Code no: R21

GUJARAT NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

FIRST INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, MARCH 2022

IN THE HONOURABLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT

UNDER ARTICLE 226(1) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ATLANTIS

PETRO TERA LTD.

(Appellant)
v.

O&G LTD. AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF ATLANTIS

(Respondent)

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

 WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.............................................................................................. III

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................ V

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION..................................................................................VIII

STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................. IX

ISSUES RAISED ................................................................................................................. X

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ......................................................................................... XI

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ............................................................................................... 1

I. Whether the writ petition filed by the appellant is maintainable or not? .............................. 1

(1) Where the writ petition seeks enforcement of a fundamental right............................. 1

(2) Where there is failure of principles of natural justice ................................................ 6

(3) Where the impugned orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction. ............. 7

(4) Where the vires of an Act is under challenge. ........................................................... 8

II. Whether the tax refund and an appropriate exemption will be granted to the appellant by the
central government under the central sales tax (levy on petroleum products) act, 1991? ........ 9

(1) The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation won’t prevail in this case. ........................... 9

(2) The Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel won’t prevail in this case. ............................. 14

(3) O&G Ltd. and PTL are equal parties to the agreement. ........................................... 15

(4) The tweet holds no authoritative significance. ......................................................... 17

PRAYER ............................................................................................................................ 19
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATION FULL FORM

& Ampersand
@ At the rate
§ Section
¶ Paragraph
AC Appeal Cases
Addl. Additional
AIR All India Reporter
Anr./anr. Another
A.P. Andhra Pradesh
Art. Article
Bom. Bombay
Ch. Chapter
cl. Clause
Co. Co-operated
Const. Constitution
GNLU Gujarat National Law University
Gov. Government
GST Goods and Services Tax
Guj. Gujarat
i.e. Id est
Inc./inc. Incorporated
Ltd. Limited
M.P. Madhya Pradesh
No./n. Number
Oct. October
Ors./ors. Others
Pvt. Private
QBD Queens Bench Division
Ref. Refer
Rs. Rupees

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SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
TR Tax Reports
U.P. Uttar Pradesh
v. Versus

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

BOOKS

1. 16 HALSBURY, HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 1008 (Butterworths 2000).

2. I(I) HALSBURY, HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND 151 (Butterworths 1973).

CASE LAWS

1. A.K. Roy v. UOI, AIR 1982 SC 710.

2. Afzal Ullah v. State of UP, AIR 1964 SC 264.
3. Alconbury Developments Ltd.) v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and
the Regions [2001] UKHL 23, [2003] 2 AC 295.
4. Amrit Banaspati v. State of Punjab, (1992) 2 SCC 411.
5. Attorney General for New South Wales v. Quinn, (1990) 170 CLR 1.
6. Bombay Conductors and Electricals Ltd. v. Government of India, 1986 (23) E.L.T. 87;
Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana, AIR 1285, 1980 SCR (3) 689.
7. Canada & Dominion Sugar Co. (West Indies) v. Canadian National Steamships Ltd,
(1946) 3 WLR 759 (PC).
8. Central Bank of India v. Devi Ispat Ltd (2010) 11 SCC 186.
9. Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and Ors. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly
and Ors, 1986 AIR 1571.
10. Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 1.
11. Chandigarh Admn. v. Manpreet Singh, AIR 1992 SC 435.
12. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Union of India,AIR 1987 SC 2414.
13. Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and Ors., 1991 AIR 101
14. Dhiyan Singh And Another v. Jugal Kishore, AIR 1952 SC 145. 146.
15. Divisional Forest Officer v. Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd, AIR 1981 1368.
16. Dr. Karan Singh v. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Anr, AIR 2004 SC 2480.
17. Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, AIR 1993 SC 1601.
18. GNCT of Delhi v. Naresh Kumar, 175 (2010) DLT 143.
19. Greenwood v. Martins Bank,1932 AIR 318.
20. Gyarsi Bai v. Dhansukh Lal, AIR 1965 SC 1055.

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21. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd v. M/S. Pinkcity Midway Petroleums (2003) 6 SCC
503.
22. Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. & Anr. v. Rani Construction Pvt. Ltd, (2002) (2) SCC
388.
23. In Ram Pravesh Singh and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors, (2006) (8) SCJ 721.
24. Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 515.
25. Jahangir R. Modi v. Shamji Ladha, (1855) 4 Bom, HCR.
26. Jayantilal Shodhan v. F.N. Rana, 1964 AIR 648.
27. Lakshmana v. State of M.P, (1983) SCC (3) 275.
28. Lekhraj S. Lalvani v. N.M. Shah Deputy Custodian Cum-Managing Officer, Bombay,
AIR 1966 SC 334.
29. Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd, 1986 AIR 1370.
30. Maharashtra Bd. v. Paritosh, AIR 1984 SC 1543.
31. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
32. Mayawanti v. Kaushalya Devi, (1990) SCR 2 350.
33. Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, 1978 AIR 85.
34. Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. v. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 1.
35. National Buildings Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan, (1998) 7 SCC 66.
36. Navjyoti Co-op Group Housing Society v. UOI, (1992) (4) SCC 494.Ghaziabad
Development Authority v. Delhi Auto & General Finance (P) Ltd., AIR 1994 SC 2263.
37. Navrattanmal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1704.
38. P. Anand Gajapathi Raju v. P.V.G. Raju, (2000) 4 SCC 539.
39. Paradise Printers v. Union Territory Of Chandigarh, AIR 1988 SC 354.
40. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. V. Reserve Bank of India, (1992) 2
SCC 343.
41. Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd, 1980 A.C. 827.
42. Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India, (1999) SC 484.
43. Radha Krishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar, 1977 AIR 1496.
44. Ram Barai Singh & Co. v. State of Bihar, (2014) SC 357.
45. Ram Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1966 Punj 436.
46. Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, AIR 1950 SC 163.Jasjit Singh, AIR 1962 SC 204.
47. Sharma Transport v. Government of AP, (2002) 2 SCC 188.
48. State Bank of Haryana v. Jage Ram, AIR 1980 SC 2018.
49. State of (NCT) of Delhi v. Sanjeev, (2005) 5 SCC 181.

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50. State of Gujarat v. M.P. Shah Charitable Trust, (1994) SCC (3) 552.
51. State Of Himachal Pradesh v. Ganesh Wood Products & Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 363.
52. State of Karnataka v. Ganesh, (1983) UJSC 345.
53. State of Manipur v. Moirangthem Chaoba Singh and Ors, (2006) 2 GLR 176.
54. State of U.P. v. Bridge & Roof Co, (1996) SCALE (6)168.
55. Sudhir Kumar v. Allahabad Bank, (2011) 3 SCC 486.
56. Supreme Court Employees’ Assn. v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 334.
57. The State of Bihar and Ors. v. Sachindra Narayan and Ors, (2019) SC 0100.
58. The State of Jharkhand and Ors. v. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd. and Ors. (2020) SC 0906.
59. Union of India & Ors. v. VKC Footsteps India Pvt Ltd., (2021) SC 706.
60. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. v. P.K. Choudhary and Ors, (2016) SC 0169.
61. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. v. Anand Kumar Pandey and Ors, (1994) SCC (5) 663.
62. Union of India v. Lt. Col. P.K. Choudhary, (2016) 4 SCC 236.
63. Uttar Pradesh Power Transmission Corporation Ltd. v. CG Power and Industrial
Solutions Ltd. & Anr, (2021) SC 383.
64. Vishambharnath Tiwari v. Rakesh Kumar and others, (2018) MP 5500.

STATUTES

1. The Constitution of India, 1950.

2. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Honorable Jurisdictional High Court exercises jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate the
matter under Article 226(1) (pari materia to the laws and constitution of India) of The
Constitution of Republic of Atlantis. 1 The Respondent humbly submits to this Jurisdiction of
the Honorable Court, as been invoked by the Appellant. However, the Respondent reserves the
right to challenge the same.

The instant matter does not fall under the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble High Court as Clause 7.5
of the dealership agreement between Petro Tera Ltd (PTL) and O&G Ltd is an Arbitration
Clause which states the following:

“Any dispute arising out of or in relation to this contract shall be decided by arbitration
comprising of an arbitral tribunal of three (3) members.” 2

Hence, under Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996,3 the agreement has a
valid arbitration clause and therefore the matter should be referred to arbitration.

1
INDIA CONST. art 226, cl. 1.
2
Factual Matrix ¶ 2
3
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, § 7.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. The central government in the Republic of Atlantis controls the sales tax on Petrol under
the Central Sales Tax (Levy on Petroleum products) Act, 1991. Section 11 of the said Act
states that any dispute relating to tax refunds must be adjudicated by a jurisdictional tax
authority.

2. Petro Tera Ltd. [“PTL”] (Appellant) entered into a dealership agreement with O&G Ltd.
which is a state-owned company for the sale of petrol and diesel. According to their
Agreement, the retail price will be determined by O&G Ltd. on a daily basis and the
Appellant cannot sell the goods at a higher price. Any losses or gains due to price
fluctuations will be on the account of the Appellant. Any dispute arising out of or in
relation to the contract shall be decided through the process of Arbitration.
3. Due to COVID- 19 pandemic situation the economy of Atlantis started to suffer from
inflationary forces. The retail price was at an all-time high and the masses were in a state
of discontent due to the same.
4. On 5.01.2022 the Central Government of Atlantis announced a reduction in sales tax on
petrol from Rs.25 per litre to Rs. 20 litre from 6.01.2022. On 6.01.2022 O&G Ltd. reduced
the retail price of petrol by 5 Rs. The Appellant had produced a huge quantity Petrol on
4.01.2022 and quite a considerable amount of the stock was still unsold.
5. On account of the reduction in retail price of the petrol, the Appellant had to sell the
existing stock at a loss. The Appellant discontently tweeted regarding their loss. The
Finance Minister responded to their tweet merely stating that they should not worry and
the taxes paid by them on goods held in stock will get refunded. Furthermore, he stated
that an appropriate exemption will be granted regarding the issue.
6. No appropriate exemption was issued. Aggrieved, the Appellant filed a writ petition in
the jurisdictional High Court against the Central Government and O&G Ltd. (Respondent)
contending that the Clause 1.6 of the Agreement covers risks due to change in good’s
price for reasons other than taxes. In addition to this, they contended that the Clause 1.6
of the Agreement and the prices fixed by O&G Ltd. for 6.01.2022 were arbitrary and
unreasonable in nature.
7. The Appellant filed a writ of mandamus directing the Central Government to refund the
additional tax collected with respect to the goods held in stock at 6.01.2022.

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ISSUES RAISED

I. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY THE APPELLANT IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT?

II. WHETHER THE TAX REFUND AND AN APPROPRIATE EXEMPTION WILL BE GRANTED TO

THE APPELLANT BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT UNDER THE CENTRAL SALES TAX

(LEVY ON PETROLEUM PRODUCTS) ACT, 1991?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY THE APPELLANT IS MAINTAINABLE OR

NOT?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the writ petition made by the Appellant
will not be maintainable with respect to the contents of the dealership Agreement signed by
both parties. The High Court may entertain a writ petition, notwithstanding the availability of
an alternative remedy, particularly: (I) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of a
fundamental right; (II) where there is failure of principles of natural justice or (III) where the
impugned orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or (IV) the vires of an Act is
under challenge. no infringement of the fundamental rights of the Appellant had taken place.

The prices fixed by O&G Ltd. for 06.01.022 and the terms of the Agreement were not arbitrary
or unreasonable in nature. The actions of the State were well within the scope of the contract
signed and agreed by both parties, indicating that the State wasn’t functioning on the whims of
its own.

The agreement had provided the Appellant with both an alternative remedy and an option to
make an application with the jurisdictional tax authority if in any case the tax refund had not
been issued. It can be concluded that both the remedies provided were efficacious and had been
passed by authorities having appropriate jurisdiction. In addition to this, the Appellant cannot
also assert that the principle of natural justice in relation to their contention has been outrightly
violated. Hence, the writ petition will not be maintainable.

II. WHETHER THE TAX REFUND AND AN APPROPRIATE EXEMPTION WILL BE GRANTED

TO THE APPELLANT BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT UNDER THE CENTRAL SALES

TAX (LEVY ON PETROLEUM PRODUCTS) ACT, 1991?

It is submitted that the no tax refund will be granted to the Appellant by the central government.
Further, no exemption will be issued with regards to the exemption notification made by the
Respondent. The case in hand will not attract the doctrine of legitimate expectation. This is
contended because it has been established in various Supreme Court judgments that the
Appellant suffering detriment is a required condition for invoking this particular doctrine. In

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addition to that, it is contended that the decision of the Central Government to not refund the
tax paid and not grant the exemption was taken with the objective of public interest. It is
believed that doing the same would lead to many people claiming the same. This would hamper
the economy’s position and the government’s source of revenue. Along with this, it is also
submitted that no violation of the Appellant’s Article 14 or similar fundamental rights has taken
place by the Respondents. It has been previously held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation
cannot be claimed as a right in itself, but can be used only when the denial of a legitimate
expectation leads to the violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.

Similarly, it is also contended that no violation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel has taken
place. It is necessary for the Appellant to have acted or relied upon the representation made,
which in this case, was the tweet posted on 8th January 2022. Therefore, this particular doctrine
cannot be invoked here.

The Respondent also submits that, with respect to various judicial precedents, it is believed that
the State is to be considered an equal party in a contract and thus, it shouldn’t be held
responsible for covering the other party’s losses. No distinction should be made between a
contract between 2 private parties and between a private party and the State.

In addition to this, it has also been submitted that the tweet posted by the Finance Minister on
8th January 2022 does not hold any authoritative significance.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY THE APPELLANT IS MAINTAINABLE OR

NOT?

1. It is humbly submitted before the Honourable court that the writ petition filed by the
Appellant is not maintainable with respect to the contents of the dealership agreement
signed by both the parties.

2. In Uttar Pradesh Power Transmission Corporation Ltd. v. CG Power and Industrial

Solutions Ltd. & Anr4, the Supreme Court held that the High Court may entertain a writ
petition, notwithstanding the availability of an alternative remedy, particularly: (1) where
the writ petition seeks enforcement of a fundamental right; (2) where there is failure of
principles of natural justice or (3) where the impugned orders or proceedings are wholly
without jurisdiction or (4) the vires of an Act is under challenge.

(1) Where the writ petition seeks enforcement of a fundamental right.

3. The Appellant has issued the writ of mandamus directing the Central Government to
refund the additional sales tax collected with respect to goods held in stock as 06.01.2022.
Along with this, a writ of certiorari has also been issued claiming that the Clause 1.6 of
the Agreement and the prices fixed by O&G Ltd. for 06.01.022 is arbitrary, unreasonable
and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 5The Respondent contends that
no infringement of fundamental rights has taken place in the said case.

4. In the case of Sharma Transport v. Government of AP,6 the expression “arbitrarily”

means, in an unreasonable manner; as fixed or done capriciously or at pleasure, without
adequate determining principle, not founded on the nature of things, non-rational, not
done or acting according to reason or judgement, depending on the will alone.

4
Uttar Pradesh Power Transmission Corporation Ltd. v. CG Power and Industrial Solutions Ltd. & Anr, (2021)
SC 383.
5
Factual Matrix ¶ 8.
6
Sharma Transport v. Government of AP, (2002) 2 SCC 188.

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5. The Respondent submits that the actions of the Central Government were not arbitrary
in nature. It acted within the scope of the agreement. Clause 1.6 of the Agreement says
that the retail price will be determined by the Corporation daily and the dealer cannot sell
the Corporations’ goods at a higher price. It also states that any losses or gains due to
price fluctuations will be on account of the dealers. 7

6. The said clause was a part of the Agreement which was signed by both the parties i.e.,
Petro Tera Ltd. and O&G Ltd. Thus, this indicates that the alleged act of the State was
not arbitrary in nature as the State had not acted on the whim of its own and had only
followed the terms of the signed agreement.

7. In Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. V. Reserve Bank of India,8 it was
observed: The function of the Court is to see that lawful authority is not abused but not
to appropriate to itself the task entrusted to that authority. It is well settled that a public
body invested with statutory powers must take care not to exceed or abuse its power. It
must keep within the limits of the authority committed to it. It must act in good faith and
it must act reasonably. Courts are not to interfere with economic policy which is the
function of experts.

8. With respect to the powers conferred to the central government in setting up the sales tax
rates, it can be concluded that while deciding the tax rate for goods in stock on the
6.01.2022 they were acting well within their authoritative powers. Hence courts should
not interfere with policies that come within the domain of experts.

9. Furthermore, Judicial restraint in exercise of Judicial Review was considered in the State
of (NCT) of Delhi V. Sanjeev,9 as follows:

“One can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which
administrative action is subject to Judicial interference. The first ground is [1]
illegality [2] irrationality, and [3] procedural impropriety.”

7
Factual Matrix ¶ 2.
8
Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of India, (1992) 2 SCC 343.
9
State of (NCT) of Delhi v. Sanjeev, (2005) 5 SCC 181.

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10. In the present case, the decision taken by the Respondents with respect to the tax rates
and retail price changes has a legal backing. The decision was undertaken in order to
pacify the masses, for public good hence it was rational in nature as well. Lastly, the
procedure followed was also in line with the dealership agreement. Keeping all these
points in mind, it can be concluded that the administrative action should not be subject
to judicial interference.

11. Furthermore, it needs no emphasis that complex executive decisions in economic matters
are necessarily empiric and based on experimentation. Its validity cannot be tested on
any rigid principles or the application of any straitjacket formula. The Court while
adjudging the validity of an executive decision in economic matters must grant a certain
measure of freedom or play in the joints to the executive. Not mere errors, but only
palpably arbitrary decisions alone can be interfered by the courts.

12. Similarly, in the case Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India10, it was held
that financial planning is in the domain of the Central Government, which financial
planning is made after due deliberation and consideration. In various judgments 11, it has
been held that it is unnecessary to explore the parameters of the doctrine of promissory
estoppel in the case regarding a tax law before it because it would be trespassing on the
legislative domain if it admitted the doctrine in the fiscal field.

13. With regards to this, the tax reduction and the retail price change by the Respondents
were promulgated keeping in mind public good. In addition to this, the council for the
Respondents submit that even though the Appellant may not have gained from the earlier
increase in sales tax but they benefitted from the increase in the price of petrol due to the
rise in international crude prices over the last year and a half. With respect to the Clause
1.6 of the signed Agreement, all gains would be on the account of the dealers. Therefore,
during the international price rise in crude oil, the Appellants must have gained profits
due to its high selling price. Thus, it is humbly submitted that both the aspects i.e., losses
and gains would be on account of the dealers, as mentioned in the said clause.

10
Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 1.
11
Bombay Conductors and Electricals Ltd. v. Government of India, 1986 (23) E.L.T. 87; Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v.
State of Haryana, 1980 SCR (3) 689.

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14. The Supreme Court in Mayawanti v. Kaushalya Devi12 states that in order for an
agreement or a contract to have a force of law the stipulations and terms of the contract
must be certain and the parties must have consensus ad idem. The authoritative powers
specified within agreement were agreed upon by the Respondent and the Appellant
inclusive of all stipulations. Hence, we can say that there was a consensus ad idem and
the powers vested under clause 1.6 to the respondent was not arbitrary, unreasonable or
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

15. The Appellant termed the actions of the State as ‘unreasonable’. It has been observed in
multiple cases13 that if a byelaw, rule or regulation or order operates as a restriction upon
the fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 19, in order to be valid, be “reasonable”
and in such cases, the rule, etc. becomes subject to additional ground of attack as being
imposed “or unreasonable restriction” on the fundamental right.

16. It is also important to note that in the case of Afzal Ullah v. State of UP14, it was held that
‘unreasonableness’ does not mean that any particular judge or judges think it to be
necessary or inconvenient; it means that the byelaw must not be partial and unequal in
its operations between different classes, must not be manifestly unjust nor involve such
oppressive or gratuitous interference with the right of those subject to them as could find
no justification in the minds of reasonable men.

17. The actions of the State, in the given facts of the case, cannot be considered as
‘unreasonable’ in its approach. The Clause 1.6 of the Agreement and the prices fixed by
O&G Ltd. for 06.01.022 were neither partial or unequal. It also did not gratuitously
interfere with the rights of others. Its actions were within the nature of the signed
agreement.

Also, a statutory Rule or Regulation cannot be held invalid on the ground of

unreasonableness15, as distinguished from arbitrariness 16.

12
Mayawanti v. Kaushalya Devi, (1990) SCR 2 350.
13
Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, AIR 1950 SC 163.Jasjit Singh, AIR 1962 SC 204. Sudhir Kumar v.
Allahabad Bank, (2011) 3 SCC 486.
14
Afzal Ullah v. State of UP, AIR 1964 SC 264.
15
Maharashtra Bd. v. Paritosh, AIR 1984 SC 1543.
16
Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 515.

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18. Apart from certiorari, the Appellant has issued the writ of mandamus. This writ lies to
quash a notification, order, rule, scheme or other form of subordinate legislation where it
is ultra vires17 or unconstitutional. 18 It could be due to the violation of fundamental rights
or any other limitations imposed by the Constitution.

19. However, in the case of Supreme Court Employees’ Assn. v. Union of India,19 and A.K.
Roy v. UOI,20 it was held that mandamus will not be issued to direct a subordinate
legislative authority to enact or not to enact a rule, order or notification which it is
competent to enact. The court will also not assume the role of rule-making authority or
assume the role of an appellate authority.21

20. The Respondent contends that the Appellant seeks enforcement of private rights and thus,
mandamus cannot be issued. As seen in the case State of Manipur v. Moirangthem
Chaoba Singh and Ors,22 it was held that a writ of mandamus cannot be issued for
enforcement of private rights, for, the rights of the parties, who have entered into a
contract, fall under the domain of private law irrespective of the fact whether the contract
has been entered into by two private individuals or by an individual, on the one hand, and
the State, on the other, and that when a contract agreement provides for arbitration, the
remedy of the aggrieved party lies in obtaining necessary relief by taking resort to
arbitration proceeding and not by public law remedy, such as, a writ of mandamus under
Article 226. Similarly, in Divisional Forest Officer v. Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd.23 and
State of Gujarat v. M.P. Shah Charitable Trust,24 the court observed that a writ petition
which is said to be governed by a contract or agreement between the parties is not
maintainable since it was a public law remedy, which was not available in private law
field where the matter is governed by a non-statutory contract.

17
State of Karnataka v. Ganesh, (1983) UJSC 345.
18
Lakshmana v. State of M.P, (1983) SCC (3) 275.
19
Supreme Court Employees’ Assn. v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 334.
20
A.K. Roy v. UOI, AIR 1982 SC 710.
21
Chandigarh Admn. v. Manpreet Singh, AIR 1992 SC 435.
22
State of Manipur v. Moirangthem Chaoba Singh and Ors, (2006) 2 GLR 176.
23
Divisional Forest Officer v. Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd, AIR 1981 1368.
24
State of Gujarat v. M.P. Shah Charitable Trust, (1994) SCC (3) 552.

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21. The Respondent submits that since the Appellant seeks enforcement of contractual rights
and liabilities, a High Court shouldn’t exercise its prerogative writ jurisdiction to enforce
such contractual obligations and, hence, a writ or direction, in the nature of mandamus,
would not lie to enforce private rights or contractual rights or obligations or even to avoid
such obligations or rights.

22. Contracts, which are non-statutory, and rights, which are purely contractual and governed
only by the terms of the contract, however, are not enforceable by any writ or order under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India so as to remedy the breach of contract, 'pure and
simple'. This has been observed in multiple cases like Lekhraj S. Lalvani v. N.M. Shah
Deputy Custodian Cum-Managing Officer, Bombay,25 Radha Krishna Agarwal v. State
of Bihar,26 State Bank of Haryana v. Jage Ram,27Life Insurance Corporation of India v.
Escorts Ltd.28

23. Thus, the Respondent submits that no infringement of the fundamental rights of the
Appellant had taken place. The prices fixed by O&G Ltd. for 06.01.022 and the terms of
the Agreement were not arbitrary or unreasonable in nature. The actions of the State were
well within the scope of the contract signed and agreed by both parties, indicating that
the State wasn’t functioning on the whims of its own.

(2) Where there is failure of principles of natural justice

24. The council of Respondents submits that the of principles of natural justice are upheld.
In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,29the court stated that Natural justice is the essence
of fair adjudication, deeply rooted in tradition and conscience, to be ranked as
fundamental. The purpose of following the principles of natural justice is the prevention
of miscarriage of justice. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, 30 the
court had introduced in India the concept of Natural justice which states that the
principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the Courts as
being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary

25
Lekhraj S. Lalvani v. N.M. Shah Deputy Custodian Cum-Managing Officer, Bombay, AIR 1966 SC 334.
26
Radha Krishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar, 1977 AIR 1496.
27
State Bank of Haryana v. Jage Ram, AIR 1980 SC 2018.
28
Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd, 1986 AIR 1370.
29
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
30
Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, 1978 AIR 851.

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procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority

while making an order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such
authority from doing injustice.

25. The agreement between the Appellant and the Respondent had a well-defined clause
which allowed for hearing of any dispute arising out of or in relation to this contract by
an arbitral tribunal consisting of members. Clause 1.7 explicitly had a procedure of
seeking justice if any dispute arose between the parties to the contract. 31Hence, the
councils for the Respondent submits that the Principles of Natural justice are upheld. In
addition to this, there is no violation of Article 14 of the constitution, as discussed above.

26. Furthermore, in Union of India (UOI) and Ors. v. Anand Kumar Pandey and Ors.,32 the
Court has repeatedly held that the rules of natural justice cannot be put in a strait-jacket.
Applicability of these rules depends upon the facts and circumstances relating to each
particular given situation.

27. The Appellant therefore cannot assert that the principle of natural justice in relation to
their contention has been outrightly violated.

(3) Where the impugned orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction.

28. The council submits that the learned court shouldn’t entertain the writ petition as the
alternative remedies provided by the Respondent are efficacious and has been passed by
them with proper jurisdiction, keeping in mind the principles of Natural justice.

29. In High Court of Madhya Pradesh, in the case of Vishambharnath Tiwari V. Rakesh
Kumar and others,33 the court stated that there is no dispute regarding the proposition
that availability of an alternative remedy by itself may not be a ground to refuse exercise
of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, there is a self-
imposed restrain on the Court while deciding, regarding exercise of power under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. This power should be exercised only where it could be

31
Factual Matrix ¶ 2.
32
Union of India (UOI) and Ors. v. Anand Kumar Pandey and Ors, (1994) SCC (5) 663.
33
Vishambharnath Tiwari V. Rakesh Kumar and others, (2018) MP 5500.

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shown by the petitioner that the alternative remedy is not efficacious or has been passed
by an authority without jurisdiction or passed in violation of principles of natural justice.

30. In the present case, the order impugned is challenged on the grounds the it is violative of
article 14 of the constitution. Furthermore, the Appellant has contended that the Clause
1.6 of the Agreement and the prices fixed by O&G Ltd. for 06.01.022 are arbitrary,
unreasonable and violative of principles of natural justice. As PTL ltd is a statutory
authority under Article 12 of the constitution, it had set out an alternative remedy in form
of Arbitration. In addition to this Central Government (Respondent) had provided an
option to make an application with the jurisdictional tax authority if in any case the tax
refund had not been issued. It can be concluded that both the remedies provided were
efficacious and had been passed by authorities having appropriate jurisdiction.

(4) Where the vires of an Act is under challenge.

31. In India, the concept of ultra vires was first traced in the case Jahangir R. Modi v. Shamji
Ladha.34 Ultra vires means "beyond the powers." It describes actions taken by
government bodies or corporations that exceed the scope of power given to them by laws
or corporate charters. The council submits that all the actions taken in relation to the sales
tax rates as well as the retail price was well within the authoritative power mentioned and
agreed upon by both the parties. Hence, the actions of the Respondents were not ultra
vires.

32. From the above, it is established that the actions of the Respondents do not fall under the
scope of the conditions or guidelines provided by the Supreme Court 35. A similar
judgment was given in Central Bank of India v. Devi Ispat Ltd.36 and Ram Barai Singh
& Co. v. State of Bihar37, State of U.P. v. Bridge & Roof Co.38 Here, it was held that in a
contract if there is a clause for arbitration, normally a writ court should not invoke its
jurisdiction and the existence of effective alternative remedy provided in the contract
itself is a good ground to decline to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article
226.

34
Jahangir R. Modi v. Shamji Ladha, (1855) 4 Bom, HCR.
35
supra note 4
36
Central Bank of India v. Devi Ispat Ltd (2010) 11 SCC 186.
37
Ram Barai Singh & Co. v. State of Bihar, (2014) SC 357.
38
State of U.P. v. Bridge & Roof Co, (1996) SCALE (6)168.

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33. The Respondent therefore contends that in the dealership agreement entered into between
the parties, there is a valid arbitration clause i.e., Clause 7.5 which clearly lays down that
in case of any dispute between the parties to the agreement the same shall be referred for
arbitration comprising of an arbitral tribunal of three members in accordance with the
agreement inter se between the parties. Therefore, the Council for the Respondent
submits that the writ petition is not maintainable. The same has been observed in various
judgements.39

II. WHETHER THE TAX REFUND AND AN APPROPRIATE EXEMPTION WILL BE GRANTED

TO THE APPELLANT BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT UNDER THE CENTRAL SALES

TAX (LEVY ON PETROLEUM PRODUCTS) ACT, 1991?

34. It is submitted that the no tax refund will be granted to the Appellant by the Central
Government. Further, no exemption will be issued with regards to the exemption
notification made by the Respondent. The case in hand will not attract the doctrine of
legitimate expectation. Furthermore, it will also not attract the doctrine of promissory
estoppel. This is contended because it has been established in various Supreme Court
judgments that the Appellant suffering detriment is a required condition for invoking this
particular doctrine.

It is also submitted that O&G Ltd. and PTL are equal parties to the agreement. The tweet
doesn’t hold any authoritative significance.

(1) The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation won’t prevail in this case.

35. A person may have a legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way by an
administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such

39
Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd v. M/S. Pinkcity Midway Petroleums (2003) 6 SCC 503; Konkan Railway
Corporation Ltd. & Anr. v. Rani Construction Pvt. Ltd, (2002) (2) SCC 388; P. Anand Gajapathi Raju v. P.V.G.
Raju, (2000) 4 SCC 539.

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 WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

treatment. The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by
the authority, including an implied representation, or from consistent past practice. 40

36. A similar explanation was given by the Supreme Court. In Ram Pravesh Singh and Ors.
v. State of Bihar and Ors,41 it was held that a person can be said to have a 'legitimate
expectation' of a particular treatment, if any representation or promise is made by an
authority, either expressly or impliedly, or if the regular and consistent past practice of
the authority gives room for such expectation in the normal course. It is a concept
fashioned by courts, for judicial review of administrative action. When a representation
has been made, the doctrine of legitimate expectation imposes, in essence, a duty on
public authority to act fairly by taking into consideration all relevant factors relating to
such legitimate expectation42.

37. However, it is not an independent legally enforceable right.43In GNCT of Delhi v. Naresh
Kumar,44 the Delhi High Court observed that mere reasonable or legitimate expectation
of a citizen may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right. In Punjab Communications
Ltd. v. Union of India45, the Supreme Court has observed in relation to the doctrine of
legitimate expectation:

“The doctrine of legitimate expectation in the substantive sense has been

accepted as part of our law and that the decision maker can normally be
compelled to give effect to his representation in regard to the expectation based
on previous practice or past conduct unless some overriding public interest
comes in the way Reliance must have been placed on the said representation
and the representee must have thereby suffered detriment.”
(Emphasis supplied)

38. The Respondents submits that, in the facts of the case, the Appellant did not face any
form of loss or damage with respect to the tweet posted by the Finance Ministry. The

40
I(I) HALSBURY, HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND 151 (Butterworths 1973).
41
In Ram Pravesh Singh and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors, (2006) (8) SCJ 721.
42
Navjyoti Co-op Group Housing Society v. UOI, (1992) (4) SCC 494.
43
Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Delhi Auto & General Finance (P) Ltd., AIR 1994 SC 2263.
44
GNCT of Delhi v. Naresh Kumar, 175 (2010) DLT 143.
45
Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India, (1999) SC 484.

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tweet which was posted on 8th January included that the tax will be refunded on goods
held in stock and an appropriate exemption would be granted.46

39. An alike judgement was given in the case of National Buildings Construction
Corporation v. S. Raghunathan.47Here, a three Judge bench of this Court, speaking
through Justice S. Saghir Ahmad, held that:

“The doctrine of ‘legitimate expectation’ has its genesis in the field of

administrative law. The Government and its departments, in administering the
affairs of the country, are expected to honour their statements of policy or
intention and treat the citizens with full personal consideration without any iota
of abuse of discretion. The policy statements cannot be disregarded unfairly or
applied selectively. It was in this context that the doctrine of "legitimate
expectation" was evolved which has today become a source of substantive as
well as procedural rights. But claims based on ‘legitimate expectation’ have
been held to require reliance on representations and resulting detriment to the
claimant in the same way as claims based on promissory estoppel.”
(Emphasis supplied)

40. In Union of India (UOI) and Ors. v. P.K. Choudhary and Ors.,48 the Supreme Court had
observed that a person who centers his claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation
has to satisfy that he has relied on the said representation and the rejection of that
expectation has worked to his detriment. A claim based on mere legitimate expectation
without anything more cannot ipso facto gives a right to invoke this principle.

41. The Appellant facing any form of detriment or damage is necessary for them to apply the
doctrine of legitimate expectation. However, this is not the case in the present scenario.

42. It was also held that the court would interfere only if the decision taken by the authority
was found to be arbitrary, unreasonable or in gross abuse of power or in violation of
principles of natural justice and not taken in public interest.49In Ram Pravesh Singh and

46
Factual Matrix ¶ 7.
47
National Buildings Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan, (1998) 7 SCC 66.
48
Union of India (UOI) and Ors. v. P.K. Choudhary and Ors, (2016) SC 0169.
49
Ibid

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Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors.,50 the Supreme Court observed that a legitimate
expectation, even when made out, does not always entitle the expectant to a relief. Public
interest, change in policy, conduct of the expectant or any other valid or bonafide reason
given by the decision-maker, may be sufficient to negative the 'legitimate expectation'.

43. The Respondent submits that the tax was rightly paid and no exemption will be granted
with the objective of public interest. COVID-19 virtually brought economic activity to
halt and has disturbed the chain of production, supply and distribution. There was a steep
increase in number of confirmed cases due to COVID-19 across the Globe. Many
Countries had declared lockdown and the entire activity came to stand still. The WHO
has officially declared COVID-19 Outbreak as a pandemic. Thus, if a tax exemption is
granted, it would lead to many people claiming for the same. Such a situation could put
the country’s economic position at danger and hamper the government’s source of
revenue.

44. In Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries,51 it was held that
whenever the question of legitimate expectation arises, it is to be determined not
according to the claimant's perception but in larger public interest wherein other more
important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate
expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this
manner would satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial
scrutiny.

45. It has also been held that the protection of such legitimate expectation does not require
the fulfilment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise.
In other words, where a person's legitimate expectation is not fulfilled by taking a
particular decision then decision-maker should justify the denial of such expectation by
showing some overriding public interest. If it is a question of policy, even by way of
change of old policy, the courts cannot interfere with a decision.52

46. Therefore, it is submitted that the Central Government would not refund the taxes that
were rightly paid. In addition to this, exemption will also not be granted. This is because

50
In Ram Pravesh Singh and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors, (2006) (8) SCJ 721.
51
Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, AIR 1993 SC 1601.
52
The State of Bihar and Ors. v. Sachindra Narayan and Ors, (2019) SC 0100.

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 WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

public authorities also have to take into account the interests of the general public which
the authority exists to promote.53 The basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation is in
reasonableness and fairness. However, it can also not be invoked where the decision of
the public authority is founded in a provision of law, and is in consonance with public
interest.54

47. The Respondent also contends that the Appellant’s Article 14 was not violated with
respect to the posting of the tweet. In Union of India v. Lt. Col. P.K. Choudhary,55it was
observed if denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of a right
that is guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse of power
or in violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well-
known grounds attracting Article 14 of the Constitution but a claim based on mere
legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke
these principles. Thus, the Court held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot
be claimed as a right in itself, but can be used only when the denial of a legitimate
expectation leads to the violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. This judgment was
relied upon the case Attorney General for New South Wales v. Quinn.56

48. Therefore, it is submitted that no violation of the Appellant’s Article 14 has taken place
since the tweet posted on 8th January, 2022 was neither arbitrary nor discriminatory in
nature.

49. The tweet posted by the Finance Minister on 8th January, 2022 regarding an appropriate
exemption to be granted does not hold any legal validity since the product in question
i.e., processed petroleum is not exempt. Therefore, the Appellant’s claim for a tax
exemption for the said product is not valid.

50. With the above contentions, the Counsel for the Respondents humbly submits that the
doctrine of legitimate expectation as an argument from the Appellant’s side won’t

53
Alconbury Developments Ltd.) v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, [2001]
UKHL 23, [2003] 2 AC 295.; The State of Jharkhand and Ors. v. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd. and Ors. (2020) SC
0906.
54
Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. v. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 1.
55
Union of India v. Lt. Col. P.K. Choudhary, (2016) 4 SCC 236.
56
Attorney General for New South Wales v. Quinn, (1990) 170 CLR 1.

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 WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

prevail. This is because the non-compliance was due to public interest. The said act also
did not cause or create any form of harm or damage to the Appellant. In addition to that,
it is also contended that there was no violation of the Appellant’s Article 14 with respect
to the tweet posted on 8th January, 2022. Therefore, the doctrine of legitimate expectation
won’t be applicable in the given case.

(2) The Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel won’t prevail in this case.

51. Estoppel may be defined as disability whereby a party is precluded from alleging or
proving in legal proceedings, that a fact is otherwise than it has been made to appear by
the matter giving rise to that disability.57 The Supreme Court, in the case Amrit Banaspati
v. State of Punjab58, held that the doctrine means that if the Government or other public
body or its official makes a representation or a promise and an individual acts upon such
promise and alters his position, the Government or the public body must make good the
promise and shall not be allowed to fall back upon the formal defect in the contract,
irrespective of any actual prejudice to the promise.

52. Estoppel is a complex legal notion, involving a combination of several essential

elements- statement to be acted upon, action on the faith of it, resulting in detriment to
the actor59.

In order to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the following conditions must be
fulfilled:
(i) A representation or conduct amounting to representation must have been
made;
(ii) The other party to whom representation was made must have acted upon
such representation; and
(iii) He must have acted to his detriment or suffered as a result of such
representation. 60

57
16 HALSBURY, HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 1008 (Butterworths 2000).
58
Amrit Banaspati v. State of Punjab, (1992) 2 SCC 411.
59
Canada & Dominion Sugar Co. (West Indies) v. Canadian National Steamships Ltd., (1946) 3 WLR 759 (PC).
60
Dhiyan Singh and Another v. Jugal Kishore, AIR 1952 SC 145. 146. Dr. Karan Singh v. State Of Jammu &
Kashmir & Anr, AIR 2004 SC 2480; Greenwood v. Martins Bank,1932 AIR 318.

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53. In the case of Paradise Printers v. Union Territory of Chandigarh,61 it was observed that
for invoking the doctrine, the party pleading estoppel must show that he had relied upon
the representation made to him. The alteration of position is thus indispensable and must
be proved. The entire doctrine proceeds on the premise that it is “reliance based”. A
similar judgment was observed in various cases. 62

54. In the facts of this case, there is no indication that the Appellant has acted upon the
reliance which was in the form of the tweet posted on 8 th January, 2022.

55. Similarly, in Gyarsi Bai v. Dhansukh Lal,63 it was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court
that even if the first two conditions so as to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel
are fulfilled, but the third is not, then there is no scope to invoke the doctrine of estoppel.
This is true to the given facts of the case as the Appellant had not faced any form of
damage or loss after the tweet was posted on 8th January, 2022.

56. Therefore, the counsel for the Respondents humbly submits that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel cannot be invoked in the present case. The Appellant had not acted
upon the reliance and thus, had not faced any type of damage or loss.

(3) O&G Ltd. and PTL are equal parties to the agreement.

57. It is also contended that it is not the responsibility of the Central Government to cover
the personal losses of entities like Petro Tera Ltd. This is because O&G Ltd. and Petro
Tera Ltd. had entered into the contract as two equal parties. In Ram Lal v. State of
Punjab,64 it was held that as regards to the interpretation of contract, there is no
distinction between the contracts to which one of the parties is the Government and
between the two private parties. With respect to the present facts of the case, O&G Ltd.
and the PTL are both equal parties in a dealership agreement and hence, do not possess

61
Paradise Printers v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, AIR 1988 SC 354.
62
State Of Himachal Pradesh v. Ganesh Wood Products & Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 363; Delhi Cloth and General Mills
Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 2414.
63
Gyarsi Bai v. Dhansukh Lal, AIR 1965 SC 1055.
64
Ram Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1966 Punj 436.

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unequal bargaining powers, as seen in the case of similar judgment in Photo Production
Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd.65

58. A parallel judgment was observed in the case Navrattanmal v. State of Rajasthan.66 Here,
it was said that there is hardly any distinction between a contract between private parties
and Government contract so far as enforceability and interpretation are concerned.

59. Also, in contractual obligations while institutions or organisations or authorities, who

come within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution are free to contract on the basis
of 'hire and fire' and the theory of the concept of unequal bargain and the power conferred
67
subject to constitutional limitations would not be applicable.

60. In the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and Ors. v. Brojo
Nath Ganguly and Ors. 68, it was observed that the court can strike down a contract where
a man has no choice, or rather no meaningful choice, but to give his assent to a contract
or to sign on the dotted line in a prescribed or standard form or to accept a set of rules as
part of the contract, however unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable a clause in that
contract or form or rules may be. However, in the present facts, this is not case. Petro
Tera Ltd. did not have the single option of entering into a contract with O&G Ltd. The
deal was signed and subsequently entered into on the basis of free consent by both the
parties.

61. In this aforementioned case, it was further held that this principle, however, will not apply
where the bargaining power of the contracting parties is equal or almost equal or where
both parties are businessmen and the contract is a commercial transaction. This is true
considering the given facts as the signed Agreement between both O&G Ltd. and Petro
Tera Ltd. was a commercial transaction which was entered into with the primary
objective of dealing with processed petroleum.

65
Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd, 1980 A.C. 827.
66
Navrattanmal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1704.
67
Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and Ors., 1991 AIR 101
68
Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and Ors. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and Ors, 1986 AIR 1571

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62. In addition to the decrease in the retail price by O&G Ltd. being considered arbitary in
nature, the counsel for the Respondents would like to contend that the signed Agreement
did not include any provision of prior consultation or intimation with PTL with regards
to the same. Hence, the changes in petroleum price were issued in the view of public
interest without consulting the same with PTL.

(4) The tweet holds no authoritative significance.

63. With respect to the tweet posted by the Finance Minister, the council for the Respondents
contends that the Central government’s reply to the tweet which was in response to the
tweet posted by the Appellant had no authoritative significance. According to the Central
Sales Tax (Levy on Petroleum products) Act, 1991 the refund of tax should only be
sanctioned based on the principles laid down under this act. Any refund sanctions claims
will not be accepted under any other principle except for the ones mentioned under the
said act.

64. In Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. And Ors. V. UOI and Ors.69, it was questioned whether-
The doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation help Appellant in
obtaining reliefs claimed by them and whether actions of State Government and Central
Government were liable to be set aside by applying these doctrines? It was held that-
State Government could not be held to be bound by its commitments or assurances or
representations because by enforcement of such commitments or assurances or
representations, object sought to be achieved by reservation of subject area was likely to
be defeated and thereby affecting public interest - Hence overriding public interest also
persuades in not invoking doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation.

65. The doctrine of promissory estoppel as contended by the appellant in order to receive the
Tax refund will not be upheld. The basis of the denial of the same is that tweet made by
the finance minister went up and above of the principles laid under the Central Sales Tax
(Levy on Petroleum products) Act, 1991. The contention made by the appellant in order
to receive the tax refund would not be upheld with respect to the ratio decidendi given in
the aforementioned case.

69
Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. v. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 1.

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66. In the case of Jayantilal Shodhan v. F.N. Rana70, the Supreme Court there said that
notifications promulgated by the State are of two kinds. All such notifications did not
have the force of law. Only those have the force of law as were a species of subordinate
legislation passed by a body having the authority to promulgate them and which laid
down rules of conduct for persons in the community to obey. But there might be
notifications which laid down no rule of conduct. It was clear that in order that a
notification or order might have the force of law it had to contain a rule or body or rules
regulating the conduct of a person or persons living in the community; it had to be passed
by a body which had the necessary authority for the purpose and it was then that it would
be enforceable by courts or other authorities and would have the force of law.

67. In order that a notification or order might recognize it if necessity arose; it was further
necessary that the same should lay down a rule or course of conduct which a person or
persons living in the community was obliged to follow and which, therefore, became
enforceable by the Courts or other authorities and acquired the force of law. In the present
case, the tweet posted by the Finance Minister did not specify or contain any such
regulating rules with respect to the said issue.

68. The tweet only vaguely mentioned that the tax would be refunded on goods held in stock
and an appropriate exemption would be granted for the same. It did not include any
specifications regarding the Appellant’s grievances. Therefore, the contentions of the
Appellant regarding the tax refund is nullified on the grounds of the tweet being not
specific in nature.

69. In conclusion, the counsel for the Respondents submits that the tax was rightly paid and
no such refund for the additional sales tax will be issued. This is also in line with the
recent judgement of the Supreme Court .In Union of India & Ors. v. VKC Footsteps India
71
Pvt Ltd, it was held that refund is a matter of a statutory prescription and cannot be
claimed as a constitutional right.

70
Jayantilal Shodhan v. F.N. Rana, AIR 1964 SC 648.
71
Union of India & Ors. v. VKC Footsteps India Pvt Ltd, (2021) SC 706.

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PRAYER

Wherefore, in the light of the facts stated, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
most humbly prayed and implored before the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court, that it
may be graciously pleased to adjudge and declare that:
1. The writ petition is not maintainable.
2. No tax refund is to be granted to the Petro Tera Ltd. (Appellant) by the central
government under the central sales tax (levy on petroleum products) act, 1991.
3. No appropriate exemption is to be issued on the basis of the exemption notification.

Also, pass any other order that it may deem fit in the favor of the Respondent to meet
the ends of equity, justice, and good conscience.

For which the respondents shall most humbly pray to this Honourable Court.

Place: s/d

Dated Counsel on behalf of the Respondent.

19