Emerging Nations (Brazil&Southafrica)

Mega-Events in Emerging Nations and the Festivalization of the Urban Backstage: The Cases of Brazil and South Africa
in Distinctive and Visible Cities

from The SAGE Handbook of New Urban Studies
View article on Credo
THE INTERNATIONAL CLASS OF MEGA-EVENT HOSTING

The trend of hosting mega-events in ‘emerging nations’, that is, in non-western countries, seems prevalent – the summer Olympics in Beijing 2008, the football World
Cup in South Africa 2010 and in Brazil in 2014, the summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro in 2016 are the prominent examples. The designated next hosts for the football
World Cups in 2018 and 2022 are Russia and Qatar, respectively. Similar to other developments, this can be related to a dissolution of the long-standing hegemonic
dominance of old-industrialized western countries.
The international political context has been shaping the making of mega-events throughout most of its history. After all, the symbolic value of becoming a host
especially of the summer Olympics has been held in high esteem by aspiring political leaders and powers for a long time: the 1936 games in Berlin took place under
Nazi Germany's auspices; and at the height of the cold war, the capitalist west decided to boycott the games in Moscow in 1980, prompting a counter-boycott of the
1984 games in Los Angeles by socialist countries. However, whereas this context was highly charged ideologically in the twentieth century, it seems that currently, in
global competition, countries are more likely to stress economic aspirations in relation to hosting. Competition and ambition have become virtues in their own right,
while the political side of hosting still remains relevant.
Indeed, only if a minimum of economic capacity (including the representation of important global sub-markets) and substantial political backing is given, can the
possibility of hosting be translated into a successful bid. Thus, being selected as a host is already perceived as a symbolic recognition of being a ‘well respected’ nation
(Cornelissen, 2004; Desai and Vahed, 2010; Ley et al., 2010). An understanding of mega-events thus has to consider the reputation at stake on the global stage and
in international relations, as well as the inward-oriented emotional and symbolic fascination. It can be argued, that the latter is especially relevant for the (re-
)construction of a national identity (Cornelissen, 2012), making this aspect of nation building more important for younger, less consolidated and possibly post-colonial
states – especially when political arrangements need to be affirmed. This is one of the reasons why mega-event research has developed a specific interest in the hosts
of the ‘Global South’.
The term ‘Global South’ alludes to an understanding of a politically constructed contrast between so-called emerging/developing nations (‘South’) on the one hand and
the old industrialized countries (‘North’ or ‘West’) on the other. Economically, politically, socially, historically and geographically, however, it would seem overly
simplistic to reduce the trajectories of the more than 200 countries globally into a spectrum of binary oppositions. Although economic power, antagonistic colonial
experience and, to a certain extent, societal structures seemed to justify this type of categorization in the latter half of the twentieth century, the dualism in this
perspective is more of a hurdle than a gain in understanding urban development, or different host countries of mega-events. Consequently, instead of referring to the
Global South, this chapter starts with the observation that mega-events increasingly take place in emerging economies and aspiring nations.
Besides the transformations in the global context, the events themselves have changed. Here, a shifting of balance towards economic considerations is manifest, with
bigger amounts of money invested in stadiums and infrastructure, and bigger profits generated through marketing and ticket sales (Table 18.1).
The characteristics of sport events can be distinguished by five dimensions: political value; economic relevance; socio-emotional involvement; material impact (that is,
built environment); and symbolic importance. If the event's size is beyond contextually defined thresholds of spectators, profit and media attention, the term sports
mega-event applies: by convention this label is reserved to designate the Football World Cup and the Summer Olympics. Both events are marketed, managed and
owned by international sporting bodies, the ‘content providers’: the Federation of International Football Associations (FIFA) and the International Olympic Committee
(IOC). These organizations have developed successful brand identities and managed to guarantee – up to now – to produce spectacles that attract an unrivaled level
of public and media attention. These events are also in a league of their own because of the immense power held by both institutions responsible for the format. The
emotional and symbolic aspects of the events are the basis of this monopoly, in turn creating a true civil religion with global reach.
The internal structures of these content-providing institutions (leadership and branches run by committee members elected in democratic procedures based on country
membership) make them comparatively more open to influence from the Global South, since their proportional share of membership is bigger than the share of the few
politically and economically leading nations. The principle of rotating the host country (different from, for example, Super Bowl or Formula One) provides for a dynamic
element, making long-term allegiances more difficult to achieve on the one hand, but also providing for an institutionalized form of policy transfer and travelling models
of event implementation, on the other hand.
Another remarkable feature of mega-events (compared to mega-projects) lies in the clearly determined time span of contract loyalty, binding all involved parties
together as long as the success of the event still is pending – with higher reputational stakes than generated for example by huge building or infrastructural projects,
also due to the fixed deadline. Although the balance of power tends to shift towards the hosts during the preparation of the event, a weakness of their position lies in
the fact that for almost all host cities (especially in the Global South), a mega-event is ‘once-in-a-lifetime’. Yet, for FIFA and IOC, the preparations for the next event
start immediately in the aftermath of the one currently underway (or earlier).
Interestingly, the commodification of events has increased their iconographic value, too, which is a major factor for the hosts’ aspirations to boost their image by
throwing sport's biggest parties. The athletes’ performances are increasingly embedded in a grand entertainment scheme, consequently leading to a holistic staging of
the host cities: opening and closing ceremonies, architecture, theme songs and branding strategies, national imaginations and ‘the spirit of the games’ as well as of the
associated products – all this goes hand in hand.
The profits to be generated by the Olympics and the soccer World Cup are mainly for the benefit of the IOC and FIFA. These gains have been increasing, in line with
the cost of hosting, which is almost entirely at the expense of the hosts. The desire to outperform earlier hosts contributes to the rising cost of hosting. In the past
decades, investments have reached dimensions way beyond the financial capacity of host cities – national budgets thus provide the main economic base, effectively
leading to a situation where taxpayers raise concerns about the rationality of being part of this. Indeed, decreasing support in western public opinion has been
identified to be a factor in favoring the hosting of mega-events in countries that are politically less open (for example, China, Russia, Qatar), and/or if the related
economies are ascending and thus not requiring tight control of government spending (China, Brazil and, to a lesser extent, at least at the time of hosting, South Africa)
(Table 18.1).
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Table 18.1 Sports mega-events in the 21st century: economic and societal attributes of host countries
Year of Year of Total cost (US$, GDP at market prices (US$, in Estim. cost % HDI CPI (when CPI (in year of
Event Host Gini (year)
allocation hosting estimate) year of hosting)11 of GDP (2013)12 allocated)15 hosting)15
Summer Australia
1993 2000 6.93 bn1 846 bn 0.82 0.933 30.3 (2008)13 No data 83.00
Olympics (Sydney)
FIFA World Japan/ South > 4.00 bn / > 2.00 37.6 (2008)/31.1
1996 2002 > 5,126 bn/ 797 bn > 0.08/> 0.25 0.890/0.891 70.50 71.00/45.00
Cup Korea bn2 (2011)13
Summer Greece
1997 2004 15 bn3 302 bn 4.97 0.853 34.3 (2013)14 53.5 43.00
Olympics (Athens)
FIFA World
2000 2006 Germany 4.12 bn4 3,333 bn 0.12 0.911 28.3 (2013)14 76.00 80.00
Cup
Summer China
2001 2008 45 bn5 5,040 bn 0.89 0.719 42.1 (2013)14 35.00 36.00
Olympics (Beijing)
FIFA World
2004 2010 South Africa 5.25 bn6 375 bn 1.4 0.658 63.1 (2013)14 46.00 45.00
Cup
Summer England
2005 2012 15.97 bn7 2,499 bn 0.63 0.892 36 (2013)14 86.00 74.00
Olympics (London)
FIFA World
2008 2014 Brazil 11.00 bn8 2,412 bn 0.46 0.744 54.7 (2013)14 35.00 43.00
Cup
Summer
2009 2016 Brazil (Rio) 11.1 bn9 2,319 bn 0,48 0.744 54.7 (2013)14 37.00 n.a.
Olympics
FIFA World
2010 2018 Russia 20 bn10 n.a. n.a. 0.788 40.1 (2013)14 21.00 n.a.
Cup
Summer Japan
2013 2020 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.890 37.6 (2008)13 74.00 n.a.
Olympics (Tokyo)
FIFA World
2010 2022 Qatar n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.851 41.1 (2013)14 77.00 n.a.
Cup
Notes:
CPI = Consumer Price Index

1 Preuss (2004)
2 Barclay (2009)
3 Itano (2008)
4 Steinbrink et al. (2012: 31)
5 Fowler and Meichtry (2008)
6 Steinbrink et al. (2012: 31)
7 http://www.theguardian.com/sport/datablog/interactive/2012/jul/26/london-2012-price-olympic-games-visualised
8 https://www.statista.com/statistics/296493/total-costs-fifa-world-cup-2014-brazil/
9 Leme (2015)
10 http://www.espnfc.com/story/1475625/russias-2018-world-cup-projected-costs-spiral
11 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD?page=2
12 United Nations Development Programme (2014)
13 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2172.html
14 http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/income-gini-coefficient
15 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview
As can be seen in Table 18.1, the total cost of the events has been multiplying in the past two decades, making the hosting increasingly impossible for smaller
economies and underlining the role of mega-events as a means to demonstrate international status – this is to some extent reflected in the relatively high ratings of the
countries in the human development index (HDI). On the other hand, there is no clear response to the question of the events’ relation to societal inequality or to
corruption, at least not if the probe is based on existing Gini and CPI data (expressing statistical measurements of inequality in income distribution and of structural
corruption, respectively; cf. the last three columns of Table 18.1). Again, there is no tendency visible towards the opposite, and the connection to hidden payments of
the content providers has been heavily demonstrated in the case of FIFA, as the recent legal action against its top representatives shows. ‘Informal benefits’ such as
bribery can only unfold, of course, if two partners are involved. Consequently, a political elite hoping to boost national identity and pride through hosting is a
precondition. Thus, in the process of applying for the event, cities do play a role, but often not the most prominent: this would then fall to members of national
governments and to the national committees of the related sporting bodies, including their relationship to FIFA or IOC.
Nevertheless, especially since the rise of ‘global terrorism’ in recent years, security concerns have become more prominent as an additional concern for host selection
(Eisenhauer et al., 2014) – an aspect that might promote less open societies as hosts. Speaking broadly, from the point of view of the content providers, ‘ideal’ hosts
provide political stability, sufficient economic capital and hunger for symbolic benefits (including a broad emotional involvement of the population, be it orchestrated or
by its own inspiration) – consequently, a new generation of host countries, characterized above, has emerged.
With regard to securing a smooth course of events, both FIFA and the IOC have developed a comprehensive catalogue of obligatory requirements addressed to
potential hosts. Their fulfillment must be guaranteed in the bid books. The fact that host countries willingly grant FIFA and IOC tax exemptions, diplomatic rights and
influence in urban planning is a clear indication of the huge political interest that the governments associate with the staging of these events (Steinbrink et al., 2011). In
the case of applications from emerging countries, the symbolic enhancement of the national profile plays a particular role – the successful staging of a mega-event is
meant to counter the stigma of ‘underdevelopment’, thus enabling the country to cross the symbolic ‘threshold’ into the circle of the world's leading nations (Greene,
2003; Ley et al., 2010).
The applicants also cherish hopes with regard to domestic affairs. Besides the argument of economic growth, which is constantly put forward in the run-up to events
(foreign direct investment, promotion of tourism, etc.; Hiller, 2000; Maennig and Schwarthoff, 2010; Whitson and Macintosh, 1996), the function of sport as a generator
of a sense of belonging – in terms of a national ‘feel-good effect’ – must be mentioned here as well (Cornelissen, 2012).
In short, although historically a very western invention, the mega-events of today can be described as a form of globalized entertainment with unique dimensions, and
with an attributed increase of the symbolic value of hosting achieved through the submission of the host to potentially universalizing effects. As stated, this applies
chiefly to the hosts, but to some extent to the content providers as well.
THE URBAN PERSPECTIVE: MOTIVATION AND CHALLENGES OF HOST CITIES

Mega-events as Catalysts for Urban Development, North and South
From the point of view of urban policy, globalization, neoliberal economic strategies and the worldwide competition between metropolises are seen as driving forces
behind the interpretation of mega-events as an element of urban development (Häußermann and Siebel, 1993). In the old industrialized nations, the events are said to
help to compensate for de-industrialization and to counter stiff international competition for foreign investment, consumption markets and entertainment (Clark, 2011;
Greene, 2003; Harvey, 1989, 2013; Sassen, 1991). For the metropolises of the South, however, urban growth challenges and infrastructure deficits as well as socio-
spatial disparities represent additional and different hurdles beyond the preparation of the mega-event itself. Hosting an event in a ‘southern’ ‘urban’ context thus is
related to the hope of empowering host cities vis-à-vis these challenges. Beyond this, throughout the world, mega-events are still promoted as stimuli of economic
growth and as a focal point of urban development and city marketing over decades.
Similar to the distinction we made at the national level and in economic terms, the desired effects of hosting can be categorized as either aiming at an external context,
or at an internal one (Häußermann et al., 2008: 263f.). With regard to the global audience, events have become instruments of marketing and image building. The
staging of the hosts as world class cities is also linked to expected or at least heralded local employment effects and a growth in tourism (Andranovich et al., 2001;
Greene, 2003; Häußermann et al., 2008; Hiller, 2000).
Regarding the internal context, the main purpose of an event is to serve as a catalyst for urban development and a legitimation for big infrastructure investment M
( ayer,
2007). During the preparation phase, a huge amount of pressure is built up due to the fixed time-frame. An intended side effect of this pressure is the temporary
empowerment of key actors – thanks to an artificially created ‘state of exception’ (Vainer, 2011). Consequently, some fields of urban policy lose budget shares and
attention (for example, social policy), whereas other sectors benefit (urban planning, infrastructural investment) (Haferburg and Steinbrink, 2010a; Matheson and
Baade, 2004). A mega-event thus provides a boost for a selected range of projects, and provides a focal point for all kinds of urban interventions.
Successful bidding and preparing for a mega-event creates an entanglement of all actors involved – governance configurations within the host cities, national
government, and international sporting bodies. The result is an amalgamation of the interests at stake, with the common goal of the incident-free staging of an event
that is marked by a unique intersection of mass appeal and world-class elitism. The marketing value and the generated profits depend profoundly on this untainted
projection of nationalized success through individual and collective achievements.
The Production of Sport Mega-Events beyond the West – Dimensions and Key Actors
Mega-event research beyond the west was quite limited until the 2010 FIFA World Cup was awarded to South Africa in 2004 – only a few events prior to this had been
analyzed through this lens. Matheson and Baade (2004) and Horne and Manzenreiter (2006) are among the pioneers of this field. Since 2010, edited collections
(Haferburg and Steinbrink, 2010b; Pillay et al., 2009) and a considerable number of studies have been published (de Souza, 2012; Newton, 2009; Schausteck de
Almeida et al., 2015; Steinbrink, 2013; Steinbrink et al., 2011), some also looking back at earlier events (for example, Brewster, 2010 on the Olympics in Mexico 1968).
For this type of host, two claims can be made: first of all, based on a lower GDP per capita, economic effects (positive or negative) tend to be more articulate here
(Cottle, 2011). Additionally, the interventions into the built environment as well as into planning and administration of the host cities are more thorough, since, at the
outset, the gap between world-class ambitions of the hosts, as well as the benchmarks set by of FIFA and IOC on the one hand, and existing infrastructure on the
other hand, is much wider compared to western host cities (Haferburg, 2011).
On a metropolitan scale, the most critical differences can be identified in attributes of urban structure and in the way economic development and transformation take
place. Scarcity of space for inner-urban redevelopment is a concern, especially in growing cities – and since a considerable economic base is required to sustain the
event-related infrastructure, most host cities share this challenge. However, in most emerging countries, the economic growth paths have not yet been transformed as
severely as in the de-industrializing nodes of the North. In these historical ‘mega-cities’, the hosting of events was often in connection with brown field development of
old ports, railway infrastructure or production sites. The inner peripheries of the new host cities, in contrast, are typically represented by informal settlements, although
redevelopment of older infrastructure can also be involved. The prophylactic ‘ordering’ of urban informality is especially visible regarding housing and trading. The
extent, however, to which informality has been erased goes beyond the requirement to build stadiums and training facilities, or to expand the property market. The
formalization and ordering of the urban sphere is indeed linked to a displacement of elements not suitable for this kind of embracing commodification – the process
thus has to be understood in the context of the staging of cleanliness, modernity and orderly urbanization.
The Visible Backstage

Since large-scale events primarily aim at showcasing a visible image of the city internationally, there is the inevitable tendency, in mega-event policies, to actually consider
everything that is invisible as unimportant, too. This, of course, includes the many social problems that cannot be integrated into a positive image.
(Häußermann et al., 2008: 265) [authors’ translation]
The preparation of events in aspiring nations can lead to a conflict between image objectives in the context of global competition on the one hand and the needs of
urban residents, most of whom are economically weak, on the other hand. Tensions are particularly evident in the engagement with urban poverty areas and related
socio-economic disparities, since the spatial structures of the cities are equally fragmented. A large part of the urban population – especially the lowest income groups
– live in overcrowded inner city housing, or in informal dwellings on the city outskirts and on residual urban land. These settlements can be described as ‘slums’ (UN-
Habitat, 2003: 11) and generally do not comply with the right to adequate housing as defined in the UN Charter for Human Rights United ( Nations, 1948). But within
the logic of mega-events, the host cities’ ‘slum problem’ is discussed in a very different light: to begin with, low-income housing is often located in zones earmarked for
event-related development (stadiums, roads, etc.); secondly, it conflicts with the cities’ image-building efforts. Governments, city administrations and organizing
committees often perceive these settlements as ‘eyesores’ – therefore, they are considered as an obstacle to city staging.
In cities of the Global South, social problems of poverty and inequality tend to be more visible, for example, in the form of informal settlements. Hence the host cities
are compelled to cope with these visible problems, or rather with the problem of their visibility (Steinbrink et al., 2011). There is hardly any room for strategies of
sustainable development, firstly because of the condensed time-frame typical for mega-events, and secondly since the limited financial resources flow into other event-
related investments. As a result, cheaper short-term measures are preferred: ‘visual protection screens’ such as fences and walls, as well as the demolition of
settlements and forced evictions. The more visible a slum is for the media and for the international public, the higher the probability of such interventions. The most
affected settlements are located near city centers or important event venues, next to airports or along important roads connecting the venues (Greene, 2003; Newton,
2009).
In compliance with the general idea of ‘urban semiotics’ (Gottdiener and Lagopoulos, 1986; Lagopoulos, 2009), this staging problem can be interpreted against the
backdrop of the specific semiotic nature of the ‘urban backstage’ – informal settlements, slums, informal trading, but also their ‘personnel’: hawkers, homeless people,
and urban dwellers that are marginalized in other ways. Figure 18.1 shows in which way related interventions take place, using the example of Rio's favelas – but
‘favela’ could be easily replaced here with ‘slum’, informal settlement, township, bidonville, villa miseria, etc.
Figure 18.1 ‘Favela’ as a problematic sign and urban-policy interventions in the context of mega-events – a heuristic model
When falling under the logic of the event, the sign ‘favela’ has two problematic aspects: The first is the high visibility of the (material) signifier – that is, the large number
of favelas, central and exposed locations of some favelas, and their broad presence in the media. The second problematic aspect is the specific signification, that is,
the semantic charging with negative ascriptions such as ‘poverty’, ‘crime’, ‘bad governance’, etc.
Based on this notion, the various observable urban policy measures can be interpreted as semiotic interventions, as governmental attempts to interfere with the
signifying character of the favela, and can hence be assigned to the two problematic aspects mentioned above. Accordingly, two types of strategic interventions can be
distinguished: (1) invisibilization and (2) transformation of the sign ‘favela’; or of ‘the slum’, or of informal, disorderly elements of urbanity in general.
STAGING (IN) THE URBAN SOUTH

We will now turn to the examples of hosting the FIFA World Cup in South Africa in 2010 and in Brazil in 2014. Additionally, we are including reflections on the Olympics
in Rio de Janeiro in 2016 – making use of the conceptual and contextual reflections outlined above. For both host countries, the analysis is presented in its own form of
narrative. Each case thus has to be considered as an independent vignette, not as a comparison along a parallel structure. Still, the summary at the end of the chapter
will develop a cross-cutting perspective.
South Africa – Three Host Cities On Different Tracks

When South Africa hosted the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the move to stage this mega-event at the southern tip of the African continent was greeted as a timely
acknowledgement of the growing importance of the ‘Global South’. Most of the fears that had been raised in international discourses before the kick-off proved
unfounded once the event was under way. Nine host cities enjoyed the international spotlight; the new and revamped stadiums were the focus of the media. Behind
the scenes, however, more infrastructure had to be created, locational decisions taken and structures of governance honed (Fleischer et al., 2013). The aspects most
lauded were the smoothness and professionalism of hosting – both have to be read as a proof of the possibility of a non-western modernity. The stadiums and the new
transport infrastructure such as the bus rapid transit (BRT) system in Johannesburg and Cape Town can be considered as the most significant interventions in the built
environment – the former costly, but under-utilized today, the latter significantly cheaper and very well received by a broad public (Wood, 2014).
All in all, the faces of South African cities have not been changed thoroughly by the event, but some lessons remain – partly humiliating ones, like being subject to the
imperial dictates of FIFA, but also the experience of empowerment of those local players who managed to use the event as an instrument to implement projects that
had been in the pipeline for many years – for example, the Gautrain, a high-speed rail link between Johannesburg airport, the CBD and Pretoria; again the BRT
system; or a new airport and the beautification of the beachfront in Durban (Haferburg et al., 2014).
Possibly the most important legacy might be found in the field of urban governance – circumventing complicated participatory and democratic procedures, forging
alliances around specific projects and selling world-class city dreams to a wider audience are certainly on the list of results. There were also a number of interventions
against ‘crime and grime’ that inevitably targeted the informal sector, the homeless, squatters and informal settlers. To this day, and possibly boosted by the clean-up
actions legitimized by the hosting of the World Cup, informality has become a target of urban upgrading policies. ‘Beautification’ and ‘ordering’ thus represent two
cornerstones of a comprehensive discourse on world-class host cities, which has a very ambiguous heritage in South Africa, given that the old apartheid city was
equally shaped by an aesthetics of architectural modernity and was shielded by policies of ‘orderly urbanization’ based on European planning concepts.
Today's post-apartheid cities still bear the scars of these older forms of ordering, equally associated with sanitizing and staging the urban sphere: the segregated city –
and its precursor, the colonial city – in practice and in vision were as much about cleanliness, ordering and representing ideals of the ‘civilized world’. Current
regulatory interventions dovetail neatly with this, thus legitimizing a strong state – and indeed, developmental authoritarianism was a welcome companion to big events
during the past decades (Mexico 1968 and 1970, Argentina 1978).
However, in South African cities the impact of almost twenty years of market-oriented urban upgrading policies is equally present – it comes as no surprise, then, that
these were accompanied by a lack of coherent metropolitan development strategies and a sometimes poor municipal performance (Oranje, 2012). As a consequence,
most of the host cities faced huge development tasks (many of them linked to the persistence of spatial fragmentation) when they were granted the right to showcase
the World Cup.
The following urban issues were identified as most urgent: deficits in housing and difficulties in creating jobs close to the places of residence of the unemployed; huge
traffic problems and immense transport costs; lack of infrastructure and municipal services in the former ‘non-white’ and still poorer neighborhoods; high crime rates; a
prevailing xenophobic discourse and manifest attacks on ‘perceived’ foreigners; and a low degree of social cohesion (Haferburg, 2011: 335; Harrison et al., 2008).
Income-based segregation has created new patterns of urban exclusion, and, by way of example, Johannesburg has been described as the world's most unequal city
with a Gini-coefficient in income of 0.75 (UN-Habitat, 2010: 72f.). The effects of recent dynamics of socio-spatial differentiation are somewhat contradictory: although
some neighborhoods in Johannesburg have changed considerably in terms of their inhabitants (Freund, 2010), a continuity with the apartheid era lies in the social fact
that one's place of residence is still crucial regarding life chances and social trajectories (World Bank, 2012).
Awarding the World Cup to South Africa in 2004 was thus accompanied by strong expectations from FIFA, the international community and local actors alike to
mitigate the most apparent of these urban development problems as quickly as possible and certainly before the event began (Cornelissen, 2011). In this light it
becomes clear that ‘ordering’ the city, or the neighborhood, was a major challenge for stakeholders in post-apartheid urban development. A safe and orderly urban
environment was not only high on the agenda of the hosts, but also of FIFA.
Johannesburg – the African City and the World Cup

Metropolitan development schemes of South African host cities all follow more or less explicitly a blueprint vision of becoming ‘world-class cities’, with international
competiveness being the common benchmark. Attracting more foreign investment requires identifying key projects as well as development nodes and corridors. Here,
Johannesburg has demonstrated that some groups of stakeholders foster an alternative spatial perspective that looks at the inner city and to the south, towards
Soweto, as new channels for investment. In opposition to the dominant development trend towards the Northern Suburbs and beyond (in the direction of Pretoria), the
former ‘South Western Township’ with its run-down and crime-ridden image has benefitted from the aspired to ‘African’ guise that had been chosen as one of the
unique selling points of the 2010 World Cup (Haferburg and Steinbrink 2010a). Township tourism – a sector that has been developing since the end of apartheid in the
mid-1990s – has exploited this interest and in turn contributed to a remodeling of a perceived African urbanity within South Africa (Figure 18.1) (Frenzel, 2014;
Rogerson, 2008; Rolfes et al., 2009). This type of ‘grassroots’ staging is flanked by a government-led transformation of public spaces that took place all over the
country. The aesthetic concepts, especially for bigger interventions, try to create a fusion of an imagined pan-African style with international design trends. Both sides
of this casting mold are epitomized by Freedom Square and the Soccer City Stadium, both in Soweto (Figures 18.2 and 18.3).
Figures 18.2 Freedom Square (Soweto, Johannesburg)
Source: Marie Huchzermeyer
Figures 18.3 Soccer City Stadium (Soweto, Johannesburg)
Source: Christoph Haferburg
In addition, some actors hoped that the World Cup would provide a chance to accelerate real-estate and business investment, and especially that the public spending
would trigger private sector cash flow into marginalized areas (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2009). This, however, has not materialized beyond some limited projects in the inner city
(for example, the Maboneng precinct; Walsh, 2013) – private investment has shied away from areas like Bertrams (next to the Ellis Park stadium) (Haferburg et al.,
2014). Substantial government-funded infrastructural upgrades took place in the wealthy northern suburbs, too – the Gautrain is the most prominent and most costly
example. The current spatial patterns of investment thus provide an ambiguous and somewhat blurred picture.
Durban – Driving the Event towards the Beautiful South

In eThekwini (Durban), a distinct regime of urban governance exercised tight control over event-related investment. This resulted in an orchestrated ‘state of
emergency’ (Haferburg et al., 2014: 284), which fueled a number of existing development projects, for example, the new King Shaka Airport and the upgraded
beachfront, increasing the speed and scope of their implementation. Creating a ‘sanitized’, crime-free environment changed the face of the inner city for the duration of
the event, and of the beachfront for a bit longer. This formerly derelict zone with potentially extraordinary value for tourism, has not (in spite of substantial beautification)
reached the glam factor of eThekwini's ‘catwalk’ and prime site for the international visitor class, which is situated out of town in Umhlanga Rocks. The impact of the
event on the inner city is very fragmented, changing from street to street, and quickly fading away (Fleischer et al., 2013). Nevertheless, and in line with the newly
constructed stadium (the only one that can be used for track and field events as well, cf. Maennig and Schwarthoff, 2010), sport and entertainment play an important
role in Durban's development strategy. A case in point is the fact that Durban has just won the bid to host the Commonwealth games in 2022 – the first competition of
its type to be held in Africa.
Cape town – Cleaning up the Mother City

In Cape Town, substantial investment was allocated to the inner city. However, compared to Durban or Johannesburg, Cape Town's inner city (dubbed the ‘City Bowl’)
was in much better shape, thus not presenting a big challenge in terms of visible problems or lacking appeal for the visitor class. In fact, Cape Town's three most
prominent staging issues had been dealt with in a heavy handed top-down approach. First, the originally designated location of the new stadium was shifted from the
intersection between rich and poor neighborhoods in Athlone to the extremely scenic coastal stretch at Green Point (Swart and Bob, 2009). Then, secondly, homeless
people were systematically relocated to a ‘transit camp’ called Blikkiesdorp, more than 30 km outside of the city. Finally, and most controversially, a prominent informal
settlement on the highway N2 between the airport and the CBD had to make way for a flagship social housing project – but only a fraction of the forcibly evicted
informal settlers were included as beneficiaries of this new housing scheme – the others stayed behind in the same camp in Blikkiesdorp (Newton, 2009). In Cape
Town, then, the preparation for the World Cup was marked much more by hiding the problems (‘invisibilization’, Figure 18.1) compared to redefining them
(‘transformation’).
Concluding Remarks: South Africa

Overall, the urban interventions in South Africa's host cities are scattered and temporary. Staging and ordering have been and remain important points of reference for
urban policies, but have not been applied in a comprehensive fashion. The effect of an event-related designing of the urban (back-)stage in South Africa, is therefore,
to a large extent, subject to local adaptations, derived from specific power brokers and area-based institutions as well as articulated interests in places and spaces.
Thus, externally constructed and initiated attempts at ordering and staging (such as World Cup-related interventions) are met by a complex web of local
understandings, trajectories and practices of how to frame, shape and control city space (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2006; Harrison et al., 2008).
While the 2010 FIFA World Cup has come and gone, the first academic assessments of the event have found that economically (in relation to sectors including tourism
and the labor market) it was a futile exercise, and the effects on South Africa's international reputation were ambivalent (Cottle, 2011; Du Plessis and Maennig, 2011;
Hammett, 2011).
All in all, the World Cup did not contribute significantly to solving any of South Africa's urban problems. The most tangible urban legacy is the BRT bus system, but
even this is operational in only two host cities (Johannesburg and Cape Town) at the time of writing. Up to now, most reports on urban impacts focus on the
construction and location of the stadiums (for example, Bahadur, 2011; Hlatshwayo, 2011), which can be considered as a huge disappointment, since none are
profitable, and some run at huge losses even in big cities like Durban. South Africa's image certainly received a boost in 2010, but recent political developments and
xenophobic attacks have quickly diluted these impressions. The country and its cities are lost in a semiotic antagonism, aspiring to intersect African traditions and
world-class aspirations (as epitomized in 2010 in branding the global event as an African world cup), but uncertain how to bridge this gap in discourse and in practice.
Accolades such as the World Design Capital awarded to Cape Town in 2014 (cf. Wenz, 2014) or Durban's successful bid for the Commonwealth Games in 2022 seem
to confirm a consolidation of South Africa's position on the world stage; the script of these events, however, has not yet been written in the South.
Brazil – Festifavelization in Rio De Janeiro

For nearly ten years now, Brazil – especially Rio de Janeiro – has strongly been hedging its bets on the urban policy of festivalization. This is reflected in the list of
sporting mega-events taking place there: Pan American Games (2007), World Military Games (2011), FIFA Confederations Cup (2013), FIFA World Cup (2014),
Summer Olympic Games and Paralympics (2016), as well as Copa America (2019). Further, large-scale political, religious and/or cultural events such as the RIO+20
Conference (2012) and the World Youth Day (2013) took place there.
The world's eyes are upon Brazil now, which, under its former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has evolved into a major economic world power. And Rio is its main
stage, on which the new, strong Brazil wants to present itself to the world. For Rio de Janeiro, this is a special opportunity after having experienced a substantial
decline in importance since 1960 when Brasília had become the new federal capital. Compared particularly to São Paulo, which has steadily grown into Latin America's
biggest economic center in the past decades, Rio has continuously been lagging behind (Steinbrink et al., 2015). The FIFA World Cup 2014 and the upcoming
Olympic Games are perceived as great opportunities to push forward urban redevelopment and infrastructural projects in order to reposition the city both nationally and
globally.
Most of Rio's informal settlements are located in its western part or in the Northern Zone (Zona Norte), far from the city center and from the economically flourishing
Southern Zone (Zona Sul), with its popular Copacabana, Leblon and Ipanema beaches. However, there are numerous favelas in these parts of the city as well, and
they shape Rio's cityscape since they are built on the steep mountain slopes and partly border the most expensive residential areas (cf. Perlman, 2010). These favelas
are by no means Rio's poorest areas with the worst living conditions, but it is precisely these that represent the biggest planning problem in the context of the mega-
events: firstly, some of them are located in areas that have been chosen for infrastructure projects relevant to the events (for example, the construction of roads
connecting important event venues); secondly, these centrally located favelas pose an aesthetic staging problem. Due to their exposed locations, they are very visible
on the city's front stage, and their appearance is difficult to reconcile with the striven-for world-class city image (Steinbrink et al., 2015). Due to their dense and
apparently chaotic building structures, the favelas rather emblematically stand for attributes (poverty, bad governance, social ills, etc.) the elimination of which is meant
to be presented to the world.
Intervention Type I: Invisibilization

This first type of strategic intervention represents the conventional method of approaching the slum as a staging problem (see above); it aims to render the favela
(signifier) ‘invisible’. Different urban policy measures of this type could be observed in Rio de Janeiro in recent years.
The coarsest form of invisibilization is the forced removal of inhabitants – mostly to the outskirts of the city – and the demolition of the buildings. Extensive eviction
measures had already been taken in the period prior to the 2007 Pan-American games, and relocations of ‘less advantaged communities’ were also mentioned in the
Olympic bid book (Rio 2016 Candidate City 2009: 145). In 2009, Rio's municipal government published a list of 119 favelas to be partly or fully removed before 2016
(Gaffney, 2010; Silvestre and Gusmão de Oliveira, 2012). However, in most cases the official rhetoric does not link the announced relocations to the approaching
events; instead, the settlements are often said to be threatened by the environment (landslides, floods, etc.) or presented as a threat to the environment (extension of
settlements to forest conservation areas).
The argument of environmental preservation was also used to justify a program for the erection of walls (‘eco limits’ to protect the Atlantic forest), 3 meters high, around
19 favelas in Zona Sul, for a total of 11 kilometers in length and encompassing 550 removed families. This program started in 2009 and was heavily criticized in the
international media. The first favela to be enclosed by walls was Santa Marta (Turcheti e Melo, 2010). This measure, which cost approximately US$18 million, and
which was financed by the State Fund of Environmental Conservation (Fecam), can be considered part of the invisibilization strategy, for walls were not only to be
erected along forest fringes, but also along connecting roads that are important for the events.
Another form of invisibilizing ‘the favela’ refers to the manipulation of the visual representation of the host city in the media: the City of Rio is making remarkable efforts
to ensure that the favelas are left out of official promotion photos and advertising videos. It is also remarkable that the term ‘favela’ does not even appear once in the
three volumes of Rio's 419-page bid book (Rio 2016 Candidate City 2009); here the politically correct term ‘community’ is used in its stead. This official language policy,
too, can be interpreted as an attempt of (notional) invisibilization of ‘the favela’.
Furthermore, favelas are also left out on the Official Tourist Map (RioTur); instead the areas are mostly indicated as green spaces. In this context, there was also a
conflict between the City of Rio and Google Maps in 2011. The city complained that the online maps had presented the favelas too prominently and had highlighted
comparatively little of Rio's tourist attractions. The city, fearing that it might suffer damage to its image, asked that the maps be changed. Google complied with Rio's
demands and amended the maps. Thereafter, the term ‘favela’ no longer appeared on the online maps and the areas are indicated as green spaces (Figure 18.4).
Figure 18.4 Cartographic invisibilization of the favela Pavão-Pavãozinho/Cantagalo Source: Google, 2013
Intervention Type II: Transformations

The second type of intervention represents a more innovative urban policy strategy applied in an effort to deal with the favela as a ‘problematic sign’ and ‘staging
obstacle’. It relates to the practice of interpretation and sense-making. This involves firstly governmental attempts to improve the image of the state with regard to how
it deals with the favelas and their inhabitants, and secondly the attempts to actively transform the favela image. Against this background, different measures of
intervention in the favelas can be interpreted as parts of a three-step strategy of semiotic favela transformation: (1) preparation, (2) remodeling and (3) staging (Figure
18.1).
1. Preparation: The first step is preparation by ‘pacification’. Shortly after the announcement of FIFA's choice of Brazil as the host of the 2014 World Cup tournament,
the government started a large-scale program for the ‘pacification’ of favelas in Rio. The declared goal of the campaign was to improve the general security situation in
Rio, as well as to create a precondition for social projects and infrastructural measures in the settlements.
The first phase consisted of the massive deployment of BOPE (Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais), a special military police unit of Rio de Janeiro State. The
invasions carried out by these notorious Special Forces were intended to expel, arrest or kill members of drug gangs and to occupy the favelas. In the second phase,
police stations of UPP (Unidade de Policía Pacificadora), Rio's ‘pacifying police unit’, were to be set up in the favelas. The newly established and specially trained UPP
police units were to act as ‘community police’ and to make sure that these areas permanently remained free from drug trafficking and armed violence. Their official task
was to act as regulators and helpers in the communities, to establish communication and interaction with the residents and to promote the overall acceptance of police
presence in the favelas.
So far, 38 UPP police stations with a total of 9,543 police officers have been set up (Governo do Rio de Janeiro, 2016) and the two largest favelas, Complexo do
Alemão and Rocinha, were also occupied in preparation for the stationing of UPPs. Altogether, the authorities planned to pacify 40 favelas before the FIFA World Cup
in 2014, and 100 before the Summer Olympics in 2016 (Freeman, 2012; Gaffney, 2010). The program is by no means a city-wide measure; it is confined to selected
favelas, and they are not necessarily those with the highest crime rates (Frischtak and Mandel, 2012: 8) but those located in city areas that are strategically relevant to
the events.
The pacification is a means to fulfill the requirements of FIFA and the IOC regarding the safety of international visitors. With this ambitious program, the state is
demonstrating its political power and capacity in matters of public security. However, it is not only the clenched fist of the state that is put on display in the cities and in
the media; the state's helping and protective hand is also skillfully stage-managed. In addition, UPP police officers are trained in media relations. Journalists, social
scientists and foreign delegations are welcome to visit UPP stations, where they are supplied with information (on the program's achievements). This intensive public-
relations work has given rise to the predominantly positive news reports. In the media, UPP police officers are presented as close to the community, helpful and
friendly. The UPP program is an integral part of strategic city-staging. It is part of a campaign with which the host city seeks to demonstrate its capacity to protect
citizens and visitors alike.
But the pacifications also create preconditions for a change in the globally communicated image of the favela itself. The program can be seen as a first step in the host
city's strategy to transform the sign ‘favela’ by actively influencing the signification and interpretation in a way that makes it possible to integrate the favela in the sugar-
loaf-sweetened and samba-saturated event-image of the ‘marvelous city’.
2. Remodeling: The second step is aesthetic remodeling (‘beautification’). Remodeling relates to acts of interference into the materiality of the signifier. Some elements
of the sign ‘favela’ are deleted, changed or added, with the aim of suggesting other – more positive – ascriptions or interpretations. Many of the massive construction
and infrastructural activities in the pacified favelas can serve as examples for this aesthetic intervention. In public speeches, these measures are presented as projects
designed for the betterment of the local living conditions; a closer look, however, reveals that many of the developments are largely intended to improve the outward
appearance of the favelas or are particularly orientated towards the needs of visitors.
For example, in the pacified Favela Mangueira, which is located next to the Maracanã Stadium, a cable car was installed, a samba school designed by star architect
Oscar Niemeyer was erected, and public places were tastefully redesigned. As a result of these beautifications, many houses in Mangueira had to be demolished and
their inhabitants displaced.
A further example is the Cantagalo-Pavão-Pavãozinho complex, which used to be infamous for its high homicide rates. The favela is located near some particularly
popular residential areas at the boundary between Ipanema and Copacabana and is quite visible from the beach. The favela complex was pacified in late 2009. Before
the pacification, construction work had already commenced on the new Ipanema metro station. Until then, Ipanema's middle-class inhabitants had considered this
neighboring area extremely unsightly, dubious and dangerous, mainly because of the disorderly appearance and the various – partly informal, partly illegal – business
activities. A 64-meter tower with a lift and a viewing platform for tourists constitutes a central element of the upgrading project; it also features a modern bridge
construction connecting the tower with the favela. Although it was claimed that the tower was designed to improve the accessibility of the settlement, this oversized
building might rather be serving the purpose of remodeling an infamous part of Ipanema so as to meet the aesthetic requirements of the middle class and the tourists.
The favela entrance and the houses located there disappeared as a result of the construction project; they were replaced by iconic architecture and by a clean,
camera-monitored square controlled by security staff. The hyper-modern building designed in blue and green and illuminated at night dominates the scenery; it also
conceals large parts of the settlement when viewed from below.
Another form of remodeling favelas, which clearly aims at a positive change in outward appearance and is primarily orientated towards the ‘tourist gaze’ U ( rry, 2002),
involves the aesthetic interventions made on favela facades. For example, the City invested in paint in order to redesign the roadside structures in the lowest part of
the well-known Favela Rocinha in bright colors. Also, along a major street within Rocinha (Rua 4), houses were revamped in this way. The bright and colorful design
contrasts sharply with the usual appearance of the grey or unplastered house fronts inside the favela.
The project, dubbed ‘Favela Painting’, conceived by the designer duo J. Koolhaas and D. Urhahn, represents a particularly impressive example of aesthetic
intervention. The two designers focused on the facades in the central square at the entrance to the lower part of the first pacified favela Santa Marta. They remodeled
the square into a comprehensive work of art. They hired people from the favela, who, after completing a brief course in painting and scaffolding, painted the house
facades, following the basic pattern drafted by the artists. The outcome of this work is a colorfully bright ensemble (Figure 18.5).
Figure 18.5 ‘Favela Painting’ in Santa Marta
Source: D. Urhahn, with permission of the artist
The new facade design in Rocinha and Santa Marta is unusual both for the favelas and for Rio as a whole; yet, the design still provides meaningful aesthetic links. In
terms of choice of color and pattern it connects with representations of the favela which are particularly prevalent in the context of city tourism in Rio: the facades apply
the same elements of style which are known from favela paintings that are offered as souvenirs on the streets.
Figure 18.6 Examples of typical favela paintings
These pictures, often designed in a naïve, child-like style (Figure 18.6), reflect a favela image devoid of misery, drugs, crime and violence. Instead they draw on
notions of an exotic way of life which, though chaotic, is largely colorful, vibrant and happy – notions of ‘the real exotic Brazil’.
The examples of activities directed towards changing the outward appearance of the favela (be that by building or painting) can all be interpreted as an expression of a
politically initiated facelift for the visitors’ eyes. The intention is not to render the few exposed favelas invisible, rather it makes them prettier, suggesting other, more
positive interpretations.
3. Staging: The third step is touristic staging. In addition to governmental attempts to achieve a transformation of the sign ‘favela’ by way of transforming its materiality,
the City of Rio has been making efforts to selectively direct the tourist's gaze and to influence the interpretation of the remodeled signifier. In the process, the city draws
upon a trend in tourism which has been spreading in the Global South since the early 1990s: namely, slum tourism, the touristic valorization of urban poverty areas,
which mostly takes place in the form of organized tours for visitors from the Global North (Steinbrink et al., 2012).
In Rio de Janeiro, favela tourism – the Brazilian version of slum tourism – emerged in the context of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Sustainable
Development (UNCED) in 1992. Favelas, already visible in the distance, drew the attention of representatives of NGOs, political activists and journalists, mainly
because the police and military had cordoned them off during the conference, owing to security and image concerns. They therefore demanded guided tours of
Rocinha, Rio's largest favela (Freire-Medeiros, 2009). The center of attention was the situation of the socio-spatially marginalized ‘favelados’ (Frenzel, 2012: 52). From
these first informally guided tours a commercial tourism branch developed in the following years. Today, there are about ten commercial agencies and many
independent tourist guides offering tours to various favelas in Rio, and approximately 70,000 Rio tourists take advantage of their offers annually – and an upward trend
can be observed (Frenzel et al., 2015). In the early phase of this development, the ‘tourist gaze’ (Urry, 2002) was a politicized gaze charged with politico-moral outrage
and, as a rule, combined with a more or less openly accusatory side glance at ‘the system’ and at ‘the political class’. Favelas were regarded as a social and political
problem, as places of oppression, exclusion and exploitation. Meanwhile, in the course of the commercialization and professionalization of favela tourism, political
concerns have shifted to the background. The main focus today is, firstly, on cultural matters and on the mode of life in the favelas, and secondly, and particularly, on
issues of violence and drug-related crime.
At least until the pacification of Rocinha in November 2011, crime and the drug war were unmistakably the central topics and gang members carrying assault rifles
were the major attraction of the tours. Besides, the tours of ‘Be-a-Local’ are explicitly guided through parts of Rocinha which, both optically and olfactorily, appear
extremely run down and dirty. In a bid to meet the expectations of international tourists, private tour companies tend to draw on certain daunting as well as thrilling
aspects of the favela imaginations disseminated by the media (Frisch, 2012). It is obvious that such tours hardly serve the purpose of positively changing this image;
the hitherto common mode of representation rather reproduces the stereotypes which are supposed to be overcome.
If favela tourism is to be valorized in terms of the festivalization paradigm, then the favelas will need to be staged differently. The City of Rio therefore decided to play
an active role in favela tourism. In May 2010, the program Rio Top Tour – initiated by the Ministry of Tourism, Sports and Leisure and TourisRio, the urban tourism
agency – was created. The aim is to develop touristic structures in pacified favelas. The program's pilot project started in Santa Marta. Cantagalo and Providência are
also among the areas covered by the program. The fact that the then president Lula da Silva personally inaugurated the program highlights the political importance
attached to favela tourism.
For the project in Santa Marta, tourist maps were produced, bilingual signposts and information boards installed, local tour guides trained, and micro-loans made
available for businesses interested in tourism. The tourist attractions advertised in the favela include the ‘Favela Painting’ art project (see above), the local samba
school, stalls of local artisans and a look-out point. In addition, the newly established UPP station is also marked as a touristic site by a plaque explaining the official
idea of pacification.
Figure 18.7 ‘Rio de Janeiro from a new point of view’ – logo of Rio Top Tour
By engaging in favela tours, the state actively tries to transmit a differently composed picture and to show the favelas ‘from a new point of view’ F ( igure 18.7). The
colorful and pleasant aspects are moved to the foreground, which contrasts with what is usually emphasized in most of the established favela tours. In other words:
social inequality is deproblematized and the tourist gaze is depoliticized – and that is definitely good for creating a happy festival mood for the visitors.
Concluding Remarks: Brazil

The housing and living situation of lower income groups probably represents the most sensitive sphere regarding the effects of the recent festivalization trend in the
Global South. This is not only because the public budgets of the host cities are strained by gigantic investments, which also tie up important financial resources needed
for social housing programs. Additionally, due to the intrinsic logic of festivalization policy, the urban poverty areas themselves represent a staging problem to be
solved before the event starts.
This, however, is only one possible interpretation. The event-related measures can just as well be interpreted in line with the inwardly directed objective of promoting
particular urban development dynamics and at the same time as a means serving powerful economic interests: for the host cities, the events constitute an opportunity
to legitimize certain policies. The immense pressure resulting from the high expectation of achieving the national goal of successfully hosting the events creates the
necessary public acceptance and permits a bundling of capacities as well as financial resources for measures and strategies which would hardly be implementable
without the events. In Brazil, this applies particularly to the expensive favela pacifications. The interests behind the pacification program and also the effects of these
measures go far beyond the short-term purpose of improving the security situation in regard to mega-events. The regained state control over the favelas not only
creates a secure environment for public infrastructural measures and social programs, but also gives rise to attractive conditions for private investments.
Despite the undeniably positive effects for the favela residents, the pacification and the follow-up projects lead to a tremendous rise in the value of land and rents and
thus, indirectly, to a displacement of large parts of the resident population. Increases in prices of up to 400per cent are being reported from some of the pacified favelas
(Freeman, 2012).
The pacifications will also have an immense impact on the formal real estate and housing sectors. In calculations conducted for the whole city,Frischtak and Mandel
(2012) report that the pacifications are responsible for about 15per cent of the rise in price in the formal housing sector between mid-2008 and mid-2011. In some
residential areas directly bordering pacified favelas, real estate prices have already doubled (Freeman, 2012). We can thus assume that in the foreseeable future,
gentrification will occur. Medium-income households will move from formal areas into the pacified favelas; and so pressure due to rent increases will be intensified and
will lead to favela residents moving out (Steinbrink et al., 2015, Steinbrink and Pott 2016).
The examples illustrate how the city of Rio uses mega-events to achieve urban policy goals. With these measures, the state enables the ‘invisible hand of the free
market’ to take hold of certain highly attractive areas, areas that have remained outside the sphere of formal economic valorization up to now.
SUMMARY
Based on research into recent major events, we have suggested five core dimensions to be considered in order to comprehend the logic of mega-event staging, or of
the festivalization of urban development in a broader sense: political value; economic relevance; socio-emotional involvement; material impact (that is, built
environment); and symbolic importance. The articulation and relative weight of each dimension differs depending on the event we are looking at (Olympics versus FIFA
World Cup), and on the scale we are focusing on (international, national, metropolitan or the immediately affected neighborhoods, for example, in ‘exclusion zones’
around the stadia, or ‘strategically in the way’ of related upgrading projects). The relative strength of the actors involved (content provider versus national government
versus city management versus private sector contractors versus civil society) is equally variable, at least to a certain extent – and when looking at this in relation to the
respective research perspective, any one of the five dimensions may become more central than the others. To complicate matters, within this amalgam of interests and
fields of action, the relative weight of each element is also subject to an adaptation and transformation of the event itself, since the latter has to be understood as a
localized re-production of a potentially global form – constantly refined by integrating the experiences of the former hosts, as well as the translations made during each
implementation and the strong tendencies of streamlining and standardization promoted by the international sporting bodies.
In the given political and economic world system, specific national elites have become prone to launch their countries in the bidding process to become future hosts.
To understand the potential gains of these aspiring hosts by interacting with the international sporting bodies, with consultants and their national branches, it is,
however, not sufficient to focus on economic benefits or on national ‘political capital’ – the interests of the urban stakeholders need to be understood as well. Our claim
is that the intersecting motives of staging and ordering the local urban realm have become an aspect of hosting which is increasing in importance.
For emerging economies and aspiring nations, representing the new generation of hosts, political reputation and symbolical importance is comparatively more
significant (without denying that economic expectations remain a strong selling point). This translates into a mode of urban implementation that pays more attention to
the staging of cities as neat and orderly. The production of urban iconographies for non-western settings resonates well with imagined alternative modernities in self-
proclaimed developmental states – societal visions with considerable political value are included in this package, and symbolic responses for rapid urbanization as
well. Beautification efforts and strategies of ordering are thus embedded in a bigger scheme of institutional empowerment and societal progress by controlling urban
design and metropolitan space.
Through this lens, four types of event-related dynamics can be distinguished in the new host cities (Haferburg, 2011: 333f.): the selective acceleration of urban
development, the streamlining of urban governance (often according to terms of reference laid out by the event's content provider), the temporary prioritization of the
content provider's business interests as a new point of reference in decision making, and, most important, the symbolic dimension of national and local self-affirmation
through city staging.
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Christoph Haferburg
Malte Steinbrink
© SAGE Publications Ltd 2017
APA
Haferburg, C., & Steinbrink, M. (2017). Mega Events in emerging nations and the festivalization of the urban backstage: The cases of Brazil and South Africa. In J.
Hannigan, The Sage handbook of new urban studies. Sage UK. Credo Reference: http://proxy.library.nyu.edu/login?
url=https://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/sageukurban/mega_events_in_emerging_nations_and_the_festivalization_of_the_urban_backstage_the_cases_of_brazil_and
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Chicago
Haferburg, Christoph, and Malte Steinbrink. "Mega-Events in Emerging Nations and the Festivalization of the Urban Backstage: The Cases of Brazil and South Africa."
In The SAGE Handbook of New Urban Studies, by John Hannigan. Sage UK, 2017. http://proxy.library.nyu.edu/login?
institutionId=577
Harvard
Haferburg, C. and Steinbrink, M. (2017). Mega Events in emerging nations and the festivalization of the urban backstage: The cases of Brazil and South Africa. In J.
Hannigan, The Sage handbook of new urban studies. [Online]. London: Sage UK. Available from: http://proxy.library.nyu.edu/login?
institutionId=577 [Accessed 10 October 2022].
MLA
Haferburg, Christoph, and Malte Steinbrink. "Mega-Events in Emerging Nations and the Festivalization of the Urban Backstage: The Cases of Brazil and South Africa."
The SAGE Handbook of New Urban Studies, John Hannigan, Sage UK, 1st edition, 2017. Credo Reference, http://proxy.library.nyu.edu/login?
institutionId=577. Accessed 10 Oct. 2022.

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Mega-Events in Emerging Nations and the Festivalization of the Urban Backstage: The Cases of Brazil and South Africa

in Distinctive and Visible Cities

THE INTERNATIONAL CLASS OF MEGA-EVENT HOSTING

CPI = Consumer Price Index

THE URBAN PERSPECTIVE: MOTIVATION AND CHALLENGES OF HOST CITIES

The Visible Backstage

(Häußermann et al., 2008: 265) [authors’ translation]

STAGING (IN) THE URBAN SOUTH

South Africa – Three Host Cities On Different Tracks

Johannesburg – the African City and the World Cup

Figures 18.2 Freedom Square (Soweto, Johannesburg)

Source: Marie Huchzermeyer

Source: Christoph Haferburg

Durban – Driving the Event towards the Beautiful South

Cape town – Cleaning up the Mother City

Concluding Remarks: South Africa

Brazil – Festifavelization in Rio De Janeiro

Intervention Type I: Invisibilization

Intervention Type II: Transformations

Figure 18.5 ‘Favela Painting’ in Santa Marta

Source: D. Urhahn, with permission of the artist

Figure 18.6 Examples of typical favela paintings

Concluding Remarks: Brazil

UN-Habitat (2003) The Challenge of Slums. Earthscan London.

© SAGE Publications Ltd 2017

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Emerging Nations (Brazil&Southafrica)

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