Globalizations

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rglo20

Information disorder, fake news and the future of

democracy

Linda Monsees

To cite this article: Linda Monsees (2021): Information disorder, fake news and the future of
democracy, Globalizations, DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2021.1927470

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2021.1927470

Published online: 26 May 2021.

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GLOBALIZATIONS
https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2021.1927470

Information disorder, fake news and the future of democracy

Linda Monsees
Institute of International Relations Prague, Prague, Czechia

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
The terms ‘fake news’ and ‘alternative facts’ have lost their shock value in Disinformation; post-truth;
today’s public discourse and seem to have become part of our normal Czechia; Germany;
political vocabulary. Fake news, mis- and disinformation are not a problem democracy; hybrid war
of a particular country but are found in politics around the world. In this
paper, I look at how disinformation appears as a problem for democracy.
Empirically, this paper explores dominant patterns of argumentation with a
focus on the US, Germany and Czechia. I discuss the themes of media
literacy, hybrid warfare and the emergence of fringe media. This paper
argues that more attention needs to be paid to the affectual dimension of
why people share fake news. Even though there is no easy solution for
dealing with fake news, a first step is to stop denouncing people for
believing in fake news and putting all our hope in media literacy.

Introduction
The terms ‘fake news’ and ‘alternative facts’ have lost their shock value in today’s public discourse
and seem to have become part of our normal political vocabulary (Egelhofer et al., 2020). Fake
news, mis- and disinformation are not a problem of a particular country but it is part of politics
around the world (Crilley & Chatterjee-Doody 2019; Hameleers et al., 2020; Humprecht, 2019;
Khaldarova & Pantti, 2016; Ranganathan, 2019; Rychnovská & Kohut, 2018). Indeed, fake news
is seen as a core factor for the current demise of democracy, the rise of authoritarianism, populism,
racism and polarization of society. However, as I argue throughout the article, ‘fake news’ might be
better understood not as a cause for these developments but as a symptom.
In this article, I draw on an emerging strand of literature which understands fake news as an
‘ordering device, a concept that serves as a means to create order in a complicated world and
make sense of what is going on’ (Braun, 2019, p. 432). The political significance of fake news
stems not only from the impact it has on people’s opinions and voting behaviour but also in the
way references to ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’ structure public debates and make the contestation
of certain political opinions less likely (Eberle & Daniel, 2019; Farkas & Schou, 2018; Vogelmann,
2018). Indeed, in this article, I investigate how references to fake news structure public debates,
reproduce specific lines of conflict and denounce certain opinions. The specific focus lies in the
relation between disinformation and democracy since the former is supposed to threaten the latter
(cf. Chadwick et al., 2018 Farhall et al., 2019;). I demonstrate how ‘fake news’ is perceived as a threat
since it supposedly disrupts rational public debate. Ultimately, so I argue, we thereby run the

CONTACT Linda Monsees monsees@iir.cz

© 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 L. MONSEES

danger of missing the affectual reasons for why people share fake news and neglect the political
economy of clickbait.
The underlying argument of this article is, then, that the importance of ‘fake news’ or disinfor-
mation lies in how references to ‘fake news’ rekindle societal debates on democracy. The emphasis
on democracy derives from the fact that most commentators focus in one form or another on how
fake news destroys features of democracy such as the formation of opinion, trust in institutions or
the conduct of elections. But as Boler and Davis argue, understanding current societal divisions
does not only require paying attention to different opinions but also more attention ‘at the level
of emotionality’ (Boler & Davis 2018, p. 76; Boler & Davis 2020). Rather than providing yet another
study into the spread of fake news, this paper argues for taking seriously the affectual reasons of
why people share and read fake news.
In order to make these arguments, I start by contextualizing the term ‘fake news’ and introdu-
cing the concept of information disorder as a more precise term to refer to the multiple changes
that we can currently observe in the realm of political communication. The important new aspect
of ‘fake news’ is the emergence of a new political economy relying on clickbait. I then discuss the
link between democracy and disinformation, broadly distinguishing between deliberative and lib-
eral on the one hand and agonistic theories of democracy on the other. Then, in the next section,
this background discussion allows me to not only discuss three important themes of the disinfor-
mation debate but also link the dominant arguments back to democratic theory. Empirically, I
focus on Germany, Czechia and the US. To be clear, these are not three full case-studies but
serve as an exploration on common themes and dynamics. Drawing on previous analyses on the
German, Czech and US-American debates me to illustrate how debates on fake news structure pub-
lic discourse, reproduces specific lines of conflict and individualizes ‘fake news’ as a societal
problem.

Information disorder and the politics of false information

Originally, the term fake news was a technical term referring to satirical news such as The Colbert
Report or the Daily Show (Tandoc et al., 2017, p. 6). Today, it more often refers to the spread of
fabricated news in order to manipulate propaganda either for political (propaganda) or for econ-
omic (advertising) goals (Tandoc et al., 2017). While the term ‘fake news’ is often used to
denounce media outlets and used in political battles, more technical terms such as dis- or mis-
information are used in academic debates referring to ‘online publications of intentionally or
knowingly false statements of facts that are produced to serve strategical purposes and are disse-
minated for social influence or profit’ (Humprecht, 2019, p. 1975). In a research report of the
European Council, Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan (2017) introduce the term ‘infor-
mation disorder’. This term places greater emphasis on the different agents involved in the cre-
ation, spread and consumption of news. Wardle and Derakhshan describe information disorder
by distinguishing between, mis-, dis- and malinformation. These types of information are distin-
guished by the intention with which news is spread and if harm is intended or not (Wardle &
Derakhshan, 2017, p. 5). This concept is better suited to capture changes in the media landscape
than ‘fake news.’ Research on fake news is mushrooming but results about the actual impact on
voting behaviour are mixed.
Methodologically, it is very difficult to research whether fake news indeed alters voting behav-
iour (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017).1 While ‘fake news’ indeed spreads fast around social networks,
this does not mean that people actually believe these stories or that they change actual behaviour
 GLOBALIZATIONS 3

or political convictions. It is true that disinformation seems to have at least some power to set the
agenda of mainstream news (Vargo et al., 2017). But even though confirmation bias and polariz-
ation play a role (Del Vicario et al., 2016), echo chambers do not play a decisive role in the out-
comes of elections (Bail et al., 2020; Boulianne et al., 2020). Research on the spread and impact
of fake news usually assumes that people sharing these stories believe in them and that reading
these stories will alter their political behaviour. However, sharing stories is never only about sharing
(neutral) information but also involves an affective dimension (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017, p. 7).
Based on previous research, we can detect two ways in which fake news is ultimately not about the
(lack of) veracity of the stories but the way they work on an affectual dimension. The first crucial
aspect concerns clickbait, the second how sharing stories is an expression of identity. Let me briefly
discuss both aspects in turn.
As Tommaso Venturini states succinctly ‘junk news is not about algorithmic persuasion’ (Ven-
turini, 2019, p. 123). He, among others, argues that people spread ‘fake news’ items even though
they do not believe them. They are shared because people might want to debunk them or make
fun of them (Venturini, 2019, p. 126). Since the point is not about the ‘fakeness’ as such, Venturini
prefers to speak about ‘junk news’ or ‘viral news’ (Venturini, 2019, p. 126). Fake news items work
since they are addictive and grab our attention – even if we do not believe them. They are produced
because they hold our attention which can then be translated into monetary revenue. A whole pol-
itical economy has developed around fake or junk news (Bakir & McStay, 2018). This shows that
fake news as a phenomenon is very complex and we need to consider economic aspects that shape
how news stories are produced and shared. Indeed, when we look at research on fake news in the
field of sociology, we can observe another reason why the phenomenon of fake news is not best
explained by only looking at quantitative signifiers. Following up on the role of the affective dimen-
sion, Polletta and Callahan (Polletta & Callahan, 2017; see also: Hochschild, 2016b) have proposed
that we should understand the sharing of fake news less as an act of rational information sharing
than as an act of identity expression. The authors argue that sharing fake news in the US presiden-
tial election can be better understood as an expression of a common identity. The question of
whether people ‘really’ believed in these stories is then secondary. Disinformation thus becomes
something that is not simply about a lack of facts in news but also about people being emotionally
attached to certain news and their emotional reactions that help them assess the veracity of news
stories (Boler & Davis 2018, pp. 78–79). People identify with certain news and use the sharing of
news as an expression of their identity and their belonging to a specific social group (Polletta &
Callahan, 2017, p. 400).
We should be less concerned with the direct impact of disinformation than with what it reveals
as a symptom of broader changes in political communication and media consumption. Junk news
aim at affective reactions such as a feeling of partisanship or deep social division (Venturini, 2019;
Young, 2021, p. 5). Sharing fake news seems to occur for multiple reasons and the emergence of
‘information disorder’ or ‘junk news’ is a symptom of changes in the media landscape and a distinct
political economy based on clickbait. As a consequence, more recent research has investigated the
debates that revolve around fake news (Creech, 2020; Farkas & Schou, 2018; Monsees, 2020; Was-
serman, 2020). That is why, in this article, I focus on how debates over fake news and disinforma-
tion rely on specific arguments and ideas that ultimately help, for example, delegitimise certain
opinions or present fake news as a security threat. Conceptually, I read the debates on fake news
in Germany, Czechia and the US through ideas on democracy. In the next section, I discuss demo-
cratic theories and their presence in debates on disinformation.
4 L. MONSEES

Democracy and fake news

In this section, I will link the phenomenon of information disorder with debates on democracy.
Methodologically, the following discussion stems from an iterative process of empirical analyses
and theoretical reflections on how this resonates with democratic theory. One might say that
this study follows very loosely the methodological tenets of Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006) soci-
ology of critique – specifically the idea that agents use patterns of justification that can also be found
in theoretical treatises. For my argument, I assume that when debating disinformation, commen-
tators refer to ideas stemming from theories of democracy to explicate why disinformation threa-
tens democracy. I draw on two main strands of democratic theory: liberal/deliberative and agonistic
theories of democracy. Research drawing on liberal or deliberative theories emphasizes the impor-
tance of social cohesion and public deliberation (Dryzek et al., 2011). In contrast, agonistic (some-
times also called ‘radical’) theories of democracy argue that politics is always conflictual and that
democracies need to find procedures to tame these conflicts in agonistic relationships (Mouffe,
2000). Both strands of theories result in different ideas of how to mitigate the impact of information
disorder. This section will look closer at the link between the debate on information disorder and
ideas of democracy and in which way the former is perceived as a problem for the latter. While
previous studies have often relied on one strand of democratic theory, I will discuss both together.
In broad brush strokes, we can say that democratic theories associated with the liberal or delib-
erative tradition emphasize the importance of rational, public deliberation and participation in pol-
itical processes. A requirement is that citizens need to feel a sense of belonging to a political
community and trust political institutions. This sense of belonging to a political community allows
them, ideally, to deliberate public issues, make informed electoral decisions and be part of demo-
cratic institutions. A precondition for this form of participation is a functioning media system in
which citizens trust. These are, of course, ideal situations and all readers would easily identify many
situations in which these ideals are not upheld. Theorists that diagnose the advent of a post-democ-
racy identify increasing corporate power and the delusion of citizens as core problems with current
democratic regimes (cf. Crouch, 2004). However, these ideals still shape debates about democracy
and they also impact the way we talk about fake news as a problem.
Within democratic theories, the emphasis often lies on the institutional setup, whereas I would
like to emphasize the role of the affectual dimension (Hutchison, 2019; Young, 2021). Democratic
regimes do not only work through rights and obligations but also require a more affectual dimen-
sion. In the context of information disorder an argument about the lack of belonging and increas-
ing polarization is made (Beam et al., 2018). Analyses that try to understand the rise of reactionary
politics and populism often emphasize this aspect of social groups that feel left behind and not part
of society. Arlie Hochschild provides one of the most forceful analyses in this context. She inves-
tigated the Tea Party movement in the US through an in-depth ethnography and reconstructs why
people vote for issues such as less governmental regulation and welfare even though this is against
their own interests. The title of her monograph ‘Strangers in their own land’ (Hochschild, 2016a)
summarizes the feeling of alienation and of being left behind by one’s own government. According
to her, part of the reason why people supported Trump was that he filled a void in their struggle for
recognition (Hochschild, 2016b). Drawing on Hochschild’s work, Polletta and Callahan (2017)
conclude that people sharing fake news do so to express an identity, a sense of belonging to a
group of people being left behind by elites.
This idea that disinformation weakens social cohesion and hampers public deliberation also
influences political practice. In the ‘Action plan against disinformation’ of the EU we can read:
 GLOBALIZATIONS 5

Our open democratic societies depend on the ability of citizens to access a variety of verifiable infor-
mation so that they can form a view on different political issues. In this way, citizens can participate
in an informed way in public debates and express their will through free and fair political processes.
These democratic processes are increasingly challenged by deliberate, large-scale, and systematic
spreading of disinformation. (High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
2018, p. 1)

This quote reflects themes known from democratic theory: the need for informed citizens and a free
public debate for democracies as well as how this is threatened by disinformation. These ideas are
also present in public discourse (Monsees, 2020) and shape academic debates, too. Indeed, much
research in journalism studies starts from this assumption of the importance of rational debate
when analysing the rise of fringe media and its supposed impact on society (Chadwick et al.,
2018; Lokot & Diakopoulos, 2016; Waisbord, 2018).
This emphasis on rational debate, informed citizens and social cohesion is, however, only one
side of the coin. Trust in institutions is not unconditional and protest and critique of political elites
is an allowed and even necessary feature of democracies. A crucial feature of democratic regimes is
then that the exercise of (governmental) power is not beyond critique. Indeed, in a democratic
society, it is not only possible but necessary to critique reports by the media and statements by
experts (cf. Irwin, 2001). In contrast to authoritarian regimes, citizens can and should be in the pos-
ition to challenge factual as well as normative claims2 made by government, media and experts.
Indeed, agonistic theories of democracy emphasize the inherently conflictual character of politics.3
According to this strand of theory, democratic theories need to acknowledge this aspect and find
ways to organize political contestation in a non-violent way. Societal conflicts need to be trans-
formed into agonistic contestation (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001).
In addition, Chantal Mouffe argued that danger for democracy lies not only in the fact that
antagonistic relations spark political violence but also in the denial of antagonistic social relation-
ships. For her, a core danger lies in the assumption that ‘conflicts can be pacified thanks to the
“opening up” of a variety of public spheres’ (Mouffe, 2008, p. 48). Even more so, conflicts should
not be translated into moral registers since adversarial debate and contestation constitute politics
(Mouffe, 2008, chap 2). Denouncing a rival political opinion on moral grounds removes the conflict
from legitimate contestation within a political community. Drawing on Laclau and Mouffe, Farkas
and Schou have used agonistic theories of democracy to understand fake news. They argue that
deploying this democratic tradition helps us to understand politics as not primarily being ‘about
facts, reason and evidence’ but rather as
the interlocking exchanges between the individual and the people, as well as the competing political
ideas about how society ought to be structured. (Farkas & Schou, 2019, p. 6)

Ultimately, they argue that ‘fake news’ has proliferated since it became a signifier for multiple issues
and hence part of different controversies (Farkas & Schou, 2018). Using agonistic theories of
democracy helps us to see how contestation of media and experts is important.
To bring the previous discussion together, political debate, factual statements and the affective
dimension can never be that easily disentangled. Democratic theorists often emphasize either the
need for social cohesion and public deliberation or that antagonistic relationships (enemy) should
be ideally translated into agonistic (rivalry) ones. In the context of information disorder, arguments
about populism as made by Jan-Werner Mueller are particularly relevant (Müller, 2016). Like
Mouffe, he identifies it as a core danger when contestation is covered up and transferred into a
moral register. According to Mueller, it is important to neither denounce populist’s (or their
6 L. MONSEES

voters’) opinions from a moralistic point of view nor to belittle the threat stemming from fascist or
chauvinist thought. Mueller identifies the danger of treating populists as in need of ‘group therapy’
so that they will understand where their anger ‘really’ comes from. Such a treatment also increases
the societal cleavage and hampers political debate. The disinformation disorder is said to increase
populism, xenophobia and misogyny. Rather than finding the solution in trying to teach people
how things ‘really’ are, engagement on political grounds is necessary. Below, I show how this
engagement with people who share and/or believe in fake news is hampered when the focus lies
on the individual beliefs of people rather than on structural aspects such as clickbait.

The trouble with fake news

This section presents three prevailing themes and arguments in debates on fake news. Drawing on
previous analyses, I focus on how in Germany, Czechia and the US disinformation is linked with
the demise of democracy through the theme of journalism, hybrid warfare and media literacy. To
be clear, I do not provide three case studies but use these debates in order to tease out important
themes and arguments and start thinking about their structuring effects on public debates.
The discussion below draws on my more detailed analyses of the German public discourse from
2016–2018 (Monsees, 2020). The material encompassed parliamentary debates, newspapers4 and
parliamentary debates on the German NetzDG and other statements by crucial figures such as
NGOs challenging German legislation and statements by Mark Zuckerberg. I conducted a textual
analysis aimed at reconstructing the dominant argumentative patterns (Herschinger, 2010 Milli-
ken, 1999;). This was achieved by analysing the material to a few guiding questions such as
‘what is the problem?’ or ‘what is the proposed solution?’ (Viehöver, 2001).5 In addition, this
paper relies on insights of previous analyses on Czechia and the US. Combining the results of ana-
lyses on fake news in Czechia, the US and Germany in such a way allows me to illustrate the role
arguments about democracy play in these debates. The emphasis in this article lies then less on pre-
senting new empirical material but rather analysing it under the lens of how disinformation is pre-
sented as a threat to democracy. Most readers will be familiar with the main political dynamics in
the US and indeed most research has been conducted on the US. The global spread of the term and
problem of ‘fake news’ was probably only made possible because ‘fake news’ became such a domi-
nant term in US politics. Czechia provides an interesting case since here the debate on disinforma-
tion is even more tightly linked to debating Russia’s power. Reporting about Crimea and Ukraine
was highly influenced by Russia’s ‘information warfare’ (see below) as well as attempts to debunk it
(Smoleňova, 2015). All three countries embed their discussion around fake news in the question of
how to secure and strengthen democracy. This allows me to tease out common themes that are cru-
cial for understanding the relation of the debates on fake news and democracy.

Fake news!? – Journalists and the ‘lying press’

The term ‘fake news’ wields political power to the extent that it can be used to denounce political
opponents and critical media reporting. Broadly speaking, we can observe two different ways in
which the term is used: One way refers to the spread of false information via social networks.
Used in that way, fake news is almost synonymous with the term disinformation that I introduced
in the first section. However, the term ‘fake news’ is also used to denounce mainstream media.
Donald Trump popularized the term by using it in that sense to delegitimise specific news outlets
and ways of reporting. The term ‘alternative facts’ received wide-spread attention when Trump and
 GLOBALIZATIONS 7

his aides made (obvious) false claims about the number of people attending his inaugural speech. In
Germany, we can observe similar struggles to the ones in the US (cf. Monsees, 2020, pp. 5–7). In
Germany, the term ‘fake news’ (in English) is used to refer to disinformation. The far-right party
AfD (Alternative for Germany) and other groups use the term ‘lying press’ (Lügenpresse) to refer to
‘mainstream’ media, especially public broadcast and their allegedly biased way of reporting (cf. Holt
& Haller, 2017). Terms such as ‘fake news’ or ‘lying press’ thereby become part of the political bat-
tlefield themselves. Claiming that something is ‘fake news’ helps denounce the political opponent
and her position. In Czechia, the term of ‘disinformation’ is much more common, and it is a crucial
tool especially in assessing foreign policy issues such as the power of Russia or the EU’s role in the
Ukraine conflict (Smoleňova, 2015, p. 10). As discussed above, the idea of free, ‘neutral’ public
deliberation is an ideal and using terms such as ‘fake news’ helps to delegitimise opponents and
frame political issues in a particular way.
One way to interpret these dynamics is as part of a larger shift in the media landscape; the rise of
fringe online media, the use of bots (Lokot & Diakopoulos, 2016) and a changing political economy
of news media (Bakir & McStay, 2018). This shift leads to growing uncertainty not only among
audiences but also among journalists. In this context, Mihailidis and Viotty use the concept of
‘spectacle’ to make sense of a changing media landscape in which ‘fringe’ media can set the agenda
for mainstream media reports (Mihailidis & Viotty, 2017, p. 442). And indeed, there is some indi-
cation that during the 2016 election partisan media became more responsive to ‘fake news’ (Vargo
et al., 2017, p. 16). Uncertainty among journalists increases and many comments in mainstream
newspapers mirror this unease with new media. The role for traditional media is made even
more complicated by the fact that correcting or debunking ‘fake news’ might not have the desired
effect. Debunking a story can ultimately help legitimise the story (Mihailidis & Viotty, 2017, p. 444).
The somewhat panicked debate about ‘fake news’ can thus also be interpreted as a sign of uncer-
tainty among journalists and journalism studies (cf. Waisbord, 2018). Most often, this professional
concern is presented as an issue not only for journalism but for society at large. Commentators
deploy arguments about the need for social cohesion and trust in institutions, as described in
the previous section. In the name of restoring journalism and saving democracy, attention shifts
towards technological solutions such as apps that can flag fake news or fact-checker websites.
However, so far research has only shown echo chambers to have limited impact and that the task
of debunking fake news encounters several difficulties, most importantly, contributing to the exist-
ing clickbait (Venturini, 2019). It is simplistic to assume that only fake news as a seemingly novel
phenomenon shapes the new media landscape. As Waisbord puts it nicely:
We should not, however, rush to conclude that ‘fake news’ is the defining trend in contemporary news.
Sweeping pronouncements about ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’ need to be approached gingerly. Different
trends and forces are at play […] Globally, the upsurge of quality investigative journalism [Schiffrin
2014], data journalism, and the fact-checking movement [Graves 2016] indicate growing interest in
news that carefully documents reality. (Waisbord, 2018, p. 2)

In the debate on fake news, we can see how commentators draw on ideals stemming from demo-
cratic theory that presuppose an informed citizen and rational public debate. The turn towards
polarized fringe media seems to be more a symptom of already existing alienation rather than its
cause. The debate on how information disorder disrupts the media system speaks to an ideal of
democracy where informed citizens are a core necessity and ‘objective’ information crucial for pub-
lic deliberation. Claiming then that something is ‘fake news’ delegitimises certain ways of consum-
ing media which serves the interests of traditional journalism.
8 L. MONSEES

We can now see how assumptions about the impact of fake news, together with ideas about the
role of the media and the need for informed citizens, structure the debate around disinformation
and democracy. Claiming that ‘fake news’ destroys the existing media landscape helps legitimise
existing media and delegitimises other news outlets as well as people who visit these sites and
share their stories.

Hybrid warfare
This section concerns the entanglement of the two tropes ‘fake news’ and ‘hybrid warfare’. Today,
disinformation is considered a major security concern as, for example, materialized in the ‘Action
Plan against Disinformation’ published by the EU high representative for foreign affairs. Russia’s
probable influence on the US elections and the Brexit referendum was the core concern for early
fake news commentators. While, in Czechia, this preoccupation ties in with larger concerns
about Russia’s geopolitical role, in Germany, interference in the 2017 parliamentary elections
was feared. The German Süddeutsche Zeitung summarizes the sentiment with the following words:
For weeks, people in London have been talking and writing about how Moscow influences the process
of formation of opinion through ‘fake news’ as it does in almost all of the Western world. (Brössler et al.,
2017)

Fake News is a concern because it distorts the process of gathering information and public delib-
eration. The ‘West’ as such becomes the target of disinformation campaigns and all democratic
elections are under pressure because disinformation campaigns might interfere with them.
Over time, this concern over influence on elections evolved into a more open concern with
security. Since Russia is said to be the main source of distributing fake news, its indirect influence
via fake news is linked with the more direct concern over Russia’s geopolitical position. In Czechia,
disinformation is said to stem from Russia or at least support Russia’s politics. Across Central and
Eastern Europe, news websites, Facebook pages and YouTube channels have emerged (Syrovatka,
2017, p. 3). The content was (and is) mostly pro-Russian and critical of the EU and the US (Smo-
leňova, 2015, p. 7). The focus lay on information and on Ukraine and the EU’s involvement in the
conflict (Smoleňova, 2015, pp. 10, 11). The emergence of disinformation is very much embedded in
a reoccurrence of considering Russia as a main security threat to the West – Czechia feeling specifi-
cally vulnerable. Jakub Eberle and Jan Daniel have summarized the Czech dynamics with the fol-
lowing words:
‘The West’ was the target of ‘Russian hybrid war’ (RHW), which played itself in the Czech context
chiefly in the form of spying, corrupting politicians, and (pro-)Russian propaganda and disinformation
campaigns. This posed a grave threat not only to the [sic] Czech security, but also to the country’s ‘Wes-
tern’ identity. (Eberle & Daniel, 2019, p. 1268)

Hybrid warfare became key to the Czech security strategy. Hybrid warfare was not characterized by
military interference, which was considered improbable, but through propaganda and so-called
information warfare (Daniel & Eberle, 2018, p. 908). This information warfare was ‘clearly framed
in geopolitical terms’ (Rychnovská & Kohut, 2018, p. 58). Rychnovská and Kohut conclude in their
network analysis of public debates on Russia and disinformation in Czechia that the ‘narrative of
Russia as a dangerous outside actor engaged in threatening activities in the Czech Republic’ was
dominant (Rychnovská & Kohut, 2018, p. 80). This sentiment is not unique to Czechia. Indeed,
we can find an expression of the same sentiment on the EU level:
 GLOBALIZATIONS 9

Disinformation campaigns, in particular by third countries, are often part of hybrid warfare,
involving cyber-attacks and hacking of networks. Evidence shows that foreign state actors are
increasingly deploying disinformation strategies to influence societal debates, create divisions
and interfere in democratic decision-making (High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy, 2018, p. 3).
Linking disinformation to geopolitical threats is a present theme in many countries but it seems
to be a more urgent issue in Central and Eastern Europe where the threat of Russia is more
imminent.
But what are consequences of a prevailing security narrative for democracy? Much has been
written on the relation between security and democracy (Bigo, 2006; Huysmans, 2014) and indeed
it is seen as a core question for the field of Critical Security Studies (Aradau, 2004). The question is,
what happens when disinformation is not only perceived as a core problem for democratic delib-
eration but also for security? Calling something a security threat raises the stakes. A security threat
requires immediate action by the executive and/or experts that know how to mitigate the threat
(Hagmann et al., 2019). The danger lies in framing disinformation as a security issue caused by
external forces which ‘consequently narrows down the thinking on who can deal with the issue
and how’ (Rychnovská & Kohut, 2018, p. 80).
As a result, democratic debate and contestation are restricted since ‘fake news’ is automatically
seen as a security concern. This does not mean that I deny the role of Russia and its interest in
influencing Western politics. It is noticeable, however, how linking ‘fake news’ and ‘security’ struc-
tures the debate around disinformation and makes state intervention more credible. Laws against
the creation and promotion of fake news often cite security concerns as we can see in Ukraine and
Malaysia (cf. Dutsyk & Dyczok, 2020 Lim, 2020;). Debates around disinformation then become
structured around security concerns and the role of Russia. We can see now how the different fea-
tures of democracy are played out against each other. On the one hand, disinformation is a problem
for democracy since it hampers public deliberation. On the other hand, it is a security concern and
should therefore be dealt with outside the democratic realm. Linking disinformation with fake news
is another mechanism for hampering the contestation of news as part of normal politics. However,
this is not the only solution to the problem of fake news and in the next section, we will look at
media literacy as a ‘softer’ solution.

The panacea of media literacy

Media literacy is probably the most common solution when it comes to thinking about fake news.
Other solutions that suggest better technologies or legal regulations are considered less promising.
For example, in Germany, the attempt to regulate platforms such as Facebook have been met with
hostility fearing that thereby these platforms would be empowered to decide what information is
true or a fake (Federal Minister for Justice and Consumer Protection, 2017; netzpiloten.org,
2017). The real problem is that ‘too many people believe too much of what they hear. Too many
people do not realize if something is made up’ (Kittlitz von, 2017). The quote stems from an article
published in the weekly newspaper Die ZEIT and continues with a discussion of the problem that
citizens need to trust media in order to be the educated citizens needed for democracy.6 Following
this sentiment, fact-checking sites have emerged around the world (Correctiv.org, 2018; Giereło-
Klimaszewska, 2019; Khaldarova & Pantti, 2016). The self-declared aim of fact-checking sites is,
as we can read on the web site of a German fact-checker group, that ‘we want to give every citizen
information in order to understand the world’ (Correctiv.org, 2018). A closer look at their self-
10 L. MONSEES

description reveals that fact-checking sites perceive their role as being an actor providing better
journalism and thus strengthening democracy.
The theme of critical thinking is a consistent thread in the German debate (Monsees, 2020). This
bottom-up strategy of media literacy and critical thinking goes hand in hand with a critical stance
against top-down solutions such as state-intervention or regulating platforms such as Facebook
(Monsees, 2020, p. 7). Countless initiatives on media literacy emerged in Germany and the idea
that education is a panacea against disinformation dominates the public debate (Monsees, 2018,
p. 10). This theme of media literacy links up with the theme of populism and the erosion of demo-
cratic structures that I discussed above. Mainstream media and many political commentators con-
sider fake news a problem since it fosters populism (Monsees, 2020, p. 20). This makes people with
a certain political opinion the problem. The solutions lie in making ‘them’ believe in the kind of
news that ‘we’ believe in. This is not to say that xenophobic, sexist and racist opinions aren’t deeply
problematic from a democratic perspective. It is notable, however, how references to ‘fake news’
structure political debates in a way that reinforces a distinction between ‘real’ and ‘fake’ news
and, more importantly, between those who can identify the fakeness of news and those who cannot
(boyd, 2018; Monsees, 2020). The problem of fake news is framed in such a way, that it becomes a
problem of individual political opinions that need to be corrected. Considering the above discus-
sion, we can see how this idea of educating ‘fake news believers’ is misled. It ignores the affectual
dimension of why people share fake news and assumes that ‘sharing’ means ‘believing’. The com-
plex relation of clickbait, alienation and a changing media landscape are all transformed into the
simple formula of media literacy.
In addition, the focus on media literacy individualizes the issue of fake news. The problem of
fake news and information disorder becomes one of certain people having false beliefs and consum-
ing the wrong kind of media. Focusing on media literacy as a solution reinforces this problem by
presenting the solution as one where the focus lies on the individual. Danah boyd showed how
‘media literacy’ is certainly needed, but the problem as such is more complex. ‘It also seems to
me that the narrow version of media literacy that I hear as the “solution” is supposed to magically
solve our political divide. It won’t’ (boyd, 2018). People are already critical of the media they read, a
lot of them are already critical of the mainstream media and distrust their information. Being able
to critically evaluate information is an important skill and a precondition for a democratic society.
However, the solution cannot be reduced to a form of media literacy where the assumption is that
‘critical thinking’ will inevitably lead people believe the right kind of news and preventing political
disagreement.
Media literacy puts individual skills in the focus and neglects the structural causes of information
disorder that I discussed in the first section (see also Mason et al., 2018). The effect is like linking it
to security: rather than asking about the roots of information disorder and the ways in which the
term ‘fake news’ is used in political battles, a focus on media literacy again externalizes the problem.
Young and uneducated people become the problem. This mirrors the problems identified by Jan-
Werner Mueller in the context of populism. Rather than engaging on a political level and asking
about the political motivation, the populism and fake news both become an issue of individual atti-
tudes. The solution is then to educate people to believe in the ‘right’ kind of media leaving aside the
wider economic and structural reasons for the emergence of fake news. This also prevents engage-
ment with the political opponent (from both sides) since the opponent is declared and to be either
intentionally lying or being deceived by false news and too uneducated to be able to participate in
democratic deliberation.
 GLOBALIZATIONS 11

Conclusion
Fake news, information disorder, and junk news shape contemporary debates on democracy. To
label something ‘fake news’ means to delegitimise specific news outlets, opinions or people sharing
this news. Drawing on previous research on Czechia, Germany and the US, I explored how in these
countries ‘fake news’ is presented as a problem for democracy. We could see how democratic ideals
shape the debate around disinformation. Especially how the ideal of an informed citizen and a
rational debate is a dominant theme, as exemplified in the emergence of fact-checking web sides
in Germany, Czechia and the US.
The idea that democracy needs contestation – even of experts and the media – is less present.
Especially when linking disinformation to hybrid warfare, the contestation of news stories stops
being part of normal democratic practice. Spreading specific news items becomes part of a threat
scenario and, as Rychnovská and Kohut argue, ‘fake news’ is put out of the realm of normal poli-
tics and becomes part of security politics (Rychnovská & Kohut, 2018). This then means that dis-
agreeing with certain news or contesting its veracity (or falsity) is not part of normal democratic
contestation but constitutes a security threat. This does not only hamper the contestation of
specific news within the political realm it also leads to a reinforcement of specific line of social
divisions in those that believe the ‘right’ and those that believe the ‘wrong’ kind of news. Denoun-
cing people sharing them as ‘uneducated,’ as is often done in public debates, does nothing in
terms of fostering better democratic debates. Media literacy, when understood in a narrow
sense, will not help to counter any spread of disinformation and it will certainly not help in deal-
ing with the underlying political economy. Indeed, it can reinforce polarization and existing
authoritarian tendencies that emerge in many Western democracies (cf. Vogelmann, 2018). By
now, the term ‘fake news’ is used rather loosely to refer to all kinds of phenomena. Frank Stengel
(2019) observed similar dynamics in relation to the term populism. Since the term is used very
broadly, the danger of fascism is played down whereas other ‘normal’ political phenomena are
dramatized (Stengel, 2019, p. 448). In the context of fake news, we observe similar dynamics
when fascist propaganda is labelled as ‘fake news’, and thereby made it difficult to call out
these anti-democratic forces.
Where does this leave us then? This article demonstrated that academic research needs to pay
more attention to the affectual dimension of both politics and of why people share fake news. Click-
bait and its related political economy are core essential to for understanding the phenomenon of
information disorder. Rather than more quantitative research into the ways in which fake news
spreads we need more sociological and political research into the context in which disinformation
occurs and how it impacts on society. Previous research suggests that people share fake news for
multiple reasons. Taking seriously the emotional reasons why people read fake news and even
take pleasure in sharing them is a next necessary step in understanding the contemporary infor-
mation disorder (cf. Young, 2021). Politically, we need to accept that disinformation (was and)
is part of our society. However, rather than reiterating the need for media literacy as a panacea,
more attention to the mechanisms of why people share them and what happens when one tries
to debunk them is needed. Denouncing people who share fake news as ‘uneducated’ will not
help anyone and will probably further social divisions. There is no easy solution of for fixing the
‘problem’ of disinformation, maybe not least because we might not even know what the real pro-
blem is. A first step, however, is to understand the phenomenon as a political one which requires a
political solution – meaning conversation and contestation.
12 L. MONSEES

Notes
1. I do not have the space to discuss the results of previous studies in detail. The early study by Alcott and
Getzkow, however, gives especially good insight into the methodological difficulties of measuring the
impact of ‘fake news’ as well as reasons to be sceptical about its impact.
2. The distinction between factual and normative claims is not always as clear-cut. Contesting this bound-
ary should, however, also be possible in a democratic society.
3. Pretending that distinguishing between fake and non-fake news is an apolitical activity fails to acknowl-
edge how establishing factual truth is always part of the political game. There is a rich tradition in
political theory emphasising this aspect of democracies (Dewey, 1999, pp. 31–34; see also Bartenberger,
2015). Indeed, it would be too simplistic to assume that commentators are not aware of this. My
discourse analysis of the German debates revealed how commentators are very aware of the fact that
in democratic regimes critique against experts is necessary and that identifying fake news is not a ‘neu-
tral’ task.
4. To be more precise: The analysis included texts from July 2016 until June 2018 and from the main Ger-
man newspapers die Zeit (weekly, liberal), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (daily, conservative leaning)
Süddeutsche Zeitung (daily, left-leaning) and the BILD. The BILD is the most sold daily newspaper but
it is also the main tabloid paper in Germany.
5. I use quotes as illustrations from that larger study; please refer to (Monsees, 2020) for a detailed account
on my methods and the results. In this article, I present the results in different forms by embedding
them more strongly in the context of democracy.
6. Interestingly, the article continues with a discussion that this trust cannot be blind. Indeed, the discus-
sion in Germany is in that way rather critical and reflexive of the term fake news. Journalists and other
commentators are aware of the fact that a functioning democracy also needs citizens that are in a pos-
ition to be critical of their authorities. This sentiment can best be described with Adornos term of
‘Erziehung zur Muendigkeit’ which translates something like ‘education to maturity’.

Acknowledgements
This paper has been presented at a virtual colloquium at King’s College London and the IPS-HUB colloquium.
I am thankful for the comments by Tony Porter, Stephan Engelkamp, Jan Daniel, Jakub Eberle and Dagmar
Rychnovská. Marieke de Goede’s and Emily Gilbert’s probing questions motivated this article. Mary Houck
provided invaluable help with the language.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding
This work was supported in part by Fritz Thyssen Stiftung.

Notes on contributor
Linda Monsees is a senior researcher at the Institute of International Relations Prague. Before joining the IIR
she held positions at Ecole Normale Supérieure Paris, Queen Mary University of London and Goethe Uni-
versity Frankfurt. She has worked on encryption, privacy practices and fake news. Her work has been pub-
lished in Security Dialogue, Internet Policy Review and Critical Studies on Security.
 GLOBALIZATIONS 13

ORCID
Linda Monsees http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5685-6949

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