma. Elena. Atty. Florendo confronted the two
and both eventually admitted to their illicit relationship. Atty. Florendo and Ma. Elena then executed and signed an affidavit, which
was later notarized, stating that they admit of their illicit relationship; that they are seeking the forgiveness of their respective spouse.
Elpidio forgave Florendo and Ma. Elena. But nevertheless, Elpidio filed a disbarment case against Florendo. Florendo said he can no
longer be sanctioned because he was already pardoned.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Florendo is correct.

HELD: No.

A petition for suspension or disbarment of a lawyer is a sui generis case. This class of cases is meant to protect the public and the
courts of undesirable members of the legal profession. As such, pardon by the offended party of the act complained of does not
operate to offset the ground for disbarment or suspension. Florendo’s act of having an affair with his client’s wife manifested his
disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low
regard for the ethics of his profession. He violated the trust reposed upon him by his client (Canon 17, Code of Professional
Responsibility). His illicit relationship with Ma. Elena amounts to a disgraceful and grossly immoral conduct warranting disciplinary
action. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that an attorney may be disbarred or suspended from his office for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, among others. It cannot be also said, as he claims,
that their relationship is merely a moment of indiscretion considering that their affair went on for more than two years. Florendo was
suspended for 6 months.
 Canon 8 Courtesy, Fairness, Candor Towards Professional Colleagues

Bugarin v. Espanol

Facts: The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing... for Annulment of Sale and Certificates of Sale. Title... trial
court issued an order... directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite to annotate at the back of certain certificates of title a
notice of lis... pendens. Before the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite could comply with said order, the defendant Spouses
Alvaran... filed a motion to cancel lis pendens.
petitioner, the newly appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders,... Inc., filed an opposition to the motion to cancel lis pendens.
motion to cancel lis pendens was granted by the court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the defendants.
During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and counsel were present together
Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring was making manifestation to the effect that he was... ready to mark his documentary evidence pursuant to
his Motion to cite (in contempt of court) the Deputy Register of Deeds of Cavite, Diosdado Concepcion.
The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained that he did not cause the appearance of the cameraman to take pictures,
however, he admitted that they came from a function, and that was the reason why the said cameraman was in tow with him and the
plaintiffs.
Notwithstanding the flimsy explanation given, the counsel sent out the cameraman after the Court took exception to the fact that
although the proceedings are open to the public and that it being a court of record, and since its permission was not sought, such
situation was an... abuse of discretion of the Court.
When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcion manifested that he needed the services of counsel and right then and
there appointed Atty. Elpidio Barzaga to represent him
Atty. Bugaring started to insist... that he be allowed to mark and present his documentary evidence in spite of the fact that Atty.
Barzaga was still manifesting that he be allowed to submit a written pleading for his client, considering that the Motion has so many
ramifications and the issues are... complicated.
At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed to mark his documentary evidence and was raring to argue as in fact he
was already perorating despite the fact that Atty. Barzaga has not yet finished with his manifestation.
While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime he felt like doing so.
Thus, the Court declared him out of order, at which point, Atty. Bugaring flared up and uttered words insulting the Court; such as:
`that he knows better than the latter as he has won all his... cases of certiorari in the appellate Courts, that he knows better the Rules of
Court; that he was going to move for the inhibition of the Presiding Judge for allegedly being antagonistic to his client
Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in direct contempt and order the Court's sheriff to arrest and place him under
detention.
To clear his name in the legal circle and the general public, petitioner filed a petition before the Court of Appeals praying for the
annulment of the Order... citing him in direct contempt of court and the reimbursement of the fine
CA found that from a thorough reading of the transcript of stenographic notes... it was obvious that the petitioner was indeed arrogant,
at times impertinent, too argumentative, to the extent of being disrespectful,... annoying and sarcastic towards the court.
Issues: THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED ORDER OF THE
TRIAL COURT WHICH TO PETITIONER'S SUBMISSIONS SMACKS OF OPPRESSION AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY,
HENCE IT COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION.
Ruling:
Petitioner insists that a careful examination of the transcript of stenographic notes of the subject proceedings would reveal that the
contempt order issued by respondent judge had no factual and legal basis.
It would also show that he was polite and respectful towards the court... as he always addressed the court with the phrase "your honor
please."
We disagree.
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
Direct contempt punished summarily. - A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or
interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court or judge, offensive personalities toward... others, or
refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be
summarily adjudged in contempt by such court or judge and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment
not... exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a superior court, or a judge thereof, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be an inferior court.
We agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals that petitioner's alleged deference to the trial court in consistently addressing the
respondent judge as "your Honor please" throughout the proceedings is belied by his behavior... threat to file a petition for certiorari
against the trial court... is contrary to Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that "a lawyer
shall abstain from scandalous,... offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts".
hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge was partial in favor of the other party... is against Rule 11.04, Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers from attributing to a... judge "motives not supported by the record or have
no materiality to the case".
behaving without due regard to the trial court's order to maintain order in the proceedings... is in utter disregard to Canon 1 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics which makes it a lawyer's duty to "maintain towards the... courts (1) respectful attitude" in order to
maintain its importance in the administration of justice, and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates
lawyers to "observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and to judicial officers and should insist... on similar conduct by
others".
behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow counsel who at the time he was making representations in behalf of the other
party, was rudely interrupted by the petitioner and was not allowed to further put a word in edgewise... is violative of Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Canon 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which obliges a lawyer to conduct himself
with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues... refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of the
Province of Cavite, through counsel, to exercise his right to be heard... is against Section 1 of Article III, 1997 Constitution on the
right to due process of law, Canon 18 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics which mandates a lawyer to always treat an adverse witness "with fairness and due consideration," and Canon 12
of Code of Professional Responsibility which insists on a lawyer to "exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
and... efficient administration of justice."
The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the petitioner's use of the phrase "your honor please."
Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his documentary evidence marked to the extent of interrupting the opposing
counsel and the court showed disrespect to said counsel and the court, was defiant of the court's system for an orderly proceeding, and
obstructed... the administration of justice.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to
the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of... justice.
Hence, petitioner cannot claim that there was irregularity in the... actuation of respondent judge in issuing the contempt order inside
her chamber without giving the petitioner the opportunity to defend himself or make an immediate reconsideration.
Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carried by his emotions in espousing the case of his client - by persisting to
have his documentary evidence marked despite the respondent judge's contrary order - he did so in the honest belief that he was bound
to... protect the interest of his client to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.
Although respondent judge was justified in citing petitioner in direct contempt of court, she erred in imposing a fine in the amount of
P3,000.00 which exceeded the ceiling of P2,000.00
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court
of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite is ordered to return to the petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of P1,000.00 out of the
original fine of
P3,000.00.

Reyes v. Chiong

Facts: Atty. Reyes filed a case for disbarment against respondent Atty. Chiong because of the latter’s violation of Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility dealing with the idea that lawyers should treat each other with courtesy, dignity and civility.
Chiong’s client did not appear upon the court when Prosecutor Salonga issued a subpoena for their preliminary investigation, the
Prosecutor filed a criminal complaint for estafa against said client. After which Chiong made an urgent motion to quash the warrant
concomitant with his filing for a civil complaint and collection for a sum of money and damages against Atty. Reyes, Xu (the
complainant’s client) and the Prosecutor. Upon their confrontation, no settlement was reached. Chiong argues that there was no
disrespect impleading Atty. Reyes as co-defendant in Civil Case No. 4884 and no basis to conclude that the suit was groundless. He
argues that he impleaded the Prosecutor because the criminal investigation had irregularities due to the action of the Prosecutor to file
estafa case despite the pendency for his client’s motion for an opportunity to submit counter affidavit and evidence.

ISSUE: Did respondent violate Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

HELD:

Yes, it was recommended by the IBP that defendant’s purpose of filing for the collection suit with damages was to be able to obtain
leverage against the estafa case of his client. Clearly there was no need to implead complainant and Prosecutor Salonga because they
never had any participation in the business transactions between Pan and Xu, clearly it was for the mere harassment of the two.
Chiong was suspended for two (2) years from the practice of law and was implemented immediatel
Mendoza v. Gadon

Torres v. Javier

Inclusion of derogatory statements actuated by his giving vent to ill-feelings stated in the pleading is not covered by the absolute
immunity or privileged communication.

Facts: Atty. Ireneo L. Torres and Mrs. Natividad Celestino charged Atty. Jose Concepcion Javier for malpractice, gross misconduct in
office as an attorney and/or violation of the lawyer’s oath for employing statements and remarks on his pleadings which are false,
unsubstantiated, with malicious imputation, abusive, offensive and improper with the character of an attorney as a quasi-judicial
officer.

Atty. Javier professes that he was angry while he was preparing his pleadings considering that his wife was included to the burglary
exposed in the present case. Also, he invokes that those statements he made are privileged communication, it forming part of a judicial
proceeding.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Javier is administratively liable for the alleged offensive statements he made in his pleadings

HELD:

It is well entrenched in Philippine jurisprudence that for reasons of public policy, utterances made in the course of judicial
proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions, are absolutely privileged so long as they are pertinent and
relevant to the subject inquiry, however false or malicious they may be. A matter, however, to which the privilege does not extend
must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy or
impropriety. That matter alleged in a pleading need not be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings. It must,
however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in
the course of the trial.

Clearly, Atty. Javier’s primordial reason for the offensive remark stated in his pleadings was his emotional reaction in view of the fact
that herein Complainant was in a legal dispute with his wife. This excuse cannot be sustained; that the Atty. Javier is representing his
wife is not at all an excuse.

In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language must be dignified and choice of language is important in the
preparation of pleadings. In the assertion of his client’s rights, a lawyer — even one gifted with superior intellect — is enjoined to rein
up his temper.

Thus, the inclusion of the derogatory statements by respondent was actuated by his giving vent to his ill-feelings towards Atty. Torres,
a purpose to which the mantle of absolute immunity does not extend.

CIR v. Asalus Corp.

FACTS: Respondent Asalus Corp. received a Notice of Informal Conference from Revenue District Office BIR. It was in connection
with the investigation conducted by Revenue Officer Fidel M. Bañares II on the Value-Added Tax transactions of Asalus for the
taxable year 2007. Asalus filed its Letter-Reply, dated December 29, 2010, questioning the basis of Bañares' computation for its VAT
liability. Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued the Preliminary Assessment Notice finding Asalus liable for deficiency
VAT for 2007 in the aggregate amount of P413,378,058.11. Asalus received the Formal Assessment Notice stating that it was liable
for deficiency VAT for 2007 in the total amount of P95,681,988.64, inclusive of surcharge and interest. Consequently, it filed its
protest against the FAN, dated September 6, 2011. Asalus received the Final Decision on Disputed Assessment showing VAT
deficiency for 2007 in the aggregate amount of P106,761,025.17, inclusive of surcharge and interest and P25,000.00 as compromise
penalty. As a result, it filed a petition for review before the CTA Division. The CTA Division ruled that the VAT assessment issued
on August 26, 2011 had prescribed and consequently deemed invalid.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the CTA erred in the decision and that the petition be granted in favor of the petitioner.

HELD:

The statement given by the CTA were correct in a way, and it was given due respect for they found it partly correct but, after a review
of the records and applicable laws and jurisprudence, the Court finds that the CTA erred in concluding that the assessment against
Asalus had prescribed. Internal revenue taxes shall be assessed within three years after the last day prescribed by law for the filing of
the return, or where the return is filed beyond the period, from the day the return was actually filed. Section 222 of the NIRC,
however, provides for exceptions to the general rule. It states that in the case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax or
of failure to file a return, the assessment may be made within ten years from the discovery of the falsity, fraud or omission.

In the oft-cited Aznar v. CTA, the Court compared a false return to a fraudulent return in relation to the applicable prescriptive periods
for assessments, to wit:
Petitioner argues that Sec. 332 of the NIRC does not apply because the taxpayer did not file false and fraudulent returns with intent to
evade tax, while respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue insists contrariwise, with respondent Court of Tax Appeals concluding
that the very "substantial under declarations of income for six consecutive years eloquently demonstrate the falsity or fraudulence of
the income tax returns with an intent to evade the payment of tax."
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED. The July 30, 2015 Decision and the November 6, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Tax
Appeals En Banc are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is ordered REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals for the
determination of the Value Added Tax liabilities of the Asalus Corporation.

Rule 8.01 – No Abusive and Improper Language 

Dallong-Galicinao v. Castro

Facts: Atty. Castro, a private practitioner, went to the office of Atty. Dallong-Galicinao, the clerk of court of Bambang (Nueva
Vizcaya) RTC, to inquire whether the complete records of a civil case had already been remanded to the court of origin. Atty. Castro
was not the counsel of record of either party in the said civil case. When denied such request, Atty. Castro hurled invectives at Atty.
Dallong-Galicinao which caused the same to file a complaint-affidavit against the former for unprofessional conduct. Due to Atty.
Castro’s public apology, Atty. Dallong-Galicinao expressed her desire not to appear on the next hearing.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Castro should be held administratively liable.

Decision: Yes. Not being the counsel of record and there being no authorization from either the parties to represent them, Atty. Castro
has no right to impose his will on the clerk of court. Although the penalty should be tempered since Atty. Castro apologized and Atty.
Dallong-Galicinao accepted it. This is not to say that Atty. Castro should be absolved of his actuations. Atty. Castro is ordered fined in
the amount of P10,000.00 with a warning that any similar infractions shall be dealt with more severely.

Alcantara v. Pefianco

FACTS: The complainant, Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, is the incumbent District Public Attorney of the Public Attorney’s Office in
San Jose, Antique. On May 18, 2000, while Atty. Ramon Salvani III was conferring with a client in the Public Attorney’s Office
(PAO), a woman approached them.  Complainant saw the woman in tears, whereupon he went to the group and suggested that Atty.
Salvani talk with her amicably as a hearing was taking place in another room.  Respondent Atty. Mariano Pefianco stood up and
shouted at Atty. Salvani and his client. Complainant said he was surprised at respondent Pefianco’s outburst and asked him to cool off,
but respondent continued to fulminate at Atty. Salvani.  As head of the Office, complainant approached respondent and asked him to
take it easy and leave Atty. Salvani to settle the matter.  Respondent at first listened, but shortly after he again started shouting at and
scolding Atty. Salvani.  This caused a commotion in the office. Respondent later explained and said that he was moved by the plight
of the woman whose husband had been murdered as she was pleading for the settlement of her case because she needed the money.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Pefianco violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: YES. Respondent was a imposed fine of P1,000.00.

Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility admonishes lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward their fellow lawyers.  Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession.  They must act honorably, fairly
and candidly toward each other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all times.

Respondent ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation
and erode public respect for it.  Whatever moral righteousness respondent had was negated by the way he chose to express his
indignation.  An injustice cannot be righted by another injustice.

Barandos, Jr. v. Ferrer

FACTS: On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment, suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of
appropriate disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for filing a reply with opposition to motion to dismiss that
contained abusive, offensive and improper language which insinuated that Atty. Barandon presented a falsified document in court. The
said document purported to be a notarized document executed at a date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer.

Moreover, on December 19, 2000, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened Atty. Barandon saying, “Laban kung laban, patayan kung
patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, angabogadonarito ay mga taga-
Camarines Sur, umuwina kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito” at the Municipal Trial Court in Daet before the start of a
hearing.

The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against repeating his unethical act; yet he faces a disbarment charge for
sexual harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter in Camarines Norte; a related criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and
criminal cases for libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against him.

On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD submitted to this Court a Report,
recommending the suspension for two years of Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on record to
prove Atty. Ferrer’s violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He attributed to Atty. Barandon, as
counsel in Civil Case 7040, the falsification of the plaintiff’s affidavit despite the absence of evidence that the document had in fact
been falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to it. The Investigating Commissioner also found that Atty. Ferrer uttered the
threatening remarks imputed to him in the presence of other counsels, court personnel, and litigants before the start of hearing. On
June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioner’s
recommendation but reduced the penalty of suspension to only one year.

ISSUE: DID THE IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS AND THE IBP INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER ERR IN FINDING
RESPONDENT GUILTY OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM AND IF THE PENALTY IMPOSED WAS JUSTIFIED?

HELD: The Supreme Court examined the records of this case and finds no reason to disagree with the findings and recommendation
of the IBP Board of Governors and the Investigating Commissioner.

The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of
these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor
towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Atty. Ferrer’s actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows that he imputed to Atty. Barandon the falsification of an
affidavit without evidence that the document had indeed been falsified. Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of
falsification in a proper forum and without using offensive and abusive language against a fellow lawyer. The Court has constantly
reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings despite the adversarial nature of our legal system.

Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and
integrity of the legal profession at all times. Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrer’s drunken invectives at Atty.
Barandon shortly before the start of a court hearing and Atty. Ferrer failed to show convincing evidence denying the said charge
against him.

All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal
profession, hence they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Atty. Ferrer’s display of improper attitude, arrogance,
misbehavior, and misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court,
was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold. Consequently, the penalty of suspension of one from
the practice of law is deemed just and proper.

Sanchez v. Aguilos

FACTS: Nenita Sanchez (petitioner) sought the legal services of Atty. Romeo Aguilos (respondent) to represent her in the annulment
case. Atty. Aguilos accepted the engagement and fixed the attorney’s fees. Sanchez had given him an initial amount but Aguilos said
he would just start working the case upon full payment of the acceptance fee and that the amount he had given for acceptance fee was
for legal separation, he said he did not know that the complainant contemplated to file an annulment. Aguilos told her that she have to
pay a higher acceptance fee for the annulment of marriage. Because of this, complainant subsequently withdraw the case and
requested for a refund of the amounts already paid. Respondent refused to do the same as he had already working on the case. This
made her bring an administrative complaint against Atty. Aguilos.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Aguilos should be held administratively liable for misconduct.

HELD: YES.

The SC fined Atty. Aguilos P10,000 and reprimanded him for his use of offensive/improper language against his fellow lawyer.
Lawyers shall keep abreast of the legal developments and participate in continuing legal education program (Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility) in order to prevent repetition of such kind of advice that respondent gave to the complainant. In giving an
advice, he should be able to distinguish between the grounds for legal separation and grounds for annulment of marriage. But as the
respondent stated in his answer, it appears that he is mixed up with the basic provisions of the law. Clearly, the respondent
misrepresented his professional competence and skill to the complainant. As the foregoing findings reveal, he did not know the
distinction between the grounds for legal separation and for annulment of marriage. Such knowledge would have been basic and
expected of him as a lawyer accepting a professional engagement for either causes of action. His explanation that the client initially
intended to pursue the action for legal separation should be disbelieved. The case unquestionably contemplated by the parties and for
which his services was engaged, was no other than an action for annulment of the complainant's marriage with her husband with the
intention of marrying her British fiancée. They did not contemplate legal separation at all, for legal separation would still render her
incapacitated to re-marry. That the respondent was insisting in his answer that he had prepared a petition for legal separation, and that
she had to pay more as attorney's fees if she desired to have the action for annulment was, therefore, beyond comprehension other than
to serve as a hallow afterthought to justify his claim

Belo-Henares v. “Arces” Guevarra

Facts: In 2002 and 2005, Maria Victoria G. Belo-Henares (“Complainant), director of Belo Medical Group corporation, performed
cosmetic surgery that allegedly harmed a patient. Thereafter, Roberto C. Guevarra (“Respondent),” a licensed attorney, brought
criminal complaints against the Complainant on behalf of the patient. During the criminal actions, the Respondent engaged in a series
of derogatory attacks directed at the Complainant and her company on social media. Through his personal Facebook profile, the
Respondent posted dozens of sexually-charged insulting and abusive statements intended to discredit the Complainant’s professional
reputation. The Respondent, who had some 2000 Facebook friends, threatened to “paralyze” the company, which at the time had 300
employees, and also threatened the Complainant with criminal conviction and sought to extort money from her.

In August 2013, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), a branch of IBP, recommended that the Respondent be suspended from
practising law for one year. It rejected his argument that the complaint violated his constitutional right to privacy, asserting that his
remarks were only shared with his Facebook friends and did not include the Complainant. The Respondent also argued that the
disciplinary action was in violation of his right to freedom of expression. He denied that his remarks were vulgar and abusive and
were intended to inspire hatred towards the Complainant and her company and that he had attempted to extort money from her. He
further asserted that the Complainant was a public figure and was therefore a valid subject for fair comment.

The Board of Governors of the Bar adopted the IBP-CBD’s report and recommendation, following which the Respondent moved for
reconsideration, arguing that there was no specific act that could warrant a suspension of his law license. He also referred to a libel
action brought against him by an employee of the Complainant’s company, which had been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In
October 2015, the Board of Governors partially granted the Respondent’s motion, reducing his suspension to six months.

The Complainant later submitted her verified complaint to the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

Decision Overview

Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court, with whom all four other presiding justices
concurred.

The main issue for the Court was whether or not the Respondent was administratively liable based on the Complainant’s allegations. It
first ruled that the Respondent’s defense of privacy in sharing his derogatory remarks on Facebook was “untenable.” The Court
explained that in order to claim a reasonable expectation of privacy on social media, and in this case, Facebook, “it is
first necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent
access thereto or to limit its visibility.” [p. 9] And such intention “can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of Facebook’s
privacy tools.” [p. 9] Here, the Court did not find any direct evidence that the Respondent had utilized any of the privacy tools or
features of Facebook that would ensure his remarks were only visible to himself and his circle of friends. The Court further reasoned
that even if the posts were only viewable by the Respondent’s friends, there was no assurance that they would be safeguarded within
the confines of privacy, in part because any Facebook friend of the Respondent could independently share the posts on their page.
“[R]estricting the privacy of one’s Facebook posts to “Friends” does not guarantee absolute protection from the prying eyes of another
user who does not belong to one’s circle of friends,” the Court concluded. [p. 10]

The Court also rejected the Respondent’s claim that the impugned remarks were within the exercise of his right to freedom of
expression. It reiterated that the constitutional freedom is not “absolute” and every person exercising the right is “obliged to act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” [p. 11] The Court also noted that the constitutional protection of
the right “may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them into
disrepute” [p. 11] In this case, the Court found that the Facebook remarks “were ostensibly made with malice tending to insult and
tarnish the reputation of complainant and [her company].” [p. 11]

The Court further dismissed the Respondent’s justification that his remarks amounted to fair criticism of the Complainant as a public
figure. The Court said, “it is the cardinal condition of all criticism that it shall be  bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety,” and in this case, the Respondent’s remarks breached the said walls.” [p. 12]

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Supreme Court of the Philippines found the Respondent “in complete and utter violation” of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. It accordingly imposed the original one-year suspension and “sternly warned” the Respondent
that he would face more severe consequences if he repeated the same or similar acts.
Canlapan v. Balayo

Facts: Complainant avers that at the mandatory conference held before Executive Labor Arbiter Jose C. Del Valle, Jr., in connection
with a money claim filed by complainant against the Boy Scouts of the Philippines - Mayon Albay Council  (Mayon Council),
respondent arrogantly threw his arm toward the complainant while menacingly saying: "Maski sampulo pang abogado darhon mo, dai
mo makua ang gusto mo!" ("Even if you bring ten lawyers here, you will not get what you want!")

Complainant was allegedly taken aback and felt humiliated by respondent's actuation, which showed a blatant disrespect for the
elderly considering that respondent was much younger. The incident was witnessed by Higino M. Mata (Mata), First Vice Chair of the
Mayon Council, who executed an Affidavit, and employees of the National Labor Relations Commission, including the security
guard.

Complainant never imagined that, in his twilight years and in his quest for justice, he would be publicly humiliated by a young lawyer
actively participating in the conference, who was neither a party to the labor case nor was authorized by the Mayon Council to appear
on its behalf.

Respondent avers that he has assisted Fajut in several cases. In addition, Fajut also consulted respondent on the legality of ordinances
and resolutions submitted to his office as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malinao, Albay. When Fajut was elected Chair of
the Mayon Council, he asked respondent to help him on legal matters concerning his new role.

Issue: WON respondent was improper and violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held:

As servants of the law, lawyers must be model citizens and set the example of obedience to law. The practice of law is a privilege
bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
expresses the lawyer's fundamental duty to "uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law"
Respondent's display of improper attitude and arrogance toward an elderly constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal
profession and cannot be tolerated by this court.

Respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and
integrity of the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 provides:

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public
or private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Furthermore, Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 requires a lawyer to employ respectful and restrained language in keeping with the dignity of the
legal profession.42 Although the remark was allegedly made in response to undue provocation and pestering on the part of
complainant, respondent should have exercised restraint. Notwithstanding his personal opinion on the merits of complainant's claims,
it was improper for respondent to state that even if complainant brought 10 (or as many) lawyers as he wanted, he would not prosper
in his claims against the Mayon Council. Careless remarks such as this tend to create and promote distrust in the administration of
justice, undermine the people's confidence in the legal profession, and erode public respect for it. "Things done cannot be undone and
words uttered cannot be taken back."

Feelings between litigants may exist, but they should not be allowed to influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor towards each
other or towards suitors in the case. As officers of the court and members of the bar, lawyers are expected to be always above
reproach. They cannot indulge in offensive personalities. They should always be temperate, patient, and courteous both in speech and
conduct, not only towards the court but also towards adverse parties and witnesses.

It has been ruled:

To note, "the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to
the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession." This proceeds from the lawyer's duty to observe the highest degree of
morality in order to safeguard the Bar's integrity. Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a, lawyer, be it in the lawyer's
public or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to
warrant suspension or disbarment.

Roque v. Balbin

Facts: Complainant alleged that he was the plaintiff's counsel in a case entitled FELMAILEM, Inc. v. Felma Mailem
Shortly after securing a favorable judgment for his client,... herein respondent-as counsel for the defendant, and on appeal-started
intimidating, harassing, blackmailing, and maliciously threatening complainant into withdrawing the case filed by his client.
According to complainant, respondent would make various telephone calls and send text messages and e-mails not just to him, but
also to his friends and other clients, threatening to file disbarment and/or criminal suits against him.
Further, and in view of complainant's "high profile" stature, respondent also threatened to publicize such suits in order to besmirch
and/or destroy complainant's name and reputation.
Initially, respondent moved for an extension of time to file his comment,... which was granted by the Court.
However, respondent failed to file his comment despite multiple notices, prompting the Court to repeatedly fine him and even order
his arrest.
Eventually, the Court dispensed with respondent's comment and forwarded e records to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
its investigation, report, and recommendation.
Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly, recommended that he be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar infractions in the future shall merit
more severe sanctions.
The Investigating Commissioner found that instead of availing of the procedural remedies to assail the adverse MeTC ruling in order
to further his client's cause, respondent resorted to crudely underhanded tactics directed at the opposing litigant's counsel... by
personally attacking the latter through various modes of harassment and intimidation.
IBP Board of Governors adopted the Investigating Commissioner's report and recommendation in toto.
Issues: The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be administratively sanctioned for the acts complained of.
Ruling:
Membership in the Bar imposes upon them certain obligations.
To this end, Canon 8 of the CPR commands, to wit:CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Case law instructs that "[l]awyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy, dignity[,] and civility.
A great part of their comfort, as well as of their success at the bar, depends upon their relations with their professional brethren.
Any undue ill feeling between clients should not influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor toward each other.
Mutual bickering, unjustified recriminations[,] and offensive behavior among lawyers not only detract from the dignity of the legal
profession, but also constitute highly unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action."
In this case, respondent's underhanded tactics against complainant were in violation of Canon 8 of the CPR.
Thus, it appears that respondent's acts of repeatedly intimidating, harassing, and blackmailing complainant with purported
administrative and criminal cases and prejudicial media exposures were performed as a tool to return the inconvenience suffered by
his client.
His actions demonstrated a misuse of the legal processes available to him and his client, specially considering that the aim of every
lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them.
More significantly, the foregoing showed respondent's lack of respect and despicable behavior towards a colleague in the legal
profession, and constituted conduct unbecoming of a member thereof.
also violated Canon 19 and Rule 19.01 of the CPR.
Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of
his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyer's client.
Court notes that respondent initially moved for an extension of time to tile comment but did not file the same) prompting the Court to
repeatedly fine him and order his arrest.
Such audacity on the part of respondent - which caused undue delay in the resolution of this administrative case - is a violation of
Canon 11, Canon 12, Rule 12.03, and Rule 12.04 of the CPR
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.x x x xCANON 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.x x x xRule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall
not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.
Verily, respondent's acts of seeking for extension of time to file a comment, and thereafter, failing to file the same and ignoring the
numerous directives not only indicated a high degree of irresponsibility, but also constituted utter disrespect to the judicial institution.
The orders of the Court are not to be construed as a mere request, nor should they be complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively; and the obstinate refusal or failure to comply therewith not only betrays  a recalcitrant flaw in the lawyer's character, but
also underscores his disrespect to the lawful orders of the Court which is only too deserving of reproof.
Case law provides that in similar instances where lawyers made personal attacks against an opposing counsel in order to gain leverage
in a case they were involved in, the Court has consistently imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Rizal P. Balbin is found guilty of violating Canon 8, Canon 11, Canon 12, Rule 12.03, Rule 12.04,
Canon 19, and Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of two (2) years, effective immediately upon his receipt of this  Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Bert Causing Case 

Facts: Atty. Causing and his client, Mabasa (Complainants), charged respondent Judge Dela Rosa with gross ignorance of the law,
gross misconduct and gross incompetence for reversing [2] the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 09-268685-86 entitled People v.
Eleazar, et al. (Libel Cases), wherein Mabasa was one of the accused.
Complainants alleged that the Libel Cases were dismissed by former Acting Presiding Judge Gamor B. Disalo (Judge Disalo) in an
Order[3] dated April 13, 2015 on the ground that the right of the accused to speedy trial had been violated. The prosecution filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the April 13, 2015 Order before the RTC Br. 4 Manila, now presided by respondent Judge Dela Rosa.
Respondent Judge Dela Rosa granted the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration in the assailed Resolution [4] dated November 23,
2015 (November 23, 2015 Resolution), the pertinent portions of which read:
xxxx
In opposition thereto, counsel for the accused cites double jeopardy. However, several settings of this Court showed that the resetting
was on motion of counsel for the accused and hence with the consent of the accused. Further, the questioned Order dated April 13,
2015 has not yet attained finality, so double jeopardy is not yet attached.
Further, the records of this case would show that the accused is not entirely without blame as to why this case has been pending. Aside
from that, the accused filed a Motion to Quash as well as accused's Motion for Reconsideration thereto resulting in the conduct of the
arraignment only in the last year of September.
The prosecution should be given its day in court. To deny the Motion For Reconsideration is a (sic) deny to prosecute on the part of
the prosecution.[5]
Complainants questioned respondent Judge Dela Rosa's November 23, 2015 Resolution granting the prosecution's Motion for
Reconsideration because, according to them, it was elementary for respondent Judge Dela Rosa to know that the prior dismissal of a
criminal case due to a violation of the accused's right to speedy trial is equivalent to a dismissal on the merits of the case and, as such,
granting the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration was tantamount to a violation of the constitutional right against double
jeopardy.[6] Complainants averred further that it was unacceptable, given respondent Judge Dela Rosa's position and the presumption
of his knowledge of the law, for him to have disregarded a rule as elementary as the constitutional right of an accused against double
jeopardy.[7]
Complainants also criticized respondent Judge Dela Rosa's act of referring to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Atty.
Causing's two (2) separate posts on his Facebook and blogspot accounts about the subject criminal cases. They reasoned that
respondent Judge Dela Rosa should have first required Atty. Causing to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt for
publicizing and taking his posts to social media. Atty. Causing emphasized that the posts were presented using decent words and thus,
it was incorrect for respondent Judge Dela Rosa to refer his actions to a disciplinary body such as the IBP. Atty. Causing further
asserted that he did not violate the sub judice[8] rule because this rule cannot be used to preserve the unfairness and errors of
respondent Judge Dela Rosa.[9]
In a 1st Indorsement[10] dated January 16, 2017, the OCA directed respondent Judge Dela Rosa to file his Comment within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof. [11]
In his Comment[12] dated March 13, 2017 (Comment), respondent Judge Dela Rosa averred that he had already reversed the November
23, 2015 Resolution as early as June 20, 2016 or way before the filing of the Complaint on January 6, 2017 — when he issued a
Resolution[13] of even date, which states:
x x x While the records of the cases will show delay also attributable to the defense and that this court was acting in the spirit of
fairness, the April 13, 2015 Order of Hon. Disalo should be upheld to the prejudice of fairness. Being caught between a rock and a
hard place, liberality is afforded to the accused. x x x
xxxx
As the records would show that the Hon. Judge Disalo dismissed these cases on the right of speedy trial, double jeopardy attaches.
Hence, this Court's Resolution dated November 23, 2015 is recalled and set aside. The dismissal dated April 13, 2015 as dictated in
the Order of Hon. Judge Disalo is reinstated.
While the right of due process of the State may have been circumvented, the interest of the private complainants with regard to the
civil aspect of the cases is protected as the dismissal of the subject criminal cases is without prejudice to the pursuit of civil indemnity.
[14]

Respondent Judge Dela Rosa explained in his Comment that he had issued the November 23, 2015 Resolution because, after studying
the records, he discovered that Complainants caused much of the delay in the proceedings. [15]
Respondent Judge Dela Rosa then enumerated in his Comment the instances wherein Complainants caused the delay in the
proceedings in the Libel Cases:

1. While the warrant of arrest for Mabasa was issued on May 28, 2009, it was only one (1) year and four (4) months after or on
September 28, 2010 that Mabasa was detained; [16]
 2. Mabasa filed a Motion to Dismiss on November 30, 2010; [17]

3. The arraignment and pre-trial of the cases were reset after then Presiding Judge Marcelino L. Sayo, Jr. (Judge Sayo) issued an
Order dated April 6, 2011, which indicated that Mabasa, through counsel, moved that the scheduled arraignment and pre-trial
be reset in order "for the parties to settle the civil aspect of these cases"; [18]

4. The counsel of Mabasa filed an Urgent Motion for Deferment dated June 9, 2011 requesting again for the re-scheduling of
the arraignment and pre-trial;[19]

5. The pre-trial of the case was again rescheduled in an Order dated August 24, 2011 by the lower court due to the absence of
Mabasa's co-accused, Johnson L. Eleazar; [20]

6. Mabasa filed a Motion to Quash dated October 11, 2011, citing the court's lack of jurisdiction; [21]

7. The lower court, in an Order dated June 27, 2012, rescheduled again the arraignment and pre-trial, citing the absence of the
private prosecutor, Mabasa and his counsel; [22]

8. Judge Sayo thereafter issued an Order dated November 28, 2012, directing the issuance of warrants of arrest against Mabasa
and co-accused Gloria Galuno due to their continued non-appearance in court; [23]

9. In an Order dated December 12, 2012, Judge Sayo lifted the warrants of arrest against Mabasa and his other co-accused in the
Libel Cases after their counsel admitted that their non-appearance in the previous hearing was due to the fault of their
counsel's law Office.[24]

10. The hearing of the case on June 30, 2014 was rescheduled after Mabasa moved for the resetting of the case due to the absence
of his counsel;[25]

11. In an Order by Judge Disalo dated August 11, 2014, counsel for Mabasa was absent again. Mabasa was finally arraigned after
the court appointed one of the lawyers from the Public Attorney's Office as counsel de oficio for Mabasa;[26]

12. The Commissioner's Report dated September 23, 2014 stated that the preliminary conference failed to push through due to
the absence of Mabasa and his counsel; [27] and

13. The initial date of the presentation of the prosecution evidence was set on April 13, 2015 by the branch clerk of court.
Notably, the cases against Mabasa would be dismissed on the same day.[28]

Respondent Judge DelaRosa emphasized that the day the Libel Cases were dismissed, i.e., on April 13, 2015, was actually the date set
for the first actual trial of the cases. He stressed that the delay of almost five (5) years in the subject cases was attributable more to
Mabasa than anyone else.[29]
Respondent Judge Dela Rosa claimed that the November 23, 2015 Resolution was issued in good faith and after evaluation of the
evidence submitted by each party. He denied that the same was motivated by bad faith, ill will, fraud, dishonesty, corruption or
caprice. In fact, Respondent Judge issued this as a matter of fairness — that is, to give the private complainants in the Libel Cases an
opportunity to pursue against Mabasa and his co-accused the civil aspect of the Libel Cases. [30]
Finally, respondent Judge Dela Rosa stressed how the filing of this administrative complaint against him — on January 6, 2017, or
after he had already reversed the November 23, 2015 Resolution through his June 20, 2016 Resolution — is pure harassment. [31]
OCA Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation[32] dated June 28, 2017, the OCA recommended that the administrative complaint against Judge Dela
Rosa be dismissed for lack of merit.
After considering the allegations in the Complaint and respondent Judge Dela Rosa's Comment, the OCA found that in the absence of
any proof that respondent Judge Dela Rosa was ill-motivated in issuing the November 23, 2015 Order and that he had, in fact, issued
his June 20, 2016 Resolution reversing himself, the charge of gross ignorance of the law should be dismissed.
The OCA ratiocinated as follows:
The main issue in this administrative complaint is rooted in respondent Judge's issuance of the Order dated 23 November 201[5],
reversing the previous one dismissing the criminal cases on the ground of violation of the right of the accused to speedy
trial. Respondent Judge has already admitted that be made a mistake in issuing the said order as this would have constituted a
violation of the right of the accused against double jeopardy. To rectify his error, he granted the motion for reconsideration
filed by the accused.
Although not without exceptions, it is settled that the function of a motion for reconsideration is to point out to the court the error that
it may have committed and to give it a chance to correct itself. In "Republic of the Philippines v. Abdulwahab A. Bayao, et al."[33], the
Court explains the general rule that the purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to grant an opportunity for the court to rectify any
actual or perceived error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. The wisdom of this rule
is to expedite the resolution of the issues of the case at the level of the trial court so it can take a harder look at the records to come up
with a more informed decision on the case.[34] (Emphasis supplied)
The OCA found that the records of the case show that respondent Judge Dela Rosa admitted that he had erred in issuing the November
23, 2015 Order, but that he had rectified such mistake. [35] The OCA held that this is precisely why our judicial system has remedies for
both the party-litigants and the court to avail of if need be. [36] The OCA asserted that it would be absurd to still hold respondent Judge
Dela Rosa liable despite his rectification through his June 20, 2016 Resolution.[37]
As to the referral by respondent Judge Dela Rosa to the IBP of Atty. Causing's act of posting matters pertaining to the pending
criminal case on the internet, the OCA disagreed with Atty. Causing's argument that respondent Judge Dela Rosa should have first
required him to show cause for having done so.[38] The OCA explained that respondent Judge Dela Rosa cannot just exercise his
contempt powers on a whim, if not haphazardly, if he believes that he has other remedies to resort to, just like in this case. [39]
The Court's Ruling
In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby adopts and approves the findings of facts and conclusions of law in the above-mentioned
OCA Report and Recommendation.
Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence. [40] A judge may also be administratively liable if
shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in ignoring, contradicting or failing to apply settled law
and jurisprudence.[41]
The Court however has also ruled that "not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties renders him
liable."[42]
For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official
duties must not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty,
hatred, or some other like motive. As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. [43]
The Court agrees with the OCA that it would be absurd to hold respondent Judge Dela Rosa liable for his November 23, 2015 Order
when he had himself rectified this in his subsequent June 20, 2016 Order. To rule otherwise would be to render judicial office
untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment.[44] To hold otherwise "would be nothing short of harassing judges to take the fantastic and impossible oath of rendering
infallible judgments."[45]
Furthermore, nothing in the records of the case suggests that respondent Judge Dela Rosa was motivated by bad faith, fraud,
corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering his decision. Other than their bare assertions, Complainants failed to
substantiate their allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be presumed [46] and this Court cannot conclude bad faith
intervened when none was actually proven.[47]
The Court likewise finds no merit in Complainants' allegation that respondent Judge Dela Rosa should have first required Atty.
Causing to show cause for his act of posting matters pertaining to the pending criminal case on the internet. The Court agrees with the
OCA that respondent Judge Dela Rosa's act of referring the matter to the IBP, an independent tribunal who exercises disciplinary
powers over lawyers, was a prudent and proper action to take for a trial court judge. The Court has explained, in the case of  Lorenzo
Shipping Corporation v. Distribution Management Association of the Philippines,[48] that judges' power to punish contempt must be
exercised judiciously and sparingly, not for retaliation or vindictiveness, viz.:
x x x [T]he power to punish for contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, and only
occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must
falter or fail. As judges[,] we ought to exercise our power to punish contempt judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and
with the end in view of utilizing the power for the correction and preservation of the dignity of the Court, not for retaliation or
vindictiveness.[49]
In fine, the administrative charge against respondent Judge Dela Rosa should be, as it is hereby, dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint against respondent Presiding Judge Jose Lorenzo R. Dela Rosa, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 4, Manila is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Rule 8.02 – Not to Encroach on Professional Employment  

Camacho v. Pangulayan

Facts: 9 students from the AMA Computer College (AMACC), all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, allegedly
published certain objectionable features - the Student Disciplinary Tribunal found them guilty and the students were expelled- the 9
students appealed but were denied by the AMACC President giving rise to a civil case calling for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with Camacho as their counsel and Pangulayan and associates representing the defendant,
AMACC- while the case was pending, letters of apology and re-admission agreements were separately executed by and/or in behalf of
the students by their parents- following this, the Pangulayan Law Offices filed a Manifestation stating, among other things, that 4 of
the students had acknowledged their guilt and agreed to terminate all proceedings- apparently, Pangulayan procured and effected the
re-admission agreements through negotiations with said students and their parents without communicating with Camacho.
ISSUE: WON Pangulayan is guilty of disregarding professional ethics.

HELD: YES, this action violates Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics which states:A lawyer should not in anyway
communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or
compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid
everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law.-
respondent violated professional ethics and disregarded a duty owing to his colleague- the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a
resolution suspending Pangulayan for 6 months and dismissed the case against the other respondents since they took no part in it- the
court concurred with IBPs findings but reduced the suspension to 3 months.

REYES v CHIONG JR.

Facts: Atty. Ramon Reyes counsel for Zonggi Xu.Atty. Victoriano Chiong, Jr for Chia Hsien Pan.Xu, a Chinese-Taiwanese went into
a business venture with Pan.Pan was supposed toset up a Cebu-based fishball, tempura and seafood products factory.He did not
establish it, and so Xu asked that his money be returned.Xu then filed a case of estafa against Pan.Prosecutor Salanga then issued a
subpoena against Pan.Atty. Chiong then filed a motion to quash, but he also filed a civil complaint for the collection of a sum of
money and damages as well as for the dissolution of a business venture against Xu, Atty Reyes, and Prosecutor Salanga.He alleged
that Salanga was impleaded as an additional defendant because of the irregularities the latter had committed in conducting the criminal
investigationhe still filed the complaint against Pan inspite of Pansmotions.Atty. Reyes was allegedly impleaded because he allegedly
connived with Xu in filing the estafa case which was baseless.IBP recommended that Chiong be suspended for 2years.
Issue:W/N Chiong should be suspended.

Held:Yes.

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, GanaLopez,Mendiola,Morada,Rivas,Sarenas2CCanon 8 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues,
and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.If Chiong believed that the two had conspired to act illegally, he could have
instituted disbarment proceedings.As a lawyer, Chiong should have advisedhis client of the availability of these remedies.Thus the
filing of the cases had no justification.Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy, dignity and
civility.Any undue ill feeling between clients should not influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor toward each other.

Laput vs. Remotigue

FACTS: Petitioner ATTY.CASIANO U. LAPUT charge respondents ATTY. FRANCISCO E.F.REMOTIGUE and ATTY.
FORTUNATO P. PATALINGHUG with unprofessional and unethical conduct in soliciting cases and intriguing against a brother
lawyer. In May 1952, Nieves Rillas Vda.deBarreraretainedpetitionerAtty.Laputtohandleher "TestateEstateofMacario Barrera" case in
CFI-Cebu.By Jan. 1955, petitioner had prepared two pleadings: (1) closing ofadministration proceedings, and (2) rendering of final
accounting and partition of said estate .Mrs. Barrera did not countersign both pleadings. Petitioner found out later that respondent
Atty. Patalinghug had filed on 11 Jan. 1955 a written appearance as the new counsel for Mrs. Barrera. On 5 Feb. 1955, petitioner
voluntarily asked the court to be relieved as Mrs. Barreras counsel. Petitioner allegedthat: (1)respondentsappearances
wereunethicalandimproper; (2)they made Mrs. Barrera sign documents revoking the petitioners Power of Attorney" purportedly to
disauthorize him from further collecting and receiving dividends of the estate from Mr. Macario Barreras corporations, and make him
appear as a dishonest lawyer and no longer trusted byhis client; and (3) Atty. Patalinghugentered his appearance without notice
topetitioner. Respondent Atty. Patalinghug answered that when he entered his appearance on 11
Jan.1955Mrs.Barrerahadalreadylostconfidenceinherlawyer,andhad alreadyfiledapleading discharginghis services.The otherrespondent
Atty. Remotigue answeredthat whenhefiled his appearance on 7 Feb.1955, the petitioner had alreadywithdrawn as counsel. The SC
referred the case to the SolGen for investigation, report and recommendation. The latter recommended the complete exoneration of
respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Remotigue and Atty Patalinghug are guilty of unprofessional and unethical conduct in soliciting
cases.

HELD: No.

The SC found no irregularity in the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug as counsel for Mrs. Barrera; and there was no actual grabbing of a
case from petitioner because Atty. Patalinghug'sprofessionalserviceswerecontractedbythe widow. Besides,the petitioner's voluntary
withdrawal on 5 Feb. 1955, and his filing almost simultaneously of a motion for the payment of his attorney's fees, amounted to
consent to the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug as counsel for the widow. The
SCalsoheldthatrespondentAtty.Remotiguewasalsonotguiltyofunprofessionalconduct inasmuch as he entered his appearance, dated 5
Feb. 1955, only on 7 February 1955,after Mrs. Barrera had dispensed with petitioner's professional services, and after petitioner had
voluntarily withdrawn his appearance. As to Atty. Patalinghugs preparation of documents revoking the petitioners power of attorney,
the SolGen found that the same does not appear to be prompted by malice or intended to hurt petitioner's feelings, but purely to
safeguard the interest of the administratrix. Case dismissed and closed for no sufficient evidence submitted to sustain the charges.

Canon 9 Unauthorized Practice of Law

Spouses Suarez v. Salazar
Aguirre v. Rana, B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 342 (2003) 

FACTS: Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. Respondent, while not yet a lawyer,
appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers of Mandaon,
Masbate and filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of
Votes in some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf
of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan," and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan. Furthermore, respondent also
signed as counsel for Emily Estipona-Hao on 19 May 2001 in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of
Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-
taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against respondent a
Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. On 22 May 2001, respondent was allowed to take the lawyer’s oath but was disallowed
from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent shall be denied Admission to the Bar.

RULING:

Respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings,
without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself "counsel"
knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had no authority to
practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. The right to practice law is not a natural
or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained
and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even
public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the
bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the
person seeking admission had practiced law without a license. True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took
the lawyer’s oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that
respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law.
Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to
be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

Alawi v. Alauya

Facts: Ashary Alauya transacted with Sophia Alawi to avail of a contract for the purchase of one housing unit from EB Villarosa &
Partner Co. Ltd., a real estate and housing company. Shortly thereafter Alauya wrote to the company expressing his intent to render
the contract void ab initio. Several correspondences ensued, all of which were signed by Alauya as ATTY. ASHARY M. ALAUYA.
Alauya is a member of the Sharia Bar and for that matter he is a counselor-at-law. Alauya claims that he does not use the title of
counselor-at-law for fear of being mistaken as a local legislator, i.e. councilor. Hence, he affixed the title of attorney before his name.
Alawi filed a verified complaint against Alauya, alleging, among others, that Alawi usurped the title of an attorney which is reserved
only for the members of the Philippine Bar.

Issue: Whether or not Alauya's membership in the Sharia Bar endows him the title of an attorney

Held: No.

Alauya is hereby reprimanded for usurping the title of an attorney reserved for those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the
study of law and had successfully passed the bar examinations, have been admitted ti the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing.
Persons who passed the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Bar and may only practice law before a Sharia Court ,
Alauya's disinclination to use the title of counselor-at-law does not warrant his use of the title of an attorney.

Exception: Rules of Court, Rule 138-A (Law Student Practice Rule) 

The Supreme Court en banc, on June 25, 2019, adopted and promulgated A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC Rule 138-A Law Student Practice,
otherwise known as the Revised Law Student Practice Rule (Revised Rule). The Revised Rule is an amendment to the existing
provisions of Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court. A salient feature of the Revised Rule is that a law student must now be certified to be
able to engage in the limited practice of law.

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court used its power to adopt and
promulgate rules concerning legal assistance to the underprivileged through the amendment of the provisions of Rule 138-A. This
amendment ensures access to justice of the marginalized sectors, enhances learning opportunities of law students by instilling in them
the value of legal professional social responsibility, and to prepare them for the practice of law. The Supreme Court also addressed the
need to institutionalize clinical legal education program in all law schools in order to enhance, improve, and streamline law student
practice, and regulate their limited practice of law. The Revised Rule is now more comprehensive with 14 sections and shall take effect
at the start of the Academic Year 2020-2021 following its publication in two newspapers of general circulation.

Under Section 3 of the Revised Rule, a law student shall apply for and secure a Level 1 or 2 Certification, as the case may be, in order
to be permitted to engage in any of the activities under the Clinical Legal Education Program of a law school. The basic distinction
between the two levels involve the minimum academic requirement the law student has successfully completed: for Level 1
Certification – first-year law courses, while for Level 2 Certification – third-year law courses.

Section 4 enumerates the practice areas for law student practitioners for both Level 1 and 2 Certifications. Section 5 itemizes the
certification application requirements, which include a duly-accomplished application form under oath in three copies accompanied by
proof of payment of the necessary legal and filing fees. It also distinguishes where each level certification is valid. Level 1 is valid
before all courts, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies within the judicial region where the law school is located, whereas Level 2
is valid before all courts, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.

Once the law student is certified, the certificate number must be used in signing briefs, pleadings, letters, and other similar documents
produced under the direction of a supervising lawyer. (Section 7) The law student shall also take the Law Student Practitioner’s
Oath, a modified lawyer’s oath, under Section 8 before engaging in the limited practice of law.

The duties of law student practitioners, law schools, and supervising lawyers are also enumerated in Sections 6, 9, and 11 respectively.

The Revised Rule also enumerates in Section 13 acts considered as unauthorized practice of lawas well as the corresponding sanctions,
without prejudice to existing laws, rules, regulations, and circulars. It stresses that “unauthorized practice of law shall be a ground for
revocation of the law student practitioner’s certification and/or disqualification for a law student from taking the bar examinations for
a period to be determined by the Supreme Court.”

Rule 9.01 – Not to Delegate Work 

Campaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio
Facts: Complainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a former employee of respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office,
charged the latter with deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice or other gross misconduct in office. Case on deceit and
grossly immoral conduct did not pursue lacking clear and convincing evidence. On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office,
the complainant alleged that the respondent cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband, who is not a member of the
Philippine Bar and two other allegations. The respondent averred that this disbarment complaint was filed by the complainant just to
get even with her.  The complainant later filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint as she is no longer interested in pursuing the
case.  This motion was not acted upon by the IBP and the case was pursued. The IBP found the respondent guilty of assisting in
unauthorized practice of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Cristal-Tenorio violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: YES.

Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9
and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read as follows:

Canon 9 – A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed
by a member of the Bar in good standing.

The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and
policy.  Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character.

Rule 9.02 – Not to Divide Legal Fees  

Halili v. CIR

Facts: The cases involve disputes regarding claims for overtime of more than five hundred bus drivers and conductors of Halili
Transit. Litigation initially commenced with the filing of a complaint for overtime with the CIR. The disputes were eventually settled
when the contending parties reached an Agreement where the Administratrix would transfer to the employees the title to a tract of land
in Caloocan, Rizal. The parcel of land was eventually registered in the name of the Union.

The Union, through Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda, filed an urgent motion with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE)
requesting for authority to sell and dispose of the property. Union President Amado Lopez, in a letter, informed J.C. Espinas and
Associates that the general membership of the said Union had authorized a 20% contingent fee for the law firm based on whatever
amount would be awarded the Union.
Atty. Jose C. Espinas, (the original counsel) established the award of 897 workers' claim. When Atty. Pineda appeared for the Union
in these cases, still an associate of the law firm, his appearance carried the firm name B.C. Pineda and Associates," giving the
impression that he was the principal lawyer in these cases.

Atty. Pineda joined the law firm of Atty. Espinas in 1965 when these cases were pending resolution. He always held office in the
firm's place at Puyat Building, except in 1966 to 1967 when he transferred to the Lakas ng Manggagawa Offices. During this one-year
stint at the latter office, Atty. Pineda continued handling the case with the arrangement that he would report the developments to the
Espinas firm. When he rejoined the law firm in 1968, he continued working on these cases and using the Puyat Building office as his
address in the pleadings.

When Atty. Pineda rejoined the Espinas firm in 1968, he did not reveal to his partners (he was made the most senior partner) that he
had a retainer's contract. He stayed with the law firm until 1974 and still did not divulge the 1967 retainer's contract. Only the officers
of the Union knew of the contract.

The alleged retainer's contract between Atty. Pineda and the Union appears anomalous and even illegal as well as unethical
considering that-
1. The contract was executed only between Atty. Pineda and the officers of the Union chosen by about 125 members only. It was not a
contract with the general membership.
2. The contingent fee of 30% for those who were still working with Halili Transit and the 45% fee for those who were no longer
working worked to the prejudice of the latter group who should and were entitled to more benefits. Thus, too, when the alleged
retainer's contract was executed in 1967, the Halili Transit had already stopped operations in Metro Manila. By then, Atty. Pineda
knew that all the workers would be out of work which would mean that the 45% contingent fee would apply to all.
3. The contract which retroactively took effect on January 1, 1966, was executed when Atty. Espinas was still handling the appeal of
Halili Transit in the main case before the Supreme Court.
4. When Atty. Pineda filed his motion for approval of his attorney's lien with Arbiter Valenzuela on February 8, 1983, he did not
attach the retainer's contract.
5. The retainer's contract was not even notarized.

A prospective buyer, the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. objected in view of PD 1529 which requires no less than an order from
a court of competent jurisdiction as authority to sell property in trust.

Atty. Pineda, without authority from the Supreme Court but relying on the earlier authority given him by the Ministry of Labor, filed
another urgent motion, praying that the Union be authorized to sell the lot. The sale was finally consummated, resulting in the
execution of an escrow agreement.

When Atty. Jose C. Espinas (herein movant and alleged original counsel for the Union) learned of the sale and apportionment of the
proceeds from past Union president Amado Lopez, he requested Labor Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela to allow him to look into the
records of the case. The latter, however, told him that the records of the case were missing. Thereupon, Atty. Espinas requested
Director Pascual Reyes of the NLRC to locate the records.

Issue:
a.Whether or not Atty. Pineda and Arbiter Valenzuela should be held in contempt.

b. Whether or not Atty. Pineda should be disbarred.

Held:

a. YES. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority
and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to
the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice.

In the Slade Perkins case, "the exercise of the power to punish contempt has a twofold aspect, namely (1) the proper punishment of the
guilty party for his disrespect to the court or its order; and (2) to compel his performance of some act or duty required of him by the
court which he refuses to perform. Due to this twofold aspect of the exercise of the power to punish them, contempts are classified as
civil or criminal.
A civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing party therein.
A criminal contempt, is conduct directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a judge, as in unlawfully assailing or
discrediting the authority or dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act.

b. YES. Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds.—A member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corrupt or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any conduct on his part showing his unfitness for the confidence and trust which
characterize the attorney and client relations, and the practice of law before the courts, or showing such a lack of personal honesty or
of good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence.

In the case, the expeditious manner by which Arbiter Valenzuela granted Atty. Pineda's motion for such authority to sell the property
make the entire transaction dubious and irregular.

Significantly Atty. Pineda's act of filing a motion praying for authority to sell was by itself an admission on his part that he did not
possess the authority to sell the property. He could not and did not even wait for valid authority but instead previously obtained the
same from the labor arbiter whom he knew was not empowered to so authorize.

The 45% attorney's lien on the award of those union members who were no longer working and the 30% lien on the benefits of those
who were still working as provided for in the alleged retainer's contract are also very exorbitant and unconscionable.

*Atty. Pineda is found guilty of indirect contempt of court for which he is sentenced to imprisonment and directed to show cause why
he should not be disbarred.

Lijuaico v. Terrado

Facts: An administrative complaint was filed by complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco against respondent Atty. Terrado for gross
misconduct, malpractice and conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him despite
receipt of payment representing attorney's fees. She alleged that she engaged the services of respondent sometime in for P70k to assist
in recovering her deposit with Planters Development Bank, Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of P180k and the release of her
foreclosed house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The property identified as Lot No. 408-C-2 and registered as TCT in the name
of said bank is the subject of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession then pending before the RTC. She also alleged that
respondent failed to appear before the trial court in the hearing for the issuance of the Writ of Possession and did not protect her
interests in the Compromise Agreement which she subsequently entered into to end LRC Case. Respondent denied the accusations
against him. He averred that the P70k he received from complainant was payment for legal services for the recovery of the deposit
with Planters Development Bank and did not include LRC Case No. B-2610 pending before the RTC.

The complaint was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. He then found guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and
9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provide:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 9.02 A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except:

a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latter's death, money shall be paid over a
reasonable period of time to his estate or to the persons specified in the agreement; or

b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or

c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even if the plan is based in whole or in part, on a
profit-sharing arrangement.
In finding the respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Investigating
Commissioner opined that:

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. To be made the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the
charge against him must be established by convincing proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt a case which compels the
exercise by the Supreme Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done as well as of the motivation thereof
must be clearly demonstrated. x x x.

In the instant scenario, despite the strong protestation of respondent that the Php70,000.00 legal fees is purely and solely for the
recovery of the Php180,000.00 savings account of complainant subsequent acts and events say otherwise, to wit:

1.) The Php70,000.00 legal fees for the recovery of a Php180,000.00 savings deposit is too high;
2.) Respondent actively acted as complainant's lawyer to effectuate the compromise agreement.

By openly admitting he divided the Php70,000.00 to other individuals as commission/referral fees respondent violated Rule 9.02,
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal
services with persons not licensed to practice law. Worst, by luring complainant to participate in a compromise agreement with a false
and misleading assurance that complainant can still recover after Three (3) years her foreclosed property respondent violated Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which says a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.[4]
The Investigating Commissioner thus recommended:

WHEREFORE, finding respondent responsible for aforestated violations to protect the public and the legal profession from his kind, it
is recommended that he be suspended for Six (6) months with a stern warning that similar acts in the future will be severely dealt with.
[5]

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that they possessed and continue to possess the legal qualifications for
it. Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity
and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with
the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. [7]

Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct [8] and are mandated to serve their clients
with competence and diligence. [9] They shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to them, and this negligence in connection therewith
shall render them liable.[10]

Respondent's claim that the attorney's fee pertains only to the recovery of complainant's savings deposit from Planter's Development
Bank cannot be sustained. Records show that he acted as complainant's counsel in the drafting of the compromise agreement between
the latter and the bank relative to LRC Case No. B-2610. Respondent admitted that he explained the contents of the agreement to
complainant before the latter affixed her signature. Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner observed that the fee of P70,000.00 for
legal assistance in the recovery of the deposit amounting to P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A lawyer shall charge only fair and
reasonable fees.[11]

Respondent's disregard for his client's interests is evident in the iniquitous stipulations in the compromise agreement where the
complainant conceded the validity of the foreclosure of her property; that the redemption period has already expired thus consolidating
ownership in the bank, and that she releases her claims against it. [12] As found by the Investigating Commissioner, complainant agreed
to these concessions because respondent misled her to believe that she could still redeem the property after three years from the
foreclosure. The duty of a lawyer to safeguard his client's interests commences from his retainer until his discharge from the case or
the final disposition of the subject matter of litigation. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship
and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause. The canons of the legal profession require that once an attorney agrees to
handle a case, he should undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion. [13]

Respondent's admission[14] that he divided the legal fees with two other people as a referral fee does not release him from liability. A
lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases.
[15]

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on the following grounds: 1)
deceit; 2) malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; 5) violation of the lawyer's oath; 6) willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court; and 7) willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party without authority.

In Santos v. Lazaro[16] and Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,[17] we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is a basic
postulate in legal ethics. When a lawyer takes a client's cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his rights.
The failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client and
makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society.

A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his client's case. Once he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the
task with dedication and care. If he fails in this duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. Thus, a lawyer should accept only as much
cases as he can efficiently handle in order to sufficiently protect his clients' interests. It is not enough that a lawyer possesses the
qualification to handle the legal matter; he must also give adequate attention to his legal work. Utmost fidelity is demanded once
counsel agrees to take the cudgels for his client's cause. [18]

In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the practice of law for six months is warranted. In addition, he is directed to
return to complainant the amount he received by way of legal fees pursuant to existing jurisprudence. [19]

Thus, Terrado is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01, 9.02, 18.02 and 20.01 of the CPR. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for six (6) months  and STERNLY WARNED that any similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered
to RETURN, within thirty (30) days from notice, the sum of P70,000.00 to complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco and to submit to this
Court proof of his compliance within three (3) days therefrom.