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Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Cwynar, A., Cwynar, W.,
Patena, W. and Sibanda, W. (2020) ‘Young adults’ financial literacy and
overconfidence bias in debt markets’, Int. J. Business Performance
Management, Vol. 21, Nos. 1/2, pp.95-113.
Welcome Sibanda holds a PhD in Finance from Cass Business School, UK and
an MBA from Birmingham University Business School, UK. He is an Assistant
Professor of Finance at Dubai Men’s College (HCT, Dubai). He is a member of
the CFA–UK Society, CII, UK and CISI, UK. Prior to joining HCT, he was an
Assistant Professor of Finance at Heriot University, Dubai Campus, where he
served as the Director of Undergraduate Studies. His research interests span
portfolio theory dynamics, fin-tech models and SME dynamics.
1 Introduction
either in absolute terms or in comparison to others’. This diversity of the forms and
typologies of overconfidence hampers comparisons of the findings reported by different
researchers. Such comparisons are additionally impeded because of the lack of
homogeneity in the instruments used to measure even the same forms of overconfidence.
In economics and finance – as opposed to psychology – the research is focused on
over-optimism rather than on over-precision (Skala, 2008). Specifically, many
researchers in economics and finance-related domains conceptualise overconfidence as
an overstatement of one’s knowledge. The operationalisations of overconfidence defined
in this way are diverse (see, for instance, Gentile et al. (2016) for an overview and
discussion). Many studies operationalise it simply as the difference between actual
knowledge (measured objectively through a test) and the individual’s self-assessment of
his or her knowledge. However, as Skala (2008, p.34) indicates based on her
comprehensive review of the research in the field of overconfidence, ‘even a general
concept of overconfidence allows to account for many phenomena in finance that the
standard economic theory does not explain’.
The literature in economics and finance concentrates on the effects of overconfidence
on human behaviour in economic contexts. Similarly, the economic and financial
research on overconfidence shows that, as in other domains, it is a widespread
phenomenon. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) and Grubb and Osborne (2015) posit
that consumers are customarily biased and are either over-optimistic or over-pessimistic
regarding consumptive quantity or price or a combination of these two dimensions. This
irrationality results in poor choices and severe consequences for consumer welfare,
because of excessive costs or compromised utility, which has massive repercussions for
the market mechanism, allocative mechanism, utility theory and public policy. Barber
and Odean (2001) argue that overconfidence and over-optimism in financial decision-
making are rife, with economic agents who believe that they are highly knowledgeable
and capable of handling their personal finances. Reality indicates that such consumers are
not competent when pressed on objective questions, fail to save adequately for retirement
and are overburdened with loans. They do not save enough because they are overly
optimistic about the future performance of their investments, and they over-borrow
because they are overconfident that they are going to be able to repay their loans on time.
In such a scenario, effective financial literacy must condition and balance the economic
agent’s powers of judgement.
Vast majority of empirical studies in economics and finance which are devoted to
overconfidence concentrate on the asset markets and examine the behaviour of investors
in these markets – in terms of both their participation in the market, and their likelihood
to perform unhealthy investing behaviours once they entered the market. Xia et al. (2014)
evidenced that financial literacy overconfidence is positively related to stock market
participation. Following previous studies showing that the participation – even small –
has a positive effect on consumers’ long-life wealth accumulation (Rooij et al., 2007;
Campbell 2006), Xia et al. (2014) assumed stock market participation as an indicator of
consumer financial well-being. However, they did not scrutinise how the overconfident
individuals participate in the stock market compared to other participants, that is – how
they behave when transacting in the market.
The findings regarding the link between overconfidence and asset market behaviour
are unambiguous and provide clear conclusions. They show that overconfident investors
Young adults’ financial literacy and overconfidence bias in debt markets 99
behave sub-optimally: they trade (buy and sell securities) too often, which has an
adverse effect on their returns (Barber and Odean, 2001; Chuang and Lee, 2006;
Deaves et al., 2009; Glaser and Weber, 2007). The negative influence of overconfidence
on investment performance has also been confirmed by Biais et al. (2005), Fenton-
O’Creevy et al. (2003), Statman et al. (2006) and Nosić and Weber (2010). Verma (2017)
confirms that overconfident consumers are more likely to make imprudent financial
decisions, irrespective of their actual financial literacy. Some findings suggest
that overconfidence may induce risk-seeking behaviour. For instance, Camerer and
Lovallo (1999), in an experimental setting, show that overconfidence leads to excessive
business entry, while Simon and Houghton (2003) find a positive association between
overconfidence and the extent to which product introductions are pioneering (i.e., risky).
This study also shows that managers introducing pioneering products were more likely
to be certain that the products would achieve success, although the products were
actually less likely to succeed. Further, financially overconfident individuals have been
found to be the most reluctant to seek formal financial advice (Gentile et al., 2016;
Kramer, 2014). From a psychological perspective this is understandable, because they
overstate their capabilities and this leads them to a conviction that they can manage
without advice.
On the other hand, little is known about the impact of overconfidence on the
behaviour of consumers in debt markets. Ausubel (1999) reports that credit card
customers are more responsive to changes in the introductory interest rate than to
monetary-equivalent adjustments in the post-introductory interest rate. Shui and Ausubel
(2005) and Heidhues and Koszegi (2010) attribute this to overconfidence about the ability
to refinance debt to avoid post-introductory rates. In an experimental setting,
Kriete-Dodds and Maringer (2015) have shown that overconfidence leads to negative
debt-related effects: more ‘accidental’ borrowing and higher interest rates.
Based on these previous studies showing that overconfidence may induce risk-
seeking behaviour and lead to poor financial decisions, we formulated the following two
hypotheses:
H1: Overconfident individuals are more likely to participate in the debt market.
H2: Overconfident individuals are more likely to demonstrate unhealthy debt behaviour.
The first hypothesis rests on two distinct assumptions. First, previous studies have
suggested that confidence reduces hesitation and induces action (Parker et al., 2012).
Hence, overconfident individuals should face particularly weak barriers to entry into the
debt market. Second, debt imposes additional risk on consumers’ income and wealth.
Given that overconfidence may push an individual to take more risk, as indicated earlier
in this section, an overconfident individual should be more likely to enter debt market.
The other hypothesis stems directly from the rich empirical evidence presented above,
which suggests that overconfidence may foster poor financial decisions and unhealthy
financial behaviour. As a result of overconfidence, individuals may make biased
estimates regarding the expected costs and benefits of credit or a loan, may overrate their
understanding of contractual terms, and may overstate their abilities to manage such
products in the future.
100 A. Cwynar et al.
3 Method
3.1 Data
We conducted the questionnaire-based survey during the period from 10–13 November
2018. The data were collected using computer-assisted web interviewing (CAWI) from a
sample of 600 Poles aged 18–35 years. We partnered with a professional market and
opinion research agency, DRB Polonia, to conduct the survey. To obtain a sampling
frame we used the database provided by the Central Statistical Office which contains
detailed information on the Polish population, including the information on how the
population is divided into different age groups. The response rate reached 44.8%. The
sample was controlled by cross-section quotas for two demographic variables: gender and
place of residence.
literacy confidence is routinely measured in this way in the literature (see, e.g., Allgood
and Walstad, 2016; Cwynar et al., 2018; Lusardi and Tufano, 2015; Porto and Xiao
2016).
We used two operationalisations of overconfidence in financial literacy. First, we
adopted the approach of Xia et al. (2014), which was also applied by Porto and Xiao
(2016) and Gentile et al. (2016), to gauge overconfidence in debt literacy. The following
classifier was used in this approach: a respondent is overconfident if, for that respondent,
OLIT ≤ sample mean and SLIT > sample mean. This measure of overconfidence was
labelled OVER1 in our analyses. The measure was coded as a binary variable
(overconfidence = 1; otherwise = 0). Second, we introduced a novel instrument of
overconfidence (labelled OVER2) measuring it as an ordinal variable on a scale from 0 to
100 based on the comparison of percentiles in the distribution of objective literacy and
subjective literacy. More specifically, our new measure of overconfidence assigns
respondents the number calculated as a difference between the respondent’s percentile of
subjective literacy and his or her percentile of objective literacy when the difference is
positive, and zero otherwise. We applied the additional measure of overconfidence as a
robustness check, because the basic binary measure used in the previous literature may be
perceived as too general and arbitrary (Porto and Xiao, 2016) and as such it may not
ensure the sufficient insight into this phenomenon.
concerns regarding the reliability of the respondents’ reports, the literature shows that
individuals meaningfully report even on their sub-optimal characteristics (Ameriks et al.,
2007; Gathergood, 2012).
4 Results
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for used variables (except controls); subsample of those
respondents who borrowed at least once (n = 395)
Table 3 reports the estimation results for the logit model estimated for entire sample,
with debt market participation as the dependent variable and overconfidence (measured
as OVER1) as the diagnostic variable, along with the socio-demographic traits as
controls (Model 1). The Hosmer and Lemeshow test turned out to be insignificant for
the model [χ2(8) = 1.59; p = 0.991], indicating that it is well-fitted to the data. The
estimates of the model are also statistically significant [χ2(10) = 83.91; p < 0.001] and the
model explains about 13% of the dependent variable’s variation. The signs at the
non-standardised regression coefficient (B) inform about whether the relationship
between diagnostic variable and dependent variable is positive or negative. Wald test (Z)
indicates whether the relationship is statistically significant. In the model, overconfidence
is significantly and inversely related to credit market participation, indicating that
overconfident participants are more likely to borrow. The odds ratio (0.634) means that
overconfident respondents are almost 37% less likely to be classified in the ‘never
borrowed’ group.
The overconfidence remained statistically and inversely related to debt market
participation after removing all the control variables from the model (see Model 2 in
Table 3).
Table 4 reports the estimation results for the logit model estimated for entire sample
with debt market participation as the dependent variable, however with the other measure
of overconfidence (that is, OVER2) as diagnostic variable along with sociodemographic
traits as controls (Model 3). The Hosmer and Lemeshow test turned out to be
insignificant for the model [χ2(8) = 3.80; p = 0.875], indicating that it is well-fitted to
data. The estimates of the model are statistically significant [χ2(10) = 83.91; p < 0.001]
and the model explains about 15% of the dependent’s variable variation. The
overconfidence is significantly and inversely related to debt market participation in the
model, indicating that overconfident participants are more likely to borrow, in the same
way as in Model 1 with OVER1. The odds ratio (0.985) means that overconfident
respondents have almost 1.5% less odds to be classified as ‘never borrowed’ individuals.
The overconfidence remained statistically and inversely related to debt market
participation after removing all control variables from the model (see Model 4 in
Table 4). Overall, the estimation results from Model 1, Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4
support our H1.
104 A. Cwynar et al.
Table 3 Results from logistic regressions (debt market participation as the dependent variable;
OVER1 as the diagnostic variable)
B SE Z Exp(B) Cl 95%
Model 1 OVER1 –0.455 0.227 4.035* 0.634 0.407–0.989
GENDER 0.371 0.178 4.330* 1.449 1.022–2.056
AGE –0.044 0.018 6.059* 0.957 0.924–0.991
EDUCAT 0.123 0.066 3.486 1.131 0.994–1.287
RESID 0.014 0.042 0.115 1.014 0.934–1.102
MSTATUSa 6.861
MARRIED 0.025 0.545 0.002 1.025 0.352–2.984
SINGLE 0.142 0.467 0.092 1.152 0.461–2.878
IN RELATION –0.441 0.516 0.730 0.644 0.234–1.769
DIVORCED/ –0.611 0.951 0.413 0.543 0.084–3.498
SEPARATED
INCOME –0.105 0.063 2.741 0.901 0.796–1.019
Cox and Snell R-squared 0.131
Nagelkerke R-squared 0.174
Χ2 83,906***
Model 2 OVER1 –1.017 0.200 25.822*** 0.362 0.244–0.535
Cox and Snell R-squared 0.048
Nagelkerke R-squared 0.063
Χ2 29.258***
Notes: B – non-standardised regression coefficient; SE – standard error; Z – Wald test;
Exp(B) – odds ratio; Cl 95% – confidence interval; significance levels: *p < 0.05;
** p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; a – the reference category is ‘widow/widower’.
Table 4 Results from logistic regressions (debt market participation as the dependent variable;
OVER2 as the diagnostic variable)
B SE Z Exp(B) Cl 95%
Model 3 OVER2 –0.016 0.004 14.000*** 0.985 0.977–0.993
GENDER 0.383 0.180 4.535* 1.466 1.031–2.086
AGE –0.040 0.018 4.790* 0.961 0.928–0.996
EDUCAT 0.125 0.067 3.511 1.133 0.994–1.292
RESID 0.012 0.042 0.084 1.012 0.932–1.110
MSTATUSa 7.764
MARRIED 0.351 0.565 0.385 1.420 0.3469–4.299
SINGLE 0.464 0.486 0.909 1.590 0.613–4.125
IN RELATION –0.133 0.534 0.062 0.875 0.307–2.495
DIVORCED/ –0.372 0.967 0.148 0.689 0.104–4.587
SEPARATED
INCOME –0.094 0.064 2.175 0.910 0.803–1.031
Notes: B – non-standardised regression coefficient; SE – standard error; Z – Wald test;
Exp(B) – odds ratio; Cl 95% – confidence interval; significance levels: *p < 0.05;
**p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; a – the reference category is ‘widow/widower’.
Young adults’ financial literacy and overconfidence bias in debt markets 105
Table 4 Results from logistic regressions (debt market participation as the dependent variable;
OVER2 as the diagnostic variable) (continued)
B SE Z Exp(B) Cl 95%
Cox and Snell R-squared 0.145
Nagelkerke R-squared 0.194
Χ2 94.161***
Model 4 OVER2 –0.017 0.002 65.958*** 0.983 0.979–0.987
Cox and Snell R-squared 0.116
Nagelkerke R-squared 0.155
Χ2 74.289***
Notes: B – non-standardised regression coefficient; SE – standard error; Z – Wald test;
Exp(B) – odds ratio; Cl 95% – confidence interval; significance levels: *p < 0.05;
**p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; a – the reference category is ‘widow/widower’.
Non–standardised Standardised
Cl 95%
coefficients coefficients t
B SE Beta LL UL
Model 5 OVER1 0.330 0.530 0.031 0.622 –0.713 1.372
GENDER –0.314 0.457 –0.034 –0.686 –1.213 0.586
AGE –0.124 0.047 –0.137 –2.625** –0.217 –0.031
EDUCAT –0.143 0.167 –0.046 –0.855 –0.472 0.186
RESID –0.107 0.112 –0.049 –0.955 –0.328 0.114
MSTATUS –0.006 0.249 –0.001 –0.023 –0.495 0.484
INCOME 0.657 0.159 0.213 4.126*** 0.344 0.970
Model 6 OVER1 0.551 0.537 0.052 1.025 –0.506 1.607
Notes: B – non-standardised regression coefficient; SE – standard error; Beta –
standardised regression coefficient; t – t test; significance levels: *p< 0.05;
**p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Table 6 reports the estimation results of multiple linear regressions for the subsample of
borrowers (n = 395) with debt behaviour as the dependent variable, however with
106 A. Cwynar et al.
overconfidence operationalised as OVER2 and used as the diagnostic variable along with
sociodemographic traits as controls (Model 7). The model is well-fitted to data [F(7.387)
= 4.631; p < 0.001] and explains 6.1% of debt behaviour variation (R-squared = 0.077;
adjusted R-squared = 0.061). The model shows that overconfidence is significant as
predictor of debt behaviour. The estimates show that the one-unit increase in OVER2 is
associated with the increase in the value of debt behaviour index by 0.023 units in
Model 7 and by 0.028 units in Model 8.
Overall, the estimation results from Models 5, 6, 7 and 8 are mixed. Some of them
confirm our H2 (Models 7 and 8 with OVER2 as the diagnostic variable), while the
others do not (Models 5 and 6 with overconfidence measured as OVER1).
Table 6 Results from linear regressions (debt behaviour as the dependent variable; OVER2 as
the diagnostic variable)
Non–standardised Standardised
Cl 95%
coefficients coefficients t
B SE Beta LL UL
Model 7 OVER2 0.023 0.010 0.114 2.314* 0.003 0.043
GENDER –0.316 0.454 –0.034 –0.696 –1.209 0.577
AGE –0.122 0.047 –0.134 –2.599* –0.215 –0.030
EDUCAT –0.146 0.166 –0.047 –0.876 –0.473 0.181
RESID –0.099 0.112 –0.045 –0.883 –0.318 0.121
MSTATUS –0.026 0.247 –0.005 0.106 –0.459 0.511
INCOME 0.630 0.158 0.205 3.973*** 0.318 0.941
Model 8 OVER2 0.028 0.010 0.136 2.716** 0.008 0.048
Notes: B – non-standardised regression coefficient; SE – standard error; beta –
standardised regression coefficient; t – t test; significance levels: *p < 0.05;
**p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Our survey indicates that about one third of the sampled participants were non-borrowers:
they reported that they had never borrowed money. For comparison, the KRD Economic
Information Bureau (2018) states that more than three-quarters of grown-up Poles report
that they have entered into at least one credit agreement or loan. However, our sample
comprised only young adults – aged at most 35 years. Compared to the nationally
representative sample of the entire population, our sampled respondents had less time to
acquire debt-related experiences. One of our logit models confirmed that the likelihood of
debt market participation increases with age. Hence, the distribution of our sample into
borrowers and non-borrowers in the proportion 2-to-1 seems to be a credible and
convincing estimate.
Our study shows that overconfidence increases the odds of participating in the debt
market, possibly because overconfident individuals, more often than those who are not
overconfident, assume optimistically that they will be able to navigate credit contracts
effectively, despite the underlying risk. To a degree, this result is similar to the one
obtained by Xia et al. (2014), who showed that financial literacy overconfidence is
Young adults’ financial literacy and overconfidence bias in debt markets 107
positively correlated to stock market participation. In both cases – the stock market and
the debt market – we are dealing with a market that can stimulate wealth creation and
accumulation, but at the same time a market in which participation entails considerable
risk. The issue that is key to successful participation is the specific behaviour in the
relevant market. Unlike Xia et al. (2014), who did not study the related behaviour among
those who reported stock market participation, we examined the debt behaviour of those
who borrowed, and we checked the link between this behaviour and overconfidence.
We obtained mixed results regarding this link. The simple binary measure of
overconfidence which is widespread in the financial literacy literature turned out to be
insignificant as the predictor of debt behaviour. However, application of the other
measure of overconfidence – that is, the quantitative one – brought results that are in line
with relations hypothesised in this article: more overconfident respondents were more
likely to perform unhealthy debt behaviours. The latter is consistent with evidence on the
association between overconfidence and financial asset-related behaviour (e.g., Barber
and Odean, 2001; Glaser and Weber, 2007; Nosić and Weber, 2010). As predicted,
overconfident individuals may make biased estimates regarding the expected costs and
benefits of credit or a loan, may overrate their understanding of contractual terms, and
may overstate their abilities to manage such products in the future.
Future researchers should aim to explore and understand how overconfidence
determines credit market participation and, particularly, further verify whether
overconfidence translates into poor debt decisions. Our analysis showed that the
regression results with debt behaviour as the outcome variable may be sensitive to the
choice of the instrument measuring overconfidence. Such effect is discussed in the
related literature. For instance, Lyons et al. (2007) showed that the regression results with
the division of financial decision-making power between partners as the predictor may be
strongly sensitive to the choice of the instrument measuring the division. Therefore, we
recommend more detailed and in-depth studies of overconfidence using different forms
of the concept – from miscalibration to over-placement – and different
operationalisations of overconfidence. Future studies should also test other scales of
healthy debt behaviour in correlation with debt literacy overconfidence. Some items
forming our debt behaviour scale may be strongly related to biases other than
overconfidence. For instance, the third item (‘Borrowing money for at least one of the
following purposes (or for similar purposes): the purchase of expensive clothing or
haberdashery accessories (e.g., a branded suit or purse), a holiday abroad, technological
novelties or gadgets (e.g., the newest model of a cult fashionable brand of smartphone)’)
may be strongly linked to such psychological dispositions as self-control, the need of for
instant gratification or impatience – all of which may lead to compulsive (and sometimes
debt-driven) buying. Finally, as usual, our data may be influenced by the effects of social
desirability (e.g. the respondents might have had an incentive to obscure some of their
characteristics – such as the fact that they borrowed, or the unhealthy nature of their debt
behaviour – in their self-reports). Hence, future studies should strive to match market
data on credit behaviour with refined estimates of overconfidence.
Our study may have a value in terms of policy implications. Given that the most
natural approach to financial literacy support is targeted education, the policy framework
should take into account the specific features of overconfident consumers as potential
recipients of such education. The key challenge in designing educational programmes for
this group may be to find a way to convince the overconfident individuals that they
108 A. Cwynar et al.
actually know significantly less than they think they do. Perhaps psychological support
would be appropriate in this respect.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education grant
[contract no. 0057/DLG/2016/10 under the program ‘Dialogue’ (within project entitled
‘Debt Watch’)].
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Appendix
Survey questionnaire
Q11 On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means very low, 2 – low, 3 – average, 4 – high,
5 – very high, indicate how would you rate your overall knowledge with respect to
credits and loans?
Q12 Based on your knowledge, classify the following statements as true or false (note
that all of them regard Polish circumstances). If you don’t know whether they are
true or false, indicate “I don’t know”.
I don’t
True False
know
Creditors are required to tell you the APY you will pay when you get x
a loan.
Your credit rating is not affected by how much you charge on your x
credit cards.
If the interest rate on an adjustable-rate mortgage loan goes up, your x
monthly mortgage payments will also go up.
Total amount of interest on a 15-year mortgage is lower than total x
amount of interest on the same, however a 30-year mortgage.
A 15-year mortgage typically requires higher monthly mortgage x
payments than the same, however 30-year mortgage.
Young adults’ financial literacy and overconfidence bias in debt markets 111
The most important thing to look at when comparing a loan or a credit offers is total x
amount of interest you will have to pay in the future.
Consumer can waive already granted loan during short-period of time after the day of x
grant.
Bank margin is another name for bank commission applied when granting loans to x
private individuals.
A list of warnings regarding dishonest lending institutions is maintained by the Polish x
National Bank.
Q13 Suppose you owe PLN 1,000 on your credit card and the interest rate you are
charged is 20% per year compounded annually. If you didn’t pay anything off, at
this interest rate, how many years would it take for the amount you owe to double?
1 2 years
2 Less than 5 years (correct)
3 Between 5 and 10 years
4 More than 10 years
5 Do not know
Q14 You owe PLN 3,000 on your credit card. You pay a minimum payment of PLN 30
each month. At an Annual Percentage Rate of 12% (or 1% per month), how many
years would it take to eliminate your credit card debt if you made no additional
new charges?
1 Less than 5 years
2 Between 5 and 10 years
3 Between 10 and 15 years
4 Never, continue to be in debt (correct)
5 Do not know
Q15 You purchase an appliance which costs PLN 1,000. To pay for this appliance, you
are given the following two options:
a Pay 12 monthly installments of PLN 100 each.
b Borrow at a 20% annual interest rate and pay back PLN 1,200 one year from
now.
Which is the more advantageous offer, in other words which one will cost less?
1 Option (a)
2 Option (b) (correct)
3 They are the same
4 Do not know
112 A. Cwynar et al.
Q16 You took a PLN 5,000 loan for one year and the interest rate you are charged is
10% per year. You are given the following two options to pay the interest on the
loan:
a One-time payment of PLN 500 in advance (at the beginning of the year),
which means that PLN 4,500 will be effectively available for you on the day
of grant.
b One-time payment of PLN 500 at the end of the year, which means that PLN
5,500 will have to be returned to the lender on the day of repayment.
Which is the more advantageous option?
1 Option (a)
2 Option (b) (correct)
3 They are the same
4 Do not know
Q23 On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means never, 5 – always, indicate the extent to which
you engage in the following behaviours (if you have never been in debt, report it
now):
1 Borrowing money without thorough examination of all pros and cons as well
as careful consideration of all available options
2 Borrowing money to repay former debts
3 Borrowing money for at least one of the following purposes (or for similar
purposes): the purchase of expensive clothing or haberdashery (e.g. branded
suit or purse), holiday abroad, technological novelties or gadgets (e.g. the
newest model of a cult brand smartphone)
4 Borrowing money simultaneously from more than one source (e.g. banks,
personal loan / payday loan companies, instalment purchases, pawnshops,
family etc.)
5 Getting behind on bills payment or/and debt repayment
Q31 Indicate your gender:
1 Female
2 Male
Q32 Indicate your year of birth
Q33 Indicate your educational attainment:
1 Grammar school (primary/elementary education)
2 Junior high school (lower secondary education)
3 Junior vocational school (lower vocational education)
4 High school (upper secondary education)
Young adults’ financial literacy and overconfidence bias in debt markets 113