PHILOSOPHY

Govier, Verwoerd
OF/THE
TRUST
SOCIAL
ANDSCIENCES
NATIONAL/ June
RECONCILIATION
2002
Trust and the Problem
of National Reconciliation

TRUDY GOVIER
WILHELM VERWOERD

The authors propose a conception of national reconciliation based on the build-

ing or rebuilding of trust between parties alienated by conflict. It is by no means
obvious what reconciliation between large groups of people amounts to in prac-
tice or how it should be understood in theory. Lack of conceptual clarity can be
illustrated with particular reference to postapartheid South Africa, where recon-
ciliation between whites and blacks was a major goal of the Mandela govern-
ment and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The authors argue that a
conception of reconciliation in terms of trust offers a promising solution to
prominent conceptual confusions surrounding the notion of “national reconcili-
ation” or reconciliation between large groups. By emphasizing the centrality of
contextually variable trust in viable relationships, the authors accommodate an
emphasis on human relationships and attitudes, as stressed by Desmond Tutu.
They argue, however, against any simplistic application of purely individualis-
tic or spiritual concepts to large groups and institutional contexts.

In this article, we propose a conception of reconciliation based on

the building or rebuilding of trust. We argue that this conception
offers a promising solution to prominent conceptual confusions sur-
rounding the notion of “national reconciliation” or reconciliation
between large groups. We illustrate this lack of conceptual clarity
with particular reference to postapartheid South Africa, where recon-
ciliation between whites and blacks has been a central, highly visible
focus of the Mandela presidency between 1994 and 1999.1 The promo-
tion of national unity and reconciliation was also the overarching goal
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).2
The concept of national reconciliation has also been used in many
other countries such as Chile, Zimbabwe, and Guatemala.3 The notion
of reconciliation between large groups is furthermore presupposed in

Received 2 June 2000

Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 32 No. 2, June 2002 178-205

© 2002 Sage Publications
178
 Govier, Verwoerd / TRUST AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION 179

talk of reconciliation between nations such as Germany and France or

the United States and Japan; or between religious groups such as
Muslims and Christians or Catholics and Protestants; or between
indigenous and nonindigenous groups in Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand. Clearly, any such reconciliation would be between
large groups.
When we reflect on such talk, its meaning seems rather unclear. It is
by no means obvious what reconciliation between large groups of
people amounts to in practice or how it should be understood in the-
ory. When we begin to think about reconciliation, the most obvious
paradigm is one involving two people, as in a case when a husband
and wife come together after a rupture in their relationship.4 In this
sort of interpersonal context, reconciliation involves the restoration of
a close, intimate relationship after a rupture typically caused by
actual or perceived wrongdoing. The most visible features of the rup-
ture usually are strong feelings of anger and resentment and attitudes
of suspicion and distrust. Where two individuals are involved, we
tend to associate the overcoming of the rift with hugs, kisses, and tears
and expressions of apology and forgiveness.
How could reconciliation between large groups of people be any-
thing like this? What can such expressions as “national reconcilia-
tion,” “reconciliation between blacks and whites,” or “reconciliation
between Christians and Jews” mean—if indeed they have any sense
at all? At a recent conference on “Dilemmas of Reconciliation,” one
participant claimed that in present circumstances, reconciliation in
Northern Ireland is impossible. Another stated that reconciliation in
post-Soviet Russia was certainly premature at present and might
never occur. Subsequent discussion revealed that in neither case
could the speaker or the audience attach a definite meaning to the
term reconciliation at the national or large-group level.5

ONE ILLUSTRATION: DISCUSSIONS OF

NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

The prevalence of lack of clarity about the concept of national rec-

onciliation was vividly illustrated in the work of the South African
TRC.6 In the words of a prominent member, “More difficult even than
the quest for truth is the quest for reconciliation. . . . One of the major
difficulties we had to face was that of definition. What does reconcilia-
180 PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES / June 2002

tion really mean? What does it entail?”7 Piet Meiring helpfully

described the main positions taken in these discussions as follows:

On the one hand there were the lawyers and jurists and politicians who,
their feet firmly planted on terra firma, warned that we should not be
too starry-eyed when we speak about reconciliation. When the dust set-
tles in the streets, when the shooting stops, when people let go of one
another’s throats, be grateful. That is enough! That is, in our context, as
far as reconciliation goes. Archbishop and the baruti (priests), on the
other hand, favored a far more lofty definition. When they spoke about
reconciliation they clothed it in religious terminology . . . it was often
said that only because God had reconciled us to him by sacrificing his
Son Jesus Christ on the cross, did true and lasting reconciliation
between humans become possible.8

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report warns

against the potentially dangerous confusion between these opposing
conceptions.9 In fact, that confusion was an ongoing source of diffi-
culty to the authors of the report.10 Many people both inside and out-
side the TRC warned against expecting too much too soon from the
reconciliation process at a national level. They were concerned about
the imposition of an overly strong notion of reconciliation (closely
associated with emotional encounters between individuals and
Christian notions of confession, contrition, forgiveness and restitu-
tion)—on a diverse and divided society trying to consolidate a fragile
democracy.11 Accordingly, some argued that the most one can and
should hope for, at least in the short term, is peaceful coexistence. Oth-
ers, including most prominently Archbishop Desmond Tutu, cau-
tioned against accepting an unduly limited notion of reconciliation.
They believed that apologies by individuals and group representa-
tives, and forgiveness on the part of victimized individuals and
groups, were vitally important for national reconciliation. A nation
attempting to “transcend the divisions and strife of the past” had a
“legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge.”12 The need to deal with
these attitudes and feelings should not be underestimated.13
We propose here that the South African debate was characterized
by a general failure to distinguish between issues of quantity and
issues of content. Quantity issues concern the level at which reconcili-
ation is sought—whether it is national, community, small group, or
interpersonal. Content issues concern the kind of reconciliation
involved—whether one is seeking merely nonviolent coexistence,
decent neighborly relations, or the restoration of a close friendship or
 Govier, Verwoerd / TRUST AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION 181

an intimate love affair. In the South African debate, it was generally

assumed that if quantity was great, as in national reconciliation, con-
tent must be thin.14 Believing that this presumption is not correct, we
argue that both quantity and content can vary in degrees and that
appreciating this fact exposes new and highly relevant possibilities.
Maximalist conceptions of national reconciliation tend to underes-
timate the difference between the national/large-group and individual/
interpersonal levels. This neglect is likely to result in a simplistic
application of a richly emotional conception of reconciliation to the
large-group level. In addition to theoretical problems, this kind of
confusion (associated in South Africa with Archbishop Tutu’s posi-
tion) may result in significant attitudinal problems. If one envisions
reconciliation as a kind of richly emotional Holy Grail, one is likely to
conclude that the fabulous goal is unreachable for large groups. One
may thus be led to pessimism and cynicism, which, in turn, tend to
undermine political processes of national reconciliation.15 The mini-
malist warning against the unreflective reduction of the large-group
level to the individual level should, therefore, be taken seriously. Yet
minimalist conceptions also have problems, because they tend to go
too far with this criticism. They may incorrectly insist that reconcilia-
tion between large groups can mean nothing richer or deeper than
nonviolent coexistence. In this way, minimalist conceptions neglect to
consider links between the large-group and individual levels, thus
underestimating the significance of attitudes and feelings.
In this article, we are seeking a viable interpretation of the notion of
national reconciliation to expose the possibility of intermediate posi-
tions, one of which we elaborate and argue for in some depth. We seek
to overcome both the tendency of maximalist conceptions to conflate
the national and the interpersonal level and the tendency of minimal-
ist conceptions to unrealistically separate these levels. Our approach
is to argue for a kind of “web” for various quantitative levels and a
spectrum metaphor for various conceptions of content. Employing
the distinction between quantity and content, we propose an interpre-
tation of reconciliation that is unitary in the sense that the same sort of
conception can apply at various quantitative levels. On the basis of
our analysis, we then argue that minimalist conceptions unrealisti-
cally neglect human relationships and attitudes; it is possible to
acknowledge their importance without conflating large-group and
interpersonal reconciliation, as maximalists tend to do. We argue for a
conceptual account of reconciliation that allows us to apply the con-
182 PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES / June 2002

cept both to interpersonal cases and to intergroup cases while never-

theless maintaining the distinction between these levels.

CLARIFICATIONS AND CONNECTIONS

We are offering a philosophical answer to the question of what

national reconciliation is and how it should be understood. We seek to
clarify the concept of national reconciliation or reconciliation between
large groups as a goal. Needless to say, even an acceptance of our
account could not resolve the broader political debates about national
reconciliation, and the impact of TRC processes and deliberations, in
South Africa. It would, however, dissolve some highly relevant con-
ceptual disputes about what national reconciliation would amount
to, and it would point to the significance of the quality of trust and
cooperative processes.16 We do not seek to operationalize the concept
of national reconciliation in any way that would permit a kind of mea-
surement of progress toward it; however, our account certainly
implies suggestions as to what sorts of attitudes, relationships, and
activities one would examine in efforts to determine whether national
reconciliation had been a success.17 Nor do we offer an account of the
merits of various proposed means toward national reconciliation—
whether these be the development and consolidation of democratic
institutions, government programs providing incentives for coopera-
tion between previously opposed groups, institutional apologies,
compensation programs, punishment of offenders, socioeconomic
development, commissions of inquiry, or the construction of memori-
als to victims of past offenses.18 The expression “national reconcilia-
tion” is typically used in the contexts of transitions to stable constitu-
tional democracies after periods of extensive human rights violations.
We propose an interpretation which makes conceptual sense of
national reconciliation in these contexts. Our conception of reconcilia-
tion is thus also informed by basic commitments to constitutional
democracy and human rights.
Our purpose is to propose an account that will address the concep-
tual conundrum described earlier and faced by the TRC. Although we
are not in a position to make such application ourselves, we believe
that this account could be usefully applied to other societies. We are
dealing philosophically with the concept of national reconciliation as
a goal, not directly discussing the empirical effectiveness of various
means to national reconciliation. However, our account would serve
 Govier, Verwoerd / TRUST AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION 183

to rule out two extreme types of means. First, it rules out seeking
revenge against former enemies. Second, it rules out the “cheap” rec-
onciliation based on lack of acknowledgement by perpetrators and
the compliance with, or condoning of, injustice on the part of those
harmed. We interpret reconciliation as requiring the reestablishment
of trust, and sustainable trust within healthy relationships cannot be
developed when widespread abuse is ignored or discounted. In this
respect, we agree with those who have described official strategies of
denial and nonacknowledgement of past conflicts as “false reconcilia-
tion.”19
A recent philosophical account by Susan Dwyer clearly poses the
problem of national and personal levels and usefully points to possi-
ble confusions between the micro and the macro level. Dwyer pro-
poses a solution to what is, in essence, the maximalist/minimalist
issue described above by interpreting reconciliation as the reconciling
of narratives. She suggests that national reconciliation be defined as
“bringing apparently incompatible descriptions of events into narra-
tive equilibrium.”20 Dwyer’s account develops in creative ways a com-
mon conception of reconciliation, that of “reconciling” apparently
contradictory statements or beliefs—as, for example, in the way one
might seek to reconcile human free choice with causal determinism.21
Her account is attractive in that it offers a modest secular account of
reconciliation based on a firm appreciation of the differences between
micro and macro levels while nevertheless being (in principle) appli-
cable at various quantitative levels. At points, Dwyer seems to pre-
sume an exclusive and exhaustive contrast between the micro level of
interpersonal relationships and the macro level of large groups. We
will urge that there are intermediate levels such as those of families,
small groups, communities, and professional groups; in addition,
there may be contexts in which the issue is one of reconciling an indi-
vidual with a group. However, this issue would not seem to be funda-
mental, because Dwyer’s account could readily be amended to adapt
to such quantitative complications.
The central difference between Dwyer’s analysis and our own is
one of basic direction. We believe, and argue by implication here, that
the reconciling (in the sense of rendering coherent) of different narra-
tives is too far removed from the realities of relationships between indi-
viduals and groups to plausibly be construed as the core of reconcilia-
tion. It is our conviction that fundamentally it is people—not their
narratives or theories—who are alienated from each other and may
need to be reconciled. To be sure, differences between individuals and
184 PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES / June 2002

groups can often be represented in terms of their different narrative

understandings of central contested events. We would argue that the
reconciling of what were incompatible accounts of events is not
strictly necessary for reconciliation of individuals and/or groups. Peo-
ple may agree to come together, even while continuing to differ about
contested events. Second, we would contend that there are contexts in
which narrative reconciliation is not the main issue. One can rather
readily envisage people managing to render some aspects of their
narratives coherent while nevertheless remaining angry and alien-
ated from each other. (“OK, we agree that our troops killed fifty-two
of your civilians, but we are still furious about your insults against our
religion.”) Dwyer might respond at this point that achieving a signifi-
cant degree of narrative coherence in the wake of serious conflict
would be a significant achievement and one that would surely require
some communication and cooperation. In these respects, she would
be correct. If, however, the agreement underlying narrative coherence
were based on joint communication and cooperative deliberations,
we would suggest that what would be most significant for reconcilia-
tion is the joint cooperative process and the attitudinal shifts emerg-
ing from that process. It would not be narrative coherence itself.
Another suggestion regarding the interpretation of the problem-
atic notion of national reconciliation is that it be defined in terms of
the development of viable democratic institutions. This suggestion
was put forward by Jake Gerwel, who was formerly director general
in the office of former South African president Nelson Mandela.22 The
idea is that viable democratic institutions would serve to mediate
relationships between people; in a process of national reconciliation,
such institutions are developed. While acknowledging that a focus on
institutions is a useful corrective to a purely interpersonal approach to
reconciliation, we would in the end resist Gerwel’s interpretation,
because we believe that it encourages one to ignore the fact that atti-
tudes, beliefs, and feelings really do count for human relationships.
Not only do these things count, they count within the very institu-
tions whose importance Gerwel is emphasizing. Groups and individ-
uals who resent each other and are suspicious, or even hateful, toward
each other cannot effectively work together within institutions. Build-
ing democratic institutions is clearly of great importance and may be
a centrally important means of reconciliation. But we would suggest
that it is hardly plausible as a clarification of national reconciliation
understood as a goal.
 Govier, Verwoerd / TRUST AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION 185

A NEW DIRECTION

We propose that reconciliation may be understood as involving

centrally the building or rebuilding of trust.23 Reconciliation is a com-
ing together after a rift, a rift that undermines trust between the par-
ties—in particular, making it difficult for those harmed to trust those
who have harmed them. Reconciliation involves the rebuilding, or
building, of a relationship in the wake of tension or alienation, often
due to actual or perceived wrongdoing.24 Trust is an attitude of confi-
dent expectation, expectation that the person, persons, or groups
trusted will act, in the context in question, in a competent and accept-
ably motivated way, so that despite vulnerability, the trusting person
or persons will not be harmed. To trust others is to believe, in the
absence of certainty about the matter, that they are likely to act well, or
decently, toward us and be reliable with respect to the issues at hand.25
When we trust, we are always to some extent vulnerable, but we are
able to accept our vulnerability due to our relative confidence about
what the other party is likely to do.26 What sort of trust is required
depends on the nature and context of the relationship. To the extent
that we trust the other party in a relationship, we can participate in
that relationship in a relaxed and nonfearful way.
We emphasize trust because of its essential role in healthy relation-
ships. To be sure, it is possible for people to maintain relationships
and work together without trust or with a low degree of trust. How-
ever, such relationships are uncomfortable, inefficient, and liable to
break down. Because trust and distrust involve beliefs, expectations,
feelings, and attitudes, and because those dispositions fundamentally
affect how we interpret the actions of others, these attitudes have a
fundamental effect on our dealings with each other. When there is
extreme distrust, every gesture, statement, and action can be inter-
preted as insincere or exploitative. Such distrust will radically under-
mine relationships and joint undertakings. Trust is essential to viable
relationships and conspicuously lacking in alienated or tense rela-
tionships.27
Reconciliation as a coming together after a rift, as the building of
trust, clearly does not mean an achievement of complete agreement or
harmony in relationships, even at the individual level. A married cou-
ple who reconcile after a quarrel will naturally experience further
conflicts after what might be called an episode of reconciliation. A
realistic goal in contexts of reconciliation is not total harmony; nor is it
a state of blissfully enduring unity. Rather, it is the building and sus-
186 PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES / June 2002

taining of a relationship with sufficient closeness and trust to handle

the conflicts and problems that will inevitably arise in the course of
time. Although reconciliation may seem like a specific, fixed goal one
is trying to reach—and the semantics of the term suggest its being an
achievement—maintaining a working, trusting relationship is per
definition an ongoing process, not a singular event marking success.28
Flexibility is another preliminary consideration in support of our
account. The range and depth of trust varies, depending on the con-
text and type of relationship involved, and for this reason, under-
standing reconciliation in terms of trust is promising, given that one
seeks a unitary account that can be applied, nonfallaciously, in both
interpersonal and large-group contexts. In the case of an intimate rela-
tionship, such as that between sexual partners or close friends, the
trust required must be deep enough and strong enough to make self-
revelation and intimacy possible and natural. In a less intimate rela-
tionship, such as that between neighbors, trust is characteristically
less deep. However, neighborly relationships could in some circum-
stances require deeper trust—as, for instance, if the need to supervise
children or respond to local crime were to arise. For previously con-
tending groups that must coexist or work together after war or violent
conflict, a major issue is refraining from violence. Refraining from the
incitement of hatred, and reliability and credibility with regard to
treaties and agreements, are also likely to be important. In all such
cases, reconciliation between alienated parties can plausibly be
understood as the rebuilding or building of trust in a relationship in
the aftermath of alienation or tension. The nature of the relationships
and the trust required will vary depending on what kind of relation-
ship is involved.

ISSUES OF QUANTITY: INDIVIDUALS, GROUPS,

AND THE ATTRIBUTION OF TRUST TO GROUPS

A Quantitative Web
We often speak of old friends wanting to be reconciled after a fight,
of a person being reconciled to the onset of a chronic illness. Through-
out North America, victim-offender reconciliation programs have
been developed to bring together criminals and their victims. In still
other cases, reconciliation is attempted between groups of people, as
in the examples of Canada and South Africa. Thus, we can usefully
 Govier, Verwoerd / TRUST AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION 187

distinguish between micro-level and macro-level reconciliation,

where the former typically involves local, face-to-face interactions—
say between two friends—and the latter concerns more global inter-
actions between groups of persons, nations, or institutions, which are
often mediated by proxy.29 One may initially think of the individual-
group distinction as a micro-macro distinction: indeed, some have
defined the problem of individual versus group reconciliation in
these terms.
However, the idea that there is a micro level on one hand and a
macro level on the other is a significant oversimplification. In addi-
tion to the level of interpersonal relationships (individual, micro) and
that of relationships between large groups at issue in national recon-
ciliation (macro), there are relationships between families, small
groups, small communities, larger communities, substantial profes-
sional or occupational groups, and so on. Individuals and groups can
be connected, and in varying ways are interdependent, in many sorts
of relationships; we may think, for instance, of friendship; neighbor-
hood relationships; professional relationships; religious, political, or
community groups; and ultimately individuals and large groups act-
ing together at the national level. For societies like Northern Ireland,
South Africa, or Chile, conflicts involving violence and other serious
wrongs leave many grievances and tensions and mean that reconcili-
ation may be an issue for people in relationships on various interme-
diate levels. The micro and the macro are not all that count. Family
members and families may have become alienated from each other
due to differing participation in political conflict. Individuals may be
alienated from communities and communities from each other; pro-
fessional groups may be alienated from their prospective clients; sig-
nificant minorities may be alienated from the state.
As a preliminary step in the direction of acknowledging this com-
plexity, one might begin by imagining a spectrum of relationships,
ranging from those between individuals, to those between small
groups, to those between communities, to those between large
groups.30 Along the spectrum, we find relations between individuals,
relations between families, relations between communities, and rela-
tions between large groups. Yet the spectrum conception, though
prima facie somewhat plausible, can be seen to be misleading in its
suggestion that relationships will be found in a single band. Individ-
uals may have relationships to families, families to communities,
large groups to individuals, and so on. For this reason, a web meta-
phor seems preferable to a spectrum metaphor. An individual may be
188 PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES / June 2002

linked to many others; some of those links amount to relationships

within groups that are in turn related to others—whether those others
be of commensurate size or not. In addition, some groups are related
to individuals. Within any relationship anywhere on the web, there is
a possibility of rupture and undermining of trust in the wake of a real
or perceived wrongdoing. If the relationship is a desirable or inevita-
ble one, the issue of reconciliation will arise.

Trust and Groups

We suggest here that reconciliation may be understood as the
repairing or building of relationships in terms of the repairing or
building of trust between the parties in a relationship. For our account
to be workable, it must make sense to attribute the attitudes of trust
and distrust to groups.31 To speak of trust or distrust as characterizing
relationships between groups is to presuppose that attitudes, beliefs,
and emotions can be attributed to groups. This presupposition might
seem to be a large stumbling block for our analysis. Clearly, groups as
such do not have minds. Groups as such do not feel such sensations as
grief and pain. They are not conscious. And yet groups can and do
deliberate, make decisions, and act.32 In the light of their delibera-
tions, decisions, and actions, it will often seem plausible to attribute
attitudes, beliefs, and emotions to them. So far as trust and distrust are
concerned, it is extremely common to attribute these attitudes to
groups. Commentators and theorists frequently make such remarks
as the following: India does not trust Pakistan in the wake of partition,
conflicts over Kashmir, and the development by each country of
nuclear weaponry targeted at the other; Israelis Jews do not trust the
Palestinian Arabs in the wake of many terrorist incidents; African
Americans do not trust the white medical establishment in the United
States in the wake of the Tuskegee scandal; Canadian Mohawks do
not trust the Catholic Church in Quebec in the wake of humiliating
treatment over many decades. Most people would simply assume
that such comments are meaningful until someone expresses philo-
sophical worries as to how groups could possibly have attitudes,
beliefs, and feelings. To propose that all such comments should be
deleted from our discourse because they are metaphysically or con-
ceptually confused would be to propose radical surgery on ordinary
language.
It is interesting to note at this point that many people who readily
and confidently attribute negative attitudes and feelings such as sus-
 Govier, Verwoerd / TRUST AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION 189

picion, anger, revenge, and hatred to groups nevertheless express a

radical kind of skepticism about the possibility of groups manifesting
more positive attitudes such as compassion, trust, or forgiveness.
Skepticism and pessimism about human moral capacities often mas-
querade under the banner of wise conceptual restraint. Taken seri-
ously, conceptual restraint based on the presumption that beliefs, atti-
tudes (including most pertinently here attitudes of trust and distrust),
and emotions cannot be attributed to groups would call for the rejec-
tion of the attribution of both negative and positive attitudes to
groups. On this view, groups could not be said to be suspicious or
fearful of each other, to resent each other, to hate each other, or to
undertake campaigns of vengeance against each other. From the point
of view of ordinary language and common experience, such a policy
of restraint has little real credibility.
Nevertheless, the logical issue as to whether trust and distrust can
appropriately be attributed to groups remains to be addressed. Obvi-
ously, groups are composed of individuals. We speak of groups act-
ing, and in so doing, we must in some sense allow that they do so only
insofar as some or all of their individual members do so.33 If we wish
to speak of groups trusting or distrusting, the same point will typi-
cally hold: groups have these attitudes only to the extent that some,
most, or all of their members have them.34 Consider, for instance, a
claim to the effect that French Canadians trust English Canadians not
to respond with violence in the event of an attempt by Quebec to sepa-
rate from Canada. One interpretation of such a claim is that most (and
the prevailing) French Canadians are confident that most (and the
prevailing) English Canadians would not act violently or condone
violence in such an eventuality. English Canadians could act vio-
lently, but insofar as French Canadians generally assume there will be
no violence, they may be said to trust English Canadians not to act
violently. Clearly, in this context, French Canadians would be a vul-
nerable group; for them to trust is for them to generally accept their
vulnerability due to their relatively benign expectations about how
English Canadians would act in response to them.
One interpretation of trust on the part of groups is distributive. On
this interpretation, group A trusts group B, if most As have the requi-
site beliefs, expectations, and attitudes toward most Bs. Another
interpretation is nondistributive or collective. If the leadership of
group A acts in such a way that the action is most plausibly explained
as presuming trust, then trust may be posited for explanatory reasons.
In neither case need a Group Mind be involved.
190 PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES / June 2002

There are, however, layers of further complexity. Individuals who

are members of groups share characteristics such as history, culture,
and collective sentiments arising from their social life. When, for
instance, the Canadian Mohawks at Oka remember their former
dependency on the Catholic Sulpician order, that memory supports
and is supported by beliefs and sentiments learned from others. The
same may be said of those South African blacks who recall the bitter
history of apartheid and are still inclined to distrust white South Afri-
cans. Individuals have many of their beliefs, feelings, and attitudes
because of their interactions within groups that have traditions and
practices based on collective culture and memory. Thus, even when
we speak distributively about trust in a group, the trust that the indi-
viduals may be said to have is not purely individual.
As for collective attributions of trust and other attitudes, these may
be made when a leadership deliberates and then issues statements of
policy, decisions, memoranda, and the like. (The leadership might be
a single individual, or—more probably—a small group such as the
cabinet in a country such as South Africa or Canada.) Consider, for
instance, a case in which a small group—say the elected and autho-
rized executive of a peace education group—meets and decides not to
send key material by mail on the grounds that the postal service is not
reliable. Through the deliberations of individuals, the group has
reached a decision. That decision indicates distrust of the postal ser-
vice. Insofar as the executive represents and acts for the group, the
group has indicated its distrust of the postal service. Should the exec-
utive decide to have a formal relationship of cooperation with an
environmental group on the grounds that that group has valuable
expertise and is potentially a good partner, that decision would imply
an attitude of trust toward the environmental group. When a collec-
tivity is organized in such a way that the leadership represents the
membership and is authorized to make decisions on its behalf, the
attitudes underlying and implied by those decisions, can be attrib-
uted to the group as a whole, in a nondistributive way.35
The matter is complex, and in some contexts it will become impor-
tant to understand whether a distributive or nondistributive interpre-
tation is intended. But we submit that sense can be made, in these
ways, of the idea that trust and distrust may be attributed to groups
and may characterize relationships between them. In cases in which
there has been a rupture in group relations in which they have for
many years been characterized by tension and alienation, the issue of
rebuilding or building a relationship characterized by some degree of
 Govier, Verwoerd / TRUST AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION 191

trust arises. This, we propose, is a useful way to understand the issue

of reconciliation between groups.

Four Mistakes to Be Avoided

We may recall the Fallacies of Composition and Division at this
point.36 To commit the Fallacy of Composition is to infer from charac-
teristics of the parts of something that the whole has the same charac-
teristics. Such an inference amounts to a logical mistake because it
ignores the difference between parts and whole. In the context of indi-
viduals, groups, and reconciliation, it would be a logical mistake to
infer from incidents of individual reconciliation a conclusion about
reconciliation between groups. To allude to the South African situa-
tion, suppose that it were the case (as it is not) that a large proportion
of black victims of police brutality had, as individuals, reconciled
with the individual white policemen who perpetrated brutality
against them. Such instances of individual reconciliation would not
show that there had been significant reconciliation between
antiapartheid blacks and white police, or between South African
blacks and whites as groups. Nor would it follow from the relative
scarcity of cases of individual reconciliation that there was an absence
of reconciliation at the group level. In his reflections on national rec-
onciliation in South Africa, Jakes Gerwel emphasized this point when
he warned against arguing from the failure of reconciliation in some
individual contexts, that national reconciliation was lacking. Gerwel
argued that to make such a fallacious inference would be to
“pathologize” a nation with relative institutional stability.37 Such an
inference, in its move from part to whole, would commit a version of
the Fallacy of Composition.38
It is equally important to avoid the Fallacy of Division, the logical
mistake of inferring a conclusion about parts (individuals) from pre-
mises about the whole (groups). From the fact that a group has a cer-
tain characteristic, it does not follow that every individual in the
group has that characteristic. Suppose that, due to an enduring cease-
fire and reliable treaty arrangements undertaken by authorized rep-
resentatives, two nations are said to be reconciled in the wake of a vio-
lent conflict. It would not follow that all or most individuals in one
country are reconciled with all or most individuals in the other. To
infer that it did would be to commit the Fallacy of Division.
We are arguing here that it is possible to offer a unitary account of
reconciliation in terms of the rebuilding, or building, of trust in a rela-
192 PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES / June 2002

tionship. We wish to apply that account to cases of individuals, cases

of groups, and mixed cases, and we believe that it is possible to do so
without committing either the Fallacy of Composition or the Fallacy
of Division. What sort of relationship exists, what sort of trust is
needed for that relationship to be workable, whether that relationship
should be preserved, whether reconciliation is desirable—these
aspects will vary depending whether we are talking of individuals or
of groups.
However, in firmly distinguishing between individuals and
groups, as is done to avoid the Fallacies of Composition and Division,
one should not lapse into two more subtle but also easy-to-commit
errors. These more subtle errors are possible if one ignores the multi-
ple and complex interdependencies between groups and individuals.
The first error is one of hypostatization—the mistake of viewing a
group as ontologically distinct from its members. While the member-
ship of a group may vary, showing that a group is not reducible to its
individuals, it remains the case that were there not some individuals
in relationships to each other, the group could not exist at all. Obvi-
ously a group has a profound ontological dependence on its individ-
ual members. The second error is one of atomization—the mistake of
trying to understand individuals without making reference to their
group affiliations and relationships. Much has been written by femi-
nists, communitarians, and others about the misleading myth of the
“atomized” individual who allegedly can be understood in isolation
from culture, relationships, and attachments to others. We find such
criticisms of the atomized individual persuasive and are led to the
conclusion that the notion of an individual understandable in isola-
tion from relationships and culture is a mistaken one.39 Although an
individual is just that—a person with feelings, goals, and beliefs—
every individual has a location, a background culture, and a network
of roles and relationships within which he or she has shaped his or her
identity. Although the individual and group levels are importantly
distinct, they are also significantly interconnected.

ISSUES OF QUALITY: A CONTENT SPECTRUM

We have proposed that reconciliation be understood as involving

centrally the building or rebuilding of trust in relationships. Reconcil-
iation is not to be understood as a final state of union, harmony, or
 Govier, Verwoerd / TRUST AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION 193

total and lasting agreement. Rather, it should be regarded as a coming

together in which parties begin to trust each other and become able to
manage their relationship and any further conflicts that it may
involve. Trust is fundamental in any relationship because it affects
what parties are able to do together. To the extent that there is trust, the
parties in a relationship are able to be confident in their expectations
about a range of dealings with each other.
What kind and degree of trust is needed for a relationship depends
on what sort of relationship it is. An intimate relationship requires a
deeper and more complete trust than a relationship of casual acquain-
tance or collegiality. Large groups relating to each other as distinct
nation-states separated geographically are likely to require less trust
for a working relationship than nation-states that share a long border.
Because relationships vary, the depth and context of the trust they
require varies. These variations mean that within a unitary account,
there is still a corresponding variation in the content of reconciliation.
A content spectrum may be envisaged. There is a whole range of
cases, depending on the depth and range of the relationship in ques-
tion, and many distinctions might be made along the way. Here, for
the purposes of simplicity, only three are defined.

Reconciliation as Friendship
In this case, reconciliation involves the rebuilding of the kind of
trust needed for an intimate relationship. Intimate relationships are
characterized by close and frequent contact, by self-revelation, and
sometimes by sexual intimacy. Such relationships require deep trust:
a confident expectation that the other is accepting and loving, honest
and truthful, caring and nonmanipulative, dependable emotionally,
loyal, desiring of closeness and close contact. An act of disloyalty such
as a marital affair or betrayal of an important confidence will under-
mine the trust necessary for such a relationship and is likely to rup-
ture it—as can be readily understood in the case of close friendships
or sexual intimacy. Reconciliation in such cases will most naturally
involve emotional coming together, apologies expressive of sorrow,
and forgiveness. By apologizing, the wronging party indicates to the
other that he or she is sorry for what he or she did, should not have
done it, and will not do such a thing again. Acknowledging wrongdo-
ing and responsibility, expressing sorrow, and taking initiative to
restore the relationship, he or she attempts to bridge the gap with the
194 PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES / June 2002

partner or friend who was hurt. The other will accept the apology
only if she or he trusts the wrongdoer enough to regard him or her as
sincere and credible. When people reconcile in a close interpersonal
context, they seek to restore a relationship of intimacy that can only
resume as a close relationship if there is considerable trust between
them.

Reconciliation as Cooperation
In this case, reconciliation involves the rebuilding of the kind of
trust needed to work together, to do things together. Perhaps the indi-
viduals or groups in question work in the same office; perhaps they
are building a well for an impoverished community; perhaps they are
sitting together in a Parliamentary committee that must deliberate
and make recommendations about some controversial aspects of for-
eign policy. To work together on common tasks, moving toward com-
mon goals, they must trust each other in many respects. Such trust
may be either distributive or collective, depending on the context. A
central area where trust is always necessary is that of communication.
To receive and exchange information in a meaningful and useful way,
people must, in the broad sense, trust each other, because they must
be able to take at least some claims as true on the say-so of the other
person.40 Another obvious matter is that of mundane reliability: each
party must be able to trust the other to fulfill commitments, act
according to agreed-on guidelines, competently perform expected
tasks, and so on.
If people are to be able to cooperate as members of groups, these
groups (and, with contextual variations, individual members or
authorized representatives of them) must be reasonably confident of
sufficient trustworthiness on the part of the others to make working
together possible. Should they regard the others as lacking in credibil-
ity, either with respect to believability, motivation, or competence,
cooperation will be difficult and uncomfortable. If a relationship of
cooperation has been ruptured by real or perceived wrongdoing and
there remains an ongoing need for parties to work together again, rec-
onciliation will become an issue. There is a gap to be bridged, one that
might be understood in this case as a kind of credibility gap. The par-
ties will have to come together to bridge this gap. Reconciliation as
cooperation means restoring enough trust to be able to work together
effectively.
 Govier, Verwoerd / TRUST AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION 195

Reconciliation as Nonviolent Coexistence

In this case, reconciliation is the rebuilding of a minimal trust
between parties. After a period of violence and intense animosity, the
parties have reached some kind of stalemate where the violence has
ceased. There has been a cease-fire or some kind of political accord;
people are no longer killing each other. They are able to live alongside
each other, barely tolerating each other, not working together, not
having common goals or setting themselves common tasks, but nev-
ertheless having a fairly confident expectation that the others will not
kill them. An example of this kind of situation would be one in which
people of different ethnic groups, groups that have sometimes in the
past been engaged in intense conflict, coexist in rather close geo-
graphical proximity. They have reasonable confidence that the others
will not engage in violence against them, but they engage in as little
close interaction as possible.41 A case in point is that of a Macedonian
village, described in a New York Times article as typifying peaceful
coexistence and dormant hostility:

The Macedonians and Albanians living in this village of 1,500 people

till their soil side by side, experience birth, marriage and death within
easy earshot of one another. But they inhabit separate worlds, speaking
different languages, sending their children to different schools and
never inter-marrying. The village is even physically split, bisected by a
thin asphalt road with Albanian homes largely on one side and Mace-
donian ones on the other. . . . On the surface, the village is a travel poster
for what the United States says can work in the Balkans: people of dif-
ferent backgrounds and religions living peacefully side by side . . . the
villagers here, while on edge now, have peacefully lived out their dual
existence for decades.42

The article goes on to describe attitudes of envy, suspicion, and fear

characterizing the relationships between these groups and to point
out that they would rather live apart than live together. As described,
the Macedonian village seems to provide an example of groups recon-
ciled to the extent that they are able to coexist without fear of inter-
group violence yet not reconciled to the extent that they are able to
work together toward common goals. Individuals and subgroups
within the Albanian and Macedonian communities have little to do
with each other. There is a kind of trust in the sense of reasonable con-
fidence about nonviolence. But that trust is minimal. Theirs is an
unstable peace.
196 PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES / June 2002

AN INTERPRETATION OF
RECONCILIATION BETWEEN LARGE GROUPS

Given the web of possibilities from a quantitative perspective and

the spectrum of meanings from a content perspective, we can see that
even within a broadly unitary account of reconciliation, there are
many possible interpretations. Earlier indications that such expres-
sions as “national reconciliation” and “reconciliation between whites
and blacks” are vague and misleading are in some ways confirmed.
Yet seeing this range of possibilities, it is clearly premature to reject
the idea that there is any reasonable interpretation of such terms.
It would clearly be a mistake to apply, without qualification, the
notion of reconciliation as friendship at the large-group level. This
possibility can be ruled out almost by definition. Intimacy, physical
and emotional closeness, and fulfilling self-revelation in the course of
intimate talk cannot characterize the relationships between large
groups of people. Consider, in this context, a case in which two
nation-states are said to reconcile after a serious conflict. In such a
case, their respective leaders might hug each other in public, the close
encounter being publicly displayed in newspapers across both lands.
Such an encounter could have enormous symbolic significance. Yet it
would be a mistake to understand such an episode of temporary
closeness between leaders as constituting reconciliation between two
nations. What is at issue is the broad relationship between two large
groups of people, a relationship likely characterized by treaties, infor-
mal agreements, many interchanges, and centrally by attitudes. If
there is indeed a reconciliation between the groups, their relationship
will be one of nonviolent coexistence or of cooperation.
In the wake of violent conflict, nonviolent coexistence constitutes
an enormous achievement, and its significance should not be down-
played.43 For people who have been engaged in bombing and shoot-
ing each other; in raiding, burning, and looting each other’s homes; in
rape, abduction, and torture, a kind of coming together in the wake of
such activities that amounts to a workable accord for nonviolence will
be enormously important. Traditional United Nations peacekeeping,
as practiced, for instance, in Cyprus, was understood as facilitating
just this kind of nonviolent coexistence. At the most fundamental
level, coexistence is a matter of stopping a war, stopping the violence.
And it is a kind of reconciliation insofar as parties have, in effect,
agreed to do that and are relying on, counting on, and trusting each
 Govier, Verwoerd / TRUST AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION 197

other to conform to their accord. But while acknowledging the pro-

found importance of coexistence in an immediate postconflict situa-
tion, reconciliation as coexistence is, in the end, too weak a notion to
offer the most plausible interpretation of what national reconciliation
should mean. Basically, the reason for this is suggested by the case of
the Macedonian village. It is in part a matter of decent attitudes
toward other human beings and in part one of plausible
sustainability.44 Groups that live in proximity to each other have,
potentially, many areas of conflict and many common concerns. We
may suppose that such people over sustained periods of time nonvio-
lently coexist while just barely tolerating each other—preserving sus-
picion, animosity, envy, and resentment. We may even suppose that
despite their proximity geographically and politically, they under-
take few, if any, common projects and nevertheless survive with some
kind of cultural life in small subgroups.45 But individuals from the
diverse groups are highly likely to become engaged in interactions,
and problems are almost certain to arise. In response to those prob-
lems, people are likely to propose different solutions. In view of such
facts, it is implausible to suppose that in the absence of any capacity
for cooperation, nonviolent coexistence between suspicious, fearful,
and alienated groups can be sustained over a substantial period of
time. Thus, a conception of reconciliation building in some factors
leading to sustainability is preferable.
In discussions of United Nations peacekeeping, this point is
increasingly recognized, insofar as peacekeeping is to be accompa-
nied by peacebuilding.46 In peacebuilding, the goal is to build institu-
tions and relationships that will make nonviolence, or “negative
peace,” sustainable. This shift in emphasis from peacekeeping to
peacebuilding is a recognition of the fact that nonviolent coexistence
is unlikely to be sustainable if it is undertaken purely as a matter of
stopping the violence and is not supplement by efforts to build capac-
ities for conflict resolution and cooperation. This lack of sustainability
constitutes a practical reason to adopt the cooperation sense of recon-
ciliation for the case of national reconciliation or any reconciliation
between large groups of people.
As we have seen, some accounts of societies in transition from civil
war or oppression to democratic cultures have concentrated primar-
ily on formal institutions such as a constitution, parliamentary insti-
tutions, elections, and so on.47 This shift marks a move from coexis-
tence to something rather like cooperation, but it can be misleading if
198 PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES / June 2002

it omits considerations of attitudes, feelings, and beliefs. For institu-

tions to be workable, the people working within them must, within
reasonable bounds, be competent, well motivated, reliable, and trust-
worthy. And within limits, they will have to regard each other as such.
As John Hardwig said memorably, “there are no people-proof institu-
tions.”48
To function within a nation-state or society, groups, and people
who are members of these groups, will need to cooperate and work
together. If they are absolutely not able to do so, any formal institu-
tions stipulated for the society will simply be unworkable. If people,
and groups of people, are to live together in a nation-state, something
more than coexistence is needed. Thus, the most reasonable interpre-
tation of national reconciliation, as used in countries seeking to
rebuild after civil conflict, would seem to be that of reconciliation as
cooperation. What is needed for national reconciliation is sufficient
trust to serve as a basis for cooperation between the large groups con-
stituting the nation and existing previously in a state of tension and
alienation due to conflict and wrongs committed by one or both
groups.
To fully appreciate what is involved in sustainable cooperation at
the large-group level, it is important to take another look at key
aspects of reconciliation as friendship. Warmth, fondness, and emo-
tional closeness are unlikely to characterize relationships between
large groups as such, but this does not mean that attitudes and emo-
tions are irrelevant at the large-group level.49 We submit that what is
important for lasting reconciliation between large groups of people
who must live within the same territory—or, for that matter, interact
on the same small planet—is the ability to cooperate without undue
fear and suspicion. That requires overcoming their alienation and
suspicion so as to be able to maintain decent and more or less comfort-
able relationships.

TWO COROLLARIES

In the light of the intuitive appeal of the warm and emotional indi-
vidual paradigm, which initially renders the large-group case almost
incomprehensible, we conclude by noting an interesting asymmetry
in the other direction. One can raise the question of when reconcilia-
tion is necessary or desirable, and in the case of many individual rela-
 Govier, Verwoerd / TRUST AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION 199

tionships, this issue is a real one. The answer in some such cases—that
of a wife and her battering husband, for instance—will simply be no.50
Reconciliation is not necessary or desirable. A man and his wife need
not reconcile in the wake of a quarrel: they can part and go their sepa-
rate ways. If there are no children resulting from the marriage, there
may be little or no need for a divorced husband and wife to bridge the
gap to rebuild a relationship permitting trust, communication, and
cooperation. They will have to refrain from violence against each
other to remain within the bounds of the law, but there may be no
interaction between them at all. Thus, at the individual level, some-
thing like divorce is an option. Reconciliation to any degree beyond
nonviolent coexistence is optional in moral and practical terms. It is
not necessarily good, and it need never occur.
But in the case of relations between large groups, divorce and such
permanent separation are unlikely to be possible. Theorists of separa-
tion and partition, such as Allen Buchanan, speak of the separation of
ethnic groups into two distinct nation-states instead of one as “politi-
cal divorce”.51 But this metaphor is seriously misleading if it encour-
ages one to think that the partitioning of a nation can be neat and final,
necessitating no further dealings between the resulting nation-states.
Even after partition, it will be necessary for contending groups, now
in two nation-states, to deal with each other to manage many matters
such as borders, transportation, postal services, economic interde-
pendence, minorities living within the derivative states, family reuni-
fication, environmental matters, and participation in the interna-
tional community.52 Whether the context is that of South Africa, in
which some have proposed a separate Afrikaner homeland, or that of
Canada, in which nearly half of Quebecers support some kind of sep-
aration from Canada, any idea that any separation would avoid the
need for relations between the formerly associated groups is illusory.
In the case of large groups, future dealings between members in a
wide diversity of contexts are inevitable. Issues of relationships, trust,
and reconciliation cannot be avoided.
The second corollary concerns the practice of public apology.
Because of the centrality of attitudes like trust for cooperation and rec-
onciliation, we believe that there is no conceptual error implied in the
idea that a public apology could serve as a major step toward reconcil-
iation between groups. In such an apology, a mandated representa-
tive of a group acknowledges its responsibility for wrongdoing,
expresses sorrow and regret, and commits the group not to commit
200 PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES / June 2002

similar offenses again.53 If we understand an apology as an appeal for

forgiveness, and forgiveness as the overcoming of anger and resent-
ment felt against those who have done wrong, we can make sense of
public apology as an important step toward reconciliation between
groups. Groups can be angry; they can hate and resent. And in princi-
ple, they can accept apologies and they can forgive.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

As noted earlier, we do not pretend to resolve the South African

debate about national reconciliation. That debate provides a powerful
illustration as to why a secular, conceptually sound yet contextually
sensitive account of national reconciliation is of interest, and we
believe our philosophical work could dissolve some issues within it.
Our account is proposed here as philosophically careful, coherent and
reasonable, and contextually sensitive—and hopefully useful to theo-
rists and practitioners of national reconciliation.
We emphasize that this account accommodates an emphasis on
human relationships and attitudes, as stressed by Desmond Tutu. At
the same time, it argues against simplistic application of purely indi-
vidualistic or spiritual concepts to relationships between large
groups, as in some maximalist accounts.
We have developed our account of reconciliation in terms of build-
ing trust between parties in a relationship because we believe that
people are unable to cooperate with each other and work together
unless their relationships are characterized by trust. Even nonviolent
coexistence presupposes a limited degree of trust. Although it is cru-
cial to distinguish between reconciliation as cooperation and reconcil-
iation as friendship, some of the attitudes implied in the latter are
highly relevant to the former. Cooperation will be difficult at best if
the groups in question feel bitter, resentful, and vindictive toward
each other. The need to overcome such attitudes to work comfortably
and effectively together indicates that there is a real point in talking—
as Desmond Tutu repeatedly has—about forgiveness in politics.
What needs to be avoided are the pitfalls associated with both the
minimalist and the maximalist approaches to reconciliation between
large groups. We have proposed an understanding of national recon-
ciliation in terms of trust in an effort to do just that.
 Govier, Verwoerd / TRUST AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION 201

NOTES

1. See, e.g., Republic of South Africa, Joint Sittings of Both Houses of Parliament, vol. 1,
cols. 2-16 (Cape Town: Government Printers, 1994); Republic of South Africa, Debates of
the National Assembly, vol. 5, cols. 1339-442 (Cape Town: Government Printers).
2. See Preamble and sec. 3 of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation
Act (no. 34 of 1995); Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (hereafter,
TRC Report), vol. 1 (Cape Town: Juta, 1998), chaps. 1, 4, 5; ibid., vol. 5, chaps. 4, 5, 8, and
esp. 9. See also Alex Boraine, Janet Levy, and Ronel Scheffer, eds., Dealing with the Past:
Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa (Cape Town: IDASA, 1994); and Kader Asmal
et al., Reconciliation through Truth (Cape Town: David Phillip, 1996). Desmond Tutu’s
own description of the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) may be
found in his No Future without Forgiveness (New York: Doubleday Random House,
1999).
3. See J. Zalaquett, Introduction to the English Edition of the Report of the Chilean
National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (Notre Dame, IN: Center for Civil and
Human Rights, 1993); J. Correa, “Dealing with Past Human Rights Violations: The Chil-
ean Case after Dictatorship,” in Transitional Justice, vol. 2, edited by Neil Kritz (Wash-
ington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1995), 478-94; Victor De Waal, The Politics of Reconcili-
ation: Zimbabwe’s First Decade (London: Hurst and Co., 1990); Daan Bronkhorst, Truth
and Reconciliation—Obstacles and Opportunities for Human Rights (Amsterdam: Amnesty
International Dutch Section, 1995); and John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable
Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1997). For a
wide range of further sources on different countries, see the INCORE Guide to Internet
Sources on Truth and Reconciliation, available from the Institute for Conflict Resolution
Web site: http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/themes/truth.html.
4. The first in a range of definitions of reconciliation provided by the Oxford English
Dictionary are “to bring (a person) again into friendly relations to or with (oneself or
another) after an estrangement,” “to win over (a person) again to friendship with one-
self or another,” “to set (estranged persons or parties) at one again; to bring back into
concord, to reunite in harmony.”
5. This conference was held at the University of Calgary, 2-6 June 1999. Gretchen
MacMillan spoke about Northern Ireland, and Janet Keeping spoke about post-Soviet
Russia.
6. For a description of the goals, structure, and methodology of the TRC, see TRC
Report, vol. 1.
7. Piet Meiring, “The Baruti vs the lawyers,” in Looking Back, Reaching Forward:
Reflections on the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, edited by Charles
Villa-Vicencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd (London: Zed Books, 2000). Meiring was a high-
profile member of the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee of the TRC.
8. Ibid.
9. TRC Report, vol. 1, 108.
10. One of the authors of this article was the main drafter of the chapter on reconcili-
ation in the Final Report of the TRC and experienced in the process tensions arising
from unclarity about individualist and large-group conceptions of reconciliation.
11. See contributions by Charles Villa-Vicencio, Priscilla Hayner, and Jakes Gerwel
in Looking Back, Reaching Forward; and Jonathan Allen, “Balancing Justice and Social
202 PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES / June 2002

Unity: Political Theory and the Idea of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” Uni-
versity of Toronto Law Journal 49 (1999): 315-53.
12. See Postamble of Interim Constitution of South Africa (Act no. 200 of 1993).
13. Compare TRC Report, vol. 1, 108; Desmond Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness
(London: Rider Books, 1999); and Donald Shriver, An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in
Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
14. For a brief discussion of “thin” versus “thick” notions of reconciliation, see
David Crocker, “Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework,” Ethics and
International Affairs 13 (1999): 60-61.
15. See Jakes Gerwel, “National Reconciliation,” in Looking Back, Reaching Forward.
16. That trust is highly important may seem obvious to many readers; we point out,
however, that it is nowhere mentioned in the five-volume TRC Report.
17. Nevertheless, our account would point in useful directions in this regard.
18. For a fuller discussion of the complex relationships between a range of ends and
means in the context of “transitional justice,” see Crocker, “Reckoning with Past
Wrongs.” See also Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History
after Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon, 1998). While our interest here is in
varying conceptions of reconciliation as a goal, we note that reconciliation can also be a
means toward other goals such as economic development.
19. See, e.g., Juan Mendez, “Accountability for Past Abuses,” Human Rights Quar-
terly 19:273-74; and Klaus Nurnberger and John Toole, The Cost of Reconciliation in South
Africa (Cape Town: National Initiative for Reconciliation, 1988). On the complex con-
nection between reconciliation and the “politics of memory and forgetting,” see Mark
Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers, 1997).
20. See Susan Dwyer, “Reconciliation for Realists,” Ethics and International Affairs 13
(1999): 81-98, esp. 89.
21. This is the sense of reconcile alluded to in the expression, “to make discordant
facts, statements etc. consistent, accordant, or compatible with each other” found in the
Oxford English Dictionary. See also the reference in the TRC Report (vol. 1, 108) to recon-
ciliation as “coming to terms with painful truth.”
22. Jakes Gerwel, the former director general in the office of former president
Mandela, notes that prior to the work of the TRC, national reconciliation in South Africa
was understood primarily as “the mutual search amongst erstwhile political foes for,
and the formal attainment of, the political and constitutional unity of the country (Gerwel, op.
cit., emphasis added). See also Allen, “Balancing Justice and Social Unity: Political The-
ory and the Idea of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” University of Toronto Law
Journal 49 (1999): 315-53.
23. Reconciliation could also be understood more broadly to involve changes of val-
ues and identity. See Hugo van der Merwe, “The Truth and Reconciliation Commission
and Community Reconciliation: An Analysis of Competing Strategies and Conceptual-
izations” (doctoral thesis, George Mason University, 1999). We find this a promising
approach. Space constraints do not allow us to address the connections and distinctions
between attitudes, values, and identities.
24. We say “rebuilding or building” to allow for the fact that in some group contexts,
such as South Africa or Northern Ireland, the previous relationship between the parties
in question was severely flawed. One would scarcely wish to rebuild that relationship.
What is at issue in such contexts is the building of a good relationship, one that did not
 Govier, Verwoerd / TRUST AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION 203

exist before but is needed given the practical circumstance that previously contending
groups have to live in the same geographic area.
25. For a detailed account of trust, we are relying on Trudy Govier, Social Trust and
Human Communities (Kingston, Ontario, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press,
1997); and Trudy Govier, Dilemmas of Trust (Kingston, Ontario, Canada: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 1998). Among other accounts of trust, especially pertinent
are Annette Baier, “Secular Faith,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1980): 131-40;
Annette Baier, “Trust and Antitrust,” Ethics 96 (1986): 231-60; Benjamin Barber, The
Logic and Limits of Trust (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983); Diego
Gambetta, ed., Trust: Making and Breaking Social Relations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1988); and Mark E. Warren, ed., Democracy and Trust (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1999).
26. See Govier, Social Trust; and Govier, Dilemmas of Trust for a fuller articulation of
this conception of trust.
27. We are saying that any case of reconciliation will require the rebuilding of trust.
We are not asserting the converse—that any case in which trust needs to be rebuilt is a
case of reconciliation. If we imagine the case of a man and woman separated by circum-
stance, but not by any actual or perceived wrongdoing, and reuniting after such a sepa-
ration, their relationship may have to be rebuilt in certain respects, including possibly
even some involving trust. But a separation as such does not constitute a rupture, or rift,
in a relationship, and it need not have involved actual or perceived wrongdoing on the
part of either party. Coming together after a separation is reunion, not reconciliation.
Consider also a case in which trust needs to be rebuilt because a trusted person acted
incompetently, not wrongly. In that case, there is not an issue of reconciliation; however,
if the relationship is one in which someone will have to trust in another’s reliable per-
formance again, and do so without a sense of fear and insecurity, that trust will have to
be rebuilt.
28. See TRC Report, vol. 1, 108; Wilhelm Verwoerd, “Signposts and Pitfalls on Our
Reconciliation Road,” in Truths Drawn in Jest: Commentary on the TRC through cartoons,
edited by Wilhelm Verwoerd and Mahlubi Mabizela (Cape Town: David Phillip, 2000).
29. Dwyer, “Reconciliation for Realists,” 83.
30. See the distinctions between individual, community, and national reconciliation
in the TRC Report, vol. 1, 106-9; ibid., vol. 5, chap. 9.
31. Arguments given here could readily be adapted to justify the attribution of
beliefs and emotions to groups. Trust and distrust are the primary objects of attention
here because of the pivotal role given in this account to trust as a characteristic of work-
able relationships.
32. We have benefited from discussing these points with Robert X. Ware and Larry
May.
33. For a useful account of group action, see Larry May, The Morality of Groups (Notre
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987).
34. There are some exceptions, as for instance in a case where a duly elected leader
extends into an area for which he has no definite mandate from others and acts so as to
imply trust. We could then, on the basis of his general mandate and action, attribute
trust to the group as a whole. However, the attribution would have to be withdrawn
were other individuals and subgroups to indicate substantial objection to the act
undertaken.
35. This account stems from Trudy Govier, Social Trust and Human Communities.
Other authors such as Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of
204 PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES / June 2002

Prosperity (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1995); Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work:
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); and
Steven Shapin, The Social History of Truth (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994)
effectively presume that it makes logical sense to attribute trust and distrust to groups.
But they do not argue the point in detail. In a case in which trust is attributed to group G
due to an action or statement by its leadership, the attribution is defeasible if contested
by many individuals who are members of G.
36. For a discussion of these fallacies, see James E. Broyle, “The Fallacies of Compo-
sition and Division,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 8 (1975): 108-13; and Frans H. van Eemeren
and Rob Groodendorst, Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies: A Pragma-
Dialectical Perspective (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1992), 174-78.
37. Gerwel in Villa-Vicencio, Hayner and Gerwel, op. cit. note 11, above, pp. 277-86.
38. As with all fallacious inferences, this one could be improved by adding extra pre-
mises; however, the premises themselves would be disputable.
39. The point has often been argued. See, for instance, Alison M. Jaggar, Feminist Pol-
itics and Human Nature (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanhead, 1983); Will Kymlicka, Lib-
eralism Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), chaps 4, 8; and Will
Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), chap. 5.
40. See Trudy Govier, Social Trust and Human Communities, chaps. 3, 4.
41. According to Gretchen Macmillan (presentation at the Dilemmas of Reconcilia-
tion Conference, 3 June 1999, in Calgary, Canada), many communities in Northern Ire-
land exhibit such characteristics: Catholics and Protestants are able to coexist, more or
less confident of nonviolence, but living quite separate lives.
42. David Rhode, “Macedonian Village Typifies (a) Peaceful Coexistence (b) Dor-
mant Hostility,” New York Times, 30 May 1999.
43. We do not intend to imply here that nonviolent coexistence is always preferable
to a condition of violence. It is arguable that nonviolent coexistence under conditions of
severe oppression or injustice, such as in apartheid South Africa during the sixties and
seventies, is a morally worse situation than one in which oppressed people are strug-
gling by various means, including some violent means, for their liberation.
44. Hatred, anger, and a desire for vengeance would not be compatible with sustain-
able nonviolence.
45. People might coexist in this way over a long time, but were they to do so without
any ability to cooperate, that would imply a greatly lessened quality of life, due to the
many complex cultural or economic activities that could not be undertaken. A vivid
illustration of this point may be found in Edward Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward
Society (New York: Free Press, 1958). See also Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work.
46. See, for instance, Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1993), chap. 4; and Kofi A. Annan, “The Peace-Keeping Pre-
scription,” in Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars before They Start, edited by Kevin M.
Cahill (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 174-90.
47. As described, for instance, in Gerwel, op. cit. note 11, above, pp. 277-86.
48. John Hardwig, “The Role of Trust in Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy 88 (1991):
693-708.
49. Nor is it to deny that individuals in various distinct groups can have warm and
friendly feelings toward each other.
50. Described and argued in some detail in Trudy Govier, Dilemmas of Trust, chap. 10.
51. Allen Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to
Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991).
 Govier, Verwoerd / TRUST AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION 205

52. Robert Schaeffer, Warpaths: The Politics of Partition (New York: Pantheon, 1989).
Schaeffer argues this point in detail, pointing out that failing to understand it has been a
significant factor in sustaining persistent, serious, and often violent conflicts between
nations that have resulted from the choice of separation as a response to conflict
between groups.
53. We discuss public apologies in “The Promise and Pitfalls of Apology,” Journal of
Social Philosophy 33 (2002): 67-82; and in “Taking Wrongs Seriously: A Qualified Defense
of Public Apology,” Saskatchewan Law Review 65 (2002): 139-62.

Trudy Govier is a Canadian philosopher who lives and works in Calgary. Formerly an
associate professor of philosophy at Trent University, she has also taught at the Univer-
sity of Calgary, Simon Fraser University, and the University of Amsterdam. Govier is
the author of number of books and papers, including A Practical Study of Argument
(Wadsworth, five editions); Social Trust and Human Communities (McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 1997); and Dilemmas of Trust (McGill-Queen’s University Press,
1998). Govier has been active in several nongovernmental organizations in the areas of
peace and foreign policy. Her most recent work is Forgiveness and Revenge, in press
with Routledge, UK.

Wilhelm Verwoerd is a South African philosopher, a former member of the Philosophy

Department at Stellenbosch University, and a staff researcher for the South African
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Verwoerd is the author of essays on topics rang-
ing from feminism to development ethics. Most recently, he was coeditor of two works
about the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Looking Back, Reaching
Forward: Reflections on the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion (with Charles Villa-Vicencio) (University of Cape Town Press, 2000) and Truths
Drawn in Jest (with Mahlubi Mabizela) (Cape Town: David Phillip, 2000). He is a
research fellow, Centre for Applied Ethics, Department of Philosophy, University of
Stellenbosch, South Africa.