MODULE 11: PATERNITY AND FILIATION
LEGITIMATED CHILDREN CASE DIGEST
Requisites
1. De Santos v. Hon. Angeles G.R. No. 105619.
December 12, 1995
Facts:
- On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos
married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with
a daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de
Santos.
- After some time, their relationship became
strained to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio
fell in love with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag,
private respondent herein.
- Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first
marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a
Nevada court in 1949, which was not recognized in
the PH.
- Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to
marry private respondent, with whom he had been
cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia.
- March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala.
- Less than a month later, on April 23, 1967,
Antonio and private respondent contracted a
marriage in Tagaytay City celebrated under
Philippine laws.
- On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leaving
properties with an estimated value of
P15,000,000.00.
- On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to
court asking for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor in connection with the
settlement of her late husband's estate.
- She alleged, among other things, that the
decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs,
namely, herself, their ten surviving children, and
petitioner.
- There being no opposition, her petition was
granted.
- After six years of protracted intestate proceedings,
however, petitioner decided to intervene.
- Thus, in a motion she filed sometime in November
1987, she argued inter alia that private
respondent's children were illegitimate.
- Petitioner contends that since only natural
children can be legitimized, the trial court
mistakenly declared as legitimated her half brothers
and sisters.
Issue:
Can natural children by legal fiction be legitimized?
Ruling:
A child conceived or born of a marriage which is
void ab initio or one which is declared a nullity is
illegitimate since there is no marriage to speak of,
but it is the law which accords him the rights of an
acknowledged natural child.
Natural children by legal fiction cannot be
legitimized in this fashion.
Although natural children can be legitimized, and
natural children by legal fiction enjoy the rights of
acknowledged natural children, this does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that natural
children by legal fiction can likewise be legitimized.
As has been pointed out, much more is involved
here than the mere privilege to be legitimized. The
rights of other children, like the petitioner in the
case at bench, may be adversely affected as her
testamentary share may well be reduced in the
event that her ten surviving half siblings should be
placed on par with her, when each of them is
rightfully entitled to only half of her share.
Legitimation takes place when three requisites are
met:
(a) that the child be a natural child;
(b) that he be recognized by both parents
either before or after a valid marriage, and
(c) that there be subsequent valid marriage of
the parents.
A natural child by legal fiction possesses the first
two requisites from inception by virtue of Art. 89,
which places him on the same plane as an
acknowledged natural child.
In that sense, he has an advantage over a natural
child as defined by Art. 269, for the latter would still
need to be recognized by both parents in order to
have the status and rights of an acknowledged
natural child.
Thus, for the purpose of legitimation, the natural
child by legal fiction needs to fulfill only the third
requisite: a valid subsequent marriage between his
parents.
Where the impediment is permanent or perpetual,
such as incest or the fact that one or both of the
parties have been found guilty of killing the spouse
of one them, no legitimation can even take place as
no valid marriage can ever be made between the
parents.
But the bigamous character of a marriage is
terminable by, among other causes, the death of
the first spouse, making a subsequent marriage
valid. And that simply was what happened in the
case at bench.
Petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos is hereby
declared the SOLE LEGITIMATE CHILD of the
decedent Antonio de Santos and, as such, entitled
to all the rights accorded to her by law.

2. Abadilla v. Tagbiliran A.M. No. MTJ-92-716.
October 25, 1995.
Facts:
- Complainant Abadilla, in respect to the charge of
gross immorality on the part of the respondent,
contends that respondent had scandalously and
publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Q.
Baybayan during the existence of his legitimate
marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Adding ignominy
to an ignominious situation, respondent allegedly
shamefacedly contracted marriage with the said
Priscilla Baybayan on May 23, 1986.
The applicable legal provision in the case at bar is
Article 269 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A.
386 as amended) which provides:
Art. 269. Only natural children can be
legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment
to marry each other, are natural.
Legitimation is limited to natural children and
cannot include those born of adulterous relations
(Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855).
The Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which
took effect on August 3, 1988, reiterated the above-
mentioned provision thus:

- Complainant claims that this was a bigamous
union because of the fact that the respondent was
then still very much married to Teresita Banzuela.
- Respondent's wife filed a complaint in the case
entitled, Teresita B . Tabiliran vs. Atty. Jose C.
Tabiliran, Jr., 115 SCRA 451.
- Respondent stood charged therein for abandoning
the family home and living with a certain Leonora
Pillarion with whom he had a son.
- In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct,
complainant claims that respondent caused to be
registered as "legitimate," his three illegitimate
children with Priscilla Baybayan by falsely
executing separate affidavits stating that the
delayed registration was due to inadvertence,
excusable negligence or oversight, when in truth
and in fact, respondent knew that these children
cannot be legally registered as legitimate.
Issue:
Whether the children in the subsequent marriage
with Priscilla can be legitimated or in any way be
considered legitimate.
Art. 177. Only children conceived and born
outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time
of the conception of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other may be legitimated.
The reasons for this limitation are given as
follows:
1) The rationale of legitimation would be
destroyed;
2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in
terms of successional rights;
3) There will be the problem of public scandal,
unless social mores change;
4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of
legitimation to adulterous children as it will
destroy the sanctity of marriage;
5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the
parents marry many years after the birth of the
child. (The Family Code, p. 252, Alicia V.
Sempio Diy).
It is clear, therefore, that no legal provision,
whether old or new, can give refuge to the deceitful
actuations of the respondent.

Ruling:

An examination of the birth certificates of

respondent's three illegitimate children with Priscilla
Baybayan clearly indicate that these children are
his legitimate issues.

It was respondent who caused the entry therein. It

is important to note that these children, namely,
Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed
Tabiliran, were born in the year 1970, 1971, and
1975, respectively, and prior to the marriage of
respondent to Priscilla, which was in 1986.

As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know

that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla,
these three children cannot be legitimated nor in
any way be considered legitimate since at the time
they were born, there was an existing valid
marriage between respondent and his first wife,
Teresita B. Tabiliran.

3. BBB v. AAA G.R. No. 193225. February 9,
2015
Facts:
- [AAA] was raising her first child borne from a
previous relationship, a boy named [CCC], with the
help of her parents.
- During the relationship with [BBB], [AAA] bore two
more children namely, [DDD] (born on December
11, 1997) and [EEE] (born on October 19, 2000).
- To legalize their relationship, [BBB] and [AAA]
married in civil rights on October 10, 2002 and
thereafter, the birth certificates of the children,
including [CCC's], was amended to change their
civil status to legitimated by virtue of the said
marriage.
- Citing the instances as constituting economic and
psychological abuse, [AAA] filed an application for
the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order with
a Notwithstanding the above, there is no absolute
request to make the same permanent after due
hearing, before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City which was granted.
- BBB appealed on the decision made by RTC,
specifically:
(a) issuance of the PPO against him,
(b) award to AAA of the sole custody over their
children,
(c) directives for him to pay attorney's fees and
costs of litigation and to post an excessive
amount of bond, and
(d) declaration that he had an abusive character
lack factual bases.
Issue:
Whether BBB should support CCC, taking into the
consideration that the legitimation of CCC was after
the celebration of BBB and AAA's marriage.
Ruling:
Article 177 of the Family Code provides that “only
children conceived and born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other may be legitimated."
Article 178 states that "legitimation shall take place
by a subsequent valid marriage between parents."
In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the
fact that BBB is not CCC's biological father.
Such being the case, it was improper to have CCC
legitimated after the celebration of BBB and AAA's
marriage.
Clearly then, the legal process of legitimation was
trifled with. BBB voluntarily but falsely
acknowledged CCC as his son.
Article 1431 of the New Civil Code pertinently
provides:
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or
representation is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying
thereon
At least for the purpose of resolving the instant
petition, the principle of estoppel finds application
and it now bars BBB from making an assertion
contrary to his previous representations.
He should not be allowed to evade a responsibility
arising from his own misrepresentations. He is
bound by the effects of the legitimation process.
CCC remains to be BBB's son, and pursuant to
Article 179 of the Family Code, the former is
entitled to the same rights as those of a legitimate
child, including the receipt of his father's support.
preclusion for BBB from raising before the proper
court the issue of CCC's status and filiation.
However, BBB cannot do the same in the instant
petition before this Court now. In Tison v. CA, 33
the Court held that "the civil status [of a child]
cannot be attacked collaterally."
The child's legitimacy "cannot be contested by way
of defense or as a collateral issue in another action
for a different purpose."
The instant petition sprang out of AAA's application
for a PPO before the RTC.
Hence, BBB's claim that CCC is not his biological
son is a collateral issue, which this Court has no
authority to resolve now.
 enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and
irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.

Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title

to the enforcement of a demand, but also an
exemption from new obligations created after the
right has vested.

Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private

respondent had the right to file a petition for
MODULE 12: ADOPTION adoption by herself, without joining her husband
Consent to Adoption therein.

1. Republic v. CA G.R. No. 92326. January 24,
1992
Facts:
- On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles
filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six (6)
years old and who had been living with her family
since he was four (4) months old.
- RTC favored the petition.
- The petitioner OSG appealed to CA that the
Family Code cannot be applied retroactively to the
petition for adoption filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles and
the petition for adoption must have not been
granted.
When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was
exercising her explicit and unconditional right under
said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file
such petition alone and to have the same proceed
to final
adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at
the time, was already vested and cannot be
prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new
law.
Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one
of the petitioners in the petition for adoption filed by
his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to the
petition as Annex "B" and expressly made an
integral part thereof, shows that he himself actually
joined his wife in adopting the child.

Issue: The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent

Whether the adopter husband and wife must jointly
file for petition for adoption.
Ruling:
The petition for adoption was filed by private
respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2,
1988, when the law applicable was Presidential
Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare
Code.
confirmatory testimony in open court, are sufficient
to make him a co-petitioner. Under the
circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his
foreign residence, he must have yielded to the legal
advice that an affidavit of consent on his part
sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is
evident from the text of his affidavit.

Under said code, a petition for adoption may be

filed by either of the spouses or by both of them.

However, after the trial court rendered its decision

and while the case was pending on appeal in the
Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the
Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under
the said new law, joint adoption by husband and
wife is mandatory.

Article 246 of the Family Code provides for

retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions
thereof, subject to the qualification that such
retrospective application will not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws.

A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity

and extent does not depend upon events foreign to
the will of the holder.

The term expresses the concept of present fixed

interest which in right reason and natural justice
should be protected against arbitrary State action,
or an innately just and imperative right which

2. Cang v. CA & Sps. Clavano G.R. No. 105308.
September 25, 1998
Facts:
- Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano
who were married on January 27, 1973, begot
three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973;
Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph
Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.
- During the early years of their marriage, the Cang
couple's relationship was undisturbed. Not long
thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her
husband's alleged extramarital affair with Wilma
Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.
- Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit
liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal
separation with alimony pendente lite which
rendered a decision approving the joint
manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that
they agreed to "live separately and apart or from
bed and board."
- Petitioner Herbert went to US and secured a
divorce decree from wife Anna Marie. He was also
granted sole custody of the three minor children to
Anna Marie, reserving "rights of visitation at all
reasonable times and places" to petitioner.
- Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private
respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara
Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-
in-law of Anna Marie, filed for the adoption of the
three minor Cang children.
- Adoptee Ketih, 14 years old, signifying consent of
adoption by signing on the petition.
- Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent
alleging that her husband had "evaded his legal
obligation to support" his children; that her brothers
and sisters including Ronald V. Clavano, had been
helping her in taking care of the children;
- Upon learning of the petition for adoption,
petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines
and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that,
although private respondents Ronald and Maria
Clara Clavano were financially capable of
supporting the children while
his finances were "too meager" compared to theirs,
he could not "in conscience, allow anybody to strip
him of his parental authority over his beloved
children."
- RTC granted the petition for adoption in favor of
the Clavano spouses.
- Petitioner Herbert appealed on the decision of
RTC, alleging that adoption was fatally defective
and tailored to divest him of parental authority
because: (a) he did not have a written consent to
the adoption; (b) he never abandoned his children;
(c) Keith and Charmaine did not properly give their
written consent: and
(d) the petitioners for adoption did not present as
witness the representative of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development who made the
case study report required by law.
- CA affirmed the decree of adoption based on
Article 188 of the Family Code which requires the
written consent of the natural parents of the child to
be adopted. It has been held however that the
consent of the parent who has abandoned the child
is not necessary.
Issue:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the
written consent of a natural parent on the ground
that the latter has abandoned them?
Ruling:
During the pendency of the petition for adoption or
on August 3, 1988, the Family Code which
amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took
effect. Article 256 of the Family Code provides for
its retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws."
Notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the
written consent of the natural parent to the adoption
has remained a requisite for its validity. Notably,
such requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of
the Rules of Court. As clearly inferred from the
foregoing
provisions of law, the written consent of the natural
parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree
of adoption.
Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent
can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned
the child or that such parent is "insane or
hopelessly intemperate." The court may acquire
jurisdiction over the case even without the written
consent of the parents or one of the parents
provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts
sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance
therewith.
This is in consonance with the liberality with which
this Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption.
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for
adoption, even absent the written consent of
petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with
jurisdiction since abandonment of the child by his
natural parents is one of the circumstances under
which our statutes and jurisprudence dispense with
the requirement of written consent to the adoption
of their minor children.

As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of

law, the written consent of the natural parent is
indispensable for the validity of the decree of
adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written
consent can be dispensed with if the parent has
abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane
or hopelessly intemperate."

In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of

the natural mother was attached to the petition for
adoption. Petitioner's consent, as the natural father
is lacking.
Nonetheless, the petition sufficiently alleged the
fact of abandonment of the minors for adoption by
the natural father

In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's

conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to
forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims over his children as to constitute
abandonment. Physical estrangement alone,
without financial and
moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment

Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all

grown up, Keith and Charmaine are now of legal
age while Joseph Anthony is approaching eighteen,
the age of majority. For sure, they shall be
endowed with the discretion to lead lives
independent of their parents.

This is not to state that this case has been

rendered moot and academic, for their welfare and
best interests regarding their adoption, must be
determined as of the time that the petition for
adoption was filed.

Said petition must be denied as it was filed without

the required consent of their father who, by law and
under the facts of the case at bar, has not
abandoned them.

3. Landingin v. Republic G.R. No. 164948. June
27, 2006
Facts:
- On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a
citizen of the United States of America (USA), of
Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA,
filed a petition 3 for the adoption of minors Elaine
Dizon Ramos who was born on August 31, 1986;
Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on September
7, 1987; and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born
on
August 5, 1989.
- The minors are the natural children of Manuel
Ramos, petitioner's brother, and Amelia Ramos.
- Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition
that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990, the
children were left to their paternal grandmother,
Maria Taruc Ramos;
- Their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-
married there and now has two children by her
second marriage and no longer communicated with
her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws
from the time she left up to the institution of the
adoption;
- The minors are being financially supported by the
petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad;
- As Maria passed away on November 23, 2000,
petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors
have given their written consent 8 to the adoption;
- RTC granted the petition for adoption.
- OSG appealed to CA and reversed the decision of
court a quo that petitioner failed to adduce in
evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos,
the children's natural mother. Moreover, the
affidavit of consent of the petitioner's children could
not also be admitted in evidence as the same was
executed in Guam, USA and was not authenticated
or acknowledged before a Philippine consular
office, and although petitioner has a job, she was
not stable enough to support the children.
Issue:
1. Whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the
minors without the written consent of their biological
mother, Amelia Ramos;
2. Whether or not the affidavit of consent
purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopter's
children sufficiently complies with the law; and
3. Whether or not petitioner is financially capable
of supporting the adoptees.
Ruling:
1. The general requirement of consent and notice
to the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the
child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents
is indispensable for the validity of a decree of
adoption.
Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child
requires that his consent must be obtained before
his parental rights and duties may.
2. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provides that the Court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. The purpose
for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the
duty of the Court to rest its findings of fact and its
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the parties.
Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence
for the purpose or purposes for which such
document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of
paper barren of probative weight.
Mere identification of documents and the markings
thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary
weight on documents unless formally offered.
As the alleged written consent of petitioner's
legitimate children did not comply with the afore-
cited law, the same can at best be treated by the
Rules as a private document whose authenticity
must be proved either by anyone who saw the
document executed or written; or by evidence of
the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the makers.
3. No. It is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be
able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of
rearing the three children in the US. She only has a
part-time job, and she is rather of age. While
petitioner claims that she has the financial support
and backing of her children and siblings, the OSG
is correct in stating that the ability to support the
adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption
only creates a legal relation between the former
and the latter.
Moreover, the records do not prove nor support
petitioner's allegation that her siblings and her
children are financially able and that they are willing
to support the minors herein. The Court, therefore,
again sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.
While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only
the best of intentions for her nieces and nephew,
there are legal infirmities that militate against
reversing the ruling of the CA.
be terminated and reestablished in adoptive
parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the
written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
1. Sayson v. CA G.R. Nos. 89224-25. January 23,
1992
Facts:
- Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children,
namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and
Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and
Rafaela on May 15, 1976.
- Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died
on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later,
on March 26, 1981.
-Their properties were left in the possession of
Delia,
Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who
claim to be their children.
- On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista,
Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and
accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and
Isabel Sayson.
- The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and
Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to
the disputed estate as the decedent's lawful
descendants.
- On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel
filed their own complaint, this time for the
accounting and partition of the intestate estate of
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's
four surviving children.
- The complainants asserted the defense they
raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and
Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel
was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel.
- As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's
share in his parents' estate by right of
representation.
Issue:
What is the status of the private respondents and
their capacity to inherit from their alleged parents
and grandparents?
Ruling:
We hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and
Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the
exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the
deceased couple, conformably to the following
Article 979 of the Civil Code:
ARTICLE 979. Legitimate children and their
descendants succeed the parents and other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or
age, and even if they should come from
different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of
the adopting parents in the same manner as a
legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a
person's love descends first to his children and
grandchildren before it ascends to his parents
and thereafter spreads among his collateral
relatives. It is also supposed that one of his
purposes in acquiring properties is to leave
them eventually to his children as a token of
his love for them and as a provision for their
continued care even after he is gone from this
earth.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter
of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno
and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her
deceased father in the distribution of the intestate
estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, she
is entitled to the share her father would have
directly inherited had he survived, which shall be
equal to the shares of her grandparents' other
children.
But a different conclusion must be reached in the
case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
grandparents were total strangers.
While it is true that the adopted child shall be
deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same
right as the latter, these rights do not include the
right of representation. The relationship created by
the adoption is between only the adopting parents
and the adopted child and does not extend to the
blood relatives of either party.
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia
and Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribel
as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and
Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are
under no obligation to share the estate of their
parents with the
petitioners.

2. Acain v. IAC G.R. No. 72706. October 27, 1987
Facts:
- On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain
filed in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City
Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of
the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the
same petitioner of letters testamentary on the
premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in
which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores
and Jose and his
sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were
instituted as heirs.
- After the petition was set for hearing in the lower
court on June 25, 1984 the oppositors (respondents
herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted
daughter of the deceased and the latter's widow
Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain) filed a motion to
dismiss on the following grounds:
(1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute
these proceedings;
(2) he is merely a universal heir and
(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been
preterited.
- Motion was denied by trial judge.
Issue:
Whether the respondents were preterited.
Ruling:
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's
will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17
SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals,
114 SCRA 478 [1982]).
Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of
the Civil Code may not apply as she does not
ascend or descend from the testator, although she
is a compulsory heir.
Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she
is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the
direct line. (Art. 854, Civil Code)
However, the same thing cannot be said of the
other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose
legal adoption by the testator has not been
questioned by petitioner (Memorandum for the
Petitioner, pp. 8-9).
Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to
the adopted person the same rights and duties as if
he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes
the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter.
It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and
preterited in the will of the testator and that both
adopted child and the widow were deprived of at
least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that
they were not expressly disinherited.
Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the
legally adopted child.
The universal institution of petitioner together with
his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of
the testator results in totally abrogating the will
because the nullification of such institution of
universal heirs - without any other testamentary
disposition in the will - amounts to a declaration that
nothing at all was written.
Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of
the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential
interpretation (Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra.
No legacies nor devises having been provided in
the will the whole property of the deceased has
been left by universal title to petitioner and his
brothers and sisters.
The effect of annulling the institution of heirs will be,
necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v.
Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper
legacies and devises must, as already stated
above, be respected.

3. Tamagro v. CA, G.R. No. 85044. June 3, 1992.
Facts:
- On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a
minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in
her death.
- Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was
filed
by Petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting
parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia
Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents, against
respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc,
Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living
at the time of the tragic incident.
- Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the
spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a
petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc.
- Petition for adoption was granted on 18 November
1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed
Jennifer.
- Respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural
parents, claimed that not they, but rather the
adopting parents, were indispensable parties to the
action since parental authority had shifted to the
adopting parents from the moment the successful
petition for adoption was filed.
- Petitioners in their Reply contended that since
Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his
natural parents, parental authority had not ceased
nor been relinquished by the mere filing and
granting of a petition for adoption.
- RTC dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that
respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed
were not indispensable parties to the action.
- CA dismissed petitioners’ appeal as they had lost
their right to appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as
parental authority is concerned, may be given
retroactive effect so as to make the adopting
parents the indispensable parties in a damage case
filed against their adopted child, for acts committed
by the latter when actual custody was yet lodged
with the biological parents.
Ruling:
This principle of parental liability is a species of
what is frequently designated as vicarious liability,
or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under
Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only
liable for torts committed by himself, but also for
torts
committed by others with whom he has a certain
relationship and for whom he is responsible.
Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical
consequence of the duties and responsibilities of
parents — their parental authority — which includes
the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the
child.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by
Adelberto with an air rifle occurred when parental
authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc
spouses, the natural parents of the minor
Adelberto.
It would thus follow that the natural parents who
had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are
the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly
maintain that because a decree of adoption was
issued by the adoption court in favor of the
Rapisura spouses, parental authority was vested in
the latter as adopting parents as of the time of the
filing the
petition for adoption that is, before Adelberto had
shot Jennifer with an air rifle.
The Bundoc spouses contend that they were
therefore free of any parental responsibility for
Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct.
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 39 of
the Child and Youth Welfare Code which states
that the adoption shall Dissolve the authority vested
in the natural parents, except where the adopter is
the spouse of the surviving natural parent
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under
the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability for the
torts of a minor child is the relationship existing
between the parents and the minor child living with
them and over whom, the law presumes, the
parents exercise supervision and control.

We do not believe that parental authority is properly
regarded as having been retroactively transferred
to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura
spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting
happened. We do not consider that retroactive
effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as
to impose a liability upon the adopting parents
accruing at a time
when the adopting parents had no actual or
physical custody over the adopted child.
4. In The Matter Of The Adoption Of Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia, G.R. No. 148311. March 31,
2005
Facts:
- On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig ,
herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia.
- He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie
was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is
Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been
using her mother's middle name and surname; and
that he is now a widower and qualified to be her
adopting parent.
- He prayed that Stephanie's middle name Astorga
be changed to "Garcia," her mother's surname, and
that her surname “Garcia” be changed to
"Catindig," his surname.
- RTC granted the adoption but the name reflected
is STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
- Petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be
allowed to use the surname of her natural mother
(GARCIA) as her middle name.
- RTC denied the petition holding that there is no
law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to
use the surname of his biological mother as his
middle name.
Issue:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her
natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name?
Ruling:
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is
deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for
all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 21
of the Family Code and Section 17 Article V of RA
8552.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it
follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to
bear the surname of her father and her mother, as
discussed above.
This is consistent with the intention of the members
of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as
earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that
the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties,
Stephanie's continued use of her mother's surname
(Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her
maternal lineage.
It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family
Code and Section 18 Article V of RA 8552 (law on
adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an
intestate heir of his/her biological parent.
Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her
hereditary rights from her natural mother in the
future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her
mother are living together in the house built by
petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose,
Baliuag, Bulacan.
Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is
closely attached to both her mother and father. She
calls them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed, they are
one normal happy family.
Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mother's
surname as her middle name will not only sustain
her
continued loving relationship with her mother but
will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.

5. In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P.
Lim, G.R. Nos. 168992-93. May 21, 2009
Facts:
- Minor children, whose parents were unknown,
were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban.
- Petitioner and Lim registered the children to make
it appear that they were the children's parents. The
children were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and
Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael).
- Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought
to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15
March 1977. Michael was 11 days old when
Ayuban brought him to petitioner's clinic. His date
of birth is 1 August 1983.
- Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died.
On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel
Olario (Olario), an American citizen
- Petitioner decided to adopt the children by
availing of the amnesty given under Republic Act
No. 8552 (RA 8552) to those individuals who
simulated the birth of a child.
- Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate
petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael
before the trial court.
- At the time of the filing of the petitions for
adoption,
Michelle was 25 years old and already married,
while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
- Michelle and her husband gave their consent to
the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of
Consent.
- Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as
shown in his Affidavit of Consent.
- Petitioner's husband Olario likewise executed an
Affidavit of Consent for the adoption of Michelle and
Michael.
- RTC rendered judgment dismissing the petitions.
The trial court ruled that since petitioner had
remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition
jointly with her new husband.
- The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7
(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the
Family Code.
- Petitioner’s argument that mere consent of her
husband would suffice was untenable because,
under the law, there are additional requirements,
such as residency and certification of his
qualification, which the husband, who was not even
made a party in this case, must comply.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can
singly adopt.
Ruling:
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, petitioner had already
remarried.
She filed the petitions by herself, without being
joined by her husband Olario. We have no other
recourse but to affirm the trial court's decision
denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex.
The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552
reads:
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except
in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own
illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however,
That the other spouse has signified his/her
consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from
each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one
spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of
the other, joint parental authority shall be
exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)

The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted
provision means that joint adoption by the husband
and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority over the
child which is the ideal situation.
As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of
a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the
spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures
harmony between the spouses.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three
exceptions enumerated in Section 7.
First, the children to be adopted are not the
legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband
Olario.
Second, the children are not the illegitimate
children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and
Olario are not legally separated from each other.
These requirements on residency and certification
of the alien's qualification to adopt cannot likewise
be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or
adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree
of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario.
Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of
petitioner.
Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 (RA 8043)
Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Toledano,
G.R. No. 94147. June 8, 1994
Facts:
- On February 21, 1990, private respondents
spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor,
Solomon
Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of private
respondent Evelyn A. Clouse.
- The principal evidence disclose that private
respondent Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen
of the United States of America. He married Evelyn,
a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City.
- On August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a naturalized
citizen of the United States of America in Guam.
They are physically, mentally, morally, and
financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve
(12) year old minor.
- Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989
up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and
has been under the care and custody of private
respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the
adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow,
likewise
consented to the adoption due to poverty and
inability to support and educate her son.
- RTC granted the petition for adoption.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners are qualified to adopt under
Philippines Law.
Ruling:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family
Code of the Philippines", private respondents
spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting
Solomon Joseph Alcala.
There can be no question that private respondent
Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon
Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases
in the aforequoted provision.
In the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen
but a natural born citizen of the United States of
America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph
Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor
the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place,
when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly
filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala
on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A.
Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her
Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a
citizen of the United States in 1988.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other
hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph
3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209.
She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to
adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the
petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor
alone without violating Article 185 which mandates
a joint adoption by the husband and wife.
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband
and wife, a condition that must be read along
together with Article 184