a.
Court of Appeals In the case at bar, substantial ends of justice warranted the referral of the case to the appellate
BP 129, as amended by RA 7902, Sec. 9 and RA 8246
Question of law, fact or both 
CGP Transport v. PU Leasing GR 164547 Mar 28, 2007
Although the form or mode of the original petition filed by herein respondent PCI from the
Order of the RTC was a special civil action for certiorari, an incorrect mode of appeal there
being questions of fact as assigned errors, i.e., the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstance, their relation to each other and to the whole situation, this Court, in
order to serve the demands of substantial justice, considers and disposes of the case as an
appeal by certiorari instead.
In an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised. In petitions
such as the one filed in G.R. No. 150483, questions of fact may not be the proper subject of
appeal under Rule 45 as this mode of appeal is generally confined to questions of law . Well
entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The resolution of factual
issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with
respect and are in fact binding on us subject to certain exceptions. Cases where an
appeal involved questions of fact, of law, or both fall within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. This is attested to by Section 15, Rule 44 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The section reads:
SEC. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. - x x x he may include in his assignment
of errors any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is
within the issues framed by the parties.
It was on this score that we referred the subject petition to the appellate court.
Under Section 5(f) of Rule 56 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, an appeal may
be dismissed on the ground of erroneous choice or mode of appeal. Said section reads:
SEC. 5. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. - The appeal MAY be dismissed motu proprio or
on motion of the respondent on the following grounds:
(f) Error in the choice or mode of appeal.
This notwithstanding, the Court may refer the case to the Court of Appeals under par. 2,
Section 6 of the same rule. Said section states:
SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. - x x x
An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court submitting
issues of fact may be referred to the Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate action. The
determination of the Supreme Court on whether or not issues of fact are involved shall be
final. [Emphasis supplied.]
This Court's discretion to refer the case to the Court of Appeals is by reason of the term "may"
in both sections. Such term denotes discretion on our part in dismissing an appeal or referring
one to the Court of Appeals.
Besides, it must be borne in mind that procedural rules are intended to ensure proper
administration of law and justice. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very
rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. 26 A
deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its prime objective, for after
all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of the courts.
court for further appropriate proceedings.
d. Court of Tax Appeals
RA 9282; RA 9503
e. Sandiganbayan
Pres. Decree No. 1606 as amended by Rep. Act. No. 7975 and 
Rep. Act No. 8249
f. Regional Trial Courts
Republic Act No. 11576, Sec. 1
BP 129, as amended by RA 7691, Sec. 5
Incapable of pecuniary estimation 
Agarrado et al v. Agarrado June 6, 2018 GR No. 212413
To be sure, according to the recent case of Foronda-Crystal vs. Son, jurisdiction is defined as
the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case. To exercise this, the court or
adjudicative body must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject matter,which is
conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by
erroneous belief of the court that it exists.
Jurisdiction over cases for partition of real properties therefore, like all others, is
determined by law. Particularly, the same is identified by Sections 19(2) and 33(3) of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act 7691.
The provisions state that in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction where
the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00 or, for civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such value exceeds P50,000.00. For those below the foregoing threshold amounts,
exclusive jurisdiction lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTC), Municipal Trial Courts
(MTC), or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTC).25
Thus, the determination of the assessed value of the property, which is the subject matter of
the partition, is essential. This, the courts could identify through an examination of the
allegations of the complaint.
According to the case of Tumpag vs. Tumpag, it is a hornbook doctrine that the court should
only look into the facts alleged in the complaint to determine whether a suit is within its
jurisdiction. According to the case of Spouses Cruz vs. Spouses Cruz, et al., only these facts
can be the basis of the court's competence to take cognizance of a case, and that one cannot
advert to anything not set forth in the complaint, such as evidence adduced at the trial, to
determine the nature of the action thereby initiated.
According to Foronda-Crystal, failure to allege the assessed value of a real property in
the complaint would result to a dismissal of the case. The reason put forth by the Court is
that:
x x x absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property,  it cannot be
determined whether the RTC or the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
the petitioner's action. Indeed, the courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market
value of the land. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted)
This same ratio has been repeated in a number of cases, including the cases of Spouses Cruz
vs. Spouses Cruz, et al.30 and Quinagoran vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court concluded
that:
Considering that the respondents failed to allege in their complaint the assessed value of the
subject property, the RTC seriously erred in denying the motion to dismiss. Consequently,
all proceedings in the RTC are null and void, and the CA erred in affirming the RTC.
Based on the foregoing, in Foronda-Crystal, the Court already established the rules that have
to be followed in determining the jurisdiction of the first and second level courts. It said:
A reading of the quoted cases would reveal a pattern which would invariably guide both the
bench and the bar in similar situations. Based on the foregoing, the rule on determining the
assessed value of a real property, insofar as the identification of the jurisdiction of the
first and second level courts is concerned, would be two-tiered :
First, the general rule is that jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the real
property as alleged in the complaint; and
Second, the rule would be liberally applied if the assessed value of the property, while not
alleged in the complaint, could still be identified through a facial examination of the
documents already attached to the complaint. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On the basis of this most recent ruling, the Court is without any recourse but to agree with the
petitioners in dismissing the complaint filed before the RTC for lack of jurisdiction.
A scouring of the records of this case revealed that the complaint did indeed lack any
indication as to the assessed value of the subject property. In fact, the only reference to the
same in the complaint are found in paragraphs six, seven, and eight thereof, which state that:
"6. Meanwhile, during the lifetime of Rodrigo Agarrado, he acquired certain real and personal
properties due to his hard work, one of which is the parcel of land with improvements standing
thereon, located at Barangay Villamonte, Bacolod City, more particularly described as
follows, to wit:
xxxx
7. RODRIGO AGARRADO died intestate and leaving no debts. Upon his death, plaintiffs by
operation of law, became co-owners of the afore-described property jointly with the other
heirs, the herein defendants;
8. Demand thru counsel has been made by the herein plaintiffs upon the defendants for the
partition of the subject property, but the same was simply ignored. Copy of the Demand Letter
is hereto attached and marked as Annex 'D' and forming part hereof." 33
None of these assertions indicate the assessed value of the property to be partitioned that
would invariably determine as to which court has the authority to acquire jurisdiction . More,
none of the documents annexed to the complaint and as attached in the records of this case
indicates any such amount Thus, the petitioners are correct in restating their argument against
the RTC's jurisdiction, for it has none to exercise.
Clearly, therefore, jurisprudence has ruled that an action for partition, while one not
capable of pecuniary estimation, falls under the jurisdiction of either the first or second level
courts depending on the amounts specified in Secs. 19(2) and 33(3) of B.P. 129, as amended.
Consequently, a failure by the plaintiff to indicate the assessed value of the subject
property in his/her complaint, or at the very least, in the attachments in the complaint as
ruled in Foronda-Crystal, is dismissible because the court which would exercise
jurisdiction over the same could not be identified.
Consequently, as the complaint in this case is dismissible for its failure to abide by the rules
in Foronda-Crystal, then the Court sees no further necessity to discuss the other issues raised.
Tabar v. Abella-Abelgas, G.R. No. 206376 July 6, 2022
Bokingco v. CA, GR No. 161739, May 4, 2006
In this connection, it is well to note that the Court had the occasion to explain that "in
determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action, or remedy sought must first be
ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction over the action will depend on the amount of
the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a
sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, the action is one where the subject of litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, which is cognizable exclusively by Regional Trial Courts."13
As gleaned from the complaint, the principal relief sought by the respondents in their
complaint is for the court a quo to issue an injunction against petitioner Bokingo and his
representatives to permanently enjoin them from preventing the survey of the subject land
What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion
publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory action (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is
limited to the question of possession de facto. An unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal)
together with forcible entry are the two forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover
possession of real property. Aside from the summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or
the plenary action to recover the right of possession and accion reinvindicatoria or the action
to recover ownership which includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of
actions to judicially recover possession.15
Significantly, the respondents’ complaint has not sought to recover the possession or
ownership of the subject land. Rather, it is principally an action to enjoin petitioner Bokingo
and his representatives from committing acts that would tend to prevent the survey of the
subject land. It cannot be said therefore that it is one of a possessory action. The respondents,
as plaintiffs in the court a quo, to be entitled to the injunctive relief sought, need to establish
the following requirements: (1) the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) that the acts
against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of the said right. As such, the
subject matter of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation and properly cognizable
exclusively by the court a quo, a Regional Trial Court under Section 19 (1) of BP Blg.
129, as amended by RA 7691:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
xxx
Hence, the court a quo did not err in denying petitioner Bokingo’s motion to dismiss.
Salvador v. Patricia Inc. GR No. 195834 Nov 9, 2016
For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, the trial court must interpret and apply the law
on jurisdiction in relation to the averments or allegations of ultimate facts in the complaint
regardless of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. Based on the foregoing provision of law, therefore, the RTC had jurisdiction
over the cause of action for injunction because it was one in which the subject of the litigation
was incapable of pecuniary estimation. But the same was not true in the case of the cause of
action for the quieting of title, which had the nature of a real action — that is, an action that
involves the issue of ownership or possession of real property, or any interest in real
property — in view of the expansion of the jurisdiction of the first level courts under Republic
Act No. 7691, which amended Section 33(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 effective on April
15, 1994,32 to now pertinently provide as follows:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. –
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of,
real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceeds (sic) Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses and costs: x x x
As such, the determination of which trial court had the exclusive original jurisdiction over the
real action is dependent on the assessed value of the property in dispute.
An action to quiet title is to be brought as a special civil action under Rule 63 of the  Rules of
Court. Although Section 1 of Rule 63 specifies the forum to be "the appropriate Regional Trial
Court," the specification does not override the statutory provision on jurisdiction. This the
Court has pointed out in Malana v. Tappa,34 to wit:
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph
of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically
require that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may"-
that an action for quieting of title "may be brought under [the] Rule" on petitions for
declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x x
bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a
statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an
opportunity or an option.
In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended,
uses the word shall and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property where
the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00, thus:
xxxx
As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration
No. 02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title to and
possession of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the
RTC.
The complaint of the petitioners did not contain any averment of the assessed value of the
property. Such failure left the trial court bereft of any basis to determine which court could
validly take cognizance of the cause of action for quieting of title. Thus, the RTC could not
proceed with the case and render judgment for lack of jurisdiction. Although neither the
parties nor the lower courts raised jurisdiction of the trial court in the proceedings, the issue
did not simply vanish because the Court can hereby motu proprio consider and resolve it now
by virtue of jurisdiction being conferred only by law, and could not be vested by any act or
omission of any party.
         Phil-Japan Active Carbon Corp. v. Borgaily, G.R. No. 197022, Jan 15, 2020
In order to determine whether the subject matter of an action is one which is capable of
pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must be considered.
If it is primarily for recovery of a sum of money, then the claim is considered as capable of
pecuniary estimation, and the jurisdiction lies with the municipal trial courts if the amount of
the claim does not exceed P300,000.00 outside Metro Manila, and does not exceed
P400,000.00 within Metro Manila. However, where the basic issue of the case is something
other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is merely
incidental to the principal relief sought, then the subject matter of the action is not capable
of pecuniary estimation, and is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
The CA held that the allegations of the complaint filed by petitioner make out a case for
breach of contract where an action for specific performance is an available remedy. Since the
same is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the same is cognizable by the RTC. The refund of
the P90,000.00 security deposit was merely incidental to the main action for specific
performance.
The CA was mistaken in appreciating the facts of the case. Contrary to its ruling, a perusal of
the complaint filed by petitioner makes out a case for collection of sum of money and not
for breach of contract. It is to be noted that the lease agreement had already expired
when petitioner filed an action for the return of the security deposit. Since the lease had
already expired, there is no more contract to breach.30 The demand for the return of the
security deposit was merely a collection suit. What the petitioner prayed for before the
MTCC was the return of the amount of P90,000.00, and not to compel respondent to comply
with his obligation under the lease agreement. As such, the CA erred when it held that the
MTCC has no jurisdiction over the case and dismissed the same for lack of jurisdiction
Respondent pleaded as counterclaim in his answer the cost of the repairs amounting to
P79,534.00, which he incurred in fixing the two units leased by the petitioner. Petitioner
rendered the two apartment units hazardous because petitioner recklessly and with impunity
disregarded all norms of decent living. Petitioner destroyed the two apartment units and
rendered it inhabitable and in need of major repairs. Thus, while respondent must return the
security deposit to petitioner, respondent had the right to withhold the same and to apply it to
the damages incurred by the apartment units occupied by petitioner. The RTC found that
respondent spent a total of P79,534.00 for the repairs on the leased premises. Petitioner, when
it occupied the apartment units, acknowledged that the leased premises were in good and
tenantable condition. Petitioner shouldered all expenses for repairs of the apartment units,
regardless of its nature, and that upon termination of the lease, petitioner must surrender the
premises, also in the same good and tenantable condition when taken, with the exception of
ordinary wear and tear. However, photographs of the extent of the damage on the leased
premises presented during trial showed that when petitioner vacated the apartment units, they
were in need of major repairs. The repairs undertaken by respondent were all covered by
receipts, which the latter furnished to petitioner. The failure of petitioner to inspect the repairs
undertaken by respondent, despite notice of the same, bars petitioner to question the propriety
of the repairs on the apartment units. Therefore, the RTC was correct when it ordered the
offsetting of the P90,000.00 security deposit to the expenses of the repairs amounting to
P79,534.00.
Recovery of possession
Honorio Bernardo v. Heirs of Eusebio Villegas GR 183357 Mar 15, 2010
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the plenary action of accion publiciana must be brought
before the regional trial courts. With the modifications introduced by Republic Act No.
7691[14] in 1994, the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts was limited to real actions where
the assessed value exceeds P20,000.00, and P50,000.00 where the action is filed in Metro
Manila, thus
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. -- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer
of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
Under the law as modified, jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the property.
A reading of the complaint shows that respondents failed to state the assessed value of the
disputed land.
Records show that at the time plaintiffs-appellees filed their complaint below, R.A.
No. 7691 which amended Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 was already in effect. However, the
complaint failed to allege the assessed value of the real property involved. Although appellant
indeed raised the issue of jurisdiction in his answer, he had not filed a motion to dismiss on
this ground nor reiterated the matter thereafter but actively participated in the proceedings
after the denial of his demurrer to evidence anchored on the failure of the plaintiffs to identify
in their complaint all the heirs of the registered owner and supposed lack of technical
description of the property in the certificate of title. Indeed, appellant is now estopped to
question the trial court's jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature of the case having
actively pursued throughout the trial, by filing various pleadings and presenting all relevant
documentary and testimonial evidence, his theory that the portion occupied by him is not
covered by the torrens title of Eusebio Villegas. [16]
We agree.
As already shown, nowhere in the complaint was the assessed value of the subject
property ever mentioned. There is no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC has
jurisdiction exclusive of the MTC. Indeed, absent any allegation in the complaint of the
assessed value of the property, it cannot readily be determined which of the two trial
courts had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case.[17]
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of a court may be questioned at any
stage of the proceedings.[18] Lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted grounds where the
court may dismiss a claim or a case at any time when it appears from the pleadings or the
evidence on record that any of those grounds exists, even if they were not raised in the answer
or in a motion to dismiss. [19] The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of
it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on
the action.[20]
However, estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a case before
challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court. One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate its
decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against
one's opponent or after failing to obtain such relief. The Court has, time and again, frowned
upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting a case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.
Significantly, the Technical Report on Verification Survey [25] by Engineer Robert C.
Pangyarihan, which was attached to and formed part of the records, contained a tax
declaration[26] indicating that the subject property has an assessed value of P110,220.00.
It is basic that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys the
presumption of regularity as it has been issued by the proper government agency.[27] Un
der Republic Act No. 7691, the RTC in fact has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action.
Taking into consideration the decision of the MTC proclaiming that the case is one
for accion publiciana and the assessed value of the property as evidenced by the case records,
jurisdiction pertains, rightfully so, with the RTC. Perforce, the petition should be denied.
Encarnacion v. Amigo, GR No. 169793 Sep 15, 2006
   Lagundi v. Bautista, G.R. No. 207269, July 26, 2021 Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas
corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under RA
Issue of constitutionality  8369. He invokes Section 5(b) of RA 8369:
Planters Products v. Fertiphil GR 166006 Mar 14, 2008
Section 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original
Quasi judicial agency/Labor cases jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
Badillo v. CA GR 131903 June 26, 2008 b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter;
Tumaodos v. San Miguel Yamamura Packaging Corp. 
GR No. 241865 Feb 19, 2020 Petitioner is wrong.

CIAC  In Thornton v. Thornton,7 this Court resolved the issue of the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction to
|||  Global Medical Center of Laguna, Inc. v. Ross Systems  issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision
  International, Inc., G.R. Nos. 230112 & 230119, May 11, 2021 in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions:

The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA
RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court 
8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of
Land Bank v. Ralla Balista GR 164631 Jun 26, 2009
minors.
Default jurisdiction  We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Mun of Pateros v. CA GR 157714 Jun 16, 2009 Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors.
Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development  The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of
  Republic Act No. 11201, Feb 14, 2019 (with IRR) Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors.
(formerly HLURB) Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 [An Act Expanding the
Ma. Luisa Dazon v. Kenneth Yap and People Jan 15, 2010  Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals] and BP 129 [The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980] are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and
Family Courts the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of
Sec 5, RA 8369 Family Courts Act of 1997 minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages 129 – that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at
A.M. No. 02-11-11 Rule on Legal Separation issue.8 (emphases supplied)
A.M. No. 02-11-12 Rule on Provisional Orders
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas corpus was further affirmed
Relation to Custody of Minors by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ
A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC Rule on Guardianship of Minors of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors:
A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC Rule on Adoption
Summary Proceedings under the Family Code, Title XI, Chapters 1 to 3 on In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M.
separation in fact between husband and wife or abandonment by one of the other and No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation
incidents involving parental authority;  to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:
Chapter 4 on Art. 41 (declaration of a spouse as presumptively dead),  Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus
Art. 51 (action of a child for presumptive legitime),  involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be
Art. 69 (judicial declaration of family domicile in case of disagreement of the enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
spouses), 
Art. 73 (spouse’s objection to the profession of the other spouse),  The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any
Arts. 96 and 124 (annulment of husband’s decision in the administration and of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
enjoyment of community or conjugal property; appointment of spouse as sole Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within
administrator except cases of “incompetent” other spouse which shall be under the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and
Rules 93 and 95) and Art. 217 (entrusting children to homes and orphanages). decision on the merits.

Madrinan v. Madrinan GR 159374 Jul 12, 2007 From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have
concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of
minors is involved.9 (emphases supplied)
We note that after petitioner moved out of their Parañaque residence on May 18, 2002, he
twice transferred his sons to provinces covered by different judicial regions. This situation is
what the Thornton interpretation of RA 8369’s provision on jurisdiction precisely addressed:
[The reasoning that by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases,
the lawmakers intended them to be the sole courts which can issue writs of habeas corpus]
will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like [respondent] without legal
recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts
of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family
courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a
minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case here,
the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of
recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed [RA
8369].10
Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that family courts are
vested with original exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases.
Writs of habeas corpus which may be issued exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b)
of RA 8369 pertain to the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in conjunction with a
petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. In other words, the
issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to the custody case pending before the family court.
The writ must be issued by the same court to avoid splitting of jurisdiction, conflicting
decisions, interference by a co-equal court and judicial instability.
The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed
by such court or officer.11 Once a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case,
it does so to the exclusion of all other courts, including related incidents and ancillary matters.
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Yu v. Yu GR 164915 Mar 10, 2006
Commercial Courts
Sec. 5.2, RA 8799
A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-corporate
Controversies
A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC dated June 21, 2016 
A.M. 00-8-10-SC Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation 
Oscar Reyes v. RTC Makati GR 165744 Aug 11, 2008
Intra-Corporate Controversy
A review of relevant jurisprudence shows a development in the Court’s approach in
classifying what constitutes an intra-corporate controversy. Initially, the main consideration in
determining whether a dispute constitutes an intra-corporate controversy was limited to a
consideration of the intra-corporate relationship existing between or among the parties. 19 The
types of relationships embraced under Section 5(b), as declared in the case of Union Glass &
Container Corp. v. SEC,20 were as follows:
a) between the corporation, partnership, or association and the public;
b) between the corporation, partnership, or association and its stockholders, partners,
members, or officers;
c) between the corporation, partnership, or association and the State as far as its
franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; and
d) among the stockholders, partners, or associates themselves. [Emphasis
supplied.]
The existence of any of the above intra-corporate relations was sufficient to confer jurisdiction
to the SEC, regardless of the subject matter of the dispute. This came to be known as
the relationship test.
However, in the 1984 case of DMRC Enterprises v. Esta del Sol Mountain Reserve, Inc.,21 the
Court introduced the nature of the controversy test. We declared in this case that it is not the
mere existence of an intra-corporate relationship that gives rise to an intra-corporate
controversy; to rely on the relationship test alone will divest the regular courts of their
jurisdiction for the sole reason that the dispute involves a corporation, its directors, officers, or
stockholders. We saw that there is no legal sense in disregarding or minimizing the value of
the nature of the transactions which gives rise to the dispute.
Under the nature of the controversy test, the incidents of that relationship must also be
considered for the purpose of ascertaining whether the controversy itself is intra-
corporate.22 The controversy must not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate
relationship, but must as well pertain to the enforcement of the parties’ correlative rights and
obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of
the corporation. If the relationship and its incidents are merely incidental to the
controversy or if there will still be conflict even if the relationship does not exist, then no
intra-corporate controversy exists.
The Court then combined the two tests and declared that jurisdiction should be determined by
considering not only the status or relationship of the parties, but also the nature of the question
under controversy.23 This two-tier test was adopted in the recent case of Speed Distribution,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals:24
To determine whether a case involves an intra-corporate controversy, and is to be
heard and decided by the branches of the RTC specifically designated by the Court
to try and decide such cases, two elements must concur: (a) the status or
relationship of the parties; and (2) the nature of the question that is the subject
of their controversy.
The first element requires that the controversy must arise out of intra-corporate or
partnership relations between any or all of the parties and the corporation,
partnership, or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates;
between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership, or association of which
they are stockholders, members, or associates, respectively; and between such
corporation, partnership, or association and the State insofar as it concerns their
individual franchises. The second element requires that the dispute among the
parties be intrinsically connected with the regulation of the corporation. If the nature
of the controversy involves matters that are purely civil in character, necessarily, the
case does not involve an intra-corporate controversy.
Given these standards, we now tackle the question posed for our determination under the
specific circumstances of this case:
Application of the Relationship Test
Is there an intra-corporate relationship between the parties that would characterize the case as
an intra-corporate dispute?
We point out at the outset that while Rodrigo holds shares of stock in Zenith, he holds them in
two capacities: in his own right with respect to the 4,250 shares registered in his name, and as
one of the heirs of Anastacia Reyes with respect to the 136,598 shares registered in her
name. What is material in resolving the issues of this case under the allegations of the
complaint is Rodrigo’s interest as an heir since the subject matter of the present controversy
centers on the shares of stocks belonging to Anastacia, not on Rodrigo’s personally-owned
shares nor on his personality as shareholder owning these shares. In this light, all reference to
shares of stocks in this case shall pertain to the shareholdings of the deceased Anastacia and
the parties’ interest therein as her heirs.
Article 777 of the Civil Code declares that the successional rights are transmitted from
the moment of death of the decedent. Accordingly, upon Anastacia’s death, her children
acquired legal title to her estate (which title includes her shareholdings in Zenith), and they
are, prior to the estate’s partition, deemed co-owners thereof. 25 This status as co-owners,
however, does not immediately and necessarily make them stockholders of the corporation.
Unless and until there is compliance with Section 63 of the Corporation Code on the
manner of transferring shares, the heirs do not become registered stockholders of the
corporation. Section 63 provides:
Section 63. Certificate of stock and transfer of shares. – The capital stock of stock
corporations shall be divided into shares for which certificates signed by the
president or vice-president, countersigned by the secretary or assistant secretary, and
sealed with the seal of the corporation shall be issued in accordance with the by-
laws. Shares of stock so issued are personal property and may be transferred by
delivery of the certificate or certificates indorsed by the owner or his attorney-in-fact
or other person legally authorized to make the transfer. No transfer, however, shall
be valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the
books of the corporation so as to show the names of the parties to the
transaction, the date of the transfer, the number of the certificate or
certificates, and the number of shares transferred. [Emphasis supplied.]
No shares of stock against which the corporation holds any unpaid claim shall be
transferable in the books of the corporation.
Simply stated, the transfer of title by means of succession, though effective and valid between
the parties involved (i.e., between the decedent’s estate and her heirs), does not bind the
corporation and third parties. The transfer must be registered in the books of the
corporation to make the transferee-heir a stockholder entitled to recognition as such
both by the corporation and by third parties.26
We note, in relation with the above statement, that in Abejo v. Dela Cruz27 and TCL Sales
Corporation v. Court of Appeals28 we did not require the registration of the transfer before
considering the transferee a stockholder of the corporation (in effect upholding the existence
of an intra-corporate relation between the parties and bringing the case within the jurisdiction
of the SEC as an intra-corporate controversy). A marked difference, however, exists between
these cases and the present one.
In Abejo and TCL Sales, the transferees held definite and uncontested titles to a specific
number of shares of the corporation; after the transferee had established prima
facie ownership over the shares of stocks in question, registration became a mere formality
in confirming their status as stockholders. In the present case, each of Anastacia’s heirs
holds only an undivided interest in the shares. This interest, at this point, is still inchoate and
subject to the outcome of a settlement proceeding; the right of the heirs to specific, distributive
shares of inheritance will not be determined until all the debts of the estate of the decedent are
paid. In short, the heirs are only entitled to what remains after payment of the decedent’s
debts;29 whether there will be residue remains to be seen. Justice Jurado aptly puts it as
follows:
No succession shall be declared unless and until a liquidation of the assets and debts
left by the decedent shall have been made and all his creditors are fully paid. Until a
final liquidation is made and all the debts are paid, the right of the heirs to inherit
remains inchoate. This is so because under our rules of procedure, liquidation is
necessary in order to determine whether or not the decedent has left any liquid
assets which may be transmitted to his heirs.30 [Emphasis supplied.]
Rodrigo must, therefore, hurdle two obstacles before he can be considered a stockholder of
Zenith with respect to the shareholdings originally belonging to Anastacia. First, he must
prove that there are shareholdings that will be left to him and his co-heirs , and this can be
determined only in a settlement of the decedent’s estate. No such proceeding has been
commenced to date. Second, he must register the transfer of the shares allotted to him to make
it binding against the corporation. He cannot demand that this be done unless and until he has
established his specific allotment (and prima facie ownership) of the shares. Without the
settlement of Anastacia’s estate, there can be no definite partition and distribution of the estate
to the heirs. Without the partition and distribution, there can be no registration of the transfer.
And without the registration, we cannot consider the transferee-heir a stockholder who may
invoke the existence of an intra-corporate relationship as premise for an intra-corporate
controversy within the jurisdiction of a special commercial court.
In sum, we find that – insofar as the subject shares of stock (i.e., Anastacia’s shares) are
concerned – Rodrigo cannot be considered a stockholder of Zenith. Consequently, we cannot
declare that an intra-corporate relationship exists that would serve as basis to bring this
case within the special commercial court’s jurisdiction under Section 5(b) of PD 902-A,
as amended. Rodrigo’s complaint, therefore, fails the relationship test.
Application of the Nature of Controversy Test
The body rather than the title of the complaint determines the nature of an action.31 Our
examination of the complaint yields the conclusion that, more than anything else, the
complaint is about the protection and enforcement of successional rights. The controversy it
presents is purely civil rather than corporate, although it is denominated as a "complaint
for accounting of all corporate funds and assets."
Contrary to the findings of both the trial and appellate courts, we read only one cause of action
alleged in the complaint. The "derivative suit for accounting of the funds and assets of the
corporation which are in the control, custody, and/or possession of the respondent [herein
petitioner Oscar]" does not constitute a separate cause of action but is, as correctly claimed by
Oscar, only an incident to the "action for determination of the shares of stock of deceased
spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes allegedly taken by respondent, its accounting and the
corresponding delivery of these shares to the parties’ brothers and sisters." There can be no
mistake of the relationship between the "accounting" mentioned in the complaint and the
objective of partition and distribution when Rodrigo claimed in paragraph 10.1 of the
complaint that:
10.1 By refusal of the respondent to account of [sic] his shareholdings in the
company, he illegally and fraudulently transferred solely in his name wherein [sic]
the shares of stock of the deceased Anastacia C. Reyes [which] must be properly
collated and/or distributed equally amongst the children including the complainant
Rodrigo C. Reyes herein to their damage and prejudice.
We particularly note that the complaint contained no sufficient allegation that justified the
need for an accounting other than to determine the extent of Anastacia’s shareholdings for
purposes of distribution.
Another significant indicator that points us to the real nature of the complaint are Rodrigo’s
repeated claims of illegal and fraudulent transfers of Anastacia’s shares by Oscar to the
prejudice of the other heirs of the decedent; he cited these allegedly fraudulent acts as basis for
his demand for the collation and distribution of Anastacia’s shares to the heirs. These claims
tell us unequivocally that the present controversy arose from the parties’ relationship as heirs
of Anastacia and not as shareholders of Zenith. Rodrigo, in filing the complaint, is enforcing
his rights as a co-heir and not as a stockholder of Zenith. The injury he seeks to remedy is one
suffered by an heir (for the impairment of his successional rights) and not by the corporation
nor by Rodrigo as a shareholder on record.
More than the matters of injury and redress, what Rodrigo clearly aims to accomplish through
his allegations of illegal acquisition by Oscar is the distribution of Anastacia’s shareholdings
without a prior settlement of her estate – an objective that, by law and established
jurisprudence, cannot be done. The RTC of Makati, acting as a special commercial court, has
no jurisdiction to settle, partition, and distribute the estate of a deceased. A relevant provision
– Section 2 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court – that contemplates properties of the
decedent held by one of the heirs declares:
Questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased
to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the
person raising the questions and on the heir. [Emphasis supplied.]
Worth noting are this Court’s statements in the case of Natcher v. Court of Appeals: 32
Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent
fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its
limited jurisdiction.
It is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot resolve to perform
acts pertaining to a special proceeding because it is subject to specific prescribed
rules. [Emphasis supplied.]
That an accounting of the funds and assets of Zenith to determine the extent and value of
Anastacia’s shareholdings will be undertaken by a probate court and not by a special
commercial court is completely consistent with the probate court’s limited jurisdiction. It
has the power to enforce an accounting as a necessary means to its authority to determine the
properties included in the inventory of the estate to be administered, divided up, and
distributed. Beyond this, the determination of title or ownership over the subject shares
(whether belonging to Anastacia or Oscar) may be conclusively settled by the probate court as
a question of collation or advancement. We had occasion to recognize the court’s authority to
act on questions of title or ownership in a collation or advancement situation in Coca v.
Pangilinan33 where we ruled:
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the
Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited
probate jurisdiction is in reality not a jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a
procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived."
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in
the testate or intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate
action. That general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and
convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece
of property without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or
ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction
by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, the probate
court is competent to decide the question of ownership. [Citations omitted.
Emphasis supplied.]
In sum, we hold that the nature of the present controversy is not one which may be
classified as an intra-corporate dispute and is beyond the jurisdiction of the special
commercial court to resolve. In short, Rodrigo’s complaint also fails the nature of the
controversy test.
Stephen Ku v. RCBC Securities October 17, 2018 G.R. No. 219491
g. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts/Circuit Trial Courts
Republic Act No. 11576, Sec. 1
BP 129, as amended by RA 7691, Secs. 2 to 4
Rules on Summary Procedure
The Revised Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases 
Unlawful detainer v. agrarian dispute 
Sps Fajardo v. Anita Flores GR 167891 Jan 15, 2010
The issue in this case is whether it is MTC or the DARAB which has jurisdiction over the
case.
There is no dispute that, on June 28, 1991, the parties executed an agreement, denominated as
"KASUNDUAN NG PAGHAHATI NG LUPA AT PAGTATALAGA NG DAAN UKOL SA
MAGKABILANG PANIG." Therein, it was admitted that Jesus Fajardo was the tiller of the
land. This Kasunduan was subsequently followed by another agreement, "KASUNDUAN SA
HATIAN SA LUPA," whereby an area of 10,923 sq m of Lot No. 2351 was given to
petitioners. The portion of the land where petitioners’ house is erected is the subject of the
instant case for unlawful detainer. Respondent argues that this portion is not included in the
deed of partition, while petitioners insist that it is.
We agree with the RTC when it clearly pointed out in its Order dated December 10, 2002 that
the resolution of this case hinges on the correct interpretation of the contracts executed by the
parties. The issue of who has a better right of possession over the subject land cannot be
determined without resolving first the matter as to whom the subject property was
allotted. Thus, this is not simply a case for unlawful detainer, but one that is incapable of
pecuniary estimation, definitely beyond the competence of the MTC. 11
More importantly, the controversy involves an agricultural land, which petitioners have
continuously and personally cultivated since the 1960s. In the Kasunduan, it was admitted that
Jesus Fajardo was the tiller of the land. Being agricultural lessees, petitioners have a right to a
home lot and a right to exclusive possession thereof by virtue of Section 24, R.A. No. 3844 of
the Agricultural Land Reform Code.12 Logically, therefore, the case involves an agrarian
dispute, which falls within the contemplation of R.A. No. 6657, or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law.
An agrarian dispute13 refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farmworkers’ associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under
this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to
farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee. It relates to any controversy relating to, inter alia, tenancy over lands devoted to
agriculture.14
Undeniably, the instant case involves a controversy regarding tenurial arrangements. The
contention that the Kasunduans, which allegedly terminated the tenancy relationship between
the parties and, therefore, removed the case from the ambit of R.A. No. 6657, is untenable.
There still exists an agrarian dispute because the controversy involves the home lot of
petitioners, an incident arising from the landlord-tenant relationship.
● Amurao v. Villalobos is quite instructive:
The instant case undeniably involves a controversy involving tenurial arrangements because
the Kasulatan will definitely modify, nay, terminate the same. Even assuming that the tenancy
relationship between the parties had ceased due to the Kasulatan, there still exists an agrarian
dispute because the action involves an incident arising from the landlord and tenant
relationship.
In Teresita S. David v. Agustin Rivera, this Court held that:
[I]t is safe to conclude that the existence of prior agricultural tenancy relationship, if true, will
divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction the previous juridical tie compels the characterization of
the controversy as an "agrarian dispute." x x x Even if the tenurial arrangement has been
severed, the action still involves an incident arising from the landlord and tenant relationship.
Where the case involves the dispossession by a former landlord of a former tenant of the land
claimed to have been given as compensation in consideration of the renunciation of the
tenurial rights, there clearly exists an agrarian dispute. On this point the Court has already
ruled:
"Indeed, section 21 of the Republic Act No. 1199, provides that ‘all cases involving the
dispossession of a tenant by the landlord or by a third party and/or the settlement and
disposition of disputes arising from the relationship of landlord and tenant . . . shall be under
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.’ This jurisdiction
does not require the continuance of the relationship of landlord and tenant—at the time of the
dispute. The same may have arisen, and often times arises, precisely from the previous
termination of such relationship. If the same existed immediately, or shortly, before the
controversy and the subject-matter thereof is whether or not said relationship has been
lawfully terminated, or if the dispute springs or originates from the relationship of landlord
and tenant, the litigation is (then) cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations . . ."
In the case at bar, petitioners’ claim that the tenancy relationship has been terminated by the
Kasulatan is of no moment. As long as the subject matter of the dispute is the legality of the
termination of the relationship, or if the dispute originates from such relationship, the case is
cognizable by the DAR, through the DARAB. The severance of the tenurial arrangement
will not render the action beyond the ambit of an agrarian dispute. 15
Furthermore, the records disclose that the dispute between the parties, regarding the
interpretation of the Kasunduan, was, in fact, raised and referred to the DAR, which in turn
referred the case to the DARAB. 16 In view of the foregoing, we reiterate Hilario v.
Prudente,17 that:
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over
which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB).
Recovery of possession 
Vda De Barrera et al v. Heirs of Vicente Legaspi GR 174346 
Sept 12, 2008
Ouano v. PGTT Gr No. 134230 July 7, 2002
Heirs of Generoso Sebe v. Heirs of Veronico Sevilla GR No. 174497 
Oct 12, 2009
h. Barangay Lupon
RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) Secs 399-422
SC ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 29 July 3, 1989
Substantial compliance 
Leo Wee v. George de Castro et al GR 1764095 Aug 20, 2008
Caasi v. Sacramento, G.R. No. 243054, March 3, 2021