Duke University Press

Chapter Title: Proust at the End

Chapter Author(s): JUDITH BUTLER

Book Title: Reading Sedgwick

Book Editor(s): LAUREN BERLANT
Published by: Duke University Press. (2019)
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv1210149.7

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Reading Sedgwick

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 2| JUDITH BUTLER

Proust at the End

A change in weather is sufficient to re­create the world and ourselves.

—­Marcel Proust, The Guermantes Way

I am honored to think with Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick once again on the occa-
sion of memorializing her. She taught me about memory, and teaches me still.
She argued with me productively, and I keep t­ hose conversations alive. Mem-
ory was indeed one of the issues about which she thought most attentively in
the years before we lost her, or so it would seem on the basis of her work on
Proust.1 It strikes me as impor­tant that both Eve and Barbara Johnson w ­ ere
reading Proust in the years before they died, and I wondered ­whether one
could find a point of convergence between t­ hese two readings. Barbara John-
son always wanted to know what Eve was working on, and she made sure,
despite increasing physical challenges in 2005, to find her way to Harvard Law
School in 2005 to hear Eve’s paper, “The Weather in Proust.” In that piece,
Sedgwick cites Johnson explic­itly, which should come as no surprise, since
they wrote in each other’s orbit. Indeed, Eve was known to pose that unforget-
table question, “Who among us is not in love with Barbara Johnson?” It was a
question that rhetorically suspended and crossed gender and sexual orienta-
tion in a way that was, and is, infamously Sedgwick. What Eve perhaps did not
quite consider is that a similar question circulates about her: Who among us
has not had our breath taken away by Eve Sedgwick—­only to have it blown
back in radically surprising ways?
My reference to breath is not casual. What seemed to claim Eve’s atten-
tion in Proust’s work was the constant evocation of climate, the way the nar-
rator notices the shifts in temperature, wind, and light, and how the narrator
functions as what Proust called an “animated barometer.” Indeed, one expects
Proust’s narrator to be living for love, for consummation, for the possession
of the lover and the vanquishing of any pos­si­ble rival. But another economy

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emerges that decenters the first, focusing instead on the changes in climate to
which one wakes in the morning, taking in the world in a new way, the sudden
surprise that any shift in the weather brings. At stake is not just a preference
for one mode of attending the world over another, but a basic reordering of
how we understand what is most fundamental to being a body in the world.
Sedgwick wrote,
The lacerating quality of Proust’s narrator’s inability to sleep in an unfa-
miliar space—as though the environment threatened not his desires but
his life—­feels less like the fear of having to share someone’s love than like
the asthmatic’s fear of being unable to breathe. I would argue that even
the mortal dread he feels, in childhood, at having to go to bed without
his m
­ other’s kiss derives its quality and rhythm much more from a threat-
ened existential function, such as breathing, than from a frustrated second-­
order drive, such as libido.2
­ ere as elsewhere, Sedgwick asks us to reconsider the theory of the drives,
H
since one of the most fundamental biological strivings is, indeed, to breathe,
and to continue to breathe. And one of the most profound panics pos­si­ble
is induced by any obstruction to breathing. To breathe requires a conducive
world, a world of air, and in this way we are bound to our environments, to
shifts in climate, in ways that bear consequences for bodily survival. For this
reason, among ­others, Sedgwick turns to the psychoanalytic work of Michael
Balint, who steers a course away from Oedipal logics that end up stoking de-
sires for possession that can only and always end in defeat. Over and against
this tragic drama of omnipotence, Balint suggests that ­there are modes of
transferring to the ambient environment. Sedgwick makes clear that this
functions as an impor­tant alternative modality within psychoanalysis, one
that links it with other impor­tant religious and philosophical traditions, from
Plotinus to Buddhism. In her view, the Oedipal presumption presupposes
that desire strives infinitely and vainly for omnipotence and exclusivity and
so is perpetually vanquished by jealousy and defeat. Sedgwick emphasizes
another modality of desire that seeks instead what is adequate and that forms
itself around the very material and ecological conditions of support, suste-
nance, and per­sis­tence. This brings her to a reconsideration of basic drives,
but also to breathing and the circumambient world in which that is pos­si­ble.
­Here Sedgwick links Balint’s perspective to Barbara Johnson’s essay, “Using
­People: Kant with Winnicott,” published most recently in Persons and Th­ ings.3
Sedgwick writes that the more benign form of transference, which attaches

64  |  Judith Butler

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to the environment itself, “requires from its object . . . ​a mode of being, spe-
cifically a mode of being that characterizes the natu­ral ele­ments.”4 She then
cites in succession Balint and Johnson. Balint refers to a mode of transference
within psychoanalysis that
presupposes an environment that accepts and consents to sustain and
carry the patient like the earth or the w
­ ater sustains and carries a man who
entrusts his weight to them. In contrast to ordinary objects, especially to
ordinary ­human objects, no action is expected from t­ hese primary objects
or substances; yet they must be t­here and must—­tacitly or explic­itly—­
consent to be used, other­wise the patient cannot achieve any change: with-
out ­water it is impossible to swim, without earth impossible to move on.5
It is in­ter­est­ing ­here that nature or the environment is personified as “giving
consent” to t­ hose who breathe its air and move upon its earth with the pre-
sumption of gravity. Its mode of consent is not precisely contractual or l­egal,
and ­there is no speech act that articulates this mode of giving consent. It gives,
lends itself out, offers itself to be used, and trusts that it w­ ill survive being
used. Sedgwick then turns to Johnson’s paraphrase of Winnicott: “The ob-
ject becomes real ­because it survives, ­because it is outside the subject’s range
of omnipotent control.”6 In Johnson’s reading of Winnicott’s analy­sis of the
transferential object, the desire for the object is a desire to mangle and maul
it, to use it, even to use it up, on the condition that the object survive all that
use. Indeed, the point that became crucial for Melanie Klein, a figure who
binds Sedgwick and Johnson, is that the desirous child needs to know that
its efforts to master, devour, and abuse the object, understood broadly but
not exclusively as the maternal, ­will be survived by the ­mother, or indeed, by
any animate or inanimate object who serves that primary function. In other
words, the object-world must remain intact not only to support and sustain
the life of the child whose de­pen­dency on that world is a m ­ atter of life and
death, but b­ ecause the child cannot live with too much power. Indeed, if the
object survives its use, the child proves not to be as omnipotent as she feared
she was. For both Johnson and Sedgwick, the animated and surviving object
and object-­world mark the limits of h­ uman omnipotence. The survival of the
object is also my own survival. This is why, for Sedgwick, breathing is more
primary than libido, and it is why, for Johnson, the object must survive its use,
marking the limit of ­human destructiveness.
­There is another dimension to the analy­sis ­here: guilt is also a second-­
order phenomenon for Klein, since what­ever check we impose on our own

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destructiveness emerges from the implicit understanding that our survival de-
pends on the survival of the object—­indeed, the object-­world, or the ambient
environment. If we succeed in toxifying the air, we ­will not survive, and if we
destroy our lover for having shared his or her love, we w ­ ill lose our lover and
our loving. Thus, for Klein, guilt is a way of managing destructiveness in order
to survive, and in that way guilt, rather than the paradigmatically moral dispo-
sition that distinguishes h­ umans from animals, is a second-­order permutation
of the desire to persist, linking us with animals, both h­ uman and nonhuman.
So what, if anything, does this excursus on an expanded account of object-­
relations have to do with reading Proust? The wager ­here is that both Sedg-
wick and Johnson w ­ ere reading Proust at the end, perhaps b­ ecause he offered
a way to ­counter omnipotence even as he recruits us into its most maddening
vicissitudes. Although I read in both En­glish and French (learned my French
in gradu­ate school by reading Proust), in preparing to write this essay I spent
some weeks rereading Proust in En­glish, appreciating how Johnson accepted
the gift of the En­glish translation, since translations are gifts, to be sure. ­Toward
the end of her life she requested to listen to Proust on tape and rejected the
­En­glish version I once sent her. “Moncrieff ?” she asked, incredulously. ­Later I
learned that she had requested that a French friend come weekly to read from
Proust, and she did. I asked that friend w ­ hether Barbara spoke at all about
what she heard, and the answer was “not a word.” She was taking it in; perhaps
we could say, with Eve: she was breathing Proust in.
Sedgwick’s reading of Proust has done something brilliant. Among the
many astonishing characteristics of the opening third of Remembrance of ­Things
Past is the extraordinary length of time that Proust dwells on Swann’s love
for Odette, his mad and inventive jealousy, his repeated and retractable real-
ization that her love has gone elsewhere, and his conviction that he himself
has become odious in her eyes. Only ­after several hundred pages of attentive
detail, culminating with the recognition that he has suffered so terribly for a
­woman who, in the end, is “not even his type,” we receive the report from our
young narrator not only that Swann did marry her, but that he did so for the
purpose of presenting her in social com­pany to a certain Duchesse de Guer-
mantes. Although ­there is already a Madame Swann remarked on by the nar-
rator in e­ arlier passages, the entirety of Swann’s relation to Odette is narrated
without any explicit reference to marriage, past, pre­sent, or ­future. ­Matters
become more confusing when Swann marries Odette and she turns out to
be the Madame Swann so firmly and explic­itly backgrounded in the first five
hundred pages of the text.

66  |  Judith Butler

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 Of course, the marriage plot would have us expect something e­ lse. Odette
is Swann’s mistress and therefore not his wife. Or Swann marries Odette at the
height of their love, and she happily becomes Madame Swann. But in this text,
it is only when the love is wrecked and the striving for possession has failed
that marriage becomes a distinct narrative possibility. Only when Odette
proves to be unequivocally elusive in the face of vari­ous forms of abject plead-
ing and accusation does marriage enter the story. We appear to witness what
seems to be a final break or the death of love, the cessation of a long story in
which Swann’s love and jealousy seem mainly derived from his own inventive
powers. The marriage of the next chapter emerges on the condition of the
death of love, perhaps as its ratification. When we come to the end of “Swann
in Love,” and Odette escapes a party with one provisionally named Napoleon III,
with whom a furtive arrangement apparently has been made, and Swann “felt
that he ­really hated Odette,” we are given to assume that the chapter’s end is
the end of that love. We expect the pain to be redoubled when a painter, de-
scribed as a strange young man, burst into tears, announcing that he was also
Odette’s lover. It is Swann, then, apparently calm, who comforts the young
man, remarking that “he was obviously the man to understand her.”7 What
follows is the relapse of the second character into the first. Proust writes, “So
Swann reasoned with himself, for the young man whom he had failed at first
to identify was himself too; like certain novelists, he had distributed his own
personality between two characters, the one who was dreaming the dream,
and another whom he saw in front of him sporting a fez.”8 Indeed, the narrator
of the story is a young man who is following the life of Swann, so we are no
longer certain at such a moment ­whether ­there is a stable distinction between
narrator and character. Indeed, it seems that Swann is also narrating, since he
gave the name “Napoleon III” to Forcheville, precisely the man to whom he
riveted his jealous attentions for some hundred pages at least.
In “Madame Swann at Home” we learn that many ­people are surprised by
the marriage, we fi­nally learn something about Odette’s class-­based convic-
tion that Swann would never marry her, and it is speculated that she suffers
from shame and humiliation. Swann resolves to marry her only a­ fter a series
of painful realizations become unbearable. Proust writes, “A new regimen,
that of matrimony, would put an end with almost magical swiftness to ­those
painful incidents.” The narrator explains that this follows from “the purely
subjective nature of the phenomenon that we call love, or how it creates, so
to speak, a supplementary person, distinct from the person whom the world
knows by the same name, a person most of whose constituent ele­ments are

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derived from ourselves.”9 Thus, the act of falling in love seems to participate in
that same distribution of personality that describes the narrator’s relation to
his character. Swann is narrating, but he is also dreaming, and in his dreams he
takes ­great plea­sure in the “creative power by which he was able to reproduce
himself by a ­simple act of division.”10
His marriage was then part of the making of a supplementary person, but
what name does that person have? Odette, Swann himself? It is not, though,
in his own eyes that this supplementary person must appear. It is in the eyes
of yet some third person, the one whose social opinion he values most highly
and who credibly represents that social power. An impossible figure, since
such a one would never offer the recognition he sought. We are told that he
dies with the certainty that the Duchesse ­will never have known the two of
them, and this deprivation is final, if not fatal.
Many Sedgwickian themes proliferate ­here. Hilarious and shocking as the
sequences may be, the death of love leads to marriage, and marriage becomes
bound up with the desire for an impossible recognition that works its fatality
on Swann himself. He no longer quite loves his Odette, was arguably not even
attracted to her at the beginning, but some other desire takes its place or was
working as its substitute from the start. What he seeks is precisely what the
narrator calls “a posthumous love,” one that requires the death of both love
and life.
At such a moment we see perhaps a certain transition in Proust that we also
find in Sedgwick. Her early work on triangularity exposed not only the way
that homosociality streaks through heterosexuality, but also how the dyad is
never quite as closed as it may appear. Even then, however, Sedgwick sought to
offer a way to think about triangulation that did not rigidify laws of exclusion,
possession, and displacement, t­ hose that characterize the most orthodox
version of the Oedipal scenario. Desire was more multiple and circuitous,
but also more in­ter­est­ing, than the Oedipal version could narrate. With the
help of Sedgwick’s reading, we might now identify a certain Buddhist turn in
Proust. H ­ ere is the passage that Paul de Man used to teach many years ago. I
offer it h­ ere ­because I think it can be read in a new way with Sedgwick’s inflec-
tion. It reflects on the improbable event of Swann’s marriage:
The laborious pro­cess of causation which sooner or l­ater ­will bring about
­every pos­si­ble effect, including, consequently, t­hose which one had be-
lieved to be least pos­si­ble, naturally slow at times, is rendered slower still
by our desire (which in seeking to accelerate only obstructs it) by our very

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 existence, and comes to fruition only when we have ceased to desire—­
have ceased, possibly, to live.11
Interestingly enough, it is not the vanquishing of desire that leads to the
expansion of pos­si­ble effects, but its deceleration. What world of possibility
opens ­here? It is as if on the flip side of the map of jealousy is the grid that
tracks interrelated connections among h­ umans and ­things that belong to an
expanding network or horizon. For Proust, love always involves a certain
proliferation of character. One becomes another self, and one’s lover does, as
well, and it is always ­either ­under the gaze of another that love becomes real
or, indeed, in a mad effort to escape the gaze, which keeps that third equally
indispensable. If an ac­cep­tance of this proliferated and interrelated mapping
becomes pos­si­ble, it is on the condition of a decelerated desire, precisely not
the frantic effort to secure and vanquish, one that lets go of a strictly egoistic
position. ­There is some invariable displacement that articulates this relation-
ality, which is why displacement is not the same as being simply negated. It
is about being determined in relation to o­ thers and to an ambient world. In
this sense, what started as a maddening triangle becomes the very basis of
relationality, the counterpoint that object-­relations is to Freudian orthodoxy,
and the freeing of the ego from its madness. Swann is no model, to be sure, but
we are left wondering about this “posthumous love” t­ oward which he is said
to strive, since that is also the question that so many ask now: What is one to
do with one’s love for Eve Sedgwick? Swann’s love for Odette now belongs
to “eternity,” but what about ours?
To fathom this, we have to return to breathing—­and, in fact, we have to
return ­there in any case. It is not precisely a m ­ atter of our w­ ill but the condi-
tion of any pos­si­ble willing. It is a prerequisite of our somatic life, and it is, for
Sedgwick, prior to libido. It takes some deceleration of desire to notice one’s
breathing and to discern ­there precisely the drive that links us to other biolog-
ical beings who strive, prior to any cognition and volition, to survive. And yet
breathing crosses both sexual and nonsexual embodiment—­that we breathe
in ways that we do not ordinarily do when we are sexually passionate, and that
we also have to breathe (are often, in fact, told to breathe) to divest from what­
ever sexual passion may be driving us mad. This is clearly a tenet of Yoga and
its Hindu basis, but it is also a tenet of Buddhism more generally: to notice
what happens in the mind without judgment. For Proust, the object of love
never stays the same, so duplication happens as a m ­ atter of course. The hallu-
cinatory pain that rivets jealous consciousness is clearly also something that is

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countered, when it is, by refusing to become so fully self-­enclosed. What gives
relief is precisely what takes one out of oneself, what is unanticipated, what
arrives as a surprise that one finds oneself taking in, as if the world itself sup-
plied an unexpected nourishment. ­There is not only a shifting and remarkable
world outside oneself, but one is, in spite of oneself, still open to it, and must
be, to ingest, to inhale, and so to survive.
This opens up the question of how we might with Buddhist assistance re-
read Freud himself. The Fort-­Da game depends on some m ­ other or support-
ing person having to leave the room, ­going elsewhere, driven by a desire that
does not have us at the center. In the same way, our lovers are always g­ oing
somewhere e­ lse; they come from somewhere ­else, they live somewhere e­ lse,
they have histories of elsewhere that arrive with them and never leave. And
most emphatically in the case when the lover represents “somewhere e­ lse” for
the mind, as is so often the case for Swann or the narrator, ­there is a “some-
where ­else” for that lover that disrupts the ­mental or phantasmatic idea, the
one that relies on the absence it seeks to vanquish.
So enough already with vanquishing! We are left to ponder what the nar-
rator might have meant by Swann’s effort to achieve a “posthumous happi-
ness” with Odette through his marriage. I confess to gaining a posthumous
happiness with Eve Sedgwick by reading Proust with her reading . . . ​and by
bringing that reading together with Barbara Johnson’s writing, if only briefly.
The point is not that she “would have loved that” but that something about
this other way of loving is what is happening still, in her name, with her text.
As we breathe still, or even as we sometimes find it difficult to breathe, we are
in some ways helpless and striving, a duality that drives us. And it seems to
me that we read as we do only b­ ecause we took her in, and breathe her in still,
with surprise, and with gratitude.

NOTES

Epigraph: Marcel Proust, The Guermantes Way, trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff and
Terence Kilmartin (New York: Random House, 1981), 358.
1 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, The Weather in Proust, ed. Jonathan Goldberg
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011).
2 Sedgwick, The Weather in Proust, 8.
3 Barbara Johnson, Persons and ­Things (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2008), 94–108.
4 Sedgwick, The Weather in Proust, 8.

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 5 Michael Balint, The Basic Fault: Therapeutic Aspects of Regression (Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1992), 145, quoted in Sedgwick, The Weather in
Proust, 8.
6 Barbara Johnson, “Using ­People: Kant with Winnicott,” in The Turn to Ethics,
ed. Marjorie Garber, Beatrice Hanssen, and Rebecca L. Walkowitz (New York:
Routledge, 2000), 27, quoted in Sedgwick, The Weather in Proust, 8.
7 Marcel Proust, Remembrance of ­Things Past: Swann’s Way and Within a Budding
Grove, trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin (New York: Random
House, 1981), 412.
8 Proust, Remembrance of ­Things Past: Swann’s Way, 412–13.
9 Proust, Remembrance of ­Things Past: Swann’s Way, 505.
10 Proust, Remembrance of ­Things Past: Swann’s Way, 413.
11 Proust, Remembrance of ­Things Past: Swann’s Way, 508.

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