| A HISTORY OF RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION ‘Third Edition David MacKenzie Department of History ‘The University of North Carolina at Greensboro and Michael W. Curran of History ‘The Ohio State University Wadsworth Publishing Company Belmont, California A Division of Wadsworth, IncChapter Thirty-Three ss Hearne a eeceecece eee ee The Politics of Stalinism, 1928-1941 By 1928 Stalin had ousted Trotskdi and the “Left Opposition” and had taken major steps toward personal rule in a totalitarian system, away from Lenin’s collective leadership and freer intraparty debate. After 41928 Stalin moved to secure total power over party and state by crush- ing the “Right Opposition” and purging other colleagues of Lenin who retained influential positions. He manipulated the Lenin cult and cre- ated the monstrous myth of his own omniscience. To win autocratic power, the Stalin regime crushed passive opposition from the peas- Intry and secured control over the countryside by forcibly collectivia- ing agriculture. With the rapid industrialization of the five-year plans, jt won support from an increasing working class." The state swallowed society a8 most Soviet citizens became state employees, subject to in- creasing party supervision and controls. After all significant opposition had seemingly been overcome, Stalin launched the Great Purge of 1996-38, which eliminated the Old Bolsheviks and left his minions triumphant over a purged party, army, and state and over a supine and frightened populace. In the Stalinist political system, theory and practice were often totally at odds. The federal system and the Consti- tution of 1936 gave national minorities and the Soviet people the ap- pearance of self-government and civil rights; actually, all power r2- Sided in a self-perpetuating party leadership in Moscow. Did Stalin’s ‘aims and methods derive from Ivan the Terrible? Was he a loyal Marx- ist and a trae heir of Lenin, or was he an Oriental despot paying mere Tip service to Marxism-Leninism? How did Stalin's pobtical system function? Why did he undertake the Great Purge? ollectivization and iridustelalization, see below, pp. 659-70‘he Politi of Salina, 1928-1981 Chapter Thirty Three Joseph Stalin, 1879-1993. (United Press International) INTRAPARTY STRUGGLES AND CRISES, 1929-1934 ‘A growing personality cult aided Stalin's drive to dominate the party i and rule the USSR. Launched cautiously at the Fourteenth Congress in | 1925, it developed notably after Stalin's fiftieth birthday (December 21, 1928), colebrated as a great historic event, In contrast with Lenin's modest, unassuming pose, the Stalin cult by the mid-1930s took on grandiose, even ludicrous forms. At a rally during the purges in 1937, N. 8. Khrushchev, Stalin’s eventual successor, declared: / ‘These miserable nonentities wanted to destroy the unity of the party ancl the Soviet stat. They raised their treacherous hands against Comrade Stalin. . . , our hope; Stalin, our desire; Stalin, the light of advanced and progressive humanity; Stain, our will; Stalin, our victory? Within the party, the atea of dissent narrowed, then disappeared. As Stalin crushed the “Left” in 1926-27, it became clear that he would exclude factions or individuals who opposed his personal authority. But though Trotskii and the rest were stripped of influential positions, they stil underestimated Stalin. Trotskii’s expulsion from the USSR in al 1929 brought predictions that power would pass to a triumvirate of ie Bukharin, Alexis Rykov, and M. P. Tomskii, which appeared (mistak- ; ‘enly) to dominate the Politburo selected after the Fifteenth Congress. 7 Quoted in E. Crankshaw, Khrushehe's Russa (Harmondsworth, Eng 1959), p. 53.Intraparty Straggle and Criss, 1929-1994 638 ‘Once the Left had been broken, Stalin adopted a moderate sianee and split with the “Right” led by Bukharin. The ‘Stalin-Bukharin strug- fle developed behind the scenes during 2 growing cron cris Rover off peasants (Kulaks), taxed heavily by the regime, withheld thelr grain from the market. Whereas Bukharin favored further conces- ae Er the peasantry, inckuding raising state grain prices, Stain begert turging strong action against the Kulaks and officials who sympathized a eon Benouncing the still unnamed opposition for blocking 1 with tration, Stalin used his control of the Secretariat and) the Orgburo to remove Bukharin’s supporters from key pany ‘and govern re posts, Belatedly contacting, Kamenev from the byoKen Left, Pathadn warned: “He [Stalin] will strangle us.” He added: Stalin. . isan unprindpled intriguer who subordinates everything tne prvervation of his over. He changes his theories according fo Wher) He Prods to get id of at any given moment. .. . Hemaneuvers in auch a ‘way as to make us stand as the schismatics” By early 1929 Stalin attacked the Right openly and told a Politburo oy sing: “Comrades, sad though it may be, we must face facts: faetional group has been established within our par composed of Bakhorine Tomskil, and Rykov.” This faction, he said, was blocking PM ustrialzation and collectivization. Though the Right controlled the Miastow party organization, Stain won majority suppor the Polit- wee bypassed the Moscow leaders, and broke thelr resistance, In FIGURE 33-1 Politics of Stalinism STALIN Politours ‘Central Committee Fulltime party cadres Communist party ‘Ente population ests ‘SGuoted in 1. Deutscher, Stalin (London, 1949), p. 314634 Chapter They Tiree | The Pes of Stalinism, 1928-1961 April 1929 the Central Committee condemned the Right and removed its leaders from their posts; in November they surrendered, recanted their views, and bought themselves a few years of grace. Open political opposition in the party ended, but during 1932-33 Stalin faced a grave economic and political crisis. Forced collectiviza- tion had brought on famine and hunger in the cities and had proyoked widespread nationalist opposition, especially among Ukrainian peas- ants. As Stalin’s popularity fell to its nadir, Trotskit's Bulletin of the Opposition declared abroad: “In view of the incapacity of the present leadership to get out of the economic and political deadlock, the con- viction about the need to change the leadership of the party is grow- ing,” Trotskii reminded his readers of Lenin’s “Testament,” which had urged Stalin’s removal as general secretary. In November 1932, after Nadezhda Allilueva, Stalin’s second wife, spoke out about famine and discontent, the overwrought Stalin silenced her roughly, and she ap- parently committed suicide. Victor Serge notes that Stalin submitted his resignation, but none of the Politburo's obedient Stalinist members dared accept it. Finally, Molotov said: “Stop it, stop it. You have got the party's confidence,” and the matter was dropped. Stalin surmounted this personal danger and the economic and political crisis in the country. Opposition remained unfocused, con- fused, and leaderless. In 1932 Stalin had Kamenev and Zinoviev ex- pelled from the party and exiled to Siberia, but after more abject recan- fations they were allowed to return. After similar admissions of guilt, other Old Bolsheviks received responsible posts. They might have tried to kill Stalin, but there seemed to be no viable alternative to his rule, Even Trotskii declared: “We are concerned not with the expulsion of individuals but the change of the system.” Stalin temporarily adopted a moderate, conciliatory course: his speech of January 1934 called for consolidating earlier gains and inaugurated a brief period of relative liberalism. Within the Politburo, the youthful and popular Len- ingrad party chief, S. M. Kirov, backed by Voroshilov and Kalinin, supported concessions to the peasantry and an end to terror; hard- liners such as Molotov and Keganovich opposed this, During 1994 Stalin apparently wavered between these groups. THE GREAT PURGE This interlude ended with Kirov’s murder in December 1934, The ac- cused assassin, Nikolaev, and his accomplices were promptly appre- hended, tried secretly, and shot. They were described officially as Trot- skyites working for the clandestine, foreign-directed “United Center,” which had allegedly plotted to kill Stalin and other top leaders. Zino- viev and Kamenev, supposedly implicated in the plot, were sentenced to penal servitude‘The Great Page 635, the secret police (GPU), which had gained a sinister reputation, was reived. Its tasks were assumed by the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), which combined control over political, regu lar, and criminal police. Henrikh lagoda, its first chief, peshaps fearing that Kirov’s liberal line threatened his power, may have engineered the nat ssination at Stain’s order. NKVD employees were highly paid’ and Sbtained the best apartments and other privileges. This “state within a cove” maintained a huge network of informers, kept dossiers on mil- lions of persons, and spied on all party agencies. Special sections erched the NKVD's own regular personnel, whose members were Expected to show loyalty primarily tothe NKVD and only secondanily forthe party. Special NKVD courts, exempt from cofttrol by govern tment of judicial agencies, were set up to conduct secret trials. While surface calm prevailed, Andrei Zhdanov, Kirov’ successor as Leningrad party chief, conducted a ruthless purge there, deporting ene of thousands of persons to Siberia, and the NKVD prepared the freatest mass purge in history. In May 1935 a Special Security Comms Bn was created to investigate all party members, “liquidate enemies of the people,” and encourage citizens to denounce suspected counter, Sevoluonuries and slackers, Its members included Stalin, N. I. Ezhov Sergei M. Kiroo, Leningrad party seetary. Hs murder in December 1638 triggered the Great Purge. (SOVFOTO) ‘Ominous changes proceeded in the political police. Early in 1934 Hee636 Chapter Thity-Three 1 The Polite of Statvem, 1928-1951, [Nadeahuda K. Krups, Lenin's wife, women's activist, (SOVFOTO) (later head of the NKVD), Zhdanov, and Andrei Vyshinskii, subse- quently chief prosecutor at the public trials. That spring, forty mem- bers of Stalin’s personal bodyguard were tried secretly for conspiracy and “terrorists” were hunted in every party and Komsomol agency. As the rapidly growing NKVD justified its existence by uncovering con- spiracies everywhere, Stalin ordered careful surveillance even of Polit- buro members. ‘Areign of terror was unleashed, dwarfing that of the French Revo- lution. Perhaps that precedent had previously deterred Stalin, who ‘once remarked: “You chop off one head today, another one tomor- row. . . . What in the end will be left of the party?’ Unlike the French case, terror in Russia reached its murderous peak two decades after the revolution. The French terror claimed a few thousand victims; from 1995 to 1938 Stalin's terror killed hundreds of thousands and sent millions into exile. Stalin, not the NKVD, initiated the Great Purge and approved executions of prominent figures. A Stalinist account ex- plained: The Trotsky-Bukkharin fiends, in obedience tothe wishes of their mas- ters—the espionage services of foreign states—had set out to destroy the party and the Soviet state, to undermine the defensive power of the Country, to assist foreign military intervention . . . fand) to bring about the dismemberment of the USSR . . . , to destroy the gains of‘The Grest Purge 687 dhe workers and collective farmers, and to restore capitalist lavery i= the USERS ‘The party had to become an impregnable fortess 19 safeguard the touchy and the gains of socialism from foreign and ‘domestic enemies. coy aed: “As long as capitalist encirclement exists, ‘Here ‘will be saeeers, spies, diversionists, and murderers in our county, sent be- Preset nes by the agents of foreign states.” The Soviet public found this distorted view credible. -fhrve great poblic trials of party leaders accused of Roms were held in Micscow. At the "Trial ofthe Sixteen” (August 1296), Prosecu- tor Vyshinskil accused Kamenev, Zinoviev, and others of conspiring to tye the segime and £0 remove Stalin and other Poptart lead- ore fer confessing, and incriminating the Right Oppository the de- fendants were convicted and shot, When this severe treatment of Fenda colleagues provoked opposition in the Central Committee, tenis Guoved lagoda and appointed as NKVD chiel, Eeho®, under Snot the purge reached its bloody climax. Bach gr3P of defendants Hao pated the nextin achain reaction of denunciations, 6 the “Trial iicihe Seventeen” Ganuary 1937), featuring Piatakov, ‘Muralov, and oi dk, the accused confessed to treasonable dealings Wir Germany weg apa. ‘The greatest public spectacle of them a te Trial of the FRrentyeone” (March 1938), included Bukharin, Ryko, and Iagoda. Foveign espionage agencies, claimed the prosecutor, had set upa “bloc Of Rightsts and Trotskyists” on Soviet sol to bring ® ‘bourgeois-capital- si ekime to power and detach non-Russian regions for the USSR. ‘Allegesily Bukharin had been a trator ince 191% ‘Vyshinskii conduded. fis prosecutions with the invariable appeals “Shot the mad dogs!” land the leading defendants were executed. ‘Why did the accused, many of them prominent, courage revo- tutionacies, publicly admit crimes that they could not have ‘committed, tutions teis Confessions constituted the only legal basis for conviction? Wihet of them had recanted several times already, each time admitting greater guilt, and hoped to save thelr lives, poston, and families. greater Bie believed that the party, to which they had dedicated thar lives, must be right. The defendants, mostly ‘middle-aged, were tae etiam by lengthy NKVD interrogations or sleeplessnes Ot cree hypnotized by the terror. Doubtless, they hoped save some Thing from blasted careers, by bowing to Stalivs ran) ‘Enose who were tried, or who died by other mear's, ‘inchuded all the cmetving members of Lenin’ Politburo except Stalin a6 Trotski, te siondant in chief tried in absentia. A former premier, Wwe former iniele of the Comintern, the trade union head, and two chiefs of the Fant History of the Commarist Party (New York, 1839), p- HT.1688 Chapter Thirty Those {The Poitis of Stalinism, 1828-1981 political police were executed. Survivors must have wondered how the reat Lenin could have surrounded himself with so many traitors and scoundrels. In 1914, to be sure, Roman Malinovskii, Lenin’s close col- league, had been exposed as a police agent. The legacy of police infil- tration of revolutionary organizations under tsarism provided some basis for believing the revelations of the 1930s. e "The Great Purge decimated the leadership corps of the Soviet armed forces. The military chiefs, especially Marshal Tukhachevskii, who had made the Red Army an effective fighting force, had appar- ently been highly critical of the early trials. In May 1997 he and other prominent generals were arrested, accused of treasonable collaboration ‘with Germany and Japan, and shot. Nore of them resisted or at- tempted a military coup. Purged later were most members of the Su- preme War Council, three of five marshals, fourteen of sixteen army generals, and all full admirals. About half of the entire officer corps ‘vas shot or imprisoned, a terrible insult to Red Army patriotism and a grave weakening of the armed forces. (After Stalin's death all of the Teading military figures who were purged were rehabilitated, many posthumously, and declared innocent of all the charges brought against them.) ‘Not only Old Bolsheviks but many Stalinist party leaders were eliminated. Purged were 70 percent of the Central Committee mem- bers and candidates chosen in 1934. At the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939, only 35 of 1,827 rank-and-file delegates from the previous congress were present! From the party and army the purge reached ‘downward into the general populace as friends and relatives of purg- ees were arrested. Thousands of ordinary citizens were denounced orally or by poison-pen letters, often out of jealousy and meanness, of crimes that they had not and could not have committed. For two years (1937-38), most of a helpless population lived in abject terror of sud- den arrest and deportation. Special targets for arbitrary arrest included former members of other political parties, former White soldiers, priests, intellectuals (especially writers), Jews and other national mi- norities in Russian towns, and professionals who had been abroad. Many ordinary workers and peasants were also denounced and forced to confess to imaginary crimes against the state. Orders were even issued to arrest a specific percentage of the population. Stalin's blood- thirstiness grew as members of all social groups were rounded up. ‘Why this terrible bloodbath? wondered the survivors. Some of the victims were scapegoats for economic failures of the eariy 1990s. Sta- lin’s chief motive, stuggests Deutscher, was to destroy those who might lead an alternative regime or criticize his policies. This policy required killing or exiling party and military men trained by purged leaders, then rebuilding the chief levers of Soviet power: the party, the amy, and the security forces, The general public may have been involved deliberately to create the climate of fear essential to Stalin’s total con-Government and Party 639 trol, The need for milions of forced laborer in the Arctic and Sera Supplied a reason for the mass deportation of workers and peasants. Perhaps Stalin became utterly mad, making pointless he search for refonal explanations. Certainly the casualties were 00 Breet f@ be justified by ordinary political or social aims. Robert Conquest’s esti Juste out eight milion purge vieims in camps by 1936, plus 9: mate Of dion in prisons, seems reasonable, During the 19006 9 mee Step empire of forced labor camps and prisons, begun in she White Sen area ‘under Lenin and described graphically in ‘Alexander Sel kenitsyn’s work The Gulag Archipelago, mushroomed in Teper sony Siberia, Major projects included constructing the Wit Sea ei Moscow-Velga canals, double-tracking the Trans-Siberian Railroad ae Maing gold in the Kolyma wastelands. Usually fed boot the ar anes (evel and working under extremely arduous conditions, su ettgtes died off rapidly only to be replaced by new milions. inmates Ger 1938, with the arrest of master purger Ezhov, Who was blamed for excesses ordered by Stalin, the purge’ intensive phase weed. By then half the urban population of the USSR wis om police Fee 5 percent had actualy been arrested.® Large-scale terre Re sat ar endemic tothe Soviet system until Stalin’s death, The ep ORK ane cost Purge was the brutal murder of Trotskii in Mexico (Sugeot $940) by an NKVD agent, the son of a Spanish Communi, Besides terrorizing the USSR, the purge opened up numerous vacandics vil se Miter posts filled by obedient but often inexperienced 969 who and med stalin’s omnipotence. The Politburo lost most of is Powel and gneured Sralin’s rubber stamp, while his private Secretariat becare aejorn Oprichnine. Otherwise, the purge altered the Soviet political system remarkably litte. 1m Treat Purge necessitated the rewriting of Communist Party history, Directed by Zhdanov and Stalin's secretaries, historians pre- sy spar Tistory ofthe Coranunst Party ofthe Soviet Union OS) Kipparently, Stalin corrected the manuscript and Woke the section'on. philosophy. Portraying Stalin as Lenin's only re disciple, the History Paee ec fer Old Bolsheviks had conspired against Lenin and the arty since 1917, Thus the all-powerful dictator had altered history 10 pa his present purposes. After 1938 Stalin worked intensively to foster patriotism, restore unity, and rebuild the army leadership and the armed forces. GOVERNMENT AND PARTY “The Stalin regime combined systematic terror and massive use of foe The Sta emnecratically phrased constitution, apparent federaysr and Tepresentative institutions. Operating ostensibly through a hierarchy Gee R. Conquest, The Great Terror (New York, 1968)640 Chapter Thity Three} The Paites of Stains, 1928-1981 of soviets, the political system was actually run by the party leadership and the NKVD. Often theory and practice were wholly at odds, and in many ways Stalinism marked a return to tsarist autocracy. Stalin him- self, no longer the patient, humble, and accessible party functionary of the early 1920s, retreated into the Kremlin’s recesses or to his country villa at nearby Kuntsevo. Rarely appearing in public, he clothed him- selfin mystery, and many in the younger generation regarded him and his oracular pronouncements with awe and reverence. Once his rivals had been eliminated, he grew more dictatorial, and after 1938 he be- came an all-powerful father figure. His Politburo contained bureau- rats and party officials, not active revolutionaries or creative ideolo- ‘gists, as in Lenin’s time. Such men as Molotov, Kaganovich, and Kuibyshev, though able administrators, were narrow and ignorant of foreign lands. In the Politburo Stalin listened impatiently to their argu- ments, then often decided an issue with a sarcasm or a vulgar joke. All important matters were decided there, under the dictator's jealous eye. ‘The legal basis of this Soviet political system was the Constitution of 1936. Constitutions under Marxism were supposed to reflect existing socioeconomic conditions and had to be altered as these conditions changed. Eailier Soviet constitutions (1918 and 1924), with a franchise that was heavily weighted to favor urban elements and that excluded “exploiters,” represented the proletarian dictatorship's first phase. In ed to the Bighth Congress of Soviets that because rapid industrialization and coliectivization had eliminated landlords, capitalists, and kulaks, “There are no longer any antagonis~ tic classes in [Soviet] society, . . . [which] consists of two friendly classes, workers and peasants.” Restrictions and inequalities in voting could be abolished, and a democratic suffrage instituted. The Stalin Constitution, he claimed, would be “the only thoroughly democratic constitution in the world.” The promises of the Stalin Constitution (superseded by a new one in 1977) often meant little in practice. “The USSR,” it proclaimed, “is a federal state formed on the basis of a vohintary union of equal Soviet socialist republics.” Most of the republics, however, had been con- quered or incorporated forcibly, and the predominance of the Russian Republic, with about half the population and three-fourths the area of the Union, negated equality. Theoretically a republic could secede, as formerly, but to advocate secession was a crime and a “bourgeois rationalist deviation.” Only the working class, through its vanguard, the Soviet Communist party, could approve secession or create and abolish republics. In 1936 Transcaucasia was split into Azerbaijan, Ar- menia, and Georgia, which were admitted as separate republics; then the Kazakh and Kirghiz. republics in central Asia were added. A Korelo Finnish Republic was created partly out of territory taken from Finland in 1940, but it was abolished equally arbitrarily in 1956. Also inGovernment and Party 681 3940, the Moldavian Republic was established, mostly from territory Jequired by treaty with Hitler, and the formerly independent Pole acaiies of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were occupied and became SQuiet republics, An amendment of 1944 permitted republics to estsb- povie ntions with fozeign countries (none has ever done so), and the Tieaine and Belorussia obtained separate United Nations representa: Bens n 945, Smaller national groups {more than one hundred in the Fenian Republic alone) obtained autonomous republics and national areas, plus legislative representation. Soviet federalism provided an illusion of autonomy and self-gov, cement, but the central government, retaining full power, repressed Siny group of individuals that advocated genuine autonomy & inde- pendence, especially in the Ukraine, the most populous non-Russian part pach nationality received its own tenritory, language, press, and weNcols, but the Russian-dominated all-Union Communist party super: see and controlled them. This federal system, in Stalin's words: "nar Uses in form, socialist in content,” differing from tsarism’s open Rus tonal on ond assimilation, perpetuated Russian rule over most areas of the old empire. National feeling persisted nonetheless among many minority peoples of the USSR. ‘Under the Stalin Constitution a bicameral Supreme Soviet became the national legislature and supposedly the highest organ of state = thorly, The Council ofthe Union was directly elected from equal ee thon qlatriets, one deputy per 300,000 population. The Council of Na- tion Sites represented the various administrative unis: twenty-five deputies from each union republic, eleven from each autonomovs T public, and so on. Delegates elected for four-year terms by universal Piffrage received good pay during brief sessions, but unlike 5; on. gressmen retained their regular jobs and had no offices roe staffs. A Bresrmlumn, elected by both houses, could issue decrees when the Su- re Soviet was not meeting, and its chairman was the titular prosk seeef ine USSR. Bills became law when passed by both houses, but the Supreme Soviet has never recorded a negative vote, It was 9 dice” aoe car mabber-stamp body without real discussion or power of dec lives Tlow it ay a network of soviets on republic, regional, provincial, Setiet and village or city levels—over sixty thousand soviets in all sae gome 1,500,000 deputies elected for two-year terms. Sovereign in theory, soviets were controlled in fact at every level by thelr party members and parallel party organizations. "The Stalin Constitution entrusted executive and administrative Bu thority to the Council of People’s Commissars (called the Canned of Nianisters since 1946). Some ministries operated only on the all-Usion Waal others there and in the republics, and still others in the republics nly. Theoretically, but not in practic, these ministries were respon Gh to the soviets. Coordinating the administrative and economic682 Chapter Uhiriy-Thvee 1 The Paitcs of Stalinism, 1828-1981 system, the Council of People's Commissars possessed more power than the constitution suggests. The Supreme Court of the USSR headed a judicial system including supreme courts in the republic, regional, and people's courts. Lower courts were elected and higher ‘ones chosen by the corresponding soviet. Judges, supposedly inde- pendent, were subject to party policies, and many important cases ‘were tried in secret by the NKVD. Article 125 of the constitation promised Soviet citizens freedoms of speech, conscience, press, assembly, and demonstrations “in conform- ity with the interests of the working people and in order to strengthen the socialist system.” Citizens were guaranteed the right to work, edu- cation, rest, and maintenance in sickness and old age. Article 127 pledged freedom from arrest except by court decision, In fact, the Soviet people have never enjoyed most of these rights. As the new constitution was printed, the NKVD was conducting mass arrests and deportations without trial. The state assigned workers to jobs arbitrar- ily and prohibited strikes and independent trade unions. Constitu- tional rights could (and can) be used only to support the regime, not to criticize it. The Stalin Constitution, unlike its predecessors, atleast suggested, in Article 126, the true role of the Communist party: ‘The most active and politically conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class, working peasants, and working intelligentsia voluntarily tunite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, whichis the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to build communist society and is the lending core ofall organizations of the working people, botk public and state. (Calies addedyt Still organized on Leninist principles, the party remained the elite force of about 4 percent of the population in which intellectuals and bureau- crats outnumbered ordinary workers. Operating, supposedly by demo- cratic centralism, it exercised decisive authority over domestic and for- ign affairs. Under Stalin, all power passed to higher party organs coopted by the leaders, not elected democratically as the party rules stipulated, The rank and file could merely criticize minor shortcomings and lost all influence over the self-perpetuating leadership. ‘The party became Stalin’s monolithic, disciplined, and increasingly bureaucratic instrument. Intraparty debate, avoiding major issues, was limited to how t0 implement decisions, not to discuss alternative policies or leaders. ‘The all-Union congress, petiodic gatherings ‘of leaders from the ‘entire USSR, theoretically exercised supreme authority within the % Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Moscow, 1957), p. 103.Government and Party — 643 party, Once factions were banned (1921) and the “Right” was defealed Fuad), however, congresses lost the power to initiate policies. Impor, Gant decisions were made in advance by the Politburo and approved Unanimously by the congress, which merely ratified policies of the leadership pro forma. In Lenin’s ime, the Central Committee, suppos- edly elected by the congress to direct party work between congresses, ‘was an important decision-making body; under Stalin it grew in size {to 125 full members and 125 candidates in 1952) but declined in power. {t comprised mostly regional party secretaries and ministers from the al-union and republic governments. ‘The Central Committee, stated the party rules, elected three sub- committees: the Politburo, the Orgburo, and the Secretariat in fact, these “subcommittees” determined the Central Committee's member- ship and policies. With about a dozen full members and a few can dates, the Politburo ostensibly “directs the work of the Centrel Com. fnitice between plenary sessions.” It has always included the most powerful party and state officials and decided the chief domestic ahd Foreign policy issues, and since 1920 thas been the main power center inthe USSR. lis meetings have been secret, and its debates presumably’ ‘hee. Stalin purged the Politburo, refilled it with his own men, and made it an instrument of his personal power. During the 1930s it expe- enced great insecurity and high turnover; since then its members have enjoyed much stability of tenure. The Orgburo, Stalin’s original power base, directed the party's organizational work unt is merger Pith the Politburo in 1952. The Secretariat directed the party’s perma- hrent apparatus. Stalin, as general secretary with four assistants, man- aged its professional staff and controlled all party personnel and ap- ointments. ‘With four or five levels the party, like the soviets, was directed centrally by its all-Union organs. Thus the Ukrainian party, ron genes: ally by Creat Russians, was controlled from Moscow, which decided is policies and personnel. Lower party officials were often sacrificed a5 reapegoats for unpopular or mistaken national policies. Some regional panty secretaries became miniature Stalins who dictated to frightened Pbordinates. At the bottom of the party hierarchy stood some 350,000 primey organizations, or cells, composed ofa least three members, in Fitlages, collective farms, factories, offices, and miffary units. Acing like Swowes of the human body, they permeated and controlled all ‘organizations and agencies Party membership was open, in theory, to all persons over twenty: cone yeats of age (over eighteen for Komspmol [Young Communist Leaguel members). Applicants filled outa detailed questionnaize, sab> mitted recommendations from three members in good standing to a primary party organization, and served at least @ year's candidacy, Applications had to be approved by the primary organizations and64 Chapter Thirty-Three J The Politics of Sainiom, 1928-1881 ratified by the district party unit. Rank-and-file members performed party work besides their regular jobs. They had to pay dues, work Actively in agitation and propaganda among their fellows, explain ‘Marxian theory and the party line, and set examples of leadership and clean living, Their main reward was power and influence, because the party was the only road to political success. Disobedient or undlisci- plined members were reprimanded, censured, or in graver cases, eX- pelled. Periodic purges were designed to cleanse the party of oppor- tunists, slackers, and the disloyal. Under Stalin, Communists occupied the key positions in most walks of life; factory managers, collective farm chairmen, school superintendents, and army officers were gener- ally party members. Within the party, urban elements predominated over rural ones and Great Russians over national minorities. “The highly centralized Stalinist political system was based on inter~ locking presidia of the party and the state. The main decisions, made by Stalin personally and approved by the Politburo, were transmitted to the people by lower party organs, soviets, trade unions, and media ‘of mass communication. The party manipulated the soviets skillfully to maintain links with the population and provide a semblance of legiti- mate rule, The main weaknesses were lack of local initiative and the fabsence of any legal means to transmit power from one leader or group of leaders to another. This intensified intrigue, suspicion, and power struggles behind the scenes at the top. STALINISM Stalin had risen in the party as an organizer and administrator, not an jideologist; Marx had been a theorist, not an active revolutionary; in Lenin, the two aspects were in rare balance. At first Stalin marched carefully in Lenin’s footsteps (his chief theoretical work was Problems of Leninism), but once in power he altered and gravely distorted the doc- trines of Marx and Lenin, Stalin’s major doctrinal innovation—social- ism in one country’—had developed accidentally and pragmatically during his struggle with Trotskii. Trotskii’s apparently contrasting the- ‘ory of “permartent revolution” stressed using the Comintern (Commti- nist International, organization of Communist parties) to foment revo- lutions abroad; Stalin emphasized building socialism in Russia first. ‘The two differed somewhat over means and tactics but shared the goal of an eventual global triumph of communism, But could socialism be ‘compleiely built in a single country? Stalin claimed in 1936 that it had already been essentially constructed in Russia, although final victory must await worldwide revolution. Stalin’s national emphasis won him continuing support from industrial workers, the intelligentsia, and mil- ¥See above, pp. 627-28.Satin 65 1 party anxious to believe that Russians 2 Pie. Socialism in one country provided al support for forced collectivization and itary men, as well as from ‘could build socialism thems the ideological basis and soci the five-year plans. five-yont Palin afirmed that socialism had triamphed 9 the USSR and that class enemies had been broken, why wag proletarian dictator- Ship not withering away, a3 Marx had predicted? Stalin had already Sh Mead this question n rather cynical fashion a the Sixteenth Party Congress in 1930: Weare in favor ofthe state dying out, and at the same 7.6% stond fos the strengtvening,of the dictatorship of the protean ‘which repre- fon et powerful and mighty authoity fall foe of which Sen ed tothe present day. The highest posse ‘development of The power of the state with the object of PFEPHS CS ‘conditions of the ci ot ofthe sat? Is tis contradictory? Yes, 1 ‘contradictory. But dying oot Son is living thing and completely reflects Manse dialec- tics? ‘Apparently, Stalin derived this view fom Lenin’s statement that state aa eermary must be perfected in the lower phase of socialism before mritherng, To justify strengthening the proelanion 140 Stalin argued Tet Fowile capitalist powers, surrounding the ‘USER, threatened that intervention. Unt “capitalist enciclemont” '% replaced by armerit encirclement of capitalism, the proletarian S15 must remain mong and alert, eliminate “bourgeois survivals” ‘and hasten the tran- Sition to the final goal—communism. ‘Stalin was reacting instinctively against a Manon {internationalism that hed already been undermined by the apparent failure of world what jution, For Stalin, the interests of the Sovit fatherland clearly preceded those of the international profs ori ‘and foreign Communist partis. Thus, in the years before World WET Tl, Soviet nationalism and patriotism were developed partly a8 2% affirmation of what the work- Pig clase had built in the USSR. partly to corr separatism in the Tee derlands. Pride in Soviet industrial and ‘echnological achievements poral tered by the regime, with considerable success SOE workers was the younger generation. The shift away fom, {internationalism was a hed in te Stain zegime’s repudiation of the works of the Marxist eee M. N. Pokrovski, who had condemned Russi tsars and Imperialism unreservedly. From the mig-19905 ‘ocurred a selective re- impevarion, and even praise of such ralers as Peter the Great and Ivan Tee Temible, for unifying and strengthening Russi. ‘Tsarist generals the Temrgavoroy and Kutwzow, and certain adimisals the Crimean War, were glorified for defending their country preroically. The new Problems of Leninism (Moscow, 1983), 2: 402- f66 Chapter Thirty-Three J The Pots of Stains, 1928-1982 Soviet patriotism contained elements of traditional Great Russian na- tionalism, which Stalin had adopted. Through Soviet nationalism— one positive aspect of socialism in one country—Stalin sought to over- come and replace narrower national loyalties within the USSR. The Stalinist political system esfablished patterns of authority, many of which—but not its cult of personality—have persisted to the present. With maximum use of force and terror, Stalin crushed all political opposition, as Ivan the Terrible had sought but failed to do. Stalin created perhaps the most powerful and centralized state in his- tory possessing a developed industry and a vast bureancracy. In 80 doing, he, though a believing Marxist, perverted Marxist ideology al- most beyond recognition by accumulating personal power analogous to that of Oriental despotism. The Communist party, though supreme over obedient sovicts, was itself transformed into a bureaucracy of frightened automatons by the Great Purge. Mass terror and the cult of individual dictatorship would be repudiated by Stalin’s successors, but not centralized autocracy. PROBLEM 10 From Lenin to Stalin—Continuity or Betrayal? Who, if anyone, was responsible for putting Soviet Russia on a course leading to renewed autoceacy, repression, and massive purges? Was this the work of Lenin or Stalin, ot was it inherent in Bolshevism or in the previous development of Russian history? Were there fundamental differences in approach, policy, and personality between Lenin and Stalin? Was Stalin's regime the logical culmination of Leninism, or did his one-man rule and personality cult represent a breach with ond repudiation of Bolshevik ideals and practice? Did Stalin’s dictatorship constitute an aberration, a temporary interruption of a Bolshevik tredi- tion of “collective leadership,” as N. S. Khrushchev would later inti- mate? Until 1960 most Western scholars stressed elements of continuity between early Bolshevism and the Stalin era. This theory of the “straight line” was reinforced more recently by Alexander Solzhenit- gyn’s Gulag. Archipelago (see below), which traced the roots of mass terror and the system of forced labor camps to the first days of Lenin’s we. Western scholars tended to view Stalin's “great transforma- tion” of 1929-33 as perfecting an inherent, inevitable totalitarianism. Recently some Western historians, utilizing new Soviet materials, have challenged this continuity thesis, arguing that Stalinism differed fun- damentally from earfier Bolshevism, that Stalin's policies were s0 vio- lent and extreme that they changed the very nature of the Soviet stateTee robtem 10° From Lenin to Statin—Continuty or Betray!” SAT and the Bolshevik party. Stalin, by emphasizing statism, Great Russieh and ghalism, and anti-Semitism, and oncouraging his own deiicatowy epudiated the beliefs of Lenin and his “Old Boishevik” colleagues, Pdi eoteki, Zinoviev, and Bukhasin. To view Stalinism as meroy fhe outgrowth of the militant Lenin of What Js to Be Done 1902), argues Stephen Cohen, is a grievous oversimpliicaion Instead, Bol- areviem evolved over the years fom an unruly, loosely organized group of independent minded revolutionaries inte he ‘centralized, bu- BrouP fhe organization of the 1920s; under Stalin, the Communist | party was terrorized and ts influence sharply reduced. 19 actuality, the | Beit vik party had never been quite the disciplined vanguard of pro- poe neals advocated in What Isto Be Done? Even official party ste” arene plined repeatedly that its history was one of “factions Sewig, | le" Despite the ban on factions engineered by Lenin, y92t, the party remained oligarchic, o as Bukhatin put negotiated feders- | Ron between groups, groupings, factions, and tendencies.” Thus, Co- Lion pettiades. the pary’s “organizational principle” did not produce Stalinist dictatorship and conformity." in te of the widely disparate views on the relationship Po- tweenthe regimes of Lenin (1917-23) and Stalin (1928-59) ae the ftoning excerpts from official Soviet publications, a Work BY & Soviet Jel ing Sopoler, two statements by émigrés from the Soviet Union, and two Western accounts. Official Soviet Interpretations 4. History of the Communist Barty of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): “short Course (New York, 1938). This s the official party history, ostensr bly prepered by the Central Committee following the Gitte Purge. It By Fished and perhaps partly written by Joseph Stain, an’ reflects a essed” Sealinst interpretation of the purge: The “dregs of hu, wrenity” referred to in the text included the leading "O'e Bolsheviks,” ray ent colleagues of Lenin—the original leaders of Soviet Russia, tee oishevik party, and the Third International (Comintern) im 1997, new faets came to ight regarding the lendsh crimes oF Me pulhastn-totaky gang. The tals]. all showed hat the Bukhassney aa otakysaa ha long ago joined to form a common band of epee of he people, operating asthe “Bloc of Rights and Trotskyies” ‘The trials ae reg that these dregs of humanity, in conjunction with the enemies of the people, Trotsky, dinoviev, and Kamenev, fad been conspiracy syubat Lenin, the Party, and the Soviet state ever since the carly days of TE Cohen, “Bolshevism and Stalinism,” in Stalinism, ed. RC. Teckes (new York, 177), pp. 19-25. See also R. C. Tucker, The Soret Politi Mind (New York, 1963).ill 648 Chapter Thirty-Three J. The Plies of Stains, 1928-1981 the October Socialist Revolution. The insidious attempts to thivart the Peace of Brest-Litovsk atthe beginning of 1918, . . . the deliberate aggra- vation of differences in the Party in 1921... the attempts to overthrow the Party leadership during Lenin’s illness and after his death, . . . the vile assassination of Kirov - . . —all these and similar villainies over a period of twenty years were committed, it ranspired, withthe partcipa- fion or under the direction of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukhatin, Rykov, and their henchmen, at the behest of espionage services of bour- sols states. “The trials brought to light the fac that the Trotsky-Bukharin fiends, in obedience to the wishes oftheir masters—the espionage services of for- tign states—had set out to destroy the Party and the Soviet state, o lndermine the defensive power of the country, to assist foreign military intervention, to prepare the way forthe defeat of the Red Army, to bring about the dismemberment of the U.SS.R,, to destroy the gains of the workers and collective farmers, and to restore capitalist slavery in the USSR. These Whiteguard pygmies, whose strength was no more than that of a gnat, apparently dattered themselves that they were the masters ofthe country, and imagined that twas realy in their power to sell or give away the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and the Maritime Region. . . . These con- femptble lackeys ofthe fascists forgot that the Soviet people had only to move a finger, and not a trace of them would be let. The Soviet court sentenced the Bukharin Trotsky fiends tobe shot. . . . The Soviet people approved the annihilation of the Bukharin-Trotsky gang and passed on to the next business. (Pp. 346-48) i i 2. History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Moscow, 1960). Issued during the modified one-man rule of N. S. Khrushchev, this party history reflects denunciation of Stalin’s crimes after 1934, balanced by praise for his economic achievements, as expressed by the ‘Twentieth Party Congress of 1956. Note that no attempt is made here to rehabilitate “Old Bolshevik” leaders like Trotskii, Zinoviev, and Bukharin. ‘The victory of socialism created favorable conditions for the extension of arty and Soviet democracy. But in spite of that, there were direct viola~ tions of Paty and Soviet democracy resulting from what was later defined | by the Party as the cult of Stalin's personality. Stalin began to develop into « law certain restrictions in inner-Party and Soviet democracy that were ‘unavoidable in conditions of bitter struggle against the class enemy and his agents. He began to violate the standards of Party life worked out by Lenin, the principle of collective leadership, deciding many important ‘questions on his own. In Stalin’s actions a discrepancy arose between ‘word and deed, between theory and practice. . . . Starting from correct : ‘Marxist premises, he warned against impermissible exaggerations of the role of the individual in history, but in practice he encouraged the cult of his own personality, ‘Stalin righlly stressed the necessity of strengthening the Soviet State in every possible way, of keeping a watchful eye. , .on the machinations ofprotien 10 From Lin Sialin——Contnay 0” Bere? she hostile capitatstenctement,« «10 Bean Sua against . Ae est ction groups ofthe Trobsgiets, Zinoeres rae ern 1987, when Socialism, was alten vietorious in the the, Reali advanced the erroneous thesis thal he class struggle in BR ould intensify as the Soviet Sate Bre an in Ine ce served asa justifietion for mae SPT against the Party's ree jpgical enemies who already been router politically. Many honest deol rand row Party people, not gully of any OAT ‘also becarne ~ Commun these repressions. During this peiod he political adventurer viet andre, Ber, © who did ot stop shor 9 atrocity to achieve an otal ni, worked his way ino responsi PISA the State, his erg advantage of Stain’ personal HOSOI, slandered and a ae A many honest people, devoted to ine YAY ‘and the people. extcrmoe period a despicable role was PAYS PY Yeshow. . . » Many tn the sar Fy Communists and non-Panty people, Whee wuiterly de- worker Tae cause ofthe Party, were slandered assistance and “july punished for their crimes. wished. Yezhov and Beria were Pench the mistakes resulting from the cul f Stalin’s personality Te Although evelopment of Soviet society, they come not checkit, and still tarde tld they change the Socialist nature of fe ‘Soviet system. (PP. 512-13) A Soviet Dissident Historian 10 became absorbed in Roy Medvedev is a Soviet Mansst scholat wh Srey of the Stalin era after Khrushchev 4 revelations at the Twentieth stay enty-second party congresses: In 1968, howe by the time he ae Completed his book Let History judge: The Oris ‘and Consequences Of Statins, the Brezhnev regime was MOT toward a partial rehabili- Sa galin and the book had to be published the United States. tall her was subsequently expetted from ine Por, ‘buthe remained sites tving in the Soviet Union. His ans ropresents an “in ider’s” view of the Stalin phenomenon. ‘Medvedev accepts the official ser sat Stalinist terror and the personality colt Wet temporary de- tna om an essentially sound Soviet system, But fhe is much more Fagorous in denouncing that terxor- ‘To many people in the Soviet Union the mass epee of 1937-38 an ieey Fprehensibe calamity that suddenty PDMS OPC the country Ma aed ta have no end, Explanations aboutied se ‘of them repre ar nga search forthe truth, but more etesPLnG venti Bevin head of the security police (YD) 3 er ie under whom the Grex Purge reaches ve Yeshow was executed, apparently at Stalin's nde. 1 1998, Beria was purged in June 1953 apparenty ater Miempting to overthrow the government Puget generated either before or after is Al i to escape the cruel Shakin made Lav removing and executing its climax,0 Chapter Thinty-Thre | The Plt of Stalinism, 1928-2941 ‘truth, to find some formula that would preserve faith in the Party and Stalin. . . . One widespread story was that Stalin did not know about the terror, that all those crimes were committed behind his back. Of course it -was ridiculous to suppose that Stalin, master of everyone and everything, did not know about the arrest and shooting of members of the Politburo and the Central Committee, . . . about the arrest of the military high ‘command and the Comintern leaders. . . . But that is a peculiarity of the ‘mind blinded by faith in a higher being. This naive conviction of Stalin’s ignorance was reflected in the word, yezhooskchina, “thy Ezhov thing,” the popular name for the tragedy of the thirties . . . , a new version of the Common people's faith in a good tsar surrounded by lying and wicked ‘ministers, But if must be acknowledged that this story had some basis in Stalin’s behavior. Secretive and self-contained, Stalin avoided the public eye; . . . he acted through unseen channels. He tried to direct events from behind the scenes, making basic decisions by himself or with = few aides, . . . prefersing to put the spotlight on other perpetrators of these crimes, thereby retaining his own freedom of movement. Some confusion about the nature of Stalin’s power must be cleared away. By the end of the twenties and the early thirties he was already called # dictator, a one-man ruler . . . , but the unlimited dictatorship that he established after 1935-38 was without historical precedent. For the last fifteen years of his bloody career Stalin wielded such power as no Russian tsar ever possessed. . . . In the years of the cult, Stalin held not only all political power; he was master of the economy, the military, foreign policy; even in literature, the arts, and science he was the supreme arbiter Te was an historical accident that Stalin, the embodiment of all the worst elements in the Russian revolutionary movement, came to power after Lenin, the embodiment of all that was best. . . . The Party must not only condemn Stalin’s crimes; it must also eliminate the conditions that facii- fated them, . . . Stalin never relied on force alone. Throughout the pe- riod of his one-man rule he was popular. The longer this tyrant ruled the USSR, coldbloodedly destroying millions of people, the greater seems to have been the dedication to him, even the love, of the majority of people. . . - ‘One condition that made it easy for Stalin to bend the Party to his will was the hugely inflated cult of his personality. . . . The deification of Stalin justified in advance everything he did. . . . All the achievements ‘and virtues of socialism were embodied in him. . . . Not conscious faith, but blind faith in Stalin was required. Like every cult, this one tended to transform the Communist Party into an ecclesiastical organization with a sharp distinction between ordinary people and leader-priests headed by their infallible pope. The gulf between the people and Stalin was not only deepened but idealized. The business of state in the Kremlin became as remote and incomprehensible for the unconsecrated as the affairs of the godson Olympus. . . . Just as believers attribute everything good to God and everything bad to the devil, so everything good was attributed to Stalin and everything bad to evi forces that Stalin himself was fighting‘Problem 10° From Lenin to Stalin—Continuty or Betrayal? 654 “Long live Stall (Pp. 289-90, 355, 962-63)" Soviet Emigrés 1. Victor Serge (Viktor L. Kibalchich), From Lenin to Stalin (New ‘York, 1973). Bom in Brussels, Belgium, in 1890 of Russian émigré par- ents, Serge became a radical Socialist and after the Russian Revolution Srent to Soviet Russia. He joined the Bolshevik party and became prominent in the Comintern, barely escaping to the West before the Great Purge. Like his “Old Bolshevik” contemporaries, Serge greatly Simired and idealized Lenin but was profoundly disillusioned by Sta- linist tyranny. "Everything has changed. The aims: from intemational social revolution to sovijisn in one country. The political system: from the workers) de- ‘Rossaty af the soviets, the goal of the sevottion, to the dictatorship ofthe fener secretariat, the functionaries, and the GPU [secret police]. The Beni from the organization, free int fe and thought and freely submit Jag to disciptne, ofrevolutionary Marasts tothe hierarchy offoureaus, 0 the pacsive obedience of orerists. The Third Intemational: rom 2 mighty Dianization of propaganda and struggle to the opportunist servlty of Ceetal Committees appointed for the purpose of approving everything: Gatheutehame or nausea. . . . The leaders: the greatest mulitants of Octo- Taoarein exile or prison. . . . The condition ofthe workers: the equalitar- Diniom of Soviet society is traneformed to permit the formation of a privie feged minority, more and more privileged in comparison with she Uersherited masses who are deprived of all rights. Morality: from the Statere, sometimes implacable honesty of heroic Bolshevism, we gradu Sly advance to unspeakable deviousness and deceit. Everything, has Thinged, everything is changing, butt wil require the perspective of ime balls we can precisely understand the realities. (Pp. 57-58) 2. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, The Guldg Archipelago, 1938-1956, 3 vols. (New York, 1973). This massive work by 2 great contemporary Russian writer forcibly exiled from the USSR in 1974, describes the forced labor camp system in the USSR and its history, based on pet- sonal experience and 227 witnesses. Begun in 1958, it was first pul- fished abroad in 1973. Arbitrary arrest and detention, argues Solzhenit syn, originated with Lenin in 1918 and was merely extended and tensified under Stalin. He sees repression as an inalienable part of an iil Soviet totalitarianism, Note how Solzhenitsyn's interpretation of Lenin differs from that of Roy Medvedev, who considers him a true ‘Marxist, invariably adhering to norms of socialist legality. Roy A. Medvedev, Let History judge: The Onigins and Consequences of Stalinism (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1968). some officials shouted as they were taken to be shot.” ae i4 | 652 Chopter Thirty-Three} The Polite of Stainiem, 1928-1941 When people today decry the abuses ofthe cult [of Stalin's personality, they Keep getting hung up on those years which are stuck in our throats, ‘37 and'38, And memory begins to make it seem as though arrests were never made before or afer, but only in those two years. . .. The zrve of 1997 and 1968 was neither the only one nor even the main one, but only one, perhaps, of the three biggest waves which strained the murky, stink- ing pipes of our prison sewers to bursting. Before it came the wave of 129 and 1530... . which drove a mere 15 million peasants, maybe even more, out into the taiga and the tundra, . . . Andaftrit was the wave of 1944 to 1846... . when they dumped whole nations dawn the sewer pipes, not ‘0 mention millions and millions of others who . . had been prisoners of war, orcaried off to Germany and subsequently repatriated kis well known that any orgon withers away ifitis not used. Therefore, if we know thatthe Soviet Security organs or Organs (and they christened themselves with this vile word), praised and exalted above all living things, have not died off even to the extent of one single tentacle, but instead, have grown new ones and strengthened their muscles—it is easy to deduice that they have had constant exercise ‘But even before there was any Civil War, it could be seen that Rus- sla. . was obviously not suited for any sort of socialism whatsoever. One of the fist blows of the dictatorship was directed against the Kadets—the members of the Constitutional Democratic Party. At the end of November 1917 . . . the Cadet Party was outlawed and arrests of its members began. . . . One ofthe first circulars of the NKVD, in December 1817, stated: “In view of sabotage by officals... use maximum iitia- tive in localities, not excluding confiscation, compulsion, and arrest.” .. V. 1 Lenin proclaimed the common, united purpose [in January 1918] of “purging the Russian land of all kinds of hacinfl insects.” And under the term insects he included not only all class enemies but also “workers smalingering at their work. . ..” It would have been impossible to carry cout this hygienic purging . . . if they haci had to follow outdated legal processes and normal judicial procedures. And so an entirely new form twas adopted: extrajudicial reprisal, and this thankless job was sel-sacrifi- ingly assumed by the Cheka . . , the only punitive organ in human history which combined in one set of hands investigation, arrest, interro- gation, prosecution, tal, nd execution ofthe vert. (Vol. 1, pp. 24-28) Western Views 1. George F. Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin (Boston, 1960). An American specialist in Russian affairs, Kennan served in the American Foreign Service, 1926-53, including a stint as ambassador in Moscow. Following retirement, he became professor at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Princeton, New Jersey, where he wrote Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920, 2 vols. (New York, 1956~ 58). Russia and the West is derived from lectures delivered at Oxford and Harvard universities, 1957-60. Kennan is also renowned as the author of the “containment theory” after World War ILProbleme 10. Pront Lenin to Stain-—Continity or Betrayal? 653 | st zemains only to mention the contrast between Stalin, asa statesman ‘ i and flenit) The differences are not easy ones to identify, for in ‘ny instances they were only ones of degree and of motive, Lenin, ey i ma of internal Party integte. He, too, was capable of ruthless | wee tie to, could be anpitying in the elimination of people who I ry daagreed with him. «= Noless than Stlin, Lenin adopted an serene of inplacable hostility toward the Western world, \ in fall this there were very significant diferences, Lenin was & na Rh no sense of inferiority, Weltborn, well-educated, endowed with sar yr formidable power and briliance, he was devoid of the angular aon cial parvenu, end he fet himself a match for any man itellec- res He was pared that whole great burden of pezonal insecurity I tan ted oo heavily on Stalin, He never had to doubt his hold on the which etd oe hig clengs He ld se he ough he | Tre ey bore him, whereas Sain was obliged to ral them theough thes | dove ie enabled Lenin to run the movement squarely on the basis of I fens ie craved to bets needs, without bothering about his own. And wn i melletual inventory of the Party was largely of his own crea se he ng celleved ofthat ignominious need which Stain constantly om ence! for buttressing his politcal views by references fo someone i aaeenerel Having fashioned Ueninism this own heats dese out of | ces Bo eeterals of Marx's legacy, Lenin had no fear of adapting it and | wei cng ita the situation required, For this reason his mind remained t wee Rtoughout his lie-open, at leat to argument and suggestion \ SR es Bivo shared his belle in the basic justification ofthe second ftom trope ylation of 1917. These people could come to him and talk to | Rass epuld find their thoughts not only accepted inthe spit they him an 9 but responded toby a citical intelligence second fo none in i Wer ieee socialist movement. They did not have to fel, as they tae ader Stalin, that deep, dangerous, ulterior meanings might be deter oi anvtiing they said, and that an innocent suggestion might Prove ‘ their personal undoing Se eet course, a profound effect on the human climate that pre- allel Hectghout the Soviet regime in Lenin's time, Endowed with this TN runent, Lenin was able to comssnicete to his astoiates an ano wert mlitant optimism, of good cheer and stenfastness and con SEAS lyalty, which nade hr the objet oftheir deepest admiration and } aie eye permitted them fo apply thelr entre energy to the work at affection an4 Pele Lenin's ultimate authority zemained unquestioned it ant canbe te spread iiatve and responstlity much farther than was eae ease in ae heyday of Stalin's power. This explains why Soviet Sielomacy wes so much more variegated and collin Lin’ time than diniomey ccquent Stalin era. In the change fom Lenin to Stalin, the rercig poigy of 2 movement became the foreign policy of a single an tia rondered more dificult the problem which Soviet power presented for the outide world. In Lani’s day, the differences were ete (Spal was possible - fo talk about them with the Soviet Sep ana to obtain at least some dlaiication as to where things stood. sac reeday, this was no longer possible... -Hisaddietion tothe ais SSSrr 58 Chapter Thirty Thee | The Politics of Stalinism, 1928-1961 ‘of deception was too profound to be separable from his intellectual caleu- lations. Unlike Lenin, who could view objective realty as something apart from himself, Stalin was able o see the world only through the prism of his own ambitions and his own fears. (Pp. 256-58) 2._ Stephen Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution. . . (New York, 1971). Stephen Cohen, professor of polities at Princeton Univer- sity, has specialized in the Soviet period and written an outstanding biography of Nicholas Bukharin, a leading theoretician and clase col- league of Lenin: While the internal party batles of 1923-28 constituted prolonged at- tempis to reconstruct the power and authority previously exercised by Lenin, the ea that there cbuld be a successor—a"Lenin of today”—was impermissible. Leni’s authority within the leadership and in the party generally had been unique, Among other things, it had derived from the fact that he was the party's creator and moving spirit from his poltcal judgment which had been proved correct so often and against so much ‘opposition, and from the fore of his personality, which united andl per- suaded his fractious colleagues. In no way did it derive from an official post. As Sokoinikov pointed out: “Lenin was neither chairman of the Politburo nor general secretary, but nonetheless, Comrade Lenin.» hed the decsve politcal word in the party.” Iwas. a kind of charismatic authority, inseparable from Lenin asa person and independent of const tutional or instvational procedures Some of his heirs intuitively understood this and commented on itn diferent ways, "Lenin was a dictator in the best sense ofthe word,” said Bakharin in 1924. Five years Inter, desenbing Lenin as the singular "leader, organizer, captain, and stern ron authority,” and contrasting is preeminence with Stalin's brate machine power, Bukharin tied to ex Plain forthe. “Bat he was for us all lish, a close, beloved person, a wonderful comrade and friend, the bond with whom was indissoluble. He was not only ‘Comrade Leni’ but something immeasurably more."”® Conclusion As should have become evident, a wide divergence of views persists among scholars about the relationship between Lenin's tule and that of Stalin. Among Soviet scholars, whereas Lenin remains an almost uni- versally revered figure, viewpoints about Stalin range from hero wor- ship by neo-Stalinists such as Sergei Trapeznikov, to the relatively balanced verdicts of the Khrushchev years, to bitter denunciation by Roy Medvedev. Most Soviet historians, however, and apparently most Soviet citizens as well, beliove that Stalin’s positive contributions to the ‘Stephen F. Cohen, Bukhari and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biog- raphy, 1888-1938 (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1971), pp. 223-224,‘proven 10 From Lenin Stlin-—Contnuity or etal? 655 USSR outweighed his monstrous crimes. In recent Yeats the latter Seen Jeon played down in the Soviet Union, where (1 emphasis has boon placed once again on Stalin's achievements 25 collectivizer, indus eesti, and war leader. Solzhenitsyn's view, howeNes, repudiates ere totalitarianism in toto, Lenin included, in faver of Russian na- fonatism and neo-Orthodoxy. Whether Stalin's reeire represents a tomgnuation of Lenin’ principles and rule, or thelr antithesis, is still Suggested Additional Reading ‘Adams, A. Stalin and His Times. New York, 1972. amaong, J. The Pls of Totalitarianism: The Communist Party of the Soviet inion fom 1934 to the Present, New York, 1962 [Avtoskinanov, A. Sil andthe Soviet Communist Party, Nev York, 1959, seer RAL, A; Inkles, and C. Klucknohn. How she Soe Systent Works. ‘Cambridge, Mass., 1956 Berman, HJ, Justice in the USSR. New York, 1968: cereal, J Stalin's Mastree: Te Show Tits nd Purges of the Thirties.» - ‘New York, 1976. ‘Corr, E. H. The Bolshevik Revolution: Socialism Jn One Country, 1924-1926. 3 vols. ind pts. London, 1958-64. Conquest, R. The Great Terror. New York, 1968 Dulin, D., and B. Nicolaevsky. Forced Labor i Sovie! Russi ‘New Haven, 1947, Doniels, R, ed. The Stain Revolution, Lexington, Massy 1972. Day, RB. Leon Trolty and the Politics of Econ sol New York, 1973. Der dehes 1 Stain A Palit Bagi. 2d ed. New York, 1967. Dijlas, M, The Naw Class. New York, 1957 oickson, J. The Soviet High Command. . - 2918-1941. New York, 1962, arse Mz How Russia Is Ruled. 24. Cambridge, Mass, 159 ‘smolenck under Soviet Rule, Casbidge, Mass 1958 Friedrich, C.J., and Z. K. Breezinski. Totliterion Dictatorship and Autocray. 2d fed. New York, 1966. ety, 1. A. Origins of ie Great Purges. «1833-1958 Cambridge, Eng., 1985. Trae, JN. The Soviet Sytem of Government th ed. CAE 1980, Hyde, A. M. Stalin The History of « Dictator. New ‘York, 1982. Kotkov, G. The Trial of Bubharin, New York, 1968 vere, A. Darkness at Noon. New York, 1851. (Novel selating 0 the Great Purge.) Levey, B., comp. The Stalinist Terror inthe Ties Documentation from the ‘Soviet Press. Stanford, 1974,(656 Chapter Thirty-Three The Polis of Sttniom, 1928-2941 Lewin, M. The Making of the Soviet System . . . New York, 1985, Medvedev, R. A. Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism. New York, 1971, 1973. ‘Moore, B., Jt. Soviet Politics: The Dilemma of Power. Cambridge, Mass., 1957. Nove, A. Stalinism and After. London, 1975. ‘Orwell, G. 1984, New York, 1949. (Novel on totalitarianism.) ‘Schapiro, L. The Communist Party ofthe Soviet Union. Rev. ed. New York, 1970. Senge, V. Memoirs of a Revolutionary, 1901-1941. New York, 1963. Solzhenitsyn, A. The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956. 3 vols. New York, 1974-75. ‘One Day in the Life of Ioan Denisovich. New York, 1963. (Novel.) Souvarine, B. Stalin: A Critica! Survey of Bolshevism. New York, 1993. ‘Trotsky, L. The Revolution Betrayed. Garden City, N.Y., 1937. ‘Stalin: An Appraisal ofthe Man and His Influence. New York, 1941. ‘Tucker, R. C., ed, Stalinism: Essays in Historia! Interpretation. New York, 1977. ‘Tumarkin, N. Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia. Cambridge, Mass., 1983. Ulam, A. Stalins‘The Man and His Era, New York, 1973. Urban, G. R,, ed. Stalinism: is Impact on Russia and the World. New York, 1982. ‘Von Laué, T. Why Lenin? Why Stalin? Philadelphia, 1964. Wyshinsky, A. The Law of the Soviet State, New York, 1948. Weissberg, A. Tie Accused. New York, 1951.