REGULATION OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

of ……………………….. 2012

on the scope and method for the performance of safety analyses prior to the
submission of an application requesting the issue of a license for the construction
of a nuclear facility and the scope of the preliminary safety report for a nuclear
facility 1)2)

Pursuant to Article 36d, Section 3 of the Atomic Law Act of 29 November 2000
(Journal of Laws of 2012, Item 264) the following is hereby ordered:

Chapter 1
General Provisions

§ 1. The terms and expressions used under this Regulation shall have the following
meaning:
1) analysis (methodology) based on the best estimate – a technical analysis
performed on the basis of the best available state of knowledge on phenomena
occurring in technological systems and processes, in which, where there are
uncertainties, the overly conservative assumptions, not provided with technical
justification, are avoided; resulting in the most probable values;
2) category 1 design basis accident – nuclear power plant or research reactor
accident which can be assumed to occur less frequently than once every 100
years of reactor operation, but equally to or more frequently than once every
1000 years of reactor operation;
3) category 2 design basis accident – nuclear power plant or research reactor
accident which can be assumed to occur less frequently than once every 1000
years of reactor operation, but equally to or more frequently than once every
10000 years of reactor operation;
4) protective barrier – a physical barrier for preventing the dispersion of
radioactive substances;
5) fundamental safety functions – safety functions with fundamental meaning for
ensuring nuclear safety of a nuclear facility, including:
a) radioactivity control,

1)
This Regulation, within the scope of its regulation, implements Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom of 25 June
2009 establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear facilitys (OJ L 172 of 2 July 2009, p.
18 and OJ L 260 of 3 October 2009, p. 40).
2)
This Regulation was notified to the European Commission on 30 April 2012 under No 2012/278/PL, pursuant to
§ 4 of the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 23 December 2002 concerning the manner in which the
national notification system of standards and legal acts functions (Journal of Laws, No. 239 Item 2039 and of
2004, No. 65, Item 597), which implements the provisions of Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical
standards and regulations and of rules on Information Society Services (OJ L 204 of 21 July 1998, p. 37, as
amended. Journal of Laws, Special Polish Edition, Section 13, v. 20, p. 337, as amended).

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 b) heat removal from the reactor, repository for spent nuclear fuel and storage
of fresh nuclear fuel,
c) shielding against ionizing radiation and retention of radioactive
substances, reduction and control of their releases to the environment and
reduction of emergency releases;
6) pressure boundary of the reactor cooling circuit:
a) in the case of pressurized water reactors – a system of physically connected
pressure components of equipment maintaining the reactor coolant with specific
operational parameters, in particular the pressure vessel or reactor pressure
channels, piping or their related items, pumps and fittings, which constitute the
reactor cooling circuit or are connected inclusively with the reactor cooling circuit
to the following fittings:
– the most externally placed cut-off valve located on the piping system which
passes through the primary containment,
– the second of two valves located on the piping of the system which does not
pass through the primary containment, and which are closed during the normal
reactor operation,
– protection accessories fitted to reactor cooling circuit components,

b) in the case of boiling water reactors – equipment pressure components running

from the reactor to the most externally placed valves cutting off the reactor
containment, assembled jointly on fresh steam and water supply piping;
7) limit design parameters – values of the technological process parameters or of
parameters of nuclear facility systems, components of construction or equipment
important for ensuring nuclear safety and radiological protection, defined for
operational states and considered accidents, which if not exceeded, ensure the
fulfilment of safety functions as well as the criteria on limited radiation impact of
the nuclear facility, determined under Article 36f, Section 2 of the Atomic Law Act
of 29 November 2000 and § 9 of Design Regulation, confirmed by safety
analyses;
8) safety group – an assembly of equipment designated to perform all actions
required for an occurrence of a postulated initiating event (PIE) to ensure that the
limits specified in the design parameters for anticipated operational occurrences
and design basis accidents are not exceeded;
9) nuclear power unit – an assembly comprising in particular: nuclear energy
reactor, reactor cooling circuit, circulation of working medium, one or more
turbine sets which, together with the auxiliary systems, creates a coordinated
system of conversion of nuclear fuel thermal energy into electricity;
10) single failure criterion – a design requirement criterion which, if met, will
ensure that the failure of any system item, as well as secondary failures resulting
from this failure, will not lead to the loss of capability of a system to perform its
intended safety function;
11) safety limits (borders) – values of these physical and technological parameters
which may not be exceeded and which directly impact the state of protective
barriers;

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12) safety system settings – parameter values at which protective devices are
automatically actuated in the event of anticipated operational occurrences or
accident conditions to prevent safety limits (borders) from being exceeded;
13) reactor containment:
a) in the case of a nuclear power plant – jointly a primary and secondary reactor
containment,
b) in the case of a research reactor – primary reactor containment;
14) primary reactor containment – a sealed structure designed to withhold limits
of design parameters defined for considered accidents;
15) single failure – a failure which results in the loss of capability of a system or
component of nuclear facility equipment to perform its intended safety function
and also secondary failure which results from it;
16) considered accidents – design basis accidents and extended design conditions;
17) the Location Regulation – the Regulation issued under Article 35b, Section 4
of the Atomic Law Act of 29 November 2000;
18) the Design Regulation – the Regulation issued under Article 36c, Section 3 of
the Atomic Law Act;
19) extended design conditions – a set of sequences of accidents being more
severe than design basis accidents, which involve the releases of radioactive
substances within the admissible limits, taken into account in the nuclear facility
design with the use of analysis (methodology) based on the best estimate,
covering compound sequences and severe accidents without failure of the reactor
containment;
20) compound sequences – sequences of events exceeding the sequences adopted
for deterministic nuclear facility design assumptions – in terms of failure of
equipment components or operator errors which could potentially lead to
significant releases of radioactive substances to the environment, but not resulting
in the reactor core meltdown;
21) physical separation – spatial separation or separation by employing
appropriate physical barriers, or by combining both of these methods;
22) safe shutdown state – the state of the nuclear facility following the anticipated
operational occurrence or accident conditions, where fundamental safety functions
are performed and maintained at a stable level for a long period of time, and in the
case of a nuclear power plant and research reactor, the reactor is additionally in a
sub-critical state;
23) operational states – normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences;
24) controlled state – a state of the nuclear facility following the anticipated
operational occurrence or accident conditions, where the fulfilment and
maintenance of the fundamental safety functions is ensured for a period which is
sufficiently long to use measures in order to attain a safe shutdown state;
25) safety system – a nuclear facility system intended to prevent the appearance
or to limit the consequences of anticipated operational occurrences and accident
conditions, and in the case of a nuclear power plant or research reactor, also to
ensure a safe shutdown state;

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 26) protection system – system which monitors the operation of a nuclear facility
and which, on sensing deviations from normal operation, automatically initiates
actions to prevent the anticipated operational occurrences and accident conditions;
27) the Act – the Atomic Law Act of 29 November 2000;
28) common cause failure – failure of two or more multiplied systems or
components of construction or nuclear facility equipment brought about by the
same occurrence or the same cause;
29) secondary reactor containment – external coating which limits the space
where radioactive fission products are located or could be located following the
accident, and which fully surrounds culverts and fittings which cut off primary
reactor containment, and at least partly:
a) the primary reactor containment,

b) part of the systems and equipment components of the nuclear facility

connected with the pressure boundary of the reactor cooling circuit or the
area of the primary reactor containment which, in the event of accident,
may transfer contaminated liquids beyond the primary reactor
containment;

30) redundancy – the implementation of a larger number of systems or

components of equipment than required for the functioning of the nuclear facility,
in particular its safety systems, so that the failure of any of them does not result in
the non-performance of the safety functions.

Chapter 2
General requirements for safety analyses

§ 2. 1. Safety analyses shall include the functioning of a nuclear facility in

operational states and in accident conditions.
2. The scope of safety analyses shall allow to demonstrate that the safety requirements
determined under Article 36f, Section 2 of the Act and § 9 and § 10 of the Design
Regulation have been met.
3. Safety analyses of a nuclear facility shall in particular assess whether:

1) the nuclear facility design solutions ensure the appropriate sequence of safety
levels;
2) a nuclear facility is capable of withstanding the physical and environmental
conditions to which it may be exposed, in particular the extreme
environmental conditions and external hazards – natural hazards and those
caused by human activity;
3) the human factors have been taken into account accordingly in the nuclear
facility design;
4) the long-term mechanisms of nuclear facility ageing, which could lead to a
reduction in its reliability, have been identified in the nuclear facility design
and whether it is ensured that these mechanisms are monitored and appropriate
preventive measures have been taken;

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 5) the nuclear facility systems, components of structure and equipment used for
preventing the anticipated operational occurrences from escalating into
accident conditions and limiting their consequences, as well as accident
operational procedure and emergency response measures are effective in
reducing the risk connected with the nuclear facility operation to admissible
levels.
§ 3. Safety analyses shall comprise deterministic analyses and probabilistic analyses.
§ 4. Deterministic analyses shall define nuclear facility behaviour under initially
assumed and defined operational states and under accident conditions and shall
assess the adequacy of its design solutions – by verifying if the technical criteria
and requirements contained in the provisions of laws and technical standards are
met.
§ 5.1. Nuclear facility deterministic analyses for design conditions shall be based on
the conservative approach.
2. Concerning the analysis of accidents which are more severe than design basis
accidents it shall be possible to apply the analysis (methodology) based on best
estimate.
§ 6. 1. Prior to the performance of safety analyses for a specific nuclear facility design
in a given location, the PIE list shall be determined.
2. The PIE list adopted for the performance of safety analyses for a specific nuclear
facility design in a given location shall cover internal and external PIEs and shall
define it in a manner including all probable failures of the nuclear facility systems,
facility structure and components of the nuclear facility equipment and human errors,
which could arise during the normal operation of the nuclear facility.
§ 7. 1. When identifying the internal PIEs, the following shall be taken into account:
1) various types of failure of the safety systems and their items and failures of other
systems and components of nuclear facility structure and equipment, which may
affect the fundamental safety function or the safety system;
2) various types of failure of the reactor coolant system pressure boundary, in
particular pipeline rupture at all possible points, including failures which could
occur outside the reactor containment;
3) various types of failure and occurrences which could take place during all types of
modes of nuclear facility operation;
4) events caused by human error, which could lead to common cause failure, in
particular such as: incorrect or incomplete maintenance and repair activities,
incorrect control and protection system settings and workers’ error.
2. When determining the PIE internal set approved for safety analyses, it shall be
necessary to take into consideration and analyse the adequacy for a given nuclear
facility design of the following types of internal initiating events and internal
secondary events resulting from these postulated initiating events, in particular:
1) fire;
2) explosions;
3) flooding caused by failure of the systems, components of structure or
equipment of the nuclear facility;

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 4) failure of pressure components, supports or other components of structure or
equipment of the nuclear facility;
5) formation of fragments, including fragments as a result of the breaking of
rotating components of the nuclear facility equipment;
6) release of technological liquids from damaged systems or components of the
nuclear facility equipment – including poisonous substances or lubricants;
7) vibrations;
8) impact caused by an item of piping ripped off from one side;
9) impact of the stream of liquid, including the recoil effect;
10) collapse of nuclear facility structure or its component, including the falling of
this kind of component of the nuclear facility structure or equipment;
11) electromagnetic disruption.
When determining the PIE external set approved for safety analyses, it shall be
necessary to take into consideration and analyse the adequacy for a given nuclear
facility design of the following types of external initiating events and secondary
events occurring as a result of these postulated initiating events, in particular:
1) natural events:
a) earthquakes and active faults,
b) geological–engineering and hydro-geological hazards, including:
– instability of slopes or embankments,
– the risk of occurrence in the soil of processes which are unfavourable for
nuclear facility construction, in particular fluidization, swelling and
subsidence,
– changes in the soil conditions brought about by static and dynamic load,
taking into account seismic phenomena,
– the state and chemical properties of subterranean waters (possible
aggressiveness in relation to construction materials, in particular concrete
and reinforced steel),
c) hydrological and meteorological hazards, including:
– extreme meteorological parameters, in particular maximum wind
velocity, maximum amounts of atmospheric precipitation over a period of
24-hours (rain, snow), extreme air temperature,
– dangerous meteorological phenomena, including lightning and tornadoes;
– flood hazard or flooding of the site due to rainfall and other natural
causes,
d) other external events, in particular extreme temperature of cooling water,
depletion of cooling reservoir water supplies brought about by natural causes,
drought, blocking of flow in the river, excessive growth of aquatic organisms,
ice that can cause blockage of water intake or disruption in the functioning of
the closed nuclear facility cooling circuit;
2) resulting from human activity:

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 a) the crashing into the nuclear facility of airplanes, including, in the case of a
nuclear power plant, large civilian aircrafts, including the effects of fire and
explosion following the direct hitting of a nuclear facility by an aircraft,
b) acts of terror and sabotage,
c) chemical explosion when reprocessing, shipping, reloading and storing
chemicals which could explode or create gas clouds, capable of rapid
combustion or detonation,
d) failure of water equipment in the understanding of the Water Act, or a part
of it, or hazards brought about by its incorrect use,
e) other events, in particular:
– release of combustible, explosive, asphyxiating, poisonous, corrosive or
radioactive substances,
– explosions of industrial installations which could generate fragments,
– fires, particularly forest, peatbog, plant, stockpiles of coal and
hydrocarbon fuels of low volatility, timber and plastics fires,
– ship crash as a potential threat to the water intake structure,
– electromagnetic disruption and eddy currents,
– blockage of air inlets and outlets or blockage of water intake and
discharge through rubble,
– oil spills and fires,
– depletion of cooling reservoir water supplies,
– earthquakes induced by mining activities.
§ 9. 1. The PIE set chosen for the performance of safety analyses for a specific
nuclear facility design in a given location shall be determined by means of systematic
analyses by:
1) applying the appropriate analytical methods;
2) comparing similar nuclear facilities with the PIE sets drawn up for safety
analyses;
3) analysing operational experience from similar facilities.
2. For all the PIEs, their expected frequency of occurrence shall be defined.
§ 10. The PIEs for a specific nuclear facility design in a given location shall be
grouped according to their type and for each group extreme events, which pose the
greatest threat to fundamental safety functions, shall be chosen for the purpose of
performing detailed accident analyses. The correctness of sub-grouping and the
selection of extreme initiating events shall be confirmed by a safety analysis.
§ 11. 1. The PIE set, initially approved for the performance of analyses for a specific
nuclear facility design in a given location, shall in particular:
1) take into account partial failure of nuclear facility systems and components of
structure and equipment, if they contribute significantly to risk;
2) take into account events with very low frequencies of occurrence or very little
consequences;

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 3) be subject to review and appropriate changes in keeping with design progress
and safety assessment, in the iterative process.
2. Events rejected from the PIE set approved for safety analyses shall be specified in
the safety analysis, together with a justification of the reasons for rejection.
§ 12. The performance of safety analyses shall be included in the quality assurance
programme. In particular the source of origin of all data shall be indicated and
documented and the entire analysis process shall be documented and archived in a
manner permitting it to be subject to independent verification.

Chapter 3
Particular requirements for deterministic safety analysis

§ 13. 1. In the deterministic safety analysis, consideration shall be given to the PIEs
and their appropriate combinations, established for a particular nuclear facility design
and location, leading to particular nuclear facility states, according to the estimated
probability of their occurrence.
2. The PIE grouping criteria leading to particular states of the nuclear facility,
according to the estimated probability of occurrence, shall be defined under Appendix
No 1.
§14. 1. Deterministic safety analyses, the purpose of which it is to demonstrate that
the acceptance criteria defined under Appendix No 1 have been met, shall be
performed for the anticipated operational occurrences and accident conditions of the
nuclear power plant, initiated by particular PIEs and by applying the single failure
criterion to safety systems fulfilling fundamental safety functions.
2. In the safety analyses, as referred to in Section 1, it shall be assumed that in the
worst case there will be an outage of external AC power supply following the
occurrence of a PIE.
§ 15. By means of a deterministic safety analysis of anticipated operational
occurrences and design basis accidents of the nuclear facility, it shall be verified
whether:
1) the safety systems are capable of fulfilling the requirements set for them, in
particular:
a) in the case of a nuclear power plant and research reactor:
- to switch off the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown state
during the anticipated operational occurrences and design basis
accidents, as well as after the anticipated operational occurrences and
design basis accidents,
- to remove residual heat from the reactor core after reactor shutdown,
at any level of power and under all conditions of the anticipated
operational occurrences and design basis accidents,
b) to remove heat generated in the nuclear fuel repository or storage facility,
c) to reduce the possibility of releases of radioactive substances to the
environment and to ensure that all releases are below the determined limits
during operational states and below the admissible levels during design
basis accidents;
2) the integrity of protective barriers is maintained.

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§ 16. 1. In the deterministic safety analysis of a nuclear facility, time intervals shall be
adopted for the analysed PIEs, suitable for the assessment of all the consequences of
accident.
2. The computation of transitional states shall be performed up to the moment of
attaining a state of the safe nuclear facility shutdown.
§ 17. It shall not be necessary to take into account the simultaneous occurrence of a
number of external PIEs or the simultaneous occurrence of an internal and external
PIE, providing that there is no cause and effect relation between the two, but an
assessment shall be carried out concerning possible failures or malfunction which
could have occurred during the long period of time required to attain a state of safe
shutdown.
§ 18. If the analysis of an anticipated operational occurrence shows that the limit
design parameters of a nuclear facility or nuclear fuel will be exceeded so that at least
one protective barrier is violated, radiation effects analyses shall be performed so as to
demonstrate that the limited radiation impact criteria, defined in § 9 of the Design
Regulation, are fulfilled.
§ 19. Deterministic safety analysis shall:
1) take into account load combinations caused by combining PIEs, external and
internal events and nuclear facility operational conditions;
2) assume appropriate safety reserves, taking into account analysis uncertainty.
§ 20. Deterministic safety analyses shall take into account all areas of occurrence or
sources of radioactive substances in the nuclear facility, in particular, commensurate
with the type of nuclear facility:
1) reactor core;
2) reactor cooling circuit, with auxiliary systems;
3) irradiated nuclear fuel during its transfer;
4) spent nuclear fuel stored on the premises of the nuclear facility;
5) radioactive waste storage and re-processing systems.
§ 21. The ICT system software used for deterministic analyses shall be properly
reviewed and validated.
§ 22. 1. In the deterministic safety analyses on design basis accidents of the nuclear
facility, it shall be assumed that:
1) PIE occurs at the least favourable time in relation to the nuclear facility state;
2) control systems act in a manner decreasing the effects of PIE, where no
operation of any control systems intended to reduce the effects of PIE is taken
into account;
3) the worst single failure will occur during the operation of safety groups, the
functioning of which is required following the occurrence of a given PIE; in
case of redundancy systems it shall be assumed that the minimum number of
systems are actuated and operate in order to perform the safety function;
4) safety systems operate at minimum output in order to perform the safety
function;

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 5) incapable of operation are all nuclear facility systems and components of
structure and equipment:
a) which cannot be recognised as fully capable of operation,
b) which during accident reach the limit design parameters, unless the
designer proves that they are fully capable of operation when they attain
these parameters.
2. Actions by nuclear facility workers, performed in order to counteract or mitigate
the consequences of accident, shall be taken into account in deterministic safety
analyses only when the following can be demonstrated:
1) workers have sufficient time to perform the required actions;
2) there is sufficient information available in order to diagnose the event (taking
into consideration the consequences of initiating event and the single failure
criterion);
3) appropriate written procedures are in place;
4) workers have been sufficiently trained.
3. In the deterministic safety analysis it shall also be possible to adopt conservative
assumptions, other than those defined under Sections 1 and 2.
4. In defining conservative assumptions for deterministic safety analyses,
uncertainties of the initial reactor state shall be taken into account, including a safety
system setting.
§ 23. 1. In the deterministic analyses of nuclear facility design basis accident, all
secondary failures shall be taken into account, which may occur as a result of the PIE.
2. If the PIE involves a failure of the part of the distribution system of electrical
power for own needs, the unavailability of all components of equipment powered with
this part of the system for own needs shall be assumed in the design basis accident
analysis.
3. If the PIE is an event which involves the release of energy, such as failure of the
pressure system leading to the release of hot water or impact caused by an item of
piping ripped off on one side, when defining the design basis accident conditions,
consideration shall be given to failure of nuclear facility systems, components of
structure or equipment which could have been affected.
4. In the case of the internal PIEs, such as fire or flooding, or external PIEs, such as
earthquake, when defining design basis accident it shall be assumed that there is
failure of all components of equipment which had not been designed to withhold such
phenomena or had not been provided with protection against such phenomena.
§ 24. 1. Deterministic safety analyses of anticipated operational events at the nuclear
facility shall be performed with the use of conservative assumptions which are similar
to those adopted when performing deterministic analyses of design basis accident, in
particular those which refer to the maintenance of fundamental safety functions
during the transition process, subject to Section 2.
2. Concerning analyses, referred to in Section 1, it shall not be necessary to assume
that all nuclear facility systems and components of equipment not belonging to safety
categories will not be available and that it is not possible to rely on mitigating

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consequences of an initiating event with the use of the control systems, providing that
the defined PIE does not cause their unavailability.
§ 25. For the purpose of deterministic analyses of nuclear facility design basis
accident, acceptance criteria for their results shall be applied at two levels:
1) general criteria referring to doses of ionizing radiation for all persons from the
general public including:
a) the requirement defined under Article 36f, Section 2, Item 2 of the Act,
b) deterministic criteria on limited radiation impact of the nuclear facility
defined under § 9, Item 1 of the Design Regulation;
2) detailed criteria, in particular the following:
a) the PIE cannot lead to a more severe state of the nuclear facility without
the occurrence of further, independent failure,
b) there is no secondary (as the consequence of the PIE) loss of any safety
systems function required to limit the accident consequences,
c) designed systems earmarked for limiting the accident consequences are
capable of withholding maximum load, stress and environmental
conditions under the analysed accidents,
d) pressures and temperatures in the reactor cooling circuit and in the
secondary cooling systems do not exceed the values of limit design
parameters,
e) in the case of accidents connected with coolant leakage, during which the
reactor core is exposed and fuel overheats, the core geometry is maintained
which permits effective cooling and the integrity of elements and fuel sets
is maintained;
f) no PIE leads to the occurrence of temperatures, pressures or differences in
pressure in the reactor containment exceeding the values of limit design
parameters for the reactor containment.
§ 26. 1. For the purpose of deterministic safety analyses on nuclear facility accidents
which are more severe than design basis accidents, the facility safety reserves shall be
defined, and it shall be demonstrated that for these events in the nuclear facility
design, the safety level sequence has been performed correctly by applying, within a
reasonable scope, technical and organisational means in order to:
1) prevent an escalation of events towards severe accidents and limit the
development of severe accidents and releases of radioactive substances to the
environment – by applying additional components of equipment and
procedures intended to bring the accident under control;
2) limit the potential consequences of radiation accidents – by implementing
emergency plans on the premises and beyond the premises of the facility.
2. For the purpose of safety analyses on the accident of a nuclear power plant and
research reactor where there is a meltdown of reactor’s core, it shall be demonstrated
that the solutions implemented in the nuclear facility design meet the requirements set
forth in Article 36c, Section 2 of the Act.
§ 27. 1. Deterministic analyses on nuclear facility accidents which are more severe
than design basis accidents, shall include a set of representative PIE sequences, in

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which the incorrect operation of safety systems and failure of protective barriers or the
bypassing of the same shall be assumed. The selection of these sequences shall be
performed by adding to the design basis accident sequences or to the dominating
sequences, as defined in the probabilistic safety analysis, additional failures in the
nuclear facility or incorrect operator’s activities.
2. The analyses on nuclear facility accidents, as referred to in Section 1, shall include
in particular:
1) an assessment of the capability of the nuclear facility solutions to resist
accidents which are more severe than design basis accidents and
identification of the potential shortcomings of these solutions;
2) an assessment of the need to apply in the nuclear facility design, additional
solutions which will ensure the limitation and mitigation of the
consequences of accidents which are more severe than design basis
accidents;
3) a description of the technical measures, which may be used for the purpose
of limiting the consequences of accident;
4) a definition of output data adopted for the purpose of emergency planning
on and beyond the premises of the nuclear facility, in particular the level
and characteristics of the releases of radioactive substances to the
environment.
3. The PIEs which may lead to accidents which are more severe than design basis
accidents shall be identified by combining probabilistic and deterministic methods
and engineering judgment based on reasonable grounds.
4. The nuclear facility accident sequences, which are more severe than design
accidents, shall be defined on the basis of results of probabilistic safety assessment, as
referred to in § 37–41.
5. The representative or limit accident sequences of the nuclear facility, which are
more severe than design basis accidents, may also be defined on the basis of
deterministic analyses i.e. the understanding of physical phenomena taking place
during severe accidents, and the acquaintance with the existing safety reserves in the
nuclear facility design and the remaining redundancy of systems during design basis
accidents.
6. In the deterministic safety analyses on nuclear facility accidents, which are more
severe than design accidents, consideration shall be given in particular to the PIEs
which initiate the following severe accidents:
1) in the case of a nuclear power plant and research reactor:
a) total loss of capability of removing the residual heat from the reactor core,
b) coolant leakage, together with total loss of capability of applying
emergency cooling of the core;
2) total loss of capability of removing heat from the storage facility for spent
nuclear fuel or from the repository of fresh nuclear fuel;
3) long-term, complete loss of electrical power supply to the nuclear facility.
§ 28. The set of accident sequences which defines the extended design conditions for
the nuclear facility shall be selected in a manner permitting the fulfilment of
deterministic criteria limiting radiation impact and probabilistic safety criteria of the
nuclear facility, defined in § 9, Item 2 and § 10 of the Design Regulation.

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Furthermore, the accident sequences, as referred to in § 30 and 32 of the Design
Regulation, shall be taken into account.
§ 29. When assessing the course of severe accidents of a nuclear facility, the full
design capacity of a nuclear facility shall be taken into account, including the use of
certain safety systems and facility systems, which are not safety systems, to a degree
exceeding their design functions, in order to reduce potentially severe accident to a
controlled state or a state limiting its consequences. In those cases where the use is
made of nuclear facility systems which exceed limit design parameters, the
justification shall be given that there exists a reasonable basis to presume that these
systems may be used in keeping with the approach indicated in the analysis.
§ 30. Deterministic safety analyses on severe accidents of the nuclear facility shall be
performed with the use of assumptions, data, methods and decision criteria based on
best estimate. In those cases where this is not possible, the conservative approach
shall be taken, by taking into account uncertainties in the understanding of modelled
physical processes.
§ 31. 1. In the deterministic safety analyses on severe accidents of a nuclear power
plant and research reactor, a wide range of physical processes shall be modelled,
which may occur following the failure of the reactor core and those processes which
may lead to the release of radioactive substances to the environment. These processes
shall include in particular:
1) processes consisting in degradation of reactor core and melting of nuclear fuel;
2) fuel-coolant interaction (including steam explosions);
3) maintenance of melted core material in the reactor vessel;
4) meltdown of the reactor vessel by the molten core;
5) heat generation in the reactor cooling circuit;
6) ejection of molten core material under high pressure, which also leads to direct
containment heating;
7) secretion, combustion or detonation of combustible gases;
8) failure or bypassing of containment;
9) interaction of molten core material with concrete;
10) release and transfer of fission products;
11) ability to cool the molten core inside and outside the reactor vessel.
2. When performing deterministic safety analyses on severe accidents of a nuclear
power plant and research reactor, it shall be required to accurately model the reactor
core behaviour, the reactor cooling system and reactor containment.
§ 32. The criteria for acceptance of the results of deterministic safety analyses on
nuclear facility accidents which are more severe than design basis accidents shall be
as follows:
1) requirements for the nuclear facility design, determined under Article 36c,
Section 2 of the Act;
2) for the extended design conditions:
a) deterministic criteria limiting radiation impact of the facility, defined
under § 9, Item 2 of the Design Regulation; for compound sequences –

13
 also the requirement determined under Article 36f, Section 2, Item 2 of the
Act;
b) probabilistic safety criteria for a nuclear facility, defined under §10 of the
Design Regulation.
§ 33. Deterministic safety analyses for the normal operation of a nuclear facility shall
include all:
1) nuclear facility conditions, in which systems and equipment are operated in
accordance with the states and scopes anticipated in the design, without any
internal or external hazards;
2) work modes for which the nuclear facility has been designed i.e. normal
operation, maintenance and repairs – in the case of a nuclear power plant and
research reactor – both during operation at power and in switch-off mode.
§ 34. 1. Deterministic safety analyses for the normal operation of a nuclear facility
shall contain an assessment of exposure of the facility workers and the population to
ionising radiation connected with its operations, and in particular:
1) the prediction of radiation doses which facility workers and the general
population could potentially receive;
2) the assessment whether the doses, referred to in Item 1, do not exceed dose
limits and whether the principle has been fulfilled that these doses are at the
lowest reasonably attainable level.
2. When performing the prediction of doses, as referred to in Section 1, Item 1:
1) the conservative approach shall be taken in cases of uncertainties;
2) the maximum values which may occur in the period of commissioning and
operation of the nuclear facility shall be applied whenever the predictions of
doses depend on the dose rates resulting from the amount of radioactive
substances or contamination levels increasing with the passage of time;
3) operational experience based on similar nuclear facilities shall be taken into
account.
§ 35. The results of dose estimation during the normal operation of a nuclear facility
shall be assessed in order to identify all weak elements of the nuclear facility design
or the method for the performance of its operation, and to implement appropriate
improvements whenever this is reasonably possible.
§ 36. Deterministic safety analysis for the normal operation of a nuclear facility shall
also contain the estimation of planned releases of radioactive substances to the
environment, with special attention being paid to the assessment whether the planned
releases of radioactive substances are at the lowest reasonably attainable level.

Chapter 4
Particular requirements for probabilistic safety analysis
§ 37. 1. Probabilistic safety analysis of a nuclear facility shall include the definition of
all sequences of events which contribute significantly to the risk caused by a nuclear
facility, the assessment of the balanced overall facility configuration design, the
assessment of isolated areas of risk and the assessment of the facility design’s
compliance with the probabilistic safety criteria specified in § 10 of the Design
Regulation.

14
2. The probabilistic safety analysis shall be performed for a nuclear power plant,
research reactor, isotopic enrichment plant, nuclear fuel production plant and plant for
reprocessing nuclear fuel.
§ 38. When performing a probabilistic safety analysis of a nuclear facility:
1) consideration shall be given to the impact of all nuclear facility systems and
components of structure and equipment in terms of their reliability in the
performance of specified safety functions;
2) the accepted levels of reliability for nuclear facility systems and components
of structure and equipment shall be justified by assessments based on
reliability data obtained from the operation of nuclear facilities or other data
sources, analysed in a manner permitting them to be verified;
3) consideration shall be given to possible workers errors, not only diagnostic,
but also when performing control functions.
§ 39. The probabilistic safety analysis shall be used primarily to verify the appropriate
application of the principle of redundancy with regard to equipment and systems,
assumed in the nuclear facility design, and to specify the requirement for the
implementation of protective measures against the common cause failure to
redundancy systems.
§ 40. 1. The starting point of a probabilistic safety analysis of a nuclear facility shall
be a complete PIE set, including both internal and external events, which may occur
under all normal operational modes and lead to the release of radioactive substances
from any source on the premises of the nuclear facility.
2. An analysis shall be performed in order to identify all failure and error sequences
which contribute to the risk.
3. The sequences, referred to in Section 2, shall contain:
1) failure of nuclear facility components of structure and equipment;
2) unavailability of nuclear facility components of structure and equipment
whilst performing maintenance, repairs or tests;
3) workers errors;
4) failure of nuclear facility systems and components of equipment due to
common cause failure;
5) ageing of nuclear facility systems and components of structure and equipment.
4. Secondary failures, which are included in the deterministic analyses, shall be taken
into account in the probabilistic safety analysis i.e. in the analysis on the sequence of
events and in the analysis on nuclear facility systems.
§ 41. 1. The probabilistic safety analysis of a nuclear facility shall be performed at the
following levels:
1) the first level at which:
a) the sequence of events which could lead to a failure of the following shall
be defined:
– failure of the reactor core – in the case of a nuclear power plant and
research reactor,

15
 – failure of nuclear facility systems and components of structure and
equipment containing radioactive substances of the kind and quantity
such that their release to the environment could lead to a radiation
hazard exceeding the criterion defined under Article 36f, Section 2,
Item 1 of the Act – in the case of an isotopic enrichment plant, nuclear
fuel production plant and plant for reprocessing nuclear fuel,
b) the failure frequency shall be estimated, as referred to in Letter (a), the
strengths and weaknesses of safety systems shall be assessed, as well as
procedures whose purpose is the prevention of such failure,
c) the following in particular shall be specified:
– sequences of failures of the nuclear facility components of structure
and equipment as well as workers errors, constituting the largest
contribution to the failure frequency, as referred to in Letter (a),
– safety systems which are the most important in preventing failure, as
referred to in Letter (a),
– the possibility of introducing changes in the design or operation of
the nuclear facility in order to lower the risk level.
2) the second level at which the routes of possible releases of radioactive substances
to the environment from the nuclear facility shall be specified and the level of these
releases and their frequency shall be estimated.
2. On the level of probabilistic safety analysis, referred to in Section 1, Item 2:
1) the development of accident shall be examined, starting from the initiation of
failure, as referred to in Item 1, Letter (a), considering the releases of
radioactive substances to the environment and phenomena which could occur
and lead to the failure of:
a) the reactor containment – in the case of a nuclear power plant and research
reactor,
b) the ultimate protective barrier – in the case of an isotopic enrichment plant,
nuclear fuel production plant and plant for reprocessing nuclear fuel;
2) the effectiveness of solutions of the nuclear facility design shall be examined,
implemented in order to limit the consequences of failures, as referred to in
Item 1, Letter (a);
3) the frequency of large releases of radioactive substances to the environment
shall be estimated.

Chapter 5
Requirements on the content of the preliminary safety report
§ 42. 1. The requirements concerning the scope of the preliminary safety report for a
nuclear power plant shall be specified in Appendix 2.
2. The requirements specified in Appendix 2 shall apply accordingly to nuclear
facilities other than a nuclear power plant.

16
 Chapter 6
Transitional and final provisions
§ 43. The provisions of this Regulation shall not apply to nuclear facilities under
construction, commissioning or operation in the territory of the Republic of Poland on
the day of its entry into force.
§ 44. The Regulation shall come into force within 14 days after the day of its
announcement.

17
 Appendices to the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of…….2012 (….)

Appendix No 1
Criteria for grouping postulated initiating events (PIE) leading to particular
states of a nuclear power plant in accordance with the estimated probability of
the occurrence of PIE

Probability of the Name of the facility state Acceptance criteria

occurrence of PIE
More frequently than Anticipated operational - technological process parameters within
once every 100 years occurrences admissible limits anticipated in the
of reactor operation design,
- no fuel degradation,
- releases of radioactive substances not
exceeding the limits determined for
normal operation
Less frequently than category 1 - failure of claddings of less than 10% of
once every 100 years fuel elements,
of reactor operation, - retained functions of reactor cooling
but equally to or more system and reactor containment,
frequently than once
- limited radiation effects, not exceeding
every 1000 years of
criteria specified in § 9, Item 1 of the
reactor operation
Design Regulation
Design accident

Less frequently than category 2 - failure of claddings of less than 10% of

once every 1000 years fuel elements,
of reactor operation, - fuel parameters within the admissible
but equally to or more limits for a given type of reactor,
frequently than once
- maintenance of reactor core geometry
every 10 000 years of
allowing effective core cooling,
reactor operation
- retained functions of reactor
containment,
- limited radiation effects, not exceeding
criteria specified in § 9, Item 1 of the
Design Regulation.
Less frequently than Compound - possible failure of at least 10% of fuel
once every 10 000 sequences element claddings, but without nuclear
Extended design

years of reactor reactor meltdown,

conditions

operation, but equally - possible significant release of

to or more frequently radioactive substances to the
than once every 100 environment,
000 years of reactor
- radiation effects, not exceeding criteria
operation
specified in § 9, Item 2 of the Design
Regulation

18
Less frequently than Severe accidents - large fuel degradation, including
once every 100 000 without failure of nuclear reactor meltdown,
years of reactor the reactor - possible significant release of
operation, but equally containment radioactive substances to the
to or more frequently environment,
than once every 1000
- radiation effects, not exceeding criteria
000 years of reactor
specified in § 9, Item 2 of the Design
operation
Regulation
Less frequently than Hypothetically severe - large fuel degradation, including
once every 1 000 000 accidents with failure of nuclear reactor meltdown,
years of reactor the primary reactor - possible extremely large releases of
operation containment radioactive substances to the
environment,
- radiation effects exceeding criteria for
extended design conditions, specified in
§ 9, Item 2 of the Design Regulation

19
 Appendix No 2
Scope of the preliminary safety report for a nuclear facility

The preliminary safety report (PSR) for a nuclear facility shall contain:
1. Introduction and general information on the nuclear facility

1.1. The purpose of the PSR.

1.2. Indication of investor, general designer, general supplier and general

contractor of the nuclear facility.

1.3. Statement on similar or identical facilities, for the construction of which

the President of the National Atomic Energy Agency issued licenses, and
on specific differences and improvements introduced into the facility
design from the time of obtaining those licenses.

1.4. Basic information on the process of preparing the PSR.

1.5. Description of the PSR structure, purpose and scope of its particular parts
and interconnections.
2. General description of the nuclear facility
2.1. Technical provisions and standards applied in the facility design.
2.2. Basic technical characteristics of the facility.
2.2.1. Type of facility.
2.2.2. Number of units.
2.2.3. Type of nuclear reactor, reactor cooling system and circulation of
working factor.
2.2.4. Basic safety systems.
2.2.5. Type of containment structure.
2.2.6. Capacity of reactor core thermal output.
2.2.7. Capacity of net power output of the nuclear power unit
corresponding to particular levels of reactor thermal output.
2.2.8. Other technical characteristics required in order to understand the
main technological processes at a nuclear facility.
2.3. Information on the spatial layout of the nuclear facility and other
technical and organisational aspects.
2.3.1. Physical and geographical location of the nuclear facility.
2.3.2. General plan of the nuclear facility.
2.3.3. Nuclear facility connections the to the power grid system –
transmission and distribution networks.
2.3.4. Communication routes (rail, road and water) leading to the nuclear
facility.

20
 2.3.5. Nuclear facility connections with other infrastructure networks.
2.3.6. Description of the limits of design process and interdependence
between the various design organisations, as well as links and
coordination of nuclear facility operations with external systems
and devices.
2.3.7. Description or reference to the confidential information on the
physical protection measures of the nuclear facility.
2.4. The operational mode of the nuclear power unit.
2.5. Documents included in the PSR on the basis of appeals.
3. Description of the integrated management system

4. Assessment of the nuclear facility location

4.1. Location reference details.
4.1.1. Nuclear facility location.
4.1.2. Population distribution and density in the region where the nuclear
facility is located, the location of public utility facilities and other
facilities relevant from the viewpoint of population distribution in
the region where the nuclear facility is located, postulated borders
of the restricted-use area surrounding the nuclear facility.
4.1.3. The economic use of land and water supplies in the region where
the nuclear facility is located and the assessment of any possible
interactions between activities performed in the region and the
nuclear facility.
4.1.4. Geotechnical parameters of land and hydrogeological
characteristics.
4.1.5. Output data for buildings and structures design and for modelling
the dispersion of radioactive materials in groundwater.
4.2. Assessment of specific hazards for a given location.
4.2.1. Detailed assessment of events in the region where the facility is
located resulting from external natural hazards and human activity.
4.2.2. Screening test criteria for each type of external event and a
description of anticipated impact of particular events on the area
where the facility is located: source of hazards, mechanisms of
possible propagation of hazards and the anticipated consequences
of the nuclear facility impact on the area where the facility is
located.
4.2.3. Probabilistic design objectives for external events and assessment of
the compliance of the probabilistic design objectives with the limit
design parameters.
4.2.4. Hazards caused by nearby industrial facilities, transport routes and
other types of activities.
4.3. Activities on the premises of the nuclear facility which could impact its
safety.

21
 4.4. Seismology.
4.5. Geological structure and geological-engineering conditions
4.6. Hydrology.
4.7. Hydrogeology.
4.8. Meteorology.
4.9. Radiological conditions concerning the facility location resulting from
the natural radioactivity and the impact of external sources of ionizing
radiation or radioactive contamination.
4.10. Conditions for emergency planning and intervention measures related to
the nuclear facility location.
4.11. Monitoring of parameters connected with the nuclear facility location.
4.12. Documents included in the PSR on the basis of appeals.

5. General design aspects of the nuclear facility

5.1. Safety objectives and design principles for the nuclear facility.
5.1.1. Sequence of safety levels.
5.1.2. Safety functions.
5.1.3. Deterministic principles and design criteria.
5.1.3.1. Single failure criterion.
5.1.3.2. Other requirements and safety criteria.
5.1.4. Probabilistic design criteria.
5.1.5. Radiological protection.
5.2. Compliance of the nuclear facility design with the design principles and
criteria for the nuclear facility.
5.3. Classification of nuclear facility systems and components of structure
and equipment.
5.4. Building facilities and structures of the nuclear facility.
5.4.1. Information concerning the design solutions of building facilities
and structures.
5.4.2. Specific information about particular building facilities and
structures.
5.4.3. Reactor containment.
5.5. Qualification of the nuclear facility systems, components of structure and
equipment important for ensuring nuclear safety and radiological
protection in terms of environmental stress and conditions.
5.6. Consideration of human factors in the nuclear facility design.
5.7. Protection of the nuclear facility against internal and external hazards.

22
6. Detailed description of the nuclear facility systems and components of
structure and equipment
6.1. Nuclear reactor.
6.1.1. Brief description of neutron-physical and thermal-hydraulic
structures and characteristics of various components of the reactor,
including: fuel, components inside the reactor, reactivity control
systems and related measurement and control systems.
6.1.2. Description of the structure of fuel elements, and the reasons for
approval of the design assumptions.
6.1.3. Description of the system of components inside the reactor (fuel
assemblies, supporting structures and components inside the vessel)
and their design solutions.
6.1.4. Physical design of the reactor and the neutron-physical
characteristics of the core.
6.1.5. Thermal-hydraulic design of the reactor.
6.1.6. Reactor materials.
6.1.7. Functional design of reactivity control systems.
6.2. Reactor cooling circuit and related systems.
6.2.1. Pressure boundary integrity of the reactor cooling circuit.
6.2.2. Reactor vessel.
6.2.3. Design solutions of the reactor cooling circuit.
6.3. Safety systems.
6.3.1. Emergency core cooling system.
6.3.2. Containment of the reactor and related systems.
6.3.3. Technical measures ensuring safe stay and work conditions for
workers.
6.3.4. Systems for removing and limiting the quantity of fission products.
6.3.5. Other safety systems.
6.4. Measurement and control systems.
6.4.1. Protection systems.
6.4.1.1. Reactor protection systems.
6.4.1.2. Systems for initiating protection systems.
6.4.2. Presentation systems of technological parameters, essential for
safety.
6.4.3. Other diagnostic and measurement systems, required for ensuring
safety.
6.4.4. Control systems not required for ensuring safety.
6.4.5. Main control room.

23
 6.4.6. Reserve control room.
6.5. Electrical systems.
6.5.1. Division of nuclear facility electrical systems into groups and
categories, with a definition of electrical system parts, which are
important for ensuring nuclear safety and radiological protection.
6.5.2. Justification of the functional suitability of the design of electrical
systems, important for ensuring nuclear safety and radiological
protection. Description of protective measures for electrical devices,
including the possibility of circumvention of these measures in case
of emergency.
6.5.3. General description of the transmission grid and the point of
connection (power station) to the electrical system of the nuclear
facility. Results of stability and reliability analyses of the
transmission system from the viewpoint of safe operation of the
nuclear facility. Description of the communication systems and the
principles of mobile cooperation with the power dispatch services
for transmission and distribution grids operators. General
description with regard to the control systems of active power,
frequency as well as reactive power and voltage in the transmission
grid. Simplified diagram depicting the connection of the nuclear
facility to a transmission grid and local distribution grid.
6.5.4. External power grids - transmission and distribution.
6.5.5. Internal electrical systems.
6.5.5.1. Alternating current electrical systems.
6.5.5.1.1. Power output system.
6.5.5.1.2. Primary and back-up power system for own needs.
6.5.5.1.3. Emergency electrical power sources (diesel or gas
turbine).
6.5.5.1.4. Power supply systems for general own needs of the
facility.
6.5.5.1.5. Uninterrupted alternating current supply systems.
6.5.5.1.6. Requirements for providing power supply to particular
recipients of alternating current.
6.5.5.2. Power systems of direct current.
6.5.5.2.1. Assessment of the process of battery discharge.
6.5.5.2.2. Main collections of direct current.
6.5.5.2.3. Fire protection measures in battery rooms and along
cable routes.
6.5.5.2.4. Indication of power supply requirements for each
collection of direct current.
6.6. Auxiliary systems of the nuclear facility.

24
 6.6.1. Systems of cooling water and water for the purpose of technological
circuits.
6.6.1.1. Cooling water system.
6.6.1.2. Indirect cooling systems for cooling nuclear devices.
6.6.1.3. Operational water system of responsible collections.
6.6.1.4. Operational water system for remaining collections.
6.6.1.5. Ultimate heat removal.
6.6.1.6. Water treatment systems for technological needs
(decarbonisation, demineralisation).
6.6.1.7. Reserve tanks of demineralised water and condensate.
6.6.2. Auxiliary technological systems.
6.6.2.1. Chemical and reactor coolant capacity regulation system.
6.6.2.2. Reactor coolant treatment systems.
6.6.2.3. Boric acid preparation and dispensing systems.
6.6.2.4. Sample collection systems: following an accident for
controlling the technological process.
6.6.2.5. Equipment and floor drainage systems.
6.6.2.6. Compressed air and other technical gas systems.
6.6.3. Heating, ventilation and air-conditioning systems.
6.6.4. Other auxiliary systems.
6.6.4.1. Diesel unit auxiliary systems (commissioning, lube oil, air and
combustion intake).
6.6.4.2. Communication systems.
6.6.4.3. Lighting systems.
6.7. Power conversion system.
6.7.1. Requirements for operation and output of turbine assemblies under
normal working conditions and accident conditions.
6.7.2. Description of the main steam piping, along with regulatory and
shut-off valves, condenser, condenser vacuum system, turbine
labyrinth seal system, turbine bypass system, turbine assembly
operational water system, condensate treatment plant and
desludging and desalination of steam generators (where applicable).
6.7.3. Water-chemical correction programme of the water-steam circuit.
6.8. Fire protection technical systems and rescue service.
6.8.1. Justification that the facility design solutions ensure appropriate fire
protection.
6.8.1.1. Solutions implementing the safety level sequence in case of
fire.

25
 6.8.1.2. Measures for fire prevention, fire detection, fire alarms,
extinguishing and limiting the spread of fire, taking into
account the functioning of the plant fire brigade unit.
6.8.1.3. In the context of fire response, fire spread and fire integrity
class, the selection of appropriate materials and building
products, structural fire protection separation and compartment
walls, in particular redundancy systems and classification of
fire protection devices.
6.8.2. Fire protection measures for the facility workers.
6.8.3. Equipment and personal requirements for the plant fire brigade unit.
6.9. Items and components of equipment used for storing nuclear fuel at the
nuclear facility, as well as components of equipment used for shipment
of nuclear fuel.
6.9.1. Items and components of equipment used for storing non-irradiated
(fresh) nuclear fuel at the nuclear facility, as well as components of
equipment used for shipment of this kind of fuel.
6.9.2. Items and components of equipment used for storing irradiated
nuclear fuel at the nuclear facility, as well as components of
equipment used for shipment of this kind of fuel.
6.10. Systems for the reprocessing of radioactive waste.
Design solutions ensuring the safe control, collection, shipment,
reprocessing, storage and removal of radioactive waste in solid, liquid or
gas form, generated on the premises of the nuclear facility as a result of
all processes and activities, throughout the period of its operation.
6.11. Other systems important for safety.
7. Nuclear facility safety analyses
7.1. Safety objectives and criteria for the nuclear facility.
7.1.1. Global objectives and criteria – for the nuclear facility as a whole.
7.1.2. Detailed objectives and criteria – specific for given structures,
systems and equipment of the nuclear facility.
7.2. Identification and classification of the initiating events.
7.2.1. Description of the applied methods for the identification of
postulated initiating events (PIE).
7.2.2. Description of assumptions adopted for the PIE classification
according to their anticipated frequency and type, and the method
for the performance of such classification.
7.2.3. PIE list divided into the categories of nuclear facility states.
7.2.3.1. Anticipated operational occurrences.
7.2.3.2. Design basis accidents.
7.2.3.3. Accidents more severe than design basis accidents.
7.2.3.3.1. Extended design conditions.

26
 7.2.3.3.1.1. Compound sequences.
7.2.3.3.1.2. Severe accidents without failure of the reactor
containment.
7.2.3.3.2. Hypothetically severe accidents with failure of the reactor
containment.
7.3. Workers actions during the anticipated operational occurrences and under
accident conditions of the facility.
7.4. Deterministic safety analyses.
7.4.1. Descriptions of the methods and results of all deterministic safety
analyses – for the purpose of assessment and justification of
nuclear facility safety: in normal operational state, during
anticipated operational occurrences and accident conditions.
7.4.2. General description of the processes of computer software
verification and validation, with reference to detailed reports.
7.4.3. In relation to the Information Technology system software:
justification of the application scope for a given event, with
reference to validation documentation, containing comparisons with
experimental data or with real operational data of the nuclear
facility (of an identical or similar type).
7.4.4. Description of validation model of the nuclear facility (or of the
nuclear power unit).
7.4.5. Safety during normal operation of the nuclear facility – descriptions
of the methods and results of performed analyses – in order to
demonstrate that the operation of the nuclear facility may be
performed safely, which leads to the confirmation that:
7.4.5.1. Radiation doses for workers and the general population do not
exceed dose limits and the principle has been fulfilled that
radiation doses for workers and the general population are at
the lowest reasonably attainable level.
7.4.5.2. Planned releases of radioactive substances from the nuclear
facility are within the admissible limits.
7.4.6. Anticipated operational occurrences and design basis accidents.
7.4.6.1. Description of the methods and results of performed analyses –
for the purpose of demonstrating:
7.4.6.1.1. Tolerance to failure or human errors owing to applied
design solutions of the nuclear facility.
7.4.6.1.2. Effectiveness of safety systems in preventing or limiting
the consequences of anticipated operational occurrences
or accidents.
7.4.6.2. Analysis of particular PIE groups.
7.4.6.3. Results of analyses on anticipated operational occurrences –
with an indication that the requirement under 36f, Section 2,
Item 1 of the Act has been fulfilled.

27
 7.4.6.4. Results of analyses on design accidents – with an indication
that the following had been fulfilled: the requirement under
Article 36f, Section 2, Item 2 of the Act and deterministic
criteria for the limitation of the nuclear facility radiation
impact, determined under § 9, Item 1 of the Design
Regulation.
7.4.7. Analyses on the capacity of the nuclear facility to limit the effects
of accidents which are more severe than design accidents, in
particular extended design conditions.
7.4.7.1. Objectives and specific acceptance criteria for the analyses of
events resulting in accidents which are more severe than
design basis accidents.
7.4.7.2. Description:
- of additional anticipated failures in emergency scenarios,
together with justification for the basis of their selection,
- of the scope and method of taking into account the operator’s
measures performed in order to limit and mitigate the
consequences of accident.
7.4.7.3. Safety analyses for extended design conditions.
Description and results of safety analyses for extended design
conditions, with an indication that the deterministic criteria for
limiting the radiation impact of the facility, determined under § 9,
Item 2 of the Design Regulation and for compound sequences, also
the requirement under Article 36f, Section 2, Item 2 of the Act are
fulfilled.
7.4.7.3.1. Compound sequences.
7.4.7.3.2. Severe accidents: selected sequences of events connected
with considerable failure of the reactor core (including its
meltdown), without failure of the reactor containment.
7.4.7.4. Demonstrating that one may, with considerable confidence,
exclude the hypothetical sequences of severe accidents leading
to early or large scale releases of radioactive substances to the
environment – in other words, that the requirements
determined under Article 36c, Section 2 of the Act and under §
32, Section 2 of the Design Regulation have been met.
7.4.8. Demarcation of the postulated borders of the restricted-
use area surrounding the nuclear facility.
7.5. Probabilistic safety analyses.
7.5.1. Brief description of the scope of probabilistic safety analyses,
applied methods and obtained results.
7.5.2. Quoting probabilistic safety criteria used for the purpose of nuclear
facility design, in particular global criteria determined under § 10 of
the Design Regulation.
7.5.3. Description of the methods of probabilistic safety analyses.

28
 7.5.3.1. Modelling of accident sequences.
7.5.3.2. Assessment of data and estimation of parameters.
7.5.3.3. Quantification of accident scenarios.
7.5.3.4. Analyses of radioactive substances releases from the
containment.
7.5.4. Description of the results of the probabilistic safety analysis and
conclusions.
7.5.4.1. Description summing up the results of the probabilistic safety
analysis (with reference to the complete probabilistic safety
analysis study concerning the facility, documented in the form
of a separate report), containing quantity risk measures for
those aspects of design solutions and facility operation which
contribute the most in terms of risk.
7.5.4.2. Comparison of results obtained from the probabilistic safety
analysis with the probabilistic safety criteria, defined under §
10 of the Design Regulation and the formulation of
unequivocal conclusions concerning the fulfilment of these
criteria.
7.6. Final summary of the results of analyses.
7.6.1. Confirmation that the appropriate safety requirements have been
fulfilled in all aspects.
7.6.2. Specification of any possible changes in relation to the
requirements, with clear justification concerning those items where
the requirements have not been fully met or have been changed as a
result of further analysis.
8. Aspects of nuclear facility commissioning
8.1. Description of the organisational concept of commissioning.
8.2. Specification of planned stages and phases of commissioning works, in
consideration of their duration, and also in consideration of
commissioning tests, referred to in Article 37a, Section 2 of the Act.

9. Aspects of nuclear facility operation

9.1. Information on the management of nuclear fuel in the reactor core and
fuel manipulation.
Description of organisational and technical undertakings connected with
the management of nuclear fuel in the reactor core and the fuel shipment
for the purpose of ensuring the safe use of fuel in the reactor and its safe
transport and storage on the premises of the nuclear facility.
9.2. Management of nuclear facility ageing processes.
Identification of nuclear facility components subject to ageing processes
and proposed procedural measures concerning these problems – in
particular by taking into account the requirements defined under § 41, 42
and 59, Section 5 of the Design Regulation.

29
10. Operational limits and conditions of the nuclear facility

11. Information on radiological protection at the nuclear facility

11.1.Application of the principle of the lowest, reasonably attainable exposure
to ionising radiation of the facility workers.
11.2. Sources of ionising radiation at the nuclear facility.
11.3. Nuclear facility design solutions adopted for the purpose of radiological
protection.
11.3.1. Radiological protection principles applied in nuclear facility
design.
11.3.2. Radiological protection objectives of in terms of volumes of
doses to which workers are exposed and expected doses to
which the general population is exposed over the period of
facility operation.
11.3.3. Design solutions for the nuclear facility structures, systems and
components from the viewpoint of ensuring radiological
protection.
Demonstrating that in the overall nuclear facility design,
appropriate solutions relating to the construction, spatial layout
and the use of the facility have been applied – in order to reduce
doses and releases of radioactive substances from all sources.
11.4. Radiological monitoring on the premises of the nuclear facility and in its
surroundings.
11.5. Radiological protection programme as a separate part of the quality
assurance programme.
12. Facilities and equipment for the purpose of emergency measures
12.1. Emergency management centre.
12.2. Technical measures permitting the control of the nuclear facility state
and the control of necessary safety systems from the reserve control
room.
12.3. External emergency management centre.
12.4. External systems for radiological monitoring which transfer data to the
appropriate emergency services at the Radiation Emergency Centre of
the National Atomic Energy Agency (Centrum Zdarzeń Radiacyjnych
Państwowej Agencji Atomistyki).
13. Impact of the nuclear facility on the environment.
13.1. Radiological impact of the nuclear facility.
13.1.1. Permissible limits and operational levels of solid, liquid and gas
releases of radioactive substances.
13.1.2. Monitoring of the nuclear facility surroundings with regard to
radioactive contamination and ionising radiation dose rate.

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 13.1.3. The environment monitoring programme and emergency systems
required in case of unplanned releases of radioactive substances,
and possible automatic devices stopping such releases.
13.2. Non-radiation impact of the nuclear facility.
13.2.1. Physical and chemical types and properties of releases.
13.2.2. Admissible limits and operational levels of releases.
13.2.3. Monitoring of contamination in the surroundings of the facility.
13.2.4. Description of emergency systems actuated in case of the
occurrence of unplanned releases.
14. Information on the radioactive waste management at the nuclear facility
14.1. Control and limitation of the quantity of radioactive waste generated at
the facility.
14.2. Shipment of radioactive waste.
14.2.1. Safe transport of radioactive waste from the source location to a
particular storage, repository or reprocessing location.
14.2.2. Consideration of the possible need to recover in the future stored
waste, also during decommissioning of the nuclear facility.
14.3. Minimizing the accumulation of radioactive waste.
14.4. Reprocessing/conditioning of radioactive waste.
14.5. Storage of radioactive waste.
14.6. Disposal of radioactive waste.
15. Aspects of nuclear facility decommissioning
15.1. Description of the decommissioning concept.
15.2. Selection of decommissioning approach.
15.3. Plan of preliminary decommissioning works.

Justification

The above draft regulation is a fulfilment of the authorization included in the

Article 36d, Section 3 of the Atomic Law Act of 29 November 2000 (Journal of Laws
of 2012, Item 264).
This draft regulation implements to the laws of Poland the provisions of Council
Directive 2009/71/Euratom of 25 June 2009 establishing a Community framework for
the nuclear safety of nuclear installations (OJ EU L 172 of 02.07.2009, p. 18 and OJ
EU L 260 of 03.10.2009, p.40).

The regulation sets forth basic requirements concerning the scope and method
for the performance of safety analyses of nuclear facilities as well as the scope of
preliminary safety report which is to be submitted to the Agency’s President along

31
with the application requesting the issue of a licence on the construction of a nuclear
facility in accordance with the provisions of Article 36d of the Act.

This regulation was drafted:

mainly on the basis of the following current guidelines of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA):
- Safety Assessment and Verification for Nuclear Power Plants. Safety
guidelines No NS-G-1.2 (2001);
- Deterministic Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants. Specific safety
guidelines No SSG-2 (2009);
- Development and Application of Level 1 Probabilistic Safety Assessment for
Nuclear Power Plants. Specific safety guidelines No SSG-3 (2010);
- Development and Application of Level 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment for
Nuclear Power Plants. Specific safety guidelines No SSG-4 (2010);
- Format and Content of the Safety Analysis Report for Nuclear Power Plants.
Safety guidelines No GS-G-4.1 (2004);

with consideration of:
- Guidelines of Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WENRA):
WENRA Reactor Safety Reference Levels. 2008;
- European Utility Requirements for LWR Nuclear Power Plants, 2001 – „ EUR
document”;
- provisions and guidelines drawn up by nuclear regulators from those countries
which have got developed nuclear power sector, in particular U.S., Canada,
Germany and Finland.

Chapter 1 (§ 1) introduces a number of specialized terms relating to the issues

of nuclear safety and radiological protection (NSRP) at nuclear facilities. This subject
matter had not been regulated in the Polish laws and so it was necessary to develop a
conceptual network allowing a clear formulation of safety requirements. While
elaborating definitions, the authors referred to international documents describing the
aforementioned issues, in particular:
− „Safety of nuclear power plants: design – safety requirements of the IAEA No
NS-R-1” (taking account of the latest amendment draft of this document DS414
of 01.06.2011);
− „Safety Glossary of the International Atomic Energy Agency, version of 2007”;
− „EUR document”.
The definitions of these concepts are consistent with definitions introduced by the
„Design” Regulation. Additionally, however, for the purpose of this regulation, design
accidents were divided into category 1 and 2, and defined accordingly. This approach
is consistent in particular with „EUR document” (they correspond to design
conditions of category „DBC3” and „DBC4”) and with Finnish governmental
regulation: „Government Decree 733/2008”.

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 Chapters 2 – 4 and Appendix No 1 regard safety analyses (their scope and
methods), whereas Chapter 5 and Appendix No 2 concern the preliminary safety
report.

Chapter 2 (§2-12) defines general requirements for safety analyses, in

particular with regard to:
- Scope and objectives of safety analyses (§2-4) – with consideration to the fact
that safety analyses include deterministic and probabilistic analyses;
- Approach for the performance of safety analyses (§5) – in case of
deterministic analyses for design conditions, the conservative approach is
required, whereas in case of analyses of more severe accidents than design
basis accidents, it is possible to use analyses based on the best estimate;
- Methods for the identification of the postulated initiating events (PIEs) and the
selection of an appropriate group of PIEs approved for safety analyses (§6-11).
Requirements determined in this chapter are the same for deterministic and
probabilistic analyses.
Chapter 3 (§13-36) specifies detailed requirements for deterministic safety
analyses for various nuclear facility states, and in particular with regard to:
- Detailed objectives of deterministic safety analyses, assumptions which should
be made for the performance of these analyses, and their quality assurance
(§13-21), in particular in §13 and §14 the Appendix No 1 is referred to
containing classification of PIEs and nuclear facility states;
- (Conservative) assumptions for design basis accidents and postulated
operational occurrences (§22-24), and acceptance criteria, (global and
detailed) results of analyses on design basis accidents (§25);
- Objectives, assumptions and approach to more severe analyses than design
basis accidents – in particular so-called „extended design conditions”,
including severe accidents (§26-31), acceptance criteria of results of analyses
on more severe accidents than design basis accidents (§32);
- Objectives, scope and approach to safety analyses for the states of nuclear
facility normal operation (§33-36).
Chapter 4 (§37-41) specifies detailed requirements for probabilistic safety
analyses of the nuclear facility. In §37-40 objectives, scope and assumptions were
determined for probabilistic safety analyses. In accordance with current worldwide
practice, it is required to perform probabilistic safety analyses on levels 1 and 2 whose
scope is as follows (§41):
- 1: sequences of events are determined leading to a failure of the reactor core,
frequency of reactor failure is estimated, and strengths and weaknesses of
safety systems are assessed as well as procedures preventing the reactor
failure;
- 2: routes of possible releases of radioactive substances from the nuclear
facility to the environment are determined and the volumes of these releases
and their frequency are estimated. The effectiveness of the nuclear facility
design solutions applied in order to limit the consequences of the reactor core

33
 failure is considered and the frequency of large releases of radioactive
substances to the environment is estimated.
Chapter 5 (§42) defines a scope of the preliminary safety report (PSR), in
particular by reference to Appendix No 2 containing description of required content of
PSR for a nuclear power plant.
Chapter 6 (§43 and 44) contains transitional and final provisions in particular
provision §43 specifies that the provisions of this regulation do not apply to nuclear
facilities which at the day of its entry into force are under construction,
commissioning or operation in the territory of the Republic of Poland. This approach
is justified with the fact that it is not possible to impose the said requirements on
facilities (MARIA research reactor and storages of spent nuclear fuel 19 and 19a),
which had been designed and commissioned before the entry into force of this
regulation.
Appendix No 1, in the form of a table, shows the classification of PIEs (with
different frequency of occurrence) leading to particular facility states and acceptance
criteria of analyses results have been determined in the terms of failure of fuel, state
of reactor cooling circuit and its containment and volumes of releases of radioactive
substances to the environment.
Appendix No 2 contains specification of the required content of PSR for a
nuclear power plant (NPP). It generally concerns nuclear power plants with thermal
reactors since in practice only these nuclear power reactor technologies are
commercially available at present and will be available over the period of next 20-30
years.
It is required that the PSR contains a comprehensive description of NPP covering
all the aspects of its nuclear safety and radiological protection as well as results of the
plant safety analyses (both deterministic and probabilistic ones), demonstrating the
fulfilment of established safety criteria in 15 sections as follows:
1) Introduction and general information about the nuclear facility.
2) General description of the nuclear facility.
3) Description of integrated management system at the stage of nuclear facility
construction.
4) Assessment of nuclear facility location – prepared on the basis of location report.
5) General design aspects of the nuclear facility.
6) Detailed description of systems and components of structure and equipment of the
nuclear facility.
7) Nuclear facility safety analyses.
8) Aspects of nuclear facility commissioning.
9) Aspects of nuclear facility operation.
10) Operational limits and conditions for the nuclear facility.
11) Information on radiological protection at the nuclear facility.
12) Facilities and equipment for emergency measures.
13) Impact of the nuclear facility on the environment.
14) Information on the radioactive waste management at the nuclear facility.
15) Aspects of nuclear facility decommissioning.

Until now no detailed provisions in the scope regulated by this draft regulation
have been applicable in the territory of the Republic of Poland.

34
 The draft regulation is subject to notification in accordance with the provisions
contained in the regulation of the Council of Ministers of 23 December 2002 on the
functioning of the national notification system for norms and legal acts (Journal of
Laws No 239, Item 2039 with later amendments).
Under Article 33 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community (Euratom Treaty), this draft regulation must be submitted for approval to
the European Commission.

The draft regulation was published in the Public Information Bulletin of the
Government Legislation Centre in the tab entitled “Government Legislation Process”,
in the Public Information Bulletin of the National Atomic Energy Agency in
accordance with Article 5 of the Act of 7 July 2005 on Lobbying Activities in the
Process of Legislation (Journal of Laws No 169, Item 1414 with later amendments) in
order to enable the announcement, under Article 7 of the aforementioned Act, of
one’s interest in the works concerning the draft regulation. No entity manifested their
interest in the works regarding the draft regulation in accordance with the provisions
on lobbying activities in the process of legislation.

35
 REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT

1. Entities impacted by the draft regulation

The draft regulation concerns entities which invest in or operate nuclear facilities, and
entities which conduct activities involving design, supply and comprehensive
performance of these facilities as well as entities supervising these activities.
Indirectly the draft regulation also concerns the President of the National Atomic
Energy Agency who, in accordance with the provisions of the Atomic Law Act, is the
competent authority for the assessment of preliminary safety report in the process of
considering the application with regard to the issue of license for the construction of
nuclear facility.

2. Consultation

The draft regulation was submitted as part of social consultations to the following
entities:
1) Polskie Towarzystwo Nukleoniczne, ul. Dorodna 16, 03-195 Warsaw
(Polish Nuclear Society),
2) Stowarzyszenie Inspektorów Ochrony Radiologicznej, ul. Garbary 15,
Poznań (Association of Radiation Protection Inspectors),
3) Stowarzyszenie Elektryków Polskich – Komitet Energetyki Jądrowej
SEP (Association of Polish Electrical Engineers – Nuclear Power
Committee), ul. Świętokrzyska 14, 00 – 050 Warsaw,
4) Centralne Laboratorium Ochrony Radiologicznej (Central Laboratory for
Radiological Protection), ul Konwaliowa 7, 01-194 Warsaw,
5) Zakład Unieszkodliwiania Odpadów Promieniotwórczych (Radioactive
Waste Managementn Plant), 05-400 Otwock-Świerk,
6) Narodowe Centrum Badań Jądrowych (National Centre for Nuclear
Research), ul. Andrzeja Sołtana 7, 05-400 Otwock-Świerk,
7) Instytut Fizyki Jądrowej PAN (Polish Academy of Sciences, Institute of
Nuclear Physics), ul. Radzikowskiego 152, 31-342 Kraków,
8) PGE EJ1 Sp. z o.o., (Polish Energy Group), ul. Mysia 2, 00-496 Warsaw,
9) PGE Energia Jądrowa S.A., (Polish Energy Group), ul. Mysia 2, 00-496
Warsaw,
10) PGE Polska Grupa Energetyczna S.A., (Polish Energy Group), ul. Mysia
2, 00-496 Warsaw,
11) Stowarzyszenie Ekologów na Rzecz Energii Nuklearnej – SEREN,
(Environmentalists for Nuclear Energy) Poland, ul. Świętokrzyska 14, 00
– 050 Warsaw,
12) Instytut Na Rzecz Ekorozwoju (Institute for Sustainable Development),
ul. Nabielaka 15 lok. 1, 00 – 743 Warsaw,
13) Polski Klub Ekologiczny (Polish Ecological Club), ul. Sławkowska 26A,
31–014 Kraków,
14) Centrum Europejskie Zrównoważonego Rozwoju (European Centre for
Sustainable Development), ul. Kołłątaja, 21 50-006 Wrocław,
15) Fundacja Greenpeace Polska (Greenpeace Poland), ul. Lirowa 13, 02-387
Warsaw,
16) Fundacja Wspierania Inicjatyw Ekologicznych (Foundation for the
Support of Ecological Initiatives), ul. Czysta 17/4, 31-121 Kraków,

36
 17) Polska Konfederacja Pracodawców Prywatnych (Polish Federation of
Private Employers), ul. Klonowa 6, 00-591 Warsaw,
18) Konfederacja Pracodawców Polskich (Federation of Polish Employers)
ul. Brukselska 7, 03-973 Warsaw,
19) Komisja Krajowa NSZZ „Solidarność” (NSZZ “Solidarity” National
Committee), ul. Wały Piastowskie 24, 80-855 Gdańsk,
20) Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych (All-Poland
Alliance of Trade Unions), ul. Kopernika 36/40, 00-924 Warsaw,
21) Business Centre Club, ul. Plac Żelaznej Bramy 10, 00-136 Warsaw,
22) Związek Rzemiosła Polskiego (Polish Craft Association), PO Box 54,
00-952 Warsaw,
23) Forum Związków Zawodowych (Trade Unions Forum), Plac Teatralny 4,
85-069 Bydgoszcz,
24) Rada Krajowa Federacji Konsumentów (National Consumer Federation
Council), Al. Jerozolimskie 47 lok. 8, 00-697 Warsaw,
25) Forum Odbiorców Energii Elektrycznej i Gazu (Electricity and Gas
Customer Forum), ul. Poleczki 21, 02-822 Warsaw.

The draft regulation also appeared in the Public Information Bulletin of the
Government Legislation Centre in the tab entitled “Government Legislation Process”,
the Public Information Bulletin of the National Atomic Energy Agency and in the
National Atomic Energy Agency website.
During the social agreement process, comments to the draft regulation were submitted
by the National Centre for Nuclear Research in Otwock – Świerk, Polish Federation
of Private Employers PKPP Lewiatan and PGE EJ1 S.A. The legislator’s response to
the comments submitted during the social agreement process has been included in the
table of comments attached to this Regulatory Impact Assessment.

3. Impact of regulation on the public finances sector, including the State

budget and the budgets of local government units

The approval of the regulation will not impact the budgets of government and local-
government administrative units.

4. Impact of regulation on the labour market

The entry into force of the regulation will have no negative impact on the employment
market. On the contrary – it will facilitate the employment growth owing to the
construction of nuclear power plants (NPP), which in turn requires the issue of a new
regulation specifying requirements for safety analyses and the content of the
preliminary safety report for the NPP, constituting the basic document which must be
submitted to the NAEA President together with an application requesting the issue of
a license for the construction of a nuclear facility.

5. Impact of regulation on competitiveness of the economy and enterprise,

including the functioning of undertakings

37
The entry into force of the regulation will have no negative impact on the internal and
external competitiveness of the economy. On the contrary, the construction of nuclear
power plants in Poland will lead to a considerable increase of technical and
organisational quality of national enterprises, which will be involved in the nuclear
power plant implementation process; and thus their internal and external
competitiveness will be enhanced.

6. Impact of regulation on regional standing and development.

The entry into force of the regulation will have no direct impact on standing and
development of regions. However, indirectly – in consideration of the fact that this is
indispensable for the implementation of nuclear energy in Poland – it may have a
positive impact on the development of regions where the nuclear power plants will be
located or where undertakings performing significant supplies and works for nuclear
energy are located.

7. Source of financing

The financing of activities the purpose of which is the fulfilment of requirements

defined under this draft regulation, should constitute a part of costs borne for
investment in the nuclear facility.

8. Social benefits

The proposed regulation will perform an important role in the maintenance of national
nuclear safety and radiological protection at the appropriate level. The entry into force
of the regulation will have a positive impact on the protection of society against the
effects of ionising radiation from nuclear facilities. The Council of Ministers, in
performing the statutory authorisation contained in Article 36d, Section 3 of the
Atomic Law Act, specified in the draft regulation the detailed requirements
concerning the scope and method for conducting safety analyses, as well as the scope
of the preliminary safety report, bearing in mind that the scope of these analyses be
appropriate to the information regarding the impact of designed nuclear facility on the
state of nuclear safety and radiological protection. These requirements comply with
the latest recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
Western European Nuclear Regulators Association and they ensure that the
comprehensive safety analyses for designed nuclear facilities are appropriately
performed and documented in the preliminary safety report.

9. Impact of regulation on the environment.

The entry into force of the regulation will have an indirect positive impact on the
protection and state of the environment. The Council of Ministers, in performing the
statutory authorisation contained in Article 36d, Section 3 of the Atomic Law Act,
specified in the draft regulation the detailed requirements concerning the scope and
method for conducting safety analyses as well as the scope of the preliminary safety
report, bearing in mind that the scope of these analyses be appropriate to the
information regarding the impact of designed nuclear facility on the state of nuclear
safety and radiological protection. These requirements comply with the latest
recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Western

38
European Nuclear Regulators Association and they ensure that the comprehensive
safety analyses for designed nuclear facilities are appropriately performed and
documented in the preliminary safety report.

39