Banco Español vs.

Palanca, 37 Phil 921

Facts:
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng secured a debt with various parcels of real property in Manila. The debt　amounted
to P218,294.10 at 8% per annum, payable quarterly. Property's estimated value was about　P292,558. After the
instrument's execution, mortgagor returned to Amoy, China and died on January 29,　1810.　The foreclosure
proceeding needed publication pursuant to section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure.　Publication was made in a
newspaper of Manila and an order of the court deposited in the post office in　a stamped envelope of the summons
and complaint directed to defendant.　The clerk, however, failed to comply with the mail publication requirement.
The bank was able to foreclose the property without the defendant.
After seven years, the administrator of the estate, Vicente Palanca, appeared and requested the court　to set aside
the order of default of July 2, 1908, and the judgment rendered upon July 3, 1908, and to　vacate all the proceedings
subsequent thereto. The basis of this application, as set forth in the motion　itself, was that the order of default and
the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court　had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or
over the subject of the action.　His appeal was denied by the lower court, hence the appeal.
His appeal was denied by the lower court, hence the appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the procedural aspect of the right to due process has been prejudiced.

Held:
1. There must be a COURT or TRIBUNAL clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the　matter before it;
2. JURISDICTION must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property　which is the
subject of the proceeding.
3. The defendant must be given the OPPORTUNITY to be heard; and
4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful HEARING.
The essentials of procedural fairness inn judicial proceedings are:

Conclusions stated by the court indicated that the judgment appealed from is without error, and the　same is
accordingly affirmed.

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SEN. JINGGOY ESTRADA v. OMBUDSMAN G.R. Nos. 212140-41 January 21, 2015

FACTS:
          
Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada two (2) criminal complaints
for plunder, among others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-
affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014.

On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other
Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the “Request”). Sen. Estrada’s request was made
“[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not
have been furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’
(Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).”
The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is not the subject of the present certiorari case.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner Estrada was denied due process of law

HELD:

NO. The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due process.

First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents.

The SC cited in its decision Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as Rule II
of Administrative Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, for ready reference.

Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents violates his
constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a
compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent with
the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen.
Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to
furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order
to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman when it states, "[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant and his
witnesses] have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits
and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his
counter-affidavits x x x." At this point, there is still no counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what
Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-respondents.
Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of the complainant. No
grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order
which denied Sen. Estrada’s Request.

Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of
probable cause, and “probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary
manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the
full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.”
Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law.

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence
now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief” as to the fact
of the commission of a crime and the respondent’s probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as
may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty

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thereof. We are in accord with the state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence
of petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence presented
and the facts obtaining therein.

Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct
of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the accused, we find
no compelling justification for a strict application of the evidentiary rules.

Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not akin to those in administrative proceedings as laid
down in the landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay. The quantum of evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is
greater than the evidence needed in a preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or to establish the
existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial
evidence,” while the establishment of probable cause needs “only more than ‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence
which would justify . . . conviction’.” In the United States, from where we borrowed the concept of probable cause, the
prevailing definition of probable cause is this:

In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not
technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not
legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such
investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However, in
administrative cases, where rights and obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence”
which cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the same as substantial
evidence because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis can include hearsay
evidence. To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in preliminary investigations will change the
quantum of evidence required in determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood or probability of guilt to
substantial evidence of guilt.

Actually, the Ombudsman went beyond legal duty and even furnished Sen. Estrada with copies of the counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents whom he specifically named, as well as the counter-affidavits of some of other co-
respondents. In the 4 June 2014 Joint Order, the Ombudsman even held in abeyance the disposition of the motions
for reconsideration because the Ombudsman granted Sen. Estrada five days from receipt of the 7 May 2014 Joint
Order to formally respond to the claims made by his co-respondents. The Ombudsman faithfully complied with the
existing Rules on preliminary investigation and even accommodated Sen. Estrada beyond what the Rules required.
Thus, the Ombudsman could not be faulted with grave abuse of discretion. Since this is a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65, the Petition fails in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.

The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are not applicable to
preliminary investigations which are creations of statutory law giving rise to mere statutory rights. A law can abolish
preliminary investigations without running afoul of the constitutional requirements of due process as prescribed in Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The present procedures for preliminary investigations do not comply and were never
intended to comply, with Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. Preliminary investigations do not adjudicate with finality
rights and obligations of parties, while administrative investigations governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, so
adjudicate. Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, requires substantial evidence for a decision against the respondent in
the administrative case.In preliminary investigations, only likelihood or probability of guilt is required. To apply Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, to preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence required to establish
probable cause. The respondent in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, has the right
to an actual hearing and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. In preliminary investigations, the respondent
has no such rights.

Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, the hearing officer must be impartial
and cannot be the fact-finder, investigator, and hearing officer at the same time. In preliminary investigations, the
same public officer may be the investigator and hearing officer at the same time, or the fact-finder, investigator and
hearing officer may be under the control and supervision of the same public officer, like the Ombudsman or Secretary
of Justice. This explains why Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, does not apply to preliminary investigations. To now
declare that the guidelines in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are fundamental and essential requirements in
preliminary investigations will render all past and present preliminary investigations invalid for violation of
constitutional due process. This will mean remanding for reinvestigation all criminal cases now pending in all courts
throughout the country. No preliminary investigation can proceed until a new law designates a public officer, outside

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of the prosecution service, to determine probable cause. Moreover, those serving sentences by final judgment would
have to be released from prison because their conviction violated constitutional due process.

Thus, petition dismissed for being premature and it constitutes forum shopping.

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OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, – versus – ANTONIO T. REYES, Respondent. G.R. No. 170512

DOCTRINE: 

In reviewing administrative decisions, it is beyond the province of the Court to weigh the conflicting evidence,
determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with
respect to the sufficiency of evidence. However, while it is not the function of the Court to analyze and weigh the
parties’ evidence all over again, an exception thereto lies as when there is serious ground to believe that a possible
miscarriage of justice would thereby result.

Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles:  (1) the
respondents right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit supporting evidence, must
be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to
support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at
the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the
tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have
simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents
would know the reasons for it and the various issues involved.

FACTS: 

In 2001, Acero, someone from the Commission on Audit, executed an affidavit against Reyes and Pealoza, who were
the Transportation Regulation Officer II/Acting Officer-in-Charge and Clerk III, respectively, of the Land
Transportation Office (LTO) District Office in Mambajao, Camiguin. 

He stated that he was made to take an examination for drivers license applicants by Pealoza, which he allegedly
failed, so he was asked (by Pealoza and Reyes) if he would be willing to pay an additional assessment in return for
the reconsideration of his application. He agreed thereto and as a result, he received his temporary license for 60
days. 

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The said affidavit was originally filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Camiguin, then it was referred to
the Office of the Ombudsman in Mindanao. Reyes and Pealoza were required to submit their counter-affidavits.

In Pealoza’s counter-affidavit, he denied telling Acero that if the latter were willing to pay additional costs, Reyes and
Pealoza would reconsider his application. Instead, he claimed that any additional costs required were due to the
initiative of Reyes, who had long been accustomed to collecting additional costs and benefitting from illegal
transactions.

Subsequently, in an Order, the Office of the Ombudsman directed the parties to appear before its office for a
preliminary conference. The parties were to consider, among others, the need for a formal investigation or whether
the parties were willing to submit their case for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record and such other
evidence as they will present at the conference. 

As none of the parties appeared during the preliminary conference, they were considered to have waived their right to
a preliminary conference, and the case was deemed submitted for decision. 

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The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao later rendered a Decision adjudging Reyes guilty of grave misconduct and
finding Pealoza guilty of simple misconduct. 

ISSUE: Whether the charge of grave misconduct against Reyes was sufficiently proven by substantial evidence

RULING: No.

Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. To
constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of official
functions and duties of a public officer.

In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law or flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest. Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists
in the act of an official who unlawfully or wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself,
contrary to the rights of others.

Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 mandates that the findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are
conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial
evidence is necessary to establish the case for or against a party. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla
of evidence. It is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.

In reviewing administrative decisions, it is beyond the province of the Court to weigh the conflicting evidence,
determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with
respect to the sufficiency of evidence. However, while it is not the function of the Court to analyze and weigh the
parties’ evidence all over again, an exception thereto lies as when there is serious ground to believe that a possible
miscarriage of justice would thereby result.

Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due
process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend
himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so
charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of
due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or
an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles:  (1) the
respondents right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit supporting evidence, must
be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to
support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at
the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the
tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have
simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents
would know the reasons for it and the various issues involved.

In the present case, the fifth requirement stated above was not complied with. Reyes was not properly apprised of the
evidence offered against him, which were eventually made the bases of petitioners decision that found him guilty of
grave misconduct.

To recall, after the affidavit of Acero was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, the respondents
therein, i.e., Reyes and Pealoza, were ordered to submit their counter-affidavits in order to discuss the charges
lodged against them. While Pealoza acknowledged in his counter-affidavit his participation in the illicit transaction

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complained of, he pointed to Reyes as the main culprit. Pealoza thereafter submitted the affidavits of Amper and
Valdehueza as witnesses who would substantiate his accusations. However, the records reveal that only the Office of
the Ombudsman-Mindanao and Acero were furnished copies of the said affidavits. Thus, Reyes was able to respond
only to the affidavit of Acero. It would appear that Reyes had no idea that Pealoza, a co-respondent in the
administrative case, would point an accusing finger at him and even supply the inculpatory evidence to prove his
guilt. The said affidavits were made known to Reyes only after the rendition of the petitioners Decision dated
September 24, 2001.

The fact that Reyes was able to assail the adverse decision of the petitioner via a Motion for Reconsideration Cum
Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Conference did not cure the violation of his right to due process in this case.
Reyes filed the said motion precisely to raise the issue of the violation of his right to due process. There is nothing on
record to show that Reyes was furnished with, or had otherwise received, a copy of the affidavits of Pealoza, Amper
and Valdehueza, whether before or after the Decision dated September 24, 2001 was issued. Thus, it cannot be said
that Reyes had a fair opportunity to squarely and intelligently answer the accusations therein or to offer any rebuttal
evidence thereto.

7|Page
Reyes v. Ombudsman (2016)

FACTS:
1. Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the anomalous Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam.

2. Involves the illegal utilization and pillaging of public funds sourced from the PDAF of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
(Senator Enrile) for the years 2004 to 2010.

3. the Ombudsman issued the assailed 144-page Joint Resolution dated March 28, 2014 finding probable cause
against; Reyes, Janet Napoles, and De Asis of one (1) count of Plunder, and against Reyes, Janet Napoles, De Asis,
and the Napoles siblings for fifteen (15) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Accordingly, separate motions
for reconsideration were timely filed by Reyes, Janet Napoles, the Napoles siblings,and De Asis.

4. On June 4, 2014, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order


denying the motions for reconsideration filed by herein petitioners. This led to the filing of the petitions before this
Court, commonly assailing the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and the June 4, 2014 Joint Order of the Ombudsman.

5. Consequently, a total of sixteen (16) Informations were filed by the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan,
charging; Reyes, Janet Napoles, and De Asis with one (1) count of Plunder, and Reyes, Janet Napoles, the Napoles
siblings, and De Asis with fifteen (15) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019

6. To forestall the service of a warrant of arrest against her, on June 13, 2014, Reyes filed an Urgent Motion to
Suspend Proceedings before the Sandiganbayan until after this Court shall have resolved her application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction

7. On July 3, 2014, resolving Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, "along with several otherrelated cases," the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution 117 finding probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against "all the
accused," opining therein that the filing of a motion for judicial determination of probable cause was a mere
superfluity given that it was its bounden duty to personally evaluate the resolution of the Ombudsman and the
supporting evidence before it determines the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused.

8. On July 4, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued another Resolution denying Reyes's Motion to Suspend Proceedings
for lack of merit. In view of the foregoing developments, Reyes voluntarily surrendered to the Sandiganbayan on even
date, and accordingly, underwent the required booking procedure for her arrest and detention. This prompted Reyes
to file the petition assailing the July 3, 2014 and July 4, 2014 of the Sandiganbayan.

9. On September 29, 2014, the Special Third Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the
existence of probable cause against them, and several others, and consequently, setting their arraignment.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the Ombudsman and/or the Sandiganbayan committed any grave abuse of discretion in
rendering the assailed resolutions ultimately finding probable cause against petitioners for the charges
against them.

RULING:
1. The Petitions Assailing the Resolution and Order of the Ombudsman.
a. The Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding probable cause to indict Reyes of one (1) count of
Plunder and fifteen (15) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
b. First, records reveal that there is substantial basis to believe that Reyes, as Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile, dealt
with the parties involved; signed documents necessary for the immediate and timely implementation of the Senator's
PDAF-funded projects that, however, turned out to be "ghost projects"; and repeatedly received "rebates,"
"commissions," or "kickbacks" for herself and for Senator Enrile representing portions of the latter's PDAF. As
correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, testimonial and documentary evidence are substantial enough to
reasonably conclude that Reyes had, in all probability, participated in the PDAF scam and, hence, must stand trial
therefore.

c. Reyes erroneously posits that under Section 4, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,
she is entitled to copies of Tuason's affidavit, as well as the transcripts of the clarificatory hearings conducted by the

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Ombudsman with Tuason, and that the Ombudsman's denial of such copies constitutes a violation of due process on
her part. In Estrada, the Court had already resolved in detail that
under both Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and Section 4, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman, a respondent to a preliminary investigation proceeding (such as Reyes in this case) is only
entitled to the evidence submitted by the complainants, and not to those submitted by a co-respondent

2. Petitions Assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

a. No grave abuse of discretion may be imputed on the part of the Sandiganbayan in denying Reyes's motion to
suspend proceedings against her in view of her filing of a petition for certiorari questioning the Ombudsman's
issuances before the Court.
In this case, since the Court did not issue any temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction in
G.R. Nos. 212593-94, then the Sandiganbayan cannot be faulted for continuing with the proceedings before it.

b. Once the public prosecutor (or the Ombudsman) determines probable cause and thus, elevates the case to the
trial court (or the Sandiganbayan), a judicial determination of probable cause is made in order to determine if a
warrant of arrest should be issued ordering the detention of the accused

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G.R. No. 211703               December 10, 2014

EDELBERT C. UYBOCO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner assailing the Sandiganbayan's Decision1 dated
January 9, 2014 and Resolution2 dated March 14, 2014, finding petitioner and his co-accused Rodolfo G. Valencia
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, in Criminal Case No. 24461, entitled People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo G.
Valencia, Carlo A. Maramot, & Edelbert C. Uyboco.

Petitioner asserts that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the existence of a conspiracy and in convicting him in
the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt of such conspiracy. More importantly, petitioner finds fault in the
Sandiganbayan's denial of his Motion to Reconsider the Decision of this Honorable Court (Promulgated on January 9,
2014) with a Plea to Re-Open the Proceedings dated January 22, 2014. In his motion, petitioner prayed for the
reopening of the proceedings on the ground that his constitutional rights to due process and to competent counsel
were violated when his former counsel, due to blatant error, abuse of discretion, and gross incompetence, did not
present any evidence in his defense, causing serious prejudice to him.

According to petitioner, he was "accorded grossly insufficient legal assistance by his former lawyer" who informed
him that "there was no necessity for a preliminary investigation and to present any evidence." His former counsel also
"failed to cross examine the main prosecution witness because said counsel was inexplicably absent on the trial date"
and even "failed to prepare and file a memorandum" and "merely relied on the defense presented by the lawyers of
co-accused Valencia and Maramot by adopting the defenses of the other accused and all their pleadings and
manifestations, even when these were clearly not applicable to petitioner’s defense." Thus, petitioner avers that his
constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due process and of law and to competent counsel were violated.

In its Comment dated September 30,2014, the Office of the Special Prosecutor opposed petitioner’s plea toreopen
the case on the ground of denial of due process. In citing Lagua v. CA,3 they claim there is no basis to set aside the
assailed decision and resolution since "a client is bound by the action of his counsel."

After a careful review of the records of the case, We find that the petition has no merit.

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth, as held by this Court in Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp, Inc., 4 to wit:

A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law. Questions of fact are not
reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of
fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.

Findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate tribunal and, absent
a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the results of the case, those findings should not
be ignored.5 Absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its
findings of facts, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive upon this Court.6

This rule admits of exceptions, asfollows: (1) where the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmise and conjectures; (2) where the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) where there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) where the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact of the
Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record.7

10 | P a g e
Even if the foregoing rules were tobe relaxed in the interest of substantial justice, this Court nevertheless finds no
reason to disagree with the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan. A meticulous scrutiny of the records of the case
persuades Us to conclude that the Sandiganbayan did not err in its finding that petitioner is guilty of the crime
charged. The evidence on record amply supports the findings and conclusions of the Sandiganbayan and petitioner
has shown no cause for this Court to apply any of the foregoing exceptions.

Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 provides:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross in excusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

For accused to be found liable under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the following elements must concur:

1) The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2) He must have
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and

3) That his action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.8

Based on the records of the case, the elements of the crime charged exist in the present case. On the first element,
accused Valencia was a public officer at the time the acts in question were committed. Thus, while petitioner was a
private individual, he was found to have been inconspiracy with accused Valencia. This is in accord with the rule that
private persons may be charged in conspiracy with public officers, as We held in People of the Philippines v. Henry T.
Go:9

At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers,
may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance
with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike
constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto. This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by
this Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving herein private respondent.

The Sandiganbayan found that petitioner and accused Valencia acted in conspiracy to commit the crime charged, to
wit:

The records show that conspiracy existed by and between accused Rodolfo Valencia and Edelbert Uyboco, president
of Gaikoku, considering that the procurement of the subject dump trucks for an overpriced amount of
Ph₱6,994,286.00 could not have been possible without each other’s participation and cooperation, as evidenced by
their execution and approval of the purchase order No. 4979 dated March 1993, and Gaikoku’s proforma invoice.10

Petitioner failed to dispute any of the documentary evidence presented by the prosecution and relied upon by the
Sandiganbayan. Thus, there appears to be no reason for this Court to review such finding.

As to the second element, accused Valencia entered into a negotiated contract with Gaikoku without authority from
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP). In fact, Valencia had already approved the purchase request for the dump
trucks as earlyas March 1993, prior to any SP resolution approving such direct acquisition.

The Sandiganbayan correctly ruled, and respondents aptly pointed out, that accused Valencia failed to comply with
the requirements of Section 369 of the Local Government Code on negotiated purchase, which required that there
must have been at least two failed public biddings before a contract for a negotiated purchase may be entered into.

11 | P a g e
The defense failed to present any substantial evidence of the two failed biddings. In fact, it was proved by presented
evidence that the alleged failed biddings were merely simulated.

The present case is similar to the case of Plameras v. People,11 wherein this Court upheld the conviction of the
accused, to wit:

As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, certain established rules, regulations and policies of the Commission
on Audit and those mandated under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) were knowingly
sidestepped and ignored by the petitioner which enabled CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz to successfully get full payment
for the school desks and armchairs, despite non-delivery – an act or omission evidencing bad faith and manifest
partiality.

It must be borne to mind that any procurement or "acquisition of supplies or property by local government units shall
be through competitive public bidding". This was reiterated in the Local Government Code of 1991 on procurement of
supplies which provides:

Sec. 356. General Rule in Procurement or Disposal. – Except as otherwise provided herein, acquisition of supplies by
local government units shall be through competitive public bidding. x x x

The petitioner admitted in his testimony that he is aware of such requirement, however, he proceeded just the same
due to the alleged advice of the unnamed DECS representative that there was already a negotiated contract – a
representation or misrepresentation he willfully believed in, without any verification. As a Governor, he must know
that negotiated contract can only be resortedto in case of failure of a public bidding. As it is, there isno public bidding
to speak of that has been conducted. Intentionally or not, it is his duty to act in a circumspect manner to protect
government funds. To do otherwise is gross inexcusable negligence, at the very least, especially so, that petitioner
acted on his own initiative and without authorization from the Provincial School Board. This can be proved by his
failure to present even a single witness from the members of the Board whom he consulted as he claimed.12

Finally, the third element of the crime is also present since it had been proven that an overpayment was made for the
dump trucks, since these were directly imported by the Provincial Government from the distributor in Japan. With this
direct importation, the Provincial Government should have only paid the tax-free amount of ₱4,594,119.85. Instead,
accused Valencia had already authorized and caused the disbursement of ₱6,994,286, or an excess of
₱2,400,166.15, in favor of petitioner’s company, Gaikoku. This has clearly caused undue injury to the government.

As to petitioner’s claim that his right to due process was denied due to his former counsel’s error, abuse of discretion
or gross incompetence, We find no merit in this claim. Time and again, this Court has ruled that a client is bound by
his counsel’s conduct, negligence and mistake in handling a case,13 and to allow a client to disownhis counsel’s
conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing
counsel.14 While this rule has recognized exceptions,15 We find that there is no reason for this Court to deviate from
the findings of the Sandiganbayan. We held in Gotesco Properties, Inc. v. Moral:16

The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural
technique. The basis is the tenet that an act performed by counsel withinthe scope of a "general or implied authority"
is regarded as an act of the client. While the application of this general rule certainly depends upon the surrounding
circumstances of a given case, there are exceptions recognized by this Court: "(1) where reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright
deprivation of the client’s liberty or property;or (3) where the interests of justice so require."

The present case does not fall under the said exceptions. In Amil v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that "to fall
within the exceptional circumstance relied upon x x x, it mustbe shown that the negligence of counsel must be so
gross that the client is deprived of his day in court. Thus, where a party was given the opportunity to defend its
interests in due course, it cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is
the very essence of due process." To properly claim gross negligence on the part of the counsel, the petitioner must
show that the counsel was guilty of nothing short of a clear abandonment of the client’s cause.17

In the present case, the Sandiganbayancorrectly denied petitioner’s motion to re-open the proceedings on the ground
of violation of his due process, to wit:

12 | P a g e
In the same vein, accused-movant Uyboco’s clear admission that "he had been given the opportunity to present his
evidence" and despite said opportunity, he and his counsel decided/opted not to present any evidence for his
defense, as shown by their written Manifestatio ndated November 20, 2012, that "after earnest assessment and
evaluation, the accused EDELBERT C. UYBOCO has deemed it unnecessary to present further evidence in his
defense, thus he is waiving his right to present further testimonial and documentary evidence," militates against his
claim of miscarriage of justice, and hence, his motion to reopen proceedings must likewise fail. Accused-movant
Uyboco cannot attribute any serious misjudgment or fault or gross incompetence on his counsel aloneas the decision
not to present further evidence in his defense bears his conformity as shown by his signature in the said
manifestation.18

The Office of the Special Prosecutor correctly pointed out that petitioner was given an opportunity tobe heard during
trial.1âwphi1 This opportunity to be heard is the essence of due process. While petitioner claims that he was
incorrectly advised by his former counsel that the presentation of evidence is no longer necessary, this unfortunate
mistake cannot qualify as gross negligence or incompetence that would necessitate a reopening of the proceedings.
In fact, not once did petitioner refute, or at the very least, address the Sandiganbayan’s finding that he had expressly
consented to the waiver of the presentation of evidence by affixing his signature as conformity to the manifestation
submitted by his former counsel.

Petitioner also erroneously claims that his former counsel "failed to prepare and file a memorandum for him" since the
records show that petitioner’s former counsel had belatedly filed a memorandum on his behalf, which the
Sandiganbayan had admitted in the interest of justice. Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the
Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 9, 2014 and Resolution dated March 14, 2014
issued by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24461 are hereby AFFIRMED.

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G.R. No. 179491               January 14, 2015

ALEJANDRO C. ALMENDRAS, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
ALEXIS C. ALMENDRAS, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

We resolve the Petition for Review filed by petitioner Alejandro C. Almendras, Jr., from the 27 January 2006 Decision
and 28 August 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73088.1 The CA affirmed the
Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Civil Case No. 33432 finding petitioner liable for damages.

THE FACTS

As culled from the CA, petitioner sent letters with similar contents on 7 February 1996 to House Speaker Jose de
Venecia, Jr., and on 26 February 1996 to Dr. Nemesio Prudente, President of Oil Carriers, Inc. The controversial
portion of the first and second letters reads as follows:

This is to notify your good self and your staff that one ALEXIS "DODONG" C. ALMENDRAS, a brother, is not vested
with any authority to liaison or transact any business with any department, office, or bureau, public or otherwise, that
has bearing or relation with my office, mandates or functions. x x x.

Note worthy to mention, perhaps, is the fact that Mr. Alexis "Dodong" C. Almendras, a reknown blackmailer, is a bitter
rival in the just concluded election of 1995 who ran against the wishes of my father, the late Congressman Alejandro
D. Almendras, Sr. He has caused pain to the family when he filed cases against us: his brothers and sisters, and
worst against his own mother.

I deemed that his act of transacting business that affects my person and official functions is malicious in purpose,
done with ill motive and part of a larger plan of harassment activities to perforce realise his egoistic and evil
objectives.

May I therefore request the assistance of your office in circulating the above information to concerned officials and
secretariat employees of the House of Representatives.3

xxxx

These letters were allegedly printed, distributed, circulated and published by petitioner, assisted by Atty. Roberto
Layug, in Digos, Davao del Sur and Quezon City, with evident bad faith and manifest malice to destroy respondent
Alexis C. Almendras’ good name. Hence, the latter filed an action for damages arising from libel and defamation
against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Digos City.

THE RTC RULING

In the course of trial at the lower court, petitioner failed to present any evidence, except his Answer, despite several
rescheduling of hearings at his instance.4 The trial court thus submitted the case for decision, and eventually ruled
that respondent was libeled and defamed. For the sufferings, social ridicule, defamation and dishonor caused by
petitioner’s letters, respondent was awarded damages, as follows: "₱5,000,000.00 as moral damages; ₱100,000.00
as exemplary damages; ₱10,000.00 for litigation expenses; and attorney’s fees in the amount of 25% of whatever
amounts actually received by plaintiff for this judgment."pp5

Petitioner moved for reconsideration and/or new trial,6 but the same was denied by the trial court.7

14 | P a g e
THE CA RULING

On intermediate appellate review, the CA ruled that petitioner was not denied due process. It noted that petitioner
was given full opportunity to present his evidence, but he vehemently disregarded the proceedings by merely
absenting himself from trials without valid excuses.8 The appellate court also ruled that the letters were not privileged
communications, since petitioner was not acting as a member of the Congress when he sent them. In fact, his letter
stated that he extends his "apology for bringing this personal matter in the open." He was, as maintained by the
respondent, sending open libelous and unsealed letters, duly published and circulated in Digos, Davao del Sur, and
Quezon City.9 Consequently, the CA upheld the damages awarded by the trial court, the amounts being consistent
with the social and financial standing of the parties involved.10

We now rule on the final review of the case.

THE ISSUES

From the foregoing, we reduce the issues to the following:

(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived due process;

(2) Whether or not the letters are libelous in nature;

(3) Whether or not the letters fall within the purview of privileged communication; and

(4) Whether or not respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s feesand litigation
expenses.

OUR RULING

We deny the petition.

Petitioner anchors his appeal on the ground that his letters are covered by privileged communications. He insists that
he has the legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, being then a
Congressman duty-bound to insulate his office and his constituents from the dubious and mistrustful pursuits of his
elder brother.11 Moreover, the letters were also not meant to be circulated or published. They were sent merely to
warn the individuals of respondent’s nefarious activities, and made in good faith and without any actual malice.
Respondent’s testimony that he learned the existence of the letter from others cannot be countenanced, as no
witness corroborated this. At best, it is only hearsay.12

On the denial of his motion for reconsideration and/or new trial, he maintains that his own counsel Atty. Leonardo D.
Suario categorically admitted that he did not know of petitioner’s ailment and thus did not make the proper
manifestations in Court. His failure to attend the hearing was not of his own volition, but because of his doctor’s strict
advice since he earlier underwent a quadruple coronary artery bypass at the St. Luke’s Medical Center-Heart Institute
in Quezon City on16 July 2001, just a day before the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial was filed. While his
counsel represents him, the latter’s mistakes should not deprive him of his day in court to present his side.13

As to the damages, petitioner avers that since respondent never testified on any suffering he sustained or why he is
entitled to them, the same must not be awarded.

On the other hand, respondent asserts that petitioner’s letters do not fall within the purview of privileged
communication because it was published and read by the secretariat of the House of the Representatives, and not
exclusively communicated to persons who have some interest or duty in the matter and who have the power to
furnish the protection sought by the author of the statement. Moreover, he was no tacting as a member of congress
when he sent the letters. The writing of a personal matter (which petitioner admitted in the letters), not relating to the
functions of a member of Congress cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be deemed to be privileged and insulated
from suit arising therefrom.14

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Malice has also been sufficiently proven because the language of the letters in fact shows that the writer had some ill-
feeling towards the respondent by using the words such as "reknown blackmailer" and "bitter rival." There is sufficient
showing that petitioner bore a grudge against the respondent and that there was rivalry or ill-feeling between them.15

Anent the damages, respondent believes that they were rightly awarded, taking into consideration his testimony in the
lower court,16 and the financial and social standing of the parties herein.17

First, we rule that petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process.

Settled is the rule that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. The only exception is when the negligence of
the counselis so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court. In such instance, the
remedy is to reopen the case and allow the party who was denied his day in court to adduce evidence. However,
perusing the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the general rule.18

Petitioner was given several opportunities to present his evidence or to clarify his medical constraints in court, but he
did not do so, despite knowing full well that he had a pending case incourt. For petitioner to feign and repeatedly
insist upon a lack of awareness of the progress of an important litigation is to unmask a penchant for the ludicrous.
Although he rightfully expected counsel to amply protect his interest, he cannot just sit back, relax and await the
outcome of the case. In keeping with the normal course of events, he should have taken the initiative "of making the
proper inquiries from his counsel and the trial court as to the status of his case." For his failure to do so, he has only
himself to blame.19 The Court cannot allow petitioner the exception to the general rule just because his counsel
admitted having no knowledge of his medical condition. To do so will set a dangerous precedent of never-ending
suits, so long as lawyers could allege their own fault or negligence to support the client’s case and obtain remedies
and reliefs already lost by the operation of law.20

Second, we find that petitioner’s letters are libelous in nature and do not fall within the purview of privileged
communication.

For an imputation to be libelous under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the following requisites must be
present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be
identifiable.21

Consequently, under Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive is shown. As an exception to the rule, the presumption of malice is done away with
when the defamatory imputation qualifies as privileged communication.22 In order to qualify as privileged
communication under Article 354, Number 1,23 the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the
communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect,
which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an
officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the
protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.24

Were petitioner’s letters defamatory in nature? We believe so.

In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be
taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by the persons reading
them, unless it appears that theywere used and understood in another sense.25 In the instant case, the letters tag
respondent as a "reknown black mailer," a vengeful family member who filed cases against his mother and siblings,
and with nefarious designs. Even an impartial mind reading these descriptions would be led to entertain doubts on
the person’s character, thereby affecting that person’s reputation.

Malice can also be presumed inasmuch as the letters are not privileged in nature. Petitioner’s contention that he has
the legal, moral or social duty to make the communication cannot be countenanced because he failed to
communicate the statements only to the person or persons who have some interest or duty in the matter alleged, and
who have the power to furnish the protection sought by the author of the statement. A written letter containing libelous
matter cannot be classified asprivileged when it is published and circulated among the public.26 Examination of the
letters would reveal that petitioner himself intended for the letters to be circulated (and they were so) when he said
that:

16 | P a g e
May I therefore request the assistance of your office in circulating the above information to concerned officials and
secretariat employees of the House of Representatives.27

This lack of selectivity on his part is indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim of privileged communication
because such publication created upon the minds of the readers a circumstance which brought discredit and shame
to respondent’s reputation.28

Lastly, having duly proved that all the elements of libel are present in this case, we rule that the damages awarded by
the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court mustbe modified and equitably reduced.1âwphi1

In awarding damages in libel cases, the court is given ample discretion to determine the amount, depending upon the
facts of the particular case.29 Article 2219 of the Civil Code expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in
cases of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. However, "while no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in
order that moral damages may be awarded, x x x it is nevertheless essential that the claimant should satisfactorily
show the existence of the factual basis of damages and its causal connection to defendant’s acts."30 Considering that
respondent sufficiently justified his claim for damages (i.e. he testified that he was "embarrassed by the said letters
[and] ashamed to show his face in [sic] government offices"31), we find him entitled to moral and exemplary damages.

However, we equitably reduce the amounts32 awarded because even though the letters were libellous, respondent
has not suffered such grave or substantial damage to his reputation to warrant receiving ₱5,000,000 as moral
damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages. In fact, he was able to successfully secure an elected position in
recent years. Accordingly, we reduce the award of moral damages from ₱5,000,000 to ₱100,000 and exemplary
damages from ₱100,000 to ₱20,000.

The award of attorney's fees is not proper because respondent failed to justify satisfactorily his claim, and both the
trial and appellate courts failed to explicitly state in their respective decisions the rationale for the award.33 It is an
accepted doctrine that the award thereof as an item of damages is the exception rather than the rule, and counsel's
fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney's fees under
Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification, without which the award is a
conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In all events, the court
must explicitly state in the text of the decision, and not only in the decretal portion thereof, the legal reason for the
award of attorney's fees.34 The same is true for the award of litigation expenses because respondent failed to
satisfactorily justify his claim. WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. The 27 January 2006 Decision and 28
August 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73088 are hereby MODIFIED, in that: (1) the
award of moral damages is reduced from ₱5,000,000 to ₱100,000; (2) the award of exemplary damages is reduced
from ₱100,000 to ₱20,000; and (3) litigation expenses and attorney's fees are deleted.

SO ORDERED.

17 | P a g e
CASE DIGEST: MALIKSI V. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 203302 : April 11, 2013] MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI, Petitioner,v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
AND HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN, Respondents. BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS: During the 2010 Elections, Saquilayan was proclaimed as winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite.
Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the RTC in
Imus, Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently,
the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected
Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan
appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi's motion for execution pending appeal, and
Maliksi was then installed as Mayor.

The COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use of
the printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order dated requiring Saquilayan to deposit
the amount necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Later, it issued
another order for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.

The First Division nullified the decision of the RTC and declared Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor.

Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right to due process because he had
not been notified of the decryption proceedings. He argued that the resort to the printouts of the ballot images, which
were secondary evidence, had been unwarranted because there was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots
had not been preserved.

The COMELEC En Banc denied Maliksi's MR.

Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari, reiterating his objections to the decryption, printing, and
examination of the ballot images without prior notice to him, and to the use of the printouts of the ballot images in the
recount proceedings conducted by the First Division.

The Supreme Court via petition for certiorari dismissed the same. The Court then pronounced that the First Division
did not abuse its discretion in deciding to use the ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the
printouts of the ballot images were not secondary images, but considered original documents with the same
evidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and that the First Divisions finding that
the ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered had been fully established by the large number of cases of
double-shading discovered during the revision.

ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court erred in dismissing the instant petition despite a clear violation
of petitioner's constitutional right to due process of law considering that decryption, printing and examination of the
digital images of the ballots were done inconspicuously upon motu propio directive of the COMELEC First Division
sans any notice to the petitioner and for the first time on appeal.

HELD: The decision of the court a quo is granted. Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay Concerns
(ABC) v. Commission on Elections, the power of the COMELEC to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy
resolution of its cases should still be exercised only after giving to all the parties the opportunity to be heard on their
opposing claims. The parties right to be heard upon adversarial issues and matters is never to be waived or
sacrificed, or to be treated so lightly because of the possibility of the substantial prejudice to be thereby caused to the
parties, or to any of them. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc should not have upheld the First Divisions deviation from
the regular procedure in the guise of speedily resolving the election protest, in view of its failure to provide the parties
with notice of its proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, the most basic requirements of due process.

The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the equivalents of the original official
ballots themselves.In Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 199149, January 22,
2013the Court held that "the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise
official ballots that faithfully capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2(3) of R.A.
No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and,
thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest."

18 | P a g e
That the two documents the official ballot and its picture image are considered "original documents" simply means
that both of them are given equal probative weight. In short, when either is presented as evidence, one is not
considered as weightier than the other.

But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the Electoral Tribunals to quickly and
unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them without
notice to the parties. Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the official ballots and the printouts of their
picture images, the rules for the revision of ballots adopted for their respective proceedings still consider the official
ballots to be the primary or best evidence of the voters will. In that regard, the picture images of the ballots are to be
used only when it is first shown that the official ballots are lost or their integrity has been compromised.

19 | P a g e
 IMELDA R. MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998

Facts:
1.            On  June 8, 1984, IMELDA MARCOS and JOSE DANS, as Chairman and  Vice Chairman of the Light
Railway Transit Authority (LRTA) entered into a Lease Contract with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation
(PGHFI) involving an LRTA property  in Pasay City for P102,760.00 per month for 25 years;
2.            On June 27,1984, the PGHFI subleased the said property for P734,000.00 per month to the Transnational
Construction Corporation represented by one Ignacio Jumenez;
3.            After   petitioner’s husband was deposed as President of the Philippines, she and Dans were charged of
alleged violation of Section 3 [g] of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the
Sandiganbayan;
4.            After trial , the First Division of the Sandiganbayan failed to comply with the legal requirement that all the 3
justices must be unanimous in its Decision because Justice Garchitorena and Justice Jose Balajadia voted for the
conviction of both accused while Justice Narciso Atienza voted to acquit them;
5.            Thereafter, Justice Garchitorena as Presiding Justice issued Administrative Order No. 288-93 constituting a
Special Division of  five and designating Justices Augusto Amores and Cipriano del Rosario;
6.            On September 21, 1993, Justice Amores wrote Justice Garchitorena that he be given 15 days his
Manifestation. On the same date, however, Justice Garchitorena   dissolved the division of 5 allegedly because he
and Justice Balajadia had agreed to the opinion of Justice del Rosario;
7.            On September 24, 1993, a Decision was rendered convicting the  petitioner and Dans of violation of Sec. 3
[g] of RA 3019;
8.            On June 29, 1998, the Third Division of the Supreme Court by a vote of 3-2 affirmed the conviction of the
petitioner but acquitted DANS;
9.            Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and at the same time prayed that her Motion be heard by
the Supreme Court en banc claiming that her right to  due process of law, both  substantive and procedural, was
violated:
a.             as a result of the fact that she was convicted as a result of the alleged disparity of the rentals agreed upon
with PGHFI and the subsequent sub-lease contract between PGHFI and Transnational Construction Corporation; and
b.            the First Division convicted her after Justice Garchitorena  dissolved the Special Division of 5 after a lunch
in a Quezon City restaurant where they agreed to convict her in one case and acquit her in her other cases. The said
meeting was attended by another  justice who is not a member of the First Division or the Special Division in violation
of the Rules of the Sandiganbayan which requires that sessions of the court shall be done only in its principal office in
Manila and that only justices belonging to the division should join the deliberations.

Held:
The petitioner is hereby acquitted.
1. The great disparity between the rental price of the lease agreement signed by the petitioner (P102,760.00 per
month)  and the sub-lease rental (P734,000.00 per month) does not necessarily render the monthly rate of
P102,760.00 manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government in the absence of any evidence using
rentals of adjacent properties showing that the rentals in the property subject of the lease agreement  is indeed very
low. NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER WAS PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION REGARDING THE RENTAL

20 | P a g e
RATE OF ADJACENT PROPERTIES.. As such,  the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the petitioner   reasonable
doubt.

2. The court notes likewise the bias and prejudice of Presiding Justice Garchitorena against the petitioner as shown
by his  leading, misleading and baseless hypothetical questions of said justice to RAMON F. CUERVO, witness for
the petitioner. Said justice asked 179 questions to the witness as against the prosecutor who cross-examined the
witness which was 73. Said number of questions could no longer be described as “clarificatory questions”. Another
ground therefore for the acquittal of the petitioner is that she was denied IMPARTIAL TRIAL before the
Sandiganbayan. This is one reason why the case could no longer be remanded to the Sandiganbayan especially so
that the other Sandiganbayan Justices in the Special Division of 5 have retired. There is therefore no compelling
reason why the case should still be remanded to the lower court when all the evidence are already with the Supreme
Court.

21 | P a g e
Delgado vs. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 357

Nature:  This is a petition for Certiorari and mandamus with prayer for a Writ of preliminary injunction

Keywords:  counsel who represented the accused in not member of the bar; Estafa thru falsification of public/official
documents; right to counsel

Summary:  Delgado together with 3 others were charged for estafa causing the frustration of one medical student.
Delgado was assisted by one Atty. Yco. The said lawyer has filed for multiple postponement of trial and one time he
failed to appear in court by reason of him being allegedly sick. No medical certificate was furnished. The court was
not impressed with such actuation and had considered the same as Delgado’s waiver of her right to trial. The lower
court convicted her and the others. She appealed before the CA and the CA sustained the lower court’s rule. Delgado
later found out that Yco is not a member of the IBP.

PARAS, J.

Facts:  Emma R. Delgado, herein petitioner, together with Gloria C. Tortona, Celia Capistrano and Catalino Bautista
alias Atty. Paulino Bautista, the last named still at large, was charged with estafa thru falsification of public and/or
official documents resulting in deceiving one Erlinda Rueda, a Medical Technologist, in arranging her travel to the
United States.

All the accused (except Catalino Bautista) pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and trial on the merits ensued. Herein
petitioner Emma R. Delgado was assisted and represented by her counsel de parte, Atty. Lamberto G. Yco. On
December 13, 1973, the date set for the continuation of the defense evidence, said Atty. Yco failed to appear despite
proper and previous notice. Instead, he sent a telegram requesting for postponement on the ground allegedly that he
was sick. No medical certificate was however submitted. The trial fiscal objected, believing that the motion was
dilatory because there had been numerous postponements in the past at petitioner's behest. The trial Court sustained
the fiscal's objection thereto, considered Emma Delgado to have waived presentation of her evidence, and
considered the case submitted for decision.

Thereafter, a judgment of conviction was rendered by the trial court and finds the accused Gloria C. Tortona, Emma
R. Delgado and Celia Capistrano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Estafa thru Falsification of
Public and/or Official Documents. Each is further ordered to pay, jointly and severally, said complainant moral
damages in the amount of P5,000.00, and one fourth of the costs of the proceedings.

Accused Gloria C. Tortona did not appeal from the aforesaid decision. Accused Celia Capistrano and petitioner
Emma R. Delgado appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issue of "whether or not on the basis of the evidence
and the law the judgment appealed from should be maintained."

Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court.

On December 27, 1976, an entry of final judgment was issued and on February 1, 1977, the records of the case were
remanded to the lower court for execution of judgment.

22 | P a g e
Believing that there was irregularity in the sending of notices and copy of the decision as petitioner was not informed
or notified of said decision by her counsel on record, Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, herein petitioner filed on February 17,
1977 with respondent Court of Appeals an "Urgent Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment, to Recall the Records and
Allw the Movant to Personally Receive Copy of the Decision.

This motion was denied by respondent Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated April 20, 1977.

On May 11, 1977 an Order was issued by respondent Court of First Instance of Manila directing the arrest of herein
petitioner Emma R. Delgado and the confiscation of her bond for failure to appear at the execution of judgment on
May 11, 1977.

On May 27, 1977, petitioner filed a Motion for the Reconsideration of the Order denying her Motion to Set Aside Entry
of Judgments, etc., invoking as one of the grounds therein, the newly discovered fact that petitioner came to know for
the first time only on May 19, 1977 that Atty. Lamberto G. Yco is not a member of the Philippine Bar. Petitioner
prayed that she be granted a new trial on the ground that she was deprived of her right to be defended by competent
counsel.

On June 3, 1977, respondent Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, hence, she filed the instant petition before
this Court.

The main thrust of petitioner's arguments is that she is entitled to a new trial and therefore, all the assailed orders of
respondent courts should be vacated and set aside, because her "lawyer," Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, is not a lawyer.

Issue:  WON petitioner is entitled to a new trial and therefore, all the assailed orders of respondent courts should be
vacated and set aside, because her "lawyer," Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, is not a lawyer.

Held:  YES. We find the petition impressed with merit

Ratio:  This is so because an accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the bar in a

criminal case filed against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is
great danger that any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering the legal perquisites
and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due process.

Ruling:  WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby rendered, remanding the
case to the trial court for new trial.

Doctrine: – The mistake of counsel will bind his client. The only exception is when the counsel represents himself as
a lawyer and is not one because in that case the accused is denied of his right to counsel and due process.

23 | P a g e
24 | P a g e
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENANCIO MORTERA

FACTS: That on or about August 25, 2002, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, armed with a knife, by means of treachery and with intent to kill, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and stab from behind with the use of said weapon
that he was then armed with, at the person of ROBELYN ROJAS y MALLARI, employing means, manner and form
which tended directly and specially to insure its execution without any danger to the person of the accused, and as a
result of which attack, the said Robelyn Rojas y Mallari sustained stabbed wound on the fatal part of the latter’s body
which directly caused his death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim. Upon arraignment on
February 6, 2004, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty." Although the accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned, during
the trial, he admitted having stabbed the victim whom he referred to as Tonying, but claimed self-defense. By his
account, after leaving his uncle's house at Gov. Camins, he passed by a corner and saw a group of people drinking.
They were Ramil Gregorio, Jonel Veñales and Tonying. Upon seeing him, Tonying ran away and called his brother,
Alberto Rojas. When the accused was about to reach the main road, Alberto Rojas, Tonying and a certain "Duk"
(brother-in-law of Tonying) accosted him and asked him for liquor money. When he refused, the three men got angry.
After telling them that he had to go, Tonying hit him with a spray gun (for painting), causing him to fall down. While he
was in a supine position, Tonying attempted to hit him again. It was at that point that he was able to get hold of his
knife and thrust it forward and hit someone. He did not know who got stabbed. He then immediately fled to Ayala and
later to Lintangan, Zamboanga del Norte. The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime charged. The accused
appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issues of denial of due process of law and his right to an impartial trial.
He claimed that the trial court judge, Judge Jesus Carbon, was hostile towards him and prejudged his guilt as could
be inferred from his "prosecutor-like" conduct. The accused likewise reiterated his claim of self-defense. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision.

ISSUE: Whether there was there was a denial of his right to due process and of his right to have an impartial trial.

RULING: The Court is not unaware of the case of Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, where it was written: The Court has
acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind upon any material
point which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides. But not only should his examination be
limited to asking clarificatory questions, the right should be sparingly and judiciously used; for the rule is that the court
should stay out of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of trial hardly in fact can
one avoid the impression that the Sandiganbayan had allied itself with, or to be more precise, had taken the cudgels
for the prosecution in proving the case against Tabuena and

Peralta. The cold neutrality of an impartial judge requirement of due process was certainly denied Tabuena and
Peralta when the court, with its overzealousness, assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate A substantial
portion of the TSN was incorporated in the majority opinion not to focus on numbers alone, but more importantly to
show that the court questions were in the interest of the prosecution and which thus depart from the common
standard of fairness and impartiality. (emphasis added) The situation in the case at bench is, however, different. As
correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, although the trial judge might have made improper remarks and
comments, it did not amount to a denial of his right to due process or his right to an impartial trial. Upon perusal of the
transcript as a whole, it cannot be said that the remarks were reflective of his partiality. They were not out of context.
Not only did the accused mislead the court by initially invoking a negative defense only to claim otherwise during trial,
he was also not candid to his own lawyer, who was kept in the dark as to his intended defense. The accused having
admitted the killing, a reverse order of trial could have proceeded. As it turned out, the prosecution undertook to
discharge the burden of proving his guilt, when the burden of proof to establish that the killing was justified should
have been his. Most probably, the trial judge was peeved at the strategy he adopted. The trial judge cannot be faulted
for having made those remarks, notwithstanding the sarcastic tone impressed upon it. The sarcasm alone cannot
lead us to conclude that the trial judge had taken the cudgels for the prosecution. The invocation of Opida fails to
persuade us either. The facts therein are not at all fours with the case at bench. In Opida, we did not fail to notice the
malicious, sadistic and adversarial manner of questioning by the trial judge of the accused therein, including their
defense witness. In Opida, the accused never admitted the commission of the crime, and so the burden of proof
remained with the prosecution. WHEREFORE, the January 23, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00518-MIN is AFFIRMED.

25 | P a g e
 [G.R. No. 190171. March 14, 2011.]

ALEN ROSS RODRIGUEZ and REGIDOR TULALI,  petitioners, vs. THE HON. BIENVENIDO
BLANCAFLOR, in his capacity as the Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Palawan, Branch 52, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA,  J p:
This is a petition for certiorari  and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by Alen
Ross Rodriguez (Rodriguez), the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan; and Regidor Tulali (Tulali), Prosecutor I of
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan, seeking to annul and set aside the October 13, 2009
Decision 1 of respondent Judge Bienvenido Blancaflor (Judge Blancaflor), Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 52,
Regional Trial Court, Palawan (RTC). The petition likewise seeks to prohibit Judge Blancaflor from implementing
the said decision.
In his October 13, 2009 Decision, Judge Blancaflor found petitioners Rodriguez and Tulali guilty of
direct contempt and ordered them to issue a public apology to the court. In the same decision, Judge Blancaflor
suspended them indefinitely from the practice of law. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding
respondents PROVINCIAL PROSECUTORS OF PALAWAN ALEN ROSS B. RODRIGUEZ
and PROSECUTOR REGIDOR TULALI as both guilty of direct contempt and for violation of
their oath of office as member of the bar and as officer of the Court, and hereby sentence them
to suffer the penalty of INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from practice of law and for each to pay a
fine of P100,000.00.
Respondents are further directed to issue a public apology to the Court for the above
grave offenses and should they fail to do so after the finality of this Sentence, a warrant for
their arrest will be issued, and they will not be released unless they comply with the order of
this Court.
Let a copy of this Order be furnished the Secretary of Justice for appropriate
action. TIaEDC
IT IS SO ORDERED. 2
The Facts

Previously pending before Judge Blancaflor was Criminal Case No. 22240 for arson (arson case),
entitled People of the Philippines v. Teksan Ami, in which Tulali was the trial prosecutor.
During the pendency of the case, Tulali was implicated in a controversy involving an alleged bribery
initiated by Randy Awayan  (Awayan), the driver assigned to Judge Blancaflor under the payroll of the Office of
the Governor of Palawan, and one Ernesto Fernandez (Fernandez), to assure the acquittal of the accused, Rolly
Ami (Ami), and the dismissal of the arson case.
On June 29, 2009, a day before the scheduled promulgation of the decision in the arson case, Tulali
filed an Ex-Parte  Manifestation withdrawing his appearance in the said case to prevent any suspicion of
misdemeanor and collusion. He attached to the said manifestation a copy of the administrative complaint against
Awayan filed (but eventually withdrawn) by his superior, Rodriguez, before the Office of the Governor of
Palawan.
On June 30, 2009, Judge Blancaflor rendered his decision acquitting Ami of the crime of arson.
Purportedly on the basis of the administrative complaint filed against Awayan and Rodriguez, Judge
Blancaflor summoned several witnesses including Tulali and heard their testimonies. On July 30, 2009, he
issued an order summoning Rodriguez to appear before him for the purpose of holding an inquiry on matters
pertaining to his possible involvement in Tulali's filing of the ex-parte manifestation and the administrative
complaint against Awayan, among others.

26 | P a g e
 On August 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed his Motion for Clarification as to the purpose of Judge Blancaflor's
continued inquiries considering that the decision in the arson case had already been promulgated.
In an order dated August 13, 2009, Judge Blancaflor informed the petitioners that he was proceeding
against them for direct contempt and violation of their oath of office on the basis of Tulali's  Ex-
Parte  Manifestation.
As earlier recited, after the submission of petitioners' respective position papers, Judge Blancaflor
issued the assailed October 13, 2009 Decision finding petitioners guilty of direct contempt. The penalty of
indefinite suspension from the practice of law and a fine of P100,000.00 each were imposed upon them.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but it was denied in the assailed
November 6, 2009 Order. 3 DISEaC
Hence, the petitioners interpose the present special civil action before this Court anchored on the
following:
GROUNDS
(A)
RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND ORDER
CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONERS WERE DENIED THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
(B)
RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND ORDER
CONSIDERING THAT HE GROSSLY VIOLATED THE RULES ON CONTEMPT.
(C)
SINCE THE ASSAILED DECISION AND ORDER ARE VOID, A WRIT OF PROHIBITION MUST
BE ISSUED AGAINST RESPONDENT. 4
Petitioners argue that the contempt proceedings are null and void for contravening their rights to due
process of law. They claim that they were denied their rights to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them, to confront the witnesses and present their own evidence. According to petitioners,
Judge Blancaflor's disregard of due process constituted grave abuse of discretion which was further aggravated
by the unlawful manner of simultaneously conducting suspension and contempt proceedings against them.
Petitioners further argue that the penalty imposed upon them in the "direct contempt" proceeding is
clearly oppressive and without basis.
In its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment, 5 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)  stated that Judge
Blancaflor committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding petitioners
guilty of direct contempt as the judgment was not based on law and evidence.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all courts to preserve order in judicial
proceedings and to uphold the orderly administration of justice. However, judges are enjoined to exercise the
power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction
and preservation of the dignity of the court, and not for retaliation or vindictiveness. It bears stressing that the
power to declare a person in contempt of court must be exercised on the preservative, not the vindictive
principle; and on the corrective, not the retaliatory, idea of punishment. 6 Such power, being drastic and
extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice. 7 HDAaIS
In this case, the Court cannot sustain Judge Blancaflor's order penalizing petitioners for direct contempt
on the basis of Tulali's  Ex-Parte Manifestation.
Direct contempt is any misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or
refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to
do so. 8
Based on the foregoing definition, the act of Tulali in filing the Ex-Parte  Manifestation cannot be
construed as contumacious within the purview of direct contempt. It must be recalled that the subject

27 | P a g e
 manifestation bore Tulali's voluntary withdrawal from the arson case to dispel any suspicion of collusion between
him and the accused. Its filing on the day before the promulgation of the decision in the pending criminal case,
did not in any way disrupt the proceedings before the court. Accordingly, he should not be held accountable for
his act which was done in good faith and without malice.
Neither should Rodriguez be liable for direct contempt as he had no knowledge of, or participation in,
the preparation and filing of the subject manifestation. It was signed and filed by Tulali alone in his capacity as
the trial prosecutor in the arson case. The attached complaint against Awayan was filed with the Office of the
Palawan Governor, and not with the RTC.
Apparently, Judge Blancaflor's conclusion, that the subject manifestation containing derogatory matters
was purposely filed to discredit the administration of justice in court, is unfounded and without basis. There being
no factual or legal basis for the charge of direct contempt, it is clear that Judge Blancaflor gravely abused his
discretion in finding petitioners guilty as charged.
Such grave abuse of authority is likewise manifested from the penalty imposed on the petitioners. Under
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court, direct contempt before the RTC or a court of equivalent or
higher rank is punishable by a fine not exceeding P2,000.00 or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or
both.
The penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and to pay a fine of P100,000.00 each with
the additional order to issue a public apology to the Court under pain of arrest, is evidently unreasonable,
excessive and outside the bounds of the law.
Petitioners also fault Judge Blancaflor for non-observance of due process in conducting the contempt
proceedings. It must be emphasized that direct contempt is adjudged and punished summarily pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules. Hence, hearings and opportunity to confront witnesses are absolutely
unnecessary. AaIDCS
In the same vein, the petitioners' alleged "vilification campaign" against Judge Blancaflor cannot be
regarded as direct contempt. At most, it may constitute indirect contempt, as correctly concluded by the OSG.
For indirect contempt citation to prosper, however, the requirements under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of
the Rules must be satisfied, to wit: 
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a charge
in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon
within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a
person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct,
or degrade the administration of justice;
xxx xxx xxx.
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings for indirect contempt may be
initiated motu proprio  by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or
any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified
petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved
therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil
actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a
principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said
petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion
orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and
decision.
In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to observe the elementary procedure which requires written
charge and due hearing. There was no order issued to petitioners. Neither was there any written or formal
charge filed against them. In fact, Rodriguez only learned of the contempt proceedings upon his receipt of the
July 30, 2009 Order, requiring him to appear before the Court in order to clarify certain matters contained in the
said order. Tulali, on the other hand, only learned of the proceedings when he was ordered to submit his
compliance to explain how he came in possession of the administrative complaint against Awayan.

28 | P a g e
 The fact that petitioners were afforded the opportunity to file their appropriate pleadings is not sufficient
as the proceedings  ex-parte  to hear the witnesses' testimonies had already been completed. EaSCAH
In the course of his investigation, Judge Blancaflor showed that he no longer had the cold impartiality
expected of a magistrate. He had clearly prejudged petitioners as manifested in the questions propounded in his
July 30, 2009 Order, as follows:
a. Your [petitioner Rodriguez's] participation, if any, in the filing of the ex-
parte manifestation by Prosecutor Tulali together with the attachment of your letter to Gov.
Joel T. Reyes dated May 8, 2009 filed on June 29, 2009 with the Clerk of Court, Branch 52,
Regional Trial Court, Palawan;
b. Whether or not the letter was received and read by Gov. Joel T. Reyes, if you
know, and if so what was the official action thereon;
c. Before Randy Awayan was terminated on June 30, 2009 was he allowed to answer
the charges against him, i.e., calling him bag man and facilitator and Ernesto Fernandez,
calling him "extortionist."
Aside from the allegations of Salam Ami, any other evidentiary basis for your
conclusion that Ernesto Fernandez was an extortionist and that Awayan was a bag
man and facilitator;
What was your role in obtaining the release of accused Rolly Ami from the
City Jail without permission from the Court on June 29, 2009 at 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon and having been interviewed in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (c/o
Prosecutor Tulali) and how long was Rolly Ami interviewed?
d. Rolly Ami is publicly known as illiterate (cannot read or write) but he was made to
sign affidavits in the absence of his lawyer on June 29, 2009 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
why?
e. Rolly Ami was fetched upon his release by SPO4 Efren Guinto, a close associate
of yours, and directly went to the Palawan Pawnshop to pawn expensive jewelry (watch and
ring), why?
What is your participation in the media coverage Re: VILIFICATION
CAMPAIGN of the Judge of Branch 52 RTC-Palawan from July 1 to 10, 2009. Do you
recognize that as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the Court, pursuant to
the rules of judicial ethics and your oath of office as a lawyer, your loyalty and fidelity
is primarily to the Court? Do you still recognize this duty and obligation? 9
Indeed, Judge Blancaflor failed to conform to the standard of honesty and impartiality required of judges
as mandated under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. CIAacS
As a public servant, a judge should perform his duties in accordance with the dictates of his conscience
and the light that God has given him. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice,
passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties. He should always bear in mind that the power of the court
to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as
a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise. 10
Contempt and suspension proceedings are supposed to be separate and distinct. They have different
objects and purposes for which different procedures have been established. Judge Blancaflor should have
conducted separate proceedings. As held in the case of People v. Godoy, 11 thus:
A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the authority
of the court; on the other hand, the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness
of the court's officer to continue in that office, to preserve and protect the court and the public
from the official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such office. The principal
purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the
court and should thus be used sparingly on a preservative and not, on the vindictive principle.
The principal purpose of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme Court is to
assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible
for the orderly administration of justice.
. . . . It has likewise been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt cannot be considered as a notice to show cause why he
should not be suspended from the practice of law, considering that they have distinct objects

29 | P a g e
 and for each of them a different procedure is established. Contempt of court is governed by the
procedures laid down under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the
practice of law are governed by file 138 and 139 thereof.
Thus, it was grossly improper for Judge Blancaflor to consider his July 30, 2009 Order on the contempt
charge as the notice required in the disciplinary proceedings suspending petitioners from the practice of law.
Granting that the simultaneous conduct of contempt and suspension proceedings is permitted, the
suspension of petitioners must still fail.
This Court is not unmindful of a judge's power to suspend an attorney from practice for just cause
pursuant to Section 28, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Judge Blancaflor, however, must be reminded
that the requirements of due process must be complied with, as mandated under Section 30, Rule 138 of the
same Rules which specifically provides,  viz.:
Sec. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. — No attorney shall be
removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity
upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own
behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear
and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte. CSaITD
Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in
his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. His guilt, however, cannot be presumed. It must indicate
the dubious character of the acts done, as well as the motivation thereof. Furthermore, a disbarred lawyer must
have been given full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, produce witnesses
in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself and counsel. 12
In the case at bench, there was no prior and separate notice issued to petitioners setting forth the facts
constituting the misconduct and requiring them, within a specified period from receipt thereof, to show cause why
they should not be suspended from the practice of their profession. Neither were they given full opportunity to
defend themselves, to produce evidence on their behalf and to be heard by themselves and counsel.
Undoubtedly, the suspension proceedings against petitioners are null and void, having violated their right to due
process.
Likewise, Judge Blancaflor's suspension order is also void as the basis for suspension is not one of the
causes that will warrant disciplinary action. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules enumerates the grounds for
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar from his office as attorney, to wit: (1) deceit, (2) malpractice,
(3) gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6)
violation of the lawyer's oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, and for (8) willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. Judge Blancaflor failed to show that the
suspension was for any of the foregoing grounds.
In fine, having established that Judge Blancaflor committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, petitioners are entitled to the remedy of prohibition under Section 2, Rule 71 of
the Rules on Contempt which provides: 
SEC. 2. Remedy therefrom. — The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court
may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition.
The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition,
provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and
conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided
against him.
Accordingly, an order of direct contempt is not immediately executory or enforceable. The contemnor
must be afforded a reasonable remedy to extricate or purge himself of the contempt. Where the person adjudged
in direct contempt by any court avails of the remedy of certiorari or prohibition, the execution of the judgment
shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition provided the contemnor files a bond fixed by the court
which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition
be decided against him. 13 ASIDTa
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 13, 2009 Decision and November 6, 2009 Order
are hereby annulled and set aside. Judge Bienvenido Blancaflor is hereby permanently enjoined from
implementing the said decision and order. This injunctive order is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Rodriguez v. Blancaflor, G.R. No. 190171, [March 14, 2011], 660 PHIL 585-599)

30 | P a g e
31 | P a g e
 [G.R. No. 175999. July 1, 2015.]

NELSON LAI y BILBAO,  petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J  p:
The accused assails the affirmance of his conviction for homicide through the assailed decision
promulgated on May 27, 2005 by the Court of Appeals (CA). 1 The conviction had been handed down by Judge
Fernando R. Elumba of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, in Bacolod City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 17446
entitled People of the Philippines v. Nelson Lai y Bilbao. 2
Antecedents
The Prosecution's version was summarized by the RTC as follows:
On December 16, 1995, at around 9 o'clock in the evening, the victim Enrico
Villanueva, Jr. together with his friends Burnie Fuentebella (a prosecution witness), Butsoy
Arenas, Raffy Gustilo, Nonoy Martinez, and Mark Anthony Merre, were seated inside the
passenger jeepney owned by the accused, Nelson Lai y Bilbao, which was parked at the back
of Pala-pala, Brgy. 6, corner North Capitol Road — San Juan Streets, Bacolod City, where
they were waiting for a female friend of theirs who was supposed to arrive at 9:30 o'clock of
the same evening per their agreement. While they were waiting for their friend to arrive, the
accused Nelson Lai y Bilbao suddenly approached the vehicle and ordered all the persons
who were seated inside (including the deceased Enrico Villanueva, Jr.) to alight therefrom.
After all of them have alighted from the jeepney, the accused instantaneously grabbed the
victim by the latter's left arm and accused him (the deceased) of having stolen the antenna of
his (Lai's) vehicle. Denying that he was responsible for the theft of the antenna, the victim was
able to free himself from the hold of the accused and ran away towards the direction of the
house of Christopher Padigos located at Purok Narra Bukid North, Brgy. 8, Bacolod City,
across the Pala-pala. Upon arriving at the house of Christopher Padigos, the victim ran all the
way to the second floor room he shared with Jemuel V. Gepaya (a prosecution witness).
Finding his roommate inside the room, the victim confided to the former that Nelson Lai had
just accused him of stealing his (Lai's) car antenna and that he (the deceased) was grabbed
and hit by the accused at the neck but that he (the victim) was able to retaliate by kicking the
accused. There the victim remained until about 11:00 o'clock of the same evening when he left
the house of Christopher Padigos to go to the dancehall located at nearby Purok Azucena,
Barangay 6, Bacolod City where a benefit dance was being held.
At around 11:00 o'clock of the same evening, both the accused and the victim were
inside the dancehall, the latter being seated on a bench together with his friends while the
former was dancing to the tune of the cha-cha. After dancing the accused stood immediately in
front at about one and a half arms length (sic.) from where the victim was seated. Thereafter,
the accused stepped towards where the victim was seated. As the accused was about to
approach the victim, a brownout suddenly occurred. Immediately after the lights went out, a
spark was seen and a gunshot rang outright in front where the victim was seated. Suddenly,
the victim fell down bloodied. Immediately thereafter, the victim was rushed to the provincial
hospital by his friends led by Burnie Fuentebella, a prosecution witness, for treatment.
Similarly, Jemuel V. Gepaya, a cousin of the victim, also followed to the hospital after hearing
the news that the victim was shot.
Inside the Emergency Room of the Provincial Hospital, while the victim
lay (sic) bleeding from a gunshot wound in the neck and awaiting medical attention, he was
able to tell Burnie Fuentebella and Jemuel Gepaya, both prosecution witnesses, that the
accused Nelson Lai was the one who shot him. Moreover, the victim likewise shouted the
name "Nelson Lai" when he was asked by PO3 Homer Vargas who shot him. Likewise, when
Enrico Villanueva, Sr., the father of the victim, arrived at the Emergency Room and asked the

32 | P a g e
 victim who shot him, the latter replied that it was "Nelson Lai". (parenthetical citations
omitted) 3
In contrast, the CA summed up the Defense's own version in its assailed decision, to wit:
Appellant Nelson Lai drives his own passenger jeep plying the Banago-Libertad route.
At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of December 16, 1995, appellant parked his jeepney at
the back of his house located at Purok Azucena, Barangay 6, Bacolod City. After resting for a
while, he went to the house of their Purok President, Ramero Jarabelo, where he drank three
bottles of beer. Thereafter, he went home at around 9:00 o'clock, passing by the dancehall
were (sic.) a benefit dance was being held as a thanksgiving party for the Sangguniang
Kabataan. There, he was invited by Merlyn Rojo, who acted as emcee of the program, to open
the first dance. Appellant acceded and danced the first dance with Merlyn Rojo. After their
dance, appellant went home as he still had to work early the next morning.
When appellant arrived home, he noticed that eight (8) persons, including the victim,
were seated inside his jeepney. He approached them and requested them not to stay inside
his jeepney. Thereafter, all of them went away without any untoward incident. When the
accused and his wife were about to have their late dinner at around 11:00 o'clock, a brownout
occurred. About two seconds after the lights went out; he heard a gunshot which he initially
thought was merely a firecracker. Later, when he overheard that someone was shot at the
dancehall which was only 40 meters away from his house, he went out to look for his two sons.
Along the way, he met Daisy Panes, who, together with her husband, were also on their way to
the dancehall. ICHDca
At the dancehall, someone told appellant that his son, Windel, was the one who
carried the victim to the hospital. So appellant went home and proceeded to eat his dinner. At
around 11:45 o'clock of the same evening, while appellant was already resting, three
policemen came to his house and told him that the victim mentioned his name as the one who
shot him. Believing that he has done nothing wrong, appellant volunteered to go with the
policemen. Appellant claims that when they arrived at the police station, he even asked that a
paraffin test be conducted on him, the result of which was negative. 4
Judgment of the RTC
In its judgment dated August 22, 2001, 5 the RTC, through Judge Elumba, disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused NELSON LAI y
BILBAO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended, and, in the absence of
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances which may be considered in the imposition of
the penalty thereof, this Court hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
fourteen (14) years, 8 months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum and orders
the accused to indemnify the heirs of the victim Enrico Villanueva, Jr. in the amount of Fifty
thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos only without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency as
well as to suffer the accessory penalty provided for by law and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 6
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner raised the following errors, to wit:
[T]hat the lower court:
1. ERRED in giving full credence to the alleged dying declaration of Enrico Villanueva, Jr.;
2. ERRED in considering the alleged earlier untoward incident between accused and the group of
Enrico Villanueva, Jr. as sufficient to motivate the former to kill the latter;
3. ERRED in discarding en (sic) toto the defense of alibi and the negative result of the paraffin test
conducted on the accused;
4. ERRED in failing to see that the entire evidence presented by both the prosecution and defense
engender a reasonable doubt which should be resolved in favor of the accused;

33 | P a g e
 5. ERRED as accused was deprived of due process when this case was decided by the
honorable presiding judge who acted as the public prosecutor in this case before he
was appointed to the bench;
6. ERRED when it completely disregarded appellant's motion for reconsideration below with nary a look
into any issue raised therein; and cDHAES
7. ERRED when it denied appellant's motion for new trial. 7
On May 27, 2005, the CA promulgated its decision, 8 disposing:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City,
Branch 42, in Criminal Case No. 17446 is hereby AFFIRMED  in toto.
SO ORDERED. 9
Ruling of the Court
In this appeal, the petitioner continues to assail the conviction, but the Court has immediately noted that
the right to due process of the petitioner had been denied to him by Judge Elumba, the trial judge, by not
disqualifying himself from sitting on and trying Criminal Case No. 17446 despite having participated in the trial as
the public prosecutor. Thus, it is necessary for the Court to first determine if the non-disqualification of Judge
Elumba prejudiced the petitioner's right to a fair and impartial trial.
As the records indicate, Judge Elumba had been assigned on March 23, 1998 as the public prosecutor
in Branch 42 of the RTC in Negros Occidental to replace the previous public prosecutor, 10 but became the
Presiding Judge of Branch 42 on April 27, 2000. 11 Branch 42 was the trial court hearing and ultimately deciding
Criminal Case No. 17446 against the petitioner. As such, Judge Elumba should have disqualified himself from
having anything to do with the case once he became the trial judge because he was compulsorily disqualified.
The petitioner pointed to the need for Judge Elumba's disqualification in his Motion for Reconsideration, 12 but
the latter ignored his concerns upon the excuse that he had appeared in Criminal Case No. 17446 only after the
Prosecution had rested its case. Judge Elumba argued that he did not personally prosecute the case, and that,
at any rate, the petitioner should have sought his disqualification prior to the rendition of the judgment of
conviction. 13
On appeal, the petitioner focused the CA's attention to the denial of due process to him by the non-
disqualification of Judge Elumba, but the CA upheld Judge Elumba's justifications, stating:
As to the fifth assigned error, appellant claims that he was denied due process
because the judge who rendered the assailed decision was also, at one time, the public
prosecutor of the instant case.  First, the record of this case shows that when the judge, who
was then a public prosecutor, entered his appearance, the prosecution had already long rested
its case, more specifically, he appeared therein only when the last witness for the defense was
presented, not to mention the fact that it was a private prosecutor who cross-examined the last
witness, Merlyn Rojo. Thus, it cannot be said that the presiding judge personally prosecuted
the instant case, nor supervised the prosecution thereof when the same was still
pending. Second, settled is the rule that a petition to disqualify a judge must be filed before
rendition of judgment by the judge. Having failed to move for the disqualification of the judge,
appellant cannot thereafter, upon a judgment unfavorable to his cause, take a total turn
about (sic.) and say that he was denied due process. 'One surely cannot have his cake and
eat it too.' 14
It is not disputed that the constitutional right to due process of law cannot be denied to any accused.
The Constitution has expressly ordained that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law." 15 An essential part of the right is to be afforded a just and fair trial before his conviction for any
crime. Any violation of the right cannot be condoned, for the impartiality of the judge who sits on and hears a
case, and decides it is an indispensable requisite of procedural due process. 16 The Court has said:
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded 'the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge' as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement,
we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as
an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled
to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a
judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him
at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment.
Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they
expect.

34 | P a g e
 Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what
Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There
cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party
and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall
have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings
are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach
the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending.
The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are
filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law. 17
The adoption of rules governing the disqualification of the judges from hearing and deciding cases
should there be any cause that diminishes or negates their impartiality is a firm means of ensuring their
impartiality as judges. In particular, Section 1, Rule 137 of the  Rules of Court embodies the rule on self-
disqualification by a sitting judge, viz.: ASEcHI
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any
case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law,
or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he
has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without
the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in
a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Section 1 of Rule 137,  supra, contemplates two kinds of self-disqualification. The first paragraph
enumerates the instances when the judge is prohibited and disqualified from sitting on and deciding a
case. 18 The prohibition is compulsory simply because the judge is conclusively presumed to be incapable of
impartiality. 19 The second paragraph speaks of voluntary inhibition; whether or not the judge can sit in and try
the case is left to his discretion, depending on the existence of just and valid reasons not included in the first
paragraph, but in exercising the discretion, he must rely only on his conscience. 20
Reprising Section 1 of Rule 137 is Section 5, Canon 3 of the  New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, 21 which pertinently demands the disqualification of a judge who has previously served as a
lawyer of any of the parties, to wit:
Section 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in
which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a
reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings
include, but are not limited to instances where:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the
case or matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their
association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein; . . . .
Given the foregoing, the CA's justifications directly contravened the letter and spirit of Section 1 of Rule
137, supra, and Section 5 of Canon 3 of the  New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,
supra. The words counsel in the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137, supra, and lawyer  in Section 5 of
Canon 3, supra, are understood in their general acceptation because their usage by the rules has not been
made subject of any qualifications or distinctions. As such, the mere appearance of his name as the public
prosecutor in the records of Criminal Case No. 17446 sufficed to disqualify Judge Elumba from sitting on and
deciding the case. Having represented the State in the prosecution of the petitioner, he could not sincerely claim
neutrality or impartiality as the trial judge who would continue to hear the case. Hence, he should have removed
himself from being the trial judge in Criminal Case No. 17446.
To be clear, that Judge Elumba's prior participation as the public prosecutor was passive, or that he
entered his appearance as the public prosecutor long after the Prosecution had rested its case against the
petitioner did not really matter. The evil sought to be prevented by the rules on disqualification had  no relation
whatsoever with the judge's degree of participation in the case before becoming the judge. He must be reminded
that the same compulsory disqualification that applied to him could similarly be demanded of the private
prosecutor or the defense lawyer, if either of them should be appointed as the trial judge hearing the case. The
purpose of this stricture is to ensure that the proceedings in court that would affect the life, liberty and property of

35 | P a g e
 the petitioner as the accused should be conducted and determined by a judge who was wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent. As the Court has amplified in Garcia v. De la Peña: 22
The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in the
instant case, the respondent judge is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity rests on the salutary principle that no judge should preside in a case in
which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge has both the
duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free
from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. The law conclusively presumes
that a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason,
prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of written
consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the people's faith and
confidence in the courts of justice. 23 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, to say that Judge Elumba did not personally prosecute or supervise the prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 17446 is to ignore that all criminal actions were prosecuted under the direction and control of
the public prosecutor. That a private prosecutor had appeared in the case was of no consequence, for such
private prosecutor still came under the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor. In this connection,
we note that it was only on May 1, 2002, or two years after Judge Elumba's appointment in the Judiciary, when
Section 5, 24 Rule 110 of the  Rules of Court, was amended by A.M. No. 02-2-07-SC in order to expressly
authorize the intervention of the private prosecutor to prosecute a criminal case in case of heavy work load or
lack of the public prosecutor, provided that the private prosecutor was authorized in writing for the purpose by the
Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor. Even so, the records do not indicate that the
private prosecutor who appeared in Criminal Case No. 17446 had been duly authorized in writing by the Chief of
the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case by himself.
We have also observed that the CA appeared too eager to sustain the refusal of Judge Elumba to
disqualify himself as the trial judge. Such overeagerness was uncharacteristic of the CA as an appellate court in
a criminal case whose unmistakable duty was to thoroughly sift and scrutinize the records of the trial court to
search for errors that would reverse or modify the judgment in favor of the accused. Had it done its duty, it would
have quickly noticed a hard indication existing in the trial records of Criminal Case No. 17446 exposing Judge
Elumba to have actually taken an active participation in the trial. The indication was in the form of the Motion to
Present Rebuttal Evidence that then Public Prosecutor Elumba had filed on January 25, 2000, the text of which
is reproduced herein: ITAaHc
MOTION TO PRESENT REBUTTAL EVIDENCE
xxx xxx xxx
That the records of the above-entitled case would show that the accused rested his
case on October 29, 1999;
That, however, after going over the records of the case, the prosecution feels
that there is a need to present rebuttal evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Court that the prosecution be allowed to present rebuttal evidence to refute the
evidence presented by the accused.
(Sgd.)
FERNANDO R. ELUMBA
Trial Prosecutor 25
The text of the motion disclosed that then Public Prosecutor Elumba had come to the conclusion that
"there is a need to present rebuttal evidence" after his having gone over the records of the case. Clearly, he had
formed an opinion that was absolutely adverse to the interest of the petitioner.
The CA's reliance on Lao v. Court of Appeals 26 was inappropriate. In  Lao, the Court opined and
declared that the petition to disqualify the trial judge must be filed prior to the rendition of judgment. 27 But the
supposed disqualification of the judge in  Lao  was premised on bias as  perceived  by a party. 28 We should point
out that perceived bias was a ground covered by the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 37,   supra, and
would justify only the voluntary inhibition of the judge. In contrast, Judge Elumba's situation rested on a ground
for  mandatory disqualification because it emanated from the conclusive presumption of his bias. 29 Such a
ground should have been forthwith acknowledged upon Judge Elumba's assumption of the judgeship in Branch
42, or, at the latest, upon the ground being raised to his attention, regardless of the stage of the case.

36 | P a g e
 Under the circumstances, Judge Elumba, despite his protestations to the contrary, could not be
expected to render impartial, independent and objective judgment on the criminal case of the petitioner. His non-
disqualification resulted in the denial of the petitioner's right to due process as the accused. To restore the right
to the petitioner, the proceedings held against him before Judge Elumba and his ensuing conviction have to be
nullified and set aside, and Criminal Case No. 17446 should be remanded to the RTC for a partial new trial to
remove any of the prejudicial consequences of the violation of the right to due process. The case shall be raffled
to a Judge who is not otherwise disqualified like Judge Elumba under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.
For, as we said in Pimentel v. Salanga: 30
This is not to say that all avenues of relief are closed to a party properly aggrieved. If
a litigant is denied a fair and impartial trial, induced by the judge's bias or prejudice, we will not
hesitate to order a new trial, if necessary, in the interest of justice. Such was the view taken by
this Court in Dais vs. Torres, 57 Phil. 897, 902-904. In that case, we found that the filing of
charges by a party against a judge generated 'resentment' or the judge's part that led to his
"bias or prejudice, which is reflected in the decision." We there discoursed on the 'principle of
impartiality, disinterestedness, and fairness on the part of the judge' which 'is as old as the
history of courts.' We followed this with the pronouncement that, upon the circumstances
obtaining, we did not feel assured that the trial judge's finding were not influenced by bias or
prejudice. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment and directed a new trial. 31
WHEREFORE, the Court ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 27, 2005 by the
Court of Appeals and the judgment rendered on August 22, 2001 by the Regional Trial
Court; REMANDS Criminal Case No. 17446 entitled People of the Philippines v. Nelson Lai y Bilbao to the
Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City with instructions to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court to assign
it to any Regional Trial Judge not disqualified under Section 1 of Rule 137 of the  Rules of Court;
and INSTRUCTS the new trial judge to resume the trial in Criminal Case No. 17446 starting from the stage just
prior to the assumption of Judge Fernando R. Elumba as the trial judge, and to hear and decide Criminal
Case No. 17446 with reasonable dispatch.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Lai y Bilbao v. People, G.R. No. 175999, [July 1, 2015], 762 PHIL 434-449)

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 [G.R. No. 167139. February 25, 2010.]

SUSIE CHAN-TAN,  petitioner, vs. JESSE C. TAN,  respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO,  J p:

The Case

This is a petition for review 1 of (i) the 17 May 2004 Resolution 2 amending the 30 March 2004
Decision 3 and (ii) the 15 February 2005 Resolution 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107, in
Civil Case No. Q-01-45743. In its 30 March 2004 Decision, the trial court declared the marriage between
petitioner Susie Chan-Tan and respondent Jesse Tan void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Incorporated as
part of the decision was the 31 July 2003 Partial Judgment 5 approving the Compromise Agreement 6 of the
parties. In its 17 May 2004 Resolution, the trial court granted to respondent custody of the children, ordered
petitioner to turn over to respondent documents and titles in the latter's name, and allowed respondent to stay in
the family dwelling. In its 15 February 2005 Resolution, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the 28 December 2004 Resolution 7 denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and motion for
reconsideration of the 12 October 2004 Resolution, 8 which in turn denied for late filing petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 resolution.

The Facts

Petitioner and respondent were married in June of 1989 at Manila Cathedral in Intramuros,
Manila. 9 They were blessed with two sons: Justin, who was born in Canada in 1990 and Russel, who was born
in the Philippines in 1993. 10 ETIDaH
In 2001, twelve years into the marriage, petitioner filed a case for the annulment of the marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties submitted to the court a compromise agreement, which we quote in
full:
l. The herein parties mutually agreed that the two (2) lots located at Corinthian Hills,
Quezon City and more particularly described in the Contract to Sell, marked in open court as
Exhibits "H" to "H-3" shall be considered as part of the presumptive legitimes of their two (2)
minor children namely, Justin Tan born on October 12, 1990 and Russel Tan born on November
28, 1993. Copies of the Contract to Sell are hereto attached as Annexes "A" and "B" and made
integral parts hereof.
2. Susie Tan hereby voluntarily agrees to exclusively shoulder and pay out of her own
funds/assets whatever is the remaining balance or unpaid amounts on said lots mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof directly with Megaworld Properties, Inc., until the whole purchase or contract
amounts are fully paid. EDIHSC
3. Susie Tan is hereby authorized and empowered to directly negotiate, transact, pay
and deal with the seller/developer Megaworld Properties, Inc., in connection with the Contract to
Sell marked as Annexes "A" and "B" hereof.
4. The property covered by CCT No. 3754 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City and
located at Unit O, Richmore Town Homes 12-B Mariposa St., Quezon City shall be placed in co-
ownership under the name of Susie Tan (1/3), Justin Tan (1/3) and Russel Tan (1/3) to the
exclusion of Jesse Tan.
5. The property covered by TCT No. 48137 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City and
located at View Master Town Homes, 1387 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City shall be exclusively
owned by Jesse Tan to the exclusion of Susie Tan.

38 | P a g e
 6. The undivided interest in the Condominium Unit in Cityland Shaw. Jesse Tan shall
exclusively own blvd. to the exclusion of Susie Tan. aDECHI
7. The shares of stocks, bank accounts and other properties presently under the
respective names of Jesse Tan and Susie Tan shall be exclusively owned by the spouse whose
name appears as the registered/account owner or holder in the corporate records/stock transfer
books, passbooks and/or the one in possession thereof, including the dividends/fruits thereof, to
the exclusion of the other spouse.
Otherwise stated, all shares, bank accounts and properties registered and under the
name and/or in the possession of Jesse Tan shall be exclusively owned by him only and all
shares, accounts and properties registered and/or in the possession and under the name of
Susie Tan shall be exclusively owned by her only.
However, as to the family corporations of Susie Tan, Jesse Tan shall execute any and
all documents transferring the shares of stocks registered in his name in favor of Susie Tan, or
Justin Tan/Russel Tan. A copy of the list of the corporation owned by the family of Susie Tan is
hereto attached as Annex "C" and made an integral part hereof.
The parties shall voluntarily and without need of demand turn over to the other spouse
any and all original documents, papers, titles, contracts registered in the name of the other
spouse that are in their respective possessions and/or safekeeping. cSTCDA
8. Thereafter and upon approval of this Compromise Agreement by the Honorable
Court, the existing property regime of the spouses shall be dissolved and shall now be governed
by "Complete Separation of Property". Parties expressly represent that there are no known
creditors that will be prejudiced by the present compromise agreement.
9. The parties shall have joint custody of their minor children. However, the two (2)
minor children shall stay with their mother, Susie Tan at 12-B Mariposa St., Quezon City.
The husband, Jesse Tan, shall have the right to bring out the two (2) children every
Sunday of each month from 8:00 AM to 9:00 PM. The minor children shall be returned to 12-B
Mariposa Street, Quezon City on or before 9:00 PM of every Sunday of each month.
The husband shall also have the right to pick up the two (2) minor children in school/or
in the house every Thursday of each month. The husband shall ensure that the children be home
by 8:00 PM of said Thursdays. TIaCAc
During the summer vacation/semestral break or Christmas vacation of the children, the
parties shall discuss the proper arrangement to be made regarding the stay of the children with
Jesse Tan.
Neither party shall put any obstacle in the way of the maintenance of the love and
affection between the children and the other party, or in the way of a reasonable and proper
companionship between them, either by influencing the children against the other, or otherwise;
nor shall they do anything to estrange any of them from the other.
The parties agreed to observe civility, courteousness and politeness in dealing with
each other and shall not insult, malign or commit discourteous acts against each other and shall
endeavor to cause their other relatives to act similarly.
10. Likewise, the husband shall have the right to bring out and see the children on the
following additional dates, provided that the same will not impede or disrupt their academic
schedule in Xavier School, the dates are as follows: HCTaAS
a. Birthday of Jesse Tan
b. Birthday of Grandfather and Grandmother, first cousins and uncles and aunties
c. Father's Day
d. Death Anniversaries of immediate members of the family of Jesse Tan
e. During the Christmas seasons/vacation the herein parties will agree on such dates as when
the children can stay with their father. Provided that if the children stay with their father

39 | P a g e
 on Christmas Day from December 24th to December 25th until 1:00 PM the children will
stay with their mother on December 31 until January 1, 1:00 PM, or vice versa.
The husband shall always be notified of all school activities of the children and shall see
to it that he will exert his best effort to attend the same.
11. During the birthdays of the two (2) minor children, the parties shall as far as
practicable have one celebration.
Provided that if the same is not possible, the Husband (Jesse Tan) shall have the right
to see and bring out the children for at least four (4) hours during the day or the day immediately
following/or after the birthday, if said visit or birthday coincides with the school day.
12. The existing Educational Plans of the two children shall be used and utilized for their
High School and College education, in the event that the Educational Plans are insufficient to
cover their tuition, the Husband shall shoulder the tuition and other miscellaneous fees, costs of
books and educational materials, uniform, school bags, shoes and similar expenses like summer
workshops which are taken in Xavier School, which will be paid directly by Jesse Tan to the
children's school when the same fall due. Jesse Tan, if necessary, shall pay tutorial expenses,
directly to the tutor concerned. DHSCTI
The husband further undertake to pay P10,000.00/monthly support  pendente lite to be
deposited in the ATM Account of SUSIE CHAN with account no. 3-189-53867-8 Boni Serrano
Branch effective on the 15th of each month. In addition Jesse Tan undertakes to give directly to
his two (2) sons every Sunday, the amount needed and necessary for the purpose of the daily
meals of the two (2) children in school.
13. This Compromise Agreement is not against the law, customs, public policy, public
order and good morals. Parties hereby voluntarily agree and bind themselves to execute and
sign any and all documents to give effect to this Compromise Agreement. 11
On 31 July 2003, the trial court issued a partial judgment 12 approving the compromise agreement. On
30 March 2004, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage void under Article 36 of the Family
Code on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity of the parties. The trial court incorporated in its decision
the compromise agreement of the parties on the issues of support, custody, visitation of the children, and
property relations.
Meanwhile, petitioner cancelled the offer to purchase the Corinthian Hills Subdivision Lot No. 12, Block
2. She authorized Megaworld Corp. to allocate the amount of P11,992,968.32 so far paid on the said lot in the
following manner:
(a) P3,656,250.04 shall be transferred to fully pay the other lot in Corinthian Hills on Lot
11, Block 2; IECcaA
(b) P7,783,297.56 shall be transferred to fully pay the contract price in Unit 9H of the 8
Wack Wack Road Condominium project; and 
(c) P533,420.72 shall be forfeited in favor of Megaworld Corp. to cover the marketing
and administrative costs of Corinthian Hills Subdivision Lot 12, Block 2. 13
Petitioner authorized Megaworld Corp. to offer Lot 12, Block 2 of Corinthian Hills to other interested
buyers. It also appears from the records that petitioner left the country bringing the children with her.
Respondent filed an omnibus motion seeking in the main custody of the children. The evidence
presented by respondent established that petitioner brought the children out of the country without his knowledge
and without prior authority of the trial court; petitioner failed to pay the P8,000,000 remaining balance for the
Megaworld property which, if forfeited would prejudice the interest of the children; and petitioner failed to turn
over to respondent documents and titles in the latter's name.
Thus, the trial court, in its 17 May 2004 resolution, awarded to respondent custody of the children,
ordered petitioner to turn over to respondent documents and titles in the latter's name, and allowed respondent
to stay in the family dwelling in Mariposa, Quezon City. HATICc
Petitioner filed on 28 June 2004 a motion for reconsideration 14 alleging denial of due process on
account of accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. She alleged she was not able to present evidence
because of the negligence of her counsel and her own fear for her life and the future of the children. She claimed
she was forced to leave the country, together with her children, due to the alleged beating she received from

40 | P a g e
 respondent and the pernicious effects of the latter's supposed gambling and womanizing ways. She prayed for
an increase in respondent's monthly support obligation in the amount of P150,000.
Unconvinced, the trial court, in its 12 October 2004 Resolution, 15 denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, which was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period. It also declared petitioner in contempt
of court for non-compliance with the partial judgment and the 17 May 2004 resolution. The trial court also denied
petitioner's prayer for increase in monthly support. The trial court reasoned that since petitioner took it upon
herself to enroll the children in another school without respondent's knowledge, she should therefore defray the
resulting increase in their expenses.
On 4 November 2004, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss 16 and a motion for reconsideration 17 of the
12 October 2004 Resolution. She claimed she was no longer interested in the suit. Petitioner stated that the
circumstances in her life had led her to the conclusion that withdrawing the petition was for the best interest of
the children. She prayed that an order be issued vacating all prior orders and leaving the parties at the status
quo ante the filing of the suit.
In its 28 December 2004 Resolution, 18 the trial court denied both the motion to dismiss and the motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner. It held that the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution
had become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period without any timely appeal
having been filed by either party. IEAacT
Undeterred, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 28 December 2004 resolution, which the
trial court denied in its 15 February 2005 resolution. 19 The trial court then issued a Certificate of Finality 20 of
the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution.

The Trial Court's Rulings

The 30 March 2004 Decision 21 declared the marriage between the parties void under Article 36 of
the Family Code on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity. It incorporated the 31 July 2003 Partial
Judgment 22 approving the Compromise Agreement 23 between the parties. The 17 May 2004
Resolution 24 amended the earlier partial judgment in granting to respondent custody of the children, ordering
petitioner to turn over to respondent documents and titles in the latter's name, and allowing respondent to stay in
the family dwelling in Mariposa, Quezon City. The 15 February 2005 Resolution 25 denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the 28 December 2004 Resolution 26 denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and motion for
reconsideration of the 12 October 2004 Resolution, 27 which in turn denied for late filing petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 resolution.

The Issue

Petitioner raises the question of whether the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of
the trial court have attained finality despite the alleged denial of due process.

The Court's Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Petitioner contends she was denied due process when her counsel failed to file pleadings and appear at
the hearings for respondent's omnibus motion to amend the partial judgment as regards the custody of the
children and the properties in her possession. Petitioner claims the trial court issued the 17 May 2004 resolution
relying solely on the testimony of respondent. Petitioner further claims the trial court erred in applying to her
motion to dismiss Section 7 of the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages. Petitioner argues that if indeed the provision is applicable, the same is unconstitutional for
setting an obstacle to the preservation of the family. AHDaET
Respondent maintains that the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court
are now final and executory and could no longer be reviewed, modified, or vacated. Respondent alleges
petitioner is making a mockery of our justice system in disregarding our lawful processes. Respondent stresses
neither petitioner nor her counsel appeared in court at the hearings on respondent's omnibus motion or on
petitioner's motion to dismiss.
The issue raised in this petition has been settled in the case of Tuason v. Court of
Appeals. 28 In Tuason, private respondent therein filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage on the
ground of her husband's psychological incapacity. There, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of

41 | P a g e
 the marriage and awarding custody of the children to private respondent therein. No timely appeal was taken
from the trial court's judgment.
We held that the decision annulling the marriage had already become final and executory when the
husband failed to appeal during the reglementary period. The husband claimed that the decision of the trial court
was null and void for violation of his right to due process. He argued he was denied due process when, after
failing to appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial court deemed him to have waived his right to present
evidence and rendered judgment based solely on the evidence presented by private respondent. We upheld the
judgment of nullity of the marriage even if it was based solely on evidence presented by therein private
respondent.
We also ruled in Tuason  that notice sent to the counsel of record is binding upon the client and the
neglect or failure of the counsel to inform the client of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of the latter's
right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face. 29
In the present case, the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court had
become final and executory upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal. 30 Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 resolution, which the trial court received on 28 June 2004, was clearly filed
out of time. Applying the doctrine laid down in  Tuason, the alleged negligence of counsel resulting in petitioner's
loss of the right to appeal is not a ground for vacating the trial court's judgments. cHaICD
Further, petitioner cannot claim that she was denied due process. While she may have lost her right to
present evidence due to the supposed negligence of her counsel, she cannot say she was denied her day in
court. Records show petitioner, through counsel, actively participated in the proceedings below, filing motion
after motion. Contrary to petitioner's allegation of negligence of her counsel, we have reason to believe the
negligence in pursuing the case was on petitioner's end, as may be gleaned from her counsel's manifestation
dated 3 May 2004:
Undersigned Counsel, who appeared for petitioner, in the nullity proceedings,
respectfully informs the Honorable Court that she has not heard from petitioner since Holy Week.
Attempts to call petitioner have failed.
Undersigned counsel regrets therefore that she is unable to respond in an intelligent
manner to the Motion (Omnibus Motion) filed by respondent. 31
Clearly, despite her counsel's efforts to reach her, petitioner showed utter disinterest in the hearings on
respondent's omnibus motion seeking, among others, custody of the children. The trial judge was left
with no other recourse but to proceed with the hearings and rule on the motion based on the evidence presented
by respondent. Petitioner cannot now come to this Court crying denial of due process.
As for the applicability to petitioner's motion to dismiss of Section 7 of the Rule on the Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, petitioner is correct. Section 7 of
the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages provides:
SEC. 7. Motion to dismiss. — No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed except
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties; provided,
however, that any other ground that might warrant a dismissal of the case may be raised
as an affirmative defense in an answer. (Emphasis supplied)
The clear intent of the provision is to allow the respondent to ventilate all possible defenses in an
answer, instead of a mere motion to dismiss, so that judgment may be made on the merits. In construing a
statute, the purpose or object of the law is an important factor to be considered. 32 Further, the letter of the law
admits of no other interpretation but that the provision applies only to a respondent, not a petitioner. Only a
respondent in a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable
marriage files an answer where any ground that may warrant a dismissal may be raised as an affirmative
defense pursuant to the provision. The only logical conclusion is that Section 7 of the Rule does not apply to a
motion to dismiss filed by the party who initiated the petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage. CSHDTE 
Since petitioner is not the respondent in the petition for the annulment of the marriage, Section 7 of the
Rule does not apply to the motion to dismiss filed by her. Section 7 of the Rule not being applicable, petitioner's
claim that it is unconstitutional for allegedly setting an obstacle to the preservation of the family is without basis.
Section 1 of the Rule states that the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to a petition for the declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage. In this connection, Rule 17 of
the Rules of Court allows dismissal of the action upon notice or upon motion of the plaintiff, to wit:

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 Section 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. — A complaint may be dismissed by the
plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion
for summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed, the court shall issue an order confirming
the dismissal. . . .
Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. — Except as provided in the preceding
section, a complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon approval of the
court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. . . . (Emphasis
supplied) EAIaHD
However, when petitioner filed the motion to dismiss on 4 November 2004, the 30 March 2004 decision
and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court had long become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-
day reglementary period without any timely appeal having been filed by either party. The 30 March 2004 decision
and the 17 May 2004 resolution may no longer be disturbed on account of the belated motion to dismiss filed by
petitioner. The trial court was correct in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. Nothing is more settled in law than
that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law. 33 The reason is grounded on the fundamental considerations of public
policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgments or orders of courts must be final at
some definite date fixed by law. Once a judgment has become final and executory, the issues there should be
laid to rest. 34
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review. We AFFIRM the (i) 17 May 2004 Resolution amending
the 30 March 2004 Decision and (ii) the 15 February 2005 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 107, in Civil Case No. Q-01-45743.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Chan-Tan v. Tan, G.R. No. 167139, [February 25, 2010], 627 PHIL 409-423)

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 [G.R. No. 119712. January 29, 1999.]

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and ASSET PRIVATIZATION

TRUST,  petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CONTINENTAL CEMENT
CORPORATION,  respondents.

SYNOPSIS

The Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) filed with the Sheriff of Malolos an application for extra-
judicial foreclosure of real and personal properties. The application involved several real and/or chattel mortgages
executed by Continental Cement Corporation (CCC) in favor of DBP. CCC filed a complaint, which principally sought
to enjoin the DBP and the Sheriff of Malolos from commencing the foreclosure proceedings. In addition, CCC also
prayed that a new term for its loan obligation be established, and that the court declare the interest escalation clause
contained in DBP's promissory notes as null and void. During the advent of the privatization program of the
government, the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) was created as its privatization arm. Several non-performing assets
of the government financial institutions, including DBP, were transferred to the National Government. Among the
assets transferred to APT was the account of CCC. DBP filed a motion to dismiss the case filed by CCC for being
moot and academic because CCC could no longer secure reliefs from them due to the transfer of DBP's claim
against CCC to APT. However, the motion of DBP was denied by the trial court. Trial ensued, and the trial court
issued an order that considered the case submitted for decision. APT filed a motion for reconsideration, but the trial
court declared that such motion became moot and academic because a decision was earlier rendered. The trial court
fixed the total indebtedness of CCC, but declared the application for extra-judicial foreclosure as premature and
without legal basis. Omnibus motions were respectively filed by both APT and DBP, but were denied by the trial
court. Both APT and DBP appealed the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. Hence, this petition for review. Petitioner APT insisted that the lower court as well as the Court of Appeals
disregarded the principles of the due process clause embodied in the Constitution when it found APT to have waived
its right to cross-examine respondent’s witnesses. On the other hand, respondent CCC countered that the findings of
the lower court may be attributed to the fault of APT’s counsel because he absented himself on scheduled hearing
dates. EAcIST
According to the Supreme Court, petitioner APT was not denied its right to due process when it failed to
cross-examine respondent’s witness as this was due to its own counsel’s failure and negligence. A party cannot feign
denial of due process when he had the opportunity to present his side. A careful review of the records reveal that
DBP had the opportunity to exhaustively cross-examine respondent’s witnesses. Furthermore, as
transferee pendente lite, APT merely stepped into the shoes of DBP. It was also ruled that the affirmation by the
Supreme Court of the Court of Appeals’ rulings as to the indebtedness of CCC, does not in anyway prejudice
APT/DBP’s right to recover from CCC, provided that they can fully substantiate their claim. The petition was denied
and the assailed decision was affirmed.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; NOT DENIED WHERE A PARTY HAD
THE OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCEEDINGS, BUT DID NOT DO SO; CASE AT BAR. — Long
ingrained in our jurisprudence is the principle that there can be no denial of due process where a party had the
opportunity to participate in the proceedings but did not do so. (Loong vs. Commission on Elections, 275 SCRA 1) As
shown from the records, the counsel for APT was absent on several occasions, specifically on April 7, May 5, June 2,
June 16, August 24 and 25, 1992. Several reasons were raised by APT's counsel to justify his absence, such as

44 | P a g e
withdrawal of previous counsel, unreadiness to conduct the cross-examinations, and serious illness. These flimsy
excuses do not warrant consideration from this Court. The due process requirement is satisfied where the parties are
given the opportunity to submit position papers, as in this case. Both parties, CCC and DBP/APT, were given
opportunity to submit their respective position papers after the Commissioner rendered his report. Contained in their
position papers were their respective comments and objections to the said report. Furthermore, the parties were also
given the chance to cross-examine the Commissioner and his representative. They were likewise granted opportunity
to cross-examine the witnesses of the other party, however, like in APT's case, they were deemed to have waived
their right, as previously discussed. The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity
to be heard and to support any evidence he may have in support of his defense. What the law prohibits is absolute
absence of the opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process when he had been
afforded the opportunity to present his side.

DECISION

MARTINEZ,  J p:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision 1 rendered by the Court of Appeals dated March 28,
1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 42596 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court-Branch 9 of Malolos, Bulacan dated
October 9, 1992 and adopting in toto the orders rendered by the same trial court dated August 25 and December 14,
1992. LLphil
On November 18, 1985, the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), a government owned and
controlled corporation, filed with the Office of the Sheriff of Malolos an application for extra-judicial foreclosure of real
and personal properties situated at San Jose del Monte and Norzagaray, Bulacan involving several real and/or
chattel mortgages executed by Continental Cement Corporation (CCC), a corporation organized and existing under
Philippine laws, engaged mainly in the manufacture of cement, in favor of DBP on August 20, 1968; September 4,
1968; May 7, 1969; September 19, 1969; October 24, 1969 and November 13, 1969.
On December 11, 1985, Continental Cement filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan. The suit principally sought to enjoin the then defendants DBP and the Sheriff of Malolos, Bulacan from
commencing the foreclosure proceedings on CCC's mortgages which were executed in favor of DBP to secure
various loans obtained by CCC. In addition, CCC also prayed that a new term for its loan obligation be established,
and that the court declare the interest escalation clause contained in DBP's promissory notes as null and void.
A temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued and subsequently a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was
likewise issued on January 17, 1986, despite opposition thereto by DBP.
Sometime in December 1986, Proclamation No. 50 2 was promulgated by then President Corazon C.
Aquino pursuant to Administrative Order No. 14. The proclamation established the privatization program of the
National Government and created the Committee on Privatization and herein petitioner ASSET PRIVATIZATION
TRUST (APT) as the privatization arm for the government.
Several non-performing assets of the government financial institutions, including DBP, were transferred to
the National Government. The transfer was implemented through a Deed of Transfer executed on February 27, 1987
between DBP and the National Government, which in turn, designated petitioner APT to act as its trustee over the
assets. Among the non-performing assets identified and transferred to the APT was the account of CCC. A Trust
Agreement was thereafter executed between the National Government and APT, wherein the latter was to take title to
and possession of liabilities and non-performing assets.
On September 18, 1987, DBP filed a motion to dismiss contending (1) that the case has become moot and
academic because CCC could no longer secure reliefs from DBP as a result of the transfer of DBP's claim against
CCC to APT; and (2) that the court lost jurisdiction over the subject matter considering that Section 31 of Proc. No.
50 prohibits the issuance of any restraining order or injunction against APT in connection with the acquisition, sale, or
disposition of assets transferred to it. However, the motion of DBP was denied by the trial court on January 27, 1988,
and APT was eventually allowed to join the defendant DBP pursuant to Proclamation No. 50, as amended.
In July 1989, the accounting firm of J. C. Laya 3 was designated by the lower court as Commissioner to
resolve the main issue in the case, that is, the determination of the actual arrearages of respondent CCC to petitioner
APT and DBP arising from loan accommodations obtained by CCC from DBP.

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 To aid the Commissioner and to expedite his task of determining the actual indebtedness of CCC, both CCC
and DBP provided the representatives of the Commissioner with the pertinent data and documents which were within
their custody and possession. Among the documents provided was a copy of the Memorandum of
Agreement 4 executed between CCC and DBP which pegged CCC's total indebtedness to DBP at P133,717,286.95
as of August 31, 1979.
The Commissioner was unable to accomplish his assigned task within the period set by the court. He was
initially given an extension of sixty (60) days. This proved to be insufficient thus he was granted another forty-five (45)
days from December 18, 1989.
Despite several extensions given to the Commissioner to complete his report, he failed to do so. This
prompted the trial court to issue an Order dated April 23, 1990 directing Atty. Jose Leynes 5 to explain why he should
not be cited for contempt for his unexplained omission to perform and accomplish his duties as the court appointed
Commissioner. This was followed by another Order dated July 2, 1990 citing Atty. Leynes in contempt of court and
ordered his imprisonment for his non-compliance with the April 23, 1990 order.
To avoid the consequences of the contempt order, Atty. Leynes submitted a draft report on July 11, 1990
entitled "Summary of Initial Findings." The contempt order was subsequently lifted by the trial court on August 20,
1990.
After several months of work had passed, the Commissioner, this time known as "Laya Manabat Salgado &
Co.," submitted to the lower court its report entitled "Commissioner's Report on Loan Proceeds and Payments" dated
January 11, 1991. The findings of the Commissioner as cited by the Court of Appeals in its decision were as follows:
"It bears emphasis that the report is confined to a determination of CCC's indebtedness
to DBP in relation only to four (4) straight peso loans, namely, a 12% ten-year loan of P3,867,291
signed on August 20, 1968; a 10% ten-year loan of P7,784,000 signed on September 19, 1969; a
10% ten-year loan signed on October 23, 1969; and a P5.5 Million loan not covered by any
promissory note but released to the extent of P1.0 Million in March 1972, and two (2) guaranteed
foreign exchange loans consisting of US$2,000,000 contracted on September 4, 1968 by CCC
but guaranteed by DBP in favor of Somex Ltd. and DM11,233,115 (German Deutsche Marks) in
favor of consortium of West German Manufacturers headed by Klockner-Humboldt-Deutz, A.G.
dated May 9, 1969 (Report, p. 3). The Report excludes the implications of, firstly, an industrial
fund loan extended by DBP for CCC's acquisition of coal conversion equipment appearing in
DBP's books of accounts as US$2,558,347 and, secondly, DBP's advances for insurance,
management fees and miscellaneous charges in the total amount of P4,436,807 (Report, pp. 8-
9, pars. 4.8, 4.9).  . . ." 6
As a result of the report, the parties filed their respective comments and objections thereto. During the trial,
former Central Bank Governor Jaime C. Laya and a representative of the Commissioner were called upon to testify.
The parties also had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses on matters touched upon in the report as well as
those disregarded by the Commissioner in its report.
After having cross-examined the representative of the Commissioner, the parties were then allowed to
submit their respective Position Papers. Contained in their respective position papers was their own computation of
the outstanding liabilities of CCC. CCC's computation of its exact indebtedness to DBP as of December 1990,
covering the straight peso loans and foreign guarantees stood at P43,601,192.73. The Commissioner reported that
the indebtedness amounted to P61,698,849.00 while DBP and APT computed CCC's total indebtedness in the sum
of P2,656,573,716.11. 7
On July 23, 1992, a hearing was scheduled for the sole purpose of examining three (3) of CCC's witnesses,
namely, Gregorio Lim, Urbano Cruz and Jessica Alonzo. The cross-examination was to be conducted by APT as
DBP had previously conducted its own cross-examination. The counsel for CCC failed to appear as he was allegedly
ill. On that same date, the court issued an order resetting the cross-examination for CCC's witnesses on August 24,
25 and 26, 1992. Again, the counsel for APT was not able to attend due to an alleged serious illness (Dengue
Hemorrhagic Fever). Also absent during the hearing was DBP's counsel and DBP/APT's lone witness, Mr. Jaime V.
Cruz.
On August 25, 1992, the trial court issued an order which considered the case submitted for decision. The
final paragraph of the order reads as follows:
"In the light of the foregoing developments, and conformably with the agreement
entered into much earlier by the contending parties to the effect that after the affiants to the
position papers shall have been cross-examined, the parties shall dispense with the presentation

46 | P a g e
 of further evidence, the case at bar is considered henceforth submitted for adjudication on the
merits." 8
It is claimed by petitioner APT that when the above-mentioned order was issued, APT did not yet have the
opportunity to cross-examine the affiants of respondent CCC; nor did it have the chance to present any of their
affiants to support their allegations as contained in their Joint Position Papers.
On September 18, 1992, APT filed a "Motion for Reconsideration." In an order dated October 13, 1992, the
trial court declared that such motion became moot and academic by reason of the decision rendered on October 5,
1992.
On that earlier date, the lower court rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which is as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. fixing the total indebtedness of plaintiff Continental Cement Corporation in favor of
defendant Development Bank of the Philippines on the straight peso loans and foreign
guarantees at P61,498,849.00 as of December 31, 1990;
2. fixing the indebtedness of plaintiff Continental Cement Corporation in favor of
defendant Development Bank of the Philippines on the coal conversion loan at US$977,000.00,
or P7,347,890.00 which is its equivalent in pesos at the official rate of exchange prevailing in
August 1979;
3. ordering the plaintiff to pay unto either of the defendants DBP or APT, within six (6)
months from the finality of this judgment, the aforementioned amount of P61,498,849.00 with
interest thereon at 10%  per annum from January 1, 1991 until the same shall have been fully
paid and the aforementioned amount of US$997,000.00/P7,347,890.00 without interest thereon;
4. declaring premature and without legal basis the application for extrajudicial
foreclosure (Annex A of the Complaint) filed on November 18, 1985 by defendant Development
Bank of the Philippines with the office of the defendant Sheriff of Malolos, Bulacan;
5. making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on January
17, 1986 in the case at bar enjoining proceedings on the aforementioned application for
extrajudicial foreclosure, without prejudice to such rights (including the institution of eventual
foreclosure proceedings) as the defendants may opt to pursue against the plaintiff in the event
that the directive specified in the preceding paragraph hereof shall not have been complied with;
and
6. dismissing the plaintiff's claim for unspecified attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED." 9
After having learned of the decision of the trial court, APT and DBP filed their respective Omnibus Motions.
APT, in its Omnibus Motion dated October 27, 1992, prayed for the issuance of the following orders by the trial court:
1) vacating and nullifying its Decision dated October 5, 1992;
2) granting APT an opportunity to cross-examine plaintiff's witness;
3) allowing DBP and APT to present their witnesses and evidence;
4) after trial, requiring the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. 10
The trial court, on December 14, 1992, issued an Order denying the separate Omnibus Motions of APT and
DBP. Both APT and DBP appealed the trial court's decision dated October 5, 1992 and orders dated August 25, 1992
and December 14, 1992.
On June 7, 1993, APT and DBP filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for  certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for an ex-parte issuance of a restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
32853. However, on January 31, 1994, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. cdpr

47 | P a g e
 Thus, on March 28, 1995, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 42596 rendered the assailed decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the
Decision dated October 5, 1992 and the orders dated August 25 and December 14, 1992 in toto.
The order dated January 22, 1993 is hereby annulled and set aside insofar as it directs the
partial release of collaterals by defendants-appellants DBP and APT." 11
In the instant Petition for Review, APT assigns the following errors committed by the appellate court:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION,
DISREGARDED THE PRINCIPLES EMBODIED IN THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF
THE CONSTITUTION, THUS:
A
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER HAS WAIVED
ITS RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE RESPONDENT'S WITNESS
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
ADOPTING IN TOTO THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER
A
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
THAT THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT IS UNENFORCEABLE
B
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
LIMITING THE LIABILITY OF RESPONDENT IN THE AMOUNT OF P61,498,849.00
AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1990 INSTEAD OF P2,656,573,716.11
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ISSUANCE OF A
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND WRITS OF PRELIMINARY AND PERMANENT
INJUNCTION.
Anent the first assigned error, petitioner APT insists that the lower court as well as the Court of Appeals
disregarded the principles of the due process clause embodied in the Constitution when it found APT to have waived
its right to cross-examine respondent's witnesses. On the other hand, respondent CCC counters that the findings of
the lower court may be attributed to the fault of APT's counsel. CCC alleges that the counsel for APT often absented
himself on scheduled hearing dates, resulting in the failure to cross-examine the witnesses of respondent CCC.
The insistence of the petitioner is without basis.
Long ingrained in our jurisprudence is the principle that there can be no denial of due process where a party
had the opportunity to participate in the proceedings but did not do so. 12
As shown from the records, the counsel for APT was absent on several occasions, specifically on April 7,
May 5, June 2, June 16, August 24 and 25, 1992. Several reasons were raised by APT's counsel to justify his
absence, such as withdrawal of previous counsel, unreadiness to conduct the cross-examinations, and serious
illness.
These flimsy excuses do not warrant consideration from this Court. The withdrawal of APT's previous
counsel in the thick of the proceedings would be a reasonable ground to seek postponement of the hearing.
However, such reason necessitates a duty, nay an obligation, on the part of the new counsel to prepare himself for
the next scheduled hearing. The excuse that it was due to the former counsel's failure to turn over the records of the
case to APT, shows the negligence of the new counsel to actively recover the records of the case. Mere demands are
not sufficient. Counsel should have taken adequate steps to fully protect the interest of his client, rather than pass the
blame on the previous counsel.

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 A motion to postpone trial on the ground that counsel is unprepared for trial demonstrates indifference and
disregard of a client's interest. A new counsel who appears in a case in midstream is presumed and obliged to
acquaint himself with all the antecedent processes and proceedings that have transpired prior to his takeover. 13
As regards the serious illness suffered by counsel during the trial dates of August 24 and 25, 1992, we take
note that Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever, if not treated at its early stage, could cause serious illness, sometimes even
death. This Court is not unmindful of the fact that counsel's absence was due to this deadly disease. What baffles this
Court is the reason offered by counsel that "although two other APT lawyers were mentioned in the pleadings, only
one was actively involved in the handling of the case." 14 Counsel further adds that he could not have possibly
appraised the two other lawyers to appear during the scheduled hearing in his absence.
We cannot understand why it would be difficult for counsel to appraise his two other collaborating counsels.
Counsel himself readily admits that of the two, only one is actively handling the case. It would take a mere phone call
to inform his co-counsels than he would be unable to attend rather than be declared absent during trial. Yet, counsel
failed to do so.
In view of the foregoing, we find the Court of Appeals did not commit error, when it declared that petitioner
waived its right to cross-examine the respondent's witnesses. The due process requirement is satisfied where the
parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers, 15 as in this case. Both parties, CCC and DBP/APT, were
given opportunity to submit their respective position papers after the Commissioner rendered his report. Contained in
their position papers were their respective comments and objections to the said report. Furthermore, the parties were
also given the chance to cross-examine the Commissioner and his representative. They were likewise granted
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses of the other party, however, like in APT's case, they were deemed to
have waived their right, as previously discussed.
The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to support
any evidence he may have in support of his defense. 16 What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity
to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process when he had been afforded the opportunity to present
his side. 17
As to the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the trial
court's decision adopting in toto the report of the Commissioner and the decision of the trial court declaring the
Memorandum of Agreement as unenforceable.
The-above-mentioned issues involve matters which are factual in nature. As a general rule, findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon this Court, and we will not normally disturb such factual
findings unless the findings of the court are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment
itself is based on a misapprehension of facts. 18
In the case at bar, we find no such error that would warrant a reversal of the assailed decision. As to the
matter of the memorandum of agreement, we concur with the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Memorandum of
Agreement itself stated that "failure of Continental to meet this deadline shall be construed as its objection to this new
restructuring scheme." 19 Moreover, CCC did not execute nor submit all the documents needed to make said
agreement effective. The fact that CCC did not comply with the requirements of the Memorandum of Agreement at
the expiration of the period set by DBP, only shows CCC's non-conformity to the agreement.
Since CCC did not express its conformity to the agreement, it was only proper for the Commissioner to
consider the amount of indebtedness of CCC based on actual loan releases. The Commissioner did consider the
Memorandum of Agreement as a source document, however, no one was able to satisfactorily explain how the figure
was arrived at. It must be emphasized that the Commissioner's report was limited in relation to four (4) straight peso
loans and two (2) guaranteed foreign exchange loans. It is, therefore, erroneous for APT and DBP to conclude that
CCC's entire outstanding obligations stood at P2,656,573,716.11.
As regards the determination of the Commissioner as to the actual indebtedness of CCC, we uphold the
ruling of the respondent court. The very reason why the Commissioner was appointed as such was due to the
complex nature of the issues involved in the case which required the technical know-how and expertise possessed by
the Commissioner. The records also bear the fact that said Commissioner was chosen by both parties.
As we have previously ruled in Quebral vs. CA 20 that factual findings of the Court of Appeals normally are
not reviewable by this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, except when the findings of the appellate court are
at variance with those of the trial court. Since the trial court and the Court of Appeals were in unison with the findings
of the Commissioner, this Court is of the opinion that it finds no compelling reason to reverse the same.
Lastly, petitioner APT argues that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary and permanent injunction against it (APT), despite the express

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provisions of Proclamation No. 50. On the other hand, CCC asseverates that since APT was a mere
transferee pendente lite, it was bound by the preliminary injunction previously issued against DBP.
We find merit in the assigned error of petitioner APT.
It must be recalled that the trial court did in fact issue a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against petitioner APT.
The particular section which contains the "non-injunction rule" is quoted hereunder:
"Courts may not substitute their judgment for that of APT, nor block, by an injunction the
discharge of its function and the implementation of its decision in connection with the acquisition,
sale, or disposition of assets transferred to it." 21
Furthermore, we reiterate the ruling held in that case that Proclamation No. 50 does not infringe any
provision of the Constitution. Thus —
"The President, in the exercise of his legislative power under the
Freedom Constitution,issued Proclamation No. 50-A prohibiting the courts from issuing
restraining orders and writ of injunction against the APT and the purchasers of any asset sold by
it, to prevent courts from interfering in the discharge, by this instrumentality of the executive
branch of the Government, of its task of carrying out 'the expeditious disposition and privatization
of certain government corporations and/or the assets thereof' (Proc. No. 50), absent any grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on its part. This proclamation, not
being inconsistent with the Constitution and not having been repealed or revoked by Congress,
has remained operative (Section 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution)." 22
The records of the case at bar does not disclose any grave abuse of discretion committed by petitioner APT
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in its effort to take possession of the assets transferred to it by DBP. We
are of the opinion that petitioners simply availed of judicial processes to recover the transferred assets formerly
owned by DBP. We hold respondent Court of Appeals liable of committing the assigned error.
In sum, petitioner APT was not denied its right to due process when it failed to cross-examine respondent's
witnesses as this was due to its own counsel's failure and negligence. A party cannot feign denial of due process
when he had the opportunity to present his side. 23 A careful review of the records reveal that DBP had the
opportunity to exhaustively cross-examine respondent's witnesses. Furthermore, as transferee  pendente lite, APT
merely stepped into the shoes of DBP.
As regards the indebtedness of CCC, petitioners APT/DBP must be reminded that all is not lost when the
Commissioner ruled that the outstanding loans amounted to P61,498,849.00 only. As manifested by the
Commissioner, the report limited itself to four (4) straight peso loans and two (2) guaranteed foreign exchange loans.
This was due to the insufficiency of supporting documents submitted by both parties. We wish to state that the
affirmation by this Court of the rulings of the Court of Appeals as to the indebtedness of CCC, does not in any way
prejudice APT/DBP's right to recover from CCC, provided they are fully able to substantiate their claim. LLphil
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED but with
modification as follows:
The writ of preliminary injunction issued on January 17, 1986, and the writ of permanent injunction issued on
October 5, 1992 are hereby declared NULL AND VOID pursuant to Section 31, Proclamation No. 50.
||| (Development Bank of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119712, [January 29, 1999], 362 PHIL 1-17)

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 G.R. No. 98310 – 263 SCRA 490 – Political Law – Due Process – Right to Be Heard – Not Being Party to a Case

In 1973, license was issued to Milagros Matuguina to operate logging businesses under her group Matuguina
Logging Enterprises. MIWPI was established in 1974 with 7 stockholders. Milagros Matuguina became the majority
stockholder later on. Milagros later petitioned to have MLE be transferred to MIWPI. Pending approval of MLE’s
petition, Davao Enterprises Corporation filed a complaint against MLE before the District Forester (Davao) alleging
that MLE has encroached upon the area allotted for DAVENCOR’s timber concession. The Investigating Committee
found MLE guilty as charged and had recommended the Director to declare that MLE has done so. MLE appealed
the case to the Ministry of Natural Resources.  During pendency, Milagrosa withdrew her shares from MIWPI. Later,
MNR Minister Ernesto Maceda found MLE guilty as charged. Pursuant to the finding, DAVENCOR and Philip Co
requested Maceda to order MLE and/or MIWPI to comply with the ruling to pay the value in pesos of 2352.04
m3 worth of timbers. The Minister then issued a writ of execution against MIWPI. MIWPI filed a petition for prohibition
before the Davao RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of MIWPI and has ordered to enjoin the Minister from pursuing the
execution of the writ. DAVENCOR appealed and the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. MIWPI averred that it is not a
party to the original case (as it was MLE that was sued – a separate entity). That the issuance of the order of
execution by the Minister has been made not only without or in excess of his authority but that the same was issued
patently without any factual or legal basis, hence, a gross violation of MIWPI’s constitutional rights under the due
process clause.

ISSUE: Whether or not MIWPI’s right to due process has been violated.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of MIWPI. Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall be affected by any
proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case not bound by judgment rendered by the court. In the
same manner an execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court.
There is no basis for the issuance of the Order of Execution against the MIWPI. The same was issued without giving
MIWPI an opportunity to defend itself and oppose the request of DAVENCOR for the issuance of a writ of execution
against it. In fact, it does not appear that MIWPI was at all furnished with a copy of DAVENCOR’s letter requesting for
the Execution of the Minister’s decision against it. MIWPI was suddenly made liable upon the order of execution by
the respondent Secretary’s expedient conclusions that MLE and MIWPI are one and the same, apparently on the
basis merely of DAVENCOR’s letter requesting for the Order, and without hearing or impleading MIWPI. Until the
issuance of the Order of execution, MIWPI was not included or mentioned in the proceedings as having any
participation in the encroachment in DAVENCOR’s timber concession. This action of the Minister disregards the most
basic tenets of due process and elementary fairness. The liberal atmosphere which pervades the procedure in
administrative proceedings does not empower the presiding officer to make conclusions of fact before hearing all the
parties concerned. (1996 Oct 24)

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 G.R. No. 118882 – 330 Phil. 1034 – Political Law – Due Process – Even the State is Entitled to It

Jane Go was being sued criminally for the death of her husband. The case was lodged before the sala of Judge
Pedro Espina of the Tacloban RTC. The Prosecution however moved for Judge Espina to inhibit himself from hearing
the case. The Prosecution averred that Judge Espina earlier ordered the Prosecution not to proceed against Jane
Go’s preliminary investigation. Judge Espina refused to inhibit himself. The matter reached the Court of Appeals and
the CA ruled that Espina does not have to inhibit himself from hearing the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process of the state has been violated.

HELD: Yes. In the case at bar, Judge Pedro Espina can not be considered to adequately possess the cold neutrality
of an impartial judge as to fairly assess both the evidence to be adduced by the prosecution and the defense in view
of his previous decision in Special Civil Action No. 92-11-219 wherein he enjoined the preliminary investigation at the
Regional State Prosecutor’s Office level against Jane Go, the principal accused in the killing of her husband
Dominador Go.

Judge Espina’s decision in favor of Jane Go serves as sufficient and reasonable basis for the prosecution to seriously
doubt his impartiality in handling the criminal cases. Verily, it would have been more prudent for Judge Espina to
have voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the criminal cases.

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       JAVIER VS. COMELEC
       G.R. No.L- 68379-812, September 22, 1986
FACTS:

1.   The petitioner Evelio Javier and the private respondent Arturo Pacificador were candidates in Antique for the
Batasang Pambansa election in May 1984;

2.   Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of the election returns, Javier went to
the COMELEC to prevent the impending proclamation of his rival;

3.   On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the COMELEC directed the provincial board of canvassers to proceed
with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders;

4.   On June 7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the
winner without prejudice to the outcome of the petition filed by Javier with the COMELEC;

5.   On certiorari with the S.C. the proclamation made by the Board of Canvasser was set aside as premature, having
been made before the lapse of the 5 – day period of appeal, which the petitioner seasonably made;

6.   On July 23, 1984 the Second Division itself proclaimed Pacificador the elected assemblyman of Antique.

ISSUE:

Was the Second Division of the COMELEC, authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984 proclaiming
Pacificador the winner in the election ?

APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSITUTION:

The applicable provisions of the 1973 Constitution are Art. XII-C, secs. 2 and 3, which provide:

“Section 2. Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of all members of the
Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials.”

“Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election casesa may be heard and
decided by divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and
decided en banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the
date of their submission for decision.”

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES:

Petitioner:
The proclamation made by the Second Division is invalid because all contests involving members of the Batasang
Pambansa come under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections en banc.
Respondents:

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Only “contests” need to be heard and decided en banc, all other cases can be – in fact, should be – filed with and
decided only by any of the three divisions.

There is a difference between “contests” and “cases” and also a difference between “pre-proclamation controversies”
and “election protests”. The pre-proclamation controversy between the petitioner and the private respondent was not
yet a contest at the time and therefore could be validly heard by a mere division of the Commission on elections,
consonant with Sec. 3. The issue at that stage was still administrative and could be resolved by a division.

HELD:

a.   The S.C. decided to resolve the case even if the Batasang Pambansa had already been abolished by the Aquino
government, and even if Javier had already died in the meantime. This was because of its desire for this case to
serve as a guidance for the future. Thus it said: “The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions
but also the conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice.
The two are not always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been
settled and decision is no longer possible according to law. But there are also times when although the dispute has
disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act, then, not only for
the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.”

b.   The S.C. held on the main issue that in making the COMELEC the sole judge of all contests involving the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city
officials, the Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and
on all matter related thereto, including those arising before the proclamation of the winners.

The decision rendered by the Second Division alone was therefore set aside as violative of the Constitution. The case
should have been decided en banc.

c.   Pre-proclamation controversies became known and designated as such only because of Sec. 175 of the 1978
Election Code. The 1973 Constitution could not have therefore been intended to have divided contests between pre
and post proclamation when that Constitution was written in 1973.

d.   The word “contests” should not be given a restrictive meaning; on the contrary, it should receive the widest
possible scope conformably to the rule that the words used in the Constitution should be interpreted liberally. As
employed in the 1973 Constitution, the term should be understood as referring to any matter involving the title or
claim of title to an elective office, made before or after the proclamation of the winner, whether or not the contestant is
claiming the office in dispute.

e.   There was also a denial of due process. One of the members of the Second Division, Commissioner Jose
Opinion was a law partner of Pacificador. He denied the motion to disqualify him from hearing the case. The Court
has repeatedly and consistently demanded “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as the indispensable imperative
of due process. To bolster that requirement we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also
appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just.

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 G.R. No. L-52241 – 133 SCRA 271 – Political Law – Due Process – Impartial and Competent Court

Rosalinda Tecson filed a case for collection of sum of money before the Rizal RTC against Pedro Azul. The case was
raffled to Judge Sarmiento. On 27 Mar 1979, Azul received the copy of the complaint. On 10 Apr 1979, Azul filed a
motion for a 15 day extension to file for responsive pleading. Azul was unaware that J. Sarmiento retired and was
temporarily substituted by J. Anover who granted the extension but only for 5 days starting the next day. However,
Azul only received the order granting his on the 23rd of the same month way past the 5 day period granted. On the
17th of April, Tecson already filed a motion to declare Azul in default averring that Azul’s 5 day extension has already
lapsed. On the 18th of the same month, J Castro, the permanent judge who replaced J Sarmiento took office and he
declared Azul to be in default due to the lapse of the 5 day extension. J Castro proceeded with the reception of
evidence the next day and of course without Azul’s evidence as he was still unaware of him being in default. On April
27th, J Castro ruled in favor Tecson. On May 2nd Azul, unaware that J Castro already decided the case moved for
reconsideration to remove his default status. On May 7th Azul received the decision rendered by the court on Apr
27th (but on record the date of receipt was May 5th). Azul filed a motion for new trial on June 6th. The lower court
denied the same on the 20th of the same month. On Aug 1st, Azul filed a notice of appeal it was denied on the 3rd but
was reconsidered on the 7th hence Azul filed his record on appeal on the 21st and J Castro approved it on the 27th but
upon motion of Tecson on the 30th, J Castro set aside its earlier decision on the 27th. Finally, J Castro disallowed
Azul’s record on appeal on the 7th of September.

ISSUE: Whether or not Azul has been denied due process.

HELD: Yes. The SC agreed with the Azul that he was denied due process. The constitutional provision on due
process commands all who wield public authority, but most peremptorily courts of justice, to strictly maintain
standards of fundamental fairness and to insure that procedural safeguards essential to a fair trial are observed at all
stages of a proceeding. It may be argued that when Azul’s counsel asked for a fifteen (15) day extension from April
11, 1979 to file his answer, it was imprudent and neglectful for him to assume that said first extension would be
granted. However, the records show that Atty. Camaya personally went to the session hall of the court with his motion
for postponement only to be informed that J Sarmiento had just retired but that his motion would be considered
“submitted for resolution.” Since the sala was vacant and pairing judges in Quezon City are literally swamped with
their own heavy loads of cases, counsel may be excused for assuming that, at the very least, he had the requested
fifteen (15) days to file his responsive pleading. It is likewise inexplicable why J Anover, who had not permanently
taken over the sala vacated by the retired judge, should suddenly rule that only a five-day extension would be
allowed. And to compound Azul’s problems, the order was sent by mail and received only twelve (12) days later or
after the five-day period. A court should have known that court orders requiring acts to be done in a matter of days
should not be sent by mail.

Further, Azul was declared in default. However, it appears that Azul was not furnished a copy of the motion from
Tecson seeking for him (Azul) to be declared in default. Also, the motion was dated April 17, 1979. Judge Castro
acted on and granted said motion on April 18, 1979 – the first day that Judge Castro assumed office.

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G.R. Nos. L-69640-45 – 136 SCRA 266 – Political Law – Due Process – Hostility Between the Judge and the Parties
– Inhibition

Paderanga was the mayor of Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental. He petitioned that J Azura inhibits himself from
deciding on pending cases brought before him on the grounds that they have lost confidence in him, that he
entertained tax suits against the city and had issued TROs on the sales of properties when it is clearly provided for by
law (Sec 74 PD 464) that the remedy to stop auction is to pay tax, that J Azura is bias, oppressive and is abusive in
his power.

ISSUE: Whether or not J Azura should inhibit himself from the trial.

HELD: Yes. The SC ruled that Azura must. As decided in the Pimentel Case (21 SCRA 160), “All the foregoing
notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a
situation where their capacity to try and decide fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any
one of the parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation But when suggestion is made of
record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of
circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He
should exercise his discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. . .”

The reminder is also apropos that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it
in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge.

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 G.R. No. L-49360 – 94 SCRA 707 – Political Law – Due Process – Hearing

David has a large parcel of land in Polomolok, Cotabato. He let Felomeno Jugar and Ricardo Jugar tend and
caretake separate portions of his land in 1971. The land is estimated to be yielding 60-70 cavans of corn cobs and
the share agreed upon is 50-50. In 1973, David withdrew the land from the brothers and has not allowed them to go
back there. The brothers prayed for reinstatement but David refused to do so. David denied that the brothers were his
tenants. He said that Ricardo was his tractor driver before but he resigned to take care of his dad and to work for
DOLE. Felomeno on the other hand surrendered the portion of the land he was tending to continue his faith healing. J
Aquilizan handled the case filed by the brothers against David and after three months he rendered a decision in favor
of the brothers without any hearing. David averred he was denied due process. J Aquilizan admitted that there was
indeed no hearing conducted but he said the decision has already become final and executory as the period for
appeal has already lapsed.

ISSUE: Whether or not David is entitled to an appeal.

HELD: Yes. The SC ruled in favor of David. A decision rendered without a hearing is null and void and may be
attacked directly or collaterally. The decision is null and void for want of due process. And it has been held that a final
and executory judgment may be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation when the judgment is void for
lack of due process of law. In legal contemplation, it is as if no judgment has been rendered at all.

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 G.R. No. L-37051 – 78 SCRA 485 – Political Law – Due Process – Hearing

Lorenzana was renting a parcel of land from the Manila Railroad Company (later from the Bureau of Lands). She later
purchased the land (San Lazaro Estate). She had the property be rented to tenants occupying stalls. Due to
nonpayment of rents, she filed 12 ejectment cases against her tenant. On the other hand, Cayetano was an occupant
of a parcel of land adjacent to that of Lorenzana’s land. Cayetano was renting the same from the Bureau of Lands.
The lower court granted Lorenzana’s ejectment cases. Lorenzana then secured a writ of execution to forcibly eject
her tenants but she included Cayetano’s property. Cayetano was not a party to the ejectment cases so she prayed for
the lower court that her property be not touched. The lower court denied Cayetano’s petition. The CA, upon appeal,
favored Cayetano. Lorenzana averred that Cayetano is now a party to the ejectment cases as she already brought
herself to the Court’s jurisdiction by virtue of her appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cayetano’s right to due process has been violated.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Cayetano and has affirmed the CA. It must be noted that respondent was not a party
to any of the 12 ejectment cases wherein the writs of demolition had been issued; she did not make her appearance
in and during the pendency of these ejectment cases. Cayetano only went to court to protect her property from
demolition after the judgment in the ejectment cases had become final and executory. Hence, with respect to the
judgment in said ejectment cases, Cayetano remains a third person to such judgment, which does not bind her;  nor
can its writ of execution be informed against her since she was not afforded her day in court in said ejectment cases.

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ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING VS. CA, 94 SCRA 261

Facts: Director Gozon issued an order dated October 5, 1960 wherein he dismissed the case filed by the petitioners
Zambales Chromite Mining Co. In that case, they sought to be declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors
of 69 mining claims located in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. On the basis Of petitioners’ evidence -the private respondents
did not present any evidence and they fled a demurrer to the evidence or motion to dismiss the protest. Director
Gozon found that the petitioners did not discover any mineral nor staked and located mining claims in accordance
with law. The petitioners then appealed from that order to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. While
the appeal was pending Director Gozon was appointed Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Instead of
inhibiting himself, he decided the appeal as it he was adjudicating the case for the first time. Thus, Secretary Gozon
exercised appellate jurisdiction over a case which he had decided as Director of Mines. He acted as reviewing
authority in the appeal from his own decision. Or, to use another analogy, he acted as trial judge and appellate judge
in the same case.

Issue: Whether petitioner’s right of due process is violated

Held: Yes. Petitioners-appellants were deprived of due process, meaning fundamental fairness, when Secretary
Gozon reviewed his own decision as Director of Mines. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer
might not turn out to be a farce the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under
review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the
reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not
admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. A sense of proportion and consideration for the fitness of
things should have deterred Secretary Gozon from reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines. He should have
asked his undersecretary to undertake the review.

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 Anzaldo vs. Clave 119 SCRA 353 (1982) G.R. No. L-54597, December 15, 1982

Fact: Petitioner, seeks to annul the decision of PEA Respondent dated March 20, 1980, revoking her appointment
dated January 5, 1978 as Science Research Supervisor II and directing the appointment to that position of Doctor
Respondent. The contested position became vacant in 1974 when its incumbent, Doctor Quintin Kintanar, became
Director of the Biological Research Center. Doctor Kintanar recommended that Doctor Respondent be appointed to
that position. Petitioner protested against that recommendation. The NIST Reorganization Committee found her
protest to be valid and meritorious. Because of that impasse, which the NIST Commissioner did not resolve, the
position was not filled up. At the time the vacancy occurred, or on June 30, 1974, both Petitioner and Respondent
Doctor were holding similar positions in the Medical Research Department: that of Scientist Research Associate IV.
Both were next-in-rank to the vacant position. Later, Doctor Pedro G. Afable, Vice-Chairman, became the Officer-in-
Charge of the NIST. Effective January 5, 1978, he appointed Petitioner to the contested position. The appointment
was approved by the Civil Service Commission. Doctor Venzon in a letter dated January 23, 1978, addressed to
Jacobo C. Clave, appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines. The appeal was forwarded to the NIST
Petitioner to the contested position. The appeal-protest was later sent to the Civil Service Commission. Chairman
Clave of the Civil Service Commission and Commissioner Jose A. R. Melo recommended in August 23, 1979 that
Respondent Doctor be appointed to the contested position, a recommendation which is in conflict with the 1978
appointment of Doctor Anzaldo which was duly attested and approved by the Civil Service. The resolution was made
pursuant to section 19(6) of the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, Presidential Decree No. 807 (which took
effect on October 6, 1975) and which provides that “before deciding a contested appointment, the Office of the
President shall consult the Civil Service Commission.” Upon denial on January 5, 1980, Petitioner appealed to the
Office of the President of the Philippines. As stated earlier, Respondent PEA (who was concurrently Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission) in his decision of March 20, 1980 Petitioner ‘s appointment and ruled that, “as
recommended by the Civil Service Commission” (meaning Chairman Clave himself and Commissioner Melo),
Respondent Doctor should be appointed to the contested position but that Doctor Anzaldo’s appointment to the said
position should be considered “valid and effective during the pendency” of Doctor Venzon’s protest. August 14, 1980,
Respondent PEA denied Petitiioner’s motion which lead for her filing of special civil action of certiorari in the SC.

What is manifestly anomalous and questionable about that decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Clave is that it
is an implementation of Resolution No. 1178 dated August 23, 1979 signed by Jacobo C. Clave, as Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission and concurred in by Commissioner Jose A. Melo.

In that resolution, Commissioner Clave and Melo, acting for the Civil Service Commission, recommended that Doctor
Venzon be appointed Science Research Supervisor II in place of Doctor Anzaldo.

When Presidential Executive Assistant Clave said in his decision that he was “inclined to concur in the
recommendation of the Civil Service Commission”, what he meant was that he was concurring with Chairman Clave’s
recommendation: he was concurring with himself

Issue: Whether Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in deciding the appeal in favor of Doctor Venzon?

Held: Yes, It is evident that Doctor Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant
Clave concurred with the recommendation of Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission.where it was held that
the decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Clave affirming his own decision when he is still Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission was void because it was rendered with grave abuse of discretion and was a mockery of
administrative justice as per the courts decision in Zambales Chromite Mining Co. vs. Court of Appeals, L-49711,
November 7, 1979, 94 SCRA 261. Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Doctor Anzaldo
that Presidential Executive Assistant Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission, as to who between Doctor Anzaldo and Doctor Venzon should be appointed Science Research
Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the Philippines. Common sense and propriety dictate that the
commissioner in the Civil Service Commission, who should be consulted by the Office of the President, should be a
person different from the person in the Office of the President who would decide the appeal of the protestant in a

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contested appointment. In this case, the person who acted for the Office of the President is the same person in the
Civil Service Commission who was consulted by the Office of the President: Jacobo C. Clave. The Civil Service
Decree could not have contemplated that absurd situation for, as held in the Zambales Chromite case, that would not
be fair to the appellant.

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 [G.R. No. 122389. June 19, 1997.]

MIGUEL SINGSON,  petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. (PAL),  respondents.

Buenaventura B. Paat for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.
Paulino D. Ungos Jr. for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; DUE PROCESS;

REVIEW BY AN OFFICER OF HIS OWN DECISION ON APPEAL, A VIOLATION OF; CASE AT BENCH. — In the
case at bar, we hold that petitioner was denied due process when Commissioner Aquino participated, as presiding
commissioner of the Second Division of the NLRC, in reviewing private respondent PAL's appeal. He was reviewing
his own decision as a former labor arbiter. Under Rule VII, Section 2(b) of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,
each Division shall consist of one member from the public sector who shall act as the Presiding Commissioner and
one member each from the workers and employers sectors, respectively. The composition of the Division guarantees
equal representation impartiality among its members. Thus, litigants are entitled to a review of three (3)
commissioners who are impartial right from the start of the process of review. Commissioner Aquino can hardly be
considered impartial since he was the arbiter who decided the case under review. He should have inhibited himself
from any participation in this case.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFECT NOT CURED BY AN IMPARTIAL REVIEW OF THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION THEREFOR. — Prescinding from this premise, the May 19, 1995 resolution of the respondent
NLRC is void for the Division that handed it down was not composed of three impartial commissioners. The infirmity
of the resolution was not cured by the fact that the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied by two
commissioners and without the participation of Commissioner Aquino. The right of petitioner to an impartial review of
his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. He is not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his
motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an impartial review of three commissioners. The denial of
petitioner's right to an impartial review of his appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due
process. ADCIca

DECISION

PUNO,  J p:

Assailed in the petition for certiorari before us is the Resolution of the public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission 1 (hereinafter NLRC) reversing the Decision of the Labor Arbiter 2 in NLRC-NCR Case No.
00-10-05750-91 finding the dismissal of petitioner Miguel Singson illegal and ordering his reinstatement. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the public respondent in an Order dated June 27, 1995.
The antecedent facts reveal that petitioner Singson was employed by private respondent Philippine Airlines,
Inc. (hereinafter PAL) as Traffic Representative Passenger, Handling Division. His duty consisted of checking in
passengers and baggage for a particular flight. On June 7, 1991, petitioner was assigned to serve the check-in
counter of Japan Air Lines (hereinafter JAL) for Flight 742. Among the passengers checked in by him was Ms. Lolita
Kondo who was bound for Narita, Japan. After checking in, Ms. Kondo lodged a complaint alleging that petitioner
required her to pay US $200.00 for alleged excess baggage without issuing any receipt. A confrontation took place
where petitioner was asked by the security officer to empty his pockets. The dollars paid by Ms. Kondo were not
found in his possession. However, when the lower panel of the check-in counter he was manning was searched, the
sum of two hundred sixty five dollars (US $265) was found therein consisting of two (2) one hundred dollar bills, one
(1) fifty dollar bill, one (1) ten dollar bill and one (1) five dollar bill. Petitioner was administratively charged and
investigated by a committee formed by private respondent PAL. 3

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 In an affidavit presented to the investigators, Ms. Kondo declared that she was with three (3) Japanese
friends when she checked in on June 7, 1991, for their flight to Narita, Japan. While in line, a man approached her
and told her that she had excess baggage. She denied the allegation since the pieces of baggage did not only belong
to her but also to her Japanese companions. The man did not believe that the Japanese were her companions and
he charged that she just approached them at the airport. To settle the matter, he told her to give him two hundred
dollars (US $200) and he apologized for their argument. She gave him one (1) one hundred dollar bill and two (2) fifty
dollar bills or a total of two hundred dollars (US $200) as excess baggage fee. She placed the money at the side of
his counter desk and he covered it with a piece of paper. He did not issue a receipt. She then reported the matter to
JAL's representative. Ms. Kondo identified the employee who checked her in as the petitioner. 4
In his affidavit, petitioner admitted that he was the one who checked in Ms. Kondo and her Japanese
companions. They checked in five (5) pieces of luggage which weighed 80 kilos and within the allowed limit for
check-in baggage. He attached the claim checks to the jacket of their tickets, returned the tickets and passport to Ms.
Kondo. He then heard an altercation involving a woman passenger with excess hand-carried baggage who was being
charged for it; she was insisting she had paid for it in the counter but could not produce a receipt. The passenger
turned out to be Ms. Kondo and she was accusing Cocoy Gabriel as the one who charged her for excess baggage.
Mr. Gabriel at that time was assigned at the THAI Airways counter, hence, it was impossible that a passenger for a
JAL flight would pay him US $200. Petitioner was talking to the JAL's representative when two PAL employees and
Ms. Kondo approached them. He was told of Ms. Kondo's claim that she paid the excess baggage fee to him.
Petitioner was surprised at the accusation since Ms. Kondo had no excess baggage when she checked in. 5
The investigation committee found petitioner guilty of the offense charged and recommended his dismissal.
Private respondent PAL adopted the committee's recommendation and dismissed him from the service effective June
7, 1991. 6
On September 12, 1991, petitioner lodged a complaint against respondent PAL before the NLRC-NCR for
illegal dismissal, attorney's fees and damages. The case was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-10-05750-91
and raffled off to then Labor Arbiter Raul T .  Aquino. Aquino found the evidence adduced by private respondent PAL
in terminating petitioner's employment insufficient. Aquino declared petitioner's dismissal illegal and ordered his
reinstatement with backwages. Respondent PAL appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. On May 19, 1995, the
Second Division of public respondent NLRC, composed of Commissioners Victoriano R. Calaycay, Rogelio I. Rayala
and Raul T  . Aquino as presiding commissioner, promulgated its Resolution reversing the decision of then Labor
Arbiter Aquino and dismissing the complaint against respondent PAL. Petitioner filed on June 5, 1995, a motion for
the reconsideration of the aforementioned Resolution and an Amended Motion for Reconsideration on June 15, 1995.
Public respondent NLRC, thru the Second Division with only two commissioners taking part, namely, Commissioners
Calaycay and Rayala, denied the motion.
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court where petitioner submits the following
assignment of errors:
"I. Public respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of
jurisdiction when the Hon. Raul T. Aquino, in his capacity as Presiding Commissioner of the
Second Division of the NLRC and as a member thereof, participated actively in the promulgation
of the aforesaid decision and in the consultation of the members thereof in reaching the
conclusion before it was assigned to the ponente, Hon. Calaycay.
"II. Public respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion as in fact it exceeded its
jurisdiction when it declared the affidavit of Lolita Kondo sufficient to declare his dismissal from
employment legal even without any cross-examination during the investigation conducted by
Philippine Air Lines.
"III. Public respondent NLRC seriously and gravely erred amounting to abuse of
discretion and/or in excess of its jurisdiction when it declared in the assailed decision that the
quantum of evidence necessary to justify the supreme penalty of dismissal of the petitioner have
been complied with, and in not imposing the burden of proving the legality of the dismissal of the
petitioner."
We find merit in this petition.
Petitioner assails the Resolution of the public respondent NLRC on account of Commissioner Raul T.
Aquino's participation in reviewing and reversing on appeal his own decision as labor arbiter in NLRC-NCR Case No.
00-10-05750-91. Respondents contend that Commissioner Aquino's failure to inhibit himself is a harmless error that
will not infirm the subject resolution. We do not agree. In the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 7 we
laid down the requisites of procedural due process in administrative proceedings, to wit: (1) the right to a hearing,
which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support thereof; (2) the tribunal must consider

63 | P a g e
the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have something to support itself; (4) the evidence must be substantial;
(5) the decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected; (6) the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; (7) the Board
or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. In addition, administrative due
process includes (a) the right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect
a person's legal right; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights and to introduce witnesses and
relevant evidence in his favor; (c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and
impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; and (d) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial
evidence presented at the hearing or at least ascertained in the records or disclosed to the parties. 8 It is self-evident
from the ruling case law that the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same person whose decision
is the subject of review. Thus, we have ruled that "the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose
decision is under review." 9
In the case at bar, we hold that petitioner was denied due process when Commissioner Aquino participated,
as presiding commissioner of the Second Division of the NLRC, in reviewing private respondent PAL's appeal. He
was reviewing his own decision as a former labor arbiter. Under Rule VII, Section 2 (b) of the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC, 10 each Division shall consist of one member from the public sector who shall act as the
Presiding Commissioner and one member each from the workers and employers sectors, respectively. The
composition of the Division guarantees equal representation and impartiality among its members. Thus, litigants are
entitled to a review of three (3) commissioners who are impartial right from the start of the process of review.
Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered impartial since he was the arbiter who decided the case under
review. He should have inhibited himself from any participation in this case.
Prescinding from this premise, the May 19, 1995 resolution of the respondent NLRC is void for the Division
that handed it down was not composed of three impartial commissioners. The infirmity of the resolution was not cured
by the fact that the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied by two commissioners and without the
participation of Commissioner Aquino. The right of petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from the time
he filed his appeal. He is not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his motion for
reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an impartial review of three commissioners. The denial of petitioner's right to
an impartial review of his appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due process. cdasia
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of the Second Division of the NLRC dated May 19, 1995 and its Order
dated June 27, 1995 in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-10-05750-91 is SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the NLRC for
further proceedings. No Costs.
||| (Singson v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 122389, [June 19, 1997], 340 PHIL 470-477)

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 MAYOR BAYANI ALONTE VS. JUDGE SAVELLANO, 287 SCRA 245
Vitug, J.
Mayor Alonte of Binan, Laguna was charged of rape before Branch 25, RTC of Laguna. However, as a result of a
petition for a transfer of venue filed by the prosecution and granted by the SC, his case was transferred to RTC
Branch 53, Manila, presided over by the respondent judge.
After the petitioner’s arraignment, the prosecution submitted an AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE signed by the private
complainant JUVIE-LYN PUNONGBAYAN where she prayed for the withdrawal of the case because she is no longer
interested in pursuing the same with no intention of re-filing the said case in the future.
Pending resolution of the said motion to withdraw, the petitioner filed a motion for bail. The same was not resolved
despite several motions filed by the petitioner to resolve the same.
On December 17, 1997, counsel for the petitioner, ATTY. PHILIP SIGFRID FORTUN, received a notice from the
respondent judge notifying him of the promulgation of the decision in this case despite the fact that the prosecution
and the defense have not presented their evidence in court.
On December 18, 1997, the respondent judge issued a Decision convicting the petitioner of rape and sentenced to
suffer a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was denied his right to due process of law.

Held:
In order that an accused in a criminal proceedings is deemed to have been given the right to due process of law, the
following requisites must be complied with before a decision is rendered:
1.            the court or tribunal trying the case is clothed with jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter before it;
2.            that jurisdiction was lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
3.            that the accused is given the opportunity to be heard; and
4.            that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing (PEOPLE VS. DAPITAN, 197 SCRA 378)
The act of the respondent judge in rendering a decision without even giving the petitioner the right to adduce
evidence in his behalf is a gross violation of his right to due process of law.  The Decision rendered is NULL AND
VOID for want of due process.

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