Analysis

The doctrine of substantive legitimate expectations: the

significance of Chiu Teng@Kallang Pte Ltd v Singapore Land
1
Authority
Judicial review; Legitimate expectation; Public interest; Singapore

The grounds of judicial review have been fixed in Singapore for a significant
period of time. These are illegality, irrationality and procedural fairness. Adherence
to the principles of the separation of powers has meant that the courts have been
reluctant to review the content of the decision outside of irrationality which has
been used sparingly and with a high threshold for an applicant to overcome.2 In
addition, the courts have also eschewed proportionality as a ground for judicial
review.3
However, recently in the landmark decision of Chiu Teng@Kallang Pte Ltd v
Singapore Land Authority4 the High Court held that it was time to recognise the
doctrine of substantive legitimate expectations as a standalone ground of judicial
review. Prior to Chiu Teng, the courts in Singapore had been reluctant to explicitly
recognise the doctrine other than by way of some form of irrationality review: in
the words of the former Chief Justice, Chan Sek Keong, the courts were treading
carefully.5 In this way, Chiu Teng marks a departure from the general reluctance
to grapple with the content of a decision. This development echoes developments
in other common law jurisdictions.6
As is usual at any early stage in the law’s development there are a number of
questions left to be considered on how the ground of review should evolve over
time. This paper focuses on some of the more conceptual questions arising from
this development, including how it fits in with existing statements made on
substantive review and how the court proposes striking a balance between the

1
I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer, Professor Maurice Sunkin and Professor Thio Li-ann for their helpful
comments. All errors remain my own.
2
See, for example, Manjit Singh s/o Kirpal Singh v AG [2013] 4 SLR 483 at [7]—“the Wednesbury test sets a high
bar”. See also Chee Siok Chin v Minister for Home Affairs [2006] 1 SLR(R) 582—the standard of unreasonableness
“is from a jurisprudential perspective, pragmatically fixed at a very high level” at [125]. The threshold has been
maintained at a high standard akin to the original threshold proposed in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v
Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 K.B. 223.
3
See, for example, Chan Hiang Leng Colin v Minister for Information and the Arts [1996] 1 SLR (R) 294 at
[38]–[47] and Chng Suan Tze v Minister of Home Affairs [1989] MLJ 89 and [1988] 2 SLR 525 at [108]–[121].
4
Chiu Teng@Kallang Pte Ltd v Singapore Land Authority [2013] SGHC 262.
5
Former Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong, “Judicial Review—From Angst to Empathy” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 469, 478.
See, for example, Re Siah Mooi Guat [1988] 2 SLR(R), Borissik Svetlana v Urban Redevelopment Authority [2009]
4 SLR(R) 92 HC and UDL Marine (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Jurong Town Corp [2011] 3 SLR 94. This can be contrasted
with cases like Abdul Nasir bin Amer Hamsah v Public Prosecutor [1997] SGCA 38 where the judges would have
been prepared to consider the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectations as a basis for estopping the Prisons
Department from retrospectively applying an alternative meaning to the term of life imprisonment (20 years versus
natural life term): it was not argued in the immediate case and therefore the court did not pronounce on it. It is possible
that the obvious constitutional implications of the case prompted the court to at least raise the possibility of the
doctrine of substantive legitimate expectations.
6
Including England and Hong Kong.

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2 Public Law

applicant and the administration. It will not address some of the more specific
practical questions, including, for example whether a legitimate expectation can
arise from general policies promulgated by the government (rather than just specific
representations) or what kind of detrimental reliance is required to generate a
legitimate expectation.7

Facts and decision

The applicant in the case was a property developer which had acquired two plots
of land through competitive tender for the purpose of redevelopment. To ensure
that land is used in line with broader land usage policy in Singapore, it is common
for state leases to specify, as a condition of the lease, the permitted uses of the
land as well as the maximum gross floor area for these permissible uses of the
land. Under the state leases, a payment, known as the “differential premium” (DP)
is payable for, inter alia, the lifting of these title restrictions. The Singapore Land
Authority (SLA) is responsible for assessing the DP payable.
The applicant argued that they had a legitimate expectation in the way the DP
would be calculated as a result of information available from the SLA’s circulars
to developers and the SLA’s website. The circulars and website stated that the DP
would be calculated based on a Table of Development Charge Rates (DC Table)
published by the Urban Redevelopment Authority. The DC Table rates are based
on a rate set for different categories of land use in different geographical areas in
Singapore. The rates are based on transactional prices of land for the preceding
six month period and on an average of such prices in any particular geographical
sector area. This mode of calculating the DP can be contrasted with a spot valuation
system which is based on the actual value of land in an actual locality at the time
of assessment.
The applicant sought to have the title restrictions lifted in preparation for a
redevelopment of the land. This was calculated by way of a spot valuation at SGD
44 million and not on the basis of the DC Table.8 The SLA explained that this was
necessary for, inter alia, a proper discharge of the state’s statutory functions:
namely, to realise the full value of any land that it is disposing of. They pointed
to s.6(1)(a) of the Singapore Land Authority Act9 which states that the SLA’s
function and duty is “to optimise land resources”.
Following a survey of the law in England, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong and
Singapore, the court found there was a sufficient basis for recognising the doctrine
of substantive legitimate expectations. The court held that such expectations can
be protected via substantive relief. The court rejected the argument that this runs
counter to the doctrine of separation of powers:
“[t]he upholding of legitimate expectations is eminently within the powers
of the judiciary … in deciding whether a legitimate expectation ought to be
upheld, the court must remember that there are concerns and interests larger
than the private expectation of an individual … If there is a public interest

7
For these questions, see Z. Chen, “Substantive Legitimate Expectations in Singapore Administrative Law” (2014)
26 SAcLJ 237 and C. Tay, “Substantive Legitimate Expectations: The Singapore Reception” (2014) 26 SAcLJ 609.
8
The applicant’s own calculation based on the DC Table was approximately SGD 11 million—a vastly different
amount from that calculated by the SLA.
9
Cap. 301, 2002 Rev Ed.

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 Analysis 3

which overrides the expectation, then the expectation ought not to be given
effect to. In this way, I believe the judiciary can fulfil its constitutional role
[to verify not only that the powers asserted accord with the substantive law
created by Parliament but also that the manner in which they are exercised
confirms with the standards of fairness which Parliament must have intended]
without arrogating to itself the unconstitutional position of being a
super-legislature or a super-executive.”10
The court went on to highlight the requirements needed to recognise and enforce
legitimate expectations. They are as follows:
(a) an unequivocal representation made by someone with proper
authority to the applicant or a class of persons to which the applicant
belongs;
(b) reasonable and detrimental reliance on the representation by the
applicant; and
(c) even if there is such a representation and reliance the court will not
enforce the expectation if, inter alia, the public authority can show
an overriding national or public interest which justifies the frustration
of the applicant’s expectation.11
In applying these requirements to the facts of the case the court found in favour
of the respondent. First, the SLA’s website explicitly stated that the SLA made no
representations. Secondly, although the SLA circulars were addressed to the class
of persons which included the applicant, it was not reasonable for the developer
to have relied solely on the SLA’s circulars. There was sufficient market evidence
at the time that pointed to the fact that the applicant ought to have known that the
DP for the land may not be assessed according to the DC Table, including recently
widely reported events in the media involving other major developers.12
In any event, the court held that any legitimate expectation would be overridden
by the SLA’s overriding statutory duty to get the best returns in matters involving
State land. The SLA is under a statutory duty to optimise land resources and to
“have regard to efficiency and economy and to the social, industrial and commercial
and economic needs of Singapore” (s.6(1)(a) and (2)(a) of the Singapore Land
Authority Act).13 This public interest trumped the financial interests of a corporation
like the applicant. The court held that the state’s finances would suffer more than
the applicant if the SLA were:
“to make an exception for this case and not apply its unpublished policy
relating to directly-alienated State land to the Land here. The overriding public
interest must therefore prevail over the financial interests of a commercial
enterprise like the applicant in this case.”14

10
Chiu Teng [2013] SGHC 262 at [113].
11
Chiu Teng [2013] SGHC 262 at [119].
12
Chiu Teng [2013] SGHC 262 at [120]–[129].
13
Cap. 301, 2002 Rev Ed.
14
Chiu Teng [2013] SGHC 262 at [130].

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4 Public Law

Analysis: some open questions

Normative foundations of substantive legitimate expectations

It is not clear from Chiu Teng, why administrative law needs to protect substantive
legitimate expectations created by administrative decisions and neither is the
rationale for recognising the doctrine in Singapore. The judgment in Chiu Teng
emphasises the importance of fairness and the need for good public administration:
“It seems to me that in this area, public law has already absorbed what is
useful from the moral values which underlie the private law concept of
estoppel and the time has come for it to stand upon its own two feet … The
doctrine will apply in circumstances where the change or proposed change
of policy is held to be unfair or an abuse of power … But these ills are
expressed in very general terms; and it is notorious (and obvious) that the
ascertainment of what is or is not fair depends on the circumstances of the
case”.15 (Emphasis added)
However, without more elaboration, reliance on broad notions of “moral values”,
“fairness” or “abuse of power” could weaken the utility of the doctrine.16 There is
a need for further guidance to develop over time for judges applying key aspects
of the doctrine and for the administration attempting to structure their discretion
and make decisions that are consistent with the doctrine.17 In particular, it is difficult
for the court or the administration to strike the balance between the expectations
on the one hand and the public interest (the final stage of deciding whether to
enforce a substantive legitimate expectation). For this balance to be struck it is
important to understand the “values” that inform each side of the scale. From the
administration’s perspective particularly, without more explanation it is difficult
to understand why their decision to pursue a particular policy goal would be an
“abuse of power” provided it complies with the existing grounds of review
(illegality, irrationality and procedural fairness).
This balance needs to be struck. As recognised in R. v North and East Devon
Health Authority, Ex p. Coughlan, the court has: “to reconcile … [the] continuing
need to initiate and respond to change with the legitimate … expectations of citizens
… who have relied, and have been justified in relying, on a current policy or an
extant promise.”18 This tension was echoed again in the case of R. (on the
application of Bibi) v Newham LBC:
“… it is important to recognise that there is often a tension between several
values in these cases. A choice may need to be made as to which good we
attain and which we forgo. There are administrative and democratic gains in
preserving for the authority the possibility in the future of coming to different
conclusions as to the allocation of resources from those to which it is currently

15
Chiu Teng [2013] SGHC 262 at [81] and [35].
16
This formed the basis for criticism in cases in the UK context in relation to the concept of “abuse of power”.
See R. (on the application of Bibi) v Newham LBC [2001] EWCA Civ 607; [2002] 1 W.L.R. 237 at [18]; R. (on the
application of Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363 at [67].
17
See also L.A. Thio, “The Theory and Practice of Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Singapore”,
Developments in Singapore Law 2006–2010: Trends and Perspectives, SAL Conference Proceedings, February 2011,
pp.714–752, paras 19–20).
18
R. v North and East Devon HA Ex p. Coughlan [2001] Q.B. 213; [2000] 2 W.L.R. 622 at [65].

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 Analysis 5

wedded. On the other hand there is value in holding authorities to promises

which they have made, thus upholding responsible public administration and
allowing people to plan their lives sensibly. The task for the law in this area
is to establish who makes the choice of priorities and what principles are to
be followed.”19 (Emphasis added)
It is precisely this discussion on the “choice of priorities” and “principles” to be
followed that is absent in Chiu Teng, especially at the final balancing stage. The
court only needed to look to Coughlan for this elaboration of what it is that triggers
the “unfair” or “abuse of power” conclusion in cases involving substantive
legitimate expectations. The court there held that the unfairness arises as a result
of the administration “reneging without adequate justification, by an otherwise
lawful decision, on a lawful promise or practice … .”20 This was echoed in the
subsequent case of Nadarajah where Laws LJ stated that:
“The search for principle surely starts with the theme that is current through
the legitimate expectation cases … Where a public authority has issued a
promise or adopted a practice which represents how it proposes to act in a
given area, the law will require the promise or practice to be honoured unless
there is good reason not to do so.”21
Thus, in recognising the doctrine the courts have acknowledged the analytical
focus of the “fairness” or “abuse of power” conclusion on the strength of the
reasons for making a decision that frustrates the expectation. It is these reasons
that have the power to uproot an otherwise lawful decision. We now turn to the
issue of how to evaluate these reasons.22

Legitimate expectation versus overriding public interest

The enforcement of a substantive legitimate expectation competes with the need
for flexibility in the government’s development of policy. The issue is how to
strike a balance. One option is to use some form of structured proportionality
reasoning.23 Alternatively, the courts can engage in a more open textured balancing
exercise: one that varies with the context. This was the preferred approach in Chiu
Teng. However, the extent of the balancing was restricted to one paragraph in the
judgment:
“As the SLA has rightfully pointed out, it is under a statutory duty to ‘optimise
land resources’ (s 6(1)(a) of the SLA Act) and to ‘have regard to efficiency
and economy and to the social, industrial and commercial and economic needs

19
Bibi [2001] EWCA Civ 607; [2002] 1 W.L.R. 237 at [24].
20
Coughlan [2001] Q.B. 213; [2000] 2 W.L.R. 622 at [69].
21
Nadarajah [2005] EWCA Civ 1363; Times, December 14, 2005 at [68].
22
This raises the question of the interplay between Wednesbury review and substantive legitimate expectations.
The former reviews the “rationality” of an executive’s decision whereas (as discussed) the latter looks at whether the
administration had an adequate rationale for departing from a legitimate expectation. Both involve a consideration
of the reasons for decision-making. However, as will be discussed below, the courts in Singapore have maintained
the threshold for Wednesbury review at a high and deferential level whereas it appears with substantive legitimate
expectation the court may be prepared to be more involved in their review of the government’s reasons for action.
Indeed, the burden of proof is different: with Wednesbury review the burden is on the applicant to explain the
“irrationality” of the administration’s decision-making whereas with substantive legitimate expectations the burden
is on the government to rationalise departure from the legitimate expectation.
23
See for example Nadarajah [2005] EWCA Civ 1363 at [67].

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6 Public Law

of Singapore’ in the carrying out of its functions (s 6(2)(a) of the SLA Act).
Its statutory duty would encompass getting the best returns for the State when
it deals with State land. This would in turn benefit the public at large. It is
therefore unacceptable in the circumstances here to argue that the State’s
finances would not suffer as much as the applicant’s if the SLA were to make
an exception for this case and not apply its unpublished policy relating to
directly-alienated State land to the land here. The overriding public interest
must therefore prevail over the financial interests of a commercial enterprise
like the applicant in this case.”24
This may be because the applicant had a weak expectation in the first instance as
discussed above. It may also be due to the fact that the impact on the applicant
was a financial one (versus an impact on civil or political rights enshrined in the
Constitution): thus at the end of the day it came to balancing the financial impact
on the applicant against the impact on the state (again as discussed above). Finally,
it may also be due to the fact that in the planning context the public interest is
naturally stacked against the applicant.25 This echoes views elsewhere about the
polycentric nature of planning decisions and the court’s limited role in areas of
polycentricity.26 It also echoes observations that Singapore administrative law is
currently balanced in favour of communitarian values.27 This can be contrasted
with the UK where it has been observed that “the courts are gradually feeling their
way towards an acceptable balance between the conflicting interests at stake in
substantive legitimate expectations cases”.28 While it is unfair to expect the same
level of development in Singapore at this early stage of the development of modern
administrative law (as evidenced by the recognition of new grounds such as
substantive legitimate expectations), the court could have provided more guidance
on how this balancing is supposed to be done. This is especially to allow courts
to properly engage with this part of the test in order to give due importance to both
the substantive legitimate expectation and the public interest. A further explanation
for the court’s limited role in balancing the various interests at stake is related to
the general state of the law of substantive judicial review in Singapore. We turn
to this issue next.

24
Chiu Teng [2013] SGHC 262 at [130].
25
See for example comments elsewhere in R. (on the application of Reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd) v East Sussex CC
[2002] UKHL 8; [2003] 1 W.L.R. 348; [2003] 1 P. & C.R. 5: “Public Law can also take into account the hierarchy
of individual rights … so that, for example, the individual’s right to a home is accorded a high degree of protection
[as in the ex parte Coughlan case] while ordinary property rights are in general far more limited by considerations
of public interest”.
26
R. (on the application of Alconbury) v Environment Secretary [2001] UKHL 23; [2003] 2 A.C. 295; [2002] Env.
L.R. 12; Lee Hsien Loong v Review Publishing Co Ltd [2007] SGHC 24 per Sundaresh Menon JC (as he then was)
at [998(b)]: “Where the decision involves matters of government policy and requires the intricate balancing of various
competing policy considerations that judges are ill-equipped to adjudicate because of their limited training, experience
and access to materials, the courts should shy away from reviewing its merits.”
27
See, for example, L.A. Thio, “Law and the Administrative State” in Kevin Y.L. Tan (ed.), Singapore Legal
System (Singapore University Press, 1999), p.14: “Not surprisingly, the shaping of administrative law in the Singapore
context is heavily influenced by government policy and the priority this accords to development oriented goals,
especially the communitarian emphasis on order and security” and at p.67: “There is an explicit judicial deference
to executive concerns pertaining to public order and national development policy. ... As in other areas of public law,
the endless tussle between efficiency and fairness values continues in the search of the grail of ‘good’ governance”.
28
I. Steele, “Substantive Legitimate Expectations: Striking the Right Balance?” (2005) 121 L.Q.R. 300, 300.

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 Analysis 7

Substantive legitimate expectations and coherence with administrative

law in Singapore
The doctrine of substantive legitimate expectations is the first time the courts have
accepted substantive review in some strong form in Singapore.29 Recently, the
former Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong recognised the possibility for more expanded
substantive review in the future.30 The court in Chiu Teng, however, did not look
at how substantive legitimate expectations fits in with other forms of substantive
review currently accepted in Singapore. In particular, it did not address the fact
that the final balancing required between the substantive legitimate expectation
and the public interest may involve (albeit embryonically) a similar analytical
exercise as proportionality (which has thus far been rejected). This raises the issue
of whether judges will be comfortable or experienced in dealing with a more
involved substantive ground of review given the general absence of such review
in the administrative law landscape.
The court’s proposed role in enforcing the doctrine of substantive legitimate
expectations (especially the final balancing stage) also runs counter to the court’s
decision in Chiu Teng on the Wednesbury challenge.31 There the court took a very
deferential approach. The court decided that the decision not to apply the DC Table
was not unreasonable because the court was dealing with a polycentric decision.
The deferential conclusion here was compounded by the fact that the court
recognised the absence of a duty to give reasons. The absence of reasons limits
the extent to which the court can involve themselves in an assessment of the
rationality or otherwise of a decision. This implies that the final stage of the
substantive legitimate expectations analysis could also be a less involved review:
the absence of a duty to give reasons will similarly limit the court’s evaluation of
whether a competing public interest is indeed an “overriding” one. Alternatively
it highlights a conflict: there is no need to give reasons in the context of Wednesbury
review but there is in the context of the final balancing stage of the doctrine of
substantive legitimate expectations.32

Enforcement options
As discussed above, the doctrine of legitimate expectations ultimately involves
balancing the interests of the individual against the broader public interest. The
courts in common law jurisdictions have devised a number of tools to strike this
balance. First, they are circumspect about the circumstances in which a substantive

29
Proportionality has not been accepted (Chng Suan Tze v MHA (1988) 2 SLR(R) 525) and Wednesbury irrationality
is set as a high threshold (see fn.1 above). See also D. Tan, “Substantive Review in Administrative Law” (2013)
SAcLJ 319, para.61.
30
Former Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong, “Judicial Review—From Angst to Empathy” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 469,
paras 25 and 27. This was also echoed by Thio, who argues that a Singapore “communitarian” version of proportionality
is possible. Thio, “The Theory and Practice of Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Singapore”, Developments
in Singapore Law 2006–2010 (Feb 2011), p.749.
31
The applicant also sought to challenge the valuation of the DP on the basis that it was irrational.
32
There may also be confusion for litigants in terms of which ground of review they should plead and for judges
in terms of which ground of review should they apply. This concern has been echoed elsewhere. See Laws LJ in R.
v Secretary of State for Education and Employment Ex p. Begbie [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1115 at 1131: “The more the
decision challenged lies in what may inelegantly be called the macro-political field, the less intrusive will be the
court’s supervision”. His Lordship suggested that the choice of which ground of review to deploy should turn on the
policy content of the decision. This would not help the applicant in Chiu Teng: the court was prepared to utilise both
grounds of review and with conflicting degrees of intensity in respect of the same decision (as discussed above).

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8 Public Law

legitimate expectation can arise. Secondly, the courts recognise that even if such
an expectation arises it may be departed from or subject to wider changing policy
objectives. Thirdly, the manner of protecting the expectation varies. For example,
in some jurisdictions the legitimate expectation is protected by characterising it
as a relevant consideration that must be taken into account by the administration
before they make a policy decision.33 In others, it receives stronger protection by
being “enforced” through prerogative remedies such as a quashing order which
quashes the original decision and requires the administration to make a fresh
decision that complies with the legitimate expectation.34 In other scenarios the
substantive legitimate expectation is protected procedurally: for example, the
applicant is given a hearing before the legitimate expectation that a particular
decision will be made in relation to them is departed from.35 In this way, the
administration is bound to different degrees by the expectation.
In Chiu Teng, the court concluded that an expectation can be protected by giving
effect to the substantive legitimate expectation. Chiu Teng followed the high water
mark decision of Coughlan in the absence of a consideration of the way the law
developed post-Coughlan. Coughlan proposed the remedy of certiorari to quash
a decision that runs contrary to an expectation without adequate reasons. However,
later cases added qualifications. In the case of Bibi, the Court of Appeal concluded
that an authority abuses its powers when it fails to take into account the applicant’s
legitimate expectation when making its decision. The court in Bibi held that a
declaration of substantive benefit would inappropriately encroach upon executive
power. Accordingly, in these subsequent cases36 the substantive legitimate
expectation was enforced as a relevant consideration that the executive was
mandated to consider.
It has been suggested elsewhere that the courts should not substantially enforce
the legitimate expectation as this sits uncomfortably with “the accepted principle
of judicial deference based on the concept of relative institutional competence in
Singapore”37 and the courts should accordingly consider using either monetary
relief or enforcing the expectation as a relevant consideration. However, as Tay
himself recognises, the latter may risk undermining the applicant’s interest as the
administration is free to determine the weight it ascribes to the expectation. The
monetary relief would go some way in ensuring due importance is paid to the
applicant’s interest. However, the issue is whether this would adequately
compensate the victim. First, it is not clear what could be the measure of damages
and, if it is compensatory in nature, whether the court would be prepared to award
the full extent of the loss.38 In Chiu Teng, this would be a significant amount of

33
Ng Siu Tung v Director of Immigration [2002] 1 HKLRD 561.
34
See Coughlan [2001] Q.B. 213.
35
See Schmidt v Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1969] 2 Ch. 149 and R. (on the application of Zeqiri) v
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] EWCA Civ 342; [2002] Imm. A.R. 42.
36
Including in Ng Siu Tung v Director of Immigration [2002] 1 HKLRD 561. In Ng, the court also did say that it
is only in an exceptional case that the court will be satisfied that the failure to take into account a relevant consideration
has not affected a decision. The court went even further in declaring that the Director of Immigration should exercise
his discretion in favour of the applicants and give substantial weight to their legitimate expectation. Accordingly the
court adopted a strong judicial role.
37
See C. Tay, “Substantive Legitimate Expectations: The Singapore Reception” (2014) 26 SAcLJ 609, paras 78
and 80.
38
Tay, “Substantive Legitimate Expectations: The Singapore Reception” (2014) 26 SAcLJ 609, para.90. Tay
recognises these open questions in the context of monetary relief.

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 Analysis 9

money given the property development context.39 If the concern with the substantive
enforcement of the expectation is the potential impact on the administration and,
in particular, their resources then monetary relief as a default may not be a better
response.
Going forward, it will be necessary to fully consider these remedial nuances.
At this stage in the law’s development it may be preferable for remedial flexibility
with the court having various options open to them in how they enforce the
expectation: taking advantage of the variety of options available as discussed
above.40 The need for some flexibility in terms of remedy could reflect the different
ways in which it is possible to strike a balance between the applicant and the
respondent. For example, it may be the case that a countervailing public interest
is compelling enough to deny full protection via substantive enforcement of a
legitimate expectation but not compelling enough to deny any relief. In such a
situation it may be possible to protect the applicant’s interest albeit to a lesser
degree (for example, by enforcing the legitimate expectation as a relevant
consideration and perhaps even ascribing a weight to it to prevent it being readily
overridden by a competing public interest).

Conclusions
The doctrine of substantive legitimate expectations is now part of the administrative
law landscape in Singapore. There is room to develop the scope, focus and
foundations of the ground. These are necessary avenues for development: it will
make the difference between whether the administration will respond to the doctrine
of substantive legitimate expectations positively by acknowledging the need to
take special account of individuals caught between changes in policy and create
exceptions for them to the policy, or defensively by preventing legitimate
expectations from arising. There also remain issues of coherence with the wider
administrative law landscape. The question remains whether substantive legitimate
expectations will inspire broader change in administrative law and substantive
review in Singapore or gradually reduce in scope and force to a lesser ground of
review in the absence of clear guidance as to its content.

Swati Jhaveri
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore

Transparency and surveillance: assessing the approach of

the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in Liberty
Covert surveillance; European Court of Human Rights; Freedom of expression;
Intelligence services; Interception of communications; Investigatory Powers
Tribunal; National security; Transparency

39
As mentioned above, the difference in computations of the applicant (SGD 11 million) and the respondent (SGD
44 million) is significant (see above, fn.7).
40
To avoid the relevant considerations approach undermining the efficacy of the legitimate expectation the court
could also consider ascribing weight to the expectation (in the same way as the Court of Final Appeal did in Ng Siu
Tung [2002] 1 HKLRD 561).

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